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In late December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. In the context of the Cold War, this move initially caused a considerable surprise and excitement in the West, as it was seen as an indirect threat for the situation in the Persian Gulf, especially after the US lost their most important ally in the area, the Shah of Iran, which was overthrown in February of the same year. Immediately afterward, however, except for diplomatic protests, no direct actions were undertaken by Western powers against the Soviet Union, and it was on the Afghan people to organize a resistance against the aggressor. Initially, Pakistani military was very concerned about the Soviet move, but subsequent analysis of the deployments of the Soviet forces showed, that there was no imminent threat to Pakistan. Instead, for the first years of the war in Afghanistan, Soviets were predominantly engaged in establishing bases and keeping urban areas under control. A total of four units of the VVS (Voenoe Vazdushny Sily - Air Force), one each equipped with MiG-21s and Mi-24s, as well as two with Mi-8s, were put under direct command of the 40th Soviet Army (HQ at Termez, in Turkmenistan Soviet Republic).
Operating under such conditions was both frustrating and problematic for Pakistani pilots and officers, especially as the number of Soviet and Afghani incursions into the Pakistani airspace increased, while there was a considerable public pressure to do something against this. Finally, the situation deteriorated to the point, where the PAF was compelled to deploy Mirages to Kamra, and F-16s to Samungli and Peshawar, in February 1986, and to adapt its RoEs in so far, that they now permitted more freedom of operation for both the tactical operators at local GCI-stations, as well as for pilots. Soon, numerous serious incidents were to follow. Before either Mirages or F-16s could arrive, however, the F-6s continued to carry the brunt of CAPs, and on 11 February 1986, they had their first serious engagement. Two F-6s, flown by Flt.Lt. Anwar Hussain and Flg.Off. Amjad Bashir were on a CAP, when the GCI advised them of two contacts NE of Parachinar. Hussain and Bashir were vectored in the area, and they soon detected four MiG-23s. Closing at a speed of Mach 1, two F-6s were swiftly positioned right behind Soviet aircraft which turned around and re-entered the Afghani airspace. The GCI advised Hussain and Bashir to turn around as well, but the leader of the formation ignored the order to continue the pursuit until a moment when four additional MiG-23s appeared. Both F-6s immediately turned around, and returned to their base at high speed and low level. This short engagement certainly hasnt had any effects on the Soviets, then on 19 March 1986, several waves of Afghan Su-22s, escorted by MiG-23MLDs of the 120. IAP bombed Pakistani border posts. These attacks were a prelude for the next offensive of Soviet and troops of the Afghan Army, initiated on 2 April, the target of which were rebel supply bases around Tani and Zhawar. By the 10 April 1986, Soviets and Afghanis reached Tani, and subsequently Su-24s and Su25s flew a series of strikes using laser-guided bombs. Mujaheddin were forced to organize a frontal defence and fight under circumstances for which they lacked the training and firepower. Regardless of these developments, the PAF was still held back, and the next serious engagement followed only on 12 April 1986, when three F-6s, flown by Gr.Capt. Shahid Kamal, Sqn.Ldr. Rahat Mujeeb and Sqn.Ldr. Khalid Chaudry were vectored to intercept two contacts in the Parachinar area. Gr.Capt. Kamal successfully closed into the range of his AIM-9P missiles and fired one Sidewinder, but no hit was observed. Meanwhile, both the targets and the whole Pakistani formation turned around towards west, and the GCI advised the pilots, that the enemy still hasnt noticed them. Thus, Kamal closed again and fired another Sidewinder, which missed again.
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Shaheens on the Prowl At 06:06AM of 12 September 1988, two F-16As of the 14th Squadron, flown by Sqn.Ldr. Khalid Mahmood (on F-16A 85-728) and Sqn.Ldr. Anwar Hussain took off from Kamra AB in order to set up a CAP over the Nawagai area. Around 06:40AM, they were vectored by the GCI to intercept two contacts which were closing the Pakistani border at high level in eastern direction. Both F-16s were soon in proper position, but the contacts then turned to the north flying parallel to the border. In fact, there were not only two, but a total of 12 MiG-23MLDs of the 120. IAP in the air that morning, eight of which were loaded with bombs and have got the order to attack certain targets in the Kunar Valley, while four - split in two pairs (Lt.Col. Sergey Bulin with Maj. N. Golisienko, and Maj. S. Petkov with 1st Lt. V. Danchenkov) - acted as escorts. Detecting four additional contacts, the GCI swiftly turned the F-16s towards the new threat, and Sqn.Ldr. Mahmood acquired a total of six contacts, of which four in the forward formation were trailed by additional two coming from behind. The only problem for Pakistanis now was, that the F-16s were still at the level of 3.500 meters, while their targets flew at more than 10.000 meters, and the rear pair of the targets was flying much faster than the first four aircraft. Indeed, the Soviet GCI detected Pakistani F-16s, and advised Petkov and Danchenkov to block them, while the rest of the formation was to turn back towards West. But, the Pakistanis were faster: closing to a distance of 12km, Mahmood achieved a radar lock-on, but his Sidewinders failed to track the target, as the Soviet pilots engaged their IR counter measures. Mahmood started no less but three attempts to acquire, but failed to do so and, after closing to a distance of less than three kilometers, tried for a fourth time. Finally, he was successful, and fired one AIM-9L from a low-to-high/left-to-right conversion attack and 135 aspect angle. His target was MiG-23MLD Bort 55, flown by Capt. Sergey Privalov, which engaged his IRCM. The Sidewinder closed, however, and exploded over his aircraft, sending dozens of hot splinters into the wings and the fuselage. The whole Soviet section executed a turn to the West now, with Privalov in tow and Petkov and Danchenkov joining the formation without - as it seems - trying to engage F-16s with their R-24s, while Bulin and Golisienko closed from the north and certainly tried to acquire a lock on.
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Final Engagements The wish of the Soviets to catch at least one of Pakistani F-16s was perhaps influenced by several Iraqi claims, that their MiG-23MLs have shot down Iranian Phantoms, Tomcats and Tigers. The Soviets certainly wanted to show their capabilities and were eager to engage. A good illustration of this was the case when on 26 September 1988, Maj. Vladimir Astahov and Capt. Boris Gavrilov intercepted two Iranian AH-1Js some 75 kilometers south-east of Shindand, and shot both down, supposedly using R-24 missiles. However, this was also to be the last engagement of Soviet interceptors during the War in Afghanistan. By this time, the Soviets troops were already pulled back from most of Afghanistan, and the DRAAF was now alone to fight against Mujaheddin, which took one city after the other. Under such circumstances, the government in Kabul was rather careful not to provoke the Pakistanis even more. Nonetheless, on 3 November 1988, two F-16s of the 14 Squadron, flown by Sqn.Ldr. Ehtsham Zakaria and Sqn.Ldr. Khalid Mahmood (on F-16A 85-717), were on a CAP over the Kohat area, the GCI informed them of six contacts closing towards the border, three of which subsequently entered the Pakistani airspace, while three - probably escorting MiG21s - remained over Afghanistan. Both F-16s were swift to engage, closing upon the enemy, when their contacts suddenly executed a 180 turn and flew back towards Afghanistan, apparently after being warned by their GCI. Closing to a range of eleven kilometers, Zakaria acquired the target visually and recognized it as a Su-22, flying at a level of almost 6.000 meters. While both F-16s were still in a climb, the Sukhois were already underway to the west, but then, one of Afghanis turned back into the threat at the same time when Zakaria experienced some difficulties with his Sidewinders. The Su-22 corrected his route towards the leading F-16, but Mahmood was quick in countering this move and firing one AIM-9L from a range of approximately five kilometers in a head-on-pass. The missile impacted, blowing several pieces off the Sukhoi, but the aircraft continued to fly. While Zakaria maneuvered for a gun-attack, Mahmood fired another Sidewinder, this time from a 150 - 160 aspect angle. The second hit broke the Su22 in two and the wreck fell some 18 kilometers inside Pakistan. The pilot. Capt. Abdul Hashim, ejected and was captured by Pakistani Army. DRAAF Su22M-4K seen on landing at Baghram AB sometimes in 1986. The Type proved popular with Afghani pilots because of its good payload and range, and became also the main fighterbomber of the DRAAF. Nevertheless, it was not nimble enough for battling the highly mobile Mujahedding down between the mountain ranges. (Avijatsija & Vremja)
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After the Soviet pull-out, in 1989, the official Afghan Army retreated into the larger cities, fortifying them in the process. All the Army was doing for the next several months was to fire SS-1B Scuds at different concentrations of Mujaheddins (over 1.000 Scuds were fired), and attacking them with air power. Otherwise, the DRAAF was busy supplying all the cutout garrisons. In February 1990, during the fighting in the Abbassak Pass, and in March 1990, during the fighting north of Kabul, the Mujaheddins cut the last land connection between Kabul and the Soviet Union. By late 1991, the official Afghan Army was actually non-existing, as the units either disintegrated due to desertions, or the local commanders disobeyed the orders from Kabul and took over the control. Only most of the DRAAF as well as the special units and the Inner Ministry troops remained loyal to Najibullah's regime. Nevertheless, even the DRAAF was not completely loyal: already in December 1989 two pilots flew their Mi-34Vs to Panjshir Valley, and deserted to Masood. These two helicopters remained operational for the next ten years. Najibullah was now negotiating with different political parties and warlords, and an agreement was reached for the creation of an interim government. However, the Mujaheddin also started to fight each other, so soon what little was left of any official structures fell apart as well: this was the moment when the USA have lost the patience and interest, and have pulled out as well, stopping any kind of deliveries to the Pakistanis and in turn leaving them without any help and financial support for the Mujaheddins. In October 1991, some Pakistani-supported Mujaheddin fractions attacked Gardez with tanks and artillery they received from Saudi Arabia (most of this material was captured from the Iraqis, in February 1991). During the fighting, however, the rivalry between different Mujaheddin groups escalated, and the battle ended with them fighting each other. Under these circumstances, the local landlord, Gen. Rasheed Dostam, established himself as the man in power: he organized his own militia, which took away the equipment of two full army divisions and a good part of the DRAAF. Dostam was soon powerful enough to reach Kabul as well, where he then turned the coat and put himself on the side of the government. But, please note: although he operated a militia consisting of former Army troops and equipped with former Army weaponry, he was not the part of the Army. How many aircraft and helicopters he controlled in late 1991 is unknown, but it is known that in December of that year the DRAAF was left only with Su-22M-3Ks and Su-22M-4Ks of the 321. IBAP at Baghram, the 322. IAP with perhaps 65 MiG-21s also at Baghram, the 377. OBVP at Kabul International, and the 332. OBVP stationed at Jurum. In October 1991, the USSR planned to deliver 15 Su24MKs to the DRAAF, but this was cancelled because of the situation of the service. The 375. OBVP at Mazar-e Sharif was obviously one of the units which were integrated into Dostam's militia.
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At the time shortly after its "official" creation, the IEAAF 1998 was a pretty powerful asset for its circumstances. It had over 30 intact MiG-21s alone. Yet, with the loss of the air base at Baghram, almost 70% of its assets were lost as well. During the retreat from Baghram, Taliban disabled or destroyed all aircraft they could not take with them (so many were inoperational at the time), and that's the reason for plenty of pictures taken at that airfield during the last two years, showing scores or broken and derelict planes lying around. The IEAAF reached the peak of its effectiveness in the year 2000, during the Taliban offensive against Taloqan, when it flew no less but 160 combat missions within two weeks. However, for the reasons which will be explained further below, it suffered a loss of at least eight MiG-21s and Su-22s, all shot down by SA-14 MANPADs. Not a single of the downed pilots was recovered (although, some ejected safely and were captured), which caused a significant problem for the IRAAF that became apparent already by the autumn 2000, when the for when the force was hardly active at all due to the lack of pilots and ammunition (this was one of the factors for the Taliban offensive being stopped in Badakhshan, in September 2000). Especially the loss of General Allahdad, Commander of the Mazar-e-Sharif AB and one of IEAAF most distinguished pilots - whose MiG-21 was shot down on 6 August 2000, by an SA-14 over Taloqan - proved to be a heavy blow for the IEAAF. Nevertheless, the military successes of the Pakistani special forces supported by the IEAAF and the al-Qaida in NW Afghanistan enabled the opening of another supply route - via Turkmenistan, foremost important for fuel imports. This route remained intact until the early days of November 2001, despite immense interdiction efforts of the USN fighters since 8 October 2001. Namely, Turkmenistan declared itself "neutral" in the US-lead Anti-Terror War even after the local government agreed to accept US forces on its soil. By the early 1999, the Taliban military became completely dependent of the standing force of the al-Quaida's militant structures, as well as the PA and PAF. Even more so, the financial support from al-Qaida helped the Taliban also attract and keep foreign volunteers in Afghanistan. To make it clear: right since 1994, when the Taliban "appeared", the Pakistanis have contributed the greatest proportion of the Taliban. By 2001, between 5.000 and 7.000 Pakistani volunteers were members of the Taliban, or, better said, the al-Qaida network in Afghanistan, which at the time was said to have had between 8.000 and 12.000 combatants inside the country. The situation of the Pakistanis in Afghanistan was, however, not that simple: their contingent was divided into three overlapping categories. The hard-core of the majority were young students from Pakistani madrassahs (religious seminaries) of the Deobandi School (which produced most Taliban), mobilized and moved into Afghanistan often without any kind of even rudimentary military training.
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This force would certainly never be able to deliver such defeats to Masood, Dostam, and Hekmatyar as it did between 1994 and 1998: indeed, all the Taliban advances in that time caused massive losses to this force, to such degree, that by 2001 they actually ceased to be of any importance. Then there was the next "class" of the Pakistanis, foremost those sent to Afghanistan by different religious organizations, like Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (formerly Haraka-ul-Ansar), the anti-Shi'ia Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), and the smaller Lashkar-eJhangvi. These were mainly Pakistani militants, to large degree also former members of the Pakistani military, with good previous training and additional knowledge of ground operations. The third "class" were PA, ISI, and PAF regulars. At earlier times, 1994 through 1998, these were mainly professional officers: they were tasked with planning and logistic roles. Some were retired officers, non-commissioned officers, and technicians of the PA and the PAF: they were mainly tasked to lead the less experienced troops of the first two "classes". By August and September 2000, however, also the first regular PA units - initially the special forces - were deployed, and they became influential in the capture of Taloqan. By the summer of 2001, the PA should have had elements of three regular commando battalions (the locals called them everything possible: between "regiment" and "division") operating in Afghanistan - of course under the guise of "Taliban". In January 2001 the process of the mobilization of such assets was maximized, with intensive support from Pakistan now reaching levels through deployment of other regular PA units. On 10 January 2001, for example, a meeting was held in Akora Khattak, in Pakistan, between the leaders of Pakistan-based extremist groups, top-ranking officers of the Pakistani ISI (such as Gen. (Ret.) Hamid Gul, former Chief of the military intelligence services) and Gen. Aslam Beg of the PA, which advocated maximized military support of Pakistan to the Taliban/al-Qaida coalition, and defying the UN sanctions against the Taliban. Interestingly, the meeting, at which representants of as many as 30 militant and military groups attended (all protected by hundreds of heavily armed guards of their own), was held in a broad daylight despite the martial law by the military Government of Pakistan; obviously, the whole affair was orchestrated by the Pakistani Government. One of the consequences of this meeting was an intensification of Pakistani support and deployment of new PA units into the northern Afghanistan. In a sweeping move, preceding the deadline of the imposition of new UN sanctions against the Taliban and foreign "volunteers" (actually mercenaries) in Afghanistan, from 12 January onward, a number of new commando and artillery units of the Pakistani Army, partially manned by Pakistani volunteers (not regular PA personnel), in total some 1.500 Pakistani nationals, was deployed in northern Afghanistan in preparation for foreseeable attacks on the government forces.
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According to contemporary reports, PA General Qamar-u-Zaman was assigned as the new officer in charge of military operations in Afghanistan, replacing PA General of the Army Saeed Zafar, who functioned in the same capacity in Afghanistan over the past year. Furthermore, additional new commanders arrived, including the PA General Tariq Bashir, formerly commander of the 9th Division of the PA; Brig. Momin and Col. Sanaullah from PA's Kohat Division. Col. Hamza of the Pakistan's ISI (military intelligence service); whole "998 Brigade" was replaced by the 996 Brigade (CO Brig. Amjad of Sayawali; the unit was a part of what was called "Charat Commando Division" by the Afghanis), and being placed in reserve; the 117 Brigade was replaced by the 994 Brigade (CO Brig. Faizan Khan of Laki Maroot, Pakistan); and the 625 Artillery Battalion (CO ? Rafique, active PA officer). In addition, PA Brig. Amjad was assigned the CO of Pakistani forces in the Takhar Province, where during the summer PA units, and units of Pakistani volunteers were equipped with additional equipment to establish capability to cross the Kokcha River. These reinforcements, however, have not managed to build up a strength needed for the expected "final offensive" against NC/UF forces in NE Pakistan, as during the relatively mild winter 2000/2001, the MC/UF forces under command of Ahmadshah Masood have not only managed to stop several fierce attacks by Pakistani/Taliban/al-Qaida forces, but also to spoil their preparations by engaging Taliban forces on several places, and forcing the Pakistanis to react, practically placing them at a defensive, instead of enabling them to act, and start their own offensive. The fighting was focused on two areas: starting an offensive in the western Afghanistan, the NC captured several cities and villages in the strategic Yakolan District, in late December 2000 and early January 2001. On 3rd January, Taliban counterattacked around Konduz (150km north of Kabul), trying to push NC forces away from the city and cut their main supply route into Tajikistan. Additional Taliban - actually Pakistani units - supported by air strikes and artillery - were then rushed from Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, towards Bamiyan, at best helping to stabilize the front. It is highly likely, that some of the Arab "Jihadis" (of which there were between 2.000 and 4.000 with the al-Qaida/Taliban) - foremost the Egyptians - and some of almost 2.000 Chechens have had some sort of experience with the aircraft, and have helped the IEAAF as well. Now, by 2001, the IEAAF had 21 MiG-21s (of which 8 operational and 13 nonoperational and mostly used for spare parts); 17 Su-20/22 airframes (8 operational and 9 non-operational and mostly used for spare parts, plus one example - the "white 82" exhibited at the entrance to Kabul International)); and five L-39 airframes (of which two intact but not operational and three in derelict condition).
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Despite severe destruction and losses, the Afghan GCI system remained roughly intact and was capable of guiding and supporting fast jet fighters in the area of Mazar-e-Sharif, Taloqan, and Kabul. Taliban pilots were known to be heavily reliant on the GCI from the monitoring of their communications, but in 1999 and 2000 this changed: suddenly, the pilots appeared which need not as much GCI-support. Some of these pilots had very good situational awareness, and their attacks were exceptionally precise. In some cases it was noticed, that some targets were hit by such pilots first, followed by the less experienced ones, which would try to hit the same place, marked by the smoke and dust from the earlier attacks. The IRAAF in 2001 The year 2001, the so-called "Taliban Air Force" - actually the air force of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan = IRAAF - started with eight operational Su-22s, eight MiG-21s, two intact and two inoperational L-39s and a total of 11 Mi-8 helicopters. Some reports said that there are also Mi-17s, but no traces of these could be found. By the time, there were still around 700 people working in the IRAAF, which operated from airfields at Kabul (very seldom: the field is foremost used for civilian and transport flights), Jalalabad, Shindand and Khandahar, although there should also be at least three or four additional - lets call them so - "dispersal" sites as well. United Front/Northern Alliance/Northern Coalition Somewhat more was known about the forces of what was then called the "United Front" (formerly so-called "Northern Coalition" aka "Northern Alliance"). The leader of the UF was still Ahmad Shah Masood (sometimes spelled also as "Ahmadshah"), with the HQ is at Khwaja Bahauddin, near the border with Tajikistan. The core of the UF (which had somewhere between 12.000 and 15.000 fighters) consisted of the Uzbek militia under Abdul Rashid Dostam (now active again in northern Afghanistan); Hazara Force (Shiia under Karim Khalili and Mohaqeq active in Bamian and Yakaolang Provinces); Pushtunis under Haji Abdul Qadir (Kunar and Nangrahar Provinces), and there are two other small fractions, close to Masood, under Ismail Khan (Ghor and Herat Provinces) and Atta Mohammad (in Darrah-e-Suf valley).
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