De La Cruz vs.

De La Cruz (art 101) Facts: Estrella de la Cruz, petitioner, was married to Severino de la Cruz, defendant, at Bacolod City. During their coverture they acquire seven parcels of land in Bacolod Cadastre and three parcels of land at Silay Cadastre. They are also engaged in varied business ventures. The defendant started living in Manila, although he occasionally returned to Bacolod City, sleeping in his office at the Philippine Texboard Factory in Mandalagan, instead of in the conjugal home at Bacolod City. Estrella then filed a petition on the ground of abandonment upon the defendant who had never visited their conjugal abode. She also began to suspect the defendant in having an illicit relation while in Manila to a certain Nenita Hernandez, which she confirmed upon getting several pieces of evidence on the defendants polo shirt and iron safe. The defendant denied the allegations of the petitioner and that the reason he transferred his living quarters to his office in Mandalagan, Bacolod City was to teach her a lesson as she was quarrelsome and extremely jealous of every woman. He decided to live apart from his wife temporarily because at home he could not concentrate on his work. The defendant, with vehemence, denied that he has abandoned his wife and family, averring that he has never failed, even for a single month, to give them financial support. In point of fact, his wife and children continued to draw allowances from his office and he financed the education of their children, two of whom were studying in Manila. Issue: Whether or not respondent abandoned his family and failed to comply with his obligations. Ruling: The SC have made a searching scrutiny of the record, and it is considered view that the defendant is not guilty of abandonment of his wife, nor of such abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership, as to warrant division of the conjugal assets. There must be real abandonment, and not mere separation. The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion. Therefore, physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term "abandonment", if the husband, despite his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife. The fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and children negatives any intent on his part not to return to the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and rights. Issue: Does the defendants separation from his family constitute abandonment in law that will justify a separation of their conjugal partnership properties? Held: No. The defendant is not guilty of abandonment of his wife, nor he was abusive of his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership properties as to warrant the division of the conjugal assets. To entitle the plaintiff of the remedies under Article 178 of the Civil Code, there must be real abandonment, and not mere separation. The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but it should also accompany financial and moral desertion. In the case at bar, is showed that the defendant continued his support to his family despite of his absence in the conjugal home. This negates any intent on his part not to return on the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and rights.

On the allegation that the defendant mismanaged the conjugal partnership property, there was no sufficient proof to show that he squandered the conjugal assets. On the contrary, defendant was able to show that he was able to increase the worth of their assets through his hard work. Considering the abovementioned facts, the plaintiffs move for the separation of conjugal properties is not justified. ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo, insofar as it decrees separation of the conjugal properties, is reversed and set aside. Conformably to our observations, however, the defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff, in the concept of support, the amount of P3,000 per month, until he shall have rejoined her in the conjugal home, which amount may, in the meantime, be reduced or increased in the discretion of the court a quo as circumstances warrant. The award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff is reduced to P10,000, without interest. No pronouncement as to costs. Xxxx Partosa-Jo vs. CA (art 101) Facts: Jose Jo, respondent, cohabited with three women and fathered fifteen children. The first woman, petitioner Prima Partosa-Jo claims to be his legal wife by whom he begot a daughter. Petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of conjugal property and an action for support. The complaint for support was granted by the lower court but the judicial separation of conjugal property was never entertained. Jo elevated the decision for support to the CA but retain its affirmation on trial courts ruling. When their motions for reconsideration were denied, both parties appeal to SC for the complaint of judicial separation of conjugal property. The SC, through the definite findings of the trial court, holds that the petitioner and respondent were legally married and that the properties mentioned by the petitioner were acquired by Jo during their marriage although they were registered in the name of an apparent dummy. Issue: Whether or not the judicial separation of conjugal property be granted to the petitioner on the ground of abandonment. Ruling: SC granted the petition. The record shows that respondent had already rejected the petitioner. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. The respondent also refuses to give financial support to the petitioner. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the respondent court is MODIFIED. Civil Case No. 51 is hereby decided in favor the plaintiff, the petitioner herein, and the conjugal property of the petitioner and the private respondent is hereby ordered divided between them, share and share alike. This division shall be implemented by the trial court after determination of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal partnership, including those that may have been illegally registered in the name of the persons. Xxxx BA FINANCE CORPORATION, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ROBERTO M. REYES, respondents. (art 102)

Facts:

Augusto Yulo, one of the respondents, secured from BA Finance Corporation, the petitioner, a loan in the amount of Php 591,003.59. To secure the said loan, Augusto Yulo used a special power of attorney allegedly executed by his wife, Lily Yulo, authorizing the former to sign the promissory note. Two months prior to the loan, Augusto Yulo had already left his wife and children. When the obligation became due and demandable, Augusto Yulo failed to pay the same. The petitioner filed a case against the spouses, and prayed for the attachment of their properties in payment of the said loan. the spouses were also charged with fraud, for failing to turn over to the petitioner the earnings of a construction contract which was also one of the subjects in the abovementioned loan. In defense, Lily Yulo filed a counterclaim, alleging that Augusto Yulo forged her signature on the special power of attorney submitted by the latter to the petitioner. Lily Yulo also claimed that Augusto Yulo had already abandoned her and her children five (5) months before the filing of the complaint. She also claimed that she never got a single centavo from the proceeds of the loan. The petitioner contended that even if the signature of Lily Yulo was forged on the special power of attorney, the spouses can still be made answerable to the obligation because the said properties form part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Yulo. Issue: Is the conjugal property liable for the payment of the obligation to the petitioner? Held: No. Although the subject properties of A&L Industries is presumed to be conjugal, said property cannot be held liable for the obligation if it has not redounded for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, under Article 161 of the Family Code. In the case at bar, the loan contracted by Augusto Yulo was undoubtedly for his own benefit because at the time he incurred the obligation, he had already abandoned his family and had left their conjugal home. Worse, he made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife on behalf of A&L Industries to procure such loan from the petitioner. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs. Xxx JOHNSON & JOHNSON VS. CA AND VINLUAN (art 102) Facts: Delilah Vinluan, wife of respondent Alejo vinluan, is the sole onwer of Vinluan Enterprises that purchased products from Johnson & Johnson, herein petitioner as she was engaged as well in the business of retailing Johnson products among others. As a result of this transaction, she then incurred an obligation worth Php 235,880.89 to petitioner which she had difficulty paying. Delilah was only able to pay Php 5,000.00 that led the petitioner to file a complaint for the collection of the principal obligation plus interest and damages. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner and sentenced Delilah to be solely liable to pay the obligation incurred from J&J. However, when the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal executed the judgment on the properties of the wife it included the spouses conjugal properties which led respondent husband file a motion to quash levy on execution on the ground that it didnt conform with the courts final decision. The motion, however, was denied. The husband elevated matter to the appellate court that ruled in favor of private respondent and reversed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition for review filed by petitioner. Issue:

Are the conjugal properties of the spouses liable for the obligation incurred solely by the wife without the consent of the husband? Held: The petition is denied. The appellate court, in the first place, cannot reverse anymore a decision that was rendered final and executory because a judgment that has become final is already considered the law, which the parties will have to conform to. The dispositive portion of the decision in the trial court already declared that husband cannot be held legally liable for wifes obligations given the fact that the latter didnt give his consent to the said transaction with petitioner. Hence, in levying on the properties that did not exclusively belong to wife, the notices of levy failed to conform to the decree of the decision, and are, therefore, irregular and contrary to the Rules. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the herein petition is hereby DENIED, and the Decision of the respondent Court is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. Xxxx Spouses Laperal vs Spouses Katigbak (art 109) FACTS: CFI Manila declared the property covered by TCT No.57626 as separate or paraphernal property of Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak. The spouses Laperal disagree with this finding reiterating that its improvements and income are conjugal assets of the Spouses Katigbak. When the spouses Katigbak got married, neither of them brought properties unto the marriage. Ramons occupation rendered him a monthly income of P200.00. The property in question was registered in the name of Evelina KalawKatigbak married to Ramon Katigbak. The latter declared that her mother was the one who bought the property for her and had placed it only in her name as the practice of her mother in buying properties and placing them directly in the names of her children. The husband having no interest with the property only signed the document for the purpose of assisting his wife. In August 1950, the Laperals filed a case and was granted by the trial court against the Katigbaks in recovery of P14,000 and jewelry amounting to P97,500 or in lieu thereof, to pay such amount. A month after the decision was rendered, Evelina filed a complaint against her husband for judicial separation of property and separate administration which was granted by the court and was sought for annulment by the Laperals. Facts: The plaintiffs, Roberto Laperal Jr. and his wife Purificacion M. Laperal sued Ramon Katigbak, who acted as an agent in the sale on the commission of jewels, and his wife Evelina Katigbak to recover the total sum P113,500 plus interest and costs. The defendant Evelina moved to dismiss, on the ground that the complaint failed to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against her. The plaintiff opposed the motion but the court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. Hence this appeal. Two causes of action were set forth in the complaint. The first transcribed four promissory notes for various sums and the notes are not signed by Evelina. The only allegations that may affect her liability if any, are that Ramon signed the notes for value received "while married to her", and that both defendants refused to pay the notes. ISSUE: WON the property in question constitutes the paraphernal property of Evelina.

HELD: All properties acquired during the marriage are presumed conjugal. It is however not conclusive but merely rebuttable, unless it be proved that the property belong exclusively to the husband and wife. In the case at bar, the deed of the land is under the name of the wife. At the time it was purchased, the property was of substantial value and as admitted, the husband by himself could not have afforded to buy considering the singular source of income. Hence, the property covered by TCT 57626 is considered a paraphernal property of the wife. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the lower Court declaring the property covered by TCT No. 57626 of the Register of Deeds of Manila as paraphernal is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. Xxxx Villanueva vs. IAC, MARTA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE AGANA, VISITACION AGANA KIPPING, PEDRO V. AGANA, MARCELO V. AGANA, JR., TERESITA AGANA SANTOS and JESUS V. AGANA, respondents. (art 109) Facts: Modesto Aranas, husband of Victoria, inherited a land from his father. Dorothea and Teodoro, Modestos illegitimate children, borrowed money from private respondent Jesus Bernas, mortgaging as collateral their fathers property. In the loan agreement, Aranas described themselves as the absolute co-owners. Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay the loan resulting to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage in 1977 and thereafter Bernas acquired the land as the highest bidder. Aftewards, the Aranases executed a deed of extrajudicial partition in 1978, in which they adjudicated the same land unto themselves in equal share pro-indiviso. Bernas then consolidated his ownership over the lot when the mortgagors failed to redeem it withn the reglementary period, and had the title in the name of Modesto cancelled and another TCT issued in his name. In 1978, petitioner Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against respondents spouses Jesus and Remedios Bernas, for the cancellation of the TCT under the name of the Bernases, and they be declared co-owners of the land. Petitioner alleged that spouses Modesto and Victoria in 1987 and 1958 executed 2 separate wills: first bequeathing to Consolacion and Raymundo and to Dorothea and Teodoro, in equal shares pro diviso, all of said Victorias shares from the conjugal partnership property; and second Modestos interests in his conjugal partnership with Victoria as well as his separate properties bequeathed to Dorothea and Teodoro. Trial court dismissed the complaint, declaring herein respondents as the legal owners of the disputed property. IAC likewise affirmed the lower courts decision. ISSUE: WON Villanueva had a right over the land and the improvements thereon made by Victoria who rendered the lot as conjugal property. HELD: The land was not a conjugal partnership property of Victoria and Modesto. It was Modestos exclusive property since he inherited it from his parents. Moreover, since Victoria died ahead of Modesto, Victoria did not inherit said lot from him and therefore had nothing of the land to bequeath by will of otherwise to Consolacion. Article 158 of the Civil Code says that improvements, whether for utility or adornment made on the separate property of the spouses through advancements from the partnership or through the industry of either spouse belong to the conjugal partnership, and buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the

partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same. There was no proof presented by Villanueva. Such proof is needed at the time of the making or construction of the improvements and the source of the funds used thereof in order to determine the character of the improvements as belonging to the conjugal partnership or to one spouse separately. What is certain is that the land on which the improvements stand was the exclusive property of Modesto and that where the property is registered in the name of one spouse only and there is no showing of when precisely the property was acquired, the presumption is that is belongs exclusively to said spouse. It is not therefore possible to declare the improvements to be conjugal in character. Furthermore, Bernas mode of acquisition of ownership over the property appears in all respect to be regular, untainted by any defect whatsoever. Bernas must therefore be deemed to have acquired indefeasible and clear title to the lot which cannot be defeated or negated by claims subsequently arising and of which he had no knowledge or means of knowing prior to their assertion and ventilation. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED. Xxxx THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, administrator of the estate of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellee. (art 115-116) FACTS: BPI, as administrator of the estate of deceased Adolphe Schuetze, appealed to CFI Manila absolving defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, from the complaint filed against him in recovering the inheritance tax amounting to P1209 paid by the plaintiff, Rosario Gelano Vda de Schuetze, under protest, and sum of P20,150 representing the proceeds of the insurance policy of the deceased. Rosario and Adolphe were married in January 1914. The wife was actually residing and living in Germany when Adolphe died in December 1927. The latter while in Germany, executed a will in March 1926, pursuant with its law wherein plaintiff was named his universal heir. The deceased possessed not only real property situated in the Philippines but also personal property consisting of shares of stocks in 19 domestic corporations. Included in the personal property is a life insurance policy issued at Manila on January 1913 for the sum of $10,000 by the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, Manila Branch. In the insurance policy, the estate of the deceased was named the beneficiary without any qualification. Rosario is the sole and only heir of the deceased. BPI, as administrator of the decedents estate and attorney in fact of the plaintiff, having been demanded by Posadas to pay the inheritance tax, paid under protest. Notwithstanding various demands made by plaintiff, Posadas refused to refund such amount. ISSUE: WON the plaintiff is entitled to the proceeds of the insurance; Whether or not the life insurance policy belongs to the conjugal partnership HELD: SC ruled that(1)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute community property, and belong one-half to the husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; (2)if the premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part

and conjugal in part; and (3)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under probate administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to the law on the matter, if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these Islands or outside. Hence, the defendant was ordered to return to the plaintiff one-half of the tax collected upon the amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of the insurance policy on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, after deducting the proportional part corresponding to the first premium. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the defendant is ordered to return to the plaintiff the one-half of the tax collected upon the amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of the insurance policy on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, after deducting the proportional part corresponding to the first premium, without special pronouncement of costs. Xxxx SPOUSES RICKY WONG and ANITA CHAN, LEONARDO JOSON, JUANITO SANTOS, EMERITO SICAT and CONRADO LAGMAN, petitioners, vs. IAC and ROMARICO HENSON, respondents (art 115-116) FACTS: Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They had 3 children however, even during the early years of their marriage, the spouses had been most of the time living separately. During the marriage or on about January 1971, the husband bought a parcel of land in Angeles from his father using the money borrowed from an officemate. Sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered an agreement with Anita Chan where the latter consigned the former pieces of jewelry valued at P321,830.95. Katrina failed to return the same within the 20 day period thus Anita demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in September 1972, check of P55,000 which was dishonored due to lack of funds. The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money against Katrina and her husband Romarico. The reply with counterclaim filed was only in behalf of Katrina. Trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs then a writ of execution was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at public auction to Juanito Santos and the other two with Leonardo Joson. A month before such redemption, Romarico filed an action for annulment of the decision including the writ and levy of execution. ISSUE: WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be satisfied through the conjugal property. HELD: The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into the business deal with Anita. The husband had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina nor authorized her to enter into such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during the marriage with unclear proof where the husband obtained the money to repay the loan. Hence, it is presumed to belong in the conjugal partnership in the absence of proof that they are exclusive property of the husband and even though they had been living separately. A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for support of the family. The writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico and the execution of judgments extends only over properties belonging to the judgment debtor. The conjugal properties cannot answer for Katrinas obligations as she exclusively incurred the latter without the consent of her husband nor

they did redound to the benefit of the family. There was also no evidence submitted that the administration of the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by Romarico before said obligations were incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so far as Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still execute the debt against Katrina, personally and exclusively. WHEREFORE, the decisions of the appellate court and the lower court in Civil Case No. 28-09 are hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modifications above stated. No costs. Xxxx Ayala Investments vs. CA (art 121-122) Facts: Same. Issue: Whether or not debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone are considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Ruling: The respondent directly received the money or services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan and services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial in the, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, xxxx HONORIO L. CARLOS, petitioner, vs. MANUEL T. ABELARDO, respondent. (art 121-122) FACTS: Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law for recovery of the $25,000 loan used to purchase a house and lot located at Paranaque. It was in October 1989 when the petitioner issued a check worth as such to assist the spouses in conducting their married life independently. The seller of the property acknowledged receipt of the full payment. In July 1991, the petitioner inquired from spouses status of the amount loaned from him, the spouses pleaded that they were not yet in position to make a definite settlement. Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner. In 1994, petitioner made a formal demand but the spouses failed to comply with the obligation. The spouses were separated in fact for more than a year prior the filing of the complaint hence spouses filed separate answers. Abelardo contended that the amount was never intended as a loan but his share of income on contracts obtained by him in the construction firm and that the petitoner could have easily deducted the debt from his share in the profits. RTC decision was in favor of the petitioner, however CA reversed and set aside trial courts decision for insufficiency of evidence. Evidently, there was a check issued worth $25,000 paid to the owner of the Paranaque property which became the conjugal dwelling of the spouses. The wife executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not sign. ISSUE: WON a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged against the conjugal partnership.

HELD: Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not deny that the same served as their conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the spouses are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan. Abelardos contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share in the construction firm is untenable since there was no proof that he was part of the stockholders that will entitle him to the profits and income of the company. Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in the amount of $25,000 plus legal interest including moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA GR-CV No. 54464 is MODIFIED in that respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the amounts of (1) US$25,000 or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the time of payment, plus legal interest from August 4, 1994, until fully paid; (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (3) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (4) P50,000.00 as attorneys fees. Xxxx EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR., petitioner, vs.MA. ELVIRA CASTILLO, respondent.(art 147) Facts: Eustaquio Mallilin claimed that he and Elvira Castillo lived together as husband and wife from 1979 to 1992 even though they were still validly married to their respective spouses. At the time of their union, Mallilin contended that he and Castillo established a brokerage corporation, from which profits they purchased several real and personal properties, registered solely in the name of Castillo. The petitioner now demanded his share in the subject properties that he claimed, is due to him as a co-owner under Article 148 of the Family Code. The respondent insisted that under Article 144 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time of their union, only unions without any legal impediment to marriage are covered by the rules on co-ownership. Thus, as the sole registered owner of the properties, Mallilin is not entitled to any share in the properties. Issue/s: (1) Should the parties be considered as co-owners of the properties in question, given that both were validly married to other parties at the time of the acquisition? (2) May the registration of Elvira Castillo alone as owner of the properties in question be attacked in this petition for partition? Held: It was ruled that Article 144 of the Civil Code was repealed by Article 148 of the Family Code, giving even persons in unions with an impediment to marriage certain rights covered by the rules of co-ownership. Since both parties contributed jointly to the acquisition of the properties, from the profits of their brokerage corporation, co-ownership applies. Despite the fact that Elvira Castillo alone was registered as owner of the properties on the transfer certificate of titles which was done by the arrangement of both parties at the time of the acquisition, the petitioner is still a co-owner of the properties. As such, he is entitled to his share in the partition. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. FACTS: Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo were alleged to be both married and with children but separated from their respective spouses and cohabited in 1979 while respective marriages still subsist. They established Superfreight

Customs Brokerage Corporation during their union of which petitioner was the President and Chairman and respondent as Vice President and Treasurer. They likewise acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondents name. Due to irreconcilable conflict, the couple separated in 1992. Petitioner then demanded his share from respondent in the subject properties but the latter refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name. Furthermore, respondent denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife because they were still legally married at the time of cohabitation. Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-ownership shares while respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. Trial court dismissed the former and granted the latter. ISSUE: WON petitioner can validly claim his share in the acquired properties registered under the name of the respondent considering they both have subsisting relationship when they started living together. HELD: The Court ruled that trial court erred that parties who are not capacitated to marry each other and were living together could not have owned properties in common. Under Article 148, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution, property or industry, shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. Hence, there is co-ownership even though the couples in union are not capacitated to marry each other. Furthermore, when CA dismissed petitioners complaint for partition on grounds of due process and equity, his right to prove ownership over the claimed properties was denied. Such dismissal is unjustified since both ends may be served by simply excluding from the action for partition the properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo, not parties in the case. WHEREFORE, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May 7, 1998, is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City for further proceedings on the merits. Xxxx ANTONIO A. S. VALDES, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDES, respondents. (art 147) Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married Jan 5,1971. Begotten during the marriage were 5 children. Jan. 1992, Valdez sought declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to Art.36 of Family Code. In the July 1994 decision of the SC, as follows: 5. marriage between Valdez and Gomez declared null and void on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity. 6. 3 older children, Carlos, Antonio and Angela to choose which parent they want to stay with. 7. Stella and Joaquin shall be in the custody of their mom. Valdez having visitation rights over the children. 8. the petitioner and the respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Art.147 of family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Art 50, 51 and 52 of the same code within 30 days from notice. The petitioner asked for clarification of that portion of the judgment and, in response, the court maintained that property regime between the parties was that of coownership. In effect, the marriage tie between the parties

was declared inexistent; but they remained connected as coowners over their properties. Issue: whether or not art.147 does not apply to cases where the parties are psychologically incapacitated Articles 50,51 and 52 in relation to art. 102 and 129 of the family code govern disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including marriage declared by reason of psychological incapacity Ruling: The Supreme Court upheld the lower court and held that a court which had jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters such as on the coownership of the parties over their properties. In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties common property, trial court was not imprudent. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the family home and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co ownership under the civil code, not art. 50,51 and 52 in relation to art 102 and 129 of family code should aptly prevail. The 1st paragraph of art 50 applying par (2), (3), (4) and of art 43 relates only by its explicit terms to voidable marriages and exceptionally to void marriages under art. 40.In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations and common law spouses or spuses of void marriage, leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the ordinary rules on co ownership subject to the provisions of the family code on the family home, the provisions found in title v, chap.2 of Family code, remain in force regardless of property regime of spouses Orders of trial court affirmed. WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial court are AFFIRMED. No costs. Xxxx JOSEFINA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. MASTER IRON WORKS & CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and ROBERTO V. ALEJO, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142, respondents. (art147) FACTS: Josefina Castillo was 24 years old when she and Eduardo Francisco got married on January 1983. The latter was then employed as Vice President in a Private Corporation. Josefina acquired two parcels of land where Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina, married to Eduardo. An affidavit of waiver was executed by Eduardo where he declared that prior to his marriage with Josefina, the latter purchased the land with her own savings and that he waived whatever claims he had over the property. When Josefina mortgaged the property for a loan, Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed. In 1990, Eduardo who was then a General Manager, bought bags of cement from defendant but failed to pay the same. The latter filed a complaint for recovery and trial court rendered judgment against Eduardo. The court then issued a writ of execution and the sheriif issued a notice of levy on execution over the alleged property of Josefina for the recovery of the balance of the amount due under the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a third party claim over the 2 parcels of land in which she claimed as her paraphernal property. ISSUE: WON the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina and Eduardo. HELD:

The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she was the sole owner. The Deed of Absolute Sale on record showed it was issued after her marriage. Their case fall under Article 148 and since they got married before the Family Code, the provision, pursuant to Art 256, can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested rights. Petitioner likewise failed that she had any vested right. Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that invalidates such marriage, Art 148 should be applied. In the absence of proof that the wife/husband has actually contributed money, property, or industry to the properties acquired during such union the presumption of coownership will not arise. The petition was denied for lack of merit. The decision of CA that the property was conjugal was affirmed. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. Xxxx Alain M. Dio v. Caridad L. Dio (art 147) In this case, Alains marriage to Caridad was declared void under Article36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are therules on coownership. Petitioner Alain M. Dio and respondent Caridad L. Dio have been childhood friends and sweethearts. They lived together for ten years then separated. After two years, they reunited and later on decided to get married. However, Alain filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of marriage based on the psychological incapacity (Article 36 of the Family Code) of Caridad. He alleged that Caridad failed to give him love and support throughout their marriage and was irresponsible, unfaithful, and prodigal. He also alleged that Caridad tends to be violent toward him. Extrajudicial service of summons was sent to Caridad who was living in the United Stated at that time. She did file any answer within the reglementary period. It was also learned that she already filed a divorce in the United States, which was granted by the Superior Court of California, and is now married to another man. The prosecutor of Las Pias declared that there was no collusion between the two parties. Furthermore, a psychological report was submitted by Dr. Tayag, a clinical psychologist, stating that Caridad was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which rooted from her early formative years and which was founded to be long-lasting and incurable. The Regional Trial Court of Las Pias granted Alains petition. However, the dispositive portion requires that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s]50 and 51 of the Family Code. Alain filed a petition questioning that requirement. The RTC partially granted the petition with modifications stating that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Hence, this petition. ISSUE:Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, anddistribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. HELD: RTC Decision AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS .For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other; 2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void. All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between Alian and Caridad. The Court agrees with Alain that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does no tapply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section19 (1) of the Rule provides: Sec. 19. Decision . - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties. It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code . In short, Article 50of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties. Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage was contracted. Under Article 40, [t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial courts decision without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Xxxx Agapay vs. Palang (art 148) Facts: Same. Article 148. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is co-owner of the riceland acquired by cohabitation between her and Miguel. Held: Article 148 of the Family Code, which provides for cases of cohabitation when a man or woman who are not capacitated to marry live exclusively with each other as husband and

wife, states that parties who acquire properties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall own them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. The actual contribution must be proved, otherwise there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. In the case at bar, Miguel and Erlindas marriage is obviously void, being contracted at the time Miguel and Carlinas marriage is still subsisting. Their relationship is just a mere cohabitation, which subjects it to the provisions of Article 148 of the Family Code. Erlinda was not able to prove that she actually contributed in the acquisition of the property, considering her age and financial circumstances during that time. She was not able to show that she made actual contributions in purchasing the property. As to the second property, the house and lot, the transaction was properly a donation by Miguel to Erlinda, but one that was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law since it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union. With the foregoing provisions of the law, Carlina and Herminia can rightfully claim ownership of the said properties. Xxxx VICTOR JUANIZA, Heirs of Josefa P. Leus etc., et al., plaintiffs and appellees, vs.EUGENIO JOSE, THE ECONOMIC INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and ROSALIA ARROYO, defendants and appellants (art148) Facts; Eugenio Jose was married to Socorro Ramos but he had been cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo for sixteen (16) years. He owned a passenger jeepney that collided with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways that resulted to the death of seven (7) passengers and physical injuries to the other five (5) passengers. Thus, a case was filed against Eugenio for damages. The decision of the court was in favor of Victor Juaniza and the heirs of the deceased Josefa Leus and the others who died in the accident. On appeal, Rosalia Arroyo prayed for reconsideration insofar as it condemns her to pay jointly with Eugenio. But, it was denied by the court based on the provisions of Article 144 of the Civil Code. She then filed for an appeal. Issue/s: (1) Is Article 144 of the Civil Code applicable in this case? and whether or not Rosalia (2) Is Rosalia, who is not the owner of the jeepney, liable jointly and severally with Eugenio for damages? Held: Under the provision, the co-ownership contemplated requires that the man and the woman living together must not be incapacitated to marry each other. Hence, Article 144 cannot apply to this case. In the issue whether Rosalia is the owner of the jeepney, Eugenio being married to Socorro Ramos follows that the jeepney belongs to their conjugal partnership. Hence, Rosalia Arroyo is not an owner and should therefore be free from liability. FACTS: Eugenio Jose, a registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the PNR that took place in November 1969 resulted in the 7 deaths and 5 physical injuries of its passengers. That time, Eugenio was married to Socorro but

had been cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo, defendant-appellant for 16 years as husband and wife. Trial court decision rendered them jointly and severally liable to pay damages to the heir of the deceased, Victor Juaniza. A motion was prayed for by Rosalia for the decision to be reconsidered. ISSUE: WON Eugenio and Rosalia are co-owners of the jeepney. HELD: The co-ownership provided in Article 147 applied only when the parties are not incapacitated to marry. Hence, the jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership with the lawful wife. The common-law wife not being the registered owner cannot be held liable for the damages caused by its operation. There is therefore no basis for her liability in the damages arising from the death of and physical injuries suffered by the passengers. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Rosalia Arroyo is hereby declared free from any liability for damages and the appealed decision is hereby modified accordingly. No costs. Xxxx GUILLERMA TUMLOS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ, respondents. (art 148) Facts: Spouses Fernandez filed an action of ejectment against petitioner Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos. In their complaint, the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building that through tolerance they had allowed the defendants-private respondents to occupy the apartment building for the last 7 years without the payment of any rent; that it was agreed upon that after a few months, Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while the other defendants promised to pay P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement was not complied with by the said defendants. They have demanded several times that the defendants vacate the premises, as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new building. Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to the complaint. She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property in question together with Mario Fernandez. She then asked for the dismissal of the complaint. Upon appeal to the RTC, petitioner and the two other defendants alleged in their memorandum on appeal that Mario and petitioner had an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the property in question as their "love nest." It was further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with their 2 children for around 10 years, and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of his marriage. ISSUE: WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148. HELD: SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were coowners of the subject property. The claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were no other evidence presented to validate it except for the said affidavit. Even if the allegations of having cohabited with Mario and that she bore him two children were true, the claim of co-

ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario is validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to marry each other. The property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual contribution is required by the said provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisitions of common property by one who has no salary, income, work or industry. Such is not included in Art 148. If actual contribution is not proven then there can be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. Held: Article 144 (148?) of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and woman who are not incapacitated to marry each other, or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void from the beginning. It does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership/absolute community between the man and his lawful wife. Evidence showed that Mario was incapacitated to marry petitioner for he was legally married to Lourdes. The petitioner thus cohabited with Mario in a state of concubinage and as such, Article 144 of the Civil Code is not applicable. Article148 of the Family Code governs their relationship. In the case at bar, petitioner failed to show any vested right over the subject property. As stated in Article 148 of the Family Code, properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property and industry shall be divided to them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Actual contribution requires sufficient proof, otherwise, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner