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ACADEMIA DE STUDII ECONOMICE Facultatea de Economie

REZUMATUL TEZEI DE DOCTORAT


Subsidiaritatea i proporionalitatea, principii fundamentale n guvernana comunitar. Mecanismele i eficiena economic a proceselor decizionale n Uniunea European

Conductor tiinific: Prof. univ. dr. DINU MARIN

Doctorand: Constantin Chiriac

BUCURETI 2010

Cuprins Introducere 1. Sistemul de guvernan Multi-Level 1.1 Specificitatea guvernrii Uniunii Europene 1.2 Definirea conceptului de guvernan 1.3 Caracteristicile reformei guvernanei 1.4 Modelul de guvernan Multi-Level - abordri conceptuale 1.5 Tipologia sistemului de guvernan Multi-Level 1.6 Interdependena europenizare - guvernana Multi-Level 1.7 Emergena modelului guvernanei Multi-Level n Romnia 1.7.1 Guvernana Multi-Level n noile state membre UE 1.7.2 Guvernana Multi-Level n Romnia 1.8 Metoda Deschis de Coordonare o nou arhitectur a guvernanei comunitare ? 2. Subsidiaritatea i Proporionalitatea principii specifice guvernanei comunitare 2.1 Definirea conceptelor de subsidiaritate i proporionalitate 2.1.2 Analiza pozitiv a subsidiaritii 2.2 Testul de subsidiaritate 2.3 Modelarea deciziilor de alocare a responsabilitii aplicrii politicilor publice 2.4 Analiza economic constituional a testului de subsidiaritate 2.5 Principiul Proporionalitii criteriu de evaluare a raportului dintre puterile UE i Statele Membre 3. Procesul de decizie la nivelul Uniunii Europene 3.1 Considerente generale privind sistemul decizional al UE 3.2 Instituiile cu rol decizional ale Uniunii Europene 3.2.1 Parlamentul European 3.2.2 Consiliul UE 3.2.3 Comisia European 3.3 Procedurile legislative comunitare 3.3.1 Procedura Codeciziei 3.3.2 Procedura Avizului Conform 3.3.3 Procedura Cooperrii 3.3.4. Procedura de Consultare

3.4 Modificri ale sistemului decizional introduse de Tratatul de la Lisabona 3.5 Procesul de negociere n UE i puterea votului 3.6 Majoritatea calificat - regula decizional principal n CM 3.7 Influena distribuiei voturilor asupra alocrilor bugetare n UE 3.8 Impactul modificrilor demografice asupra procesului decizional din Consiliul UE 4. Relaii interinstituionale i procesul decizional n UE 4.1 Principalele categorii de mecanisme decizionale 4.2 Modelele decizionale ale Procedurilor Consultrii i Codeciziei 4.3 Analiza interinstituional a puterii CM n procesul decizional 4.4 Predictibilitatea rezultatelor pe scala politicilor publice n Procedurile Codeciziei i Consultrii 5. Msurarea distribuiei puterii ntre membrii UE 5.1 Aspecte teoretice privind msurarea votului 5.2 Analiza comparativ a indicilor puterii votului a Tratatelor de la Nisa i Lisabona 5.3 Influena viitoarelor extinderi ale UE asupra puterii de vot a statelor membre 5.3.1 Calcularea indicatorilor sistemelor de vot 5.3.2 Analiza scenariilor de extindere 6. Formarea i Logica Majoritilor 6.1 Logica formrii majoritilor 6.2 Teoria formrii majoritilor i modele utilizate 6.2.1 Indicii puterii coaliiilor cu majoritate calificat 6.2.2 Studiu de caz. Eficiena economic a procesului de luare a deciziilor. Calculul indicatorilor de distribuie a puterii pentru Parlamentul Romniei 1996-2008 6.2.3 Coaliii Conectate. Indicii puterii pentru o coaliie conectat 6.3 Formarea majoritilor n Consiliul UE 6.3.1 Studiu de caz. Formarea i logica majoritilor n Parlamentul Romniei. Calculul indicatorilor de formare a majoritilor 6.4 Modelul Hosli-Kaniovski al formrii coaliiilor 6.5 Formarea majoritilor n Consiliul UE n funcie de poziia statelor membre pe scala politicilor publice

6.6 Studiu de caz. Calculul indicilor puterii coaliiilor din consiliile judeene din Romnia 7. Soluii alternative pentru schemele bazate pe reprezentarea cetenilor i pentru sistemele de vot ale PE i CM 7.1 Compromisul Jagellonian 7.1.1 Critica Tratatelor Nisa i Lisabona 7.1.2 Rdcina ptrat soluia decizional optim pentru CM? 7.2 Studiu de caz. Aplicarea regulii decizionale a rdcinii ptrate n CM. Efectul de aproximare prin rotunjire i Compromisul Jagiellonian. Cazul Romniei 7.3 Model alternativ de alocare a mandatelor Fix+Pro n Parlamentul European 7.4 Consecine ale modelelor de reprezentare n Uniunea European 8. Formarea majoritilor n consiliile judeene din Romnia 8.1 Considerente privind formarea majoritilor 8.2 Estimarea relaiei dintre numrul de votani i numrul mandatelor obinute de fiecare partid n consiliile judeene 8.3 Estimarea relaiei dintre numrul de mandate i numrul de comisii de specialitate ctigate 8.4 Estimarea probabilitii unui partid de a forma o majoritate 8.5 Semnificaia rezultatelor obinute 9. Concluzii i contribuii personale Lista Tabelelor i Graficelor Bibliografie

Cuvinte cheie: Uniunea Europeana, guvernana Multi-Level, subsidiaritate, proporionalitate, proces decizional, eficien economic, distribuia puterii, logica i formarea majoritilor Sinteza prilor principale ale tezei de doctorat Exist o varietate de teorii privind clasificarea Uniunii Europene ca o entitate politic sau statal chiar dac nu exist un consens destul de larg privind faptul c aceasta nu poate fi considerat stat, neexistnd nici o prevedere n acest sens n tratatele ncheiate i nici o constituie. De-a lungul ultimilor decenii, UE a fost preocupat de guvernana intern. Au fost fcute mai multe ncercri de a stabili un echilibru al puterilor n cadrul UE i de fiecare dat s-a adus un plus de responsabilitate i eficien n procesele decizionale comunitare, prin Tratatul de la Maastricht 1992, Amsterdam 1997, Nisa 2000, Lisabona 2007. A existat o ndelungat dezbatere referitor la alternativele privind guvernana Uniunii Europene: federalism versus interguvernamentalism. Federalismul implic integrarea printr-o divizare a suveranitii ntre o autoritate central comunitar i statele naionale membre, reprezentnd n esen o mprire a autoritii ntre o autoritate federal central i statele membre, termenul de comparaie mai adecvat pentru UE nu ar fi nici SUA i nici Germania ci federalismul elveian. Interguvernamentalismul presupune c deciziile importante ale UE sunt de competena statelor naionale. Acesta implic roluri mai puin importante pentru Parlamentul European i roluri mai importante pentru Consiliul European i Consiliul Uniunii Europene. O mare parte din opoziia fa de o organizare federal a Uniunii Europene se bazeaz pe confundarea federalismului cu organizarea federal a SUA. Sistemul de guvernare european a nsemnat deznaionalizarea statului, destatalizarea politicii i internaionalizarea regimurilor politice. Guvernana, ca i sistem, a cunoscut n mod continuu modificri datorit evoluiei proceselor de globalizare. Datorit schimbrilor permanente impuse de procesul de globalizare, statele naionale pentru a se adapta, s-au vzut puse n situaia transferrii unor elemente din suveranitatea lor la nivele transnaionale. Guvernana UE s-a dovedit destul de flexibil cu limitrile impuse de prevederile tratatelor ncheiate. Anumite competene au fost transferate de la nivelul naional ctre nivelul comunitar, prin reviziile tratatelor impuse de consideraii de eficien n timp ce altele au rmas neschimbate. Mrirea numrului de competene comunitare poate fi privit ca o extindere a orizontului, la nivel de guvernan supranaional, n dauna guvernrii
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naionale. Integrarea European a modificat radical sistemul i natura guvernanei n Europa. Termenul de guvernan Multi-Level este folosit pentru a descrie un nou pattern privind sistemul de decizie comunitar i a fost un rspuns la teoriile integrrii europene, n special cele interguvernamentaliste, cu abordare centrat pe stat, care au subestimat rolul unor actori i au supraevaluat rolul altora. Conceptul modific ntr-o mare msur concepia proceselor de guvernare aa cum exist, fie la nivel local sau la cel internaional, accentund cadrul interdependent existent ntre diveri actori. Uniunea European poate fi descris drept un model de guvernan Multi-Level, n care procesele decizionale sunt distribuite la nivel supranaional, naional ct i la nivel subnaional implicnd nu numai actori guvernamentali ci i actori privai. Conceptul de guvernan Multi-Level caracterizeaz dinamica relaiei dintre actorii situai la diferite niveluri teritoriale: public, privat sau non-guvernamental, fiind folosit att analitic ct i normativ pentru a nelege sensul metodologiei de a lua decizii pentru susinerea diverselor parteneriate publice sau private. Prin prezenta cercetare mi-am propus realizarea unei analize complexe a guvernanei comunitare prin prisma modelului Multi-Level i a celor dou principii fundamentale subsidiaritatea i proporionalitatea, a proceselor decizionale care au loc la nivel comunitar, a modificrilor sistemului decizional european ca urmare a tratatelor adoptate i impactul acestora asupra distribuiei i raporturilor de putere n relaiile interinstituionale prin confruntarea diverselor opinii i conturarea unei viziuni de ansamblu. Structura lucrrii. Scopul i sarcinile cercetrii au determinat structura tezei, care cuprinde: introducerea, opt capitole care redau coninutul de baz al cercetrii, concluzii, anexele i bibliografia. n primul capitol al lucrrii intitulat Sistemul de guvernan MultiLevel am explicat de ce Uniunea European poate fi considerat un model de guvernan Multi-Level, procesele decizionale fiind distribuite la nivel supranaional prin Comisia European i Parlamentul European, naional prin guvernele centrale ale statelor membre, ct i la nivel subnaional (regional i local) implicnd instituii guvernamentale i ageni privai. Guvernana european aduce o estompare a granielor statelor naionale componente provocnd o deznaionalizare a spaiului public procesul putnd fi conceptualizat n doi pai. Primul ar fi c guvernana european are un efect direct asupra structurii politice a statelor naionale, dnd posibilitatea actorilor naionali de a putea aciona scurtcircuitnd
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nivelul naional. Acest efect ar putea avea consecine importante odat cu dezintegrarea structurilor naionale i dezvoltarea structurilor transnaionale. n final se apar noi diferenieri sociale i politice care vor produce modificri de substan n structurile i sistemele de interese de la nivel intermediar. Totui schimbrile n sistemele politice nu sunt suficiente pentru o integrare reuit a statelor naionale. Al doilea pas al dinamicii guvernanei va urma doar n momentul n care aplicarea principiului subsidiaritii va transcede graniele teritoriale. Organizarea statal este meninut nu doar de structura politic intern ci i de identitile culturale i sentimentele naionale. De aceea trebuie inut cont, n procesul de integrare european de structura naional i odat cu progresul ctre o guvernan european de diferenele din noua structur comunitar fa de sistemele naionale individuale i de modul cum de administrare a procesului de extindere. Am artat c sistemul de guvernan Multi-Level a realizat o dependen a actorilor implicai, de diverse resurse (financiare, informaionale, politice i organizaionale) care a avut drept consecin interaciunea lor. Modelul dependenei de resurse este stabilit de dinamica intereselor n vederea obinerii de avantaje. nelegnd distribuia acestor resurse, abilitile i capacitile de folosire a acestora, se neleg deciziile de politici publice, deoarece exist o corelaie mare ntre gradul de interdependen i gradul n care autoritatea este dispersat. Am explicat faptul c exist o interdependen ntre europenizare i dezvoltarea modelului de guvernan Multi-Level, legtura fcndu-se cu ajutorul politicii de coeziune. Exist dou direcii n ceea ce privete implicaiile pentru guvernana Multi-Level i politica de coeziune a UE. Prima este legat de modelul lui Rhodes de politic de tip reea i presupune o alegere raional, considernd reeaua ca o oportunitate pentru o interaciune strategic. Din acest punct de vedere europenizarea rezult dintr-o distribuie de resurse ntre actori n spaiul intern ca rezultat al apartenenei la UE. Cealalt direcie a guvernanei Multi-Level, este faptul c nsui UE cauzeaz o transformare n guvernana comunitar. Exist o distincie clar ntre abordarea raionalist i cea sociologic care genereaz ipoteze distincte n funcie de natura i msura n care evolueaz guvernana prin politica european de coeziune. Curentul raionalist va lua de baz c suma puterilor s fie nul considernd faptul c actorii naionali vor continua s-i stabileasc singuri obiectivele (dei ntr-un mediu dinamic) iar redistribuia puterilor autoritii se va face printr-o guvernan de tip Multi-Level. n contrast perspectiva sociologic presupune c puterea trebuie s fie un joc cu sum pozitiv, actorii i vor schimba preferinele

printr-o socializare ntr-un mediu n continu schimbare care va tinde ctre o guvernan Multi-Level printr-un proces de nvare-adaptare. Am artat c anumite caracteristici ale modelului de guvernan Multi-Level au aprut i n noile state est-europene, inclusiv n Romnia i c un rol important l-au avut programele de preaderare. ns dezvoltarea modelului n aceste state este dependent de anumite precondiii: descentralizarea i reconstrucia de pe alte baze a funciilor sociale, existena unei societi civile puternice nsemnnd implicarea activ a acesteia n sfera public i transparena acesteia. Din perspectiva statului centralizat sistemul Multi-Level implic o considerabil deprtare de structura ierarhic i autoritar-centralizat a modelului clasic de guvernare. Am explicat modul cum se face implementarea sistemului de guvernan Multi-Level n Romnia artnd c exist condiiile specifice care necesit o abordare difereniat fa de celelalte ri postcomuniste. n al doilea capitol al lucrrii intitulat Subsidiaritatea i Proporionalitatea principii specifice ale guvernanei comunitare am analizat rolul primordial jucat de principiile subsidiaritii si proporionalitii n cadrul guvernanei comunitare. Principiul subsidiaritii este conceptul care sprijin cel mai bine teoria sistemului de guvernare Multi-Level, explicnd modul de repartizare i interaciune ntre nivelurile guvernanei. Cele dou principii n corelaie cu sistemul de guvernare Multi-Level, reprezint un proces prin care se coordoneaz solicitrile de la diverse nivele, care intr n competiie, cu respectarea principiului puterilor concurente. Pentru a reui acest lucru, principiul trebuie s aib capacitatea de a direciona sau a evita ca o iniiativ legislativ a unui anumit nivel de guvernare, s aib consecine asupra altui nivel de guvernan cu care sunt mprite competenele, asupra aceleiai msuri. Pentru a mpiedica aceasta, orice iniiativ sau decizie trebuie s fie transparent, evalund n acelai timp impactul secvenial al elementelor componente ale principiului respectiv (legitimitate i eficien). Subsidiaritatea presupune ca structura de guvernan Multi-Level s fie destul de flexibil pentru a permite relocarea unor competene ntre diferitele nivele, n funcie de anumite modificri circumstaniale. Pe msur ce barierele naionale care separ economia i statul se estompeaz, interdependenele ntre regiuni se intensific. Am explicat de ce rezultanta unui asemenea proces este faptul c din ce n ce mai mult autoritate se va deplasa ctre nivelele mai nalte de guvernare. Ar putea fi o consecin cu implicaii nedorite, care poate fi soluionat specificnd condiiile minime necesare pentru aplicarea principiului subsidiaritii i dezvoltnd un sistem de guvernan care
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graviteaz n jurul statului naional, coninnd n acelai timp elemente specifice de suveranitate naional dar evolueaz treptat ctre un sistem de guvernan supranaional. Am examinat metodologia de evaluare din punct de vedere economic a subsidiaritii, prezentnd concret i modalitatea de evaluare a unei msuri obligatorii la nivel comunitar, printr-un test funcional de subsidiaritate reprezentnd o analiz a centralizrii sau descentralizrii politicilor. Am artat cum testul de subsidiaritate funcioneaz n cadrul economic comunitar prin modelarea deciziei de alocare a responsabilitii aplicrii politicilor fie la nivel local sau central. Decizia de alocare a unor funciilor specifice ctre nivelul central sau ctre nivelul local poate fi motivat de balana obinerii unor stimulente contradictorii: fie economie de scar fie economie de scop. Un argument n favoarea centralizrii este c alocarea unor responsabiliti ale politicilor ctre nivelul central are ca rezultat economia de scar, reducnd astfel costul total al delocrii acestei funcii. Conceptul de economie de scar l-am utilizat n sensul n care se includ i beneficiile care se obin din coordonarea la nivel centralizat a politicilor. Unele din funciile politicilor aparinnd economiei de scar, sunt corelate cu alte funcii la acelai nivel local sau central, aceasta ntmplnduse i datorit economiei de scop, fiind posibile datorit existenei unor asocieri ntre dou sau mai multe funcii guvernamentale (informaionale, organizaionale,). Testul de subsidiaritate l-am analizat i din perspectiva analizei economice constituionale, care examineaz alegerea constrngerilor n contrast cu alegerea n cadrul constrngerilor scopul analizei economice fiind de a identifica optimului structurii instituionale care servete la obinerea maximului de bunstare, msurat n termeni economici precum alocare, cretere sau distribuie. Am analizat al doilea principiu fundamental al guvernanei europene cel al proporionalitii, care presupune c legalitatea regulilor comunitare trebuie s fie supus condiiei ca mijloacele folosite s fie corespunztoare obiectivului urmrit i nu trebuie s depeasc, s mearg mai departe dect este necesar s l ating, iar, cnd exist o posibilitate de alegere ntre msuri corespunztoare trebuie s fie aleas cea mai puin oneroas. Potrivit acestui principiu, mijloacele folosite trebuie s fie proporionale cu scopul lor. Legarea subsidiaritii cu principiul proporionalitii, n forma cea mai simpl, implic faptul c costurile implementrii politicilor nu trebuie s depeasc ctigurile iar presiunea reglementar nu trebuie s fie excesiv. Principiul proporionalitii are un cmp de aplicare mai ntins dect cel al subsidiaritii, aciunea sa cuprinznd att domeniul de exercitare a
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competenelor concurente, ct i acela al competenelor exclusive. n mod concret, atunci cnd Comunitatea are de ales ntre mai multe mijloace de aciune, ea trebuie s utilizeze, msura cu eficacitate egal cu aceea care las cea mai mare libertate statelor membre, particularilor i firmelor. n acest caz trebuie s se examineze cu atenie dac o intervenie pe cale legislativ ce presupune adoptarea unui act comunitar se dovedete necesar, sau dac alte mijloace, mai puin constrngtoare, pot fi utilizate: recomandare, sprijin financiar, aderarea la o convenie internaional, etc. Dac actul comunitar se dovedete indispensabil, coninutul su nu trebuie s se caracterizeze printr-un ,,exces de reglementare, cu caracter constrngtor, sunt preferate directivele. n al treilea capitol al lucrrii intitulat Procesul de decizie la nivelul Uniunii Europene am explicat sistemul de decizional comunitar artnd modificrile care au fost aduse instituiilor comunitare prin diverse tratate, ultimul fiind Tratatul de la Lisabona, detaliind procedurile legislative i etapele de desfurare a fluxului decizional. Am artat c exist o interdependen strns ntre procesele de negociere din cadrul Consiliului UE i distribuia voturilor statelor membre care au o influen mare asupra eficienei proceselor decizionale. Un aspect important al procesului decizional al UE l reprezint distribuia puterii ntre membrii Uniunii Europene, nsemnnd capacitatea de a influena deciziile comunitare prin gsirea unei poziii care s realizeze o coaliie ctigtoare n Consiliul de Minitri. Cea mai direct msur a puterii este numrul de voturi repartizate rii n Consiliul de Minitri. Una dintre consecinele cele mai importante ale puterii se refer la alocaiile bugetare. Bugetele anuale trebuie s treac i de Consiliul de Minitri i de Parlamentul European. ns n fiecare caz exist praguri diferite de majoriti. Dac n cazul Parlamentului European pragul majoritii este de 50% n cazul Consiliului de Minitri este de 71%. Lund n calcul faptul c alocarea membrilor pe state n Parlamentul European este similar cu alocarea voturilor pe state n Consiliu de Minitri, orice coaliie ctigtoare care poate trece un buget prin Consiliu de Minitri poate s-l treac i prin Parlamentul European. Statele membre i folosesc influena n Consiliul de Minitri pentru a aloca fonduri ct mai multe, astfel alocrile de fonduri fcute sunt influenate ntr-o mai mare msur de ctre puterea votului i a negocierilor dect de necesitile de fonduri. Am artat c exist o corelaie ntre alocrile bugetare i ponderea voturilor de care dispun statele membre n Consiliul European i c aproape 90% din alocrile bugetare pot fi explicate prin msurarea puterii de vot,
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lund n calcul preferinelele i modelele de cooperare de vot dintre statele membre, identificnd pattern-uri de cooperare stabile privind modalitatea de vot a unor ri. Concluzia este c puterea votului msurat de ctre indicele Shapley-Shubik, determin n mod esenial alocrile bugetare pe termen lung, ns pe termen scurt pot interveni diveri factori exogeni. Un factor care afecteaz aceast corelai este i faptul c intenia declarat a UE este de a face alocrile bugetare pe baza necesitilor statelor, cheltuielile din bugetul comunitar avnd drept scop dezvoltarea economic egal i progresul social uniform n statele membre. Din analiza alocrilor bugetare rezult clar c regulile decizionale precum i ponderea voturilor au un impact mare asupra alocrilor bugetare, chiar mai mult dect doresc s spun oficialitile UE n al patrulea capitol al lucrrii intitulat Relaii interinstituionale i procesul decizional n UE am analizat procedurile Consultrii i Codeciziei ntr-un cadru interinstituional artnd influenele asupra procesului decizional n fiecare caz a Consiliului UE, Parlamentului European i Comisiei Europene. Cele dou proceduri le-am evaluat considernd trei reguli decizionale: Tratatul de la Nisa, Tratatul de la Lisabona i rdcina ptrat a Compromisului Jagiellonian. n fiecare caz am artat c exist o relaionare interdependent interinstituional complex care aduce modificri ale distribuiei de putere ntre cele trei instituii. n marea majoritate a cazurilor procesul decizional este bazat pe aceste dou proceduri i n contextul relaional studiat a rezultat c datorit acestui fapt se pot produce modificri ale puterii Consiliului i a puterii intra-instituionale a acestuia (modificri ale puterii relative a statelor membre comparat cu situaia n care nu se iau n calcul influenele legislative ale Comisiei i Parlamentului). Am examinat distribuia de putere n Consiliu UE ntr-un context spaial, folosind teoria economic a jocurilor, aplicat sistemului decizional interinstituional. Cele dou proceduri decizionale au fost modelate folosind indicatorul de putere strategic, introdus de Napel i Widgren i aplicat analizei interinstituionale. Am generalizat msurtorile efectuate de ctre indicii Penrose, Banzhaf sau Shapley-Shubik aplicate unui model cooperativ i interaciunii bazate pe preferinele asupra politicilor publice. Rezultatele au demonstrat existena unor schimbri n influena interinstituional a celor trei instituii europene dependente de regulile decizionale ale fiecrei organizaii care ia decizii pe baza votului. Astfel n cazul procedurii Consultrii, majoritatea calificat sub regula Tratatului de la Lisabona, crete puterea Comisiei Europene comparativ cu regulile Nisa, iar sub regula
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rdcinii ptrate crete puterea acesteia n comparaie cu Lisabona, n timp ce puterea Consiliului scade. n procedura Codeciziei exist aceeai tendin: sub Tratatul de la Lisabona crete puterea Comisiei i Parlamentului i scade puterea Consiliului comparat cu regulile Nisa, i sub regula rdcinii ptrate crete puterea Comisiei i Parlamentului i scade puterea Consiliului comparat cu Tratatul de la Lisabona. n plus n procedura Codeciziei influena marilor partide politice europene poate fi comparat cu influena statelor membre, astfel nct dimensiunea politic i ideologic a procesului decizional devine mai important dect n etapele timpurii ale dezvoltrii Uniunii Europene. Am explicat modul n care se pot face predicii privind rezultatele celor dou proceduri decizionale prin specificarea n primul rnd a msurii n care Comisia, Parlamentul i Consiliu transform preferinele statelor membre pentru anumite politici n politici ideale ale instituiilor din care fac parte iar n al doilea rnd de combinarea preferinelor colective ale instituiilor implicate pentru a rezulta un acord. n al cincilea capitol al lucrrii intitulat Msurarea distribuiei puterii ntre membrii UE am explicat, pornind de la teoria privind msurarea votului, cum se calculeaz distribuia puterii statelor membre ale Uniunii Europene. Msurarea puterii votului se face cu ajutorul a doi indicatori clasici: indicatorul Shapley-Shubik i indicatorul Banzhaf. Primul se calculeaz pe baza votului pivotal sau decisiv i pe posibile permutri ale voturilor pentru care toate poziiile pivotale ale unui votant oarecare sunt analizate. Indicele de putere Shapley-Shubik ntr-o situaie de vot depinde de numrul de coaliii n care fiecare juctor este pivotal, n timp ce indicele Banzhaf depinde de numrul de posibiliti n care fiecare votant poate efectua o micare swing i arat de cte ori fiecare juctor ntr-un joc poate schimba o coaliie dintr-una pierztoare ntr-una ctigtoare. Indicii puterii votului sunt folosii pentru analiza diferitelor tipuri de coaliii ctigtoare. n mulimea coaliiilor ctigtoare W se pot defini dou submulimi: mulimea MW reprezentnd minimum de coaliii ctigtoare i mulimea SMW format din minimum strict de coaliii ctigtoare. n MW cel puin unul dintre membrii coaliiei trebuie s aib o poziie de pivot, distincia dintre W i MW fiind dat de existena unei pivotri. Diferena dintre MW i SMW este dat de numrul de pivotri. Astfel dac n MW cel puin unul dintre membrii coaliiei are o pivotare, n SMW oricare votant poate s aib o pivotare, fiecare coaliie fiind format dintr-un numr strict determinat de membri astfel nct orice votant care se retrage determin transformarea dintr-o coaliie ctigtoare ntr-una pierztoare.
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Am analizat comparativ indicii puterii votului Tratatelor de la Nisa i Lisabona rezultnd faptul c dei noile reguli decizionale au fost prezentate ca fiind soluii la probleme de legitimitate, reprezentare democratic i transparen avnd o dubl surs de reprezentare: a cetenilor statelor i a statelor membre exist ctiguri i pierderi ale unor state membre. De exemplu Germania are o putere mai mare dect cea cuvenit prin numrul populaiei ctignd mult prin Tratatul de la Lisabona. Am evaluat care va fi influena viitoarelor extinderi al Uniunii Europene asupra puterii de vot a statelor membre folosind 6 scenarii de la UE 27, actual, pn la UE 41 care ar include i Rusia, sub trei reguli decizionale: Tratatul de la Nisa, Tratatul de la Lisabona i rdcina ptrat a Compromisului Jagiellonian. A rezultat c inegalitatea ntre puterea votului sub dubla majoritate persist, dei exist schimbri mari n puterea votului ca urmare a extinderilor. Admiterea unei ri de mrime mare duce la o dezechilibrare a distribuiei puterii votului, n timp ce dac exist doi membri cu o pondere a votului mare, apare o structura de vot bipolar existnd tendina pentru acestea s se contracareze. Pe de alt parte, sistemul Jagiellonian reuete s creeze o distribuie egal a puterii votului n toate scenariile n al aselea capitol al lucrrii intitulat Formarea i Logica Majoritilor am explicat modul de formare a majoritilor n cazul propunerilor legislative n Consiliul UE. La fiecare vot pentru formarea majoritii iau natere coaliii ntre statele membre, rile cu interese similare votnd la fel pe anumite politici. Rezultatul oricrei proceduri de vot este fie de acceptare sau respingere a propunerii legislative. n cazul n care o propunere legislativ trece, nseamn c s-a format o coaliie ctigtoare de ctre adepii propunerii aprobate. Atunci cnd o propunere este respins, exist dou situaii posibile: sau o coaliie ctigtoare s-a format mpotriva propunerii sau o coaliie de blocaj (coaliia minoritar) are suficiente voturi pentru a preveni o anumit propunere s fie adoptat. Am descris indicatorii care sunt folosii pentru analiza puterii votului coaliiilor care au reguli de votare specifice majoritilor cu o anumit pondere. Am analizat indicii puterii absolute a votului, folosind indicele Penrose i trei indici propui de Coleman: indicele puterii de a aciona, indicele puterii de a preveni aciunea i puterea de a iniia aciunea. Acetia fiind folosii pentru compararea ntre organizaii care folosesc decizia prin vot utiliznd diferite majoriti i reguli de votare. Am argumentat de ce indicatorii puterii votului ofer indicii pentru implicarea juctorilor n formarea unor coaliii ctigtoare, reprezentnd
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instrumente eficiente pentru nelegerea proceselor decizionale n cadrul unor sisteme organizaionale avnd la baz votul. Scopul oricrei analize a puterii votului este de a msura cantitativ puterea relativ a unui juctor sau a grupurilor omogene de juctori care particip la o decizie precum i de a evalua nsui sistemul din punct de vedere al acceptabilitii i eficienei acestuia i de a nelege mecanismele i logica formrii coaliiilor. Am explicat modul cum se formeaz majoritile n Consiliul UE utiliznd modelul Hosli-Kaniovski precum i n funcie de poziia statelor membre pe scala politicilor publice. Modelul const n a evalua puterea de vot i eficiena procesului decizional prin gruparea statelor membre din Consiliu n blocuri, pe baza politicilor duse de acestea pe termen lung. n urma analizei efectuate a reieit faptul c n practica statelor membre ale Consiliului, exist un comportament de vot interdependent, datorit preferinelor similare, informaiilor comune i votului strategic. Pe termen lung n numeroase probleme similaritile i diferenele demografice, geografice sau socio-economice se vor manifesta n modele de vot, de aceea n calcularea puterii votului s-a inut cont de agregarea preferinelor de vot n jurul unor poli comuni de interes. Aceste diferene sunt importante deoarece conform teoriei clasice a analizei puterii votului se ia n calcul egalitatea puterii de vot, a reprezentrii cetenilor. mprirea pe blocuri s-a realizat pe baza unor ipoteze plauzibile, pe baza studierii comportamentului de vot de-a lungul unei perioade de timp relativ mare, ns aceasta mprire nu are caracter inflexibil, iar componena blocurilor se poate schimba oricnd ca urmare a unor condiii interne/externe care duc la presiuni asupra comportamentului de vot a unui stat sau grupe de state din blocuri diferite. Am artat c distribuia puterii votului este n mai mic msura afectat de corelaia dintre voturi dect de eficiena procesului decizional, comportamentele de vot eterogene i interdependente ale statelor membre scznd aceast eficien. n ceea ce privete formarea coaliiilor n funcie de poziia statelor membre pe scala politicilor publice a rezultat c un stat membru va prefera o coaliie ctigtoare care combin poziia politicii altui stat care este cea mai apropiat de poziia politicilor lui. Dac o coaliie de mrime mare nu poate fi format, este posibil ca un stat s prefere un rezultat care este mai apropiat de propria poziie a politicilor dect de un rezultat care este la o distan mai mare dect preferina acestuia. De asemenea a reieit c statele care au cea mai mic distan a politicilor pot fi etichetate drept ctigtori ai proceselor de negociere iar statele care au cea mai mare distan a politicilor pot fi numite pierztoare ale proceselor de negociere.

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n al aptelea capitol al lucrrii intitulat Soluii alternative pentru schemele bazate pe reprezentarea cetenilor i pentru sistemele de vot ale PE i CM am examinat, pornind de la critica Tratatelor de la Nisa i Lisabona soluiile posibile care ar putea elimina deficienele sistemelor de vot folosite i a reprezentrii inegale a cetenilor europeni. Toate sistemele de vot ale UE au fost un compromis ntre dou deziderate: principiul egalitii statelor membre i egalitatea cetenilor. Dubla majoritate introdus la Lisabona doar aparent reflect aceste dou deziderate. n acest sistem statele mari vor ctiga mai mult din legtura direct cu populaia, n timp ce statele mici vor avea o putere disproporionat din condiia ca numrul de state care susin o propunere s creasc. Efectul combinat a acestora duce la scderea puterii rilor medii. O asemenea concluzie a fost tras i de Penrose care a descoperit aceast deficien prin analiza sistemului dublei majoriti n 1952. Descoperirile lui pot fi considerate drept o opinie critic profetic a sistemului Tratatului de la Lisabona. Faptul c acest sistem folosete doar dou criterii nu remediaz un alt defect de baz: sistemul nu este mai transparent deoarece un cetean simplu nu are posibilitatea de a calcula puterea votului potenial al fiecrui stat membru, deoarece fiind necesare calcule matematice complexe la fel ca i la Tratatul de la Nisa. Aceste calcule arat faptul c principiul de baz al democraiei care arat c fiecare cetean al oricrui stat este de valoare egal, este nclcat n ambele sisteme. Soluia de atribuire a voturilor, proporional cu rdcina ptrat a populaiei, reprezint o aplicare matematic simpl a principiului proporionalitii descresctoare i este cuprins ntre dou extremiti: o ar-un vot (ca i cum Europa ar fi o asociaie simpl de state) i voturi proporional cu populaia (ca i cum Europa ar fi un singur stat). ns faptul c puterea votului fiecrei ri ar trebuie s fie proporional cu rdcina ptrat a populaiei nu rezolv n ntregime problema. Regula rdcinii ptrate ne spune doar cum ar trebui distribuit puterea ntre ri, dar nu este clar cum trebuie implementat practic aceasta lege n termeni de pondere a votului. Problema este cum s fie alocate voturile i cum trebuie stabilit pragul pentru a obine o anumit distribuie de putere. O soluie ar fi ca ponderea voturilor s fie proporional cu legea rdcinii ptrate i apoi gsit pragul optim care va produce o transparen maxim a sistemului, adic acel sistem n care puterea votului fiecrui stat membru va fi aproximativ egal cu ponderea voturilor. Astfel legea lui Penrose ar fi respectat iar influena potenial a fiecrui cetean n Consiliu ar fi aceeai, ceea ce ar duce i la respectarea principiului reprezentativitii. Un astfel de sistem ar fi de asemenea transparent, simplu i obiectiv i nu ar crea nici un avantaj sau
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dezavantaj pentru nici o ar. Acest sistem a fost numit Compromisul Jagiellonian, iar pentru Consiliul de Minitri al UE 27 pragul optim ar fi de 61,57%. n ceea ce privete Parlamentul European distribuia mandatelor a fost i este o problem delicat datorit sensibilitilor naionale. Orice propunere pentru a revizui aceast distribuie trebuie s ia n considerare prevederile stabilite n tratatele n vigoare i orice modificare care este pe cale s reformeze tratatele trebuie s fie suficient de apropiat de sistemul curent pentru a nu cauza schimbri majore i s fie bazate pe principii ferme pentru a evita dificultatea negocierilor tradiionale bazate pe interese naionale partizane. S-au purtat nenumrate discuii privind o noua modalitate de atribuire a mandatelor n Parlamentul European. Pentru perioada 2009-2014 mandatele n Parlamentul European sunt atribuite urmare a propunerilor Comitetului pentru Afaceri Constituionale plus 1 suplimentar pentru Italia, de unde abrevierea alocarea AFCO+1. Aceast recompensare a Italiei cu un mandat a dus de fapt la decesul alocrii de tip AFCO datorit inegalitii reprezentrii, de exemplu un deputat Italian reprezint 804.818 ceteni din 59 de milioane, n timp ce un deputat din Spania reprezint 810.339 din doar 44 milioane. Parlamentul European printr-o rezoluie atrage atenia asupra pachetului de reforme pentru instituiile UE i solicit ca viitoarele reforme s corecteze orice inegalitate care apare. Una dintre soluiile care au fost luate n considerare este modelul Fix+Pro pentru alocarea mandatelor. Soluia Fix+Pro atribuie 6 locuri fiecrui stat membru astfel alocndu-se 162 de mandate. Aceasta duce la implementarea principiului pluralitilor, prin alocarea principalilor constitueni ai spectrului politic n fiecare stat membru n principal majoritatea i opoziia pentru a fi reprezentate n Parlamentul European. n continuare se atribuie mandatele rmase adic 589 dup principiul o persoana-un vot. Se folosete metoda divizorului cu rotunjiri standard care se conformeaz foarte bine cu principiul reprezentrii proporionale. Cu datele actualizate ale numrului populaiei, acesta este divizat printr-un divizor comun 822.000 i apoi prin rotunjirea standard se obin cotele care reprezint numrul de mandate dorit. Asta nseamn c fiecare 822.000 de ceteni ai UE sunt reprezentai de un parlamentar. Nici un coeficient nu va fi rotunjit dincolo de 90, astfel nct cu cele 6 mandate fixe se obine pragul maximal de 96 de locuri. Aceast soluie conduce ctre respectarea principiului democratic al egalitii electorale separat pe fiecare grup de subieci. Cetenii sunt tratai egal prin garantarea unui mandat pentru fiecare 822.000 ceteni, iar statele

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sunt tratate egal prin garantarea a 6 mandate de fiecare ar. Principiul un om-un vot subliniaz principiul reprezentrii proporionale. n al optulea capitol al lucrrii intitulat Formarea majoritilor n consiliile judeene din Romnia am analizat formarea majoritilor n cadrul consiliilor judeene la momentul iunie 2008 cnd au avut loc alegerile locale. Am estimat parametrii modelelor econometrice ce descriu relaiile dintre: 1. numrul de votani, ponderea obinut de fiecare partid i numrul de mandate de consilieri judeeni alocate fiecrui partid n urma algoritmilor folosii de legea electoral; 2. ponderea obinut de fiecare partid i numrul comisiilor de specialitate ctigate Am estimat probabilitatea pentru un partid de a forma o majoritate ntr-un consiliul judeean n funcie de ponderea mandatelor de consilieri judeeni si de faptul c are sau nu are preedinte de consiliu judeean. A rezultat c exist un model econometric liniar care explic numrul de mandate n funcie de performanele electorale ale competitorului electoral. n funcie de mandatele pe care le ctig n corpul votaional (n cazul nostru consiliile judeene) i al negocierilor pentru obinerea majoritilor a rezultat c numrul de comisii de specialitate este dependent de numrul de mandate ctigate de un partid. Astfel c partidul care are cele mai multe mandate va avea i cele mai multe comisii de specialitate. n urma calculrii probabilitii de obinere a unei majoriti n cadrul unui consiliu judeean, n cazul partidului care este pe primul loc n ceea ce privete numrul de mandate, i care are preedintele de partea sa, aceasta este mult mai mare dect orice alt variant. S-a confirmat astfel faptul c preedintele are un rol important n negocierea i formarea majoritilor ntr-un consiliu judeean, avnd un interes direct de a-i putea promova iniiativele prin intermediul unei majoriti stabile. n fapt odat cu schimbarea legislaiei n urma creia preedintele este ales n urma unui scrutin uninominal, acesta are o poziie de putere n negocieri mult mai mare dect n situaia legislativ anterioar, n care funcia de preedinte rezulta n urma negocierilor dintre partide care duceau la obinerea majoritilor n consiliul judeean. Concluziile din finalul tezei subliniaz nc o dat principalele idei care au reieit din analiza efectuat pe parcursul lucrrii. Metodele de cercetare se bazeaz pe abordarea sistemica a obiectului de cercetare guvernana european i eficiena proceselor decizionale comunitare. n lucrare au fost utilizate cu preponderen urmtoarele metode de cercetare tiinific: metoda dialectic i componentele ei - analiza,
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sinteza, inducia, deducia, analogia; au fost utilizate i metodele analizei statistice. Pentru efectuarea cercetrii s-a recurs, de asemenea, la procedeul analizei comparative.

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ACADEMY OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Faculty of Economics

SUMMARY OF PhD THESIS


Subsidiarity and proportionality, fundamental principles in community governance. Mechanisms and economic efficiency in EU decision making processes.

Scientific Coordinator: Prof. univ. dr. DINU MARIN

PhD Candidate: Constantin Chiriac

Bucharest, 2010

Contents Introduction 1. Multi-Level Governance System 1.1 The specificity of the EU governance 1.2 Defining the concept of governance 1.3 Characteristics of governance reform 1.4 Multi-Level governance model - conceptual approach 1.5 Typology of Multi-Level governance system 1.6 Interdependence Europeanization - Multi-Level Governance 1.7 The emergence of Multi-Level Governance model in Romania 1.7.1 Multi-Level Governance in the new EU members 1.7.2 Multi-Level Governance in Romania 1.8 Open Method of Coordination a new architecture for community governance? 2. Subsidiarity and proportionality principles specific to community governance 2.1 Define the concepts of subsidiarity and proportionality 2.1.2 Positive analysis of subsidiarity 2.2 Subsidiarity test 2.3 Modeling decisions for the allocation of responsibility of public policy implementation 2.4 Economic analysis of the constitutional test of subsidiarity 2.5 The principle of proportionality criterion to evaluate the relationship between EU powers and the States 3. Decision making at EU level 3.1 General considerations on EU decision-making system 3.2 Institutions of EU decision-making role 3.2.1 European Parliament 3.2.2 European Union Council 3.2.3 European Commission 3.3 Community legislative procedures 3.3.1 Codecision Procedure 3.3.2 Assent Procedure 3.3.3 Cooperation Procedure 3.3.4. Consultation Procedure 3.4 Changes in decision-making system introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon
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3.5 EU negotiating process and voting power 3.6 Qualified majority - the main decision-making rule in CM 3.7 Influence the distribution of votes on the budget allocations in the EU 3.8 Impact of demographic change on decision making in the Council 4. Institutional relations and decision making in the EU 4.1 The main categories of decision-making mechanisms 4.2 Models of consultation and Codecision decision-making Procedures 4.3 Institutional analysis of CM in decision-making power 4.4 Predictability results scale public policy Codecision and Consultation Procedures 5. Measuring the distribution of power among EU members 5.1 Theoretical issues concerning the measurement of voting 5.2 Comparative analysis of indices of voting power of the Treaties of Nice and Lisbon 5.3 Influence future EU enlargements on the voting power of Member States 5.3.1 The benchmark voting systems 5.3.2 Analysis of expansion scenarios 6. Formation and logic of the Majorities 6.1 Logic formation of the majorities 6.2 Theory formation of majorities and models used 6.2.1 Power indices qualified majority coalition 6.2.2 Study. Economic efficiency of decision-making process. Calculation of indicators of power distribution for the Romanian Parliament 1996-2008 6.2.3 Coalition connected. Indices connected power to a coalition 6.3 The formation of majorities in the Council 6.3.1 Study. Formation and logic of the majority in the Romanian Parliament. Calculation of indicators forming majorities 6.4 The coalition formation model Hosli-Kaniovski. 6.5 The formation of majorities in the EU Council according to the position of Member States on the scale of public policies

6.6 Study. The calculation of power indices coalition of county councils in Romania 7. Alternative schemes based on representation of citizens' voting systems and the European Parliament and Council of Ministers 7.1 Jagellonian compromise 7.1.1 Criticism Nice and Lisbon Treaties 7.1.2 Square root solution optimal decision for the Council of Ministers? 7.2 Study. Applying the square root decision rule in CM. The approximation by rounding and Jagiellonian Compromise. The Romanian case 7.3 Alternative model of allocation of mandates "Fix + Pro" in European Parliament. 7.4 Consequences of model representation in the European Union 8. The formation of majorities in the county councils in Romania 8.1 Considerations on the formation of majorities 8.2 Estimate the relationship between the number of voters and the number of mandates obtained by each party in the county councils 8.3 Estimate the relationship between the number of seats and number of specialized commissions earned. 8.4 Estimated probability of a party to form a majority 8.5 The significance of the results obtained 9. Conclusions and personal contributions List of Tables and Graphs References

Keywords: European Union, Multi-Level Governance, subsidiarity, proportionality, decision making, economic efficiency, distribution of power, logic and the formation of majorities

Summaries of the main parts of the Thesis There are a variety of theories on the classification of the European Union as a political entity or state even if there is a fairly wide consensus on the fact that it can not be considered state, there are no no provision to that effect in treaties or a constitution. Over the past decades, the EU was concerned about internal governance. Several attempts were made to establish a balance of powers within the EU and each time has brought additional responsibility and efficiency in community decision-making processes, through the Treaty of Maastricht 1992, Amsterdam 1997, Nice 2000 and Lisbon in 2007. There was a long debate on EU governance alternatives: federalism versus intergovernmentalism. Federalism involves integrating a division of sovereignty between a central authority Community and national member states, representing essentially a sharing of authority between a central federal authority and the Member States, the EU more appropriate comparison would be neither U.S. nor Germany but Swiss federalism. Intergovernmentalism assumed that EU decisions are important for the national states. It involves less important role for the European Parliament and key roles for the European Council and Council of the European Union. Much of the opposition to a federal organization of the European Union is based on confusion with the federal organization of U.S. federalism. European governance system meant denationalization of state policy and the internationalization of political regimes. Government's scheme saw continually changes due to developments in the globalization process. Due to continuous changes imposed by globalization, nation states to adapt, we've seen put the situation of transferring elements of their sovereignty to transnational levels. EU governments proved quite flexible with the limitations imposed by treaties concluded. Certain powers have been transferred from national to Community level through revisions to the treaties imposed by considerations of efficiency, while others remained unchanged. The growing number of Community competence can be regarded as an extension of the horizon, supranational governance at the expense of national governance. European integration has radically changed the nature
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of governance systems in Europe. Multi-Level Governance term used to describe a new pattern on a Community decision was a response to theories of European integration, especially Intergovernmentalism with statecentered approach, which underestimated the role of actors and have overstated the role others. Concept change in a large measure of government design process as is, either locally or at international, emphasizing the interdependencies among different actors. EU can be described as a model for Multi-Level Governance, where decision-making processes are distributed at supranational, national and subnational level involving not only governmental actors but also private actors. Multi-Level Governance concept characterizing the dynamics of the relationship between actors situated at different territorial levels: public, private or non-governmental, are used both analytical and normative framework for understanding the meaning of methodology to make decisions in support of various public and private partnerships. Through this research I proposed the creation of a comprehensive analysis of EU governance in terms of Multi-Level model and the two fundamental principles subsidiarity and proportionality, decision making processes that take place at Community level, the European decision-making system changes as a result of treaties adopted and their impact on distribution and power relations in institutional relations by confronting different views and outline a general vision Thesis structure. The purpose and tasks of research have determined the structure of the Thesis, which includes: introduction, eight chapters restore basic content of the research findings, annexes and bibliography. In the first chapter of the book entitled "Multi-Level Governance System" explained why the EU can be considered a Multi-Level governance model, distributed decision-making processes at the supranational European Commission and European Parliament, national by central governments Member States and sub-national level (regional and local) involving government institutions and private agents. European governance without blur the boundaries of nation states a component causing a process of denationalization of public space can be conceptualized in two steps. The first is that European governance has a direct effect on the political structure of national states enabling national actors can act bypassing the national level. This effect could have important consequences with the disintegration of national structures and the development of transnational structures. Finally, there appear new social and political differences that will cause substantial changes in structures and systems of

interest to intermediate level. However changes in political systems are not sufficient for a successful integration of national states. The second step of the dynamics of governance will result only when the principle of subsidiarity will transcend territorial boundaries. State organization is maintained not only by internal political structure but also of cultural identity and national sentiments. Therefore to consider the national structure in the European integration process and with progress towards a new governance structure differences European Community to the individual national systems and how management of the enlargement process. We have shown that Multi-Level Governance system has made a dependency of the actors involved, the various resources (financial, informational, political and organizational) which resulted in their interaction. The resource dependence is determined by the dynamics of interests to obtain benefits. Understanding distribution of resources, skills and capabilities of their use means of public policy decisions, as there is a high correlation between the degree of interdependence and the degree to which authority is dispersed. I explained that there is interdependence between Europeanization and development of Multi-Level Governance model, the link being made by the cohesion policy. There are two directions in terms of implications for MultiLevel Governance and EU cohesion policy. The first is related to model type of policy network Rhodes and assumes a rational choice, considering the network as an opportunity for strategic interaction. From this point of view Europeanization resulting from a distribution of resources between actors in the internal space as a result of EU membership. Other Multi-Level Governance direction is that the EU itself causes a shift in community governance. There is a clear distinction between rationalist and sociological approach that generates different hypotheses depending on the nature and extent evolving governance by European cohesion policy. Current basic rationalist take that "to be zero sum of considering that the national players will continue to establish themselves (although in a dynamic environment) and the redistribution of powers authority will be a Multi-Level Governance. In contrast sociological perspective requires that power must be a positive sum game, players will change their preferences through socialization in a changing environment which will tend to Multi-Level Governance through a process of learning-adaptation. We have shown that certain features of Multi-Level Governance model emerged in the new East European states, including Romania and that role was played pre-accession programs. But the development model in
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these states is dependent on certain preconditions: decentralization and reconstruction of the other bases of social functions, the existence of a strong civil society means the active involvement of its public sphere and its transparency. From the perspective of Multi-Level centralized state system involves a considerable distance from the hierarchical structure and centralized authoritarian pattern of government. I explained how to make implementation of Multi-Level Governance system in Romania showing that there are specific conditions that require a differentiated approach to the other post-communist countries. In the second chapter of the book entitled "Subsidiarity and Proportionality - specific principles of community governance", we analyzed the primary role played by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in EU governance. Subsidiarity is the concept that best supports the theory of Multi-Level Governance system, explaining how sharing and interaction between levels of governance. The two principles in conjunction with Multi-Level Governance system is a process by which coordinates requests from various levels, which compete with the principle of competing powers. To achieve this, the principle must be able to direct or prevent a legislative initiative to a certain level of government, have consequences on another level of governance that are shared powers, the same measures. To prevent this, any initiative or decision must be transparent, while assessing the impact of sequential components that principle (legitimacy and efficiency). Subsidiarity requires that Multi-Level Governance structure is flexible enough to allow the relocation of powers between different levels, according to some circumstantial changes. As national barriers separating the economy and state are blurring, interdependencies between regions is increasing. I explained what results such a process is that increasingly more authority will shift towards higher levels of government. It could be a consequence of undesirable implications that can be solved by specifying the minimum conditions for the principle of subsidiarity and developing a governance system that revolves around national state, containing both specific elements of national sovereignty but evolve gradually towards supranational governance system. We examined the methodology of economic evaluation of subsidiarity, showing how concrete and evaluation of binding measures at Community level, a functional test of subsidiarity represent an analysis of centralization and decentralization policies. We showed how subsidiarity test works by shaping the decision of the economic Community of allocating responsibility or policy implementation
8

at local or central. Decision assignment of specific functions by the central or the local level may be motivated to achieve balance conflicting incentives: either scale economy or economy of scope. An argument for centralization is that the allocation of policy responsibilities to the central level will result in economies of scale, thereby reducing the total cost of relocation of this function. The concept of economies of scale we used in the sense that it include benefits that are obtained from centralized coordination of policies. Some of the functions belonging to the policies of scale, are related to other functions in the same local or central, it happen because of economy and end the existence of the possible association between two or more governmental functions (informational, organizational). Subsidiarity test we examined and in terms of constitutional economic analysis, which examines the "choice constraints," in contrast to the "choice within constraints" to economic analysis is to identify the optimum institutional structure used to achieve maximum welfare, measured in terms economic and allocation, growth or distribution. We examined the second fundamental principle of European governance, the principle of proportionality, which implies that the legality of Community rules shall be subject to the condition that the means used are appropriate to the objective pursued and must not exceed, to go further than necessary to achieve and when there is a choice between appropriate measures must be chosen the least onerous. Under this principle, the means used must be proportionate to their purpose. Linking subsidiarity principle of proportionality, in the most simple, implies that policy implementation costs should not exceed earnings and regulatory pressure should not be excessive. The principle of proportionality has a scope larger than that of subsidiarity, action covering the field for the exercise of concurrent powers, and that of exclusive competence. Specifically, where the Community has to choose between several modes of action, it should use, as effectively equal to that which leaves the greatest freedom of Member States, individuals and firms. In this case you need to consider carefully whether by legislative action involving adoption of a Community act is necessary, or if other means less restrictive, may be used: recommendation, financial aid, joining an international convention and so on. If the document is required in the Community, its contents should not be characterized by a regulatory excess with binding nature guidelines are preferred. In the third chapter of the thesis entitled "Decision Process in the European Union" explained the system of EU decision-making by showing the changes that were made to the Community institutions by various treaties, the last being the Lisbon Treaty, detailing the legislative procedures
9

and steps for conducting the flow decision. We have shown that there is a close interrelationship between the processes of negotiating the EU Council and the distribution of votes of the Member States that have a large influence on the efficiency of decision-making processes. An important aspect of EU decision-making is the distribution of power among EU members, meaning the ability to influence EU decisions by finding a position to make a winning coalition in the Council of Ministers. The most direct measure of power is the number of votes divided country in the Council of Ministers. One of the most important consequences of power refers to budgetary allocations. Annual budgets must pass and the Council of Ministers and European Parliament. But in each case are different thresholds of majority. If in Parliament majority threshold is 50% for the Council of Ministers is 71%. Taking into account that the allocation of the states members of the European Parliament is similar to the allocation of votes in states in the Council of Ministers, any winning coalition that can pass a budget by the Council of Ministers may pass it through Parliament. Member States use their influence in the Council of Ministers to allocate as many funds as funding allocations made are influenced to a greater extent by the power of voting and negotiations than the needs of funds. We have shown a correlation between budget allocations and the share of votes available to Member States in the European Council and that almost 90% of budget allocations can be explained by measurement of voting, taking into account the preferences and voting patterns of cooperation between Member States identifying stable patterns of cooperation on how to vote certain countries. The conclusion is that voting power measured by the Shapley-Shubik index, essentially determines the long-term budget allocations, but short various external factors can occur. One factor affecting the correlated is that the EU's declared intention is to make budgetary allocations on the needs of states, spending the Community budget aimed equal economic development and social progress uniformly in the Member States. The analysis of budget allocations it is clear that decision rules and voting weights have a large impact on budget allocations, even more than willing to tell EU officials. In the fourth chapter of the book entitled "institutional relations and decision making in the EU, we analyzed the Consultation and Codecision procedures in an inter-institutional framework showing influences on decision making in each case the EU Council, European Parliament and European Commission. The two procedures we evaluated considering three decision rules: the Nice Treaty, the Treaty of Lisbon and the square root of
10

the Jagiellonian Compromise. In each case we have shown a complex interrelationship of interdependence which brings changes in the distribution of power between the three institutions. In most cases decision making is based on these two procedures in the context of relational study resulted because of this that can cause changes in the power of power in the Council and its institutional (changes in relative power of Member States compared with the situation are not taken into account the Commission's legislative influence and Parliament). We examined the distribution of power in the EU Council in a spatial context, using economic theory of games, the system applied in interinstitutional decision. The second decision-making procedures were modeled using the strategic power indicator, introduced by Napel and Widgren and applied institutional analysis. We generalized measurements made by Penrose indices, Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik applied a model based on cooperative and interaction preferences on public policies. The results revealed changes in the institutional influence of the three European institutions dependent decision rules of each organization to make decisions on the vote. Thus if the Consultation procedure, the qualified majority rule in the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Commission the power increase compared with Nice rules and the square root rule increases its power compared to Lisbon, while the Council power decreases. The Codecision procedure is the same trend: as the Lisbon Treaty increases the powers of the Commission and Parliament and Council the power decreases compared with Nice rules, and the square root rule increases the power of the Commission and Parliament and Council the power decreases compared with the Lisbon Treaty. In addition the influence of large political parties Codecision procedure can be compared with the influence of European Member States that political and ideological dimension of decision making becomes more important than in the early stages of development of the European Union. I explained how you can make predictions on the results of two decision-making procedure by specifying in particular the extent to which the Commission, Parliament and the Council makes preferences for certain policies of the Member States of the ideal political institutions that are part and secondly by combining the collective preferences of the institutions involved to give an agreement. In the fifth chapter of the paper entitled "Measuring the distribution of power among EU members" I explained, from the theory of measurement vote, how to calculate power distribution EU Member States. Measurement of voting shall be by means of two classic indicators: Shapley11

Shubik and Banzhaf. The first is calculated using pivotal or decisive vote on the possible permutations of the votes for all pivotal positions of a certain voting are analyzed. The Shapley-Shubik power index in a voting situation depends on the number of coalitions in which each player is pivotal, while the Banzhaf index depends on the number of ways in which each voter can make a swing motion and the number of times each player in one game can change a coalition from a losing into a winning. Voting power indices are used to analyze different types of winning coalitions. Winning coalitions in the set W can be defined two subsets: MW set a minimum winning coalition and the set up of SMW strict minimum winning coalition. In MW at least one of the coalition members should have a pivotal position, the distinction between W and MW is given by the existence of a swivel. The difference between the MW and SMW is based on the number of swivel. Thus if the MW at least one coalition member has a pivot, the SMW any voter may have a pivot, each coalition being formed by a strictly limited number of members so that any voter who retires determined transformation from a winning coalition losing one. We examined the voting power indices compared to the Nice and Lisbon Treaties result that although the new rules of decision have been presented as solutions to problems of legitimacy, democratic representation and transparent representation with a double source: the citizens of the Member and the Member States there are gains and loss of certain Member States. For example, Germany has more power than the population earning more due by the Treaty of Lisbon. We evaluated which will influence the future of EU enlargement on the voting power of Member States using 6 scenarios for the EU 27, the current EU to 41 which would include Russia, the three decision rules: the Treaty of Nice Treaty Lisbon and the square root of the Jagiellonian Compromise. A result that inequality between the double majority voting power remains, although there are large changes in voting power as a result of enlargement. Acceptance of a country's large size leads to an imbalance in distribution of voting power, while if there are two members with a greater voting share, voting is a bipolar structure there is the tendency for them to oppose. Moreover, Jagiellonian system manages to create an equal distribution of voting power in all scenarios. In the sixth chapter of the book entitled "Formation and logic of the Majorities" I explained how the formation of majorities for legislative proposals in the Council. Every vote to form a majority coalition arises between Member States, countries with similar interests as voting on certain policies. The result of any voting procedure is either to accept or reject the
12

legislative proposal. If a legislative proposal passes, it means that the winning coalition was formed by supporters of the proposal approved. When a proposal is rejected, there are two possible scenarios: either a winning coalition was formed against the proposal or a blocking coalition (minority coalition) has enough votes to prevent a specific proposal are adopted. I described the indicators that are used for power analysis of voting coalitions that have specific rules for voting majorities with a certain weight. We examined indices of absolute power to vote, using the Penrose index proposed by Coleman and three indices: the index of power to act, the index of power to prevent action and the power to initiate action. They are used for comparison between organizations using different decision using majority voting and voting rules. I argued that voting power indices provide evidence for the involvement of players in the formation of winning coalitions, representing effective tools for understanding decision-making processes within organizational systems based on the vote. The goal of any voting power analysis is to measure quantitatively the relative power of a player or homogeneous groups of players participating in a decision and to evaluate the system itself in terms of acceptability and efficiency and to understand the mechanisms and logic formation of coalitions. I explained how to form a majority in the EU Council Hosli using model-based Kaniovski and the position of Member States on the scale of public policies. The model is to assess the voting power and efficiency of decision making by Member States of the Council group in blocks, with policies pursued by them long term. Following analysis showed that in practice Member States of the Council, there is an interdependent voting behavior, because similar preferences, shared information and strategic voting. In the long term problems in many of the similarities and differences in demographic, geographic or socio-economic models of voting will occur, therefore the calculation of voting power to take account of aggregate voting preferences of poles around common interests. These differences are important because under the classical theory of voting power analysis is taken into account equal voting power, the representation of citizens. The division block was based on plausible assumptions, based on the study of voting behavior over a relatively long period of time, but this division is not inflexible character, and different blocks can be changed at any time due to internal conditions/leading to external pressure on the voting behavior of a state or group of states in different blocks. We have shown that the distribution of voting power is less affected by the correlation between votes

13

than the efficiency of decision making, voting behavior and interdependent heterogeneous Member States decreased this efficiency. Regarding the formation of coalitions depending on the position of Member States on the scale of public policies has become apparent that a Member State would prefer to combine a winning coalition policy position to another state that is closest to his policy position. If a coalition of large size can not be formed, it is possible for a country to prefer a result that is closer to its own policy position than a result that is closer than its preference. It also showed that states that the distance of policies can be labeled as winners of the negotiating process and states that the greatest distance can be called losing policies of negotiation processes. In the seventh chapter of the paper entitled "Alternative schemes based on representation of citizens' voting systems and the European Parliament and Council of Ministers" we examined, from the criticism of Nice and Lisbon Treaties possible solutions that could eliminate the shortcomings of the voting systems used and unequal representation of European citizens. All EU voting systems were a compromise between two goals: the principle of equality and equal citizens of the Member States. Lisbon introduced a double majority apparently reflects only those two goals. In this system the big states will gain more from direct contact with the population, while small states would have disproportionate power in a condition that the number of states supporting a proposal to increase. Their combined effect lowers the average power countries. Such a conclusion was drawn and the Penrose who discovered this deficiency by analyzing the double majority system in 1952. His findings can be considered as a "prophetic critical opinion" of the system of the Lisbon Treaty. The fact that this system uses only two criteria does not solve another basic flaw: the system is not transparent as a simple citizen is not able to calculate the potential voting power of each Member State as being required complex mathematical calculations like the Treaty of Nice. These calculations show that the basic principle of democracy which states that every citizen of any state is of equal value is violated in both systems. Solution award votes in proportion to the square root of population, is a simple mathematical application of the principle of proportionality decreasing and is between two extremes: "a country-one vote" (as if Europe would be a simple association of states) and votes in proportion to the population " (as if Europe would be a single state). But the fact that "each country's voting power should be proportional to the square root of the population" not entirely solve the problem. Square root rule tells us just how
14

power should be distributed between countries, but it is unclear how this law is implemented practically in terms of share of the vote. The problem is how to allocate votes and how to set the threshold to achieve a certain distribution of power. One solution would be the share of votes to be proportional to the square root law and then found the optimal threshold that will produce maximum transparency of the system, i.e. the system in which voting power of each Member State will be approximately equal weighting of votes. Thus Penrose's law should be respected and the potential influence of each citizen in the Council would be the same, which would lead to the principle of representativeness. Such a system should also be transparent, simple and objective and not create any advantage or disadvantage for any country. This system was called the Jagiellonian Compromise and the EU Council of Ministers of 27 optimal thresholds would be 61.57%. As regards the European Parliament and the distribution of mandates has been a sensitive issue because of national sensitivities. Any proposal to revise the distribution must take into account the provisions laid down in treaties in force and any amendment that is about to reform the treaties must be sufficiently close to the current system does not cause major changes and are based on firm principles to avoid the difficulty of negotiations based on the traditional partisan national interests. There have been countless discussions on a new way of mandating the European Parliament. For the period 2009-2014 the European Parliament awarded mandates recommendations of the Constitutional Affairs Committee plus 1 extra for Italy, where the abbreviation "allocation AFCO 1. The reward of Italy with a mandate actually led to "death" due to unequal allocation of AFCO type representation, for instance an Italian MEP is 804,818 citizens of 59 million, while a deputy in Spain is only 810,339 of 44 million. European Parliament by a resolution draws attention to the package of reforms to EU institutions and calls for further reforms to correct any inequality that appears. One of the solutions that have been considered is the model "Fix + Pro" for the allocation of seats, this solution "Fix + Pro" 6 seats allocated to each Member State as is allocating 162 seats. This leads to implementing the principle of plurality, the main constituents of the political spectrum allocation in each member state - mainly the majority and opposition - to be represented in Parliament. It goes on to say the remaining 589 mandates assigned by the principle "one person-one vote". Use divisor method with standard rounding conforms well to the principle of proportional representation. With the update of population, it is divided by a common divisor 822,000 and then acquire the shares that standard rounding the number of seats desired. This means that 822,000 EU citizens each
15

represented by one European parliamentary. No one factor will be rounded beyond 90, so with 6 fixed seats to obtain the maximum threshold of 96 seats. This solution leads to respect the democratic principle of electoral equality separately on each group of subjects. Citizens are treated equally by guaranteeing a seat for every 822,000 citizens, and states are treated equally by ensuring the 6 seats each country. The principle of "one man-one vote" emphasizes the principle of proportional representation. In the eighth chapter of the book entitled "The formation of majorities in the county councils in Romania" I have examined the formation of majorities in the county councils when they were held in June 2008 local elections. I have estimated the parameters of econometric models that describe relationships between: 1. number of voters, the share obtained by each party and the number of seats allocated to each party county councilors from the algorithms used by the electoral law; 2. share obtained by each party and the number of specialist committees won. I estimated the probability for one party to form a majority in a county council to the share warrants and county councilors that has or has not the district council chairman and result that there is a linear econometric model explaining the number of seats depending on the electoral performance of the electoral competitor. The result according to the mandates that they earn on voting body (in our case the county councils) and negotiations to achieve a majority, the number of specialist committees is dependent on the number of seats won by party. So the party that has the largest number of those will have more specialized committees. After calculating the probability of obtaining a majority in a district council, where the party is first in the number of seats, and having the President for his part, it is much higher than any other variant. It was thus confirmed that the President has an important role in the negotiation and formation of majorities in a district council with a direct interest to be able to promote initiatives by a stable majority. In fact with the change in the law following which the President is elected through a single vote, it is a position of power in negotiations more than the previous legislative situation, as President, result from negotiations between parties that result in majorities in the county council. Conclusions of the end of thesis underlines once again the main ideas which emerged from the analysis made during the work. Research methods are based on systemic approach to the goal European governance and efficiency of Community decision-making processes. The work was chiefly used the following methods of scientific research: the dialectical method and its components - analysis, synthesis,
16

induction, deduction, analogy was used and the methods of statistical analysis. I appeal for conducting research, also the benchmarking process.

17

Curriculum vitae Europass

Informaii personale
Nume/Prenume Adresa Telefon Mobil E-mail Cetenia Data naterii Chiriac, Constantin str. Narciselor, 14 A, 600188, mun. Bacu, Romnia 072.409.7339 costelchiriac@yahoo.com, Romn 30.01.1968

Experienta profesionala
Perioada Funcia sau postul ocupat Principalele activiti si responsabiliti Numele i adresa angajatorului Tipul activitii sau sectorul de activitate Perioada Funcia sau postul ocupat Principalele activiti i responsabiliti Numele i adresa angajatorului Tipul activitii sau sectorul de activitate Perioada Funcia sau postul ocupat Principalele activiti i responsabiliti Numele i adresa angajatorului Tipul activitii sau sectorul de activitate Perioada Funcia sau postul ocupat Principalele activiti i responsabiliti 2007-prezent Director Conducerea activitii Filialei Regionale Nord-Est a Autoritii Electorale Permanente Autoritatea Electoral Permanent Administraia Public Central 2004-2007 Consilier Camera Deputailor Expertiza pe probleme economice Camera Deputailor Consiliere - expertiz 2005 Cercettor tiinific Cercetare tiinific n domeniu economic Universitatea George Bacovia Cercetare tiinific 2001-2004 eful Corpului de Control al Prefectului, Director cabinet Prefect Bacu, Auditor Public Intern Numele i adresa angajatorului
Pag 1 - Curriculum vitae Chiriac Constantin

Coordonarea activitilor de verificare i control a serviciilor publice descentralizate ale ministerelor i ale celorlalte organe centrale din unitile administrativ-teritoriale Auditarea intern a activitilor Prefecturii Bacu Coordonare activitate Cabinet Prefect

Prefectura Bacu

Tipul activitii sau sectorul de activitate Perioada Funcia sau postul ocupat Principalele activiti i responsabiliti Numele i adresa angajatorului Tipul activitii sau sectorul de activitate

Administraie public 1992-2001 eful Corpului de Control Comercial Coordonare activiti de verificare i control comercial Primria Buhui Administraie public

Educaie i formare
Perioada Calificarea / diploma obinut Domenii principale studiate / competene dobndite Numele i tipul instituiei de nvmnt / furnizorului de formare Perioada Calificarea / diploma obinut Domenii principale studiate / competene dobndite Numele i tipul instituiei de nvmnt / furnizorului de formare Nivelul de clasificare a formei de invatamint / formare Perioada Calificarea / diploma obinut Domenii principale studiate / competene dobndite Numele i tipul instituiei de nvmnt / furnizorului de formare Nivelul de clasificare a formei de nvmnt / formare Perioada Calificarea / diploma obinut Domenii principale studiate / competene dobndite Numele i tipul instituiei de nvmnt / furnizorului de formare Nivelul de clasificare a formei de nvmnt / formare Perioada Calificarea / diploma obinut Domenii principale studiate / competene dobndite Numele i tipul instituiei de nvmnt / furnizorului de formare Nivelul de clasificare a formei de nvmnt / formare 2006-2009

Doctorand
Economie Academia de Studii Economice Bucureti 2003-2005

Master
Marketing i Comunicare n Afaceri Academia de Studii Economice Bucureti nvmnt superior/Masterat 2002-2004

Master
tiinele Comunicrii i ale Limbajului Facultatea de Litere i tiine Bacu nvmnt superior/Masterat 2001-2002

Studii Postuniversitare
Marketing Universitatea de Stat din Bacu nvmnt superior/Studii postuniversitare 2001 Diploma de perfectionare Audit intern i control financiar preventiv Ministerul de Finane Perfecionare Profesional

Pag 2 - Curriculum vitae Chiriac Constantin

Perioada Calificarea / diploma obinut Domenii principale studiate / competente dobndite Numele i tipul instituiei de nvmnt / furnizorului de formare Nivelul de clasificare a formei de nvmnt / formare Perioada Calificarea / diploma obinut Domenii principale studiate / competene dobndite Numele i tipul instituiei de nvmnt / furnizorului de formare Nivelul de clasificare a formei de nvmnt / formare Perioada Calificarea / diploma obinut Domenii principale studiate / competene dobndite Numele i tipul instituiei de nvmnt / furnizorului de formare Nivelul de clasificare a formei de nvmnt / formare

2009-2013 Student Drept Universitatea "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" Iai nvmnt superior 1995-1999

Economist / Diplom de Licen


Comer/Marketing Academia de Studii Economice Bucureti nvmnt superior 1987-1992

Inginer / Diplom de Licen


Ingineria si Managementul Sistemelor Tehnologice Universitatea Politehnica Bucureti nvmnt superior

Aptitudini si competente personale


Limba materna Limbi straine cunoscute Autoevaluare
Nivel european
(*)

Romn

Comprehensiune
Abilitati de ascultare
x X
(*) Cadrului

Vorbit
Interactiune
x x

Scris
Exprimare
x x x x

Abilitati de citire
x X

Limba englez Limba Francez

european de referin pentru limbi

Publicaii i rezultate cercetare tiinific


Perioada Studii i Cercetri tiinifice Domeniu de abordare Publicaia Perioada Studii i Cercetri tiinifice Domeniu de abordare Publicaia Perioada Studii i Cercetri tiinifice
Pag 3 - Curriculum vitae Chiriac Constantin

2009 Aplicarea legii lui Penrose n procesele decizionale din Consiliul Uniunii Europene. Studiul de caz: impactul legii rdcinii ptrate asupra formrii coaliiilor Romniei n CM. Economic ECTAP nr. 7/2009 (536), revist cotat B+, ISSN 1844-0029 2009 Emergena modelului Guvernanei Multi-level n Romnia Economic TRANSYLVANIAN REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCES, Universitatea Babe-Bolyai, nr. 1/200 (23), revist cotat A, ISSN 1224-7154 2008 Eficiena economic a procesului de luare a deciziilor n UE. Studiu de caz: Calculul indicatorilor de distribuie a puterii pentru Parlamentul Romniei, 1996-2004,

Domeniu de abordare Editura Perioada Studii i Cercetri tiinifice Domeniu de abordare Conferin tiinific internaional Perioada Studii i Cercetri tiinifice Domeniu de abordare Conferin tiinific internaional Perioada Studii i Cercetri tiinifice Domeniu de abordare Publicaia Perioada Studii si Cercetari Stiintifice Domeniu de abordare Publicaia Perioada Studii i Cercetri tiinifice Domeniu de abordare Publicaia Perioada Lucrare Domeniu de abordare Editura

Economic ECTAP nr. 12/2008 (529), revist cotat B+, ISSN 1844-0029 2008 European Governance: Is Subsidiarity Principle a Compromise Between Supranationalists and Intergovernamentalists or a Constitutive Principle of Multi-level system? Economic INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ECONOMICS, LAW AND MANAGEMENT ICELM 3, Tg Mure, 4-7 iunie 2008, ISSN 1843-2964 2008 European System of Multi-level Governance a more realistic perspective to the Global Governance? Economic 4th INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE of ASECU, Academia de Studii Economice Bucureti, Romnia 22-24 May, 2008 2006 Studiu privind dezvoltarea economic local a staiunii Slanic Moldova Economic Seria tiine Economice, Universitatea Bacu, 2006, ISSN 1224-9858 2005 Analiza cererii si ofertei de servicii a investitiei Schi parc Slanic Moldova Economic Buletin tiinific, Universitatea George Bacovia, 2005, ISSN 1454 5675 2005 Aplicarea Directivei nr 77/91 a CEE. Analiza comparativa a societatilor anonime in UE Economic Buletin Stiintific, Universitatea George Bacovia, 2005, ISSN 1454 5675 2002 Strategii i Tactici de Marketing Electoral Economic Junimea, Iai, 2002 Da, dobndite prin studiu i experien practic Da, dobndite prin studiu i experien practic Da, dobndite prin studiu i experien practic Certificat ECDL. Da/ Categoria B

Competene i aptitudini tehnice Competene i abiliti sociale Competente i aptitudini organizatorice Competente i cunotine de utilizare a calculatorului Permis de conducere

Pag 4 - Curriculum vitae Chiriac Constantin

Curriculum vitae Europass

Personal information
First name / Surname Address Telephone E-mail Nationality Date of birth Chiriac, Constantin Narciselor, 14 A, Bacau, Romania 072.409.7339 costelchiriac@yahoo.com, Romanian 30.01.1968

Work experience
Dates Occupation or position held Main activities and responsibilities Name and address of employer Type of business or sector Dates Occupation or position held Main activities and responsibilities Name and address of employer Type of business or sector Dates Occupation or position held Main activities and responsibilities Name and address of employer Type of business or sector Dates Occupation or position held Main activities and responsibilities Name and address of employer Type of business or sector Dates Occupation or position held Main activities and responsibilities Name and address of employer Type of business or sector
Pag 1 - Curriculum Vitae Chiriac Constantin

2007-today Director of Permanent Electoral Authority - Branch Northeast Management Permanent Electoral Authority - Branch Northeast Permanent Electoral Authority Central Public Administration 2004-2007 Counselor Chamber of Deputies Expertise on economic issues Chamber of Deputies Executive 2005 Scientific Researcher Scientific research in the field of economic George Bacovia University Scientific research in the field of economic 2001-2004 Director of Bacau County Prefects Cabinet, Head of Control Department of Prefect, Public Internal Auditor Coordination of verification activities and control decentralized public services of ministries and other central bodies of administrative-territorial units, coordination of activities of Bacau County Prefects Cabinet, internal auditing activities Prefecture of Bacau Prefecture of Bacau Public Administration 1992-2001 Head of Commercial Control Department of Mayor Coordinating activities of verification and commercial control City Hall of Buhusi, Bacau Public Administration

Education and training


Dates Title of qualification awarded Principal subjects/occupational skills covered Name and type of organization providing education and training Dates Title of qualification awarded Principal subjects/occupational skills covered Name and type of organization providing education and training Level in national or international classification Dates Title of qualification awarded Principal subjects/occupational skills covered Name and type of organization providing education and training Level in national or international classification Dates Title of qualification awarded Principal subjects/occupational skills covered Name and type of organization providing education and training Level in national or international classification Dates Title of qualification awarded Principal subjects/occupational skills covered Name and type of organization providing education and training Level in national or international classification Dates Title of qualification awarded Principal subjects/occupational skills covered Name and type of organization providing education and training Level in national or international classification Dates Title of qualification awarded Principal subjects/occupational
Pag 2 - Curriculum Vitae Chiriac Constantin

2006-2009

PhD. Candidate
Economy The Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies 2003-2005

Master
Marketing and Business Communication The Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies Master in Marketing and Business Communication 2002-2004

Master
Mass Communication and Language Faculty of Arts and Sciences Bacau Master in Mass Communication and Language 2001-2002

Postgraduate Studies
Marketing State University of Bacau Postgraduate 2001 Diploma training Internal audit and preventive financial control Ministry of Finance Professional Training

2009-2013 Student Law The Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iai Higher Education 1995-1999

Economist / Diploma
Commerce /Marketing

skills covered Name and type of organization providing education and training Level in national or international classification Dates Title of qualification awarded Principal subjects/occupational skills covered Name and type of organization providing education and training Level in national or international classification The Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies Higher Education 1987-1992

Engineer / Diploma
Engineering and Management of Technological Systems Polytechnic University of Bucharest Higher Education

Personal skills and competences


Mother tongue Other language(s) Self-assessment
European level (*) Understanding Listening
x X

Romanian

Speaking
Spoken interaction Spoken production
x x x x x X

Writing
x x

Reading

English French

(*) Common European Framework of Reference for Languages

Publications and research results


Dates Studies and Scientific Research 2009 Penrose's Law enforcement in the European Union Council decision-making processes. Case study: the impact of the square root law on the formation of coalitions of Romania in the Council of Ministers Economic ECTAP no. 7/2009 (536), B+, ISSN 1844-0029 2009 The emergence of Multi-Level Governance model in Romania Economic TRANSYLVANIAN REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCES, Babe-Bolyai University, no. 1/200 (23), A, ISSN 1224-7154 2008 Economic efficiency of decision making in the EU. Case study: calculation of indicators of power distribution for the Romanian Parliament, 1996-2004. Economic ECTAP no. 12/2008 (529), B+, ISSN 1844-0029 2008 European Governance: Is Subsidiarity Principle a Compromise Between Supranationalists and Intergovernamentalists or a Constitutive Principle of Multi-level system? Economic INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ECONOMICS, LAW AND MANAGEMENT ICELM 3, Tg Mure, 4-7 iunie 2008, ISSN 1843-2964 2008 European System of Multi-level Governance a more realistic perspective to the Global Governance?

Domain approach Publication Dates Studies and Scientific Research Domain approach Publication Dates Studies and Scientific Research Domain approach Publication Dates Studies and Scientific Research Domain approach Conferin tiinific internaional Dates Studies and Scientific Research
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Domain approach Conferin tiinific internaional Dates Studies and Scientific Research Domain approach Publication Dates Studies and Scientific Research Domain approach Publication Dates Studies and Scientific Research Domain approach Publication Dates Book Domain approach Publishing House

Economic 4th INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE of ASECU, The Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies, Romnia 22-24 May, 2008 2006 Study on local economic development of the resort Slanic Moldova Economic Economics Series, Bacau State University, 2006, ISSN 1224-9858 2005 Analysis of supply and demand of investment services Slanic Moldova Ski Park Economic Scientific Bulletin, George Bacovia University, 2005, ISSN 1454 5675 2005 Application of Directive no 77/91 of CEE. Comparative analysis of liability companies in the EU Economic Scientific Bulletin, George Bacovia University, 2005, ISSN 1454 5675 2002 Marketing Strategies and Tactics Election Economic Junimea, Iasi, 2002 Yes, acquired through study and practical experience Yes, acquired through study and practical experience Yes, acquired through study and practical experience ECDL Certificate. Yes / Category B

Technical skills and competences Social skills and competences Organizational skills and competences Computer skills and competences Driving licence

Pag 4 - Curriculum Vitae Chiriac Constantin