An Agenda for NATO . Toward a Global Security Web Z.

Brzezinski Foreign Affairs, October 2009

NATO's 60TH anniversar , ce!ebrate" in A#ri! $it% #o&# an" circ'&stance b t%e !ea"ers of near! (0 a!!ie" states, generate" !itt!e #'b!ic interest. NATO's %istorica! ro!e $as treate" as a bore. )n t%e o#inion*s%a#ing &e"ia, t%ere $ere fre+'ent "erisive "is&issa!s an" even ca!!s for t%e ter&ination of t%e a!!iance as a " sf'nctiona! geostrategic irre!evance. ,'ssian s#okes#eo#!e &ocke" it as a -o!" .ar re!ic. /ven France's "ecision to ret'rn to f'!! #artici#ation in NATO's integrate" &i!itar str'ct'res**after &ore t%an 00 ears of abstention**aro'se" re!ative! !itt!e #ositive co&&entar . 1et France's actions s#oke !o'"er t%an $or"s. A state $it% a #ro'" sense of its 'niversa! vocation sense" so&et%ing abo't NATO**not t%e NATO of t%e -o!" .ar b't t%e NATO of t%e t$ent * first cent'r **t%at &a"e it re2oin t%e $or!"'s &ost i&#ortant &i!itar a!!iance at a ti&e of far*reac%ing c%anges in t%e $or!"'s sec'rit " na&ics. France's action 'n"er!ine" NATO's vita! #o!itica! ro!e as a regiona! a!!iance $it% gro$ing g!oba! #otentia!. )n assessing NATO's evo!ving ro!e, one %as to take into acco'nt t%e %istorica! fact t%at in t%e co'rse of its 60 ears t%e a!!iance %as instit'tiona!ize" t%ree tr'! &on'&enta! transfor&ations in $or!" affairs3 first, t%e en" of t%e cent'ries*!ong 4civi! $ar4 $it%in t%e .est for transoceanic an" /'ro#ean s'#re&ac 5 secon", t%e 6nite" 7tates' #ost* .or!" .ar )) co&&it&ent to t%e "efense of /'ro#e against 7oviet "o&ination 8res'!ting fro& eit%er a #o!itica! '#%eava! or even .or!" .ar )))95 an" t%ir", t%e #eacef'! ter&ination of t%e -o!" .ar, $%ic% en"e" t%e geo#o!itica! "ivision of /'ro#e an" create" t%e #recon"itions for a !arger "e&ocratic /'ro#ean 6nion. T%ese s'ccesses, %o$ever, give rise to a !egiti&ate +'estion3 .%at ne:t; .%at are t%e i&#!ications an" !essons to be "ra$n fro& t%e #ast 60 ears; NATO's ne$ secretar *genera! %as been taske" to 4"eve!o# a ne$ 7trategic -once#t an" s'b&it #ro#osa!s for its i&#!e&entation for a##rova! at

<NATO's= ne:t s'&&it.4 >iven t%e c'rrent an" !ike! f't're sec'rit "i!e&&as confronting t%e a!!iance, t%at ne$ conce#t $i!! %ave to "ea! $it% at !east fo'r f'n"a&enta! c%a!!enges3 first, %o$ to attain a #o!itica!! acce#tab!e o'tco&e for NATO's "ee#ening engage&ent in t%e over!a##ing Afg%an an" ?akistani conf!icts5 secon", %o$ to '#"ate t%e &eaning an" ob!igations of 4co!!ective sec'rit 4 as e&bo"ie" in Artic!e @ of t%e a!!iance's treat 5 t%ir", %o$ to engage ,'ssia in a bin"ing an" &'t'a!! beneficia! re!ations%i# $it% /'ro#e an" t%e $i"er Nort% At!antic co&&'nit 5 an" fo'rt%, %o$ to res#on" to nove! g!oba! sec'rit "i!e&&as. T%e first t$o of t%ese c%a!!enges #ertain to NATO's cre"ibi!it as a regiona! 6.7.*/'ro#ean a!!iance, t%e !atter t$o to its #otentia! g!oba! ro!e. Fai!ing to co#e $it% an one of t%ese fo'r c%a!!enges co'!" 'n"er&ine t%e t%ree transfor&ationa! !egacies of NATO note" ear!ier. An" t%ose !egacies, far fro& being on! of %istorica! significance, are re!evant to t%e a!!iance's g!oba!! i&#ortant &ission to"a . UNITING THE WEST FO, TH/ !ast @00 ears, $or!" #o!itics %as been "o&inate" b states !ocate" on t%e s%ores of t%e Nort% At!antic. As t%ese states co&#ete" $it% one anot%er for treas're an" #o$er, t%e in effect estab!is%e" t%e Nort% At!antic region's $or!"$i"e i&#eria! s'#re&ac . B't t%at s'#re&ac $as not stab!e. )t $as #erio"ica!! 'n"er&ine" b vio!ent riva!ries a&ong t%e Nort% At!antic states t%e&se!ves. )n c%anging co&binations, ?ort'ga!, 7#ain, France, t%e Net%er!an"s, an" t%e 6nite" Aing"o& co&#ete", fo'g%t, an" re#!ace" one anot%er as t%e #ree&inent overseas i&#eria! #o$er. Over t%e co'rse of t%e !ast t$o cent'ries, t%e g!oba! %ierarc% c%ange" "ra&atica!! even as t%e sco#e of t%e riva!r e:#an"e", 'n"er Na#o!eon's France, fro& oceanic contro! to "o&ination over /'ro#e as $e!!. Na#o!eon's c%a!!enge f'rt%er transfor&e" t%e geo#o!itics of t%e Nort% At!antic riva!r b #reci#itating t%e entr of t$o non*At!antic #o$ers**centra! /'ro#ean ?r'ssia 8$%ic% !ater beca&e >er&an 9 an" /'rasian ,'ssia 8!ater t%e 7oviet 6nion9**into t%e co&#etition for t%e first ti&e. A cent'r !ater, .or!" .ar ), $%ic% in fact $as !arge! a /'ro#ean $ar, "re$ in t%e 6nite" 7tates fro& across t%e At!antic. T%e 6nite" 7tates' entr #rove" "ecisive to t%e o'tco&e of t%at $ar, an" t%e victor of t%e ne$ Britis%*Frenc%*6.7. coa!ition see&e" to ass're t%e contin'e" financia! an" #o!itica! #ree&inence of t%e Nort% At!antic region.

T%at t'rne" o't to %ave been an i!!'sion. France $as b!e" to e:%a'stion. T%e 6nite" Aing"o& $as near! bankr'#t. T%e 6nite" 7tates $as sti!! #ainf'!! a&biva!ent abo't its g!oba! ro!e. An" t%en >er&an 's +'ick res'rgence triggere" .or!" .ar )). T%is g!oba! conf!ict $as on! ver #artia!! $on b t%e !atest variant of t%e Nort% At!antic coa!ition**t%e 6.7.*Britis% one**$%ic% %a" to s%are t%e s#oi!s of victor in /'ro#e $it% its $arti&e #artner 8an" rising riva!9, t%e /'rasian 7oviet ,'ssia. /'ro#e's centra! an" eastern regions #asse" 'n"er Bosco$'s contro!, an" its $estern re&nants 8sti!! "ivi"e" $it%in b bitter &e&ories of $ar9 beca&e "e#en"ent entire! on t%e f't're co'rse of t%e 6nite" 7tates. )n t%e t$o $or!" $ars, /'ro#e %a" effective! co&&itte" #o!itica! s'ici"e. To its cre"it, t%e 6nite" 7tates rose to t%e c%a!!enge. NATO $as one of t%e t$o ke instr'&ents 'se" b .as%ington to foster transnationa! coo#eration in t%e $estern re&nant of /'ro#e. A!t%o'g% t%e .estern /'ro#eans t%e&se!ves recognize" t%e nee" to overco&e t%eir %istorica! "ivisions, t%eir initia! #ost$ar efforts centere" as &'c% on kee#ing >er&an "o$n as on a"vancing .estern integration. )t $as t%e 6nite" 7tates t%at, t%ro'g% t%e Bars%a!! ?!an, &a"e .estern /'ro#e's econo&ic recover a gen'ine! transnationa! effort, one t%at even inc!'"e" t%e $estern #arts of occ'#ie" >er&an . An" it $as Britis% "i#!o&ac **"riven b Con"on's recognition t%at its "a in t%e s'n %a" co&e to an en" an" t%at t%e 6nite" Aing"o&'s $or!" ro!e "e#en"e" over$%e!&ing! on its abi!it to tie itse!f c!ose! to .as%ington**t%at &ost #ers'asive! #resse" t%e 6nite" 7tates to &ake an e:#!icit an" bin"ing sec'rit co&&it&ent to .estern /'ro#e's s'rviva! as a co!!ection of "e&ocratic states an" as an integra! #art of t%e s%r'nken .est. A!t%o'g% NATO $as create" #ri&ari! to #rovi"e s'c% ass'rance against t%e !oo&ing 7oviet t%reat, its #o!itica! effect in .estern /'ro#e $as to #ro&ote reconci!iation $it% t%e for&er A:is #o$ers >er&an an" )ta! , $%i!e fostering an en"'ring acce#tance of transat!antic inter"e#en"ence. Bost notab!e an" significant in t%at regar" $as t%e initia!! "iffic'!t ter&ination of Franco*>er&an %osti!it . T%e Frenc% at first strong! o##ose" an for&'!a for >er&an rear&a&ent, even $it%in a co&&on /'ro#ean "efense co&&'nit . B't gra"'a!! , farsig%te" Frenc% an" >er&an !ea"ers c'!tivate" a #o!itica! reconci!iation t%at event'a!! f!o$ere" into a gen'ine entente. None of t%is $o'!" %ave %a##ene" $it%o't NATO. )ts transnationa!! integrate" b't &i!itari! 6.7.*"o&inate" str'ct'res &a"e t%e inc!'sion of >er&an forces 8a!beit $it%o't a se#arate co&&an" or genera! staff9 &ore #a!atab!e to t%e Frenc% even before t%e event'a! a"&ission into t%e a!!iance,

in D9@@, of .est >er&an as a f'!!*f!e"ge" &e&ber. T%e instit'tiona!ization of NATO an" t%e !ater e&ergence of t%e /'ro#ean /cono&ic -o&&'nit 8$%ic% s'bse+'ent! evo!ve" into t%e /69 t%'s &eant t%at t%e civi! $ar $it%in t%e .est $as fina!! over. T%e %istoric i&#ortance of t%at fact cannot be overstresse". NATO itse!f, %o$ever, $as conceive" in fear an" born in a fatig'e" /'ro#e. /:#ectations of a ne$ $ar $ere initia!! $i"es#rea", an" t%e sense of v'!nerabi!it $as ac'te. 6.7. forces, e:ce#t for a re!ative! $eak #resence in occ'#ie" >er&an , $ere back %o&e an" &ost! "e&obi!ize". T%e /'ro#eans nat'ra!! #resse" for a ra#i" ret'rn of 6.7. forces an" for a'to&aticit in !a'nc%ing a f'!!*sca!e &i!itar res#onse to an attack. At first, %o$ever, 6.7. $ar #!anners $ere inc!ine" to t%ink of t%e 6nite" 7tates' sec'rit co&&it&ent to /'ro#e**in t%e event t%at $ar co'!" not be "eterre" b $%at $as t%en a 6.7. n'c!ear &ono#o! an" a 7oviet gro'n" offensive co'!" not be sto##e" b a &assive bo&bing of ,'ssia**as rea!istica!! invo!ving on! t%e ob!igation to "efen" a /'ro#ean bri"ge%ea", to be fo!!o$e" !ater b a secon" !iberation of /'ro#e. E'ite 'n"erstan"ab! , t%at $as not entire! reass'ring to t%e /'ro#eans. )n t%at setting, t%e co!!ective*action*triggering Artic!e @ of t%e Nort% At!antic Treat $as "esigne" to, bin" t%e 6nite" 7tates to /'ro#e, b't in a $a t%at co'!" overco&e t%e tra"itiona! re!'ctance of A&ericans to beco&e entang!e" in "istant foreign conf!icts. For t%e A&ericans, t%e $or"ing in Artic!e @**to t%e effect t%at eac% a!! $o'!" react to an attack on an one of t%e& 4b taking fort%$it% . . . s'c% action as it "ee&s necessar , inc!'"ing t%e 'se of ar&e" force4**&eant t%at .as%ington retaine" t%e rig%t to "eter&ine %o$ it $o'!" react &i!itari! if 7oviet forces crosse" t%e /!be ,iver. For t%e /'ro#eans, it $as a #!e"ge t%at t%e 6nite" 7tates $o'!" in an case be &i!itari! engage" fro& "a one. T%e co&&it&ent itse!f $as c!ear, b't t%e nat're of t%e res#onse $as contingent. Nonet%e!ess, t%ro'g% NATO, t%e strategic inter"e#en"ence of t%e .est beca&e bin"ing. An" t%at for&'!a s'ffice" for t%e ne:t 60 ears. .%et%er .or!" .ar ))) $as act'a!! !ike! $i!! never be kno$n. T%e #ost* D90@ 7oviet 6nion, ensconce" in t%e &i""!e of /'ro#e, !oo&e" as an enor&o's t%reat. B't it $as a!so $ar $ear , an" it %a" to "igest $%at it %a" engorge". On bot% si"es, so&e strategica!! farsig%te" officia!s $ere arg'ing be%in" t%e scenes t%at t%e e&erging ne$ contest for g!oba! s'#re&ac $o'!" be #o!itica!! #ro!onge" b't #robab! **at !east for +'ite a $%i!e**not reso!ve" b force of ar&s. On t%e 6.7. si"e, >eorge Aennan &a"e a co&#e!!ing case

t%at t%e 7oviet 6nion, a!t%o'g% aggressive, co'!" be containe" an" event'a!! $orn "o$n. Arg'ing t%at t%e t%reat fro& t%e 7oviet 6nion $as #re"o&inant! #o!itica! an" not &i!itar , %e $arne" against e:cessive &i!itarization of t%e .estern res#onse. )t is no$ c!ear fro& t%e 7oviet arc%ives t%at so&e !ea"ing ,'ssian e:#erts on t%e .est, casting t%eir arg'&ents in Bar:ist ter&ino!og , $ere si&i!ar! inc!ine". )n D900, t%e 7oviet foreign &inister, F ac%es!av Bo!otov, annotate" for Gose#% 7ta!in &e&oran"'&s #re#are" b )van Baisk 8t%e $arti&e 7oviet a&bassa"or in Con"on an" b t%en a "e#'t foreign &inister9 an" Ba:i& Citvinov 8at one #oint Baisk 's e+'iva!ent in .as%ington an" b t%en a!so a "e#'t foreign &inister9. T%e conc!'"e" t%at t%e #ost$ar era $o'!" be &arke" b t%e 6nite" 7tates' ascen"anc , t%e 6nite" Aing"o&'s "ec!ine, intensifie" ca#ita!ist contra"ictions, an" a #ro!onge" #erio" of gro$ing co&#etition bet$een t%e 6nite" 7tates an" t%e 7oviet 6nion**b't not $ar. /ven t%o'g% 7ta!in occasiona!! s#oke "ark! of anot%er $or!" $ar, %e a!so see&e" to t%ink t%at it $o'!" not co&e an ti&e soon. )n D9@0, 7ta!in &a %ave vie$e" t%e Aorean .ar as a convenient "iversion fro& t%e stan"off in /'ro#e an" a!so as an o##ort'nit to #otentia!! increase -%ina's "e#en"ence on t%e 7oviet 6nion. Ho$ever, fears in t%e .est t%at t%e Aorean .ar $as a #rec'rsor to a !arger $ar #reci#itate" a &assive 6.7. &i!itar "e#!o &ent in /'ro#e. T%'s, t%e Aorean .ar in"'ce" a #o!itica! #s c%osis t%at intensifie" t%e inc!ination of bot% si"es to "efine t%e -o!" .ar !arge! as a &i!itar contest. ?ara"o:ica!! , b s#'rring a confrontation in /'ro#e bet$een t$o ar&e" ca&#s, t%e vio!ent conf!ict in Asia &a %ave &a"e bot% a $ar of &isca!c'!ation an" a #o!itica! acco&&o"ation in a "ivi"e" /'ro#e !ess !ike! . Of co'rse, one can never kno$ if a NATO "efine" !ess in &i!itar ter&s 8as Aennan 'rge"9 &ig%t %ave been ab!e to e:#!ore a #o!itica! "etente $it% t%e 7oviet 6nion after 7ta!in's "eat%, in D9@( 8at t%e ti&e t%ere $ere so&e vag'e %ints of 7oviet interest in a co&#ro&ise on >er&an 9, "'ring t%e H'ngarian ,evo!'tion of D9@6, or before t%e 7oviet &i!itar s'##ression of t%e ?rag'e 7#ring in D96H. A!! t%at is c!ear is t%at t%e #ossibi!it of e:#!oiting t%e "isarra in t%e 7oviet !ea"ers%i# to ac%ieve a #eacef'! revision of t%e #o!itica! stat's +'o $as not serio's! e:#!ore". T%e rea!it is t%at in t%e v'!nerab!e "eca"es after .or!" .ar )), conf!ict $as avoi"e" !arge! beca'se t%e 6nite" 7tates sta e" co&&itte" to "efen"ing

/'ro#e an" NATO re&aine" 'nite". T%at 'nit $as teste" "'ring t%e t$o $ar*t%reatening crises of t%e ear! D960s3 t%e Ber!in crisis an" t%e -'ban &issi!e crisis. )n neit%er case is t%ere reason to be!ieve t%at Bosco$ $as inc!ine" to start a $ar, b't in bot% t%e 7oviet !ea"ers%i# $as i&#atient! ga&b!ing t%at inti&i"ation &ig%t $ork to a!ter t%e geo#o!itica! stat's +'o. 1et t%e #ara&o'nt interest of t%e t$o antagonists in avoi"ing an a!!*o't $ar #revai!e", even if t%eir contin'ing &i!itar stan"off in a "ivi"e" /'ro#e "i" as $e!!. ENLARGING THE WEST IIIIIIII B1 TH/ !ate D9J0s an" ear! D9H0s, t%e 7oviet 6nion's officia!! #roc!ai&e" e:#ectations of s'r#assing t%e 6nite" 7tates in bot% econo&ic an" &i!itar #o$er %a" beg'n to !ook %o!!o$, an" strains $it%in t%e 7oviet 6nion itse!f**intensifie" b Bik%ai! >orbac%ev's #erestroika**began to &itigate .estern fears t%at gro$ing 7oviet strategic #o$er &ig%t &ake /'ro#e v'!nerab!e to n'c!ear b!ack&ai!. )n t%at setting, bot% si"es beca&e &ore $i!!ing to active! e:#!ore s'c% iss'es as ar&s contro!, %'&an rig%ts, an" even troo# re"'ctions. B t%e en" of t%e "eca"e, t%e ra#i"! gro$ing "isarra in t%e 7oviet b!oc**s#ear%ea"e" b t%e s'ccess of t%e 7o!i"arit &ove&ent in ?o!an" an" #r'"ent! e:#!oite" in its fina! #%ase b NATO 8an" #artic'!ar! b c!ose! coo#erating 6.7., >er&an, Britis%, an" Frenc% !ea"ers9**%a" gotten o't of %an". Before !ong, bot% t%e 7oviet 6nion an" t%e 7oviet b!oc beca&e %istor . NATO's ro!e t%en c%ange". )t beca&e t%e fra&e$ork for stabi!izing a s'""en! 'nstab!e geo#o!itica! sit'ation in centra! an" eastern /'ro#e. )t is no$ eas to forget t%at even after t%e "isso!'tion of t%e 7oviet b!oc in D9H9* 90**t%e e&anci#ation of /astern /'ro#e, t%e rea##earance of in"e#en"ent Ba!tic states, an" t%e re'nification of >er&an **t%e resente" ,'ssian ar& re&aine" "e#!o e", as "'ring t%e -o!" .ar, on t%e banks of t%e /!be an", 'nti! D990, in t%e for&er 7oviet sate!!ite states. A!t%o'g% t%e ar& 's event'a! $it%"ra$a! $as a!! b't inevitab!e, t%e 'ncertainties regar"ing regiona! sec'rit , bor"er iss'es, an" f'n"a&enta! #o!itica! i"entit in t%e for&er 7oviet b!oc $ere co&#!e:. .it% t%e e&erging /6 in no #osition to offer reass'ring sec'rit , on! NATO co'!" stab! fi!! t%e voi". .%at fo!!o$e" $as !ess t%e #ro"'ct of strategic "esign t%an t%e res'!t of %istor 's s#ontaneit . T%e !atter is often conf'sing an" contra"ictor , an" et

'!ti&ate! "ecisive. T%at $as !arge! t%e case $it% NATO's e:#ansion east$ar". )nitia!! , ,'ssia's ne$ !ea"ers%i# acce"e" re!'ctant! to it 8notab! , in t%e co'rse of ,'ssian ?resi"ent Boris 1e!tsin's negotiations $it% ?o!is% ?resi"ent Cec% .a!esa in A'g'st D99(95 on! on secon" t%o'g%t, s%ort! t%ereafter, "i" ,'ssia begin to ob2ect. Boreover, recent! "ec!assifie" &ateria!s c!ear! ref'te t%e oft*&a"e arg'&ent t%at ,'ssia $as #ro&ise" t%at NATO $o'!" not e:#an". )n an case, t%ere $as no #ractica! $a of #reventing t%e s#ontaneo's s'rge of t%e centra! an" eastern /'ro#ean states to$ar" t%e on! .estern instit'tion t%at co'!" si&'!taneo's! ass're t%eir sec'rit an" %e!# "efine t%eir #o!itica! i"entit . One %as to re&e&ber t%at t%e centra! an" eastern /'ro#eans $ere in a &oo" of ent%'siastic e&anci#ation fro& t%e 7oviet 6nion's a!&ost five*"eca"e an" rat%er %eav *%an"e" "o&ination. T%e $ere "eter&ine" to beco&e an integra! #art of t%e free /'ro#e an" "isinc!ine" to beco&e a geo#o!itica! no &an's !an" bet$een NATO an" ,'ssia. )f t%e centra! an" eastern /'ro#ean states %a" been !eft o't, t%e /'ro#e "ivi"e" in t$o b t%e -o!" .ar, instea" of beco&ing one, $o'!" %ave beco&e a /'ro#e "ivi"e" into t%ree3 t%e NATO states in t%e $est5 a .est*!eaning b't insec're centra! an" eastern /'ro#e, as $e!! as t%e ne$! sovereign b't 'nstab!e Be!ar's an" 6kraine, in t%e &i""!e5 an" ,'ssia in t%e east. Ho$ s'c% an arrange&ent co'!" %ave #eacef'!! en"'re" is "iffic'!t to i&agine. An en!arge" NATO %as #rove" itse!f to be b far #referab!e to t%e instabi!it or even vio!ence 8a !a 6kraine or >eorgia recent! 9 t%at a!&ost certain! $o'!" %ave at so&e #oint ens'e" in a centra! an" eastern /'ro#e !eft to its o$n 'ncertain "evices bet$een a re'nifie" >er&an in NATO an" a resentf'! ,'ssia sti!! te&#te" to vie$ t%e region as #art of its 4near abroa".4 8)t is note$ort% t%at t%e fres%! re'nite" >er&an , an i&&e"iate neig%bor to centra! an" eastern /'ro#e, %a" no s'c% i!!'sions on t%is score an" #!a e" a ke ro!e in #'s%ing for$ar" t%e NATO en!arge&ent #rocess.9 )n brief, NATO en!arge&ent $as %istorica!! ti&e! an" a!so t%e rig%t t%ing to "o. B t%e ear! ears of t%e t$ent *first cent'r , t%e a!&ost tota! geo#o!itica! over!a# bet$een &e&bers%i# in NATO an" &e&bers%i# in t%e /6 &a"e it c!ear t%at /'ro#e $as fina!! bot% sec're an" 'nite". T%e c!os're of t%e #ro!onge" /'ro#ean civi! $ar &eant t%at A&ericans an" /'ro#eans, in !ooking back at NATO's first 60 ears, "i" %ave gen'ine ca'se for ce!ebration in A#ri! 2009. AD USTING TO A TRANS!OR"ED WORLD

ANK 1/T, it is fair to ask3 )s NATO !iving '# to its e:traor"inar #otentia!; NATO to"a is $it%o't a "o'bt t%e &ost #o$erf'! &i!itar an" #o!itica! a!!iance in t%e $or!". )ts 2H &e&bers co&e fro& t%e g!obe's t$o &ost #ro"'ctive, tec%no!ogica!! a"vance", socia!! &o"ern, econo&ica!! #ros#ero's, an" #o!itica!! "e&ocratic regions. )ts &e&ber states' 900 &i!!ion #eo#!e acco'nt for on! D( #ercent of t%e $or!"'s #o#'!ation b't 0@ #ercent of g!oba! >K?. NATO's #otentia! is not #ri&ari! &i!itar . A!t%o'g% NATO is a co!!ective* sec'rit a!!iance, its act'a! &i!itar #o$er co&es #re"o&inant! fro& t%e 6nite" 7tates, an" t%at rea!it is not !ike! to c%ange an ti&e soon. NATO's rea! #o$er "erives fro& t%e fact t%at it co&bines t%e 6nite" 7tates' &i!itar ca#abi!ities an" econo&ic #o$er $it% /'ro#e's co!!ective #o!itica! an" econo&ic $eig%t 8an" occasiona!! so&e !i&ite" /'ro#ean &i!itar forces9. Toget%er, t%at co&bination &akes NATO g!oba!! significant. )t &'st t%erefore re&ain sensitive to t%e i&#ortance of safeg'ar"ing t%e geo#o!itica! bon" bet$een t%e 6nite" 7tates an" /'ro#e as it a""resses ne$ tasks. T%e basic c%a!!enge t%at NATO no$ confronts is t%at t%ere are %istorica!! 'n#rece"ente" risks to g!oba! sec'rit . To"a 's $or!" is t%reatene" neit%er b t%e &i!itant fanaticis& of a territoria!! ra#acio's nationa!ist state nor b t%e coercive as#iration of a g!oba!! #retentio's i"eo!og e&brace" b an e:#ansive i&#eria! #o$er. T%e #ara"o: of o'r ti&e is t%at t%e $or!", increasing! connecte" an" econo&ica!! inter"e#en"ent for t%e first ti&e in its entire %istor , is e:#eriencing intensif ing #o#'!ar 'nrest &a"e a!! t%e &ore &enacing b t%e gro$ing accessibi!it of $ea#ons of &ass "estr'ction**not 2'st to states b't a!so, #otentia!! , to e:tre&ist re!igio's an" #o!itica! &ove&ents. 1et t%ere is no effective g!oba! sec'rit &ec%anis& for co#ing $it% t%e gro$ing t%reat of vio!ent #o!itica! c%aos ste&&ing fro& %'&anit 's recent #o!itica! a$akening. T%e t%ree great #o!itica! contests of t%e t$entiet% cent'r 8t%e t$o $or!" $ars an" t%e -o!" .ar9 acce!erate" t%e #o!itica! a$akening of &ankin", $%ic% $as initia!! 'n!eas%e" in /'ro#e b t%e Frenc% ,evo!'tion. .it%in a cent'r of t%at revo!'tion, s#ontaneo's #o#'!ist #o!itica! activis& %a" s#rea" fro& /'ro#e to /ast Asia. On t%eir ret'rn %o&e after .or!" .ars ) an" )), t%e 7o't% Asians an" t%e Nort% Africans $%o %a" been conscri#te" b t%e Britis% an" Frenc% i&#eria! ar&ies #ro#agate" a ne$ a$areness of antico!onia! nationa!ist an" re!igio's #o!itica! i"entit a&ong %it%erto #assive an" #!iant #o#'!ations. T%e s#rea" of !iterac "'ring t%e t$entiet%

cent'r an" t%e $i"e*ranging i&#act of ra"io, te!evision, an" t%e )nternet acce!erate" an" intensifie" t%is &ass g!oba! #o!itica! a$akening. )n its ear! stages, s'c% ne$ #o!itica! a$areness ten"s to be e:#resse" as a fanatica! e&brace of t%e &ost e:tre&e et%nic or f'n"a&enta!ist re!igio's #assions, $it% be!iefs an" resent&ents 'niversa!ize" in Banic%aean categories. 6nfort'nate! , in significant #arts of t%e "eve!o#ing $or!", bitter &e&ories of /'ro#ean co!onia!is& an" of &ore recent 6.7. intr'sion %ave given s'c% ne$! aro'se" #assions a "istinctive! anti*.estern cast. To"a , t%e &ost ac'te e:a&#!e of t%is #%eno&enon is fo'n" in an area t%at stretc%es fro& /g #t to )n"ia. T%is area, in%abite" b &ore t%an @00 &i!!ion #o!itica!! an" re!igio's! aro'se" #eo#!es, is $%ere NATO is beco&ing &ore "ee#! e&broi!e". A""itiona!! co&#!icating is t%e fact t%at t%e "ra&atic rise of -%ina an" )n"ia an" t%e +'ick recover of Ga#an $it%in t%e !ast @0 ears %ave signa!e" t%at t%e g!oba! center of #o!itica! an" econo&ic gravit is s%ifting a$a fro& t%e Nort% At!antic to$ar" Asia an" t%e ?acific. An" of t%e c'rrent! !ea"ing g!oba! #o$ers**t%e 6nite" 7tates, t%e /6, -%ina, Ga#an, ,'ssia, an" )n"ia** at !east t$o, or #er%a#s even t%ree, are revisionist in t%eir orientation. .%et%er t%e are 4rising #eacef'!! 4 8a se!f*confi"ent -%ina9, tr'c'!ent! 8an i&#eria!! nosta!gic ,'ssia9 or boastf'!! 8an assertive )n"ia, "es#ite its interna! &'!tiet%nic an" re!igio's v'!nerabi!ities9, t%e a!! "esire a c%ange in t%e g!oba! #ecking or"er. T%e f't're con"'ct of an" re!ations%i# a&ong t%ese t%ree sti!! re!ative! ca'tio's revisionist #o$ers $i!! f'rt%er intensif t%e strategic 'ncertaint . Fisib!e on t%e %orizon b't not as #o$erf'! are t%e e&erging regiona! rebe!s, $it% so&e of t%e& "efiant! reac%ing for n'c!ear $ea#ons. Nort% Aorea %as o#en! f!o'te" t%e internationa! co&&'nit b #ro"'cing 8a##arent! s'ccessf'!! 9 its o$n n'c!ear $ea#ons**an" a!so b #rofiting fro& t%eir "isse&ination. At so&e #oint, its 'n#re"ictabi!it co'!" #reci#itate t%e first 'se of n'c!ear $ea#ons in anger since D90@. )ran, in contrast, %as #roc!ai&e" t%at its n'c!ear #rogra& is entire! for #eacef'! #'r#oses b't so far %as been 'n$i!!ing to consi"er consens'a! arrange&ents $it% t%e internationa! co&&'nit t%at $o'!" #rovi"e cre"ib!e ass'rances regar"ing t%ese intentions. )n n'c!ear*ar&e" ?akistan, an e:tre&ist anti*.estern re!igio's &ove&ent is t%reatening t%e co'ntr 's #o!itica! stabi!it . T%ese c%anges toget%er ref!ect t%e $aning of t%e #ost*.or!" .ar )) g!oba! %ierarc% an" t%e si&'!taneo's "is#ersa! of g!oba! #o$er. 6nfort'nate! ,

6.7. !ea"ers%i# in recent ears 'nintentiona!! , b't &ost 'n$ise! , contrib'te" to t%e c'rrent! t%reatening state of affairs. T%e co&bination of .as%ington's arrogant 'ni!atera!is& in )ra+ an" its "e&agogic )s!a&o#%obic s!oganeering $eakene" t%e 'nit of NATO an" foc'se" aro'se" B's!i& resent&ents on t%e 6nite" 7tates an" t%e .est &ore genera!! . SUSTAINING ALLIAN#E #REDI$ILIT% TH/ K)7?/,7AC of g!oba! #o$er an" t%e e:#an"ing &ass #o!itica! 'nrest &ake for a co&b'stib!e &i:t're. )n t%is "angero's setting, t%e first or"er of b'siness for NATO &e&bers is to "efine toget%er, an" t%en to #'rs'e toget%er, a #o!itica!! acce#tab!e o'tco&e to its o't*of*region &i!itar engage&ent in Afg%anistan. T%e 6nite" 7tates' NATO a!!ies invoke" Artic!e @ of t%e Nort% At!antic Treat in "eci"ing to 2oin t%e ca&#aign to "e#rive a! Eae"a of its safe %aven in Afg%anistan. T%e a!!iance &a"e t%at co&&it&ent on its o$n an" not 'n"er 6.7. #ress're. )t &'st accor"ing! be #'rs'e" on a gen'ine! s%are" &i!itar an" econo&ic basis, $it%o't caveats regar"ing &i!itar #artici#ation or evasions regar"ing ba"! nee"e" financia! assistance for Afg%anistan an" ?akistan. T%e co&&it&ent of troo#s an" &one cannot be over$%e!&ing! a 6.7. res#onsibi!it . To be s're, t%at is easier sai" t%an "one, b't it s%o'!" be t%e centra! #o!itica! "'t of NATO's ne$ secretar *genera! to kee# insisting on bot% &i!itar an" financia! s'##ort. T%e basic o#erating #rinci#!e %as to be t%at ever a!! contrib'tes to t%e e:tent t%at it can an" t%at no a!! is a!toget%er #assive. T%e act'a! 8not 2'st #!e"ge"9 contrib'tion of eac% a!! to t%e nee"e" &i!itar , socia!, an" financia! effort s%o'!" be reg'!ar! #'b!icize" an" 2oint! revie$e". Ot%er$ise, Artic!e @ $i!! #rogressive! !ose its &eaning. T%eoretica!! , it is of co'rse #ossib!e t%at NATO at so&e #oint $i!! conc!'"e 8an" so&e of its &e&bers #rivate! ta!k as if t%e %ave a!rea" "one so9 t%at t%e effort in Afg%anistan is not $ort% t%e cost. )n"ivi"'a! a!!ies co'!" +'iet! $it%"ra$, sa!ving t%eir consciences b 'rging t%at NATO iss'e a grave $arning of its co!!ective intent to strike back fro& a "istance if a! Eae"a 'ses eit%er Afg%anistan or ?akistan as a base for !a'nc%ing ne$ attacks against targets in Nort% A&erica or /'ro#e. Ho$ever, a NATO #'!!o't, even if not for&a!! "ec!are", $o'!" be vie$e" $or!"$i"e as a re#etition of t%e ear!ier 7oviet "efeat in Afg%anistan. )t $o'!" a!&ost certain! #ro&#t bitter transat!antic recri&inations, $o'!" 'n"er&ine NATO's cre"ibi!it , an" co'!" a!!o$ Ta!iban e:tre&ists in Afg%anistan an" ?akistan to gain contro! over &ore t%an 200 &i!!ion #eo#!e an" a n'c!ear arsena!.

7%ort! after ass'&ing office, t%e Oba&a a"&inistration conc!'"e" a #o!ic revie$ of t%e 6nite" 7tates' goa!s in Afg%anistan. )ts reasonab!e conc!'sion $as t%at a stab!e Afg%anistan cannot be ac%ieve" #ri&ari! b &i!itar &eans. T%is goa! $i!! re+'ire a co&bination of a &i!itar effort t%at "enies victor to t%e Ta!iban 8an" faci!itates t%e #rogressive e:#ansion of effective nationa! contro! b t%e Afg%an ar& 9 an" a s'staine" internationa! financia! effort to i&#rove t%e $e!!*being of t%e Afg%an #eo#!e an" t%e efficac of t%e Afg%an govern&ent. T%is is bot% &ore &o"est an" &ore rea!istic t%an ear!ier notions of b'i!"ing a &o"ern "e&ocrac in a societ in $%ic% on! t%e 'rban sectors are &ore or !ess +'asi*&o"ern an" t%e r'ra! areas are in &an res#ects sti!! +'ite &e"ieva!. No$ t%at t%e e!i&ination of a! Eae"a's safe %aven %as been "efine" as t%e ke ob2ective, !oca! acco&&o"ations $it% co&#!iant Ta!iban e!e&ents no !onger nee" to be e:c!'"e". NATO's &i!itar "isengage&ent at so&e #oint co'!" fo!!o$. T%is re"efinition of #o!ic $o'!" #rovi"e a rea!istic basis for ac%ieving a #o!itica!! acce#tab!e o'tco&e b't for one g!aring o&ission3 it "oes not a""ress in a strategica!! "ecisive fas%ion t%e fact t%at t%e conf!ict $it% t%e Ta!iban in Afg%anistan cannot be reso!ve" $it%o't ?akistan's gen'ine #o!itica! an" &i!itar s'##ort for t%e effort to s%ore '# a nonf'n"a&enta!ist regi&e in Aab'!. T%at f'!! s'##ort %as not been fort%co&ing in #art beca'se of t%e rising intensit of f'n"a&enta!ist #assions in ?akistan, es#ecia!! a&ong t%e r'ra! sectors, an" a!so beca'se t%e geo#o!itica! concerns of t%e ?akistani &i!itar abo't its co'ntr 's o$n sec'rit are at o""s $it% 6.7. an" Britis% sensitivities regar"ing )n"ia's interests. A!as, for so&e in t%e ?akistani &i!itar , t%e e:tre&e c%oice of a Ta!iban*contro!!e" ?akistan t%at "o&inates a Ta!iban*contro!!e" Afg%anistan co'!" even be #referab!e to a sec'!ar ?akistan $e"ge" insec're! bet$een a t%reatening )n"ia an" an Afg%anistan t%at geo#o!itica!! f!irts $it% )n"ia in or"er to be in"e#en"ent fro& ?akistan. >iven -%ina's riva!r $it% )n"ia an" its strategic stake in a viab!e ?akistan, engaging -%ina in a geo#o!itica! "ia!og'e abo't ?akistan's !ong*ter& sec'rit co'!" be %e!#f'! in reass'ring ?akistan regar"ing Afg%anistan an" )n"ia. )n"ia**"es#ite its reci#roca! antagonis& $it% ?akistan**a!so %as a stake in its $estern neig%bor's not triggering a regiona! '#%eava!. 7i&i!ar! , )ran, $%ic% vie$s t%e Ta!iban $it% %osti!it , co'!" again #!a a constr'ctive ro!e in %e!#ing stabi!ize Afg%anistan's $estern region, &'c% as it "i" in 2002. A serio's effort b NATO to engage -%ina, )n"ia, an" )ran in a strategic "ia!og'e on %o$ best to avoi" a region$i"e e:#!osion is t%'s ver

ti&e! . .it%o't t%at "ia!og'e, NATO's first ca&#aign base" on Artic!e @ co'!" beco&e #ainf'!! #ro!onge", "estr'ctive! "ivisive, an" #otentia!! even fata! to t%e a!!iance. REA!!IR"ING #OLLE#TI&E SE#URIT% )T .A7 note" ear!ier t%at Artic!e @ of t%e Nort% At!antic Treat s'ffice" for 60 ears. B't is it sti!! cre"ib!e; A c!oser !ook at its $or"ing &a be in or"er3 T%e ?arties agree t%at an ar&e" attack against one or &ore of t%e& in /'ro#e or Nort% A&erica s%a!! be consi"ere" an attack against t%e& a!! an" conse+'ent! t%e agree t%at, if s'c% an ar&e" attack occ'rs, eac% of t%e& . . . $i!! assist t%e ?art or ?arties so attacke" b taking fort%$it%, in"ivi"'a!! an" in concert $it% t%e ot%er ?arties, s'c% action as it "ee&s necessar , inc!'"ing t%e 'se of ar&e" force, to restore an" &aintain t%e sec'rit of t%e Nort% At!antic area. 7ince /'ro#ean states 60 ears ago earne" for g'arantee" 6.7. #o$er b't %a" no effective #o$er t%e&se!ves, t%at $or"ing satisfie" t%e basic /'ro#ean nee". )t &itigate" t%eir co!!ective insec'rit b co&&itting t%e 6nite" 7tates at a ti&e $%en a!! kne$ t%at on! t%e 6nite" 7tates co'!" res#on" $it% &eaningf'! force. An" once it "i", a!! t%e ot%ers $o'!" #rett &'c% %ave to fo!!o$. No$, %o$ever, t%e sit'ation is "ifferent. T%e $ar in Afg%anistan is a case in #oint. Bost of t%e 6nite" 7tates' a!!ies no$ fee! re!ative! sec're. )t is t%e 6nite" 7tates t%at nee"s co&&itte" a!!ies in t%at $ar. B't t%e +'a!ifie" $or"ing of Artic!e @ 84as it "ee&s necessar 49 gives eac% of t%e& t%e o#tion to "o as &'c% or as !itt!e 8or even not%ing9 as t%e t%ink a##ro#riate. An" s'##ose t%e Ta!iban $ere to take over ?akistan, $it% its n'c!ear arsena!, an" t%en t%reaten NATO in Afg%anistan. .o'!" t%at &eet Artic!e @'s triggering stan"ar" of 4an ar&e" attack against one or &ore of <t%e NATO a!!ies= in /'ro#e or Nort% A&erica4; /ven &ore #er#!e:ing is t%e c'rrent significance of Artic!e @ to /'ro#e itse!f. )t raises t%e +'estion of %o$ tig%t! bin"ing are NATO's co!!ective* sec'rit ob!igations. )f a geo#o!itica!! e:#ose" /'ro#ean &e&ber of NATO $ere to beco&e a victi& of an ar&e" attack an" if t%e 6nite" 7tates an" t%e 6nite" Aing"o& an" ot%er NATO a!!ies $ere inc!ine" to co&e to its ai" b't, sa , >reece an" )ta! $ere not, co'!" Artic!e @ be invoke"; Kes#ite t%e e:#ansion of its &e&bers%i# to 2H co'ntries, NATO re&ains bo'n" b $%at it %as "efine" as 4a f'n"a&enta! #rinci#!e4**na&e! , t%at 4a!!

NATO "ecisions are &a"e b consens's,4 t%at 4consens's %as been acce#te" as t%e so!e basis for "ecision*&aking in NATO since t%e creation of t%e A!!iance in D909,4 an" t%at 4t%is #rinci#!e re&ains in #!ace.4 Accor"ing! , t%e secretar *genera! of NATO, as #art of t%e task assigne" to %i& at t%e recent a!!iance s'&&it, &ig%t consi"er "esignating a senior a!!ie" gro'# to 'n"ertake a revie$ of t%e c'rrent &eaning of Artic!e @. Not on! t%e Afg%an c%a!!enge b't a!so t%e significant "ec!ine of t%e 6.7. &i!itar #resence in /'ro#e, t%e increase" &e&bers%i# in NATO itse!f, an" t%e c%anges a!rea" note" in t%e g!oba! sec'rit conte:t ca!! for anot%er !ook at t%is ke artic!e. /ven if a $ar in /'ro#e is 'n!ike! 8an" in an s'c% case, t%e 6.7. reaction $o'!" be t%e &ost significant for so&e ti&e to co&e9, it is rig%t to ask $%et%er a sing!e &e&ber**or even t$o or t%ree &e&bers**of a co!!ective* sec'rit a!!iance %ave t%e rig%t to in effect veto a 2oint res#onse. ?er%a#s so&e t%o'g%t s%o'!" be given to for&'!ating a &ore o#erationa! "efinition of 4consens's4 $%en it is s%are" b an over$%e!&ing &a2orit b't not b ever one. Artic!e D( of t%e treat s%o'!" a!so be revie$e". )t #rovi"es for t%e rig%t of an &e&ber to !eave NATO after 20 ears b't "oes not inc!'"e an #rovision for NATO to e:c!'"e a &e&ber for not being tr'e to its ob!igations. 6nfort'nate! , t%e #ossibi!it t%at at a critica! 2'nct're, so&e e:terna! financia! or #o!itica! inf!'ence co'!" se"'ce a NATO &e&ber can no !onger be entire! e:c!'"e", #artic'!ar! given t%e size of t%e e:#an"e" a!!iance an" t%e ab'n"ance of o'tsi"e te&#tations. One s%o'!" not s$ee# 'n"er t%e r'g t%e fact t%at a vag'e consens's t%at s%ie!"s "ivisions &a %e!# #reserve NATO's for&a! 'nit b't $o'!" "o so at t%e cost of #otentia! #ara! sis in a &o&ent of 'rgent nee". -re"ib!e co!!ective sec'rit $i!! %ave no en"'ring &eaning if it invo!ves on! se!ective benefits. ENGAGING RUSSIA TH/ ACC)AN-/ a!so nee"s to "efine for itse!f a %istorica!! an" geo#o!itica!! re!evant !ong*ter& strategic goa! for its re!ations%i# $it% t%e ,'ssian Fe"eration. ,'ssia is not an ene& , b't it sti!! vie$s NATO $it% %osti!it . T%at %osti!it is not !ike! to fa"e soon, es#ecia!! if ?ri&e Binister F!a"i&ir ?'tin beco&es #resi"ent again in 20D2. Boreover, for a $%i!e et, ,'ssia's #o!ic to$ar" NATO**"riven b %istorica! resent&ent of t%e 7oviet "efeat in t%e -o!" .ar an" b nationa!ist %osti!it to NATO's e:#ansion**is !ike! to tr to #ro&ote "ivision bet$een t%e 6nite" 7tates an" /'ro#e an", $it%in /'ro#e, bet$een NATO's o!" &e&bers an" NATO's ne$ &e&bers.

)n t%e near f't're, ,'ssia's &e&bers%i# in NATO is not !ike! . ,'ssia**o't of 'n"erstan"ab!e #ri"e**"oes not seek to be a &e&ber of a 6.7.*!e" a!!iance. An" it is a!so a fact t%at NATO $o'!" cease to be NATO if a #o!itica!! non"e&ocratic an" &i!itari! secretive ,'ssia $ere to beco&e a &e&ber. Nonet%e!ess, c!oser #o!itica! an" sec'rit coo#eration $it% a gen'ine! #osti&#eria! ,'ssia**one t%at event'a!! co&es to ter&s, !ike t%e 6nite" Aing"o&, France, an" >er&an "i" before, $it% its ne$ %istorica! conte:t**is in t%e !ong*ter& interest of t%e 6nite" 7tates an" /'ro#e. Hence, t$o strategic ob2ectives s%o'!" "efine NATO's goa! vis*L*vis ,'ssia3 to conso!i"ate sec'rit in /'ro#e b "ra$ing ,'ssia into a c!oser #o!itica! an" &i!itar association $it% t%e /'ro*At!antic co&&'nit an" to engage ,'ssia in a $i"er $eb of g!oba! sec'rit t%at in"irect! faci!itates t%e fa"ing of ,'ssia's !ingering i&#eria! a&bitions. )t $i!! take ti&e an" #atience to &ove for$ar" on bot%, b't event'a!! a ne$ generation of ,'ssian !ea"ers $i!! recognize t%at "oing so is a!so in ,'ssia's f'n"a&enta! nationa! interest. ,'ssia's increasing! "e#o#'!ate" b't %'ge an" &inera!*ric% /'rasian territor is bor"ere" b @00 &i!!ion /'ro#eans to t%e $est an" D.@ bi!!ion -%inese to t%e east. An" t%e a!ternative favore" b so&e ,'ssian strategists**an anti*.estern a:is $it% -%ina**is i!!'sor for t$o reasons3 its benefits $o'!" be "'bio's to t%e -%inese, an" t%e econo&ica!! $eaker an" "e&o*gra#%ica!! "e#!ete" ,'ssia $o'!" be congeste" -%ina's 2'nior #artner. At t%is stage, t%e /6 can be a &ore #ro"'ctive ve%ic!e for #ro&oting #ositive c%ange in t%e /ast**b e:#!oiting t%e fact t%at none of ,'ssia's ne$! in"e#en"ent neig%bors $is%es to be its co!on or sate!!ite again**an" NATO can &ake a contrib'tion b conso!i"ating t%e res'!ts of s'c% #ositive c%ange. )n s'c% a "ivision of !abor, t%e /astern ?artners%i#, origina!! #ro#ose" b ?o!an" an" 7$e"en, co'!" ver $e!! be an effective instr'&ent for #ro&oting c!oser ties bet$een t%e /6 an" Ar&enia, Azerbai2an, Be!ar's, >eorgia, Bo!"ova, an" 6kraine. .it% its activities ranging fro& #rovi"ing financia! an" tec%no!ogica! assistance to offering 'niversit sc%o!ars%i#s an" faci!itating trave! to t%e .est, t%e initiative is res#onsive to t%e evi"ent as#irations of t%e #eo#!es concerne" an" ca#ita!izes on t%e $i"es#rea" #'b!ic "esire in t%e /ast for c!oser ties to t%e /6. ,'ssia to"a cannot react to s'c% an initiative in t%e sa&e &anner as t%e 7oviet 6nion $o'!" %ave in t%e #ast. T%e Are&!in %as to res#on" b &aking e+'a!! attractive offers to t%e co'ntries concerne", t%ereb in"irect! confir&ing its o$n res#ect for t%eir sovereignt , %o$ever re!'ctant t%at

res#ect &a be. )n a""ition, t%e co&#etition bet$een ,'ssia an" t%e /6 t%at s'c% an initiative $i!! foster $i!! not on! be beneficia! to t%e co'ntries so co'rte" b't a!so c'!tivate #o#'!ar as#irations in ,'ssia for si&i!ar! #rivi!ege" socia! access to t%e .est. Boreover, given t%e c!ose socia! !inks bet$een ,'ssia an" 6kraine, t%e &ore 6krainian societ gravitates to$ar" t%e .est, t%e &ore !ike! it is t%at ,'ssia $i!! %ave no c%oice b't to event'a!! fo!!o$ s'it. NATO %as to be caref'! not to 'nintentiona!! reinforce ,'ssia's i&#eria! nosta!gia regar"ing 6kraine an" >eorgia. T%e #o!itica! s'bor"ination of eac% is sti!! an evi"ent, an" even #rovocative! state" 8es#ecia!! b ?'tin9, ob2ective of t%e c'rrent r'!ers in t%e Are&!in. )n steering a #r'"entia!! ba!ance" co'rse, NATO s%o'!" &aintain its for&a! #osition t%at event'a! &e&bers%i# in NATO is o#en to bot% co'ntries b't at t%e sa&e ti&e contin'e to e:#an" its co!!aborative re!ations%i# $it% ,'ssia itse!f, as $e!! as $it% &ost &e&bers of t%e Bosco$*s#onsore" -o&&on$ea!t% of )n"e#en"ent 7tates. )n a""ition to for&ing t%e NATO*,'ssia -o'nci!, NATO %as a!rea" "eve!o#e" )n"ivi"'a! ?artners%i# Action ?!ans $it% fo'r -)7 &e&bers. Boreover, DD -)7 &e&bers c'rrent! co!!aborate $it% NATO in bot% t%e ?artners%i# for ?eace #rogra& an" t%e /'ro*At!antic ?artners%i# -o'nci!. T%ese #rogra&s, a!t%o'g% &o"est an" caref'!! "esigne" not to c%a!!enge Bosco$'s #re&ier stan"ing in t%e -)7, "o #rovi"e t%e basis for consi"ering a &ore for&a! sec'rit arrange&ent bet$een NATO an" ,'ssia be on" t%e NATO*,'ssia -o'nci!. )n recent ears, ,'ssia %as occasiona!! %inte" t%at it $o'!" favor a treat i&#! ing an e+'a! re!ations%i# bet$een NATO an" t%e Are&!in*create" 8an" so&e$%at fictitio's9 -o!!ective 7ec'rit Treat Organization, $%ic% $as set '# in 2002. ,e#!acing t%e "ef'nct .arsa$ ?act an" co# ing NATO's treat , t%e -7TO no$ inc!'"es Ar&enia, Be!ar's, Aazak%stan, A rg zstan, ,'ssia, Ta2ikistan, an" 6zbekistan. NATO %as been re!'ctant to consi"er a for&a! #act $it% t%e -7TO, since t%at $o'!" i&#! #o!itica!*&i!itar s &&etr bet$een t%e t$o. Ho$ever, t%is reservation co'!" #er%a#s be set asi"e in t%e event t%at a 2oint agree&ent for sec'rit coo#eration in /'rasia an" be on" $ere to contain a #rovision res#ecting t%e rig%t of c'rrent non&e&bers to event'a!! seek &e&bers%i# in eit%er NATO or t%e -7TO**an" #er%a#s, at a sti!! &ore "istant #oint, even in bot%. A NATO*-7TO treat containing s'c% a #roviso $o'!" constit'te an in"irect co&&it&ent b ,'ssia not to obstr'ct t%e event'a! a"%esion to

NATO of eit%er 6kraine or >eorgia in ret'rn for t%e "e facto affir&ation b NATO t%at in neit%er case is &e&bers%i# i&&inent. T%e &a2orit of t%e 6krainian #eo#!e #resent! "o not "esire NATO &e&bers%i#, an" t%e recent $ar bet$een >eorgia an" ,'ssia ca!!s for a coo!ing*off #erio" 8$%ic% s%o'!" not e:c!'"e #rovi"ing >eorgia $it% #'re! "efensive antitank an" antiair s ste&s, so t%at t%e co'ntr "oes not re&ain te&#ting! "efense!ess9. )t s%o'!" be in t%e interest of bot% ,'ssia an" t%e .est t%at 6kraine's an" >eorgia's orientation be "eter&ine" t%ro'g% a "e&ocratic #o!itica! #rocess t%at res#ects t%e nationa! sovereignt an" t%e #o!itica! as#irations of t%e #eo#!es concerne". An t%ing !ess co'!" #ro&#t a serio's! "a&aging "o$nt'rn in /ast*.est re!ations, to t%e "etri&ent of ,'ssia's !ong*ter& f't're. REA#HING OUT TO ASIA IIIIIIII B1 TH67 in"irect! reso!ving a contentio's iss'e bet$een NATO an" ,'ssia, a NATO*-7TO agree&ent co'!" a!so faci!itate a coo#erative NATO o'treac% f'rt%er east, to$ar" t%e rising Asian #o$ers, $%ic% s%o'!" be "ra$n increasing! into 2oint sec'rit 'n"ertakings. To"a 's 7%ang%ai -oo#eration Organization $as origina!! for&e" in D996 as t%e 7%ang%ai Five to "ea! $it% bor"er iss'es a&ong -%ina, Aazak%stan, A rg zstan, ,'ssia, an" Ta2ikistan. )n 200D, it $as rena&e" an" e:#an"e" to inc!'"e 6zbekistan. At t%at ti&e, it $as a!so c%arge" $it% fas%ioning coo#erative res#onses to terroris&, se#aratis&, an" "r'g trafficking. Afg%anistan, )n"ia, )ran, Bongo!ia, an" ?akistan %ave observer stat's. T'rke , given t%at it is a NATO &e&ber an" %as a s#ecia! interest in -entra! Asia, co'!" #er%a#s #!a a ke ro!e in e:#!oring a coo#erative arrange&ent bet$een NATO an" t%e 7-O. A #ositive o'tco&e co'!" foster sec'rit coo#eration on a transregiona! basis in one of t%e $or!"'s &ost e:#!osive areas. 7'c% gra"'a!! e:#an"ing coo#eration co'!" !ea", in t'rn, to a 2oint NATO* 7-O co'nci!, t%ereb in"irect! engaging -%ina in coo#eration $it% NATO, c!ear! a "esirab!e an" i&#ortant !onger*ter& goa!. )n"ee", given t%e c%anging "istrib'tion of g!oba! #o$er an" t%e east$ar" s%ift in its center of gravit , it co'!" a!so beco&e ti&e! before !ong for NATO to consi"er &ore "irect for&a! !inks $it% severa! !ea"ing /ast Asian #o$ers**es#ecia!! -%ina an" Ga#an**as $e!! as $it% )n"ia. T%is co'!" #er%a#s a!so take t%e for& of 2oint co'nci!s, $%ic% co'!" #ro&ote greater intero#erabi!it , #re#are for &'t'a!! t%reatening contingencies, an" faci!itate gen'ine strategic

coo#eration. Neit%er -%ina nor Ga#an nor )n"ia s%o'!" avoi" ass'&ing &ore "irect res#onsibi!ities for g!oba! sec'rit , $it% t%e inevitab!e s%are" costs an" risks. To be s're, it $i!! not be eas to engage s'c% ne$ g!oba! #!a ers in fas%ioning t%e nee"e" sec'rit fra&e$ork. )t $i!! take ti&e, #atience, an" #erseverance. Kes#ite t%e o##osition of t%e rising #o$ers to t%e 6nite" 7tates' recent 'ni!atera!is& in $or!" affairs an" t%eir !ingering resent&ent of .estern "o&ination, it is easier for t%ese #o$ers to #a !i# service to t%e notion of s%are" ob!igations $%i!e !etting t%e 6nite" 7tates 8s'##orte" b /'ro#e9 ass'&e t%e act'a! b'r"ens. Accor"ing! , t%e en!ist&ent of ne$ #!a ers $i!! be a #rotracte" #rocess, b't it &'st nonet%e!ess be #'rs'e". T%ere is no ot%er $a to s%a#e effective sec'rit arrange&ents for a $or!" in $%ic% #o!itica!! a$akene" #eo#!es**$%ose #revai!ing %istorica! narratives associate t%e .est !ess $it% t%eir recent e&anci#ation an" &ore $it% t%eir #ast s'bor"ination**can no !onger be "o&inate" b a sing!e region. THE #ENTER O! THE WE$ To ,/BA)N %istorica!! re!evant, NATO cannot**as so&e %ave 'rge"** si&#! e:#an" itse!f into a g!oba! a!!iance or transfor& itse!f into a g!oba! a!!iance of "e&ocracies. >er&an -%ance!!or Ange!a Berke! e:#resse" t%e rig%t senti&ent $%en s%e note" in Barc% 2009, 4) "on't see a g!oba! NATO. . . . )t can #rovi"e sec'rit o'tsi"e its area, b't t%at "oesn't &ean &e&bers across t%e g!obe are #ossib!e.4 A g!oba! NATO $o'!" "i!'te t%e centra!it of t%e 6.7.*/'ro#ean connection, an" none of t%e rising #o$ers $o'!" be !ike! to acce#t &e&bers%i# in a g!oba!! e:#an"e" NATO. F'rt%er&ore, an i"eo!ogica!! "efine" g!oba! a!!iance of "e&ocracies $o'!" face serio's "iffic'!ties in "eter&ining $%o& to inc!'"e an" $%o& to e:c!'"e an" in striking a reasonab!e ba!ance bet$een its "octrina! an" strategic #'r#oses. T%e effort to #ro&ote s'c% an a!!iance co'!" a!so 'n"er&ine NATO's s#ecia! transat!antic i"entit . NATO, %o$ever, %as t%e e:#erience, t%e instit'tions, an" t%e &eans to event'a!! beco&e t%e %'b of a g!obe*s#anning $eb of vario's regiona! coo#erative*sec'rit 'n"ertakings a&ong states $it% t%e gro$ing #o$er to act. T%e res'!ting sec'rit $eb $o'!" fi!! a nee" t%at t%e 6nite" Nations b itse!f cannot &eet b't fro& $%ic% t%e 6N s ste& $o'!" act'a!! benefit. )n #'rs'ing t%at strategic &ission, NATO $o'!" not on! be #reserving transat!antic #o!itica! 'nit 5 it $o'!" a!so be res#on"ing to t%e t$ent *first cent'r 's nove! an" increasing! 'rgent sec'rit agen"a.

IIIIIIII B Zbignie$ Brzezinski Zbignie$ Brzezinski $as 6.7. Nationa! 7ec'rit A"viser fro& D9JJ to D9HD. His &ost recent book is 7econ" -%ance3 T%ree ?resi"ents an" t%e -risis of A&erican 7'#er#o$er.