International Relations and Pesc

Review Article INTERNATiONAL RELATiONS THEORY AND THE RiSE OF EUROPEAN FOREiGN AND SECURiTY POLiCY
By ULRiCH KROTZ and RiCHARD MAHER* Jeffrey T. Checkel, ed. 2007. International Institutions and Socialization in Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press, 292 pp. Marise Cremona, ed. 2008. Developments in EU External Relations Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 336 pp. Marise Cremona and Bruno de Witte, eds. 2008. EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals. Portland, Ore.: Hart Publishing, 324 pp. Seth G. Jones. 2007. The Rise of European Security Cooperation. New York: Cambridge University Press, 310 pp. Christoph O. Meyer. 2007. The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 232 pp. Michael E. Smith. 2004. Europes Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation. New York: Cambridge University Press, 308 pp.
T least since the mid-1960s, conventional wisdom held that European integration in foreign policy, security, and defense was unlikely to amount to much very quickly or smoothly, irrespective of the often impressive achievements in other policy areas.1 However, beginning in the mid-1990s, under the auspices of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and a European security and defense policy (ESDP), European integration in these domains of traditional high politics has evolved and consolidated bit by bit. The old conventional wisdom, that is, no longer seems to accurately reect political reality.
* We are grateful to the editors of World Politics and to the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions. 1 Gordon 199798; Haas 1975; Hoffmann 1966; Hoffmann 1982; Hoffmann 2000; Zielonka 1998. An interesting early exception is Galtung 1973. World Politics 63, no. 3 ( July 2011), 54879 Copyright 2011 Trustees of Princeton University doi: 10.1017/S0043887111000141
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Accordingly, a group of scholars of very diverse theoretical, intellectual, and disciplinary backgrounds has argued that European integration in these policy areas has gained considerable substance. Among other developments, these scholars have identied numerous signs of the changing climate:
a growing desire in Europe for an increased ability to act autonomously in security and defense matters and to raise Europes prole in world politics; the institutionalization of patterns and habits of cooperation, consensus building, and consultation in foreign and security policy; the creation of European military forces and security institutions; and the emergence of norms and other intersubjective understandings, including the convergence of national strategic cultures around a common European strategic culture.
Indeed, a growing number of scholars claim that European foreign and security policy, like Europes power and inuence more broadly, is on the rise, and they are documenting their claims with mounting empirical evidence. One longtime observer of European politics holds that Europe today is a superpower and that world politics is once again bipolar, with the United States and the EU as the poles.2 Generally, national governments remain in rm control of the creation and implementation of foreign, security, and defense policy, such that divergence and disagreement between governments will at times be inevitable. This raises an interesting and important theoretical question: why is it that European cooperation in foreign, security, and defense policy, which has signicantly expanded and consolidated over the course of the past fteen years, seems to work and hold together in some specic instances yet not in others? As even the most casual observer of European politics knows, cooperation is uneven across both countries and individual policy issues. Some European countries, such as France, tend to strongly support Europe becoming a more cohesive and powerful actor, whereas others, such as Britain, tend to be more ambivalent. In some instances, such as peacekeeping, Europe acts as virtually a single political actor, whereas in others, such as the use of military force, the ssures and disagreements between governments often surface quickly and remain pronounced. A cluster of recent books and journal articles sheds theoretical and empirical light on half of this question, namely, why intra-European foreign and security policy cooperation has become more successful in
2
Moravcsik 2009; Moravcsik 2010a; Moravcsik 2010b.
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recent years compared to what it was in the past. These publications place different emphases on what has changed and hold sharply differing views on what has caused the changes. There is divergence over just what constitutes cooperation, how to measure it, and how to explain its variation across time. While each author seeks to develop theoretically and conceptually well grounded explanations for the increase in the scope and intensity of cooperation, each does so from positions that span nearly the entire range of the major approaches to international relations theory and of scholarship on world politics more broadly: realism, various types of institutionalism and legal institutionalization, and social constructivism. These recent writings bring together in signicant and illuminating new ways the main strands of IR and social science theory with the history and politics of European integration. Moreover, this takes place in the policy areas in which European integration had traditionally been the weakest and least developed and, correspondingly, which had received the least theoretical attention. Taking these books and articles together, one can identify three broad issues that serve to frame this emerging eld of study. Considered together, these works illuminate the range of causal forces that may lead to increased cooperation and that shape its unique characteristics, the political motivations behind cooperation, and the prospects for continued or even greater cooperation in the future. First, how can we use IR theory to explain increased cooperation in European foreign and security policy? In what ways can realist variables such as international or regional distributions of power account for greater cooperation? Or is cooperation a function of decades of institutionalizing certain norms and patterns of behavior or of the increasing legalization of European foreign and security policy? Or does it derive from the gradual convergence of national strategic cultures around a distinct European strategic culture? Second, with what purpose do European states adopt common positions in foreign and security policy? Through a careful review of this collection of scholarly works, one sees how the various authors dene, though sometimes only implicitly, the many different social and political purposes behind the greater European cooperation in foreign, security, and defense policy. Realists of different stripes point to the desire of many Europeans to act autonomously from the United States; to avoid a potential security dilemma in postcold war Europe by binding Germany into European political and security institutions; or to balance against the United States in some form. Historical institutionalists and scholars focused on the expansion and deepening legal institu-
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tionalization cite a desire to make foreign and security policy more rule governed or note the effects of path dependence for locking in certain norms and practices over a span of several decades. Constructivists and sociological institutionalists point to the process of moving beyond the nation-state as the main source or provider of security and to the decisive importance of norms, ideas, socialization, and discourse for actors strategies, policies, and concrete interests.3 The third issue concerns, in the vernacular of European integration, the EUs nality. Where is European integration in foreign policy, security, and defense ultimately headed? Toward a fully integrated system in which foreign and security policy is dened and implemented in Brussels? Toward a system in which the national governments retain their own prerogatives over foreign and security policy but increasingly converge around common positions, from conict prevention and crisis management in the Balkans to the promotion of good governance and human rights in places as disparate as the Caucasus, the Balkans, and sub-Saharan Africa? Or to a decentralized system in which power and authority ow upward to supranational bodies and sideways to private actors? Absent any consensus on the nality issue among scholars or policymakers, the scope and intensity of cooperation may of necessity reach its functional and political limits, at least in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, together and individually the books and articles under consideration here prompt a rethinking of a long-held assumption about European foreign and security policy: that impediments to cooperation are insurmountable and that cooperation in foreign and security policy will thus be shallow and ad hoc. These works agree that European foreign policy and security cooperation have reached a scope and intensity unprecedented in the history of European integration. At a minimum, the starting point in the future will not be debates over the existence or nonexistence of substantive levels of cooperation but rather will be debates over (1) when, under what conditions, and to what extent European states cooperate with each other in foreign policy and security matters; (2) the relative importance of different causal factors, including the structures of the international or regional systems, institutions, and norms, culture, and other ideational variables; and (3) the consequences for European politics, European states, and world politics more broadly.
3 In addition, policymakers cite the need to reduce the dominance of the United States or functional necessities: to respond effectively to the many potential disruptions on Europes periphery, European governments need to act collectively, rather than individually. See Cooper 2004; Vdrine 2001.
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At the same time, one realizes that, as Europe attempts to nd its place in the world, constraints and impediments to greater cooperationand thus perhaps to a greater role in world politicshave hardly vanished. When it comes to core security interests, European governments continue to pursue predominantly nationally dened interests and policies. The heated debates preceding the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in March 2003 or EU member states relations with Russia, particularly over energy security, illustrate the resilience of statecentered interests, power, and prerogatives.4 It is questions of vital national interests and issues regarding the purpose of (pan-)Europes increasingly outward orientation in foreign and security policy and the direction in which Europe is heading that will continue to account for the uneven patterns of cooperation and impose limits on the scope and intensity of cooperation in the future. In no other area is the likelihood of incompatibility of basic interests and values higher than in foreign policy, security, and defense because those are the issues that strike at the very core of state sovereignty and state identity. This article is organized as follows. The rst section examines some denitional issues and sketches how, over the past decade, a new eld has emerged that merges the study of European foreign, security, and defense policy with general theorizing in international relations. The next three sections consider European cooperation in foreign and security policy as seen through the lenses of some of the main theoretical and conceptual approaches to IR theory today: realism, various types of institutionalism, and social constructivism. The fth section draws a number of lessons and insights from reading these various books and articles together. In light of this articles ndings and arguments, the concluding section reviews the subject matters theoretical promise, as well as its political importance. THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW FIELD OF STUDY Despite the advent of European foreign, security, and defense affairs as a distinct area of study, no standard denition of foreign, security, or defense policy cooperation has emerged among the growing number of scholars who study it. There is, in other words, no consensus on the exact explanandum or appropriate dependent variable. This is so
4 On Iraq, see Gordon and Shapiro 2004, 12836; on energy policy, see Abdelal 2010; Buchan 2009, esp. chap. 9; Maher 2011, chap. 6. Additionally, on responding to genocide, note Smith 2010. For a general discussion of the factors and forces promoting and undermining Europes emergence as a full actor in foreign policy, security, and defense, see Krotz 2009.
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in part because the various scholars working in the eld operate from very different theoretical orientations and are interested in explaining different aspects of cooperation. While this may provide for a fruitful diversity of theoretical and empirical studies that focus on different features of European foreign and security policy, it also tends to hinder the accumulation of knowledge on the subject matter. Among the books under review, for example, Jones breaks down his dependent variablesecurity cooperationinto four categories: security institutions, economic sanctions, arms production, and military forces. Smith parses his dependent variableforeign and security policy cooperationinto two different categories: quantitative indicators of cooperation and qualitative ones. The quantitative indicators include the expansion of European Political Cooperation (EPC) actions and CFSP common positions and joint actions from 1970 to 1995, the number of functional issues with which EU foreign policy has dealt, and the expansion of the EU repertoire of foreign policy tools and instruments. The qualitative indicators include the rationale for the expansion of EU foreign policy cooperation and the collective responses of EU member states. Meyers explanandum is the degree of normative convergence around a distinct and coherent European strategic culture. The Cremona and Cremona and de Witte volumes document the increasing legalization of EU foreign policy, in particular, the growth and complexity of EU external relations law and the extent to which governments are accountable to judicial oversight of their foreign policy actions. The extent of this diversity is not surprising. Foreign policy, security, and defense are expansive concepts that span multiple sets of actions and practices. They can include foreign aid and humanitarian concerns, areas in which both the European Commission and the individual national governments have long been active. The EU has conducted a number of peacekeeping missions, both within and outside of Europe. Foreign and security policy also includes the creation and implementation of measures of coercion, intimidation, and deterrencewhat Thomas Schelling called the diplomacy of violence.5 This includes the imposition of sanctions and embargoes, an area in which European countries are increasingly working through the EU.6 For example, the EU (as well as individual governments) has imposed sanctions on Iran for its failure to abide by successive Security Council resolutions to
5 6
Schelling 1966. Jones 2007, chap. 4.
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halt its uranium enrichment program. Defense policy, traditionally an exclusively national concern and historically the least integrated policy area, is generally understood to encompass decisions regarding the threat or use of force as well as arms development and production.7 Defense cooperation could include humanitarian interventions, for which Meyer claims there is increasing support across Europe, although this support is uneven across countries (pp. 13943). The very expansiveness of these concepts underscores the multiplicity and magnitude of the European developments at the same time as it tends to obscure what precisely is meant by cooperation or integration in foreign policy, security, and defense, how to measure it, and how to evaluate its change over time. Rather than being dichotomousabsent or presentEuropean cooperation in foreign and security policy has always existed along a continuum, both before and after World War II. The nineteenth-century Concert of Europe is one type of regional security cooperation, as was EPC of the 1970s and 1980s.8 More prosaically, Europes very political and institutional development since the end of World War II is a form of intense foreign policy cooperation. Thus viewed, cooperation among European states in foreign policy, security, and defense is not a new phenomenon. What is new, however, is that for the rst time Europe appears to be an increasingly cohesive political unit that is looking outward, beyond Europe. And the scope and intensity of cooperation is qualitatively different today as compared with what it was even in the very recent past. Furthermore, European security today embodies greater complexity than it did in the past. Not only is there greater cooperation among national governments but there are also a multitude of different actors that must be taken into account. The use of European foreign and security policy can thus be ambiguous, referring either to supranational or to intergovernmental processes. The European Commission dispenses humanitarian aid and negotiates trade agreements on behalf of all member states.9 Intergovernmental cooperation may encompass all EU member states or a subset of EU member states acting apart from the rest. Or individual European governments may act unilaterally. At times a common position among the twenty-seven member
7 On interstate cooperation and its impediments in security and defense, as well as neglected aspects of regional integration in Europe in these areas from the 1970s through the rst decade of the twenty-rst century, see Krotz 2011. 8 On the Congress of Vienna and Concert of Europe, see Schroeder 1994, chaps. 12, 13; on EPC, see Nuttall 1992. 9 On trade, note Meunier 2007.
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states emerges on specic issues. At other times different groups of states take the lead, for example, the British-French-German troika in negotiations with Iran. Individual states continue to pursue special relationships with countries within or outside of Europe, such as France-Germany or Britain with the United States. In practice, European governments oscillate between different degrees of unilateralism, bilateralism, and multilateralism in pursuit of national or European values and interests. The formation of West European security arrangements after World War II was deeply intertwined with the beginning of the cold war, U.S. involvement in continental reconstruction, and early steps toward European integration.10 The European Defense Community (EDC) was to parallel the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in binding European governments and societies more closely together. The EDC would have established a Europe of the original sixWest Germany, France, Italy, and the Benelux countrieseffectively integrated in security and defense, and it would have created a European military. The EDCs conclusive failure in 1954 brought about two longer-term consequences: NATO and the trans-Atlantic frame decisively took over in the areas of security and defense, and ultimate authority in the domains of traditional high politics remained at the level of the nation-state. Thus, for many decades, political realities provided little reason for scholars to spend much time thinking about European integration and its causal forces in these policy domains. From the initial postwar development of European integration in the 1950s, foreign and security policy received little empirical and even less theoretical attention. Starting in the 1990s, however, following Europes failure to stem the violence in the Balkans, the EU has become more serious about matching its signicant commercial and economic prowess with diplomatic and political inuence. In December 2003 the EU released its very rst paper outlining a unique security strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World, and it has articulated a number of areas in which it seeks to act as a single, unied actor.11 The time when foreign and defense policy is dictated from Brussels for all member states is still far offif not completely unrealistic. However, even if states continue to
Hill and Smith 2000; Katzenstein 2005; Lundestad 1998; Lundestad 2003; Trachtenberg 1999. European Commission 2003. Subsequently, a reection groups May 2010 report analyzed some of the longer-term (that is, 202030) challenges facing the EU in world politics and international security. See European Council 2010.
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dene the basic parameters, foreign and defense policy in Europe is no longer exclusively a matter of atomized nation-states.12 Even Britain, long ambivalent over the creation of a European security and defense posture, reversed course in December 1998 at St. Malo, when Prime Minister Tony Blair pledged, along with President Jacques Chirac of France, Britains readiness to see the EU become a political actor backed by military capability.13 Less than ve years later, in March 2003, EU troops took over for NATO in Bosnia and Macedonia, marking the EUs rst military mission. In June of that same year European troops embarked on a mission to eastern Congo, the EUs rst military mission outside of Europe. The classic theoretical positions on European integrationneofunctionalism, as articulated by Ernst Haas, and intergovernmentalism, as initially formulated by Stanley Hoffmannagreed that the integrative pressures that characterized other policy domains would be extremely difcult if not impossible to replicate in the security and defense realms.14 The other main theoretical or analytical frameworks used to study European integration and European politicstransactionism, federalism, and multilevel governancenever produced major theoretical statements on EU foreign and security affairs.15 Until almost the end of the twentieth century, theorizing on European integration remained fairly aloof from the main developments in general IR theory. Over the course of the 1990s, Andrew Moravcsik was among the rst and most important scholars to seek direct connections between the study of European integration and general IR theory, formulating a liberal intergovernmentalist approach that combined Hoffmanns original statism with a liberal outlook that rooted national interests (or state preferences) in domestic and transnational societies.16 Institutionalist, social constructivist, and structural realist explanations of European integration followed.17 The books and articles considered
12 For overviews of the development and expansion of European foreign and security policy from various angles, see Wallace 2005; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008; Smith 2008; Bindi 2010; Chivvis 2010; Mrand, Foucault, and Irondelle 2011. 13 Howorth 2000. 14 Haas 1958; Haas 1975; Hoffmann 1966; Hoffmann 1982. 15 On Karl Deutschs pioneering work on transactionism and cybernetics, see Deutsch 1954; Deutsch et al. 1957; Deutsch 1963; in Deutschs spirit, note Puchala 1970; Katzenstein 1976; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998. On federalist approaches, see Etzioni 1965; Spinelli 1972; Etzioni 2001. On multilevel governance, see Hooghe and Marks 2001; Jachtenfuchs 2001; Larat and Kohler-Koch 2009. 16 Moravcsik 1991; Moravcsik 1993; Moravcsik 1997; Moravcsik 1998. 17 Pierson 1996; Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse 2001; Fligstein, Sandholtz, and Stone Sweet 2001; Parsons 2003; Rosato 2010.
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here continue and expand this trend in applying general IR and social science theory to European politicsthis time to foreign, security, and defense policy. What has emerged is an increasingly distinct eld of study with its own research questions, conceptual issues, and search for causal explanations. IR theory is now fully engaging with European integration studies and vice versaand, paradoxically, in precisely those policy areas in which European integration traditionally had been the weakest and least developed. REALISM: BINDING GERMANY, AUTONOMY FROM THE UNITED STATES, BALANCING The increase in European security cooperation in the postcold war era, as well as European integration in general, posed a puzzle for structural realist theory.18 With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, European states no longer faced a threat to their political and territorial integrity. Accordingly, many realists expected European integration, along with NATO, to weaken or recede; some even anticipated power competition to return to the European continent.19 However, rather than reverting to a balance of power system reminiscent of the nineteenth century, European security has become more deeply institutionalized. Instead of viewing each other as potential competitors and sources of threat, European states have increased the scope and intensity of their cooperation. In response to these developments, realism largely absent from the eld since Hoffmanns classic 1966 article on the durability of the nation-state in Europe20has once again entered the theoretical debate on European integration. In The Rise of European Security Cooperation, Jones asks why, after so many failed attempts in the past, European states have been both more open to cooperation and more successful in establishing it in areas such as the creation of a European security institution (CFSP); the imposition of economic sanctions on a European rather than a national or transatlantic basis; collaboration on arms production; and the creation of European military forces. Jones attributes the increase in intra-European security cooperation to changes in the structure of both the international system and the regional system in Europe following the end of the cold war. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international
Collard-Wexler 2006. Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 1993. 20 Exceptions include Grieco 1995; Grieco 1996.
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system shifted from bipolarity to unipolarity. Two subsequent developments changed the security environment in Europe and potentially threatened its stability. First, a unied Germany emerged as a potential regional hegemon. Then, in the early 1990s, the United States began to rapidly reduce its troop presence on the Continent, raising concerns about its long-term commitment to European security. Both changes were potentially highly destabilizing to the strategic equilibrium in Europe. In particular, some feared that the inevitable withdrawal of the United States from the Continent would create a power vacuum in the heart of Europe. These simultaneous changes to the international and regional distributions of power, according to Jones, motivated European states to cooperate on security issues for two main reasons. First, European governments, including Germanys, were anxious to maintain peace and stability in Europe. With Germanys rise in relative power and the United States eventual retreat from Europe, a potential security dilemma loomed.21 European governments sought to bind Germany into a European security institution to prevent it from fomenting instability. This was successful because Germany today is a status quo rather than a revisionist power and because German political leaders also recognized and wanted to avoid a security dilemma. The second reason was to increase Europes ability to project power abroad and to decrease its reliance on the United States. Following the cold war, it was inevitable that Europe and the United States would no longer dene their interests with the same degree of compatibility as they had during the preceding decades. The wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s characterized this new reality most profoundly. Europe, paralyzed by division and incoherence, catastrophically failed to stop the bloodshed in the Balkans. The United States, having no immediate security interests in the region, encouraged the Europeans to do the job themselves. Only after it had become clear that it would take American military action to stop the killing and that the very credibility of NATO was at stake did the United States intervene. The wars in Bosnia and Kosovo also demonstrated the vast disparity in military capabilities between the United States and Europe. Following these wars, Europeans realized they had to develop an autonomous military capability to use when and where the United States chose not to act. American unipolarity, according to Jones (pp. 2124 et passim), was a necessary condition for enhanced European security cooperation.
21 On the security dilemma in international politics, see Herz 1950; Buttereld 1951; Jervis 1978; and, more recently, Glaser 1997.
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While insisting that the United States does not pose any kind of threat to Europe, Jones holds that intra-European security cooperation would not have proceeded as quickly in the absence of American unipolarity. American preponderance produced a dependence on American military and political power for European countries. It followed from this situation that a primary motivation behind recent European security cooperation was to reduce Europes reliance on the United States and to increase its autonomy in world politics. Jones provides an array of evidence demonstrating that signicant increases in intra-European security cooperation have in fact materialized in certain policy areas since the cold war period. After three failed attempts in the past, the EU has been successful in creating a European security institution (CFSP). Whereas between 1950 and 1990 European governments that imposed economic sanctions on another state did so through the EC in only two out of seventeen cases (12 percent), since 1991 EU member states have imposed economic sanctions on target states through the EU in twenty-one out of twenty-seven cases (78 percent) (p. 97). European arms producers are more likely to enter partnerships with one another, rather than with American rms. And the EU now has its own military force that it can deploy to areas of instability. The book, however, will not satisfy all skeptics, especially those who believe that Europes impressive capabilitieseconomic, political, military, and cultural or soft power appealhave not yet translated into real inuence and fall far short of Europes at times grand ambitions.22 For example, Jones does not examine whether European security cooperation leads to effective outcomes. Europe may have its own security institutions, and European states may be imposing sanctions through the EU much more than they did during the cold war, but do such sanctions bring results? Are they, for example, successful in changing the behavior of the target state? And can Europe succeed in bundling its capabilities and act coherently when it really matters? On arguably the most consequential security decision since the end of the cold warwhich position to take regarding the United States invasion of Iraqthe Europeans were hopelessly divided. Javier Solana, at the time the high representative for CFSP, was completely marginalized in the lead-up to the invasion. What does this say about the effectiveness of this institution and about Europes real impact? Approaching the subject matter through structural realist precepts, Jones opens himself to the familiar charge that he leaves out more than
22
This capabilities-expectations gap is an old concern. See Hill 1993.
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he includes. For example, there is no discussion of domestic politics, the weight of Europes history on elite and public attitudes to security policy, or the recognition of the importance of political leadership, with a corresponding complete lack of agency for European policymakers. This is somewhat curious because, as structural realists concede, the international system simply shapes the security environment in which states operate; structure alone does not determine outcomes.23 In real life, however, we know that political leaders, their motivations, and their choices matter greatly, for both the form and the content of cooperation. Jones neglects many other trends in European politics. For example, his account cannot explain why there has been greater support among French and German policymakers for intra-European security cooperation, whereas other European states such as Britain, the Netherlands, Poland, and several in Central and Eastern Europe have sought instead to maintain the primacy of NATO. A number of other realists have set their sights on European security cooperation in recent years.24 While certain similarities aboundall place causal primacy on the structure of the international system there are interesting differences as well, both about the causes of greater cooperation and about the motivations behind it. Barry Posen, for example, attributes increased intra-European security cooperation to traditional balance of power (as opposed to balance of threat) dynamics.25 European security cooperation, in Posens account, is not motivated by fear of an imminent threat from the United States. Instead, European governments are concerned about maintaining their autonomy and independent capabilities. While the United States and Europe continue to share many values and common interests, they do not necessarily have the same strategic objectives. By taking advantage of economies of scale, Europe ensures that it will be able to act independently of the United States in areas such as crisis management and conict prevention. Realists also hold different views on whether Europe is balancing against the United States and, if so, whether this balancing is of the hard or soft type. Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth see no evidence of such balancing. They argue that regional security concerns, rather than balancing ambitions, motivate the increase in intraEuropean security and defense cooperation.26 Keir Lieber and Gerard
Waltz 1986, 34344; Posen 2006, 160. Art 2004; Hyde-Price 2006; Kupchan 2002; Kupchan 2003; Posen 2006. 25 For a contrary view, see Howorth and Menon 2009. The seminal work on balance of threat realism is Walt 1987. 26 Brooks and Wohlforth 2005; Brooks and Wohlforth 2008, 8083.
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Alexander do not view European security and defense cooperation as amounting to very muchcertainly not enough to balance U.S. preponderance.27 Robert Art takes issue with both of these views. He argues that the motive behind the EUs effort to increase its security and defense capabilities is clearly a case of balancing the United States.28 Specically, Britain and France launched ESDP to enhance their political inuence within the transatlantic alliance through soft balancing, but not to challenge Americas military hegemony with hard balancing.29 One thing on which realists do seem to agree is that Europes increased security and defense cooperation will serve to complicate relations between the United States and Europe and lead to more frequent transatlantic disagreements.30 As Europe charts a more independent course in world politics and relies less on the United States for its basic security needs, the United States and Europe will no longer dene their interests with the same degree of commonality as they did during the cold war and in its immediate aftermath. INSTITUTIONALISM: PATH DEPENDENCE AND LEGALIZATION With a book and a number of articles over the past decade, Michael Smith has emerged as the most visible expositor of a largely historical institutionalist approach to explaining the appearance and consolidation of European foreign and security policy cooperation.31 In Europes Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation, Smith asks how EC/EU member states have been able to intensify their cooperation in foreign and security policy since 1970 while simultaneously respecting the sovereignty of the individual member states and avoiding the transfer of control over foreign and security policy to Brussels. Smiths explanation, however, actually draws on various institutionalist approaches and combines elements of historical, sociological, and rationalist theorizing.32 As he says: EU foreign policy matured from a weak intergovernmental forum inspired by instrumental
Lieber and Alexander 2005. Art 2004; Art 20056. 29 Art 2004, 199. 30 Hyde-Price 2006, 23132; Jones 2007, 23843; Kissinger 2001, chap. 2; Posen 2006, 185. 31 In addition to the book, see Smith 2000; Smith 2001; Smith 2004a; Smith 2004b. For a forerunner of this approach, see Ginsberg 2001. 32 Hall and Taylor 1996; Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander 1999; Pierson 2004; Katznelson and Weingast 2005; Krotz 2010. On combining rationalist and constructivist approaches, see Fearon and Wendt 2002. For a hint of sociological institutionalism in some of Smiths work, note especially 2004a.
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rationality into a more institutionalized policy-making system governed by social rationality.33 According to Smith, European foreign policy cooperation is not directed by supranational institutions; does not involve bargaining between the member states over, for example, side payments or issue linkages (issue-specic lobbying is virtually nonexistent, especially compared with other policy areas); is not dominated by the largest states (the rotating six-month presidency gives small states important agenda-setting and leadership opportunities); and does not reect the lowest common denominator (as Smith points out, preference outliers often adapt their positions to be more in line with the community position). External inuences, notably American power or American policy choices, also cannot explain cooperation. Nor can functional or political spillover (pp. 2532).34 Instead, European foreign policy and security cooperation emerged through the institutionalization of habits and patterns of cooperation, consultation, and consensus building, and much of the book is devoted to examining this historical process. Progress was gradual and incremental, marked by both intended and unintended consequences, and has exceeded anything planned in the rst meeting of EPC in 1970. As Smith nds, although EU foreign policy was established along strict intergovernmental lines on the basis of a grand bargain, it has become far more institutionalized than its architects had intended or even expected.35 This institutionalization has affected not only actors interests but their identities as well, especially those who work in the permanent bureaucracy in Brussels. Institutions lead to greater cooperation in foreign and security policy by two mechanisms. The rst, and more important, is preemption. By this Smith means that institutionalization keeps European governments from unilaterally adopting xed positions on consequential foreign and security policy issues without consulting other European governments.36 The second is elite socialization. This has fostered a transition from actors pursuing their own instrumental rationality based on predetermined national positions to a socially constructed rationality based on collective positions.37 Historically, institutionalization, according to Smith, developed in three stages (pp. 4049). The rst stage began with the creation of EPC
Smith 2004a, 103. See also Smith 2004a, 9698. 35 Smith 2004a, 99. 36 Smith 2004a, 101. 37 Smith 2004a, 1012.
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in 1970. This was a strictly intergovernmental forum, both informal and inexpensive (in political and other costs), that sought to create consensus among the foreign ministers of the different EC member states. Governments at rst were highly reluctant to cede any control or authority in foreign and security policy to supranational institutions. As a result, there was little expectation that the initial meetings between foreign ministers would result in any substantive developments. The second stage featured the development of a transgovernmental EPC network. The network included policy experts, bureaucrats, and members of the foreign policy establishments of the EC member states. The meetings became more frequent, information sharing was enhanced, working groups were created, and the telex system of communication was developed. As Smith points out, during this phase a unique culture of cooperation emerged among the foreign ministries that included shared standards of behavior, shared understandings, and a common (political) language. The foreign policy elites in different governments got to know one another and became comfortable working with each other. Trust developed, and consultation became second nature (what has been called a coordination reex). The third stage involved deepening the institutionalization process, which included the emergence of rules and norms, including the expectation that EU governments would consult each other before taking a position on an important issue, and the development of the acquis politique. With the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, CFSP became one of the EUs three pillars, together with monetary union and Justice and Home Affairs. Without the twenty years of EPC, Smith maintains, CFSP would have been difcult if not impossible to achieve. EU foreign policy has also become an increasingly legalized domain. Legalization is a particular and distinctive form of institutionalization. It involves decisions to impose legal constraints on governments in particular issue and policy areas.38 Legalization creates obligations on governments and subjects behavior to outside scrutiny through the delegation of monitoring and related tasks to third parties. In EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals and Developments in EU External Relations Law, legal scholars Cremona and de Witte document the expanding legal institutionalization of European foreign and security affairs and thereby complement and esh out other institutional work on the subject. The deepening of legal norms and principles in the EUs external relations has taken place via two
38
Goldstein et al. 2001.
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pathwaysthrough the expansion of the EUs role in external relations in the Single European Act (SEA) and the Maastricht Treaty; and through a process of judicial review: we have seen a rapid thickening of judge-made constitutional law relating to the respective roles of the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament, to the intricate division of competences between the EU and Member States (Cremona and de Witte 2008, xii). As a result of these two developments, the EUs foreign relations have grown massively in volume and complexity (Cremona and de Witte 2008, xiii). There is an increasingly large volume of both treaty law and case law on issues ranging from trade and development policy, the EUs role in neighborhood conicts (particularly covering conict prevention), and the EUs neighborhood policy, that is, the political, institutional, and constitutional changes states must make to be considered for EU membership. At the same time, even as foreign and security policy has become more legalized, member states have resisted full legalization in these domains, particularly in areas of vital national interests.39 This seems to be true for institutionalization in general. Frequently, one has the sense that institutionalization can explain cooperation only in cases in which vital interests are not at stake. Decades of institutionalization did not prevent the ascoes surrounding Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq, or the selfhelp policies in relations with Russia. This, many might say, may be sobering news for institutional theorizing more generally, as the EU, composed of advanced Western democracies with a long history of cooperation, should be a favorable domain for effective institutionalized security cooperation. While the literature on institutionalization and legalization illuminates important developments in EU foreign and security policy, questions persist over their true causal role. In many instances, institutionalization is to a certain extent endogenous to other factorssuch as economic integration, shifts in domestic preferences, the expansion and consolidation of democratic institutions, integration in other policy and issue areas, and normative evolution, at both the societal and the elite levels. Evaluating the real impact of institutions independently from these other factors therefore remains a daunting yet critical task. Finally, institutionalism can be vague on the internal dynamics leading to institutional change and evolution, especially on the magnitude and speed of institutionalization. Smith cites three such logics: a func39
Smith 2001.
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tional logic, normative appropriateness, and a sociocultural (or socialization) logic (p. 33). As a historical institutionalist, he holds that institutions evolve incrementally and gradually over time. In many instances, however, institutional development does not proceed in a constant and gradual manner. In such cases, the idea of punctuated equilibrium might be a better analogy to explain the institutionalization of European foreign and security policy.40 Punctuated equilibrium posits long periods of stasis interrupted by relatively brief periods of major change. CFSP was dormant until France and Germany made a deal at Maastricht on political and economic union. Similarly, defense cooperation remained modest until the 1998 Franco-British agreement in St. Malo. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM: STRATEGIC CULTURE, NORMATIVE CONVERGENCE, SOCIALIZATION Scholars have adopted constructivist perspectives to explain various features of European politics, including aspects of regional integration and eastern enlargement; Europes regional polity within the American imperium; socialization of different sorts; and various aspects of European identity.41 But only recently have scholars used constructivism to explain European security cooperation. So far this new focus has mostly evolved around asking whether a common European strategic culture is emerging or whether in fact it already exists in some form and what if any effect this has on state behavior. Research on the emergence and possible robustness of a European strategic culture is politically important. A number of scholars (and not only those studying strategic culture) and policy practitioners have claimed that European foreign policy, security, and defense, if they are to grow beyond current roles and capabilities, will require a foundation of shared interests, values, priorities, perceptions of threat, and legitimate means and ends for the use of military force, as well as agreement on Europes proper role in the world. If disagreement or divergence on these issues persists, many academics and policymakers believe, then cooperation in these policy areas is unlikely to develop and consolidate. In The Quest for a European Strategic Culture, Meyer analyzes the extent to which national strategic cultures in Europe have converged since the end of the cold war. Strategic cultures comprise deep-seated norms, beliefs, and ideas about a states role in the world, its perception
Krasner 1984; Krasner 1988; Eldredge and Gould 1972. McNamara 1999; Christiansen, Jrgensen, and Wiener 2001; Parsons 2003; Schimmelfennig 2003; Katzenstein 2005; Checkel 2007; Krotz 2007; Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Risse 2010.
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of security threats, and the legitimate means and ends for the use of force (p. 2). Though these cultures remain distinct, Meyer nds that there is increasing convergence among European states regarding the deprioritization of territorial defense since the end of the cold war; the need and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping; a strong role for the UN, including authorizing the use of military force; and a general preference for civilian rather than military policy instruments (p. 185). While Meyer claims there has been broad normative convergence among Britain, France, Germany, and Poland (the four countries under consideration in his book), he cautions that national differences still exist: [N]ormative convergence in these areas does not mean that national beliefs have become fully compatible, but only that differences have narrowed (p. 11). In explaining the process of normative convergence, Meyer species three causal mechanisms: changing threat perceptions due to changes in the external security environment; institutional socialization and the role of epistemic communities as the drivers of cognitive change; and mediatized crisis learning, by which he means normative shifts within media discourse that in turn challenge existing social norms and induce learning (p. 6). To assess the degree of normative convergence and thus the extent to which a distinctly European strategic culture is emergingMeyer uses data from public opinion polls, a content analysis of newspapers, and responses to a questionnaire by think tank experts and by national parliamentarians sitting on defense committees. Where is Europe heading, and what is the purpose of foreign policy and security cooperation? Meyer sees the emergence of what he calls Humanitarian Power Europe, where there is convergence on low to medium level of risk tolerance regarding the proportionate use of force, moderate to high authorization requirements [for the use of military force], a growing attachment to the EU as an actor with a general preference for using soft power, and support for goals regarding the use of force, which do not substantially transcend beyond the purposes of humanitarianism (p. 30). This is contrasted to two other ideal types: Helvetian Europe, where Europe would limit its global commitments and prole, leave military alliances such as NATO, and privilege nonalignment and neutrality; and Global Power Europe, in which Europe would use its aggregated power to adopt a more activist outward orientation, including the pursuit of realpolitik, a higher tolerance for risk, and lower thresholds for the authorization of force. Although Meyer asks important questions and expands the theoretical debate, the issues of whether or not a common European strategic
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culture is emerging and what effect this might have on state behavior ultimately remain inconclusive. Even Meyer confesses that only a narrow and thin strategic culture has emerged (p. 42). Moreover, measuring the existence and the causal effect of strategic culture (or normative convergence)across four countries reecting cultural changes within an entire regionis a conceptually and methodologically challenging task. Strategic culture or related types of domestic construction have commonly been used to explain or compare the conduct of single countries.42 Conceptual and methodological difculties arise when applying the concept to multiple countries. The difculty is not unique to Meyer. Another attempt at evaluating the strength of a European strategic culture suffers from conceptual and methodological challenges similar to those that characterize Meyers study.43 Despite staking a claim within the modernist constructivist camp (p. 5) la Schimmelfennig, Katzenstein, Finnemore, and Checkel, among others, and self-consciously adopting a broadly positivist epistemology, the book is surprisingly atheoretical. Even when Meyer articulates testable hypotheses, there is little attempt at explaining how all the variables and propositions hang together. Moreover, the hypotheses or testable propositions that are advanced are often in no way unique to constructivist theorizing or clearly distinguished or distinguishable from the expectations of other theoretical perspectives in IR. For example, Meyer states that Britain, France, Germany, and Poland have a fading attachment to territorial defense today as compared with their orientations during the cold war period and that a new normative consensus has emerged regarding perceptions of external security threats. However, this can be equally and perhaps more easily explained by rationalist and materialist approaches. Indeed, it would be astonishing (or proof of serious paranoia and poor political leadership) if these countries felt the same or an increased perception of threat to their territorial security now that the cold war is over and the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact are gone. A second, related problem is the absence of any consideration or explicit testing of alternative explanations. One gets the sense that there is a general dissatisfaction with political realism, particularly structural realism, but there is hardly any discussion of specically why realism is unsatisfactory and why the use of strategic culture will help us arrive at more complete, accurate, and rigorous explanations of these important
42 43
See, for example, Johnston 1998; Katzenstein 1996; Kier 1997; Krotz forthcoming. Giegerich 2006.
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developments. The result is an apparent unwillingness either to subject claims to empirical disconrmation or to demonstrate why this framework offers a better explanation compared with the alternatives. Third, there is also an issue of tautology or circularity in the book that applies the concept of strategic culture to European foreign and security policy.44 For example, normative convergence leads to changing threat perceptions or changing attitudes about the legitimate use of military force. Meyer uses these in turn as evidence for evolving normative convergence. Strategic culture can be used as either an independent or a dependent variable, depending on ones research objective. The relationship between the two is not always clear in the work considered here. It is true that the two could be co-constituted, but one would then have to show specic feedback mechanisms linking strategic culture as an independent and an outcome variable, respectively. In addition, it remains unclear where strategic culture is located and how its impact should be measured or empirically documented. This might be because what represents strategic culture is not consistent throughout Meyers book. In fact, to assess the strength of normative change, Meyer uses different proxies for each of his three empirical chapters. To assess changing threat perceptions in response to both the end of the cold war and the rise of Islamist terrorism, Meyer focuses on existing public opinion surveys. One thus infers that public opinion represents or reects strategic culture. To assess changing norms on the use of force (particularly in response to cases of ethnic conict and human rights abuses) and multilateralism, Meyer conducts a content analysis of national newspapers, offering anecdotal evidence that a normative shift emerged following the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. One thus infers that newspaper editorials reect strategic culture. To evaluate whether the rise of new security institutions acts to socialize agents operating within them, Meyer uses responses to questionnaires. One thus infers that the degree to which institutional socialization occurs reects the strength of strategic culture. However, as International Institutions and Socialization in Europe demonstrates, none of these criticisms or shortcomings is inherent to constructivism as such or to applications of constructivist thought. Exploring how institutions in Europe socialize states and state agents, Jeffrey Checkel and contributors provide conceptually and methodologically rigorous constructivist research. The volumes basic proposition is that international institutions are social environments and that
44
For a sharp critique along such lines, see Foucault, Mrand, and Irondelle 2010.
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participation in them may socialize both individual policymakers and states; institutions can have constitutive as well as constraining effects (p. 19). Checkel denes socialization as a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community (p. 5). He distinguishes between two types of socialization. Type I socialization is the movement from instrumental rationality to the conscious adoption of new roles. Type II socialization signies changes in values and interests or when agents accept community or organizational norms as the right thing to do (p. 6). By adopting the rules of the broader community, the actor or agent moves from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness.45 Checkel further identies three separate causal mechanisms that induce change: strategic calculation, role playing, and normative suasion (pp. 916, 24351). The individual chapters apply this framework to the socializing effects of several institutions in Europe, including NATO, the Council of Europe, and the OSCE. Interestingly, the results of institutionalization are largely consistent with Meyers ndings. The empirical studies demonstrate that the socializing effects of European institutions are uneven and often surprisingly weak, and in no way can be construed as shaping a new, post-national identity (p. 16). Unfortunately, no chapter looked specically at CFSP or ESDP. It would have been instructive to compare the ndings with those of Meyer and Smith.46 WHERE THE FIELD STANDS These books and articles represent a decisive development in the literature on European foreign and security policy. Examined together, they provide a number of lessons and insights. First, across theoretical perspectives, a consensus has emerged that European states have succeeded in establishing a degree of cooperation in foreign policy, security, and defense that is historically unprecedented. Second, there is basic disagreement regarding which factors are driving and thus are most important for explaining the apparent consolidation of policy-making at the European level. That we nd such disagreement across works rooted in different theoretical or intellectual
March and Olsen 2006. In addition to the constructivist approaches outlined in this section, political sociology has entered the eld as well. Situated in a broader argument about state transformation, ESDP, because it cuts to the heart of state sovereignty, redenes the way in which Europeans think about the state in the twenty-rst century. For the rst time in nearly ve centuries, according to this view, elites and the European public no longer view defense as a fundamental part of state identity. See Mrand 2008.
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traditions should not be surprising. What is remarkable, however, are the striking differences within the same macroperspective, realism in particular. Some realists attribute the rise in European security cooperation to a desire for enhanced autonomy from the United States and a greater prole in world politics. Others point to traditional balance of power dynamics (a response to American unipolarity). Some, such as Jones, leave out balancing dynamics altogether. Yet another reason realists cite is a desire to avoid a potential regional security dilemma and to bind Germany into European institutions. Institutionalists place differing emphases on the relative importance of logics of consequences versus logics of appropriateness driving cooperation, as well as the role of path-dependent versus sociological processes for institutional evolution and adaptation. Constructivists diverge on how deeply institutions socialize actors and over what matters most in reshaping the regions political character: socialization through international institutions or normative convergence otherwise driven. Third, while the works discussed here demonstrate that European foreign, security, and defense policy has signicantly expanded and consolidated over the past fteen years, marshaling a broad range of causal factors and explanations for why this has happened, none of the authors addresses the question of why cooperation works at some times on some issues but not on others. For example, while the EU was able to adopt a common position in response to the six-day war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, including sending an EU mission to Georgia to monitor Russias promise of troop withdrawal from Georgia proper, EU states are still divided on recognizing Kosovos independence. It is not clear how the authors would explain such variation: the starts and stops of integration or why cooperation on foreign and security policy seems to ebb and ow. Rather than moving in a linear fashion, progress toward consolidating a more cohesive European foreign and security policy has been uneven and has moved in a number of successive phases, marked by incremental successes building on major failures.47 This returns us to the question raised earlier: why does European cooperation in foreign policy, security, and defense seem to work and hold together in some political instances but not in others? The extant research in this new eld has not yet seriously considered or even acknowledged this question. Theorizing on these starts and stops will further strengthen the burgeoning eld in the future.
47
Wallace 2005.
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Fourth, it is also worth noting what is currently missing in this literature. To date, there is no major theoretical work applying liberal IR theory to increased European foreign and security policy cooperation. A liberal IR theory might stress how domestic and transnational societal coalitions, interdependence, domestic institutions, and perhaps values shape state preferences and make cooperation more likely. Such a liberal approach would also likely see the purpose of European cooperation in much different terms than that of a realist approach, for example. It would place less emphasis on Europes military capabilities and advantages and instead highlight Europes soft power appeal and its ability to attract others, particularly those states on Europes periphery that one day hope for EU membership. As Moravcsik says, Despite its substantial military assets, Europes true geopolitical comparative advantage lies in projecting civilian inuence: economic inuence, international law, smart and soft power.48 Finally, another notable feature of this literature concerns the nature of causal explanation. Most arguments in this new eld tend to adopt a zero-sum form in which cooperation derives from international or regional pressures, or institutionalization, or culture and identity. In real political life, any sensible observer would likely agree that the increase in the scope and intensity of cooperation is probably shaped by more than one of these factors, perhaps by all of them. There might even be an element of overdetermination. The more interesting question is how these various factors interact with each other, how and possibly in what order they combine to establish causal effect, and how much each factor or variable explains individually. The degree to which moving beyond monocausal arguments or explanations more or less cleanly rooted in one macroperspective or paradigm and the degree to which analytic eclecticism might help to arrive at historically and politically more exhaustive explanations offer an interesting theoretical puzzle that arises from these works. These are questions that future scholarship in the area will likely consider.49 CONCLUSION: THEORETICAL PROMISE AND POLITICAL IMPORTANCE The past decade has witnessed the advent of a new area of research that has merged the study of European integration in the areas of traditional high politics with international relations theory. Scholars have
48 Moravcsik 2009, 40910. For a basic outline of what a liberal IR theory of European foreign, security, and defense policy could look like, see Moravcsik 2009, 40910; Henke 2010. 49 On analytic eclecticism, see Sil and Katzenstein 2010.
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identied a wide range of factors to explain the rise of European foreign policy, security, and defense cooperation. This may reect the multiplicity of forces at work and the many dimensions that these changes in European affairs imply, as well as the diversity of international relations theory and the elds infancy. The new eld offers a number of promising theoretical openings in areas of great political importance. Bringing general IR theory to the study of European foreign and security policy holds clear benets for isolating key factors that can potentially lead to greater cooperation or integration in these domains. But what about the reverse? What might the study of European integration in security and defense offer to IR and social science theory? Will there be new, meaningful contributions or reappraisals of some of the central features, concepts, and conventional wisdoms of major theories or theoretical paradigms? Since the seventeenth century European politics has provided IR with some of its core concepts and theories: the modern territorial state, the balance of power, deterrence, alliance politics, major aspects of power transition theory, the security dilemma, basic approaches to regional integration, offense-defense theory, and nationalism and ideology. Will similar theoretical or analytical breakthroughs occur by studying European foreign and security policy of the early twenty-rst century? European foreign and security policy cooperation seems to be a qualitatively new form of resilient and evolving cooperation between states in these areas. It is not simply a framework of collective security, nor a conventional military alliance, nor just a new type of twentyrst century European concert. Will this system in security and defense further consolidate into a distinct regional polity and machinery of policy-makingand thus offer new ways of theorizing international affairs? Or will it, little by little, turn into a cohesive pan-European actor in high politics that resembles classic nation-states yet on a larger scaleand thus offer new terrain for theorizing full-scale regional integration in foreign policy, security, and defense? What is highly likely is that Europes role in world politics will largely be dened by Europes most powerful states in pursuit of their own interests, perhaps along with the increasing involvement of various European-level institutions and ofces, both intergovernmental and supranational. Taking domestic politics more systematically into accountwhether viewed through historical institutionalist, constructivist, or rationalist lensescould be one of the more signicant contributions of this new eld to the study of international relations. European states are democracies, and thus political leaders are accountable to their publics. In the
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safe, secure, and prosperous EU, foreign, security, and defense policy is in important ways a function of domestic politics. While the Talleyrands, Metternichs, Castlereaghs, and Bismarcks of European history (and the many minor gures alongside) may not have had to bother with tries such as domestic pressures, democratic constitutional arrangements, or public opinion, this clearly is not the case for todays political leaders. Systematic testing of the role of domestic politics, presumably in association with regional and systemwide factors and forces, promises to help the eld to arrive at more comprehensive and robust theoretical knowledge. Beyond the theoretical promise of the subject matter, there is its basic political importance. The fate of European cooperation in the foreign policy, security, and defense domains will be crucial if Europe is to nd its place and, one way or another, dene its role in the world. In one sense perhaps, European governments today face a decision similar to the one the United States faced in the 1940s: to boost their strategic means to match their expanding collective foreign policy goals or to scale down their ambitions to match their limited capabilities. Europe is unlikely to be able to afford to avoid this issue indenitely and will eventually have to confront it. Europe will also have to accept that an increased role worldwide potentially involves painful costs and risks, and it will have to determine which might be tolerable and which unacceptable. One of the most noteworthy developments in European foreign and security affairs is that longtime observers of European politics have begun to reect on what a European grand strategy should beand could be.50 Arguments over the purpose and ends of European foreign policy and security cooperation will continue, not only among scholars operating from similar or different theoretical orientations but also among practitioners and policymakers across the political spectrum, and at the national and supranational levels, promoting their preferred vision of Europe as a political project. Similarly, the nality issuewhere European foreign policy, security, and defense cooperation, as well as European integration at large, are ultimately headedwill involve political decisions. In any case, a Europe more or less cohesive in foreign policy, security, and defense would mark a dramatic shift from what Europe has experienced over the past two centurieswhether nineteenth-century-style balancing, great power concert, warring against each other, or loosely
50
For example, Howorth 2009; Howorth 2010; Vennesson 2010.
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coordinating in matters of foreign and security policy. Such a Europe would also mark a signicant feature of the basic character of world politics in the decades and century ahead. REFERENCES
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T H E CONTRI B UTORS
JOHN GERRING is a professor of political science at Boston University. He is the author of Party Ideologies in America, 18281996 (1998), Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework (2001), Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (2007), A Centripetal Theory of Democratic Governance (2008), Concepts and Method: Giovanni Sartori and His Legacy (2009), Social Science Methodology: A Unied Framework (2012), Global Justice: A Prioritarian Manifesto (in process), and Democracy and Development: A Historical Perspective (in process), along with numerous articles. He can be reached at jgerring@bu.edu. DANIEL ZIBLATT is a professor of government at Harvard University. He is the author of Structuring the State: The Formation of Italy and Germany and the Puzzle of Federalism (2006) and coeditor of The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies (2010). He is currently completing a book entitled, Conservative Political Parties and the Birth of Modern Democracy in Europe. He can be reached at dziblatt@fas.harvard.edu. JOHAN VAN GORP is a fth-year doctoral candidate in the Political Science Department at Boston University. He is currently working on his dissertation, Discursive Institutionalism and Political Change in the Netherlands. He can be reached at johan.van.gorp@gmail.com. JULIN ARVALO received his Ph.D. in political science from Boston University in May 2011. His work focuses on Latin American political economy and studies the interplay between ideas and the formation of political values and attitudes. He can be reached at jarevalob@gmail .com. TARIQ THACHIL is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Yale University. His research interests include examining the linkages between political parties and ordinary voters, ethnic and religious politics, and patterns of public spending in poor democracies. He is currently completing a book manuscript based on his doctoral dissertation, examining how religious nationalists can win over poor communities using social services. He can be reached at tariq.thachil@yale.edu. DANIEL SABBAGH is a senior research fellow at Sciences Po, Centre dtudes et de recherches internationales (CERI) UMR CNRS no. 7050. He is the author of Equality and Transparency: A Strategic Perspective on Afrmative Action in American Law (2007). He can be reached at sabbagh@ceri-sciences-po.org. HAN DORUSSEN is a professor in the Department of Government at the University of Essex. His current research interests include the relationship between trade and conict, peacekeeping operations and the governance of postconict societies, and policy convergence and burden sharing in the European Union. He can be reached at hdorus@essex.ac.uk. LAWRENCE EZROW is an associate professor in the Department of Government at the University of Essex. He has written on democracy, political representation, elections, political parties, party strategies, and political institutions. His most recent book is Linking Citizens and Parties (2010). He can be reached at ezrow@essex.ac.uk. HUGH WARD is a professor in the Department of Government at the University of Essex. His recent work applies social network theory to international cooperation and conict. He can be reached at hugh@essex.ac.uk. ULRICH KROTZ is a fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, and an assistant professor of political science at Brown University. He is author of Flying Tiger: International Relations Theory and the Politics of Advanced Weapons (2011) and History
and Foreign Policy in France and Germany (forthcoming). He is now working on two different book projects and a range of articles in the areas of European foreign and security policy and Europe in the world; Franco-German relations and their impact on the history and politics of European integration; and shifts and continuities in contemporary world politics. He can be reached at ukrotz@wca.harvard.edu. RICHARD MAHER is a Max Weber postdoctoral fellow at the European University Institute for the 201112 academic year. He recently completed a Ph.D. in the Political Science Department at Brown University. His dissertation examines the alliance security dilemma under unipolarity. His research areas include alliances, nuclear weapons, and energy security. He can be reached at richard_maher@brown.edu.
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Review Article INTERNATiONAL RELATiONS THEORY AND THE RiSE OF EUROPEAN FOREiGN AND SECURiTY POLiCY

Moravcsik 2009; Moravcsik 2010a; Moravcsik 2010b.

Schelling 1966. Jones 2007, chap. 4.

This capabilities-expectations gap is an old concern. See Hill 1993.

Goldstein et al. 2001.

For example, Howorth 2009; Howorth 2010; Vennesson 2010.

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