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t
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, AN ESS.
CONCERr
HUMA
: UNDERSTAl
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JOHN
LOCKE
Powerline Publishing
Group
Printed in the USA
CONTENTS,
._- .... -.
DclCA'fIOIt
1' 11: ........ .., to R_a


BOOI I.
01' INNATB NOTION!
0& ... 1.-latrod.otIon
Note. "
II.-No lnute PrfnclplMID t.Jle lUnd
1I1.-No I.nate Pnotloal Prlnclpl ...
".-other Oonslderatlou concerolng ,
tpeoalatlye aDd praeUcal
Nolo
BOOI II.
01' (DUS.
OUP. I .... ID 1I"'*aI, and their Orfgl,,,
IImplold ....
Note
_
8oUdlt;r.
V.-or _pie or dive," I!en_
_pie or RolIecUon
VII..-ot_pIe both _lion d
vm. ......... C'arthor 00uIden1l __ I
PoroapUoa
1-otReteaUoa
and oilier ()por&IIao 0
_
Kod .. ; ODd, PInt, of" III
and Ito limp'. Mod..
n.-orDaro_ ADd aq ... lIi.n .... oIdencI
_ote
XV1-Ot __ bar
XVIL-ot loftDJt1. ""
XVIIL-Olo_ Ilml'" lIod ..
XIX.-ot tho Jlodes or ThInk....
xx.-or Jlod .. of P1euuro and ""'"
XXI.-ot Power "
XXIL-or_ Jlodoa
XXIIL-ot _ ..... pIoo ofS .... w-.
Note "
Drv.-or coUooUy. Id ..
XXV.-of Ralatlou
UVL-OtOo __ ...... and oIber Rolallon

01' HUNAN UNDBllSTANDING
CHAPTER D
110 INNATE PBlNCIPLES IN TnB JIlHD.
t TM way .hovm how we COfM by lIIIIy knowledU'.IUJllcimt to
it flot i .. nate.-It Is an established opinion among
men that there are In the understanding certain prm-
some primary notions. K ..... I ........ oharacters. It we!">
stamped upon the mind of man. which the soul receIves In Its
very first being. and brings the world with it. It would
be IlUfticient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseneaa
of this supposition If I should only show (as I hope I sha.1lln
the following parts of this discourse) how men. barely by the
use of their natural faculties. may attain to a.1l the knowledge
they have. without the help of any and m.ay
arrive at oertainty without any suoh ongmal notions or Prin-
ciples. For I inIagine. anyone will easily grant. it would
be impertinent to suppose the Ideas of coloura mns.te in. a
creature to whom God hath given sight. and a power to receIve
them by the eyes from external objeots: and no les!,
would it be to attribute several truths to the ImpresBlons of
nature and innate oharacters. when we may obsorve In ouraelv,!s
faculties fit to attain as e ... yand certain knowledge of them as if
they were origina.1ly inIprinted on the mind.
But because 8 man is not permitted without censure to foll?w
hio own thoughts In the search of truth. when they lea.d him
ever so little out of the common roa.d, I shall set. the
rea&ODlI that ma.de me doubt of the truth of that opmlon ... an
exouse for my mistake. if I be in one; whioh I leave to be con
ai.iered by those who. with me, dispose themselves to embrace
knth wherever they find it.
2. GrneraZ "".mt tM great
commonly taken for granted, than that there are ccrtam prtn-
ciples, both speculative and (for speak of both),
nniversa.11y agreed upon by all mankind; which therefore, they
argue, must needs be constant which t!te of
meb. receive in their first beings, and which they bnng mto
world with them, as neceesa.rily and rea.1ly as they do any of thm
Inherent faculties. ..,
8. Uflw .... aZ com ... t 1"''''''' nothl""V """"te.-Thi!' a:gament,
drawn from nniversal oonsent, has this misfortune m that If
It were true in matter of faot, that there were certam
wherein a.1l mankind agreed, it would not prove them Innate, If
there can be auy other way shown, how men may C?me to .that
univeroal .. greement in the things they do consent m; which I
pr8llllDle may ue done.
,/
NO INNATB PRINCIPLBS IN THB NIND
.. II W1u&t N, N;" 1IIId, II II N impouibLJ /O'f' tM ........ tMtag to
b IIIId not to be," not .,...,....aZly lU.tmUa to.-But, which il
woree, this argament of nniveraa.! consent, which Is ma.de use of
to prove Innate principles, seems to me a demonstration that
none because there are none to which a.1l ma.n.
kind gIve an umversal assent. I sha.1l begin with the speculative
and instance In those magnified principles of demonstration:
II Whatsoever Is, Is;" and, "It Is impossible for the same thin
to be, and not to be," which, of a.1l others I think have
most a.l!0wed title to These have lMJ'settled a'reputation
of muuns nniverea.1ly received, that it will, no doubt, be thought
strange if anyone should seem to question it. But yet I take
liberty to say, that these propositions are IMJ far from having an
univeraala.asent. that there are a great part of mo.nJrind to whom
they are not so much as known.
Not mMta naflwraZly becauB not known to
itli<)te, t1e.-For, first, it Is evident, that a.1l children
and Idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them'
and the want of that Is enongh to destroy that nniveraa.! aasent'
which II!-ust be the neceesary concomitant of a.1l
knths: It to me near a contradiotion to say, that there
are truths unprmted on the soul which it perceives or under-
stands not; inIprinting, if It signify anything. being nothing
else but the ma.king certain truths to lie perceived. For to
Imprint anything on the mind, without the mind's pereeiving
U, seems to me hardly Intelligible. If therefore children and
ldiote have lMJule, have minds, with those inIpressions upon
them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and neceaaa.rily
know and a.aaent to these truths; which since they do not, it is
evident that there are no such inIpreesionB. For if they are not
notions naturally inIprinted, how can they be Innate? And if
they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown? To
a notion Is on the mind, and yet at the same
time to say that the mind Is Ignorant of it, and never yet took
notice 01 U.1s to IJ!-a.ke nothing. No proposition
aa.n be aa.ld to be m the mmd which It never yet knew which it
was never yet conscious of. For if anyone may, by the
same reason, a.1l propoeitions that are true, and the mind is
eapable ever of a.oaenting to. may be said to be in the mind and
to be inIprinted; since if anyone can be said to be In the ..clod,
which It never yet knew, it must be only because It Is capable
of knowing It; and so the mind Is of a.1l truths it ever aha.1l
know. thus truths may be inIprinted on the mind which
it never nor ever sha.1l, know: for a man may live long
and die u 1a.st In ignorance of many truths which his mind w..:
.. pable of knowing, and that with certainty. So that if the
.. paclty of knowing be the natural inIpre8Bion contended for
alf the truth, a mAIl ever comea to know will, bI this
0]1 HUMAN UNDBRSTANDING
be IV8I1 .. of them Innate: and this point will amount
DO more, only a very Improper way of speaking;
whIoh, 'It'hIln It pretends aaseri the contrary, says nothing
dilferent from tho .. who deny Innate principles. For nobody,
I think, ever denied that the mind was capable of knowing
18vera! truths. The capacUy, they say, is innate; the know
ledge acquired. But then, to what end suoh contest for certain
hm&te maxim. , If truths can be Imprinted on the understand.
Ing without being perceived, I can see no differenoe there can
be between any truths the mind is capable of knowing in respeot
of their original: they must eJl be Innate, or eJl adventitious;
In vain aheJl a man go about to distinguish them. He therefore
that talb of Innate notions in the understanding, CaUDOt (if he
Intend thereby any distinct sort of truths) mean suoh truths to
be In the underna.nding ... It never perceived, and is yet wholly
IfInorant of. Por if theee words (" to be in the understanding ")
have any propriety, they signify to be understood. So that,
be In the understanding, and not to be understood; be in the
mind, and never be perceived; is eJl one as to say, any thing
is, and is DOt, In the mind or understanding. If therefore these
two propoaiticma: II Whatsoever is, is;" and, II It is impossible
for the same thing to be, and not to be," are by nature imprinted,
chlldren cannot lie Ignorant of them; Infants, and all that have
lOuJa, must necesaarily have them in their understandings, know
the truth of them, and _ent to It.
"S. Put""", 1motD th_ WMf& they ooma to the I6Id of ... ..,011,
411111HN4.-To avoid this, it is usually answered, that all men
know and _t them, when they come the use of reason;
and this u _ugh to prove them Innate. I answer,
'1. DoubUul. expreaaioWl, that have lIO&rCe any BignUication, go
for clear reasons to thOle who, being prepossessed, take not the
pains to examine even what they theml8!ves say. For, apply
this &lllWer with any tolerable sense to our present purpose, it
mud .tgnify one of theee two things; either, that, ... BOOn ...
men aome to the use of reason, these suppOil8d native inacriptions
eome to be known and observed by them; or e1ee, that the use
and exercise of men's reaaons _ista them In the discovery of
th_ principles, and certainly makes them known them.
8.11'--011 tNOotldt"dti them, tluat wOlda Me prow thMn iMtJU.
-If they mean that by the use of reeaon men may discover theee
principle., and that this is II1I1Ilcient to prove them Innate, their
way of arpIng will stand thus: viz., That, whatever truths
nuon _ eertaInly diecover to us, and make us1irmly _t
to, thole are all naturally Imprintsd on the mind; Iince that
ani .... _t which u lnade the mark of them, amount. to
DO _ but thla-that by the use of reason we are capable
_ to a certain knowledge of, and uaent to, them; and by
tIIIa _ then will be no difference between the maxim of
NO INNA7"B PRINCIPLBS IN THB MIND
'5
the mathematicians and theorem. tbey deduce from them: all
must be equally allowed Innate, they being all discoveries made
by the use of reason, and truths that a rational oreature may
certsinly come to know, if be apply his thoughts rightly thet
way.
9. It." faUJe that .. e/J8Ofl tNeotl .... thtJm.-Bu. how can th_
men think tbe use of reason necessary to disoover princlplea that
are '!OPposed innate, when reason (if we may believe them) 11
else but .faculty of deducing unknown truths from
prinCIples or propoBltlons that are e.1ready known' That cer.
tainly can never be thought innate which we have need of
reason to discover, unless, as I have Bald, we will have all the
osrlain truths that reason ever teaches us to be Innate We
may as well think the use of reason necessary make eyea
dlaCover visible objects, as that there should be need of ree.ao
or exercise thereof, to make the understanding l8e what
in It, and cannot be In the understanding
before It be perceIved by it. So that to make reaaon diseover
truths thus imprinted, is to say, that the use of reason
a man what h? before; and if* men have those
Innate lDlpressed truths Ortgmally, and before the use of reaso
and yet are always ignorant of them till they come the use !l
reason, it is effect to alloY that men know and know them not,
at the same time. '
10. It will here perhaps be aald, that mathematical demonstrr.-
ticma, and other truths that are not innate are not ... sented to,
.. lOOn ... proposed, wherein they are disfu.guJahed from th_
maxim. and other Innate truths. I shall have oocaaion to. ak
of ueent upon the first proposing, more particnlar!t!! anfb
y
I IIhall here only, and that veg readilYI allow, that maxim;
and mathematical demonstrations are In this dift'erent-that the
one has need of rellSOn, using of proofs, to make them out and
pin our assen.; but the other, as soon as understood, are, with.
out any the Ie.... reaaoning, embraced and But I
wi.hal beg leave to obeerVe, that it lays open the wea.knesa of
thU subterfuge which r8f(ulrea the use of reason for the discovery
of th_ general truths, amce it mu. he confessed, that in their
diecovery there is no Use made of reaaoning at alL And I think
thole who give this answer will not be forward afIInn that
thelmow18dge of this maxim, II That it is Impoaaible b- the
IIIloIII8 thing be, and not to be," is a deduction of our reason.
For thU would be to destroy that boun.y of nature they seem SO
fond of, whilst they make the knowledge of those principles
depend on the labour of our .thoughts; for eJl reasoning is seareh
and casting about, and requ11'8s pain. and application. And how
81m It with any lolerable sense be supposed, that what was im.
OF HUMAN UNDBRSTANDING
priD$ed by namre, 118 the foundation and guide of our ftUOII,
Should need the use of reason to U ?
11. Those who will take the pa.ins to refteot with a little
attention on the operations of the understanding, will find. that
this ready assent of the mind to some truths, depends not eIther
on native Inscription, or the use of reaaon; but on a faculty of
the mind quite distinot from both of as w!' shall here-
after. Reaaon therefore having nothing to do m proourmg our
assent to these maxims, if by saying. that .. men know and
assent to them when they oome to the use of reason." be meant
that the use of reason assists us in the knowledge of these
maxims. it is utterly false; and, were it true. would prove them
not to be innate.
12. PM coming ro the .... oj r.a.aOft. not tM time we come ro
1mow tM,. ma<r>i11Ul.-If by knowing and assenting to them.
.. when we come to the use of reason." be meant, that this Is the
time when they come to be taken notice of by the mind; and
that as soon as children come to the use of reaaon, they come
also to know and assent to these maxims; this also is false and
frivolous. First. it is jaue; because it is evident these ma.xim
a
are not In the mind ao early as the use of reason
l
and therefore
the coming to the use of reason is falsely assignea as the time of
their discovery. How many instances of the use of reaaon may
we observe In children. along time before they have any know-
ledge of this maxim ... That it is impossible for the same thing
to be, and not to be "I And a great part of illiterate people and
savages pass manYlears. even of their rational age. without ever
thinking on this an the like general propositions. I grant. men
come not to the knowledge of these general and more abstract
truths. which are thougM innate, till they come to the use of
reason; and I add, nor then neither. Which is so. beeause till
after they come to the use of reason. those general abstract ideas
are not framed In the mind. about which those general ma.xirna
are. whioh are mistaken for innate principles. but are indeed
discoveries made. and verities introduced, and brought Into the
mind by the same way. and disoovered by the same steps, 118
several other propositions which nobody was ever ao extravagant
118 to suppose innate. This I hope to make plain in the sequel of
this discourse. I allow therefore a necessity that men should
come to the use of reaaon before they get the knowledge of those
I!8Deral truths; but deny. that men's coming to the use of reaaon
18 the time of their discovery.
18. By this they are not iUlJtmguUMd from other 1mowable
htM.-1n the meantime it is observable. that this saying.
.. That men know and assent to these maxims when they come to
the use of reaaon," amounts. In reality of fact, to no more but this:
That they are never known nor taken notice of before the use of
. -on, but may pouibly be assented to 8OD1Il time after during
NO INNATB PRINCIPLES IN THB MIND If
man's life; but when. Is uncarialn: and 10 may all other
knowable truths as well as these; which therefore have no ad-
vantage nor distinction from others. by this note of being known
when we come to the use of reaaon; nor are thereby proved to
be Innate. but quite the contrary.
14. IJooming to tM U8e oj rea,onwer. the time ojtheilriUlJCOfJery,
it would not p1"ooe them ilTlnate.-But. secondly. were it true that
the precise time of their being known and assented to were when
men come to the use of reason. neither would that prove them
Innate. This way of arguing is as j'rimOZoU8 118 the supposition
01* itself is falso. For by what kind of logic will it appear that
any notion is originally by nature imprinted in the mind In its
first constitution. because It comes first to be observed and
assented to when a faculty of the mind. which has quite a
province. begins to exert itself? And therefore the commg to
the use of speech. if it were supposed the time that these maxims
are ftrst assented to (which it may be with as much truth as the
time when men come to the use of reason). would be as good a
proof that they were Innate. 118 to say they are innate because
men assent to them when they come to the use of reason. I
agree. then. with these men of innate principles. that there is no
mowledge of these general and self-evident maxima In the
mind till it comes to the exercise of reason; but I deny that the
coming to the use of reason is the precise time when they are
ftrst taken notice of; and if that were the precise time. I deny
that it would prove them innate. All that can. with any truth.
be meant by this proposition. "That men assent to them when
:2 come to the use of reaaon." is no more but this-That the
Ing of general abstract ideas, and the understanding of
general names. being a concomitant of the rational faculty. and
growing up with it. children commonly get not those general
ide .... nor learn the names that stand for them. till. having for a
good while exeroised their reaaon about familiar and more par-
ticular ideas. they are. by their ordinary disoourse and actions with
others. acknowledged to be capable of rational conversation. If
I188eDting to these maxims. when men come to the use of reaaou.
can be true In anl other sense. I desire it may be shown; or.
at 18ll8t. how in this, or any other sense. it proves them innate.
111. PM .tep. by which the miITId attaiITIB 'IWeral htl18.-The
II8D888 at first1et In particular ideas. and furnish the yet empty
cabinet: and the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of
them. they are lodged In the memory. and names got to them.
Afterwards the mind. proceeding farther. abstracts them. and by
degrees learns the use of general names. In this manner the
mind comes to be furnished with ido ... and language. the materials
about which to exercise its discursive faculty; and the nse of
reason becomes dally more visible. as these materials. that give
TIle Dlnth ed1tloa OIDlglloLN_BDrr.
J8 OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
It employment, Increase. But though the having of generalldeall,
and the use of general words and reuon, nsua.lly grow together,
yet I see not how this any way proves them innate. The know-
ledge of some truths, I confess, IS very early in the mind; but in
a way that shows them not to be innate. For, if we will observe,
we sha.ll find it still to be about ideas not innate, but acquired;
it being about those first, which are imprinted by external things,
with which Infants have earliest to do, which make the most fre-
quent Impressions on their senses. In ideas thus got, the mind
discovers that some agree, and others differ, probably as soon as
it ha.s any use of memory, u soon as it is able to retain and receive
distinct ideas. But whether it be then or no, this is certain, it
does SO long before it has the use of words, or comes to that
which We commonly ca.Il" the use of reason." For a child knows
as certainly, before it can speak, the difference between the ideas
of sweet and bitter, (that is, that sweet is not bitter,) u it knows
afterwards, when it comes to speak, that wormwood and sugar-
plums are not the &aule thing.
16. A child knows not that three and four are equal to seven
till he comes to be able to count to seven, and has got the name
and idea of equaJity; and then, upon explaining those words, he
presently assents to, or rather perceives the truth of that proposi-
tion. But neither does he then readily assent because it is an
innate truth, nor was his assent wanting till then because he
wanted the use of reason; but the truth of it appears to him as
soon as he has settled in his mind the clear and distinct ideas
that these names stand for; and then he knows the truth of that
proposition upon the same grounds, and by the same means, that
he knew before, that a rod and cherry are not the same thing;
and upon the same grounds also, that he may come to know
afterwards, "that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and
not to be," as sha.ll be more fully shown hereafter: so that the
later it is before anyone COmes to have those general ideas about
whioh those maxims are, or to know the signification of those
general terms that stand for them, or to put together In his mind
the ideas they stand for; the later also will it be before he comes
to usent to those maxims, whose terms, with the ideas they
stand for, being no more innate than those of a cat or a weasel,
he must stay till time and observation have acquainted him with
them; and then he will be in a capacity to know the truth of
these maxims, upon the first occasion tha' sha.ll make him put
together those ide ... in his mind, and observe whether they agree
or disagree, according as is expressed in those propositions. And
therefore it is that a man knows that eighteen and nineteen are
equal to thirty-seven, by the same selfevidence that he knows
one and two to be equal to three; yet a child knows this not so
soon as the other; not for want of the use of re8.8on, but because
the ideu the words eiJzhteen. nineteen, and thirty.seven stand
NO INNATE PRINCIPLES IN THll MIND
19
for, are not eo BOOn got, u those which are lligni:ll.ed by one,
\Wo, and three.
17. A18tmtintg aa .oon aa propo.ea and underatooa,protllll thmn
ROt tnnats_-This evasion therefore of general lIoSSent when men
come to the use of reason, failing u it does, and leaving no differ-
ence between those supposed innate and other truths that are
afterwards acquired and learnt, men have endeavoured to secure
an universal aseent to those they ca.Il maxims, by saying, they
are generally usented to u soon u proposed and the terms
thsy are proposed in understood: seeing all men, even ohildren,
as eoon u they hear and understand the terms, lIoSSent to these
propositions, they think it is .ufficient to prove them innate.
For, since men never faU, after they have once understood the
words, to acknowledge them for undoubted truths, they would
infer, that certa.i.nly these propositions were first lodged In the
understanding, which, without any teaching, the mind, at the
very first proposal, immediately closes with, and usents to, and
after that never doubts again.
18. If /JUOh, an aa.tmt be a mark of innate, t1um. that one and two
/We 6'1.'UaZ to t1vreo, that BWeetnlll ... fIOt bittsrne .. ,anda tllOUlana
the loke, ...... t be innats.-In answer to this, I demand whether
ready lIoSSent, given to a proposition upon first hearing and under-
standing the terms, be a certain mark of an innate principle? If
it be not, suoh a general lIoSSent is in vain urged as a proof of
them: if it be said, tha.t it is a mark of innate, they must then
allow all such propositions to be innate which are generally
_nted to u soon as heard; whereby they will find themselves
plentifully stored with innate principles. For, upon the &aule
ground, viz., of assent at first hearing and understanding the
terms, that men would have those maxims p .... for innate, they
must also admit several propositions about numbers to be innate;
and thus, that "one and two are equal to three," that .. two and
two are equal to four," and a multitude of other the like propoBi-
tiona In numbers that everybody lIoSSenta to at first hearing and
undsrstanding the terms, must have a place amongst the .. innate
axioms. Nor is this the prerogative of numbers alone, and pro-
poBitions made about several of them; but even natural
philoeophy, and all the other sciences, afford propoBitions, which
are sure to meet with assent u soon as they are understood.
That "two bodies cannot be in the same placo " is a truth thai
nobody any more Bticks at than at this maxim, that "It is im-
poseible for the same thing to be and not to be," that "white ia
not black," that a" square is not a circle," that" yellowness is
not sweetness ": these and a million of other such propositions,
u many at least u we have distinct ideas, every man In his wit.
at first hearing, and knOwing what the names Btand for, must
necessarily assent to. If these men will be true to their own
rule, and have" usent at first hearing and understanding the
10 OP HUMAN UNDBRSTANDING
&erma " to be II mark of bmate, they mud aJ10w Do& only as many
bma:::!kopoaitions as men have distinct ide .... but &II III&Ily as men
can e propositions wherein different ideas are denied one 01'
IoDOUl8l': einee every proposition, wherein one different idea Ie
denied of IoDOUler, will as certainly find aseent at first hearing and
undentanding Ule terma, &II U1Ie general one, "It Is impossible
f01' Ule lI&Dle to be and no& to be "; or that which Is Ule founda-
tion of it, and Is Ule easier understood of Ule two, .. The II&Dl8 Is
not different ": by which account they will havd leglcna of bmate
propositions of U1Is one BOrt, without mentioning any oUler. Bnt
eince DO proposition can be innate, unless Ule ideas about which
It Is be innate, U1Ie will be to suppose all our ideas of colours,
BOunds, tastee, figure, ete., innate: than which there cannot be
anything more opposite to reaaon and experience. Universal
eOO ready aseent upon hearing and understanding the terms, Is,
I grant, II mark of self-evidence: but self-evidence, depending not
on innate Impressions, but on something else (as we shall show
hereafter), belonge to several propositions, which nobody was yet
BO extravagant &II to pretend to be innate.
19. Svch IR. g6fll1raT.propoBiti&na knoum beforo th .. unW",aT.
............. -Nor let it be said, that those more particular self
evident propositicna which are assented to at first hearing, as,
that "one and two are eqnal to three," that ... green is not red,"
ete., are received &II Ule consequences of those more universal
propositions. which are looked on as innate principles; eince any
one who will but take Ule pains to observe what passeR in the
understanding will certainly find that these and the like 1_
general propositions are certainly known and firmly assented to
by Ulose who are utterly ignorant of those more general maxims;
and BO, being earlier in the mind than those (as they are called)
first principles, cannot owe to Ulem Ule assent ..,.herewith Uley
are received at first hearing.
20. OM an4 otI6 equal to two, etc., fIOt g6fll1raT. fIOr flAefu!,
It be B&1d, that these propositions, viz., to Two and
two are equal to four," .. Bed Is not blne," etc., are not
J:IlUIma, nor of any great use; I llonsWer, That makes not to
the argument of universal assent, upon hearing and understand
ing. F01', If that be the certain mark of innate, whatever pro-
position can be found that receives general assent, as soon lIS
beard and understood, that must be admitted for an innate pro-
position, as well as this maxim, to that it is impossible for Ule
lI&Dle thing te be and not to be, they being upon tbis ground equal.
And as te Ule ditl'erence of being more general, that makes this
maxim more remote from being innate; Ulose general and
abstract ideas being more strangers to our first apprehensions
than those of" more particular self-evident propositions; and
Ulerefore it Is 10nger before they are admitted and assented to
The ninth ocUtlon OIIllta II 01. "-Borr.
NO INNATB PRINCIPLES IN THB MIND

bY the growing understanding. And as to Ule _fulneaa of
iIi.e magnified maxims, that perhaps will not be found 10 grea'
lIB ill generaUy conceived, when ii comes to* its due plaee to bs
more fully oonsidered.
In. not b.w.g knoum '011I6Wme. til! propo.ed,

thml not mnats.-But we have not yet done with" aBsent
to propositions at first hearing and understanding Uleir term.:"
It fli we first take notice, that U1Ie, instead of being a mark that
u.oy'are innate, Is a proof of the contrary ; eince it supposes that
.. viIral who understand and know other things, are ignorant of
tbue principles till Uley are proposed to Ulem, and that one may
be unacquainted with these truths till he hears them from others.
For If they were Innate, what need they be proposed in order to
aainlnJr assent; when, by being in the understanding,' by a
iiature1 and original impression (if there were any suoh), they
could nol but be known before? Or doth the proposing them
print Ulem olearer in Ule mind than nature did? If BO, then the
oonaequenee will be, that a III&Il knows them better after he has
been Ulus taught them than he did before. Whence it will follow,
that Ulese principles may be made more evident to us by others'
teaching than nature has made them by impression; which will
m agree with Ule opinion of innate prinoiples, and give but little
lIuU10rity to Ulem; but, on the contrary, makes them nnftt to be
Mle foundations of all our omer knowledge, lIS Uley are pretended
$0 be. This cannot be denied, that men grow first acquainted
wW1 many of these selfevident truths, upon their being proposed;
built Is clear that whosoever does so, ftnde in himself that he
Ulen begins to know a proposition which he knew not before;
and whiCh, from Ulenceforth, he never questions; not because ii
was innate, but because Ule consideration of the nature of Ule
things contained in those worde would not suffer him to U1ink
oiherwlae, how or whensoever he Is brougM to reflect on them.
And If whatever is assented to at first hearing and understand
Ing Uls terms, must pass for an innate principle, every well-
grounded observation drawn from partioula.re into a general rule
mud be innate; when yet it Is certain, that not all but only
aagacIous heads light at first on these observations, and reduce
them. Into general propositions; not innate, but collected from a
Jl!8C8ding acquaintance and refleotion on partioular instances.
'.l'hNe, when obeervlng men have made them, unobserving men
when Uley are Jlroposed to them, caunot refuse their aseent to.
!& ImpUoitty knoum befors propolling, signifies tMt the mind
.. CGpGbH of tmderltam.dMog thml, or signifies fIOtMIIIIl.-If it
be.ala, II The understanding hath an implicit knowledge of these
principles, but not an explicit, before U1Ie first hearing," (as they
mud who will that Uleyare in the understanding before ther
are known,) it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a prin
'!'be DlDtb hu If 1a"1D8te.d of II t.ot-BDrr.
..
OP HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
elpIe Imprinted on the nnclerstanding implicitly; unl8118lt be tbia,
tilat $he mind is capable of understanding &tid ....... ntlng firmly
$0 IIUOh proposition.. And thus all mathematical demonstn.
tions, .. well aB first princivles, must be reoeived .. native 1m.
on the mind: which I fear they will scaroe allow them
$0 be who find it harder to demonstrate a proposition th&tl ....... nt
$0 it when demonstrated. And few mathematici&nB will be
forward to believe, that all the diagrams they have drawn were
bu' coplea of those Innate characters which nature had engraven
upon their minds.
28. TM wrgwrrwmt O/4UtmWng on twit upon a./.
"'f'P
oriUon
0/ flO pr_dent teIZOMng.-There is, I fear, this
farther wealmees in the foregoing argument, which would per-
.uade us that therefore those maxims are $0 be thought Innate
which men admit at first hearing, because they ....... nt to proposi-
Uons which they are not taught nor do receive from the foroe of
any argument or demonstration, but a bare explication or
unaentanding of the tarms. Under which there seems to me to
lie this faJlacy: that men are supposed not to be taught, nor $0
learn &tIything tU novo; when in truth they are taught &tid do
learn something ignorant of before. For, first, it is
evident they have ed the terms and their signification;
neither of which waa bom with them. But this is not all the
acquired knowledge in the case; the ideas themselves, about
which the proposition is, are not bom with them no more th&n
their names, but got afterwards. So that in all propositions
tilat are usented to at first hearing, the terms of the proposition,
their standing for such Ideu, &tid the ideu themselves that they
stand for, being neither of them innate, I would faIn know what
there is rema.ining in such propositions that is Innate. For I
would gladly have &tIyone name thai; proposition whose terms or
ldeu were either of them Innate. We by degrees gei; ideu &tid
names, &tid learn their appropriated connexion one with another;
&tid then to propositions, made in such terms whose signification
we have learnt, &tid wherein the agreement or disagreement we
C&Il peroelve in our ideaB when put together is expressed, we at
first hearing usent; though to other propositions, in themselves
aB oeriam a.nd evident, but which are conoeming idelU not eo
soon or so easily got, we are at the same time no way capable of
_ting. For though a child quickly aBsents to this proposition,
tilat .. an apple is not fire," when, by familiar acquaintance, he
hu got the ideu of those two different things distinctly im-
printed on his mind, &tid has learnt that the name ... apple" &tid
.. fire .. stand for them; yet it will be some years after. perhaps,
before the eame child will aBsent to this proposition, that .. it is
Impouible for the same thing to be and not to be," because that,
thOUgh perhape the words are .. BUy $0 be learnt, yet the signi-
fication of them being more large, comprehensive, &tIiI abstract
NO INNATE PRINCIPLES IN THE MIND
than of the names annexed to thoBe sensible things the child
hath to do with, it ialonger before he learns their precise me&n'
lng, and it requires more time plainly to form in his mind those
general ideas they stand for. Till that be done, you will in vain
endeavour to make any child aBsent to a proposition made up of
such general terms; but as soon aB ever he has got those ideaB,
and learned their names, he forwardly closes with the one as well
aB the other of the forementioned propositions, and with both for
the same reason, viz., because he finds the ideas he has in his
mind to agree or disagree, according aB the words standing for
them are a.fiirmed or denied one of another in the proposition.
But if propositions be brought to him in words which stand for
id4!"8 he has not yet in .his mind; to such propositions, however
eVIdently true or false m themselves, he affords neither assent
nor dIssent, but is ignorant. For words being but empty sounds,
any farther than they are signs of our ideaB, we cannot bu'
assent to them aB they correspond to those ideas we have, but
no farther than that. But the showing by what stepa and waya
knowledge comes into our minds, and the grounds of several.
degrees of assent being the business of the following discourse,
it may aufiioe to have ouly touched on it here, aB onB reaSOD that
made me doubt of those innate principles.
24. Not mnats, beca.tUe not timMJBr.a.Zly lU.tmtBtJ. to.-To COD
clude tbia argument of universal consent, I agree with these
defenders of innate principles, that if they are innate, they mmt
needs have universal aBsent. For, that a truth should be Innate
and yet not assented to, is to me aa unintelligible aB for a man to
know a truth and be ignorant of it at the same time. But then,
by these men'. own confession,they cannot be Innate ; sinoe they
are not aBsented $0 by those who understand not the terms, nor
by a great part of those who do understand them, but have yet
never heard nor thought of those propositions, which, I think, is
Mleast onehalf of ma.nkind. But were the number far less, It
would be enough to destr01 universal. aBsent, and thereby show
$hese propositions not to be mnate, if children alone were ignorant
of them.
iii. ThMe fIOl tM ford lmown.-But that I may not be
aocused to argue from the thoughts of infanta, whioh are unknown
to us, and to conclude from what PB888s in their understandinge,
before theyexpreas it, I say next, that these two general. propos!.
tions are not the truth. that first possess the minds of children,
nor are anteoedent to all acquired and adventitious notions,
wldch, if they were Innate, they must needs be. Whether we
C&Il determine it or no, it matters not; there is oerla.inly a time
when children begin to think, and their words and actions do
_ us that they do so. When therefore oapable of
thought, of knowledge, of assent, can it ratio be supposed
shey O&tl be ignorant of those notions that nature Imprinted
OF HUM.fN UNDBRST.fNDING
were there any such? Oan it be with an1
of reason, that they perceive the ImpresSlons from things WIthout,
and be at the same time ignorant of those characters which
nature itself has taken care to stamp within? Oan they receive
and assent to adventitious notions, and be .ignorant thOll8
which are supposed woven into the very prinCIples of thm being,
and imp,rinted there in indelible characters, to be the
and gmde of oJl their acquired knowledge and future reasomngs ?
Thill would be to make nature take pains to no purpose, or, at
leut to write very ill; since its characters could net be read
by those eyes which saw other things very well: and those are
very ill supposed the clearest parts of truth and the
of oJl our knowledge, which are not first known, WIthout
which the undoubted knowledgs of several other things may
had. The child certainly knows that the nurse it
neither the cat it plays with, nor the Blaclmloor It 18 afraId of ,
that the worm seed or mustard it refuses is not the apple or
sugar it cries for; this it and ....
of: bnt will anyone say, it 18 by VIlme of this pnnclple, it
is imposeibla for the same thing to be and not to be,' that it
80 firinly assents to these and other parts of its knowledge? or
thet the child has any notion or apprehension of that proposition
at an age wherein yet, U is plain, it knows a great many other
truths ? He that will say, .. Ohildren join these lIeneral abstract
speoulations with their suokingbottles and thmr rattles," may
perhaps, with justice, be thought to have more passion and
zeal for his opinion, but lase sincerity and truth, than one of
thetage.
96. AM.a fIOt mnat..-Though therefore there be several
general propositions that meet with OOnstlIoIlt and ready assent
... soon as proposed to men grown up, who have attained use
of more general IIoIld abstract ideas, IIoIld names sta.nding for
$hem' yet they not being to be found in those of tsuder years,
who know other things, they cannot pretend to
1;IDiversal assent of intelligent persona, and 80 by no meaIl!'
be supposed innate; it being impossible that any truth which 18
innate (if there were any such) should be unknown, at lsaat to
anyone who knows lIoIlything else: since, if they are innate
they must be innate thoughts; there being nothing a
truth m the mind that it has never thought on. Where!.y it 18
evident if there be any innate truths,* they must neoessarily be
the first of any thought on, tha first that appear there.
Not W1au, """"""'8 thsy apJJeM l6ad whtw, wMt """'!It.
.how t.,I} ol6arut.-That the
of are not Known to ohildren, idiots, and a great part of mankind,
we have already au1Iioiently proved; whereby}t is they
have not an universal assent, nor are general lIDprell&lOll8. But
Tho DlnU> oddo lion, _lAo aIood.-_
NO INN.fTB PRINCIPLES IN THB MIND
as
&here Is this farther .argnment in it against their being innate :
that these characters,if they were native and original impressions
should appea.r fairest and clea.rest in those persons in whom yet
we find n? footsteps of them; and it is, in iny opinion a strong
presumpt!on that are not innate, since they are le.:at known
to those m whom, if they were innate, they must needs exert
themselves with most force and vigour. For children, idiots
savages, and illiterate people, being of all others the least cor:
by oustom or borrowed opinions; learning and education
cast native thoughts into new moulds. nor by
su.pennducmg foreIgn and studied doctrines confounded those
fllIr written there; one might reasonably
that m theIr mInds these innate notions should lie open
fairly to eyeryone's view, as it is certain the thoughts of children
do. It nnght very well be expected that these principles should
be perfectly known to naturals; which, being stamped imme-
diatelyon the these men suppose), can have no depend-
ence on the constItutions or organs of the body, the oulyconfesBed
difference between them and others. One would think accord-
to these men's principles, that oJl these native beams of
light (were there any such) should in those who have no
reserves, no a.rts of concealment, shine out in their full lustre
and leave us in no more doubt of their being there than we
of their of pleasure and abhorrence of pain. But, alas I
amongst idiots, savages, and the grossly illiterate, what
general maXlIllll are to be found? what universal principles of
knowledge? Their notions a.re few and narrow borrowed only
from those objects they have had most to do ';;th and whioh
have. made upon their senses the frequentest and strongest inl-
preSSIons. A ohild knows his nurse and his cradle and, by
degrees, the playthings of a little more advanoed age' and a
young savage has perhaps his head filled with love and hunting
acoording to the fashion of his tribe. But he that from a ohilci
untaught, or a wild inhabitant 01 the woods will expeot these
abstract maxims and reputed principles of sciences, will, I fear
lind himself mistaken. Such kind of general propositions
seldom mentioned in the huts of Indians; muoh lesS a.re they to
be found .in the thoughts of children, or any inlpresslons of them
on the mInds of natnrals. They a.re the language and businesa
of the schools and academies of learned nations acoustomed '0
that sort of or where disputes a.re frequent:
these bemg suited to artificial a.rgumentation and useful
for conVlotIon; but not much conducing to the disoovery of
truth or advancement of knowle<h1e. But of their amoJl use for
the Improvement of knowledgs, 1: ahoJ1 have occasion to speak
more at large, book iv. ohap. 7.
28. know not how absurd this may seem to
the masters of demonstration: and probably it will hardly go down
OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
with anybody at first hearing. I must therefore beg a Utile
truoe with prejudice and the forbea.ance of censure till I have
been heard out in the sequel of this discourse, being very willing
to submit to better judgments. And since I impartially search
aftar $rUth, I shall not be sorry to be convinced iliat I have
been too fond of my own notions; which, I confess, we are all
apt to be when application and study have warmed our heada
with them.
Upon the whole matter, I cannot aee any ground to think
these two famed speculative ma.xima innate, sinoe are not
UDlverseJly assented to; and the assent they so generaJ.ly find is
no other than what several propositions, not allowed to be
Innate, equally partake in with them; and ainoe the assent iliat
is given them is produced another way, and comes not from
natural inscription, as I doubt not but to make appear in the
following discourse. And if these erst principles of knowledge
and menoe are found not to be innate, no other speculative
maxima can, I suppose, with better right pretend to be 10.
OHAPTEB IlL
80 llOlATB PRAOTIOAL PBIBOIPLlIL
1. No moraZ principle 0 cleM amd ao g_aZly re_eci IN
the forNIl6fltMiiIeci 'fetmZa.twe f/UWima.-If those speculative
maXIma whereof we discoursed in the foregoing chapter, have not
an actual universal assent from all mankind, as we there proved,
it Is muoh more visible concerning practical principles, that they
come shorl of an universal reception; and I think it will be hard
to instance anyone moral rule which can pretend to so general
and ready an assent as, "What ia, Is," or to be 10 manifeat a
$rUth as this, .. That it Is impossible for the eame thing to be,
and not to be." Whereby it is evident that they are farther
removed from a title to be innate; and the doubt of their being
native impreaaiona on the mind i. atronger against theee moral
principle. than the other. Noi tbat it bringe their truth at all
in queetion. They are equeJly true, though not equeJly evident.
Thoee epeculative InaDma carry their own evidence with
them; but moralprinciplea require reascm1ng and discourse,
and lIODle exercise of the mind, to diecover the oerlainty of their
$rUth. They Ue not open as natural characters engraven on the
mind; which if any such were, they must needs be visible by them-
selves, and by their own light be oerlain and known to everybody.
But thiats no derogation to their truth and oertainty; no more
than it Is to the truth or oertainty of the three a'Dglee of a
SriaDgle beinR equal to two right onea, beoause it Is not 10
evident as, " The whole Is bigger than a pan," nor 80 apt to be
_ted to at ftrat hearing. U may n1lioe that these moral
NO INNATE PRACTICAL PRINCIP'LBS
.,
ifa .. oapable of demonstration; and therefore it is our
we come not to a certain 1m I d own
Ignorance wherein many men are otlli e ge of
d
them. But the
assent wherewith otbers' em, an the siown8BB of
th.ey are not innate, and t'h
e
melanifest .. t
Mthout r erna ves to theU' VIew
FlUth amd judice not owned... .
Whether there be any such moral rincfj"l'le.", all ........ -
!'B"tehe, hi! .appeal to any wbo have be:n but :rJe!.eretn
tel
all men do
m e story of mankind, d I ow y conversant
of own chimneys. Where the amoke
UnIversally reeeived with t d b a practioal truth that Is
innate? Justioe and ou f t or question, as It must be if
men seem to a ' e in T I!mg 0 oo'.'tracts, is that which most
extend itself toBfue .. prmtple which Is thought to
greatest villains' and they wh evhs, an the confederacies of the
off of humanity Itself
0
IiUt
e
farth
d
rul
est

one WIth another I nt, h' 1 an ee of lustioe
amongst another'; buff: is \'h
t
o:tlBW:
S
do this one
laws of nature. They 0u, recalVIng theee as the innate
within their own communitiea b as rules . of convenienoe
that he embraces justioe as a to conceive
his fellow highwayman, and P,:-mCl
P
who acts fairly
kills the next honest man he meets with je plunders or
the common tie. of s . t us oe and truth are
robbers, who b ak . OOle y, and therefore even outlaws and
and rules of :e wOi
ld
besides, must keep faith
together. But will emfu:
es
, or else they cannot hold
th
and rapine have thaJ by
ey aJlow and assent to? an lw"'oo, whioh
8. Objeotion. .. ,,- .
they aMnit them in men lW'W them on tlW prtICtiCfJ, 11"
th
be .urged, .that the t:tr will
h
'
eU' pra.atice contradicts I . agrees w at
tbe actions of men the best FIrst, I have always thought
aince It is certain that most of tbeir thoughts; but
professions, have either 'ddthsome open
Is impossible to establish an . ",.ie esa prmClplee, It
should look for it onI amon t unlvers consent (though we
Is impo .. ible to conclUde thr me
S
); without whioh It
to
derived from contemplation.. Practical principle.
oonformity of action, not and must produoe
or sIse they are in vain distinguish d fro ve theU' tt;Itb,
N atnre, I confe.. has t' em. s...,., ..... tive DlaXlm&.
an aversion to '. !JU
th
man a de8J1'e of happiness, and
01 1 . IIllIHD'Y , ese mdead, are innate ractical .
P es, which, as practiro.l onght, do conu!:ue
OP HUJlAN UNDERSTANDING
be pleaaod to allow It. Your lordship, therefore, might, without""
preJudioe to thoes declarations of goOd.will and favour yon have for
the author of the Euay of Human Und8l'8tanding, have .pared the
mentioning his quatin/!: anth01'8 that are in print, for mattera of fact, to
quite another purpoeo, as going about to Invalidate the argument for
a DeIty from th. Universal oonaent of mankind;' mce he leavee that
UDiverl&l GOlII8nt as entire and as large as yon yourself do, or can own
or IUppoeolt. But here I have no reason to be BOrry that' yourlord.
Ihip 'baa J!!:ven me thiA oooaeion for the viDdioation of thiA peuage of
m, book; If thera ebould be anfone beaidee lOur lordeblp who ebould
10 &.r mI.atake It, as to think it m the leaet inva1idatee the argument
for a God from the Univera1 oonaent of mankind.'
.. But, beoauea you queetion tho oredIbility of th088 anthon I have
quoted, wbiob, you . y, were very illohoeen,' I will onveleave to ."
that he whom I relied on for hiA ieBtimony ooneerning tha Hottentots
.f 8oldanla, _ no lea a man than an ambeaeador from the King of
England to tha Great 1rI011Ul. Of whoes relation 1rI0neiaur Theveno'
(no ill judge in the 0&88) Dae eo great an esteem, that he _ at the
paiDa to tnnalete It into French, and publish it in his (whiob is
_nted no injudiolona) Oolleotion of Travels. But to Intercede with
JOur 1ordebI1,' for a little more favourable allowance of oredIt to Sir
Thomas Roe. relation: Ooore, an inhabitant of the ooantry, who
oould BpIlI'k EnJdiAb, IIIlIIIlf8Ci Mr. Terry' that they of 80ldania 1iad no
God. But if 'he, too, have the illlu"" to find no oredIt with yon, I
hope fO!l will be a little more favourable to a divine of th. oburch of
EnglAnd, now Iiring, and admit of his teetimony in oonllrmation of Sir
Thomae Roe'L This worthy gentleman, in the relation of his va1"&"
to Bunt, ,mnted but two years speaking of the eame people, baa
aheoe wOn1a: They are I1liIk even DelOW idolatry; are d .. titnte of both
and temple; and, _ring a little ahow of rejoiflil!g, .whlob iA made
at the fnll and new moon, have loat all kinda of rellgl.ona davotion.
Nature baa eo rIobly provided for their oonvenience ID this life, that
the,' have drowned aJl _ of the God of it, and are grown quite
.nr- of the next. 't
.. But, to provide against the clearest evidenee of atheiAm In th_
people, fOIl _, that the ....,.."t given of them makes them not fit
to be a itandarl1 for the _ of mankind.' ThiA, I think, may pe8II
for nothing, till eomebod} be found '"that makes them to be a stsndard
ror the _ of mankin .' All the uea I made of them _ to ebow,
that there were men in tha world that bad no Innate idea of a God.
But, to keep eometbing like an going, (for what will not that
do I) yon go near thoee (Jden to be men. What elee do
aheoe wordi aignifJ.1- A P!"'ple 10 atnngely bereft of oommon I8DI&,
that they can bardI.J be nCltoned in&nkind' as appears by the
beat ICOOWlts of the Oden of 8oIdanl..,... I hope if any of them
.... oalI.ed Peter. Jam., or John, it would be put IKll'Ilple that thq
were men: however Oourwee, Wewena. ... d llonshed&, and th ...
ethan who bad _ that bad no plaoea In your nomeno!etor, would
Iwdil \lUI muter with yoar
.. 111 lord, I Ihonld not mention tbIa, but that what JOIl youneIC -I
Iaere may be a motive to JOIl to OOIIIider. that what yon have leid I1Ulb
TDan'l'-. pp. If, .. t .... 0YDIn0Ir, p. -
THE ORIGINAL OP OUR
BOOK II
CHAPTER I.
01' IDEAS DI OENBBAL. AND TUBla ODIODIAL.
$0 :W:rr hi.lmm,=g:usc=
. being. ilie .ideas that are iliere. past
ili men .... ve m ilielI" mmd aevera! ideas auoh as are
by the worda, .. whileneB8. sweetneas,
n is ing'{he
O
ly'dz:unk
enn8llll
." .. doilie ....
th ? I kn p. e "'!... inquired, How he comea by
Id:: .. d . <!w_:' harlB a received doctrine, iliat men have native
o'"!gm ... 0 acters &tamped upon ilielr minda In ilieir
first bemg. Tbie opinion I have a'large examined a1read
an suppoae, "!"hat I llid In ilie foregoing book will
mu eully admitted, when I have shown whence the
understanding may get all ilie Ideas it has, .. d by what". .. d
degrees iliey may oome into the mind for whioh I ahall
to every <!De's own obaervation and
AU idsa..o011l<l from ,em"tUm Of" reflecti<m.-Le' 118 then
auppoee mmd be. as we say, while paper. void of all char.
aoters, Wli b
iliout
Imy Ideas; how oomes it to be furnished? Whence
oomes , y tha, vast store. which $he busy Imd boundl81111 fan
0!l it with 1m almcmendless variety?
. maleriale of reason Imd knowledge? To this I
:iwerd md,0ne word, From experience: in that all our knowledJre
e Imd from ilia' 1$ ultimately derivos ilealf. Our 011.
sr,"ation employed eUher about exlernai sensible objeota or
a out ilie of our minda. perceivedlmd retl"';ted
on by ourselves. 18 that which supplies our understandlnga ili
all the materials of thinlring. These two are the fOuntam!' of
whenoe all the i.Ieas we have or can natnrall,
-ve, aprmg. '
8. TIN object of _"tUm one lOves of u.....-Firn. Our
particular aensible objects, do CODvey into
e aever .. dlatme' perceptious of thing., accordi.oc to iliOM
OIl HUJlA.N UNDBRSTA.NDING
ft,l'loaa ways wherein those objects do alfeot them; and thus we
come by those ideas we haw of whUe, hea"
harcl bik sweel, ana all thole w' we oaIl sensible II ee;
whloh whm: I 88i1 the aeneea convey Into the mina, I mean,
from eDamal obleota convey Into the mind what produces
those This great source of most of the ideas we have,
ae .... "dIng_woou; upon our 88D888, ana clerivea by them to the
r- c1iDg. r oaJl " sensation "
oj otW "w,;,u 1M otMr _"" of eMm.-
Secondly. The other fOllntain, from which
the understanding with ideas, is the perception of the
of our own minas within us, as U is employed about the Ideas It
has aot which operations when the soul comes to reflect on and
'i' as: do fumish the with another eet of ideas
=. not be had from things witho,;,t; and al!
oeption, thinking, doubting, believing, willingb' '
and all the different actings of our own mmds; whIch we,
OOIlIClous of and observing In ourselves, do from these
into our understanding as distinct ideas, as we do from bodies
atrecting our senses. This source of ideas ever,: man h'"!l wholly
In himself' and though it be not eense as havwg nothing to do
with ex_l objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly
eno h be called "internal sense." But as I. oaIl the
so I oaIl this " reflection," the ideas It affords
8uch only as the mind gets by reflecting on its. own operatlo'!8
within itself. By reflection, then, in the followms: part !If thlB
discourse I would be understood to mean that notIce whIch the
mind of its own operations, ana the manner of the!"> by
reason whereof there come to be ideas of theee m. the
understanding. These two, I say, viz., external material th!ngs
as the objects of sensation, and the operations of our own
within as the objects of reflection, are, to me, the ODly originala
from whence all our ideas take their beginnings. term
.. tions "here I use in a largs 8ense, as comprehending not
b=" the actions the mind about its ideas, but sort of
pasaions arising sometimes from them, such as is the satisfaction
or uneasiness arising from any thought.
II .All otW ideal Me oJeM OfllHW tM
standi.ng seems to me not to have the least glimmermg of any
ideas wliich it doth not receive from one of th.ese two .
objeota fumish the mind with the ideas of een&lble qualities, whIch
are all those different perceptions they in ns; the
mind fumishee the understanding with ideas of It I own operatIOns.
These when we have taken a full survey of them, and their
eeveral oombinations, and relations, we shall find t? con-
taIn all our whola atock of iaeas; and thet we have nothing In
our minds which did not come In one of theee two ways. .Let
any CIII8 eumine his own thoughts, and thoroughiy.earch imo
THE ORIGINA.L OIl OUR IDEAS
6.
bI. and then let him tell me, whether all the
original ideas he has there, are any other than of the objeots of
his 88D888, or of the operations of his mind considered as objeots
of relleotion; and how great a mass of knowledge soever he
imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a view,
see that he has not any idea in his mind but what one of these
two hath imprinted, though perhaps with infinite variety com-
pounded and enlarged by the understanding, as we shall see
hereafter.
6. Ob,,,,,,,abZe ... IlMldr ..... -He that attentively considers the
atate of a chUd his flrst coming into the world, will have little
reason to think him stored with plenty of ideas that are to be the
of hi.s future knowledge. It is by degrees he comes to be
them; and though the ideas of obvious and familiar
themselves before the memory begins to keep a
reglBter of time and order, yet it is often so late bafore some
unnsual qualities come in the way, that there are few men that
!ecolleot the of their acquaintance with them;
ana, if 1t were worth whUe, no doubt a child might be so orderea
as to have but a very few even of the ordinary ideas till he were
grown uJl to a man. But all that are born into the world being
lurrounde.d with. bodies that perpetually and diversely affect
them, varIety of 1deas whether care be taken about it, or no, are
imt=ted on the minas of ohildren. Light and colours are busy
at d everywhere when the eye is but open; sounas and some
tangible qualities faU not to solicit their proper senses, and force
an entrance to the mind; but yet I think it will be granted easUy
that if a child were kept in a place where he never saw any
but black and white till he were a man, he would have no more
ideas of scarlet or green, than he that from his childhood never
tasted an oyster or a pinoapple has of those partioular relishes.
7. M .... atr. differently furnish.d with the.1l acoording to the
lifferent obj.cta they convert. with.-Men then come to be fur.
nishea with fewer or more simple ideas from without, aocording
as the objects they converse with afford greater or less variety ;
ana from the operations of their minas within, according as they
more or 1.11 refleot on them. For, though h. that contemplates
the operations of his mind cannot but have plain and clear ideas
of them; unless he turn his thoughts that way, and consiaers
them attentively, he will no more have olear and distinct ideas
of all the operations of his mind, and all that may be observed
therein, than he will have all the particular ideas of any land-
scape, or of the parts and motions of a clock, who will not turn
his eyes to it, ana with attention heea all the parts of it. The
picture or clock may be so placed that they may come in his
way every day; but yet he will have but a confused idea of all
the parts they are made 0', till he applies himself with attention
kI conaider them each in particular.
OF HUIIAN UNDBRSTANDING
.. 1 .... 0/ later, NeaU." tMy need "'lMaUott.-ADa
benoe .... _ ibe nuon why U is pre"y law before moM ohllc1ren
P' ideM of $he operations of $heir own minds; and lOme have
-1 very olear or perfee$ Idsas of $he greatest pad of them
all $hmr Dves :-beeause, though they pass there continually, yet
like bUng visions, $hey make nol deep Impl'8B8ion. enough to
leave In lIle mind clear, distinct, lasting ideae, till the under-
nandiL iurne Inwarda upon ltealf, reftaclB on its own operations,
and m
7
them the object of its own conwmplation. Children,
when $hell::ne tim Into U, are lI\lrl"Ounded wi$h a world of new
UlIDgs, 11' , by a con .... t aolicitatlon of $heir aeneas, draw $he
mma con .... Uy to tham, forward to take noUce of new, and apt
to be delighted with ibe variety of changing objeete. Thue tDe
first yean are U8UaIly employed and diverted In looking abroad.
Men'. buaiDeae In them is to acquaint thamealves with what ia
to be found without; and so, growing up In a conetant attention
to outward eaneatiODs, aeldom make any coneiderable reftection
on what paaeae withID $hem till $hey come to be of riper yean;
mel some _ evv at all.
9. PIuJ .otd "..,.., to have ideM w""" it beg"" to perc..ov".-To
uk, at what time a man haa 11m any Ideae, Ie to aak when he
begine to pereeive; having ldeae, and perception, being the same
tbiDg. 1 know ille an opinion, that the eoul alwa18 thinks; and
that it baa the actual perception of ideas within itealf eonetantly,
... lOIIIf ... " em .. ; and that actual thinking II ... inseparable
from the lOul, ... actual extension is from the body: which, if
true, to Inquire af&er $he beginning of a man'. ideae is $he
... to Inquire after the beginning of bill eoal. For, by $hia
IoCC01IDi, lou! and its ideae, ... body and ita e:ltenalon, will begin
to e:liat both at the aame time.
10. T1uJ aotd thiftk. ItOt aZway.; fM' em. _fa proof.-But
whether the eoul be suppoead to erist antecedent to, or _val
with, or eome time after, the first rudiments or organization, or
the beginnings of life In the body, I leave to be disputed by thoae
who have better thonght of that matter. 1 confeBS myealf to
have one of thoae dull eoule that doth not peroeive itealf alwa18
to contemplate ideas; nor can conceive it any more neceaaary for
the eoul ..111'1018 to fulnk, than for the body always to move; $he
perception of Ideas being, as 1 conceive, to the soul, what motion
II to the body; not its e88ence, but one of ita operations; and,
$berefore, thongh thinking be supposed never eo much the
actinn of the lOul, yet it II not necessary to suppoae that .t
mould be always thinking, alway. In action: that, perhllopl, is
ibe privilege of the Infiniw Author and Preserver of thIDgs,
"who never e1umberanore1eepa;" but U is not compewnt to any
6niIe belDg, at leaet not to the lOul of man. We know certainly,
by nperienae, that we sometimes think; dr .. w tills In-
fUlibIe coneequence,-that there Ie somc1.hiog m us that has a
THB ORIGINAL OF OUR IDBAS
power to think; but whether that BUbatance perpetually thinka,
or no, we can be no farther assured than e:lp8rience InformB us.
For to Bay that actual thlnkin.. I. eBSentiai to tbe eoul and
lDsep ...... ble from it, is to beg ';hat is in question and not to
prove it by reason; which is neces8&ry to be done' if it be nol
a self evident proposition. But whether the BOul
always thinks,' be a self-evident proposition. that everybody
assent. to on first he .... ing. I nppea.l to mlloDJriud. It II doubted
whether I thought all. last ?r no;. the question being
about a of. f",!t, .t II beggll.'g ,t to bnng ... a proof for it
an hypothes which 18 .the very thing In dispute; by which way
ODe may anyfulng; and it is but supposing that all
watehes. whilst the balance beats, think. and it is sufficiently
proved, and pIIost doubt, that my wateh thought all last night.
:Hut ,he that would not deceive himself ought to bnild his hypo.
thes18 on matter of fact, and make it out by _ible nperience
and not presume on matter of fact because of his hypothesis !
that is, he euppose. It to be .0; which w .. y of provlntf
amounts to th'.,-that I must necessarily think all last night
beeause another suppose. 1 alway. think, $hough 1 myeclf
cannot perceive that I alwa18 do eo.
But in love with their opinions may not only suppoea wbat
is In questIOn,. but r:JIege wrong of fact. How elea could
anyone make ,t an inference of mlDe, that a thing is not, because
we are not sensible of it in our sleep? 1 do not say there is no
BOulln a man because he is not Bensible of it In hi leep but I
do. "'y, he at time, waking or sleeping,
bemg ns,ble of ,t. Our belllg sensible of it Is not nece.s&ry
to but to our thoughta; and to them it is, and to Ulem
It will alway. be, nec88sary, till we can think without being
consciouB of it.
11. It U ItOt aJwa,y. comciow of ".-1 grant that the 80ulln a
man is never without thought, because it I. the condition
of bemg !,wake; but whether sleeping wiUlout dreaming be not
an affection of ibe whole man, mind ... well ... body may be
worth a wa!<lDg man's consideration; it being bard to' conceive
that any t!i!it! and no*, be conecioUB of U. If the
eoul doth m a sleepmg man WIthout being conecious of it
1 ask, whether, during such thinking, it baa any pleasure or pain'
or be capable of happlne .. or mieary? I am sure the man
not, more the or eartb he lie. on. For to be happy
or Wlth?ut conscious of U, _me to me utterly
and Or if it be poBSible that the eoul
can, whilat body 18 sleeping, have ita thinking, enjoyments,
and c?ncerne, Ita pleasure or pain, apart, which the man II not
conscIous of, nor partOoke. in it is certrun that Boerates as1eep
and Socrate. awake, is not the same person; but hi. eoul
be aleeps, and Socrates the man, oonsi.ting of body and eoul,
OP HUMAN UNDBRSTANDING
when he fa waking, are two per!IOIllI; since waking Socra&es h ..
DO knowledge of, or concernment for that happiness or misery
of hfa soul wD1ch it enjoys alone by itself whilst he sleeps, with-
out l*'C8iving anything of it, no more than he haS for the
happinMB or mfaBryof a man in the Indies, whom he knows not_
For if we take wholly away all consciousness of our actions and
sensations, especially of pleasure and pain, and the concernmen$
thet accompanies i', It will be hard to know wherein place
per8OII&lldentity.
12. II II .leopilng mean thinks without 7mowing it, the sleeping
Me two 'pw.om_-"The soul, during sound sleep,
thIDks," say these men. Whilst U thinks and perceives, it is
:le, cerialnly, of those of delight or trouble, as well as any
perceptions; and U must necessarily be conscious of its
own perceptions. But U has all this apan. The sleeping man,
U fa plain, is conscious of nothing of all this. Let us suppose,
then, the soul of Castor, whilst he is sleeping, remed from his
body; which is no impossible supp_osition for the men I have
here do with, who so liberally allow life without a thinking
soul to all other animals. These men canno', then, judge it im-
possible, or a contradiction, that the body should live without
the soul; nor that the soul should subsist and think, or Have
perception, even perception of happiness or misery, without the
body.- Let us, then, as I say, suppose the soul of Castor separated,
during hfa sleep, from his body, to think apan. Let us suppose,
too, that it chooses for its soone of thinking the body of another
man, v. g. 1'01111][, who is sleeping without a soul: for if Castor's
soul can think whilst Castor is asleep, what Castor is never
conscious of, 1$ Is no matter what place it chooses to think in.
We have here, then, the bodies of two men with ouly one soul
between them, which we will suppose to sleep and wake by
tarns; and the soul still thinking in the waking man, whereof
the sleeping man is never conscious, has never the least percep-
tion. I ask, then, whether Castor and Pollux, thus, with only one
soul between them, which thinks and perceives in one what the
other fa never conscious of, nor is concerned for, are not two as
distinet persons as Castor and Hercules, or as Socrates and Plato,
were? and whether one of them might not be very happy and
the other very miserable ? Just by the same reason they make
the soul and the man two persons, who make the sOul think
alllori what the man is not conscious of. For, I suppose, nobody
WIll make identity of persons to consist In tha soul's beiugunited
to the very same numerical particles of matter; for if that be
necessary to identity, it will be impossible, In that constant /!Ill[
of the panicles of our bodies, that any man should be the same
person two days or two moments together.
18. Impo,rible to convitace tho.e tkClt .lup without tJr61l1TT1fntfi
tMllAq U.iM.-Thus, methinks, every drowsy nod shakes thelt
MEN THINK NOT ALWAYS
doetrlne who teach that their soul is always thinking. Those,
at least, who do at an"l time sleep without dreaming can never
be convinced that theU' thoughts are sometimes for hours busy
without their knowing of It; and if they are taken in the very
act, waked in the middle of that sleeplDg' contemplation, can
give no manner of account of It.
14. ...... a,,.sllITTI without f'"""""bf11"ilng ';t, m "aMr. !""geil.
-It will perhaps be sald, tha.t the soul thinks even m the
soundest sleep, but the memory retains it not That the soul
in a sleeping man should be this moment busy a-thinking, and
the next moment in a waking man not remember, nor be able
to recollect one jot of all those thoughts, Is very hard to be oon-
csived, and would need some better proof than bare assertion
to make U be believed. For who can without any more ado
but being barely told so, imagine that the greatest pan of men
do, during all their lives, for several hours every day think of
something which, if they were asked even In the middle of these
thoughts, they could remember nothing at all of? Most men,
I thiDk, pass a great pan of their sleep without dreaming. I
once knew a man thet was bred a scholar, and had no bad
memory, who told me, he had never dreamed in his life till he
had thet fever he was then newly recovered of, which was about
the five-or-six-and-twentleth year of his age. I suppose the
world affords more such instances; at least, every one's ac-
quaintance will furnish him with examples enough of such as
pass most of their nights without dreaming,
111. UpOfO tm. hypotkeN, tke thought. 01 II "...
ought to be mod f'IIRonCII.-To think often arid never to retaIn it
10 much as one moment, is a very useless sort of thinking; and
the soul, In such a state of thinking, does very little if at all
exoel that of a looking-glass, which constantly reoe1ves a variety
of images, or ideas, but retains DOne; they disappear and vanisli,
and there remain no footsteps of them; the looking-glass Is
never the better for such Ideas, nor the soul for such thoughts.
Perhaps U will be said, "that in a man the materials of
the body are employed and made use of m thinking; and that
the memory of thoughte Is retained by the impressions that are
made on the brain, and the traces there left after such thinking;
but that In the tbinldng of the soul which is not J18.rceived In a
sleeping man, there the soul thinks apan, and, maktIlg no use of
the organs of the body, leaves no impressions on It and conse-
quently no memory of such thoughts." Not to mention again
the absurdity of two distinct persons, which follows from this
supposition, I answer farther, that whatever ideas the mind can
receive and contemplate without the halp of the body, it is
reasonable to conclude it can retain without the help of the body
too; or else the soul, or any separate splr1t, will have but little
advantage by thinking. If it has DO memory of its own thoughts i
OF HUMAN UNDBRSTANDING
If .. cannot lay them up for Its 1188, and be able to roco.ll them
upon ooouion; If it cannot reSect upon what ill pad, and make
1188 of its former experiences, reasonings, and con$emplanons;
to what doee it think? They who make the soul a
thlnlring $bing. at thiII rate will not make it a much more noble
being ilian those do whom they condemn for o.llowing it to be
nothing but the subtilest parte of matter. Charac&era drawn on
dust thet the firat breath of wind effaces, or impreaaione made on
a heap of atoms or anlmal spirits, are altogether as ueefnl, and
render the subject ... noble, as the thoughts of a soul thet perish
in thinking; that, once out of sight, are gone for ever, and leave
no memory of themaelv811 behbid them. Nature never mak811
exeel1ent things for mean or no ueea; and it ill hardIy to be con-
aeived thet our infinitely Wise Creator should make 10 admirable
a faculty as the power of thinlring, that faculty which com811
nearest the exoeJlency of hill own incomprehensible being, to be
80 Idly and UUBBly employed, at least a fourth parf of its time
here, as to think conetantly without remembering any of those
thoughts, without doing any good to iteelf or others, or beiJlII
any way ueefuI to any other part of the creation. If we wiil
examine it, we ahalI. not find; I SUpp088, the motion of dull and
lIeIIlIeleu matter anywhere in the univeree made 80 llttle 1188 of,
and so wholl,v thrown away.
16. em tlKr ltypothaN, tM.oul ...... t '-t.ua. fIOt d.!rtHd
from _.Iion or r6Jfuflioft, of lOMe" tMr, it flO appeM_.-
It ill true, we have sometimes inetances of perception whilat we
are asleep, and retain the memory of those thoughts: but how
exUavagant and incoherent for the moat pari they are, how llttle
aonformable to the perfection and order 01 a rational beiJur, th088
who are acquainted with dreams need not be told. Thill I would
wiIlIDgly be aatiaIled in: Whether the soul, when It thinb thue
&pari, and u it were separate from the body, acta leaa rationo.lly
*'im when _ioinUy with it, or DO' If ita I8parMe thoughta
b.leaa rati/lJlal, then theee men must b3 that the soul owes the
perleo$lon of ratiDDaJ. thinking to the y; If it do8II not, it ill a
wonder that our dreams should be for the moat part 80 frivolone
and IrraUonal, and that the soul should retain none of ita more
ra aolIloquiea and medita&n..
17. 11 I tMisk tDMn I 1motD ., fIOt, fIOOOdg -'- _1mOtD iI.
-ThoH who so OODftclently tell ne, that $he soul always aotualIy
tbinb, I wouId $hey would alao tell ne those Ideu an
that are in the soul of a child before or just at the union with
the bcc1y. before it hath reeeived any by eenaation. The dreams
of IleeJiiDIr men are, as I take it, all made up of the wa!ing
lIIAD'slcleU, though for tha moat peri oddly put together. It ill
Rranga, If the aoUl baa ideas of ita own $hat it derived not from
eenaation or reftection (as it must have, If it thought before It
naeAved any bnpreaaton from the body), $hat it should nev .. ba
liEN THINIl NOT ALWAYS
Ita private thinking (so private, that-the man hlmaelf peraeivee
it not, retain any of them the very moment it waba out of
them, and then mal<e $he man glad with new diIIcoveriea. Who
oan ftnd it reaaonable that the soul should in its retirement, duriDg
sleep, have 10 many hours' thoughts, and yet never light on any
of $hose ideas it borrowed not from seneanon or reflection, or at
least preserve the memory of none bui such which, being ocoa
sioned from the body, must needa be lees natural to a spirit?
It is strange $he soul should never once in a man'. whole life
recall over pure, native thoughts, and th088 ideas U
had before it ed anything from the body; never bring
into the waking IlIAD'. view any other ideas but what have a
tang of the cask, and manifestly derive $heir original from thet
union. If it always thinks, and SO had Ideu before it W&8
united, or before it received any from the body, it ill 00' to be
suppoeed but thet during sleep it recollects its naiive ideas
and retirement from communicating with the body,
whilst it by itself, $he ideas it ill bualed about should be,
sometimes at least, those more natural and congenial OD88 which
it had in iteelf, underived from the body, or ita own operatione
about them; which aince the waking man never remembers, we
mnat from thiII hypothesis conclude, either that the soul remem
bera something thet the man does not, or else that memory
belongs ouly to such ideas ... are derived from the body, or $he
mind's operatione about them.
18. How lmotD. ""!10m that tM _lallDay. t1tM&u' For;,f it
be fIOt ",ljtIfJidtmt propolition, .h&Be'" proof.-I would be glad
alao to learn from these men, who so confidently pronounae that
the human soul, or, which is all one, that a man, always thinks,
how they come to know it; nay, how they come to knowthat they
themaelves think, when $hey themselves do not peMve it? This,
I am afraid, ill to. be sure without proofs, and to know without
peMvina. It ill, I auapect, a confused notion taken up to earve
an hypotI.eeiII; and DOD8 of thoee clear truths that ei$her $heir
own evidence forees ne to admit, or common e:r:perianae makes
It bnpudence to deny. . For the moat $hat can be saId of it is,
thet it ill possible the soul may always think, but not always
retain it in memory; and I say, it ill as possible $hat the soUl
may not always thiIlk, o.nd much more probable that ii should
sometimes not think. $han that it should oftan think, and $hat
a long while toga$her, and not be oonecious to itealf, the next
moment after, that it had $hought.
19. Tltat._.laovldb,lnuy ... t1Kn1Nag,IIttd.-tflO,NIM.,
the _t motlUIIt, -r/mpr06able.-To suppose $lie soul to think,
and the IlIAD not to perceive it, ill, as baa been Bald, to make two
peraone in one man; and if oneconeidera well $h8IIe men's way of
speaking, one should be led into a auapicion thet they do 80. For
die,J wtiel tell us that the soul always ']links, do never, that 1
01' HUIUN UNDBRST.dNDING
nmem'*. -Y. thM .. man uways 0dDb. Can the .oa1 ibIDk,
aDd DO' the man? or .. man Urlrik, aDd DO$ be 00DICi01l8 of "t
Tbilperhape would be B118p8Ilted of jargon In others. If they -Y.
"The man ihInka always, bulla DOt alwaya OODaCious of it," they
II1II1- weD 11&1. his body Ia ex$ended wiiliout having pariII. For
it Ia alwgeiher _In$elllglble that a body Ia ex$ended with
out paris, .. tha, anyihlng without being consciowl of
tt, or perceiving thM it doulO. They who bJk $lius may. with
.. much l'I!IIIOII, H it be _s&l")' to their hypothesis. say. that
a man Ia always h1lDfJl'Y, but iliat he dou not always feel it:
whereas hunger oonsIaU bi. that very -Uon. .. thinJdng con
siab In being 00DICi0Ul tha, one thiDks. If they say, that a man
Ia alwaya oonsoious to hlmseH of thlnkjng, I ask bow they know
it? OimsoIoumeu Ia the pereepUon of what pa8II8IIln a man'.
own mind. Can anoilier man pereelve that I am OODICioQII of
an:] iliIng, when I pereelve it DO$ myself? No man'. know-
ledge here can go beyond his experience. Wake a man out of a
lOund Bleep, and ask him what he WM that moment thlnJdng on.
If he himself be conscious of nothing he then though' on, he
man be .. notable diviner of thOughtl tha, can asmre him that
he WM thinking: mal he no$ wiili more reason asmre him he
WM no$ asleep? This Ia IOmethlnJr beyond philosophy; and it
canDOt be leu than revelation that Cliaccivera to aDOther thoughts
in my mind when I can lind nODe there myB8lf: and they must
n8Bd8 have .. penetrating sigh' who can oer$aInly see that I think.
when I canDOt peroeive it myaelf, and when I declare that I do
no$ j aDd can see that dogs or elephanta do no$ think, when
e:/ .. fve all the demonstration of it imaginable, except only
UB iliat they do 10. This lOme may luspect to be .. _tep
beyond the RoaicruoianB j it to Inake one'_ IIIIlf
invisible to others than to make an er's thoughta viBible '0 me.
which are not viBiblo to hlInself. But it 9 but de1Ining the lOuI
to be .. 8Obe$anoe that alwaya thinks. and the bUBine .. 9 done.
If eoch definition be of any auiliority, I know not what it oan
eerve for, but to make many men 808pe0$ that they have no lOule
at a1!t:!koo they find allQOd part of their liv .. p ... away with
out ing. For DO deilniUons tha, I know. no suppOBitions
of any eeot, are of force enough to destroy aODBlant experienoe j
aDd \*,hapi It Ia the affootation of knowing =ond what we
peroelve that malt.. 80 much use1e .. dispute n0ge In ilie
world.
90. No idH. but from _oNion cw re,fttJOUon etJidmt. if -
oburw cm/dr."..-I aee no reaBOD therefore to believe that the
aoul ihInka before the aeDS88 have furniBhed t, with IdeaB to
think on; and ... thoae are Inoreased and retained, 10 it comel
byexerolae to Improve tta faculty of the BeverU partl
of it; as weD ... afterwardB, by compoun' thOBe ide... ani
ndJec$Ing on ita own opersUons, it In_ tta ,took, as weD l1li
i,
liEN THINK NOr .dLIV.drS
Iaolllty In remembering. imagining, reason'ng. and othor moa.
of tblnldDllI
He that will eolfer hlmoeJf to be Informed by obeervaUon
aDd uperienoo. aDd DO' make his own hypothesis the rule of
nature, will find few ligna of a lOuI accustomed to much think.
ing In .. new,born chilci, and much fewer of any reaeonlng at alL
Arid ya, it Ia hard to imagine. that the rational lOuI should
think 10 much and not reason at aU. And he that will conBider
that infante newly come into the world. spend the greaten part
of their time In aleep. and are aeldom awake. but when either
hunger oallB for the teat, or some pain (the most Imporiunate of
all or some other violent ImpreBBion on the body.
foro8B the d to perceive and attend to it :-he. I say. who
oonslders this will. perh .. ps, find re ... on to imagine, tha, .. faltus
In the mother's womb differs not much from the ltate of .. vege.
table; but p .... 8B the greatest part of its time without peroeption
or thought. doing very little but aleep in a plaoe where it neea.
not Beok for food. and t. surrounded with liquor alwaya
80ft, and near of the same temper j where the eyes have DO light.
and the ears 10 Ihut up are not very SUlceptible of lOuna.; and
where there is little or DO varlety or change of objeota to move
the Ben8el.
W. Follow a child from its birth. and obaerve the alteratione
that time makel. and you Bhall find. ae the mind by the 88DS88
com8B more and more to be furnished with Ide .... it oomes to be
more and more awake, thinks more the more it has matter to
think on. After lOme time it begins to know the objecte whiOO.
being mOlt familiar with It, have made laeting ImpreBBions.
Thus it comes by degree. to know the persons U da.ily oonverseB
with, and dietlnguish them from Itrangers j whiOO are instan088
and effecta of ita coming to retain and dietiuguish the ide ... the
88DS8B convey to It: and 10 we may obeerve how the mind. by
degreca. Improv81 in theBe, and advanoe. to the exerciae of those
other f&cultiel of eularging. oompounding, and ab8tracting ita
Ideas. and of reaeoning about them, and reflecting upon all ili888 i
of whioh I shall have ooo ... ion to apeak more hereafter.
If It shall be demanded, then. when a man beginl to have
any Ideas? I think, the true answer la, When he Ifr8t baa any
eensation. }oor Binoo there appear not to be any lao... in the
mind before ilie 88DSe8 have oonveyed any In, I coDOelve that
ideas in the understanding are ooeval with Bensatien j whiOO is
BUOO an lmpreBBion or motion made in _ part of the body 81
produces lOme in the underatanding. 16 II about
iheee lmpreBBions on our 88DS88 by outwai-d objecta. that
the mind eeeme fint to employ IteeH In BUoh operations ... we
call .. peroopUon, rememberiDg. conBideration. reasoning." &c.
!M. Tho origf,nal of all otW time the mind oom8B
to reflect on ita own operations about the ideas got by 8ensation,
01' HU"AN UNDUsrANDING
.. ..... HIeIf wl&h a 118'1t'''' of ideu, whlah I oaJI
.. ta- of N4eolIoD." Th_ are $he Impreesions &hat are made
on oar __ by ou$ward objecte, &ha& are exhiDaioal to the
miDIl; and ilII own operations, prooeed1ng from (XlWllft InVlnaloal
and proper to l&aelf, wblob, when relleo&ecl on hy i&aelf, become
aIIo objeo&e of Ita oon&emplatiou, are, .. I have Ald, &he original
of all bowledge. Th ... $he lim cap..,Uy of human In&ellec& is,
&ha& the miDIl a fiUed &0 reoelva &he Impreesions made on U,
eUbea- &hroui!h &he _ by outward obj ..... or by Ita own
operations when 1& refiec&e on them. This is &he fim nep a man
Iiiak. towards &he dieoovery of anything, and &he groundwork
whereon &0 build all &hOM nooODB which ever he shalJ. have
IUI&urally in &his world. All &hOM sublime thoughts which tower
above &he olouc1a, and reach .. high &8 heaven itself, &ake &heir
rUe and footing here: In all &hat great e:den& wherein &he mind
wandera in &hose remote ope.culation. it may Beem to be elevated
wl&h, U atirB not one jot beyond &hOMideaa which _ or refi_
b have 01tered for ita oon&emplation.
1ft u.. recqtiotl of t1l<l wnder.ta,"Un," for
tM mod pMt thlo pan tbe undero&auding is merely
-'va; and whether or no U will have these beginningo and, &8
It were, materials of knowledge, a not in Its own power. For tbe
objeo&e of our _ do many of &hem obtruc1a their particular
Id8u upon our minde, whether we will or no; and tbe operations
of our minde will not let 1111 be wi&hout at 1_& some obecure
notionl of them. No man can be wholly ignoran& of what be
doee when be thinke. These limple Ideae, when offered to &he
mind, the undentanding can no more refnBe to have, nor alter
when &hey are Imprlntaa, nor blc& &hem out and make new on81
Itself, &ban a mirror can refnBe, alter or obliterate &he images or
lc1aaa, which &he objec&e ... before it do &herein produce. AI
$he bodiel &hat IUrround 1111 do dlverMly rJfeot our organo, &he
miDIlll forced to reoelve &he ImpreseiODB, and cannot avoid &he
peroepUon of &hose Ideas &ha& are annexed to &hem.
OHAPTEB U.
01' BlJlPLS ID ......
1. U_lIlJloulldeci appeMCI_.-The beUerto undemand &he
uatare, lIIIoIIIler, and extant of our knowledge, one &bing II care-
fully to be observed ooncern:ing &he Ideaa we have; and &hat a,
thea lOme of &hem are limple, and _ oomplex.
Though the qualiU81 tbet all'eo& our _ are, In $he &hlDgII
&hemseiv8l, 10 united &Ild blended &ha& &here II no separaUon, no
diMDce be&ween &hem; yet 1& II plain &he Ideas they prodnce In
&he mind enter by &he _1Imj1e and unmixed. 110r though
the IiJhl and toiloh often tab In from the lame object a& abe
SIMPLE IDEA.S
'I
Illme time different Idelloll-1IoII a man l8es at once motion ana
colour, &he hand f&ell softne88 and warmm in &he same piece of
wax-yet the simple ideas thus united in tbe same subject are ..
perfectly distino& &8 &hose that come In by dIIl'erent I8naes; &he
coldne88 and hardneBB which a man feels in a piece of ice being
as distinct idelloll in the mind &8 the smell and whitaneBl of a lily,
or lioii the taate of sugar and smell of a rose: and &here Is notbing
can be plainer to a man than the clear and distinct perception
he hIIoII of those simple ideas; which, being eacb In Itself
uncompounded, contains In It no&bing but one uniform appear
ance or conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into
dIIl'erent idelloll.
2. Tl"",wnd CCIfI Mt1l<lr _1<6 nor dBdroy t1l<lm.-Thesellmple
Ideae, &he materials of all our knowledge, are suggened and fur
nlshed to &he mind only by &hose two ways above mentioned,
'flz., sensation and refiection.* When &he understanding is once
Aored wi&h &heBe limple idelloll, it hIIoII the power to repeat, compare,
and unite mem, even to an almost infinite variety, and SO can
make at pl8llollure new complex ideas. But it is not In &he power
of &he mo.t exalted wit or enlarged understanding, by any quick.
ne or variety of &houghts, to invent or frame one new limple idea
In &he mind, not taken in by&he ways before mentioned; nor can
any force of the underotanding destroy those &hat are &here: &he
dom1nlon of man In &his little world of hlI own understanding,
being much-what the same lioii it is In the great world of visible
things, wherein hlI power, however managed by art and skill,
reaches no farthedban to compound and divide &he materials &hat
are mac1a to hlI band but can do nothing towards the making the
least particle of new matter, or deatroying one atom of whet Is
already in being. The same Inability will everyone find In him-
self, who shalJ. go about to fashion in hlI underotanding any IImple
Idea not received In by hlI I8naes from external objec&e, or DY
reflection from the P.perations of hlI own mind about &hem. I
would have anyone $ry to fancy any taste which bad never
all'ec&ed hlI palllte, or frame &he idea of a scent he bad never
Imelt; and when be can do &his, I will aloo conclude, &hat a
blind man hatb id6tu of colours, and a deaf man true, dlsUnot
notions of sounc1a.
8. This is the reason why, thougb we canno& believe It Impol'
Ilble to God to make a oreaWre with other organo, and Jnore ways
to convey Into the undemanding &he notice of corporeal &bingo
than those five lioii &hey are 11BU&lIy counted, which be hIIoII !Pven to
man; yet I think 1& Is not posBible for anyone to 1m&f!Ul8 any
other qualiti81 in bodies, howsoever OODBtimted, whereby mey can
be &aken notice of, beBid81 eounde, tastes, smells. visible and tan-
gible qualities. And bad m&llklnd been made with but four I8Il888,
the quoilitieB which are tbe objects of the fifth _, bed been
8M tho Note ., tIM end. 01. thiI chapter, p. 72.-brl'.
01' HU.AN UNDBRsrANDING
ana ......, ...... ItIeH wlih a l18'li'''' of ldeu, .... hiGh I oaD
"1dMa of 1'idIeotioD." Tb.a In .w, impreesions lhal In made
on oar _ by u ~ objeoY, lhal are e:drbudoal to Ute
mJna; dit. O'WD opemtions, reo aeeding from }101I'&n InUinaloal
d proper to iUelf, whloh, w en refteoW on by iUelf, beoome
a.IIo obj" of it. contemplation, are, .. I have e8id, Ute orlglnal
of .n mowledge. Thus.w, flrd cap.oUy of human Intellect l8,
lhal the mind is fl"ed to receive Ute impr8ll8i0ne made on U,
althar ibrough Ute eeneee by outward objech, or by it. own
openti.one when U reft .. on $hem. ThIs Is.w, lim ... p a man
uiMeI Wwarda .w, discovery of anything, and Ute ground-work
.... hereon to bulld aU Utoee nemons which ever he shaJl have
nMurally in ihls world. All UtOllB sublime Utoughta which $ower
above lIie olouda, and reach .. high .. heaven ltaeU, ake Utelr
rise and footing here: In aU $hat great extent wherein Ute mind
wandera In Utoee remo$e apeoulenon. It may seem $0 be e1evaW
wiUt, it ati.n not one jot beyond ihoeeldeu which _ or refleo-
&ion have offered for it. contemplation.
~ 1,. u.. reC"1'Hon o[ limp" id6M, u.. tmd8r.tan<Ung u lor
"Ie _II tJM:t P<NHw.-In ihls pari tbe unde ... tanding Is merely
pueive; and wbeiher or no " will have these beginnings and, ..
It were, ma$eriala of knowledge, Is not in ita own power. For tbe
obi .. t. of our senses do many of Utem obtrude their particular
ideas upon our minds, wbeUter we will or no ; and Ute operanone
of our minds will not let U8 be wiUtout at leut some obscure
nononl of Utem. No man can be wholly ignorant of wbat be
does wben be thinks. The88 simple ideas, when offered $0 Ute
mind, Ute undemanding can no more refuse $0 hll ve, nor alter
.... ben Utey _lmprinW, nor blot Utem out and make new onel
il88lf, tba.n a mlrror can refuse, alter or obli$era$e Ute imagee or
ldeu, which Ute objec$e eat before it do Uterein produce. Aa
the bodiel &bu B1Iriound U8 do divereely rJfect our organs, Ute
mind Is forced $0 recaive Ute impreuiona, and cannot avoid Ute
JII'08pnon of UtOl8 ideas &bat ... annexed $0 Utem.
OHAPTER U.
ow BlKPL. ID lI.
1. U_IIlJlouncIM 1Ipp8<IN_.-Tbe better $0 undemand Ute
nature, manner, and eX$ent of our knowledge, one tb.!f Is care-
falIy $0 be obeerved ooneeming &be ldeas we have; lhal 18,
tb.a* IODl8 of $hem In simple, .ad IODl8 oompleL
Though Ute qualinea that afl'eet our aenoee are, In the thiDp
Utemaeiv ... 10 uniW and blended lhal Utere Is no 18p&r&non, no
dia$enoe between Utem; yet it Is plain Ute ideu .-y produce In
Ute mind enter by Ute _ simPle and unmixed. For Utoup
the at,bt and toiloh often aka In from &be ume object at tbe
SIMPLB IDBAS
'1
."me time difrerent ideas-as a man see. at once motion and
colour, tbe band feela softn... and warmth in Ute aame piece of
wax-yet the simple ideas thus uniW in Ute 8I1me .ubject are ..
perfectly distinc' as those that come in by different sense.; the
coldnell and hardn ... whicb a man feels in a piece of ice being
as distinct ideas in Ute mind a. the smell and whi$enell of a lily,
or "'" the t ...... of sugar and smell of a rose: and there is notblng
can be plainer $0 a man than the olear and distinet percepnon
he has of those simple ideas; which, being elWlh in iteaU
uncompounded, oontains In it nothing but one uniform appear-
ance or oonoeption in the mind, and is not distingulsbable In$o
different ideas.
~ T-"" mimd CM& neither make nor deBtroy them.-Tbese simple
ideu, Ute materiaIa of aU our knowledge, are sugge.W and fur-
nished to the mind only by those two ways above mennoned,
vis., sensation and reflection. * When the underetanding is once
.$orad with these simple ideu, it has the power $0 repeat, compare,
and uni$e them, even $0 an almost infinite variety, and so oan
lD8ke at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not In the power
of Ute most exalted wit or eDIarged underetanding, by any quick-
ness or variety of &boughta, $0 invent or frame one new simple idea
in Ute mind. not aken in by the ways before mennoned; nor can
any force of the understanding destroy thoee $hat are there: &be
dominion of man in ihls little world of biB O'WD undel'l!tandinR,
being much-wha' &be lIlme as it Is In the great world of visibIe
ihings, wherein biB power, however managed by art and skill,
reacbes no farther_than $0 compound and divide the materials $ha'
are made $0 biB hand but can do nothing towarde the making the
le"",t particle of new mat$er, or destroying one a$om of ww., is
already in being. The lIlme inability will everyone find in him
saU, wbo shaJl go about $0 fashion in biB undel'l!tanding any simple
Idea not received in by biB 88nse8 from external objects, or 11:/,
refleoti.on from tha P.JI8r&tions of biB own mind about Utem. I
would have anyone try $0 fancy any tas$e which had never
affected biB palate, or frame &be idea of a soent he had never
smelt; and when be can do ihls, I will also conolude, $hat a
blind man hatb id6M of colours, and a deaf man true, dietinet
notions of sounds.
B. ThIs is the reason why, Utongh we ClIIoBDot believe i$ impoa-
aible $0 God $0 make a creature with other organs, and more ways
$0 convey in$o tha undeI'Bt:, the notice of corporeal things
ihan &b0l8 five as Uteyare ycounW, whloh be has jPven $0
man; yet I think It is not possible for anyone $0 Imagine any
o&ber quaJiti .. 1n bodi .. , howsoever conati.tuW, whereby Ute'! can
be aken notice of, besid .. sounds, tastes, amells, visible an tan-
gible qualiti.... And had mankind been made with but four seD88l,
&be ql1Alin88 th.n which are the objeeta of &be nUb 8eD88, had been
I\eo tho Nolo at \be ODd of W. ciulpter, p. 72.-BD ....
OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
&8 far from our notice, lmaidnation, and oonceplion, &8 now any
belonging to a sixth, seventh, or eighth sense, can POSSibly be:
which, whether yet some other creatures, in some other parle of
this vast and stupendous universe, may not have, will be a great
presumption to deny. He that will not set himself prondly at the
$op, Glf all things, but will oonsider the Immensity of this fabric,
and the great variety that Is to be found in this little and Inoon.
siderab1e part of it which he has $0 do with, may be apt to think,
that in other mansions of it there may be other and different in.
telligible beings, of whose faculties he ha.. as little knowledge or
apprehension, as a worm shut up in one drawer of a cabinet hath
of the senses or understanding of a man; such variety and excel.
lency baing suitable $0 the wisdom and power of the Maker. I
have here followed the oommon opinion of man's having but five
een-, though perhaps there may be justly counted 1DO%9; but
either supposition serves equally to my present purpose.
NOTE.-Page 71.
AGAI1m'd.r.-that the materials or all oar knowledge &lII
IIld fttrnisbed to the mind only by sensation and re1Iection, the lJIshop
01 Woroester makee OM 01 the idea of subetillce in these words: .. If
the idea of substllloe be grounded upon plain and evidsut reason, then
WB must allow an idea of subetillce wliioh oomes not in by sensation
or re1Iection; 80 we may be certain of 80msthiug which we have not
by thoesId .......
To which our author .......... :* .. These words 01 your lorclship'.
oontain notb!ng that I 8B8 in them againIt me; for I never said, tliat
the general ideoi of subetonce oomes in by ecnsation and re1Iection, or
thet it iI a simv1e idee of 88Dlltion or re1Iection, though it be nlti
matelI foundecf in them; for it II a oomplex idea lIllide up of the
genenU ideo of lOIDe thing or beIDg with the rel&tion of a support to
iooidento. For general id8IB oome not into the mind by sensation or
re1Iecti"",- but &lII the Ol'8Iturea or inventiono of the understanding, 88
I think I have shown;t and also how the mind makee them from
ideas which it hao got by sensation and reflection; IIld 88 to the id ..
of relation, how the mbid forme them. and how they are derived from,
and ultimately terminate In, ideos of sensation and reflection, I have
likewile shown.
.. But thet I may not be mistaken what I mean when I apeak of
Ideas or BBDlltion and reflection 88 the matoriols of all oar know.
ledae, ldve me 1eeve, 1IIJ' lord, to set down here a place or two out of
ezplain myHlf; 88 I thne speak of id .. of BBDlltion and
I' That th-. when WB have taken a full survey of them and their
.veral modes, and the compodtlono made out of them, we shall lind
to oontain all our whole IItook of id ..... and we have nothing In om
*lIlhll_Lottortou..BllhopofwCll'OOOtor, p.16,-.
t _ w. chap. w.; _II. aboP- .,.... -. :a.m. _ It.
SIMPLE IDEAS
7'
minds which did not come in one of thoes two ways. '* ThiI thought
in another place I exprese thne :
... These simple id ..... the material. of all our knowledge, are sng.
gestec! and fnrniShed to the mind, only by those two ways above men-
tioned, viz., sensation and reOection. 'f And again,
... These are the most considerable of those limple id .. whioh
the mind he&, and out of whioh is made e.ll its other knowledge ; all
which it receivee by the two fore-mentioned ways of sensation and
re1Iection. ': And,
'''Thne I have In a short draught !liven,. view of our original
Ideaa, from whenoe all the reot are denved, and of whioh they are
made up."
.. Thio IIld the like, said In other places, II what I have thought
oonosrning id.. of sensation and reflection, 88 the foundation and
materiols of all oar id ..... and oons&quently of all oar knowledae:
I have eat down th .. e psrticulera out of my hook, that the ....aer.
a full view of my opinion herein, may the bettor _ what in
it iI U&ble to your lordship's reprehension. For that your lordship is
not well satisfied with it, appears not ouly by the words unaer
oonsideration, but by these alsci: 1 But we are still told that our
understillding can have no other id ... but either from BBDlltion or
reflection.'
.. Yoar lordship's argument, in the pa.ssage we are upon, stoDds thne:
1 If the general idee. of substllloe be grounded upon t'lain and eviden'
reason, then we mnet e.Uow an ideo oJ 8Ubetillce WhlOh oomes not in
b,l8DlBtion or reflection.' ThiI is,. oonsequenoe whioh, with snbmia.
lIOn, I think will not hold, bscanee it is founded UJlOIl a supposition
whioh I think will not hold; viz. thet reaaon and !aeas are moonsis
tent: for if that BDPpoeitiou be not true, then the general ideo of
substillce may be grounded on plain and avident reason ; and yet it
will not follow from thenoe thet It is not ultimatoly grounded on and
derived from id ... 1 whioh oome in by sensation or reflection,' and 80
oannot be said to oome In by sensation or reflection.
" To explain myself, and olear my meaning in thio matter. All the
ideas or all the sensible qualiti.. of ,. oherry oome Into my mind by
eensation; the id ... of perceiving. thiuking, reaBODing, knowing, &C.
oome into my mind by reOection. The id.. of these qualities and
lOtions or powers are peroeived by the mind to be by themselvee
q"oon8istent with e:rlstsuoe; or, 88 your lordship well exp ...... it,
1 we find that we can have no true conoeption or any modes or aool
dents, butwe mnet conoeive a subetratmn or subJect wherein they are;'
.... , that they cannot exist or subsilt of themee1vee. Renoe the mind
peroeivee the n808Bll8.l':f oonnection -with Inherence or being supported,
whioh a rel&tive idea supel!odded to the red oolour in a Cherry,
Gr to thlnkmg In a mill, the mind tramee the oorrel&tive idea of a sup-
port. For I never denied that the mind oonld trame to itoelf Id ... of
relation, but have ehowed the quito oontrary in mr ohapters about
rel&tion. But bscanee a rel&tion oannot be founded m nothing, or be
the relation of nothing, and the thiull here rel&ted 88,. supporter or
a support iI not represented to ,the mmd by any olear and distinot

Book chap. .u. _ 10. Book II. chap. ;uI. 7L
74
01' HUIIAN UNDBRSTANDING
Idea, th_f"", the obecuJe, Indiatlnot, ftgDe idea oC tbiwr or 1OI!Ie-
tbiDg iI aU thet ill.n to be the pooitive idea whioh hal tile relation
oC a npport or enbotratum to mOdes or aooidenta ; and that
lDdetermlned idea oC eomothing ia, by the abetraction of the mmd!
derived aleo from the simple id... of .. nsatiOD and relIeotion: ana
tbu tba mind, from tba poeitive, sim!!le ... got by OODAtiOD !'I'd
relIeo&Ion oomes to the relative ,dea of enbetan .. , whioh,
withont th ... poaitivt, simp-Ie id .... it would ne_ have.
.. Thill your lordahip ( ... tbont giving by retail all
atoP'! of the mind in thia buin_> hal weU .:qu ... d m thia more
Iitaiiillar way: ' We find we can have no true conception o! any mod!",
or aooidento, bnt we mnet concei"e or where,n
th.y .,.' linoe it ia repngnanoy to our conOOJltiona of thinga, that
mod .. 0/ aooidenta Ihonld Inboiat by themeelves.' ,
.. Benoe your lordohip oalla it 'the rational idea of IQbetanoe; and
,., 'I grant that by .. nsa?on and relIeotion we to know the
po ..... and properties oC thwga; bnt onr _ Is ... tilfted that there
mut be eomethlnJ! beyond tli .... beoenee it Is impooaible that they
ohould enbeiat by ih_I" .. ;' eo that if thia be, that your lord
obip _ by , tbo rational id ... of enbetanoe, 1_ nothing there ia
in it apittat whit 1 have eeid, it Is founded simple ideu 01.
....... tion or reflection, and tbat It ... "cry obscure ,d ...
.. Yonr lordship'" conclOBion from yonr foregoing worda ia, 'And
10 we may be oertsin of som. things wbioh w. Ii.". not by th_
id ... " wltiob ia proposition wh_ precise moaning your Iordabip
will Corgive me if r prof... .. it mnw. tbere, 1 do not nnderatanif.
lor It Is unoertlin to me w'bother your IDrdahip moana, we may oer
toinly know the exlatenoe of sometbing , wbich w. have n!,t bT th!"",
1doIa,' or oertIinly know the distinot I'roperties of something whioh
we have not", th_ id .... ' or oortr.bily know the truth of lOmB
position 'whiob we have not by th_ id ... ;' for to be oertIin of
iometbinI! may lignify either of thou: but in wbichsoever of th_ b
be meant") do not _ how 1 am oonoerned in it. II
OlLU'TEB m.
". 1II1W1 on BIIIIO.
1. DWiotI 0/ """r. ......... -The bettor to .ooncalve .. Ideas
we reoeive from _$ion, It may not be _ for us to aon
dder them.1n referenoe to the different ways whereby "y make
&beJr to our minds. and make themselveB perOelvable
then, there .... _ wblah come into our minds by one
--::.:i;.. TbeN .... othen .u. _vey tb-tve-Into the
_ than one.
TbIIdl1. Othen.u. .... had from reftecUoD owy.
Poarilily. There.... lIOIIle that make themeelves way. and
a .. ltlgeetod to .. mind, by all the way. of ._tlon and
re8eaUollo
IDIUS 01' ONB SBNSB
tJ
We IhaIl_Pider them apari under theae .. veraI heads.
1. There are some idsae whiob have admit"'nce only throngh
l!I'e .. nae, whiob Ie peoqlIarly adapted to receive them. Thus
light and 8Olours. u white, red. yellow. blue, with their .. veral
degreeo or obads. and mixture.. .. green, ooarlet. purple.
.... green. and the rest, 80me in owy by the eyOl; all kind. of
DOlees. sonnda, and tonOl. owy by the oare; the .. veral taBtoe
and amells, by the no .. and palate. And if the .. organs. or the
I1erves which are the 80nduitB to con"ey them from without to
their audience In the brain, the mind'. preoenee-room. Cu I ma,
so call it,) are. any of them, so dioordered .. not to perform thOU'
functions, they have no poatom to be admittod by. no other way
SO bring themaelVOl into view. and be receI"ed by the under
stending
The most aonoiderable of thoee belonging to the touch are heat
and oold. and solidity; all the rest - 80neiating almost wholly in
the .. naible 8Onfiguration, .. smooth and rough; or eloe more
or Ie .. firm adhesion of the parts ... hard and soft, tough and
brittle-are obvious enough.
!A. I think it will be needle .. to enumerate all the particular
elmple ide .. to eaeh .. noe. Nor indeed Ie It possible
If we would, there belDg a great many more of them belonging
to moot of the .. noes than we have names for. The variety of
ameli which are many almost. if not more, than apeoIeB of
bodies in the world, do mo.t of them want nam... 8_' and
.fNnking commowy serve onr tnrn for the .. ide ... which in eft'eot
Is little more than to coJl them ple .. ing or di"pleaeing; thongh
the amell of a rose and violet. both sweet. are certainly "ery
diotinot ideae. Nor are the different tute. that by our palateo
we receive Ideas of. muOO bettor provided with namOl. 8weet.
"'ttw ..,.. Mr.,., ,"It, are almost all the epithets we ha"e
to denominato that numberl ... variety of reliahOl which .... to be
found dletinot, not only in almost every sort of creatures, but In
the different parto of the oeme plant. frnit, or animal. The eame
may be sald of aolonrs and sounds. I oball therefore. in the
_unt of Pimple idsae I am here l!ivlng. oontont myself to .. t
down only moo .. are moot matorial to our preIOllt purpose. or
are in th_lvOl le88 apt to be taken notice of. thongh they are
"ery frequently the ingredient. of our 80mplex ld ... ; amongst
whioh I think I may well account .. eolidity. whiob therefore I
IhaIl treat of in the ned ohapter.