Balance-of-Power Thinking from the Renaissance to the French Revolution Author(s): Per Maurseth Source: Journal of Peace Research,

Vol. 1, No. 2 (1964), pp. 120-136 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/423251 Accessed: 18/07/2009 11:59
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BALANCE-OF-POWER THINKING FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION*

By

PER MAURSETH
University of Oslo and Peace Research Institute Oslo

1. Introduction
It is a question whether the idea of the balance of power be owing entirely to modern policy, or whether the phrase only has been invented in these latter ages.1 Thus David Hume opened his essay 'Of the Balance of Power', published in 1752. In the first part of the essay he claimed to have found sufficient evidence in ancient history to prove that states had been acting upon balance-of-power principles, and he concluded his investigation so far by stating: In short, the maxim of preserving the balance of power is founded so much on common sense and obvious reasoning, that it is impossible it could altogether have escaped antiquity, where we find, in other particulars, so many marks of deep penetration and discernment.2 Long before this essay was written, the concept or notion of a European balance or equilibrium of power had become a fundamental element in most serious writing on the problems of international relations as well as a widely disseminated political slogan with a high degree of popular acceptance. Since then the notion has survived, though for shorter periods scornfully denounced, and in recent years it seems to have risen to greater prominence than ever before in Western political thought and debate on all levels. This being so, a historical study of the growth of the idea of the balance of power seems an interesting subject in its own right with no need of further justification. However,

it may also be a reasonable expectation that such a study can offer some valuable contributions to those who like to think in terms of power balance. The present article shall carefully avoid the intricate and very attractive problems concerning the many-sided and highly variable functions of the balance-of-power doctrine as a tool in international conflicts, though an analysis along those lines might yield the most important results. More modestly, the present article aims only at providing an introductory sketch of how the idea developed through three centuries from the end of the fifteenth century. This too may prove helpful, if for no other reason than that it is always stimulating to be confronted with the marks of our predecessors' penetration and discernment.3

2. Early development. v. simple Complex balance

As far as we know, the idea of a balance of power had no place in mediaeval thought. Its origin is usually attributed to the Renaissance in Italy where the term came into use at the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth. Throughout the whole period under examination all thinking in terms of power balance has in common a starting-point of unchanging basic assumptions that can be crystallized into three statements: 1. The security and independence of any single state depend in the last analysis on physical power.

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2. Power is relative, and power of any single state must (and can) be measured in terms of the power of the surrounding states. 3. Hence any increase in the power of one state means a decrease in the power of its neighbours and represents a threat to their security and independence. From this common ground, however, thinking might proceed along many different roads, and from the very beginning we can distinguish two important types of balance-of-power models: a complex v. a simple balance scheme. At the end of the 15th century Philippe de Cominesgrouped the principal states in Europe into pairs of natural rivals. To every great people God had given another as opponent: France/England, England/ Scotland, Spain/Portugal, Italian princes/ city republics, Austria/Bavaria, etc., and 'chacun a l'oeil que son compagnon ne s'accroisse'.4 Two of the pairs listed by Comines are interrelated - Francel England/Scotland - and thus his formally bilateral presentation covers a complex balance system in nuce. With only a few more interlockings established a fullfledged multilateral balance system would emerge, in which the vigilance of any member would be extended to cover all the others. A generalization of this complex kind was offered some 75 years later
by Jean Bodin. It is necessary power that he acquires the to prevent capacity a to

princes do keep due sentinel, that none of their neighbours do overgrow so (by increase of territory, by embracing of trade, by approaches, or the like), as they become more able to annoy them than they were. And this is generally the work of standing counsels to foresee and to hinder it. During that triumvirate of kings, King Henry the Eighth of England, Francis the First King of France, and Charles the Fifth Emperor, there was such a watch kept, that none of the three could win a palm of ground, but the other two would straightways balance it, either by confederation, or, if need were, by a war; and would not in any wise take up peace at interest.... Neither is the opinion of some of the schoolmen to be received, that a war cannotjustly be made but upon a precedent injury of provocation. For there is no question but a just fear of an imminent danger, though there be no blow given, is a lawful cause of a war.6 This relatively short passage is loaded with elements highly illustrative of the wide scope of problems involved in balance-ofpower reasoning. Here we are confronted with the usual mixture of formulating a maxim of wise policy and providing a descriptive principle for events past and present. To the general maxim of keeping 'due sentinel' are further cursorily added some suggestions concerning different dimensionsof power to be taken into account,7 and a clear recommendation of wareven preventive war - as a proper means to re-establish a disturbed equilibrium. Finally, he brusquely does away with apprehensions as regards the compatibility of this doctrine and international law. Thinking in terms of an interdependent balancing of many power-units in a complex or multilateral system, however, did not for a long time become the prevailing line of thought. Soon it was completely overshadowed by the simple balance model. The term 'simple' is used to denote the inflexible bipolar structure of the system and must not be taken to imply any restriction in the number of system-members,

prince from climbing to such heights of impose his law on his fellow princes, he wrote, 'car la securite des princes et des republiques gist en un contrepoids egal de puissance des uns et des autres'.5 A minimum version of a complex balance system with three participants was outlined by Francis Bacon in his essay 'Of Empire': First for their neighbours; there can no general rule be given (the occasions are so variable), save one, which ever holdeth; which is, that

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in which respect there is no theoretical difference between the two models. Favoured by the common etymological origin, as well as by the everyday experience of balancing the two scales indispensable in most economic transactions, the bipolar model was clearly easier to grasp and to popularize. Equally favoured by political experience, the simple model naturally prevailed. From the beginning of the 16th and well into the 18th century the conflict between the house of Austria and the house of France was regarded as the fundamental pattern of European politics. From its Italian origin with the disturbed, peace and friendship will come to an end, depending as they do among princes only on mutual fear and awe. Because of their greatness, however, peace and war in the whole of Christendom depend on whether there be peace or war between France and Austria. The interest of all Christian states lies therefore in maintaining the balance between the two. From this deduction, a concrete formulation of policy followed promptly: Depuis quelque temps la maison d'Autriche s'est grandement renforcee et accrue, et de reputation et de pays; tellement que la balance est sans doubte trop chargee d'un cote; et Florentine scholars Rucellai and Guicciars'en va temps de peser un peu sur dini, who described Italian politics in the l'aultre, qui ne veult que nostre France en soit enfin emportee.l10 1480s as a simple balance system between Venice aiming at 'imperio di tutta Italia' The permanence of the Hapsburg-Bourand the alliances of Florence, Milan and bon rivalry, and the long-lasting inferiority Naples 'pro communi libertate',8 it was of France, stimulated some refinements in easy to extend the idea to Europe with its the simple balance scheme that became two great powers alternating in the role of lasting importance. of ambitious claimant for universal monFirstly, the permanence of this rivalry archy and with the weaker party leading an itself made it possible to tie balance thinkalliance in defence of freedom by re-estab- ing even more rigorously to its concrete lishing the international power equilibrium. model, not only seeing the two powers as permanently seated in opposite scales, but 3. The 'Frenchperiod' even explicitly identifying them with the From the middle of the 16th century to scales. In the last important contribution to the middle of the 17th, Hapsburg was balance-of-power thinking from the French generally regarded as the most powerful period, the Duc de Rohan formulated this of the two rivals, and consequently the in a somewhat different metaphor: most important contributions to the II y a deux puissances de la balance-of-power doctrine in this period Chrestiente qui sont comme les deux come from French sources. poles desquels descendent les influences de paix et de guerre sur les In a pamphlet from the year 1584, autres estats, i savoir les maisons de Discours au roi sur les moyens de diminuer France et d'Espagne.l1 we can see very clearly how the I'Espagnol, general and basic assumptions of balance- Still in the second half of the 18th century of-power thinking are translated into the previous balance thinking was summed up terms of the simple balance system: like this: La Maison de France et la Maison Tous estats ne sont estimes forts et d'Autriche ont ete regardtes comme faibles qu'en comparaison de la force les bassins dans la balance de ou faiblesse de leurs voisins. Et pour l'Europe.l2 tant les sages princes entretiennent contre-poids tant qu'ils peuvent.9 The oldest evidence of this identification As long as this balancing succeeds, they can live in peace; if the equilibrium is seems to come from England, where the historian William Camdeninterpreted the

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same events which his younger contemporary Bacon had described in terms of the complex balance scheme, in the following words: And true it is which one hath written, that France and Spain are as it were the Scales in the Balance of Europe, and England the Tongue or the Holder of the Balance.l3 Here we are confronted with another important contribution from the French period: the concept of the role as 'holder of the balance'. This concept was not only perfectly compatible with the concrete model of scales, it might even seem a logical completion of this line of thought. The role as holder of the balance must also by necessity be a particularly glorious one, and efforts were made to secure this role for the King of France. In 1616 Richelieu claimed the title 'arbitre de la chrestiente' as an acquisition to the French Crown dating from the reign of Henry IV.14 In the following year an anonymous French balance-of-power writer rejected - for the sake of the European equilibrium the idea that Louis XIII should seek to obtain the imperial crown. Instead he advised him to use his influence to transfer the crown to another dynasty, by which wise policy Louis 'tiendra la balance du monde en ses mains, qu'il a apportee du
Ciel'.15

balances. Such subsystems were Italy, where the power of Spain was balanced by Venice, Tuscany, Savoy and the Papal State, and Germany, where the components in the balance were imperial v. princely power. Still, the attribution of this double role to France contained logical weaknesses, which were only removed when England finally took over the role of holder of the European balance in the literature, and balance-of-power thinking entered what may fairly be called its classical stage. Before this happened, France had explicitly abandoned the balance-of-power doctrine, as can be seen from the instruction given in 1665 to the ambassador of France to the Sublime Porte, concerning Venice: Encore que la maxime de la Republique soit de vouloir tenir l'equilibre entre les puissances de 1'Europe, et pour cet effet d'embrasser toujours le parti du plus faible pour empecher qu'il ne devienne trop inferieur i
lautre .. 16

This sublime function of arbiter or holder of the balance must nevertheless be difficult to reconcile with the identification of France with one of the two scales in the balance. The solution to this contradiction was sought in another important refinement of the simple balance system. This took the form of introducing a distinction between the superior and general European balance in which France was one of the scales, and a series of regional balances, subordinate but important to the total equilibrium. As the weaker part in the greater balance, France was motivated to restore the equilibrium, and therefore well suited to 'hold' the minor

and since Venice would not fail to employ her forces against Louis XIV to the advantage of Spain as the weaker part, the King did not at all desire to work for peace between Turkey and Venice. At this time the idea of the balance of power had been picked up by Austrian writers arguing that the French theory had been basically sound, only wrongly applied since France was the real challenger to the balance. This short-lived Austrian period led directly into the English period, as England was openly called upon by the most prominent of the Austrian
balance writers, Franz Paul von Lisola, in a pamphlet entitled Appel de l'Angleterre,

published in 1673.17
4. The 'British period'

Within a generation the balance-ofpower doctrine had risen to the status of a sacred principle in British foreign policy, and this new situation is amply reflected

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both in continental literature and in numerous English contributions. England's position as holder of the balance was supported by the view that England's interests in continental affairs were restricted to upholding the balance, and that she therefore could act with a kind of impartiality. It was claimed by British writers: It is manifest that the people of an island can have no interest in making foreign acquisitions.l8 And the same opinion was given a spirited expression by the continental scholar, Emmerichde Vattel: L'Angleterre, dont les richesses & les Flottes respectables ont une tresgrande influence, sans allarmer aucun Etat pour sa liberte, parce que cette Puissance paroit guerie de l'esprit de Conquete; l'Angleterre, dis-je, a la gloire de tenir en ses mains la Balance
Politique.l9

In order to fulfil this beneficial function in European affairs, howtever, England must be secured a powerful position, and might even claim a fair remuneration. In this dangerous crisis, says an anonymous English pamphlet in 1677, it has pleased Providence Divine to appoint England as arbiter of the fate of Europe and to add such advantages to this office that the nation's honour, duty and security seem inextricably bound together.20 This opinion too was echoed from the continent. In a doctoral dissertation from Gottingen (1744) the author declared that at present Spain was disturbing British trade and thereby the balance, since it was necessary to the equilibrium of Europe that England was maintained in enjoyment of her advantages.21 The most important theoretical contributions in English literature in the period, particularly as regards the specification of the role of holder of the balance, came, however, from the opposition against Britain's active engagement in continental affairs in the decades after the treaty of Utrecht. The most productive and insistent

of the contributors was Lord Bolingbroke, who had himself been leading in concluding the peace of 1713. To Bolingbroke the essential elements in the balance-of-power doctrine are restraint and moderation - restraint in entering into armed conflicts, moderation in the formulation and pursuit of war aims. For this opinion he argues from three different angles: (1) England's unique position and particular interests as an island, (2) the general European balance of power's not being endangered by every conflict between the states on the continent, and (3) the exact state of equilibrium being, for principal as well as practical reasons, neither obtainable nor perceivable. As an island, protected by the sea and by a mighty fleet, rich in itself and richer by its commerce, England is not forced to take a regular part in continental politics, but neither can she turn her back on Europe: We must always remember, that we are not part of the continent, but we must never forget that we are
neighbors to it.22

The governments on the continent must for the sake of their own security be constantly and restlessly active in foreign policy. Driven by necessity they must engage themselves as mediators, guarantors and participants in defensive and offensive alliances. This continental system has its own automatism: Their several interests are the objects of their alliances; and as the former are subject to change, the latter must vary with them. Such variations, whether occasioned by the course of accidents, or by the passions of men, tho made by a few, will affect many; because there always are, and always must be, systems of alliances subsisting among these nations; and therefore,as a change in some of the parts of one system necessarily requires a change in all the rest; so the alteration of one system necessarilyrequires an alteration of the others. Thus are they always tossed from peace to war, and from war to peace.23

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But if England, who had no need of it, indulged in 'the rage of negotiating', she would lose her decisive influence. Only in extraordinary crises, in which the general balance of power was obviously threatened, would it be proper for England to intervene. This restraint in foreign affairs would ... place the British nation in such circumstances of happiness and glory, as the greatest empires could never boast. Far from being alarmed at every motion on the continent ... we might enjoy the securest peace, and the most unenvied plenty. Far from courting, or purchasing the alliances of other nations, we might see them suing for ours. Far from being hated and despised, for involving ourselves in all the little wrangles of the continent, we might be loved and respected by all those who maintain the just ballance of Europe, and be formidable to those alone who should endeavor to break it.24 On the other hand, untimely intervention would result in the loss of these advantages, and in addition such intervention might upset a balance still not imperilled. The safeness of a patient vigilance as well as the dangers involved in rash action Bolingbroke tied to a further analysis of the nature of the balance: The scales of the balance of power will never be exactly poized, nor is the precise point of equality either discernible or necessary to be discerned. It is sufficient in this, as in other human affairs, that the deviation be not too great. Some there will always be.25 This imperfection implies that at certain periods a policy based on balance-ofpowter estimates is doomed to fail: They who are in the sinking scale, for in the political balance of power, unlike to all others, the scale that is empty sinks, and that which is full rises; they who are in the sinking scale do not easily come off from the habitual prejudices of superior wealth, or power, or skill, or courage, nor from the confidence that these prejudices inspire. They who are in the rising scale do not immediately feel their strength, nor assume that confidence in it which successful experience gives them afterwards. They who are the most concerned to watch the variations of this balance, misjudge often in the same manner, and from the same prejudices. They continue to dread a power no longer able to hurt them, or they continue to have no apprehensions of a power that grows daily more formidable.26 This theoretical deduction of a timelag between actual and perceived disturbances of the balance is supported by the same historical evidence in Bolingbroke's writings as was invoked by the Austrian writers who picked up the balance doctrine when it was abandoned by the French: from the last stages of the Thirty-Years' War and to the treaty of the Pyrenees, Europe had been fooled on false balance premises to support an already too powerful France. The arguments for moderation in action were the same as called for restraint before acting: A constant attention to these deviations is therefore necessary. When they are little, their increase may be easily prevented by early care and the precautions that good policy suggests. But when they become great for want of this care and these precautions, or by the force of unforeseen events, more vigor is to be exerted, and greater efforts to be made. But even in such cases, much reflection is necessary on all the circumstances that form the conjuncture; lest, by attacking with ill success, the deviation be confirmed, and the power that is deemed already exorbitant become more so; and lest, by attacking with good success, whilst one scale is pillaged, too much weight of power be thrown into the other.27 Though Bolingbroke to a great extent presents his reflections in the language of the simple two-scaled balance, in some important respects his work was a revival and further development of the complex

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balance model in his description of the normal continental system, as will be seen from the italicized quotation on page 124. To this system he attributed certain inherent mechanisms that kept the system in incessant movement with continually shifting alignments and frequent wars. Only when the system degenerated into a simple and unbalanced bipolarism, would it be the task of England to intervene and re-establish equilibrium. This same doctrine of moderation was voiced by David Hume, who made a biting criticism of the British wars in the name of the balance of power by stating: Our wars with France have been begun with justice, and even, perhaps, from necessity; but have always been too far pushed from obstinacy and passion. The same peace, which was afterwards made at Ryswick in 1697, was offered so yearly as the year ninety-two; that concluded at Utrecht might have been finished on as good conditions at Gertuydenberg in the year eight; and we might have given at Frankfort, in 1743, the same terms which we were glad to accept at Aix-la-Chapelle in the year fortyeight. Here then we see, that above half of our wars with France, and all our public debts, are owing more to our own imprudent vehemence, than to the ambition of our neighbours. In the second place, we are so declared in our opposition to French power, and so alert in defence of our allies, that they always reckon upon our force as upon their own; and expecting to carry on war at our expence, refuse all reasonable terms of
accommodation. ... All the world

the same doctrine as an expression of a robust and even merry scepticism explicitly tied to British commercial interests. This particular brand is amply demonstrated by Daniel Defoe at the beginning of the 18th century, and I shall take the liberty of quoting him at length: Peace.I question whether it be in the Humane Nature to set Bounds to its own Ambition, and whether the best Man on Earth wou'd not be King over all the rest if he could. Every King in the World would be the Universal Monarch if he might, and nothing restrains but the Power of Neighbours; and if one Neighbour is not strong enough for another, he gets another Neighbour to join with him, and all the little ones will join to keep the great one from suppressing them. Hence comes Leagues and
Confederacies . . .29 A just Ballance of Power is the Life of

Thus the foundation of the balance of power and of international relations in general; and faced with this reality justice and legitimate accession to power are reduced to factors of secondary importance: This is the short History of this League, which really has more of Policy than Right in it, for strictly Considered, the Right of Succession can devolve but upon one Person, let that one be who it will, is not the present Business. But publick good, the Peace of Kingdoms, the General quiet of Europeprevails to set aside the Point of nice Justice, and determine in favour of the Publick Tranquility.30

knows, that the factitious vote of the House of Commons, in the beginning of the last parliament, with the professed humour of the nation, made the Queen of Hungary inflexible in her terms, and prevented that agreement with Prussia, which would immediately have restored the general tranquillity of Europe.28 In the treaties of England in this period the balance of power is idealized as a prerequisite to the peace of Europe. In most contemporary English literature we meet

Public tranquillity in the issue in question, i.e. the Spanish succession, then quickly boils down to a matter of preserving Britain's commercial hegemony: If the French get the Spanish Crown, we are beaten out of the Field as to Trade, and are besieged in our own Island, and never let us flatter our selves with our Safety consisting so much in our Fleet; for this I presume to lay down as a fundamental Axiom, at least as the Wars go of late, 'tis not the longest Sword, but

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the longest Purse that conquers. If the French get Spain they get the greatest Trade in the World in their Hands; they that have the most Trade, will have the most Money, and they that have the most Money, will have the most Ships, the best Fleet, and the best Armies; and if once the French master us at Sea,
where are we then?31

So far, we might still expect the argument to conclude by eulogizing British trade as an instrument for promoting universal progress and welfare. In Defoe's reasoning, however, considerations of this kind are not only conspicuously absent, he even frankly admits a grave threat to British interests from improvements in Spain: The present King of France,like a wise Governor, puts his People upon all manner of Improvements; tho' are a slothful Nation, if the Spaniards the French Diligence comes once to thrive in Spain, he knows little of Spain that does not know they are capable of Improvements, several ways to the disadvantage of the English Trade. I'll give but one Instance, Spainis a very hot Country, and yet such is the to the Old Constancy of the Spaniard ridiculous Custom, that they wear their Cloaks of coarse black English Bays, should the French King' when he is Master of Spain, forbid the Spaniardsthe wearing of Bays, and introduce some antick French Druget, or other thin Stuff, such as they make it wou'd at once destroy in Normandy, our Trade of Bays, which is the noblest Manufacture in many respects that we have in England, and send 40 Thousand People who depend
on that Trade to beg their Bread .. .32

1. Act to increase capabilities but negotiate rather than fight. 2. Fight rather than pass up an opportunity to increase capabilities. 3. Stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential national actor. 4. Act to oppose any coalition or single actor which tends to assume a position of predominance with respect to the rest of the system. 5. Act to constrain actors who subscribe to supranational organizing principles. 6. Permit defeated or constrained essential national actors to reenter the system as acceptable role partners or act to bring some previously inessential actor within the essential actor classification. Treat all essential actors as acceptable role partners.33 Before turning to the continental contributions to balance-of-power thinking in the same period, repeated emphasis must again be laid on the fact that British writers never professed strong convictions as to the theoretical possibility of a stable balance of power. Neither did they exalt the doctrine as the way to a lasting peace. The robust resignation in this respect, so characteristic of most British writers in the field, was concisely formulated by Charles Davenant,contemporary of Defoe: As the Earth is now divided into several Kingdomes, Principalities and States, between 'em Wars will happen, but the Weaker fortifie themselves by Alliances with the stronger; so that (unless some Great Oppressor rises up to disturb the World with his Ambition) we have many more years of Peace than of War; whereas in Universal Empires every day had its
different Calamities
...34

By the middle of the 18th century British balance-of-power tradition had

explicitly or implicitly incorporated

practically all the elements that have been laid down by an eminent social scientist of the 20th century as 'essential rules' characterizing the balance-of-power system, and a better summing up than this formulation of the rules by Morton A. Kaplancan hardly by found:

5. Continentalpeace ideologues in the 18th century

Strongly contrasting with this attitude, a series of important continental contributions to balance-of-power reasoning in the 18th century emerged from a sincere preoccupation with the problems connected with providing a basis for a lasting

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peace. The period covered by this study also gave birth to a number of schemes aiming at organizing the European states into some sort of permanent confederation. Such projects, however, from the 'Grand Design' attributed to Henry IV by Sully to that outlined by Immanuel Kant, lies in the main outside the scope of the present article, as being directed towards a community of power rather than towards a balance of power.35 Nevertheless, in arguing their case some federalist writers moved within the sphere of balance reasoning, though transcending it in their conclusions. In this line of thought the simple balance model is seen to be completely replaced by a revival of the complex model with a strong emphasis on the common characteristics and common interests of the system members. Though echoing British writers in their distrust of human nature, continental philosophers of the Enlightenment provided two different sets of additional premises which permitted an outspoken optimism as regards the future of the European system of states. The first set of premises was a strong belief in the value of education in affecting the conduct of monarchs, both by improving their moral status and by supplying them with deeper insight into their true interests, which in effect might be regarded as one and the same object. Fenelon, archbishop and tutor to the grandson of Louis XIV, worked along these lines in his 'Supplement a 1'Examen de conscience sur les devoirs de la royaute': Les Etats voisins les uns des autres, ne sont pas seulement obliges a se traiter mutuellement selon les regles de justice et de bonne foi; ils doivent encore, pour leur surete particuliere, autant que pour l'interet commun, faire une espece de societe et de republique generale. Il faut compter qu'a la longue la plus grande Puissance prevaut toujours et renverse les autres, si les autres ne se reunissent pour faire le II n'est pas permis contre-poids. d'esperer, parmi les hommes, qu'une puissance superieure demeure dans les bornes d'une exacte moderation, et qu'elle ne veuille dans sa force que ce qu'elle pourrait obtenir dans la plus grande faiblesse. Quand meme un prince serait assez parfait pour faire un usage si merveilleux de sa prosperite, cette merveille finirait avec son regne. L'ambition naturelle des souverains, les flatteries de leurs conseillers et la prevention des nations entieres ne permettent pas de croire qu'une nation qui peut subjuguer les autres s'en abstienne pendant des
siecles entiers ...

II faut done compter sur ce qui est reel et journalier, qui est que chaque nation cherche a prevaloir sur toutes les autres qui l'environnent. Chaque nation est done obligee a veiller sans cesse, pour prevenir l'excessif aggrandissement de chaque voisin, pour sa surete propre. Empecher le voisin d'etre trop puissant, ce n'est point faire un mal; c'est se garantir de la servitude et en garantir ses autres voisins; en un mot, c'est travailler at public: car l'aggrandissement d'une nation au dela d'une certaine borne change le systeme general de toutes les nations qui out rapport at celle-la
... Tous les membres qui composent

la liberte, a la tranquillite, au salut

le grand corps de la chretiente se doivent les uns aux autres, pour le blen commun, et se doivent encore a eux-memes, pour la surete de la patrie, de prevenir tout progres de quelqu'un des membres, qui renverserait l'equilibre et qui se tournerait a la ruine inevitable de tous les autres membres du meme corps. Tout ce qui change ou altere ce systeme general de l'Europe est trop dangereux et traine apres soi des maux infinis.36 Still only rather vaguely pointing in the direction of a European federalism, this open advocacy of the balance-of-power doctrine supported by a vehement insistence on the identity of system interests and single member interests, was a courageous enterprise in absolutist France, deeply engaged in intrigues for securing a Bourbon succession to the Spanish throne. More extreme in his belief in the effects of offering a comprehensive solu-

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tion to the problems of European peace, as well as in the scope and detail of his proposals, I'Abbede Saint-Pierre in his 'Projet de paix perpetuelle' can be seen as representing the same line of educational optimism. The same author, however, provides the link to the second type of optimism, in that his work was picked up and rewritten by Jean Jacques Rousseau in the latter half of the century. In Rousseau's version we are presented with a sort of mechanistic system resembling that outlined by Bolingbroke, but with an even greater emphasis on its automatic processes: C'est ainsi que toutes les puissances de l'Europe forment entre elles une sorte de systeme qui les unit par une meme religion, par un meme droit des gens, par les moeurs, par les lettres, par le commerce, et par une sorte d'equilibre qui est l'effet necessaire de tout cela, et qui, sans que personne songe en effet a le conserver, ne serait pourtant pas si facile a rompre que pensent beaucoup de gens... Le systeme de l'Europe a precisement le degre de solidite qui peut la maintenir dans une agitation perpetuelle, sans la renverser tout-a-fait; et si nos maux ne peuvent augmenter, ils peuvent encore moins finir, parce que toute grande revolution est desormais impossible... Mais qu'on y songe ou non, cet equilibre subsiste, et n'a besoin que de lui-meme pour se conserver, sans que personne s'en mele; et quand il se romprait un moment d'un cote, il se retablirait bientot d'un autre: de sorte que si les princes qu'on accusait d'aspirer a la monarchie universelle y ont reellement aspire, ils montraient en cela plus ambition que de genie.37 This optimism concerning the self-readjusting and self-perpetuating properties of the system did not imply that Rousseau found the system an ideal one. On the contrary, he attacked it as involving unnecessary suffering and expense, since it inspired unending but vain conflicts. . . . de sorte que les peuples sont incessament desoles sans aucun profit sensible pour les souverains.38 Therefore it was in need of perfection, which could be achieved by the aid of Reason. At this point Rousseau proceeded to present the scheme taken over from l'Abbe de Saint-Pierre for a European confederation based not on lofty idealism but on the true interests of each sovereign state. As this transcends our limited purpose, we shall leave Rousseau at this stage, only noting that he insisted that his project of perpetual peace did not at all presuppose any change in human nature:
... car on doit bien remarquer que

nous n'avons point suppose les hommes tels qu'ils devraient etre, bons, genereux, desinteresses, et aimant le bien public par humanite; mais tels qu'ils sont, injustes, avides, et preferant leur interet a tout.39 Though strikingly different in other respects, Kant's treatise, Zum ewigen Frieden, voiced a similar kind of optimism concerning the impersonal functioning of the state system. His conclusions, too, place him as a federalist thinker, but the European community of states as envisaged by Kant was a predestined end-inview of Nature herself and the logical outcome of the operation of compelling forces inherent in the existing balance system, in spite of, nay even by means of, selfish and wicked dispositions of human nature: Man kann dieses auch an den wirklich vorhandenen, noch sehr unvollkommen organisierten Staaten sehen, dass sie sich doch im aiusseren Verhalten dem, was die Rechtsidee vorschreibt, schon sehr nahern, obgleich das Innere der Moralitat davon sicherlich nicht die Ursache ist (... .), mithin der Mechanism der Natur durch selbstsiichtige Neigungen, die naturlicherweise einander auch ausserlich entgegenwirken, von der Vernunft zu einem Mittel gebraucht werden kann, dieser ihrem eigenen Zweck, der rechtlichen Vorschrift, Raum zu machen und hiemit auch, soviel an dem Staat selbst liegt, den inneren sowohl als ausseren Frieden zu befordern und zu sichern. - Hier

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international law. Daniel Defoe admitted the possibility of conflict between legal and political doctrines, but declared in favour of letting the latter prevail. Kant, finally, seems to have regarded both as expressions of the same imperfect stage in the development of international relations, and he is obviously less concerned with assessing their mutual relationship than with demonstrating that Nature is working to make them both obsolete. Some brief remarks on how those whose work was primarily in the field of international law approached the balance-ofMacht ... Indessen ist dieser das Verlangen jedes Staats (oder seines power doctrine may therefore seem perOberhaupts), auf diese Art sich in tinent. den dauernden Friedenszustand zu Both lines of thought aimed at formuversetzen, dass er womoglich die ganze Welt beherrscht. Aber die lating maxims for conducting international Natur will es anders. - Sie bedient affairs.Both also can be seen as proceeding sich zweier Mittel, um Volker von from a common basic norm: the will or der Vermischung abzuhalten und sie of each individual state to seek abzusondern, der Vershiedenheit der obligation as such. Writers on international to survive die zwar und der Religionen, Sprachen Hasse however, law, willingly recognized a den Hang zum wechselseitigen und Vorwand zum Kriege bei sich number of legally impeccable ways by fuiihrt,aber doch bei anwachsender which any state might increase its power, Kultur und der allmaihlichen Ander Menschen zu grosserer and hence there arose serious difficulties naiiherung Einstimmung in Prinzipien zum Ein- with regard to the balance-of-power docverstaindnissein einem Frieden leitet, trine. The main problem may be formuder nicht wie jener Despotism (auf lated as follows: Shall it be considered dem Kirchhofe der Freiheit) durch compatible with international law, for the Schwaichung aller Kraifte, sondern of preserving the balance of power, sake durch ihr Gleichgewicht im lebhaftesten Wetteifer derselben hervor- to intervene against a state which by normal and legitimate means achieves gebracht und gesichert wird.40 It is important to note that Kant, though decisive advantages in its power position? regarding it as the irresistible will of Can a mere anticipation of a threat be Nature that one day the present warlike regarded as sufficient legal justification for balance system, by some conscious act of starting a preventive war? To theorists of international law this the heads of states, would be replaced by a voluntary confederation of free states, problem presented a more painful puzzle carried the notion of an equilibrium of than to politicians: power with him into the new system as a La question n'est pas un probleme, pour la plupart des Politiques: Elle positive value in itself. est plus embarassante pour ceux qui veulent allier constamment la Justice law 6. Balanceof powerin international a la Prudence.41 At different periods we have seen the problems of justice and international law Many different solutions were offered, touched upon by balance-of-power writers. none of them, however, gaining sufficient Francis Bacon declared the balance-of- acceptance to be regarded as the authoritapower doctrine perfectly compatible with tive answer from the discipline of interheisst es also: Die Natur will unwiderstehlich, dass das Recht zuletzt die Obergewalt erhalte... Die Idee des Volkerrechts setzt die vieler von einander unAbsonderung abhaingiger benachbarter Staaten voraus; und obgleich ein solcher Zustand ans sich schon ein Zustand des Krieges ist (wenn nicht eine foderative Vereinigung derselben dem Ausbruch der Feindseligkeitenvorbeugt): so ist doch selbst dieser nach der Vernunftidee besser als die Zusammenschmelzung derselben durch eine die andere iuberwachsende und in eine Universalmonarchieubergehende

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national law as such. Some theorists were willing to admit the legitimacy of preventive wars to preserve the balance of power, arguing that the inherent ambition of human beings made it certain that power would be aggressively employed by any state that felt sufficiently strong. Consequently, it was not only dangerous, but even unnecessary to wait for concrete acts of aggression. Theorists of this kind not only accepted balance-of-power doctrines as legally defensible, but declared for their complete incorporation among the doctrines of international law (Kahle). Others insisted that only manifest aggression might justify war (Grotius), or at least indisputable evidence that concrete aggression was under preparation (Pufendorf).42 Vattel, himself deeply convinced of the need to preserve the balance of power, sought to reconcile the divergent opinions by two different approaches. In the first place, he formulated a set of rather lenient rules as to how a state might produce such indisputable evidence when feeling threatened by the growing power of a neighbour state. Secondly, he ranked war at the bottom of a list specifying a number of permitted reactions towards anticipated
aggression.

any tenability as a descriptive as well as a normative theory. Already discernible as a growing trend in the 1740s, the total refutation of the whole concept of a balance of power culminated in the massive frontal attack launched by Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi in 1758 in his treatise 'Die Chimare des Gleichgewichts von Europa'. A summary of Justi's work seems therefore the simplest method of doing justice to the whole school of critics up to the end of the 18th century. Besides, this also seems a convenient way of summing up the various difficulties which we have seen protagonists of the balance striving to cope with. For, though never before brought together and never before formulated so sharply, the arguments by which Justi sought to explode the total framework of equilibrist thinking, were not his own inventions. As will be seen from the following presentation of six of his major arguments, we have already encountered most of them in other contexts: 1. Only one type of war can be recognized as reasonable and thereby justified: such wars that are caused by irreconcilably conflicting economic interests. But nine out of ten wars in modern history have been caused by irrational passions, ambition and envy. And the same passions have given rise to the idea of a balance of power and used it to conceal the basic motives for war. The first of these sentences reminds one of the efforts of, e.g., Daniel Defoe to support a balance strategy by commercial interests; the second and third will be seen to fall within the extension of David Hume's argument. 2. A balance-of-power policy presupposes that power can be measured and compared, but power comes from many sources, and there exists no common denominator for comparing different forms of power. Moreover, even the same form of power cannot be reliably compared for

7. Balance reasoning attacked The contributions to balance-of-power reasoning hitherto examined have come either from professed protagonists of the idea or at least from writers displaying a general sympathetic attitude. The criticisms encountered so far have been of a rather mild character, whether simply accusing balance practitioners of failure to comply with the demands of the doctrine properly understood, or directed against the imperfections of the balance system with respect to maintaining peace, or stemming from legalistic apprehensions. This presentation cannot be concluded, however, without dealing with the more fundamental criticism which altogether denied the ideas of a balance of power

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lack of a measure for estimating both quantitative and qualitative variations. Already Francis Bacon had touched on this problem, and Bolingbroke had discussed it in greater detail, finding only an indirect solution by allowing minor deviations from the strict balance to pass without reaction, recommending intervention only against obvious disturbances of the equilibrium. 3. The actual power of any state can be greatly increased if its government pursues a wise and enlightened policy of reform in domestic affairs. Thus, without increasing its territory by an inch of foreign soil, a state might utterly disturb a settled international power equilibrium by a not only perfectly legitimate, but even highly praiseworthy policy. Acting in accordance with equilibrist maxims, less enlightened and more backward states would then feel entitled to intervene in order to redress the balance. In its consequences, therefore, the balance-of-power doctrine will discourage human progress and greatly reduce the freedom of individual states which it claims to protect. By this argument the dilemma which we have seen theorists of international law striving to solve is presented with extreme clarity, hardly permitting any equivocal answers. 4. Neither can the immense armaments and public debts caused by concerns for the general equilibrium of Europe be justified by the dangers of universal monarchy. Firstly, the chances that these dangers shall materialize are microscopic. Secondly, if the almost impossible really happened, and a single state rose to such preponderance, the only policy recommended by reason would be to concede rather than irritate the invincible. The former premise accords very well with Rousseau's opinion, but the latter one contradicted fundamentally one of the basic values underlying all balance-ofpower reasoning. 5. To Justi the most alluring but utterly false pretence in equilibrist literature was the notion of a general European 'republic' or community of states tied together by moral ties as well as common interests. In reality, a Hobbesian state of nature still existed in international affairs, and the aggregate of individual states did not at all form a higher unit with recognizable system interests. 6. In conclusion, Justi denied the validity of the historical evidence invoked by balance-of-power writers in support of their doctrine. On the contrary, he sought to demonstrate that history as well as contemporary politics would become incomprehensible if described in equilibrist terms. The truth was rather that no state had ever acted on balance-of-power principles, but that all
... sich dieses Lehrgebaiudes be-

dient haben, um sich Bundesgenossen zu verschaffen und ihr besonderes Interesse und ihre Leidenschaften .. darunter zu verstecken.43 8. Concludingreflections Has there ever existed a balance of power between states? The question presupposes that it is possible firstly to specify the conditions under which such a balance may be said to obtain, and secondly to recognize to what degree the conditions have been fulfilled in different international situations. In other words, there must exist both a theory of balance of power sufficiently precise to render it applicable to concrete circumstances, and a solid body of the historical knowledge necessary for its application. To the question above, then, the material presented and commented upon in this article can provide no answer. It certainly does not convey the right sort of historical knowledge for such a purpose. Moreover, some readers will have noted that I have shunned the use of the term 'theory' with reference to the balance-ofpower statements commented upon, and I have done so deliberately. These state-

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ments might deserve to be called theories in the broad sense, taken to cover all statements with a claim to give some generalized description of reality. Nevertheless, it seems clear that none of them meets the criteria of a scientific theory in a more restricted sense. Then, what are the lessons, if any, to be drawn from this body of past thinking ? Perhaps its most striking characteristic is its high degree of similarity with current debate. If we penetrate beneath the surface of old-style language, it seems to me that one can hardly escape being impressed with a feeling that precisely this way of reasoning still forms the core of balanceof-power thinking, widely circulated and highly respected. Since the 18th century some refinements may have been added to the doctrine, but it has scarcely undergone any fundamental change. Some people may find comfort by thus seeing - to paraphrase Canning's words -the balance of the Old World called back into existence to support their conceptions of the balance of the New. This, however, would be a particularly unhappy conclusion to draw, owing to the great lack of consistency and general agreement that the material displays. We have seen sharp disagreements as to how the balance doctrine ought to be employed, but maybe the best illustration is offered by the partitions of Poland in the last third of the 18th century. Hailed by some writers as 'a desirable and even outstanding achievement of balance-ofpower policy', by others the same events were described as 'a hideous breach of balance-of-power precepts'.44 These dissensions, obviously due to divergent political as well as moral orientations, to some extent also stemmed from the many different meanings in which the term 'balance of power' was used. Modern writers have been keenly aware of this for instance, difficulty. HansJ. Morgenthau, lists four different meanings; ErnstB. Haas extends the number to eight; and A. F. Pollard felt so uneasy about it that he consulted the Oxford English Dictionary, where he found twenty different meanings of 'balance', sixty-three of 'of' and eighteen of 'power', leaving it to mathematicians to calculate the possible number of combinations.45 Nor is evidence lacking from current debate to demonstrate the same unclarity as regards basic definitions. This being so, serious doubt is cast on the operational and even on the educational value of using balance-of-power concepts. One function of this study may therefore be that of inspiring both a certain scepticism and a rise in the demands for stringency and precision. In our days we are exposed to energetic efforts to persuade us that peace will be best secured by a perfection of the international balance of power. Even without raising at this point the question of definitions, familiarity with the balance-ofpower tradition in political literature may increase the power to resist such efforts by bringing to mind the awkward fact that war has always been regarded as a proper means of creating or restoring the desirable equilibrium. Although a balance of power has avowedly been regarded as a prerequisite for peace, there can be no doubt that the doctrine of balance has frequently, and with astonishing success, served as a justification for war. Maybe the greatest theoretical difference between the balance models presented in this article is between the models for a deliberate balance policy and the model of the self-balancing system of states, the most typical exponent of this last being Rousseau. According to descriptive models of the former kind, states may or may not pursue a balance-of-power policy from which may or may not result an actual balance of power. Regrettably enough, the evidence needed for the verification or falsification of such theories is of a kind that in practice must be immensely difficult to establish, if not impossible in principle.

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The second type of balance model seems closely related to classical economic theory. From the individual efforts of all interacting states to maximize some powerl security function of theirs, there results a state of equilibrium unintentionally within the system of states as a whole, this process being very similar to the equation of supply and demand within a market of perfect competition. This way of reasoning, having brought great progress to the science of economics, might seem a promising way to follow for the science of politics. If it is entered upon, however, the term 'balance of power' might be dispensed with since it is used only to describe general properties of the system as such, and since in experience it is an easy prey to misunderstanding and confusion. It may also be added that the present state of economics as a science, as well as the present state of world politics, might render it a hazardous adventure for political science to seek inspiration in the early childhood of today's most advanced social science.

NOTES * Paper presented at the First Nordic Conference on Peace Research, Oslo, 4-8 January 1963, here published as PRIO publication no. 11-1. The author wishes to express his gratitude to the Aquinas Foundation, New York, for financial support.
2 Ibid., p. 305.

1 David Hume, Essaysand Treatises, Vol. I, p. 300.

3 As will be amply demonstrated by the following references, I have taken quite a lot of the quotations from previous similar studies in the field. My indebtedness to these authors for guidance to the primary sources as well as to the problems in general may seem less obvious, but is possibly even greater. Those whom I would particularly like to mention in these respects are, in chronological order: Ernest Nys, 'La theorie de l'equilibre europeen', Revuede droitinternational et de legislation comparee,

t. XXV,

1893.

E. Kaeber, Die Ideedes europdischen in derpublizistischen Literatur vom 16. bis zur Mitte Gleichgewichts des 18. Jahrhunderts, Berlin 1907. Charles Dupuis, Leprinciped'equilibre et le concert de la paix de Westphalie a l'acted'Algeciras, europeen Paris 1909. A. F. Pollard, 'The Balance of Power', Journalof theBritishInstitute of International Affairs,Vol. II, no 2, 1923. Edward V. Gulick, Europe's ClassicalBalanceof Power,Cornell Univ. Press, N. Y. 1955. Gaston Zeller, 'Le principe d'equilibre dans la politique internationale avant 1789', Revue Historique,t. CCXV, 1956. 4 Quoted from Zeller, op. cit., p. 26. 5 Ibid., p. 27. 8 J. Spedding (ed.), The Worksof FrancisBacon,Vol. VI, London 1870, pp. 420 f. 7 To this problem Bacon returned in greater detail in the essay 'Of the true Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates', ibid., pp. 444-52. 8 See Kaeber, op. cit., pp. 12 f. 9 Quoted from Zeller, op. cit., p. 28.
10 Ibid.

1683. Quoted from Zeller, 11Henri de Rohan, De l'interetdes princeset estats de la chrestiente, op. cit., p. 29. 12 Gaspard de Real de Curban, La sciencedu gouuernement, Paris 1765. Quoted from NYS, op. cit., p. 43. and Victorious Princess 13 William Camden, The Historyof the mostRenowned Elizabeth,late Queen of England,3. ed., London 1675, p. 223. Quoted from Kaeber, op. cit., p. 28. 14 Kaeber, op. cit., p. 33. 15 Ibid., p. 32. 16 Quoted from Zeller, op. cit., p. 31.
17 Kaeber, pp. 50 f.

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Henry St. John, Lord Viscount Bolingbroke, Works,Vol. I, London 1754, p. 427. 19Emmerich de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens,ou Principes de la Loi NaturelleAppliques ai la Conduite & aux Affairesdes Nations& des Souverains, t. I, livre 3, Leyden 1758, p. 18. 20 The presentState of Christendom, and the Interestof England, with a regardto France. Kaeber, op. cit., pp. 58 f. 21 L. Martin Kahle, Commentatio iurispublicide trutinaEuropae,quaevulgoappellatur 'Die Ballance vonEuropa',Gottingen 1744. See Kaeber, op. cit., pp. 94 ff. 22Bolingbroke, Works, Vol. II, p. 499. 23Ibid., Vol. I, p. 426. (My italics)
18

24 Ibid., 2CIbid., 26 Ibid., 27 Ibid.,

28

p. 431. Vol. II, p. 439. p. 389. p. 439.

Hume, op. cit., pp. 306 f. Daniel Defoe, A trueCollection London of the Writings of theAuthorof the True Bomrn English-man, 1703, p. 356. 30 Ibid., p. 358.
29 31

32

Ibid., p. 362. Ibid., p. 363.

33 Morton A. Kaplan, Systemand Processin International Politics, N. Y. 1962, p. 23. 34 Charles Davenant, Essays, London 1701, p. 291. 35 This distinction was made by Woodrow Wilson in the US Senate on 22 Jan. 1917. See Pollard, op. cit., p. 52. 36 Quoted from Dupuis, op. cit., pp. 26 f. 37 Jean Jacques Rousseau, Extraitdu Projet de Paix Perpetuelle de M. I'Abbede Saint-Pierre, Oeuvres completes, t. V, Paris 1823, pp. 408, 415, 416.
38

Ibid., p. 419.

39
40 41 42

Ibid., p. 444. Immanuel Kant, Zum ewigenFrieden,Werke B. VI (Berlin 1914), pp. 453 f.
Vattel, op. cit., t. I, livre 3, p. 14.

In a special Appendix to his book Kaeber gives a brief outline of how these problems were tackled by several theorists. Op. cit., pp. 143-53. 43 Quoted from Kaeber, op. cit., p. 121. 44 Ed. V. Gulick, op. cit., p. 37. 45 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 3rd ed. N. Y. 1960, p. 167; Ernst B. Haas, 'The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda', in James N. Rosenau, InternationalPolitics and ForeignPolicy, N. Y. 1961, pp. 320 ff.; A. F. Pollard, op. cit., p. 58.

S U MM A R Y The article gives a survey of the development of balance-of-power thinking in the course of three centuries. Three stages of development are distinguished, each characterized by important innovations in balance thinking. 1. Early development. Originally used to describe Italian conditions, the idea was gradually given a general European application. In the beginning a complex (multilateral) balance model can be seen to coexist together with a simple bipolar model. 2. The Frenchperiod covers approximately the first half of the 17th century, the main contributions to balance thinking coming from French quarters. Reflecting the dominating Hapsburg-Bourbon rivalry, balance thinking tended to prefer the simple bipolar model. The idea was further refined by the introduction of a number of inferior regional balances and by developing the concept of a 'holder' of the balance. 3. The British period. Abandoned by France at about 1660, the idea was picked up by Austrian writers, but soon handed over to England, which from the end of the 17th century became the leading exponent of a European balance of power. In British

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literature the idea was further developed towards a re-introduction of the complex balance model and a specification of assumptions and methods of balance-of-power politics. Continental contributions to balance-of-power thinking in the 18th century from advocates of a European federalism, from theorists of international law and from outright critics of the balance of power are treated under separate headings. In conclusion the author emphasizes the great similarity between balance-of-power thinking in the 18th century and current debate on international affairs. Granted the diversity of meanings in which the term 'balance of power' has always been used, and the diversity of opinions as regards concrete formulations of balance-of-power policy, historical knowledge of the balance-of-power tradition may well inspire scepticism towards today's revival of the idea, not only as a descriptive theory but as a political doctrine as well.

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