Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Techniques:
Learning
Personal Safety
Very Unlikely
Possible
Manage Risk
Operating Safe
Process safety culture Compliance with standards Process safety competency Workforce Involvement
Procedures
Asset
Contractor Training
Stakeholder Outreach
Management
Operational
Readiness
Conduct
of operations Management
knowledge management
Emergency
Measurement Auditing
Hardware wearout
Learning phase Creeping Changes in plant
Change in people
Loss of corporate memory Accident
Life of Plant
HAZOP
Evaluate controls for the hazards of the process as they are currently understood because
Process changes have introduced new hazards New knowledge on hazard consequences is available Recent incidents have revealed new scenarios Barriers previously credited have changed
HAZOP or HAZID?
HAZOP
Loss of Containment
FAULT TREE
EVENT TREE
CONSEQUENCES
CAUSES
Methodology
1.
HAZOP node is a process line HAZID node is unit operation, typically 1 or more P&IDs
2.
operating parameters
key aspects of process control system protective systems, trips/relief's/bunds
3. 4. 5. 6.
No (not, none) More (more of, higher) Less (less of, lower) As well as (more than) Part of Reverse
Other than
Earlier/later than
Mixing
Etc.
HAZID Guidewords
Burst
Runaway Reaction
Impact Corrosion Wear Temperature extreme Vent/Drain Overflow Flange/Seal
Puncture
Weakening
Openings
Hazard Study Equivalent days per platform: 90-150 Recommendations for improvement: ~500
Hazard Study Equivalent days per platform: 15 Recommendations for improvement: ~100
GW
Cause
Consequence
Safeguard
Recommendation
No Flow
Individual causes should be detailed. Manual valve HVxxx closed through human error, OR Flow control failure FICxx, OR spurious closure XV xxx
Sequence should be determined Tell the Hazard story. No flow causing build up in pressure this will be slow as feed is low at y m3/min. Overpressure maximum up to 4x design, but as slow rate of pressure rise line leakage at 2 to 3x design. Release of flammable substance into local process area. 1 to 2 fatalities if ignited normal occupancy.
Consider should be avoided. Should detail HAZOP team concern Normal design practice to have pressure relief. Should be a review to determine if relief is required against design requirements and protection required to avoid fatality consequences.
GW
Cause
Hazard
Consequence
Sev erity
Safeguard
Recommendation
Hazard study provides the list of initial failures and the risk screening to pick out significant hazard scenarios
Scope of LOPA: Only those with a SIF? Which severity level? If HAZOP records are sketchy, lengthy discussion in LOPA is likely Failure sequence not quantifiable: Must be an equipment or human failure
Poor: Operator error Good: Block valves HV1 and HV2 left closed after maintenance
Poor logic in HAZOP: e.g. failure of a safeguard as cause Failure to determine ultimate consequence and hence all safeguards SIF cant be identified as no tag number on HAZOP record
LOPA is top down from hazardous event, HAZOP is bottom up from cause
Goals:
Accurate, current, detailed description of hazards and safeguards available for reference in ORAs, MOCs Reduce resources demanded for periodic process hazard review
Method:
Update the periodic review record with Recommendations Closures and risk assessment results (such as LOPA); Revalidate the periodic review of hazards, every 5 years
Have all the recommendations been completed? Have the changes since the baseline Hazard Study been fully assessed? Have there been any relevant process safety incidents, has the learning from these been acted upon? Are there any current concerns? Is there any new knowledge or relevant good practice applicable to this node? In view of the above, does the hazard study need repeating?
Repeat over all nodes Table updated and new recommendations in the revalidation report