LETTERS OF TESTIMENTARY RULES OF COURT: RULE 78 [G.R. No. 187879. July 5, 2010.

DALISAY E. OCAMPO, VINCE E. OCAMPO, MELINDA CARLA E. OCAMPO, and LEONARDO E. OCAMPO, JR., petitioners, vs. RENATO M. OCAMPO and ERLINDA M. OCAMPO, respondents. FACTS: Petitioners Dalisay E. Ocampo (Dalisay), Vince E. Ocampo (Vince), Melinda Carla E. Ocampo (Melinda), and Leonardo E. Ocampo, Jr. (Leonardo, Jr.) are the surviving wife and the children of Leonardo Ocampo (Leonardo), who died on January 23, 2004. Leonardo and his siblings, respondents Renato M. Ocampo (Renato) and Erlinda M. Ocampo (Erlinda) are the legitimate children and only heirs of the spouses Vicente and Maxima Ocampo, who died intestate on December 19, 1972 and February 19, 1996, respectively. Vicente and Maxima left several properties, mostly situated in Bian, Laguna. Vicente and Maxima left no will and no debts. On June 24, 2004, five (5) months after the death of Leonardo, petitioners initiated a petition for intestate proceedings, entitled "In Re: Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Sps. Vicente Ocampo and Maxima Mercado Ocampo, and Leonardo M. Ocampo," in the RTC, Branch 24, Bian, Laguna, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. B-3089. 5 The petition alleged that, upon the death of Vicente and Maxima, respondents and their brother Leonardo jointly controlled, managed, and administered the estate of their parents. Under such circumstance, Leonardo had been receiving his share consisting of one-third (1/3) of the total income generated from the properties of the estate. However, when Leonardo died, respondents took possession, control and management of the properties to the exclusion of petitioners. The petition prayed for the settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima and the estate of Leonardo. It, likewise, prayed for the appointment of an administrator to apportion, divide, and award the two estates among the lawful heirs of the decedents ISSUE: Whether who should be appointed as special administrator HELD: Inasmuch as there was a disagreement as to who should be appointed as administrator of the estate of Vicente and Maxima, the RTC, acting as a probate court, deemed it wise to appoint joint special administrators pending the determination of the person or persons to whom letters of administration may be issued. The RTC was justified in doing so considering that such disagreement caused undue delay in the issuance of letters of administration, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court. Initially, the RTC, on June 15, 2006, appointed Renato and Dalisay as joint special administrators, imposing upon each of them the obligation to post an

administrator's bond of P200,000.00. However, taking into account the arguments of respondents that Dalisay was incompetent and unfit to assume the office of a special administratrix and that Dalisay, in effect, waived her appointment when petitioners nominated Bian Rural Bank as special administrator, the RTC, on February 16, 2007, revoked Dalisay's appointment and substituted her with Erlinda.

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 187879. July 5, 2010.]

DALISAY E. OCAMPO, VINCE E. OCAMPO, MELINDA CARLA E. OCAMPO, and LEONARDO E. OCAMPO, JR., petitioners, vs. RENATO M. OCAMPO and ERLINDA M. OCAMPO, respondents. DECISION NACHURA, J p: This petition 1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision 2 dated December 16, 2008 and the Resolution 3 dated April 30, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 104683. The Decision annulled and set aside the Order dated March 13, 2008 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24, Bian, Laguna, in Sp. Proc. No. B-3089; while the Resolution denied the motion for reconsideration of the Decision. AaSTIH The Antecedents Petitioners Dalisay E. Ocampo (Dalisay), Vince E. Ocampo (Vince), Melinda Carla E. Ocampo (Melinda), and Leonardo E. Ocampo, Jr. (Leonardo, Jr.) are the surviving wife and the children of Leonardo Ocampo (Leonardo), who died on January 23, 2004. Leonardo and his siblings, respondents Renato M. Ocampo (Renato) and Erlinda M. Ocampo (Erlinda) are the legitimate children and only heirs of the spouses Vicente and Maxima Ocampo, who died intestate on December 19, 1972 and February 19, 1996, respectively. Vicente and Maxima left several properties, mostly situated in Bian, Laguna. Vicente and Maxima left no will and no debts. On June 24, 2004, five (5) months after the death of Leonardo, petitioners initiated a petition for intestate proceedings, entitled "In Re: Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Sps. Vicente Ocampo and Maxima Mercado Ocampo, and Leonardo M. Ocampo," in the RTC, Branch 24, Bian, Laguna, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. B-3089. 5 The petition alleged that, upon the death of Vicente and Maxima, respondents and their brother Leonardo jointly controlled, managed, and administered the estate of their parents. Under such

circumstance, Leonardo had been receiving his share consisting of one-third (1/3) of the total income generated from the properties of the estate. However, when Leonardo died, respondents took possession, control and management of the properties to the exclusion of petitioners. The petition prayed for the settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima and the estate of Leonardo. It, likewise, prayed for the appointment of an administrator to apportion, divide, and award the two estates among the lawful heirs of the decedents. AHDaET Respondents filed their Opposition and Counter-Petition dated October 7, 2004, 6 contending that the petition was defective as it sought the judicial settlement of two estates in a single proceeding. They argued that the settlement of the estate of Leonardo was premature, the same being dependent only upon the determination of his hereditary rights in the settlement of his parents' estate. In their counter-petition, respondents prayed that they be appointed as special joint administrators of the estate of Vicente and Maxima. In an Order dated March 4, 2005, 7 the RTC denied respondents' opposition to the settlement proceedings but admitted their counter-petition. The trial court also clarified that the judicial settlement referred only to the properties of Vicente and Maxima. Through a Motion for Appointment of Joint Special Administrators dated October 11, 2005, 8 respondents reiterated their prayer for appointment as special joint administrators of the estate, and to serve as such without posting a bond. In their Comment dated November 3, 2005, 9 petitioners argued that, since April 2002, they had been deprived of their fair share of the income of the estate, and that the appointment of respondents as special joint administrators would further cause injustice to them. Thus, they prayed that, in order to avoid further delay, letters of administration to serve as joint administrators of the subject estate be issued to respondents and Dalisay. IHaECA In another Motion for Appointment of a Special Administrator dated December 5, 2005, 10 petitioners nominated the Bian Rural Bank to serve as special administrator pending resolution of the motion for the issuance of the letters of administration. In its June 15, 2006 Order, 11 the RTC appointed Dalisay and Renato as special joint administrators of the estate of the deceased spouses, and required them to post a bond of P200,000.00 each. 12 Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated August 1, 2006 13 of the Order, insisting that Dalisay was incompetent and unfit to be appointed as administrator of the estate, considering that she even failed to take care of her husband Leonardo when he was paralyzed in 1997. They also contended that petitioners' prayer for Dalisay's appointment as special administrator was already deemed abandoned upon their nomination of the Bian Rural Bank to act as special administrator of the estate.

In their Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration, 14 respondents asserted their priority in right to be appointed as administrators being the next of kin of Vicente and Maxima, whereas Dalisay was a mere daughter-in-law of the decedents and not even a legal heir by right of representation from her late husband Leonardo. aETDIc Pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed a Motion to Submit Inventory and Accounting dated November 20, 2006, 15 praying that the RTC issue an order directing respondents to submit a true inventory of the estate of the decedent spouses and to render an accounting thereof from the time they took over the collection of the income of the estate. Respondents filed their Comment and Manifestation dated January 15, 2007, 16 claiming that they could not yet be compelled to submit an inventory and render an accounting of the income and assets of the estate inasmuch as there was still a pending motion for reconsideration of the June 15, 2006 Order appointing Dalisay as co-special administratrix with Renato. In its Order dated February 16, 2007, the RTC revoked the appointment of Dalisay as co-special administratrix, substituting her with Erlinda. The RTC took into consideration the fact that respondents were the nearest of kin of Vicente and Maxima. Petitioners did not contest this Order and even manifested in open court their desire for the speedy settlement of the estate. On April 23, 2007, or two (2) months after respondents' appointment as joint special administrators, petitioners filed a Motion for an Inventory and to Render Account of the Estate, 17 reiterating their stance that respondents, as joint special administrators, should be directed to submit a true inventory of the income and assets of the estate. TDcEaH Respondents then filed a Motion for Exemption to File Administrators' Bond 18 on May 22, 2007, praying that they be allowed to enter their duties as special administrators without the need to file an administrators' bond due to their difficulty in raising the necessary amount. They alleged that, since petitioners manifested in open court that they no longer object to the appointment of respondents as special co-administrators, it would be to the best interest of all the heirs that the estate be spared from incurring unnecessary expenses in paying for the bond premiums. They also assured the RTC that they would faithfully exercise their duties as special administrators under pain of contempt should they violate any undertaking in the performance of the trust of their office. In an Order dated June 29, 2007, 19 the RTC directed the parties to submit their respective comments or oppositions to the pending incidents, i.e., petitioners' Motion for Inventory and to Render Account, and respondents' Motion for Exemption to File Administrators' Bond. Respondents filed their Comment and/or Opposition, 20 stating that they have already filed a comment on petitioners' Motion for Inventory and to Render Account. They asserted that the RTC should, in the meantime, hold in abeyance

the resolution of this Motion, pending the resolution of their Motion for Exemption to File Administrators' Bond. ITEcAD On October 15, 2007, or eight (8) months after the February 16, 2007 Order appointing respondents as special joint administrators, petitioners filed a Motion to Terminate or Revoke the Special Administration and to Proceed to Judicial Partition or Appointment of Regular Administrator. 21 Petitioners contended that the special administration was not necessary as the estate is neither vast nor complex, the properties of the estate being identified and undisputed, and not involved in any litigation necessitating the representation of special administrators. Petitioners, likewise, contended that respondents had been resorting to the mode of special administration merely to delay and prolong their deprivation of what was due them. Petitioners cited an alleged fraudulent sale by respondents of a real property for P2,700,000.00, which the latter represented to petitioners to have been sold only for P1,500,000.00, and respondents' alleged misrepresentation that petitioners owed the estate for the advances to cover the hospital expenses of Leonardo, but, in fact, were not yet paid. Respondents filed their Opposition and Comment 22 on March 10, 2008, to which, in turn, petitioners filed their Reply to Opposition/Comment 23 on March 17, 2008. CSEHcT In its Order dated March 13, 2008, 24 the RTC granted petitioners' Motion, revoking and terminating the appointment of Renato and Erlinda as joint special administrators, on account of their failure to comply with its Order, particularly the posting of the required bond, and to enter their duties and responsibilities as special administrators, i.e., the submission of an inventory of the properties and of an income statement of the estate. The RTC also appointed Melinda as regular administratrix, subject to the posting of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00, and directed her to submit an inventory of the properties and an income statement of the subject estate. The RTC likewise found that judicial partition may proceed after Melinda had assumed her duties and responsibilities as regular administratrix. Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari 25 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in (a) declaring them to have failed to enter the office of special administration despite lapse of reasonable time, when in truth they had not entered the office because they were waiting for the resolution of their motion for exemption from bond; (b) appointing Melinda as regular administratrix, a mere granddaughter of Vicente and Maxima, instead of them who, being the surviving children of the deceased spouses, were the next of kin; and (c) declaring them to have been unsuitable for the trust, despite lack of hearing and evidence against them. cHCaIE Petitioners filed their Comment to the Petition and Opposition to Application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, 26 reiterating their arguments in their Motion for the revocation of respondents' appointment as joint special administrators. Respondents filed their Reply. 27

On December 16, 2008, the CA rendered its assailed Decision granting the petition based on the finding that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking respondents' appointment as joint special administrators without first ruling on their motion for exemption from bond, and for appointing Melinda as regular administratrix without conducting a formal hearing to determine her competency to assume as such. According to the CA, the posting of the bond is a prerequisite before respondents could enter their duties and responsibilities as joint special administrators, particularly their submission of an inventory of the properties of the estate and an income statement thereon. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision. 28 The CA, however, denied it. Hence, this petition, ascribing to the CA errors of law and grave abuse of discretion for annulling and setting aside the RTC Order dated March 13, 2008. SEIcAD Our Ruling The pertinent provisions relative to the special decedents' estate under the Rules of Court provide administration of the

Sec. 1. Appointment of special administrator. When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed. 29 Sec. 2. Powers and duties of special administrator. Such special administrator shall take possession and charge of goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the court. 30 IaEHSD Sec. 1. Before an and letters such sum as Bond to be given before issuance of letters; Amount; Conditions. executor or administrator enters upon the execution of his trust, testamentary or of administration issue, he shall give a bond, in the court directs, conditioned as follows:

(a) To make and return to the court, within three (3) months, a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall come to his possession or knowledge or to the possession of any other person for him; (b) To administer according to these rules, and, if an executor, according to the will of the testator, all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate which shall at any time come to his possession or to the possession of any other person for him, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts,

legacies, and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed by the court; (c) To render a true and just account of his administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court; HCaDET (d) To perform all orders of the court by him to be performed. 31

Sec. 4. Bond of special administrator. A special administrator before entering upon the duties of his trust shall give a bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned that he will make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his possession or knowledge, and that he will truly account for such as are received by him when required by the court, and will deliver the same to the person appointed executor or administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to receive them. 32 Inasmuch as there was a disagreement as to who should be appointed as administrator of the estate of Vicente and Maxima, the RTC, acting as a probate court, deemed it wise to appoint joint special administrators pending the determination of the person or persons to whom letters of administration may be issued. The RTC was justified in doing so considering that such disagreement caused undue delay in the issuance of letters of administration, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court. Initially, the RTC, on June 15, 2006, appointed Renato and Dalisay as joint special administrators, imposing upon each of them the obligation to post an administrator's bond of P200,000.00. However, taking into account the arguments of respondents that Dalisay was incompetent and unfit to assume the office of a special administratrix and that Dalisay, in effect, waived her appointment when petitioners nominated Bian Rural Bank as special administrator, the RTC, on February 16, 2007, revoked Dalisay's appointment and substituted her with Erlinda. THSaEC A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control, expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, with a view to its smooth administration and speedy settlement. 33 When appointed, he or she is not regarded as an agent or representative of the parties suggesting the appointment. 34 The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court. 35 While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their deceased parents in their appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. 36 The probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that

the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness 37 and the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, 38 as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted. 39 The appointment or removal of special administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 40 HITAEC Granting the certiorari petition, the CA found that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking respondents' appointment as joint special administrators, and for failing to first resolve the pending Motion for Exemption to File Administrators' Bond, ratiocinating that the posting of the administrators' bond is a pre-requisite to respondents' entering into the duties and responsibilities of their designated office. This Court disagrees. It is worthy of mention that, as early as October 11, 2005, in their Motion for Appointment as Joint Special Administrators, respondents already prayed for their exemption to post bond should they be assigned as joint special administrators. However, the RTC effectively denied this prayer when it issued its June 15, 2006 Order, designating Renato and Dalisay as special administrators and enjoining them to post bond in the amount of P200,000.00 each. This denial was, in effect, reiterated when the RTC rendered its February 16, 2007 Order substituting Dalisay with Erlinda as special administratrix. Undeterred by the RTC's resolve to require them to post their respective administrators' bonds, respondents filed anew a Motion for Exemption to File Administrators' Bond on May 22, 2007, positing that it would be to the best interest of the estate of their deceased parents and all the heirs to spare the estate from incurring the unnecessary expense of paying for their bond premiums since they could not raise the money themselves. To note, this Motion was filed only after petitioners filed a Motion for an Inventory and to Render Account of the Estate on April 23, 2007. Respondents then argued that they could not enter into their duties and responsibilities as special administrators in light of the pendency of their motion for exemption. In other words, they could not yet submit an inventory and render an account of the income of the estate since they had not yet posted their bonds. cSTDIC Consequently, the RTC revoked respondents' appointment as special administrators for failing to post their administrators' bond and to submit an inventory and accounting as required of them, tantamount to failing to comply with its lawful orders. Inarguably, this was, again, a denial of respondents' plea to assume their office sans a bond. The RTC rightly did so. Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of the duties and obligations of an administrator namely: (1) to administer the estate and pay the debts; (2) to perform all judicial orders; (3) to account within one (1) year and at any other time when required by the probate court; and (4) to make an inventory within three (3) months. More specifically, per Section 4 of the same Rule, the bond is conditioned on the faithful execution

of the administration of the decedent's estate requiring the special administrator to (1) make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his possession or knowledge; (2) truly account for such as received by him when required by the court; and (3) deliver the same to the person appointed as executor or regular administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to receive them. ATESCc Verily, the administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the heirs, as it compels the administrator, whether regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in, and discharge the obligations incumbent upon, him. Its object and purpose is to safeguard the properties of the decedent, and, therefore, the bond should not be considered as part of the necessary expenses chargeable against the estate, not being included among the acts constituting the care, management, and settlement of the estate. Moreover, the ability to post the bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office of administration. 41 Hence, the RTC revoked respondents' designation as joint special administrators, especially considering that respondents never denied that they have been in possession, charge, and actual administration of the estate of Vicente and Maxima since 2002 up to the present, despite the assumption of Melinda as regular administratrix. In fact, respondents also admitted that, allegedly out of good faith and sincerity to observe transparency, they had submitted a Statement of Cash Distribution 42 for the period covering April 2002 to June 2006, 43 where they indicated that Renato had received P4,241,676.00, Erlinda P4,164,526.96, and petitioners P2,486,656.60, and that the estate had advanced P2,700,000.00 for the hospital and funeral expenses of Leonardo. 44 The latter cash advance was questioned by petitioners in their motion for revocation of special administration on account of the demand letter 45 dated June 20, 2007 of Asian Hospital and Medical Center addressed to Dalisay, stating that there still remained unpaid hospital bills in the amount of P2,087,380.49 since January 2004. Undeniably, respondents had already been distributing the incomes or fruits generated from the properties of the decedents' estate, yet they still failed to post their respective administrators' bonds despite collection of the advances from their supposed shares. This state of affairs continued even after a considerable lapse of time from the appointment of Renato as a special administrator of the estate on June 15, 2006 and from February 16, 2007 when the RTC substituted Erlinda, for Dalisay, as special administratrix. CHaDIT What is more, respondents' insincerity in administering the estate was betrayed by the Deed of Conditional Sale dated January 12, 2004 46 discovered by petitioners. This Deed was executed between respondents, as the only heirs of Maxima, as vendors, thus excluding the representing heirs of Leonardo, and Spouses Marcus Jose B. Brillantes and Amelita Catalan-Brillantes, incumbent lessors, as vendees, over a real property situated in Bian, Laguna, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-332305 of the Registry of Deeds of Laguna, for a total purchase price of P2,700,000.00. The Deed

stipulated for a payment of P1,500,000.00 upon the signing of the contract, and the balance of P1,200,000.00 to be paid within one (1) month from the receipt of title of the vendees. The contract also stated that the previous contract of lease between the vendors and the vendees shall no longer be effective; hence, the vendees were no longer obligated to pay the monthly rentals on the property. And yet there is a purported Deed of Absolute Sale 47 over the same realty between respondents, and including Leonardo as represented by Dalisay, as vendors, and the same spouses, as vendees, for a purchase price of only P1,500,000.00. Notably, this Deed of Absolute Sale already had the signatures of respondents and vendee-spouses. Petitioners claimed that respondents were coaxing Dalisay into signing the same, while respondents said that Dalisay already got a share from this transaction in the amount of P500,000.00. It may also be observed that the time of the execution of this Deed of Absolute Sale, although not notarized as the Deed of Conditional Sale, might not have been distant from the execution of the latter Deed, considering the similar Community Tax Certificate Numbers of the parties appearing in both contracts. cEaDTA Given these circumstances, this Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it revoked the appointment of respondents as joint special administrators, the removal being grounded on reason, equity, justice, and legal principle. Indeed, even if special administrators had already been appointed, once the probate court finds the appointees no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto. 48 On the other hand, the Court finds the RTC's designation regular administratrix improper and abusive of its discretion. of Melinda as

In the determination of the person to be appointed as regular administrator, the following provisions of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, state Sec. 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. No person is competent to serve as executor or administrator who: (a) (b) Is a minor; IaDcTC

Is not a resident of the Philippines; and

(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude. xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving

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husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; CDTSEI (c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select. Further, on the matter of contest for the issuance of letters administration, the following provisions of Rule 79 are pertinent of

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) The jurisdictional facts; heirs, and the names and

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the residences of the creditors, of the decedent; (c)

The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed. HDTSIE But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration. Sec. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. When a petition for letters of administration is filed in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition, and shall cause notice thereof to be given to the known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to any other persons believed to have an interest in the estate, in the manner provided in Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76. Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for administration. Any interested person may, by filing a written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of the incompetency of the person for whom letters are prayed therein, or on the ground of the contestant's own right to the administration, and may pray that letters issue to himself, or to any competent person or persons named in the opposition. Sec. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. At the hearing of the petition, it must first be shown that notice has been given as herein-above required, and thereafter the court shall hear the proofs of the parties in support of their respective allegations, and if satisfied that the decedent left no will, or that there is no competent and willing executor, it shall

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order the issuance of letters of administration to the party best entitled thereto. AHCaES Admittedly, there was no petition for letters of administration with respect to Melinda, as the prayer for her appointment as co-administrator was embodied in the motion for the termination of the special administration. Although there was a hearing set for the motion on November 5, 2007, the same was canceled and reset to February 8, 2008 due to the absence of the parties' counsels. The February 8, 2008 hearing was again deferred to March 10, 2008 on account of the ongoing renovation of the Hall of Justice. Despite the resetting, petitioners filed a Manifestation/Motion dated February 29, 2008, 49 reiterating their prayer for partition or for the appointment of Melinda as regular administrator and for the revocation of the special administration. It may be mentioned that, despite the filing by respondents of their Opposition and Comment to the motion to revoke the special administration, the prayer for the appointment of Melinda as regular administratrix of the estate was not specifically traversed in the said pleading. Thus, the capacity, competency, and legality of Melinda's appointment as such was not properly objected to by respondents despite being the next of kin to the decedent spouses, and was not threshed out by the RTC acting as a probate court in accordance with the above mentioned Rules. However, having in mind the objective of facilitating the settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima, with a view to putting an end to the squabbles of the heirs, we take into account the fact that Melinda, pursuant to the RTC Order dated March 13, 2008, already posted the required bond of P200,000.00 on March 26, 2008, by virtue of which, Letters of Administration were issued to her the following day, and that she filed an Inventory of the Properties of the Estate dated April 15, 2008. 50 These acts clearly manifested her intention to serve willingly as administratrix of the decedents' estate, but her appointment should be converted into one of special administration, pending the proceedings for regular administration. Furthermore, since it appears that the only unpaid obligation is the hospital bill due from Leonardo's estate, which is not subject of this case, judicial partition may then proceed with dispatch. HAEIac WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated December 16, 2008 and the Resolution dated April 30, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 104683 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the Order dated March 13, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Bian, Laguna, with respect to the revocation of the special administration in favor of Renato M. Ocampo and Erlinda M. Ocampo, is REINSTATED. The appointment of Melinda Carla E. Ocampo as regular administratrix is SET ASIDE. Melinda is designated instead as special administratrix of the estate under the same administrator's bond she had posted. The trial court is directed to conduct with dispatch the proceedings for the appointment of the regular administrator and, thereafter, to proceed with judicial partition. No costs. SO ORDERED. Carpio, Peralta, Abad and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

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C o p y r i g h t

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HABEAS CORPUS RULES OF COURT: RULE 102 [G.R. No. 182497. June 29, 2010.]

NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN, petitioner, vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 37, DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO RAZON, JR., DIRECTOR GEARY BARIAS, PSSUPT. CO YEE M. CO, JR. and POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR AGAPITO QUIMSON, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner alleged in her petition that her husband PO1 Ampatuan was assigned at Sultan Kudarat Municipal Police Station. On 14 April 2008, he was asked by his Chief of Police to report to the Provincial Director of Shariff Kabunsuan, Superintendent Esmael Pua Ali (Supt. Ali). The latter brought PO1 Ampatuan to Superintendent Piang Adam, Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Maguindanao. PO1 Ampatuan was directed to stay at the Police Provincial Office of Maguindanao without being informed of the cause of his

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restraint. The next day, 15 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to the General Santos City Airport and was made to board a Philippine Airlines plane bound for Manila. Upon landing at the Manila Domestic Airport, PO1 Ampatuan was turned over to policemen of Manila and brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim by Police Director Geary Barias and General Roberto Rosales. A press briefing was then conducted where it was announced that PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for the killing of two Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Officials. He was then detained at the Police Jail in United Nations Avenue, Manila. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to inquest Prosecutor Renato Gonzaga of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila due to the alleged murder of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, head of the Law Department of the COMELEC. On 20 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was turned-over to the Regional Headquarters Support Group in Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City. ISSUE: THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF PO1 BASSER B. AMPATUAN WAS MADE WITHOUT ANY WARRANT AND THEREFORE, ILLEGAL; HELD The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 182497. June 29, 2010.]

NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN, petitioner, vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 37, DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO RAZON, JR., DIRECTOR GEARY BARIAS, PSSUPT. CO YEE M. CO, JR. and POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR AGAPITO QUIMSON, respondents. DECISION

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PEREZ, J p: Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 1 of the Rules of Court assailing the Order dated 25 April 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 37, in Special Proceeding No. 08-119132 which denied the petition for Habeas Corpus filed by herein Petitioner Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan in behalf of her husband Police Officer 1 Basser B. Ampatuan 2 (PO1 Ampatuan). STADIH Petitioner alleged in her petition that her husband PO1 Ampatuan was assigned at Sultan Kudarat Municipal Police Station. On 14 April 2008, he was asked by his Chief of Police to report to the Provincial Director of Shariff Kabunsuan, Superintendent Esmael Pua Ali (Supt. Ali). The latter brought PO1 Ampatuan to Superintendent Piang Adam, Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Maguindanao. PO1 Ampatuan was directed to stay at the Police Provincial Office of Maguindanao without being informed of the cause of his restraint. The next day, 15 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to the General Santos City Airport and was made to board a Philippine Airlines plane bound for Manila. Upon landing at the Manila Domestic Airport, PO1 Ampatuan was turned over to policemen of Manila and brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim by Police Director Geary Barias and General Roberto Rosales. A press briefing was then conducted where it was announced that PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for the killing of two Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Officials. He was then detained at the Police Jail in United Nations Avenue, Manila. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to inquest Prosecutor Renato Gonzaga of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila due to the alleged murder of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, head of the Law Department of the COMELEC. On 20 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was turned-over to the Regional Headquarters Support Group in Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City. 3 acTDCI Petitioner continues that on 21 April 2008, Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva ordered the release for further investigation of PO1 Ampatuan. 4 The Order was approved by the City Prosecutor of Manila. But Police Senior Superintendent Co Yee Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson refused to release PO1 Ampatuan. This prompted Petitioner to file the petition for writ of habeas corpus in the RTC of Manila, Branch 37. 5 Private respondents had another version of the antecedent facts. They narrated that at around 7:08 o'clock in the evening of 10 November 2007, a sixty-four-year-old man, later identified as Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M.H. del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District (MPD) Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutor's Office. On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Clarence V. Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding

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probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder) and recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing. HIAEcT On even date, a charge sheet for Grave Misconduct was executed against PO1 Ampatuan, the accusatory portion of which reads: CHARGE SHEET THE UNDERSIGNED NOMINAL COMPLAINANT hereby charges above-named respondent of the administrative offense of Grave Misconduct (murder) pursuant to Section 52 of R.A. 8551 6 in relation to NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular 93-024, committed as follows: That on or about 7:08 in the evening of November 10, 2007, in M.H. del Pilar and Pedro Gil St., Ermita, Manila, above-named respondent while being an active member of the PNP and within the jurisdiction of this office, armed with a cal .45 pistol, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, shot Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Jr., COMELEC official on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal gunshot wounds which directly cause (sic) his death. Acts contrary to the existing PNP Laws Rules and Regulations. 7 Also, through a Memorandum dated 18 April 2008, Police Director General Avelino I. Razon, Jr. directed the Regional Director of the National Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO) to place PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody, thus: EcATDH 1. Reference: Memo from that Office dated April 15, 2008 re Arrest of PO1 Busser Ampatuan, suspect in the killing of Atty. Alioden Dalaig and Atty. Wynee Asdala, both COMELEC Legal Officers. 2. This pertains to the power of the Chief, PNP embodied in Section 52 of RA 8551, to place police personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of a grave administrative case filed against him or even after the filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such police personnel. 3. In this connection, you are hereby directed to place PO1 Busser Ampatuan, suspect in the killing of Atty. Alioden Dalaig and Atty. Wynee Asdala, both COMELEC Legal Officers, under your restrictive custody. 4. For strict compliance. 8

On 19 April 2008, through a Memorandum Request dated 18 April 2008, respondent Police Director Geary L. Barias requested for the creation of the Summary Hearing Board to hear the case of PO1 Ampatuan. 9 TIEHSA On 20 April 2008, Special Order No. 921 was issued by Police Director Edgardo E. Acua, placing PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody of the Regional Director, NCRPO, effective 19 April 2008. Said Special Order No. 921, reads:

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Restrictive Custody PO1 Basser B. Ampatuan 128677, is placed under restrictive custody of the Regional Director, NCRPO effective April 19, 2008. (Reference: Memorandum from CPNP dated 18 April 2008). BY COMMAND OF POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL RAZON: 10 Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is being held for other charges/legal grounds. 11 Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City's Prosecution Office, petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008. The petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 08-119132 and was raffled to Branch 37. aTcSID On 24 April 2008, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, respondent Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding therein respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing said respondents to show cause why they are withholding or restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan. 12 On 25 April 2008, the RTC resolved the Petition in its Order which reads: Essentially, counsels for petitioner insists that PO1 Basser Ampatuan is being illegally detained by the respondents despite the order of release of Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva dated April 21, 2008. They further claim that as of April 23, 2008, no administrative case was filed against PO1 Ampatuan. Respondents, while admitting that to date no criminal case was filed against PO1 Ampatuan, assert that the latter is under restrictive custody since he is facing an administrative case for grave misconduct. They submitted to this Court the Pre-charge Evaluation Report and Charge Sheet. Further, in support of their position, respondents cited the case of SPO2 Manalo, et al. v. Hon. Calderon, G.R. No. 178920 claiming that habeas corpus will not lie for a PNP personnel under restrictive custody. They claim that this is authorized under Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551 authorizing the Chief of PNP to place the PNP personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of administrative case for grave misconduct. TCDHaE Petitioner countered that the administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan was ante-dated to make it appear that there was such a case filed before April 23, 2008. The function of habeas corpus is to determine the legality of one's detention, meaning, if there is sufficient cause for deprivation or confinement and if there is none to discharge him at once. For habeas corpus to issue, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of illegal and involuntary

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deprivation of freedom which must be actual and effective, not nominal or moral. Granting arguendo that the administrative case was ante-dated, the Court cannot simply ignore the filing of an administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan. It cannot be denied that the PNP has its own administrative disciplinary mechanism and as clearly pointed out by the respondents, the Chief PNP is authorized to place PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody pursuant to Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551. The filing of the administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this Court has no authority to order the release of the subject police officer. TacSAE Lastly, anent the contention of the petitioner that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has rendered the administrative case moot and academic, the same could not be accepted by this Court. It must be stressed that the resignation has not been acted (sic) by the appropriate police officials of the PNP, and that the administrative case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP. WHEREFORE, premises DISMISSED. 13 considered, the petition for habeas corpus is hereby

Distressed, petitioner is now before this Court via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question the validity of the RTC Order dated 25 April 2008. The issues are: I. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF PO1 BASSER B. AMPATUAN WAS MADE WITHOUT ANY WARRANT AND THEREFORE, ILLEGAL; II. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT CONCEDED THE AUTHORITY OF RESPONDENT AVELINO RAZON, JR. UNDER SEC. 52, PAR. 4, R.A. 8551 TO PLACE AMPATUAN UNDER RESTRICTIVE CUSTODY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; DSETac III. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT SHIRKED FROM ITS JUDICIAL DUTY TO ORDER THE RELEASE OF PO1 AMPATUAN FROM THE CUSTODY OF RESPONDENTS MAMANG PULIS. 14 Essentially, a writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty. 15 Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Court sets forth the procedure to be followed in the issuance of the writ. The Rule provides: RULE 102 HABEAS CORPUS

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SEC. 1. To what habeas corpus extends. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. SEC. 2. Who may grant the writ. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district. CITaSA xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. 16 ACTISE Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment. 17 The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual's liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. 18 Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. 19

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In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. 20 IDcAHT In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused. 21 While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. 22 Petitioner contends that when PO1 Ampatuan was placed under the custody of respondents on 20 April 2008, there was yet no administrative case filed against him. When the release order of Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva was served upon respondents on 21 April 2008, there was still no administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan. She also argues that the arrest on 14 April 2008 of PO1 Ampatuan in Shariff Kabunsuan was illegal because there was no warrant of arrest issued by any judicial authority against him. CTSDAI On the other hand, respondents, in their Comment 23 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that the trial court correctly denied the subject petition. Respondents maintain that while the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila had recommended that PO1 Ampatuan be released from custody, said recommendation was made only insofar as the criminal action for murder that was filed with the prosecution office is concerned and is without prejudice to other legal grounds for which he may be held under custody. In the instant case, PO1 Ampatuan is also facing administrative charges for Grave Misconduct. They cited the case of Manalo v. Calderon, 24 where this Court held that a petition for habeas corpus will be given due course only if

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it shows that petitioner is being detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully, but a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. 25 The Solicitor General is correct. In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975 (also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Section 41 (b) of the said law enumerates the disciplinary actions, including restrictive custody that may be imposed by duly designated supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP as a matter of internal discipline. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 8551 reads: AIHDcC Sec. 52. xxx . . . . xxx xxx

4. The Chief of the PNP shall have the power to impose the disciplinary punishment of dismissal from the service; suspension or forfeiture of salary; or any combination thereof for a period not exceeding one hundred eighty (180) days. Provided, further, That the Chief of the PNP shall have the authority to place police personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of a grave administrative case filed against him or even after the filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such police personnel. [Emphasis ours]. Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. 26 Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted for. 27 SHTEaA Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuan's restrictive custody is the administrative case filed against him, his remedy is within such administrative process. We likewise note that PO1 Ampatuan has been under restrictive custody since 19 April 2008. To date, the administrative case against him should have already been resolved and the issue of his restrictive custody should have been rendered moot and academic, in accordance with Section 55 of Republic Act No. 8551, which provides:

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SEC. 55. follows:

Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read as

Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days from arraignment: Provided, however, That if it can be shown by evidence that the accused is harassing the complainant and/or witnesses, the court may order the preventive suspension of the accused PNP member even if the charge is punishable by a penalty lower than six (6) years and one (1) day: Provided, further, That the preventive suspension shall not be more than ninety (90) days except if the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petitions of the respondent: Provided, finally, That such preventive suspension may be sooner lifted by the court in the exigency of the service upon recommendation of the Chief, PNP. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. (Emphasis supplied.) DHaEAS Having conceded that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, we have to dismiss the petition. In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face that the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Corona, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro and Del Castillo, JJ., concur. C o p y r i g h t 2 0 1 0 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.

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HABEAS CORPUS RULES OF COURT: RULE 102 [G.R. No. 190108. October 19, 2010.]

DAVID E. SO, on behalf of his daughter MARIA ELENA SO GUISANDE, petitioner, vs. HON. ESTEBAN A. TACLA, JR., Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 208; and DR. BERNARDO A. VICENTE, National Center for Mental Health, respondents. [G.R. No. 190473. October 19, 2010.]

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HON. ESTEBAN A. TACLA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Mandaluyong City, Branch 208; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. DAVID E. SO, on behalf of his daughter MARIA ELENA SO GUISANDE, respondent. FACTS: Petitioner David E. So (So) in G.R. No. 190108 filed the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo on behalf of his daughter, Ma. Elena So Guisande (Guisande), accused of Qualified Theft in the criminal case pending before Judge Tacla. Petitioner So alleged, among others, that Guisande was under a life-threatening situation while confined at the NCMH, the government hospital ordered by the RTC Mandaluyong City to ascertain the actual psychological state of Guisande, who was being charged with a non-bailable offense. Prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings before the RTC, Guisande was committed by So for psychiatric treatment and care at the Makati Medical Center (MMC). Thus, the return of the warrant for the arrest of Guisande, issued by Judge Tacla, stated that the former was confined at MMC for Bipolar Mood Disorder and that she was "not ready for discharge," as certified by her personal psychiatrist, Dr. Ma. Cecilia Tan. EcDSTI Acting on the prosecution's Urgent Motion to Refer Accused's Illness to a Government Hospital, Judge Tacla ordered Guisande's referral to the NCMH for an independent forensic assessment of Guisande's mental health to determine if she would be able to stand arraignment and undergo trial for Qualified Theft. ISSUE: ISSUE a JOINT WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND AMPARO HELD: In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. . . . The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. aETDIc In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter

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found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 190108. October 19, 2010.]

DAVID E. SO, on behalf of his daughter MARIA ELENA SO GUISANDE, petitioner, vs. HON. ESTEBAN A. TACLA, JR., Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 208; and DR. BERNARDO A. VICENTE, National Center for Mental Health, respondents. [G.R. No. 190473. October 19, 2010.]

HON. ESTEBAN A. TACLA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Mandaluyong City, Branch 208; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. DAVID E. SO, on behalf of his daughter MARIA ELENA SO GUISANDE, respondent. RESOLUTION NACHURA, J p: Before us are consolidated petitions: (1) A petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo against Judge Esteban A. Tacla, Jr. (Judge Tacla) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 208, Mandaluyong City, and Dr. Bernardo A. Vicente (Dr. Vicente) of the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), docketed as G.R. No. 190108; and HADTEC (2) G.R. No. 190473, which is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente of the NCMH, assailing the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered in open court on December 3, 2009, in the case docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00039. The antecedents are: Petitioner David E. So (So) in G.R. No. 190108 filed the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo on behalf of his daughter, Ma. Elena So Guisande (Guisande), accused of Qualified Theft in the criminal case pending before Judge Tacla. Petitioner So alleged, among others, that Guisande was under a life-threatening situation while confined at the NCMH, the government hospital ordered by the RTC Mandaluyong City to ascertain the actual psychological state of Guisande, who was being charged with a non-bailable offense. Prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings before the RTC, Guisande was committed by So for psychiatric treatment and care at the Makati Medical Center (MMC). Thus, the return of the warrant for the arrest of Guisande, issued by Judge Tacla, stated that the former was confined at MMC for Bipolar

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Mood Disorder and that she was "not ready for discharge," as certified by her personal psychiatrist, Dr. Ma. Cecilia Tan. EcDSTI Acting on the prosecution's Urgent Motion to Refer Accused's Illness to a Government Hospital, Judge Tacla ordered Guisande's referral to the NCMH for an independent forensic assessment of Guisande's mental health to determine if she would be able to stand arraignment and undergo trial for Qualified Theft. Subsequently, Judge Tacla, upon motion of the NCMH, ordered that accused Guisande be physically brought to the NCMH, with NCMH Chief Dr. Vicente to have temporary legal custody of the accused, and thereafter, Judge Tacla would issue the corresponding order of confinement of Guisande in a regular jail facility upon the NCMH's determination that she was ready for trial. Accused Guisande was confined at the NCMH Payward, Pavilion 6-I-E, instead of Pavilion 35, Forensic Psychiatric Section, where female court case patients are usually confined at the NCMH. In connection therewith, Dr. Vicente issued a special Memorandum on November 9, 2009, reiterating existing hospital policies on the handling of court case patients undergoing evaluation procedures to foreclose any possibility of malingering 2 on the patient's part, specifically patients accused of a non-bailable crime. Eventually, claiming "life-threatening" circumstances surrounding her confinement at the NCMH which supposedly worsened her mental condition and violated her constitutional rights against solitary detention and assistance of counsel, accused Guisande and her father simultaneously, albeit separately, filed a Motion for Relief from Solitary Confinement before the RTC Mandaluyong City, and the present petition in G.R. No. 190108 for the issuance of the writs of habeas corpus and amparo. HcTSDa On the Motion for Relief filed with RTC Mandaluyong City, Judge Tacla issued the following Order: The Court rules to Grant accused's [Guisande's] motion subject to the condition that only the accused's counsel and the accused' physician on her hypothyroid condition are allowed to visit the accused in coordination with the respective psychiatrist/doctor of the NCMH taking charge of the psychiatric examination upon accused. 3 On the petition for habeas corpus and amparo, this Court issued a Resolution on November 24, 2009, to wit: G.R. No. 190108 (David E. Guisande vs. Hon. Esteban A. Branch 208, Dr. Bernardo A. Acting on the Petition for Resolved to: (a) So, in Behalf of his Daughter Maria Elena So Tacla, Jr., Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong, Vicente, National Center for Mental Health). Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo, the Court

ISSUE a JOINT WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND AMPARO;

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(b) REFER the petition to the Court of Appeals, Manila, for (i) IMMEDIATE RAFFLE among the Members of the said Court; (ii) HEARING on December 3, 2009, Thursday, at 10:00 a.m.; and (iii) DECISION within ten (10) days after its submission for decision; and aEcADH (c) ORDER the respondents to make a verified RETURN of the Joint Writ of Habeas Corpus and Amparo before the Court of Appeals, Manila, on December 1, 2009, and to COMMENT on the petition before said date. 4 As directed by this Court, Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente appeared before the CA on December 1, 2009 and, in the afternoon, filed their Consolidated Return of the Writ. On December 3, 2009, the NCMH submitted its Evaluation Report to the RTC Mandaluyong City: ASSESSMENT AND REMARKS: Review of the history and clinical reports from Makati Medical Center revealed that Ma. Elena So-Guisande was diagnosed and managed as Bipolar I Disorder. On the other hand, based on a series of mental status examinations and observations at our center, she is found not manifesting signs and symptoms of psychosis at the present time. Neither a manic episode nor a severe depressive episode was manifested during her confinement at our center, despite voluntarily not taking her medication is. Although she is complaining of mood symptoms, these are not severe enough to impair her fitness to stand trial. TDcAIH Ms. Guisande does have sufficient understanding of the nature and objective of the court proceedings and the possible consequences of her cases. She is likewise capable of communicating with her counsels. She is therefore deemed (Emphasis supplied.) COMPETENT to stand the rigors of court trial.

On even date, pursuant to the directive of this Court, the CA's Special Seventeenth Division held a hearing. Thereafter, Justice Normandie B. Pizarro (Justice Pizarro), to whom the petition was raffled, disposed, in this wise: JUSTICE PIZARRO: The essence of the deliberation this morning is on the proceedings that obtained pursuant to the September 22, 2009 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 208, Mandaluyong City. The parties heard the arguments of the Petitioner on the right of the subject patient, Ma. Elena, to avail of extended medical treatment citing the Constitution and the Geneva Convention on Human Rights. In the course of the proceedings this morning, Judge Tacla, Jr., informed this Court that the NCMH submitted to him a report consisting of eight (8) pages at about 8:46 this morning. The parties, specifically the petitioner, were shown the said report. Afterwards, Judge Tacla's opinion on

27

the matter was heard and he did not interpose any objection thereto. The Accused, subject of this case, Ma. Elena So-Guisande, may now be discharged from the custody of the NCMH and is considered fit for the rigors of trial. The parties were heard on the matter and all of them were in accord with the dispositive portion of the aforesaid report. CacISA After a prolonged discussion on the matter, and without objection on the part of the parties, as the Accused should now proceed to trial in accordance with law, and at the same time recognizing the right of the Accused to avail of further medication, this Court decrees the following set up that should cover this proceedings: The trial of this case shall resume and the arraignment at the Court a quo shall push through as originally scheduled on February 2, 2010. To balance the situation, the right to seek medical treatment of the subject is hereby recognized by all and the patient shall be confined at the St. Clare's Medical Center, 1838 Dian St., Palanan, Makati City, her hospital of choice, under the headship of Dr. Yat, subject to the twenty-four (24) hour custodial control of the NBI. xxx JUSTICE PIZARRO: Dr. Yat is directed to submit, again by agreement of the parties, a periodic report every fifteen days to the RTC, Branch 208, for its evaluation. The first report shall be submitted on or before December 18, 2009. In this regard, the Director Nestor M. Mantaring of NBI is politely DIRECTED to cause the transfer from NCMH to the St. Clare's Medical Center of the subject Accused, Ma. Elena So-Guisande, and to provide two (2) or three (3) security personnel to the Accused after making the proper coordination with the RTC, Branch 208. Director Mantaring is to submit a one (1) page compliance on the matter within three (3) days from receipt of this Resolution furnishing Judge Tacla, Jr. a copy thereof. IACDaS xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

It is understood that the case pending before RTC, Branch 208, involves a non-bailable offense where normally the Accused should have been confined in jail. But considering the peculiarities of this case, the parties have all agreed to the set up as provided in this Order. It is also understood by the parties that henceforth the control of the trial proceedings as well as the control over the custody of the accused/patient shall be in the hands of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 208, Mandaluyong City. STATE SOL. DE VERA: Your honor, the Hospital fees to be settled before the transfer, Your Honor. JUSTICE PIZARRO:

28

As committed in open-Court, Atty. Carpio shall insure the settlement of the fees for the confinement of Accused/patient at the NCMH, as a precondition for her release therefrom. WHEREFORE, the foregoing considering considered, this petition for Habeas Corpus and Amparo is considered CLOSE and TERMINATED. All parties are notified in open court of this Order. DHITSc xxx JUSTICE PIZARRO: Let copies of this Order be furnished the RTC, Br. 208, Mandaluyong City, the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation as well as the Supreme Court, and all the parties. SO ORDERED. 5 Hence, the petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 190473, filed by the OSG, which was consolidated with G.R. No. 190108. During the pendency of these consolidated cases, various events occurred which ultimately led to the incident before this Court, i.e., a Manifestation and Motion 6 dated March 11, 2010, filed by the OSG on behalf of public respondents, Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente, to wit: 1. On February 4, 2010, acting on the City Prosecutor's January 25, 2010 Motion to Withdraw Information, public respondent Judge ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case No. MC019-12281. Hence, their Urgent Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before this Honorable Court has been rendered moot and academic. A copy of the February 4, 2010 Order dismissing Criminal Case No. MC019-12281 is attached herewith as Annex "A." aCcADT 2. Furthermore, in view of the dismissal of Criminal Case No. MC019-12281 from which the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Writ of Amparo (docketed before the Supreme Court as G.R. No. 190108 and Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. SP No. 00039) and the Petition for Review (docketed as G.R. No. 190473) stemmed from, these cases and pending incidents thereon should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Writ of Amparo (docketed before the Supreme Court as G.R. No. 190108 and Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. SP No. 00039) and the Petition for Review (docketed as G.R. No. 190473) and all other pending incidents thereon be DISMISSED for having been rendered moot and academic. Petitioner So filed a Comment 7 refuting the OSG's motion to dismiss G.R. Nos. 190108 and 190473. Through counsel, and using strong words, he vehemently opposed the dismissal of the petitions because they had filed criminal complaints and an administrative case against respondents Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente, as well as the NCMH and an attending doctor thereat, for purported violations of accused Guisande's rights during her confinement at the NCMH. xxx xxx

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Adding to the flurry of cases, petitioner So filed a cite Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente in contempt before the submission of an altered and falsified document, which formed an integral part of, their Consolidated Return of

Verified Petition to CA for their supposed was attached to, and the Writ. cHSIAC

Posthaste, and even without us requiring the OSG to file one, it filed a Motion to Admit Reply 8 with its Reply 9 to the Comment of petitioner So attached thereto. The OSG clarified and denied outright petitioner So's allegation in the Comment that the criminal case for Qualified Theft against accused Guisande was a prevarication and concoction of private complainant 10 and that Judge Tacla had conspired to falsely accuse petitioner So's daughter, Guisande. In all, the OSG reiterated that G.R. Nos. 190108 and 190473 had been rendered moot and academic with the dismissal of the criminal case for Qualified Theft against Guisande. Significantly, on August 25, 2010, the OSG filed another Manifestation and Motion 11 informing this Court of the following: (1) Resolution dated June 7, 2010 issued by Assistant City Prosecutor Teresa D. Escobar-Pilares (Assistant City Prosecutor Escobar-Pilares), dismissing the charge of petitioner So against Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente and their counsels for Falsification under Article 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as I.S. No. XV-07-INV-10B-01371, for insufficiency of evidence; 12 and (2) Resolution dated July 27, 2010 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 00039, where petitioner So's verified petition for contempt was dismissed for lack of merit, and where the CA ordered the petition for habeas corpus/writ of amparo closed and terminated. 13 CcAITa Likewise, the OSG reiterated its motion to dismiss the instant consolidated petitions. We completely agree with the OSG. Accordingly, we deny the petitions in G.R. Nos. 190108 and 190473 for having been rendered moot and academic by the dismissal of Criminal Case No. MC09-12281 for Qualified Theft pending before the RTC Mandaluyong City. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo was based on the criminal case for Qualified Theft against petitioner So's daughter, Guisande. To recall, petitioner So claimed that the conditions and circumstances of his daughter's, accused Guisande's, confinement at the NCMH was "life threatening"; although Guisande was accused of a non-bailable offense, the NCMH could not adequately treat Guisande's mental condition. Thus, to balance the conflicting right of an accused to medical treatment and the right of the prosecution to subject to court processes an accused charged with a non-bailable offense, the CA directed the transfer of Guisande from the NCMH to St. Clare's Medical Center, while noting that because of the peculiarities of this case, there was a deviation from the regular course of procedure, since accused Guisande should have been

30

confined DEIHAa

in

jail

because

she

was

charged

with

non-bailable

offense.

Notably, nowhere in the transcript of the CA hearing on December 3, 2009, nor in the Order recited in open court by Justice Pizarro, is there an affirmation of petitioner So's claim that the confinement of accused Guisande at the NCMH was illegal. Neither were the respective acts performed by respondents Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente in ascertaining the mental condition of accused Guisande to withstand trial declared unlawful. On the contrary, the NCMH, a well-reputed government forensic facility, albeit not held in high regard by petitioner So's and accused Guisande's family, had assessed Guisande fit for trial. The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to violate, a person's life, liberty, and security for amparo cases should be illegal or unlawful. Rule 102 of the Rules of Court on Habeas Corpus provides: Sec. 1. To what habeas corpus extends. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo states: CIETDc

Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover threats thereof. extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or

Our decisions on the propriety of the issuance of these writs reiterate the foregoing rules. In Lourdes D. Rubrico, Jean Rubrico Apruebo, and Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Maj. Darwin Sy a.k.a Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, a certain Jonathan, P/Supt. Edgar B. Roquero, Arsenio C. Gomez, and Office of the Ombudsman, 14 we qualified: The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire

31

to secure amparo reliefs and protection unsubstantiated allegations. 15 cHSIDa

and/or

on

the

basis

of

In the recent Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan v. Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig, RTC, Manila, Branch 37, Director General Avelino Razon, Jr., Director Geary Barias, PSSupt. Co Yee M. Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson, 16 we intoned: The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or place under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual's liberty is restrainted via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. . . . The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. aETDIc In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant of the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. 17 In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to which hospital, the NCMH or a medical facility of accused's own choosing, accused Guisande should be referred for treatment of a supposed mental condition. 18 In addition, we note that it was procedurally proper for the RTC to ask the NCMH for a separate opinion on accused's mental fitness to be arraigned and stand trial. Be that as it may, the CA allowed the transfer of

32

accused to St. Clare's Medical Center under the custody of Dr. Rene Yat, who was required periodically to report on his evaluation, every fifteen (15) days, to the RTC Mandaluyong City, although in the same breath, the CA also ordered the continuation of the arraignment and trial of the accused for Qualified Theft before the same trial court. In other words, Guisande remained in custody of the law to answer for the non-bailable criminal charge against her, and was simply allowed to pursue medical treatment in the hospital and from a doctor of her choice. IcTaAH Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no longer under peril to be confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused Guisande's person, and treatment of any medical and mental malady she may or may not have, can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. In short, the cases have now been rendered moot and academic which, in the often cited David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 19 is defined as "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value." Finally, the Resolutions of the CA and Assistant City Prosecutor EscobarPilares, unmistakably foreclose the justiciability of the petitions before this Court. In CA-G.R. SP No. 00039, the CA said: We are also not swayed by [David So's] argument that [petitioners] advanced lies to this Court when they stated in their petition that Elena was facing two (2) non-bailable offenses. During the hearing on the petition for habeas corpus/writ of amparo, the counsel for [David So] stated that Elena was facing only one (1) non-bailable offense to which [petitioners] did not anymore object. Besides, the number of non-bailable offenses is not even material in the instant case for habeas corpus/writ of amparo as the only issue to be determined here was whether or not Elena's confinement at NCMH was lawful. CETIDH Finally, the issue in the verified petition, of whether [petitioners] were in contempt of court, is rendered moot and academic considering that this Court had already rendered its open court Order on December 8, 2009, which was favorable to [David So], and it was only later that the latter raised the issue of contempt. Finding no merit in [David So's] verified petition for contempt against [Judge Tacla, Dr. Vicente and the NCMH], and there being no other objections made by the parties against Our March 17, 2010 Resolution, the instant petition for habeas corpus/writ of amparo is declared CLOSED and TERMINATED. SO ORDERED. 20 In XV-07-INV-10B-01371 for Falsification under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code, the Assistant City Prosecutor made the following findings:

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. . . [T]he undersigned finds no probable cause that respondents committed the charges filed against them. Examination of the Contract of Confinement which was claimed to have been falsified reveals that it was merely a photocopy. The supposed full photocopy of the original copy of the subject contract did not contain any alteration (change) or intercalation (insertion) that could have changed its meaning or that could have made it speak of something false. The contents of the contract depicting that [Guisande's] yaya (Ms. Galleto) was indeed confined at the NCMH as claimed by respondents to accompany [Guisande], [So's] daughter who was confined thereat remained the same. Respondents explained that they were unaware of the inadvertent partial reproduction of the document and supported the same with an affidavit of good faith executed by an NCMH clerk explaining why it was only partially reproduced. TCADEc Likewise, respondents' statement that [Guisande] is "facing non-bailable offenses" is not absolutely false. Respondents satisfactorily explained that at the time of the filing of their pleading, they believed in good faith that she was facing more than one non-bailable offenses (sic) as she was charged with Qualified Theft before the Mandaluyong City RTC, Branch 208 and Syndicated Estafa before the San Juan Prosecutor's office. While it may be true that [Guisande] has only one (1) non-bailable offense pending in court, respondents proved with their evidence that she had others pending at the time in other forum. WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the charges for Falsification under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code filed against all respondents namely: (1) Judge Esteban A. Tacla, Jr., (2) Dr. Bernardino A. Vicente, (3) ASG General Magtanggol M. Castro, SSS Diana H. Castaeda-de Vera, SS Charina A. Soria and AS Jefferson C. Secillano, be DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. 21 WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 190108 and 190473 for the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo, and review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are DENIED for being moot and academic. No costs. SO ORDERED. CAIaHS 2 0 1 0 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.

C o p y r i g h t

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HABEAS CORPUS RULES OF COURT: RUE 102 [G.R. No. 183711 : September 06, 2011] EDITA T. BURGOS v. GENERAL HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., ET AL. FACTS: In her Manifestation and Motion, the petitioner alleges that the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) failed to comply or at least, to notify the petitioner of its compliance with the Courts directive in its June 22, 2010 Resolution, ordering the PNP-CIDG and its incumbent Chief to submit to the Commission on Human Rights [ CHR] the records and results of the investigation which the PNP-CIDG claimed to have forwarded to the Department of Justice. The petitioner adds that General Gilberto Jose C. Roa of the Judge Advocate General (JAG), Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP); the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of our June 22, 2010 Resolution; and then Chief of Staff, AFP, General Ricardo David have not furnished her with a copy of their explanation which the Court required them to submit in its July 5, 2011 Resolution. The petitioner prays that she be allowed to examine the documents so submitted to this Court.

ISSUE: Whether there is a violation of the writ f habeas corpus

HLED: Since police involvement in the abduction of Jonas Burgos has not been shown in any significant degree, there is no reason to require the incumbent PNP Director General and the Chief of the PNP-CIDG to also file their return on the writ. We likewise see no reason to further require the TJAG to separately file its own return on the writ of habeas corpus considering that the habeas corpus respondents have already jointly filed their verified return through the Office of the Solicitor General.

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EN BANC [G.R. No. 183711 : September 06, 2011] EDITA T. BURGOS v. GENERAL HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., ET AL. Sirs/Mesdames: Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated SEPTEMBER 6, 2011, which reads as follows:cralaw "G.R. No. 183711 (Edita T. Burgos v. General Hermogenes Esperon, Jr., et al.), G.R. No. 183712 (Edita T. Burgos v. General Hermogenes Esperon, Jr., et al.); and G.R. No. 183713 (Edita T. Burgos v. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, et al.).On August 19, 2011, Edita T. Burgos (petitioner) filed a Manifestation and Motion and a Motion for Clarificatory Order. In her Manifestation and Motion, the petitioner alleges that the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) failed to comply or at least, to notify the petitioner of its compliance with the Courts directive in its June 22, 2010 Resolution, ordering the PNP-CIDG and its incumbent Chief to submit to the Commission on Human Rights [ CHR] the records and results of the investigation which the PNP-CIDG claimed to have forwarded to the Department of Justice. The petitioner adds that General Gilberto Jose C. Roa of the Judge Advocate General (JAG), Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP); the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of our June 22, 2010 Resolution; and then Chief of Staff, AFP, General Ricardo David have not furnished her with a copy of their explanation which the Court required them to submit in its July 5, 2011 Resolution. The petitioner prays that she be allowed to examine the documents so submitted to this Court. In her Motion for Clarificatory Order, the petitioner adverts to the Court of Appeals' (CA's) August 8, 2011 resolution which failed to order the Director General of the PNP, the Chief of the PNP-CIDG and the TJAG to be impleaded in the consolidated cases for habeas corpus and amparo. She asserts that the CA failed to take heed of the Court's pronouncement in its July 5, 2011 Resolution: To adjust to the extraordinary nature of Amparo and habeas corpus proceedings and to directly identify the parties bound by these proceedings who have the continuing obligation to comply with our directives, the AFP Chief of Staff, the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, the Director General of the PNP, the Chief of the PNP-CIDG and the TJAG shall be named as parties to this case without need of naming their current incumbents separately from the then incumbent officials that the petitioner named in her original Amparo and habeas corpus petitions, for possible responsibility and accountability. The petitioner prays that a Clarificatory Order be issued (i) ordering the

36

Director General of the PNP, the Chief of the PNP-CIDG and the TJAG to be impleaded as respondents in the amparo and habeas corpus petitions; (ii) requiring them to submit a return of the writ of habeas corpus; and (iii) directing them to comment on the CHR Report. At the outset, these motions should have been filed with the CA since this Court already referred both the amparo and the habeas corpus petitions to the CA in our July 5, 2011 Resolution, in order to obviate any delay, however, we resolve the petitioner's Manifestation and Motion by requiring the PNP-CIDG to submit to this Court, instead of the CHR, the records and results of the investigation which the PNP-CIDG claimed to have forwarded to the Department of Justice, or to furnish this Court with proof of their earlier submission to the CHR, copy furnished the petitioner in either case. We also require General Roa of the TJAG, AFP; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of our June 22, 2010 Resolution, Rear Admiral Cornelio A. dela Cruz, Jr.; and then Chief of Staff, AFP, General David to furnish the petitioner with a copy of their Explanation, without the copies of the documents that we required them to submit exclusively to this Court. Our observation on the propriety of filing these motions with the CA is emphasized in the petitioner's Motion for Clarificatory Order. There is no ambiguity that this Court has to clarify. While the fallo of our July 5, 2011 Resolution did not expressly contain the directive to implead the incumbent PNP Director General, the Chief of the PNP-CIDG and the TJAG, the quoted portion of our July 5, 2011 Resolution could have been easily resolved by the CA in the petitioner's favor. To stress, their being impleaded is born of necessity to "adjust to the extraordinary nature of Amparo and habeas corpus proceedings and to directly identify the parties bound by these proceedings who have the continuing obligation to comply with our directives."[1]cralaw The petitioner has not explained in her motion and we do not see any reason why the incumbent PNP Director General and the Chief of the PNP-CIDG should be required to also file their return to the writ of habeas corpus. On July 8, 2011, the Court issued a writ of habeas corpus requiring (i) Lt. Harry A. Baliaga; (ii) the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP; (iii) the incumbent Commanding General, Philippine Army; and (iv) the Commanding Officer of the 56th IB, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, at the time of the disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, Lt. Col. Melquiades Feliciano, to file their verified return on the writ in view of the Cabintoy evidence which purports to establish military involvement in the abduction of Jonas Burgos. This is the reason why we limited to these individuals the duty of filing a return on the writ. Since police involvement in the abduction of Jonas Burgos has not been shown in any significant degree, there is no reason to require the incumbent PNP Director General and the Chief of the PNP-CIDG to also file their return on the writ. We likewise see no reason to further require the TJAG to separately file its own return on the writ of habeas corpus considering that the habeas corpus respondents have already jointly filed their verified return through the Office of the Solicitor General. We, however, grant the petitioner's prayer to require the incumbent PNP Director General, the Chief of the PNP-CIDG and the TJAG to file their Comment on the CHR Report with the CA for a more exhaustive ventilation of the parties' positions and arguments.cralaw WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to: 1. REQUIRE the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group to SUBMIT to this Court, instead of the Commission on Human Rights (as required in our June 22, 2010 Resolution), the records and results of the investigation which the Philippine National PoliceCriminal Investigation and Detection Group claimed to have forwarded to

37

the Department of Justice or, if it has already complied with our June 22, 2010 Resolution, to FURNISH this Court with proof of their submission to the Commission on Human Rights, within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution, copy furnished the petitioner in either case; 2. REQUIRE General Gilberto Jose C. Roa of the Judge Advocate General, Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, Armed Forces of the Philippines, at the time of our June 22, 2010 Resolution, Rear Admiral Cornelio A. dela Cruz, Jr.; and then Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, General Ricardo A. David to FURNISH the petitioner with the copy of their explanation, without the copies of the documents/materials which we required to be released exclusively to this Court in our July 5, 2011 Resolution; 3. DENY the petitioner's request to be allowed to examine the documents submitted to this Court per paragraph (i) of the fallo of our July 5, 201 1 Resolution, without prejudice to our later determination of the relevance and of the advisability of public disclosure of those documents/materials; 4. ORDER the incumbent Philippine National Police Director General, the Chief of the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, and The Judge Advocate General to be impleaded in these consolidated cases for amparo and habeas corpus pursuant to our July 5, 2011 Resolution; 5. DENY the petitioner's prayer that the Philippine National Police Director General, the Chief of the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, and the Judge Advocate General be required to file their return on the writ of habeas corpus; and 6. REQUIRE the incumbent Philippine National Police Director General, the Chief of the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, and The Judge Advocate General to file their Comment on the Commission on Human Rights' Report with the Court of Appeals, copy furnished the petitioner and this Court." Abad, J., no part. Sereno, J., on leave. Reyes, J., on official leave. Very truly yours, (Sgd.) ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL Clerk of Court

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HABEAS CORPUS RULES OF COURT: RUE 102 [G.R. Nos. 184461-62, May 31 : 2011] LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO AND LT. FRANCIS MIRABELLE SAMSON, PETITIONERS, VS. ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEO, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. NO. 184495] ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEO, PETITIONERS, VS. GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR.GEN. AVELINO RAZON, (RET.) GEN. ROMEO TOLENTINO, (RET.) GEN. JOVITO PALPARAN, LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. [G.R. NO. 187109 ] ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEO, PETITIONERS, VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR.GEN. AVELINO RAZON, (RET.) GEN. ROMEO TOLENTINO, (RET.) GEN. JOVITO PALPARAN, LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO, DONALD CAIGAS, A.K.A. ALAN OR ALVIN, ARNEL ENRIQUEZ AND LT. FRANCIS MIRABELLE SAMSON, RESPONDENTS.

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FACTS: At 2:00 a.m. of June 26, 2006, armed men abducted Sherlyn Cadapan (Sherlyn), Karen Empeo (Karen) and Manuel Merino (Merino) from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan. The three were herded onto a jeep bearing license plate RTF 597 that sped towards an undisclosed location. Having thereafter heard nothing from Sherlyn, Karen and Merino, their respective families scoured nearby police precincts and military camps in the hope of finding them but the same yielded nothing. ISSUE: THE PETITION[S] FOR HABEAS CORPUS AND WRIT OF AMPARO SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE BY THE REQUIRED QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONERS HAVE SHERLYN CADAPAN, KAREN EMPEO AND MANUEL MERINO ARE IN THEIR CUSTODY. HELD: Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a motion for execution for an amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the right to life, liberty and security of a person is at stake, the proceedings should not be delayed and execution of any decision thereon must be expedited as soon as possible since any form of delay, even for a day, may jeopardize the very rights that these writs seek to immediately protect. The Solicitor General's argument that the Rules of Court supplement the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is misplaced. The Rules of Court only find suppletory application in an amparo proceeding if the Rules strengthen, rather than weaken, the procedural efficacy of the writ. As it is, the Rule dispenses with dilatory motions in view of the urgency in securing the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. Suffice it to state that a motion for execution is inconsistent with the extraordinary and expeditious remedy being offered by an amparo proceeding EN BANC [G.R. Nos. 184461-62, May 31 : 2011] LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO AND LT. FRANCIS MIRABELLE SAMSON, PETITIONERS, VS. ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEO, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. NO. 184495] ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEO, PETITIONERS, VS. GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR.GEN. AVELINO RAZON, (RET.) GEN. ROMEO TOLENTINO, (RET.) GEN. JOVITO PALPARAN, LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. [G.R. NO. 187109 ] ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEO, PETITIONERS, VS. GLORIA

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MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR.GEN. AVELINO RAZON, (RET.) GEN. ROMEO TOLENTINO, (RET.) GEN. JOVITO PALPARAN, LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO, DONALD CAIGAS, A.K.A. ALAN OR ALVIN, ARNEL ENRIQUEZ AND LT. FRANCIS MIRABELLE SAMSON, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N CARPIO MORALES, J.: At 2:00 a.m. of June 26, 2006, armed men abducted Sherlyn Cadapan (Sherlyn), Karen Empeo (Karen) and Manuel Merino (Merino) from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan. The three were herded onto a jeep bearing license plate RTF 597 that sped towards an undisclosed location. Having thereafter heard nothing from Sherlyn, Karen and Merino, their respective families scoured nearby police precincts and military camps in the hope of finding them but the same yielded nothing. On July 17, 2006, spouses Asher and Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed a petition for habeas corpus[1] before the Court, docketed as G.R. No. 173228, impleading then Generals Romeo Tolentino and Jovito Palparan (Gen. Palparan), Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac (Lt. Col. Boac), Arnel Enriquez and Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson (Lt. Mirabelle) as respondents. By Resolution of July 19, 2006,[2] the Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals. The habeas corpus petition was docketed at the appellate court as CA-G.R. SP No. 95303. By Return of the Writ dated July 21, 2006,[3] the respondents in the habeas corpus petition denied that Sherlyn, Karen and Merino are in the custody of the military. To the Return were attached affidavits from the respondents, except Enriquez, who all attested that they do not know Sherlyn, Karen and Merino; that they had inquired from their subordinates about the reported abduction and disappearance of the three but their inquiry yielded nothing; and that the military does not own nor possess a stainless steel jeep with plate number RTF 597. Also appended to the Return was a certification from the Land Transportation Office (LTO) that plate number RTF 597 had not yet been manufactured as of July 26, 2006. Trial thereupon ensued at the appellate court. Witness Wilfredo Ramos, owner of the house where the three were abducted, recounted that on June 26, 2006, while he was inside his house in Hagonoy, he witnessed armed men wearing bonnets abduct Sherlyn and Karen from his house and also abduct Merino on their way out; and that tied and blindfolded, the three were boarded on a jeep and taken towards Iba in Hagonoy.[4] Witness Alberto Ramirez (Ramirez) recalled that on June 28, 2006, while he was sleeping in his house, he was awakened by Merino who, in the company of a group of unidentified armed men, repaired to his house; that onboard a stainless jeep bearing plate number RTF 597, he (Ramirez) was taken to a place in Mercado, Hagonoy and was asked by one Enriquez if he knew "Sierra," "Tanya," "Vincent" and "Lisa"; and that Enriquez described the appearance of two ladies which matched those of Sherlyn and Karen, whom he was familiar with as the two had previously slept in his house.[5]

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Another witness, Oscar Leuterio, who was himself previously abducted by armed men and detained for five months, testified that when he was detained in Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija, he saw two women fitting the descriptions of Sherlyn and Karen, and also saw Merino, his kumpare.[6] Lt. Col. Boac, the then commander of Task Force Malolos, a special operations team tasked to neutralize the intelligence network of communists and other armed groups, declared that he conducted an inquiry on the abduction of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino but his subordinates denied knowledge thereof.[7] While he denied having received any order from Gen. Palparan to investigate the disappearance of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino, his assistance in locating the missing persons was sought by the mayor of Hagonoy. Major Dominador Dingle, the then division adjutant of the Philippine Army's 7th Infantry Division in Fort Magsaysay, denied that a certain Arnel Enriquez is a member of his infantry as in fact his name did not appear in the roster of troops.[8] Roberto Se, a supervisor of the Equipment, Plate Number and Supply Units of the LTO, denied that his office manufactured and issued a plate number bearing number RTF 597.[9] On rebuttal, Lt. Mirabelle, Lt. Col. Boac and Gen. Palparan took the witness stand as hostile witnesses. Lt. Mirabelle testified that she did not receive any report on the abduction of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino nor any order to investigate the matter. And she denied knowing anything about the abduction of Ramirez nor who were Ka Tanya or Ka Lisa.[10] Gen. Palparan testified that during a debate in a televised program, he mentioned the names of Ka Lisa and Ka Tanya as the ones involved in revolutionary tax activities; and that he ordered Lt. Col. Boac to conduct an investigation on the disappearance of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. [11] When pressed to elaborate, he stated: "I said that I got the report that it stated that it was Ka Tanya and Ka Lisa that, I mean, that incident happened in Hagonoy, Bulacan was the abduction of Ka Lisa and Ka Tanya, Your Honor, and another one. That was the report coming from the people in the area."[12] By Decision of March 29, 2007,[13] the Court of Appeals dismissed the habeas corpus petition in this wise: As Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino are indeed missing, the present petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy since the main office or function of the habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention which presupposes that respondents have actual custody of the persons subject of the petition. The reason therefor is that the courts have limited powers, means and resources to conduct an investigation. x x x. It being the situation, the proper remedy is not a habeas corpus proceeding but criminal proceedings by initiating criminal suit for abduction or kidnapping as a crime punishable by law. In the case of Martinez v. Mendoza, supra, the Supreme Court restated the doctrine that habeas corpus may not be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person, or as a means of finding out who has specifically abducted or caused the disappearance of a certain person. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

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Thus the appellate court disposed: WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED, there being no strong evidence that the missing persons are in the custody of the respondents. The Court, however, further resolves to refer the case to the Commission on Human Rights, the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police for separate investigations and appropriate actions as may be warranted by their findings and to furnish the Court with their separate reports on the outcome of their investigations and the actions taken thereon. Let copies of this decision be furnished the Commission on Human Rights, the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police for their appropriate actions. SO ORDERED. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 95303 moved for a reconsideration of the appellate court's decision. They also moved to present newly discovered evidence consisting of the testimonies of Adoracion Paulino, Sherlyn's mother-in-law who was allegedly threatened by soldiers; and Raymond Manalo who allegedly met Sherlyn, Karen and Merino in the course of his detention at a military camp. During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 95303, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of Amparo[14] With Prayers for Inspection of Place and Production of Documents dated October 24, 2007, docketed as G.R. No. 179994. The petition impleaded the same respondents in the habeas corpus petition, with the addition of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, then Armed Forces of the Phil. (AFP) Chief of Staff Hermogenes Esperon Jr., then Phil. National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Avelino Razon (Gen. Razon), Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado (Lt. Col. Anotado) and Donald Caigas. Then President Arroyo was eventually dropped as respondent in light of her immunity from suit while in office. Petitioners in G.R. No. 179994 also prayed that they be allowed to inspect the detention areas of the following places: 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 7th Infantry Division at Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija 24th Infantry Batallion at Limay, Bataan Army Detachment inside Valmocina Farm, Pinaod, San Ildefonso, Bulacan Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan The Resthouse of Donald Caigas alias Allan or Alvin of the 24 th Infantry Batallion at Barangay Banog, Bolinao, Pangasinan 56th Infantry Batallion Headquarters at Iba, Hagonoy, Bulacan Army Detachment at Barangay Mercado, Hagonoy, Bulacan Beach House [at] Iba, Zambales used as a safehouse with a retired military personnel as a caretaker;

By Resolution of October 25, 2007, the Court issued in G.R. No. 179994 a writ of amparo returnable to the Special Former Eleventh Division of the appellate court, and ordered the consolidation of the amparo petition with the pending habeas corpus petition.

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Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 002, respondents in the amparo case, through the Solicitor General, filed their Return of the Writ on November 6, 2007.[15] In the Return, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac and Lt. Mirabelle reiterated their earlier narrations in the habeas corpus case. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon Jr. stated in the Return that he immediately caused to investigate and verify the identities of the missing persons and was aware of the earlier decision of the appellate court ordering the police, the Commission on Human Rights and the National Bureau of Investigation to take further action on the matter.[16] Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, the then battalion commander of the 24th Infantry Battalion based in Balanga City, Bataan, denied any involvement in the abduction. While the 24th Infantry Battalion detachment was reported to be a detention site of the missing persons, Lt. Col. Anotado claimed that he found no untoward incident when he visited said detachment. He also claimed that there was no report of the death of Merino per his inquiry with the local police.[17] Police Director General Avelino Razon narrated that he ordered the compilation of pertinent records, papers and other documents of the PNP on the abduction of the three, and that the police exhausted all possible actions available under the circumstances.[18] In addition to the witnesses already presented in the habeas corpus case, petitioners called on Adoracion Paulino and Raymond Manalo to testify during the trial. Adoracion Paulino recalled that her daughter-in-law Sherlyn showed up at home on April 11, 2007, accompanied by two men and three women whom she believed were soldiers. She averred that she did not report the incident to the police nor inform Sherlyn's mother about the visit.[19] Raymond Manalo (Manalo) claimed that he met the three abducted persons when he was illegally detained by military men in Camp Tecson in San Miguel, Bulacan. His group was later taken to a camp in Limay, Bataan. He recalled that Lt. Col. Anotado was the one who interrogated him while in detention.[20] In his Sinumpaang Salaysay,[21] Manalo recounted: x x x x 59. Saan ka dinala mula sa Sapang? Pagkalipas ng humigit kumulang 3 buwan sa Sapang, dinala ako sa Camp Tecson sa ilalim ng 24th IB. x x x x Sa loob ng barracks ko nakilala si Sherlyn Cadapan, isang estudyante ng UP. Ipinapalinis din sa akin ang loob ng barracks. Sa isang kwarto sa loob ng barracks, may nakita akong babae na nakakadena[.] Noong una, pinagbawalan akong makipag-usap sa kanya. Sa ikatlo o ikaapat na araw, nakausap ko yung babaeng nagngangalang Sherlyn. Binigyan ko siya ng pagkain. Sinabi niya sa akin na dinukot si[ya] sa Hagonoy, Bulacan at matindi ang tortyur na

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dinaranas niya. Sabi niya gusto niyang umuwi at makasama ang kanyang magulang. Umiiyak siya. Sabi niya sa akin ang buong pangalan niya ay Sherlyn Cadapan, mula sa Laguna. Sa araw tinatanggal ang kanyang kadena at inuutusan si Sherlyn na maglaba. x x x x. 61. Sino ang mga nakilala mo sa Camp Tecson? Dito sa Camp Tecson naming nakilala si `Allan Alvin' (maya-maya nalaman naming na siya pala si Donald Caigas), ng 24th IB, na tinatawag na `master' o `commander' ng kanyang mga tauhan. Pagkalipas ng 2 araw matapos dalhin si Reynaldo sa Camp Tecson dumating sina Karen Empeo at Manuel Merino na mga bihag din. Inilagay si Karen at Manuel sa kwarto ni `Allan[.]' Kami naman ni Reynaldo ay nasa katabing kwarto, kasama si Sherlyn. x x x x 62. x x x x Kaming mga lalake (ako, si Reynaldo at si Manuel) ay ginawang utusan, habang sina Sherlyn at Karen ay ginawang labandera. Si Sherlyn ang pinahirapan nina Mickey, Donald at Billy. akin na siya'y ginahasa. x x x x 63. x x x x x x x x Kaming lima (ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn, si Karen at si [Merino]) ang dinala sa Limay. Sinakay ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn at si [Merino] sa isang stainless na jeep. Si Karen ay isinakay sa itim na sasakyan ni Donald Caigas. x x x x x x x x 66. Saan pa kayo dinala mula sa Limay, Bataan? Mula sa Limay, kaming 5 (ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn, Si Karen at si Manuel) ay dinala sa isang safehouse sa Zambales, tabi ng dagat. x x x x (underscoring supplied; italics and emphasis in the original) On rebuttal, Lt. Col. Anotado and Col. Eduardo Boyles Davalan were called to the witness stand. Lt. Col. Anotado denied seeing or meeting Manalo. He posited that Manalo recognized him because he was very active in conducting lectures in Bataan and even appeared on television regarding an incident involving the 24 th Infantry Batallion. He contended that it was impossible for Manalo, Sherlyn, Karen and Merino to be detained in the Limay detachment which had no detention area. Sabi ni Sherlyn sa

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Col. Eduardo Boyles Davalan, the then chief of staff of the First Scout Ranger Regiment in Camp Tecson, testified that the camp is not a detention facility, nor does it conduct military operations as it only serves as a training facility for scout rangers. He averred that his regiment does not have any command relation with either the 7th Infantry Division or the 24th Infantry Battalion.[22] By Decision of September 17, 2008,[23] the appellate court granted the Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 95303 (the habeas corpus case) and ordered the immediate release of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino in CA-G.R. SP No. 00002 (the amparo case). Thus it disposed: WHEREFORE, in CA-G.R. SP NO. 95303 (Habeas Corpus case), the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. Accordingly, in both CA-G.R. SP NO. 95303 (Habeas Corpus case) and in CA-G.R. SP NO. 00002 (Amparo case), the respondents are thereby ordered to immediately RELEASE, or cause the release, from detention the persons of Sher[lyn] Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino. Respondent Director General Avelino Razon is hereby ordered to resume [the] PNP's unfinished investigation so that the truth will be fully ascertained and appropriate charges filed against those truly responsible. SO ORDERED. In reconsidering its earlier Decision in the habeas corpus case, appellate court relied heavily on the testimony of Manalo in this wise: the

With the additional testimony of Raymond Manalo, the petitioners have been able to convincingly prove the fact of their detention by some elements in the military. His testimony is a first hand account that military and civilian personnel under the 7th Infantry Division were responsible for the abduction of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino. He also confirmed the claim of Oscar Leuterio that the latter was detained in Fort Magsaysay. It was there where he (Leuterio) saw Manuel Merino. His testimony that Leuterio saw Manuel Merino in Fort Magsaysay may be hearsay but not with respect to his meeting with, and talking to, the three desaparecidos. His testimony on those points was no hearsay. Raymond Manalo saw the three with his very own eyes as they were detained and tortured together. In fact, he claimed to be a witness to the burning of Manuel Merino. In the absence of confirmatory proof, however, the Court will presume that he is still alive. The testimony of Raymond Manalo can no longer be ignored and brushed aside. His narration and those of the earlier witnesses, taken together, constitute more than substantial evidence warranting an order that the three be released from detention if they are not being held for a lawful cause. They may be moved from place to place but still they are considered under detention and custody of the respondents. His testimony was clear, consistent and convincing. x x x. x x x x The additional testimonies of Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado and Col. Eduardo Boyles

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Davalan were of no help either. Again, their averments were the same negative ones which cannot prevail over those of Raymond Manalo. Indeed, Camp Tecson has been utilized as a training camp for army scout rangers. Even Raymond Manalo noticed it but the camp's use for purposes other than training cannot be discounted. x x x x In view of the foregoing, there is now a clear and credible evidence that the three missing persons, [Sherlyn, Karen and Merino], are being detained in military camps and bases under the 7th Infantry Division. Being not held for a lawful cause, they should be immediately released from detention. (italic in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied) Meanwhile, in the amparo case, the appellate court deemed it a superfluity to issue any inspection order or production order in light of the release order. As it earlier ruled in the habeas corpus case, it found that the three detainees' right to life, liberty and security was being violated, hence, the need to immediately release them, or cause their release. The appellate court went on to direct the PNP to proceed further with its investigation since there were enough leads as indicated in the records to ascertain the truth and file the appropriate charges against those responsible for the abduction and detention of the three. Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, et al. challenged before this Court, via petition for review, the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court. This was docketed as G.R. Nos. 184461-62, the first above-captioned case- subject of the present Decision. Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo, on the other hand, filed their own petition for review also challenging the same September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court only insofar as the amparo aspect is concerned. Their petition, docketed as G.R. No. 179994, was redocketed as G.R. No. 184495, the second above-captioned case. By Resolution of June 15, 2010, the Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 184495 with G.R. Nos. 1844461-62.[24] Meanwhile, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed before the appellate court a Motion to Cite Respondents in Contempt of Court for failure of the respondents in the amparo and habeas corpus cases to comply with the directive of the appellate court to immediately release the three missing persons. By Resolution of March 5, 2009,[25] the appellate court denied the motion, ratiocinating thus: While the Court, in the dispositive portion, ordered the respondents "to immediately RELEASE, or cause the release, from detention the persons of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino," the decision is not ipso facto executory. The use of the term "immediately" does not mean that that it is automatically executory. There is nothing in the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which states that a decision rendered is immediately executory. x x x. Neither did the decision become final and executory considering that both parties questioned the Decision/Resolution before the Supreme Court. x x x. Besides, the Court has no basis. The petitioners did not file a motion for execution pending appeal under Section 2 of Rule 39. There being no motion,

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the Court could not have issued, and did not issue, a writ of execution. x x x. (underscoring supplied) Via a petition for certiorari filed on March 30, 2009 before this Court, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo challenged the appellate court's March 5, 2009 Resolution denying their motion to cite respondents in contempt. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 187109, the last above-captioned case subject of the present Decision. Only Lt. Col. Anotado and Lt. Mirabelle remained of the original respondents in the amparo and habeas corpus cases as the other respondents had retired from government service.[26] The AFP has denied that Arnel Enriquez was a member of the Philippine Army.[27] The whereabouts of Donald Caigas remain unknown.[28] In G.R. Nos. 184461-62, petitioners posit as follows: I ...THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE VALUE OF THE TESTIMONY OF RAYMOND MANALO. II THE PETITION[S] FOR HABEAS CORPUS AND WRIT OF AMPARO SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE BY THE REQUIRED QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONERS HAVE SHERLYN CADAPAN, KAREN EMPEO AND MANUEL MERINO ARE IN THEIR CUSTODY. III PETITIONERS' DENIALS PER SE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AGAINST THEM BECAUSE THEY DID NOT REALLY HAVE ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALLEGED ABDUCTION; MOREOVER, THE SUPPOSED INCONSISTENCIES IN THEIR TESTIMONIES ARE ON POINTS IRRELEVANT TO THE PETITION. IV THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE ASSAILED DECISION IS VAGUE AND INCONGRUENT WITH THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. V THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED AND FAILED TO RULE UPON THE FATAL PROCEDURAL INFIRMITIES IN THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO.[29] In G.R. No. 184495, petitioners posit as follows: 5. 6. 7. 8. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for Inspection of Places; The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for Production of Documents; The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Police Director Gen. Avelino Razon did not make extraordinary diligence in investigating the enforced disappearance of the aggrieved parties... The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that this was not the command coming from the highest echelon of powers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine Army and the Seventh Infantry Division of the Philippine Army to enforcibly disappear [sic] the aggrieved parties... The Court of Appeals erred in dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent in this case; The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that President Gloria

9. 10.

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11.

Macapagal Arroyo had command responsibility in the enforced disappearance and continued detention of the three aggrieved parties... The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Armed Forces Chief of Staff then Hermogenes Esperon and the Present Chief of Staff as having command responsibility in the enforced disappearance and continued detention of the three aggrieved parties...[30]

In G.R. No. 187109, petitioners raise the following issues: [1] Whether... the decision in the Court of Appeals has become final and executory[.] [2] Whether...there is a need to file a motion for execution in a Habeas Corpus decision or in an Amparo decision[.] [3] Whether...an appeal can stay the decision of a Habeas Corpus [case] [or] an Amparo case[.][31] Essentially, the consolidated petitions present three primary issues, viz: a) whether the testimony of Raymond Manalo is credible; b) whether the chief of the AFP, the commanding general of the Philippine Army, as well as the heads of the concerned units had command responsibility over the abduction and detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino; and c) whether there is a need to file a motion for execution to cause the release of the aggrieved parties. G.R. Nos. 184461-62 Petitioners Lt. Col. Boac, et al. contend that the appellate court erred in giving full credence to the testimony of Manalo who could not even accurately describe the structures of Camp Tecson where he claimed to have been detained along with Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. They underscore that Camp Tecson is not under the jurisdiction of the 24th Infantry Batallion and that Manalo's testimony is incredible and full of inconsistencies.[32] In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,[33] an original petition for Prohibition, Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order which was treated as a petition under the Amparo Rule, said Rule having taken effect during the pendency of the petition, the Court ruled on the truthfulness and veracity of the personal account of Manalo which included his encounter with Sherlyn, Kara and Merino while on detention. Thus it held: We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based respondent Raymond Manalo's affidavit and testimony, viz: x x x x. We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's statements were not corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of evidence. Raymond's affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents, also corroborate respondents' accounts of the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo's familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as shown in his testimony and confirmed by on

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Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the "Division Training Unit," firms up respondents' story that they were detained for some time in said military facility. (citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied) On Manalo's having allegedly encountered Sherlyn, Karen and Merino while on detention, the Court in the immediately cited case synthesized his tale as follows: The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was then he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry. After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his men in the 24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed. On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be thankful they were still alive and should continue along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name "Oscar" and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his affidavit. On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as "Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock. Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought him and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house. Another time, in another "Operation Lubog," Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and killed only his son right before Raymond's eyes.

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From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house. five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.

were transferred to his men stayed with Like in Limay, the stayed in Zambales

In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz: x x x x.[34] (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Court takes judicial notice of its Decision in the just cited Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo[35] which assessed the account of Manalo to be a candid and forthright narrative of his and his brother Reynaldo's abduction by the military in 2006; and of the corroborative testimonies, in the same case, of Manalo's brother Reynaldo and a forensic specialist, as well as Manalo's graphic description of the detention area. There is thus no compelling reason for the Court, in the present case, to disturb its appreciation in Manalo's testimony. The outright denial of petitioners Lt. Col. Boac, et al. thus crumbles. Petitioners go on to point out that the assailed Decision of the appellate court is "vague and incongruent with [its] findings" for, so they contend, while the appellate court referred to the perpetrators as "misguided and self-righteous civilian and military elements of the 7th Infantry Division," it failed to identify who these perpetrators are. Moreover, petitioners assert that Donald Caigas and Arnel Enriquez are not members of the AFP. They furthermore point out that their co-petitioners Generals Esperon, Tolentino and Palparan have already retired from the service and thus have no more control of any military camp or base in the country.[36] There is nothing vague and/or incongruent about the categorical order of the appellate court for petitioners to release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. In its discourse, the appellate court merely referred to "a few misguided selfrighteous people who resort to the extrajudicial process of neutralizing those who disagree with the country's democratic system of government." Nowhere did it specifically refer to the members of the 7th Infantry Division as the "misguided self-righteous" ones. Petitioners finally point out that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen do not have the requisite standing to file the amparo petition on behalf of Merino. They call attention to the fact that in the amparo petition, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen merely indicated that they were "concerned with Manuel Merino" as basis for filing the petition on his behalf.[37] Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo[38] provides: The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in the following order: (a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents of the aggrieved party; (b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or

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(c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party. Indeed, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen failed to allege that there were no known members of the immediate family or relatives of Merino. The exclusive and successive order mandated by the above-quoted provision must be followed. The order of priority is not without reason--"to prevent the indiscriminate and groundless filing of petitions for amparo which may even prejudice the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party."[39] The Court notes that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen also filed the petition for habeas corpus on Merino's behalf. No objection was raised therein for, in a habeas corpus proceeding, any person may apply for the writ on behalf of the aggrieved party.[40] It is thus only with respect to the amparo petition that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen are precluded from filing the application on Merino's behalf as they are not authorized parties under the Rule. G.R. No. 184495 Preliminarily, the Court finds the appellate court's dismissal of the petitions against then President Arroyo well-taken, owing to her immunity from suit at the time the habeas corpus and amparo petitions were filed.[41] Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. x x x [42] Parenthetically, the petitions are bereft of any allegation that then President Arroyo permitted, condoned or performed any wrongdoing against the three missing persons. On the issue of whether a military commander may be held liable for the acts of his subordinates in an amparo proceeding, a brief discussion of the concept of command responsibility and its application insofar as amparo cases already decided by the Court is in order. Rubrico v. Macapagal Arroyo[43] responsibility as follows: expounded on the concept of command

The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict." In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of

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criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (citations omitted; emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)[44] It bears stressing that command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity,[45] and thus a substantive rule that points to criminal or administrative liability. An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of individuals or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit.[46] Rather, it is a remedial measure designed to direct specified courses of action to government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of aggrieved individuals.[47] Thus Razon Jr. v. Tagitis
[48]

enlightens:

[An amparo proceeding] does nor determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance...for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance...[49] (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Further, Tagitis defines "accountability," viz: what constitutes "responsibility" and

x x x. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.[50] (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied) Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases to determine criminal liability.[51] The Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement as far as amparo cases are concerned. Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command responsibility in amparo cases to instances of determining the responsible or accountable individuals or entities that are duty-bound to abate any transgression on the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.

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If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be any.[52] (emphasis and underscoring supplied) In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue.[53] In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party. Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government agency. Relatedly, the legislature came up with Republic Act No. 9851[54] (RA 9851) to include command responsibility as a form of criminal complicity in crimes against international humanitarian law, genocide and other crimes.[55] RA 9851 is thus the substantive law that definitively imputes criminal liability to those superiors who, despite their position, still fail to take all necessary and reasonable measures within their power to prevent or repress the commission of illegal acts or to submit these matters to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. The Court finds that the appellate court erred when it did not specifically name the respondents that it found to be responsible for the abduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. For, from the records, it appears that the responsible and accountable individuals are Lt. Col. Anotado, Lt. Mirabelle, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas. They should thus be made to comply with the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino should be dismissed for lack of merit as there is no showing that they were even remotely accountable and responsible for the abduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. G.R. No. 187109. Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a motion for execution for an amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the right to life, liberty and security of a person is at stake, the proceedings should not be delayed and execution of any decision thereon must be expedited as soon as possible since any form of delay, even for a day, may jeopardize the very rights that these writs seek to immediately protect. The Solicitor General's argument that the Rules of Court supplement the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is misplaced. The Rules of Court only find suppletory

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application in an amparo proceeding if the Rules strengthen, rather than weaken, the procedural efficacy of the writ. As it is, the Rule dispenses with dilatory motions in view of the urgency in securing the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. Suffice it to state that a motion for execution is inconsistent with the extraordinary and expeditious remedy being offered by an amparo proceeding. In fine, the appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to immediately release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino was not automatically executory. For that would defeat the very purpose of having summary proceedings[56] in amparo petitions. Summary proceedings, it bears emphasis, are immediately executory without prejudice to further appeals that may be taken therefrom.[57] WHEREFORE, in light following judgment: of the foregoing discussions, the Court renders the

1. The Petitions in G.R. Nos. 184461-62 and G.R. No. 184495 are DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 17, 2008 is AFFIRMED with modification in that respondents in G.R. No. 184495, namely Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson, Gen. Jovito Palparan, Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas are ordered to immediately release Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino from detention. The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino are DISMISSED. 2. The petition in G.R. No. 187109 is GRANTED. The named respondents are directed to forthwith comply with the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court. Owing to the retirement and/or reassignment to other places of assignment of some of the respondents herein and in G.R. No. 184495, the incumbent commanding general of the 7th Infantry Division and the incumbent battalion commander of the 24th Infantry Battalion, both of the Philippine Army, are enjoined to fully ensure the release of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino from detention. Respondents Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson, Gen. Jovito Palparan, Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas shall remain personally impleaded in the petitions to answer for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies. Let copies of this Decision and the records of these cases be furnished the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for further investigation to determine the respective criminal and administrative liabilities of respondents. All the present petitions are REMANDED to the Court of Appeals appropriate action, directed at monitoring of the DOJ, PNP and investigations and the validation of their results. SO ORDERED. for AFP

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CHANGE OF NAME RULES OF COURT: RULE 103 [G.R. No. 186027. December 8, 2010.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MERLYN MERCADERA through her Attorney-in-Fact, EVELYN M. OGA, respondent. FACTS: On June 6, 2005, Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera), represented by her sister and duly constituted Attorney-in-Fact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga), sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth from Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No. 9048 (R.A. No. 9048). 2

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Under R.A. No. 9048, the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general, as the case may be, is now authorized to effect the change of first name or nickname and the correction of clerical or typographical errors in civil registry entries. "Under said law, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers. The law now excludes the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied" 3 and removes "correction or changing of clerical errors in entries of the civil register from the ambit of Rule 108." Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of the rules are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register. ISSUE: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE CHANGE IN RESPONDENT'S NAME UNDER RULE 103. HELD: Besides, granting that Rule 103 applies to this case and that compliance with the procedural requirements under Rule 108 falls short of what is mandated, it still cannot be denied that Mercadera complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding before the lower court. The publication and posting of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation and the notices sent to the OSG and the Local Civil Registry are sufficient indicia of an adverse proceeding. The fact that no one opposed the petition, including the OSG, did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same and did not make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. Considering that the OSG did not oppose the petition and the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court were procedurally defective. Indeed, it has become unnecessary to further discuss the reasons why the CA correctly affirmed the findings of the lower court especially in admitting and according probative value to the evidence presented by Mercadera.

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 186027. December 8, 2010.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MERLYN MERCADERA through her Attorney-in-Fact, EVELYN M. OGA, respondent. DECISION

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MENDOZA, J p: This petition for review on certiorari assails the December 9, 2008 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN, which affirmed the September 28, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 8 (RTC), in a petition for correction of entries, docketed as Special Proceedings No. R-3427 (SP No. R-3427), filed by respondent Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera) under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. TcDIEH The Factual and Procedural Antecedents On June 6, 2005, Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera), represented by her sister and duly constituted Attorney-in-Fact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga), sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth from Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No. 9048 (R.A. No. 9048). 2 Under R.A. No. 9048, the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general, as the case may be, is now authorized to effect the change of first name or nickname and the correction of clerical or typographical errors in civil registry entries. "Under said law, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers. The law now excludes the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied" 3 and removes "correction or changing of clerical errors in entries of the civil register from the ambit of Rule 108." Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of the rules are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register. 4 The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect the correction unless a court order was obtained "because the Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with a permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their office as mandated by Republic Act 9048." 5 Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition for Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City (RTC). The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings No. R-3427 (SP No. R-3427). Section 2 of Rule 108 reads: CHDAaS SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name. [Underscoring supplied]

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Upon receipt of the petition for correction of entry, the RTC issued an order, dated June 10, 2005, which reads: Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, notice is hereby given that the hearing of said petition is set on JULY 26, 2005 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning, at the Session Hall of Branch 8, this Court, Bulwagan ng Katarungan, Dipolog City, on which date, time and place, anyone appearing to contest the petition shall state in writing his grounds there[for], serving a copy thereof to the petitioner and likewise file copies with this Court on or before the said date of hearing. Let this order be published at the expense of petitioner once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper edited and published in Dipolog City and of general circulation therein, the City of Dapitan and the province of Zamboanga del Norte, and copies hereof be furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General of (sic) 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village, Makati, Metro Manila, the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog, and posted on the bulletin boards of the City Hall of Dipolog, the Provincial Capitol Building, and of this Court. IT IS SO ORDERED. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for the Republic of the Philippines and deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor to assist in the case only on the very day of the hearing. This prompted the court to reset the hearing on September 5, 2005. On said day, there being no opposition, counsel for Mercadera moved for leave of court to present evidence ex parte. Without any objection from the City Prosecutor, the trial court designated the branch clerk of court to receive evidence for Mercadera. DAaIHT On September 15, 2005, the testimony of Oga and several photocopies of documents were formally offered and marked as evidence to prove that Mercadera never used the name "Marilyn" in any of her public or private transactions. On September 26, 2005, the RTC issued an order 6 admitting Exhibits "A" to "I" 7 and their submarkings, as relevant to the resolution of the case. The following facts were gathered from documentary evidence and the oral testimony of Oga, as reported by the lower court: Petitioner Merlyn M. Mercadera was born on August 19, 1970 at Dipolog City. She is the daughter of spouses Tirso U. Mercadera and Norma C. Lacquiao. The fact of her birth was reported to the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City on September 8, 1970. It was recorded on page 68, book no. 9, in the Registry of Births of said civil registry. In the certification of birth dated May 9, 2005 issued by the same registry, her given name appears as Marilyn and not Merlyn (Exhibit "C"). On September 29, 1979, petitioner was baptized according to the rites and ceremonies of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines. As reflected in

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her certificate of baptism issued by said church, she was baptized by the name Merlyn L. Mercadera (Exhibit "D"). In her elementary diploma issued by the Paaralang Sentral ng Estaka, Dipolog City; her high school diploma issued by the Zamboanga del Norte School of Arts and Trades, Dipolog City; and college diploma issued by the Silliman University, Dumaguete City, where she earned the degree of Bachelor of Secondary Education, uniformly show her name as Merlyn L. Mercadera (Exhibits "E", "F", and "G"). Presently, she is working in U.P. Mindanao, Buhangin, Davao City. Her certificate of membership issued by the Government Service Insurance System also bears his [sic] complete name as Merlyn Lacquiao Mercadera (Exhibit "H"). TaSEHD When she secured an authenticated copy of her certificate of live birth from the National Statistics Office, she discovered that her given name as registered is Marilyn and not Merlyn; hence, this petition. In its September 28, 2005 Decision, 8 the RTC granted Mercadera's petition and directed the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City to correct her name appearing in her certificate of live birth, Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera, to MERLYN Lacquiao Mercadera. Specifically, the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City is hereby directed to correct the given name of petitioner appearing in her certificate of live birth, from Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera to MERLYN Lacquiao Mercadera. In a four-page decision, the RTC ruled that the documentary evidence presented by Mercadera sufficiently supported the circumstances alleged in her petition. Considering that she had used "Merlyn" as her given name since childhood until she discovered the discrepancy in her Certificate of Live Birth, the RTC was convinced that the correction was justified. The OSG timely interposed an appeal praying for the reversal and setting aside of the RTC decision. It mainly anchored its appeal on the availment of Mercadera of the remedy and procedure under Rule 108. In its Brief 9 filed with the CA, the OSG argued that the lower court erred (1) in granting the prayer for change of name in a petition for correction of entries; and (2) in admitting the photocopies of documentary evidence and hearsay testimony of Oga. For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of Mercadera's given name might seem innocuous enough to grant but "it is in truth a material correction as it would modify or increase substantive rights." 10 What the lower court actually allowed was a change of Mercadera's given name, which would have been proper had she filed a petition under Rule 103 and proved any of the grounds therefor. The lower court, "may not substitute one for the other for purposes of expediency." 11 Further, because Mercadera failed to invoke a

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specific ground recognized by the Rules, the lower court's order in effect allowed the change of one's name in the civil registry without basis. IcHSCT The CA was not persuaded. In its December 9, 2008 Decision, 12 the appellate court affirmed the questioned RTC Order in CA-G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN. The CA assessed the controversy in this wise: Appellant's insistence that the petition should have been filed under Rule 103 and not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is off the mark. This Court does not entertain any doubt that the petition before the trial court was one for the correction on an entry in petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth and not one in which she sought to change her name. In Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, the High Court reiterated the distinction between the phrases "to correct" and "to change." Said the High Court: To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute. Article 412 of the New Civil Code does not qualify as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected or distinguished on the basis of the effect that the correction or change may be. Such entries include not only those clerical in nature but also substantial errors. After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein. That appellee sought to correct an entry and not to change her name is patent to the Court from the allegations in her petition, specifically, paragraphs 7 and 8 thereof xxx xxx xxx

Anent the RTC's error in admitting the photocopies of Mercadera's documentary evidence and in vesting probative value to Oga's testimony, the CA cited the well-established rule that "evidence not objected to may be admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment." 13 DTcASE On March 6, 2009, the OSG filed the present petition. On behalf of Mercadera, the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) filed its Comment 14 on July 3, 2009. The OSG declined to file a reply claiming that its petition already contained an exhaustive discussion on the following assigned errors: 15 I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE CHANGE IN RESPONDENT'S NAME UNDER RULE 103. II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN CONSIDERING SECONDARY EVIDENCE.

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Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code. 16 This rule provides the procedure for an independent special proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. 17 In petitions for change of name, a person avails of a remedy to alter the "designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known." 18 When granted, a person's identity and interactions are affected as he bears a new "label or appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of, or dealing with him." 19 Judicial permission for a change of name aims to prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the change by virtue of a court decree. The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which requires publication of the order issued by the court to afford the State and all other interested parties to oppose the petition. When complied with, the decision binds not only the parties impleaded but the whole world. As notice to all, publication serves to indefinitely bar all who might make an objection. "It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it." 20 HIaTDS Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of one's existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity or civil status. 21 However, "there could be instances where the change applied for may be open to objection by parties who already bear the surname desired by the applicant, not because he would thereby acquire certain family ties with them but because the existence of such ties might be erroneously impressed on the public mind." 22 Hence, in requests for a change of name, "what is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced . . . mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant . . . ." 23 Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code. 24 Entries in the civil register refer to "acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons," 25 also as enumerated in Article 408 of the same law. 26 Before, only mistakes or errors of a harmless and innocuous nature in the entries in the civil registry may be corrected under Rule 108 and substantial errors affecting the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party are beyond the ambit of the rule. In the abandoned case of Chua Wee v. Republic, 27 this Court declared that, ". . . if Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy

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of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the new Civil Code." In the latter case of Wong v. Republic, 28 however, Justice Vicente Abad Santos, in a separate concurrence, opined that Article 412, which Rule 108 implements, contemplates all kinds of issues and all types of procedures because "the provision does not say that it applies only to non-controversial issues and that the procedure to be used is summary in nature." In Republic v. Judge De la Cruz, 29 the dissenting opinion penned by Justice Pacifico De Castro echoed the same view: TIaCAc It is not accurate to say that Rule 108 would be rendered unconstitutional if it would allow the correction of more than mere harmless clerical error, as it would thereby increase or modify substantive rights which the Constitution expressly forbids because Article 412 of the Civil Code, the substantive law sought to be implemented by Rule 108, allows only the correction of innocuous clerical errors not those affecting the status of persons. As was stressed in the dissent on the aforesaid Wong Case, Article 412 does not limit in its express terms nor by mere implication, the correction authorized by it to that of mere clerical errors. . . . it would be reasonable and justified to rule that Article 412 contemplates of correction of erroneous entry of whatever nature, procedural safeguards having only to be provided for, as was the manifest purpose of Rule 108. . . . proceedings for the correction of erroneous entry should not be considered as establishing one's status in a legal manner conclusively beyond dispute or controversion, . . . the books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto . . . shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. Hence, the status as corrected would not have a superior quality for evidentiary purpose. Moreover, the correction should not imply a change of status but a mere rectification of error to make the matter corrected speak for the truth. . . . Finally in Republic v. Valencia, 30 the above stated views were adopted by this Court insofar as even substantial errors or matters in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established, provided the parties aggrieved avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. "If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted . . . ." 31

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"Where such a change is ordered, the Court will not be establishing a substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the substantive law embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate the Constitution." 32 In the case at bench, the OSG posits that the conversion from "MARILYN" to "MERLYN" is not a correction of an innocuous error but a material correction tantamount to a change of name which entails a modification or increase in substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial error that requires compliance with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule 108. DHcESI It appears from these arguments that there is, to some extent, confusion over the scope and application of Rules 103 and Rule 108. Where a "change of name" will necessarily be reflected by the corresponding correction in an entry, as in this case, the functions of both rules are often muddled. While there is no clear-cut rule to categorize petitions under either rule, this Court is of the opinion that a resort to the basic distinctions between the two rules with respect to alterations in a person's registered name can effectively clear the seeming perplexity of the issue. Further, a careful evaluation of circumstances alleged in the petition itself will serve as a constructive guide to determine the propriety of the relief prayed for. The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one's name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings. 33 In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 34 also includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in one's name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108. This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary proceeding. As explained above, Republic v. Valencia is the authority for allowing substantial errors in other entries like citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an adversary proceeding. "After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein." 35 A serious scrutiny of this petition reveals a glaring lack of support to the OSG's assumption that Mercadera intended to change her name under Rule 103. All that the petition propounded are swift arguments on the alleged procedural flaws of Mercadera's petition before the RTC. In the same vein, no

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concrete contention was brought up to convince this Court that the dangers sought to be prevented by the adversarial proceedings prescribed in Rule 103 are attendant in this case. Instead, the RTC found the documents presented by Mercadera to have satisfactorily shown that she had been known as MERLYN ever since, discounting the possibility that confusion, or a modification of substantive rights might arise. Truth be told, not a single oppositor appeared to contest the petition despite full compliance with the publication requirement. ICAcTa Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." 36 From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court "to remove the faults or error" from her registered given name "MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the same to conform to the one she grew up to, "MERLYN." It does not take a complex assessment of said petition to learn of its intention to simply correct the clerical error in spelling. Mercadera even attempted to avail of the remedy allowed by R.A. No. 9048 but she unfortunately failed to enjoy the expediency which the law provides and was constrained to take court action to obtain relief. Thus, the petition was clear in stating: 7. That as such, there is a need to correct her given name as appearing in her Certificate of Live Birth from MARILYN to MERLYN to conform to her true and correct given name that she had been using and had been known within the community . . . . 8. That herein petitioner went to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City and requested them to effect such correction in her Certificate of Live Birth, however, the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City will not effect such correction unless an order is obtained by herein petitioner from this Honorable Court because the Local Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their office as mandated by Republic Act 9048, hence the filing of this petition. [Emphases supplied] Indeed, there are decided cases involving mistakes similar to Mercadera's case which recognize the same a harmless error. In Yu v. Republic 37 it was held that "to change 'Sincio' to 'Sencio' which merely involves the substitution of the first vowel 'i' in the first name into the vowel 'e' amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error." In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, 38 it was held that the change of petitioner's name from "Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu" to "Emperatriz Labayo" was a mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding was appropriate. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto, the correction involved the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what appears as "Midael" as given name would read "Michael." In the latter case, this Court, with the agreement of the Solicitor General, ruled that the error was plainly clerical, such that, "changing the name of the child from 'Midael C. Mazon'

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to 'Michael C. Mazon' cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig)." 39 HScAEC In this case, the use of the letter "a" for the letter "e," and the deletion of the letter "i," so that what appears as "Marilyn" would read as "Merlyn" is patently a rectification of a name that is clearly misspelled. The similarity between "Marilyn" and "Merlyn" may well be the object of a mix-up that blemished Mercadera's Certificate of Live Birth until her adulthood, thus, her interest to correct the same. The CA did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow was the correction of her misspelled given name which she had been using ever since she could remember. It is worthy to note that the OSG's reliance on Republic vs. Hernandez 40 is flawed. In that case, this Court said that "a change in a given name is a substantial matter" and that it "cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding that would in effect render it a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding." While this Court stands true to the ruling in Hernandez, the said pronouncement therein was stated in a different tenor and, thus, inapplicable to this case. Hernandez was decided against an entirely different factual milieu. There was a petition for adoption that must not have led to a corresponding change in the adoptee's given name because "it would be procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of a corresponding petition for the latter relief at law." In the present case, the issue is the applicability of either Rule 103 or Rule 108 and the relief sought by Mercadera can in fact be granted under the latter. This Court finds no attempt on the part of Mercadera to render the requirements under Rule 103 illusory as in Hernandez. Besides, granting that Rule 103 applies to this case and that compliance with the procedural requirements under Rule 108 falls short of what is mandated, it still cannot be denied that Mercadera complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding before the lower court. The publication and posting of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation and the notices sent to the OSG and the Local Civil Registry are sufficient indicia of an adverse proceeding. The fact that no one opposed the petition, including the OSG, did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same and did not make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. Considering that the OSG did not oppose the petition and the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court were procedurally defective. Indeed, it has become unnecessary to further discuss the reasons why the CA correctly affirmed the findings of the lower court especially in admitting and according probative value to the evidence presented by Mercadera. SCaEcD WHEREFORE, the December 9, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

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Carpio, Nachura, Peralta and Abad, JJ., concur. C o p y r i g h t 2 0 1 0 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.

CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY RULES OF COURT: RULE 108 [G.R. No. 177861. July 13, 2010.]

IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION AND CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF BIRTH, EMMA K. LEE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO K. LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-ONG, JULIAN K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, ROSA LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY LEE-CHIN, HENRY K. LEE, NATIVIDAD LEE-MIGUEL, VICTORIANO K. LEE, and THOMAS K. LEE, represented by RITA K. LEE, as Attorney-in-Fact, respondents. FACTS: Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China. They had 11 children, namely, Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Rosa Lee-Vanderlek, Melody Lee-Chin, Henry K. Lee, Natividad Lee-Miguel, Victoriano K. Lee, and Thomas K. Lee (collectively, the Lee-Keh children). In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another property of Lee nearby, and had a relation with him. Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu's children with Lee (collectively, the Lee's other children) claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court may compel Tiu to testify in the correction of entry case that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to show that she is not Keh's daughter. HELD: It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners' records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the

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petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners' contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter's children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 177861. July 13, 2010.]

IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION AND CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF BIRTH, EMMA K. LEE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO K. LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-ONG, JULIAN K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, ROSA LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY LEE-CHIN, HENRY K. LEE, NATIVIDAD LEE-MIGUEL, VICTORIANO K. LEE, and THOMAS K. LEE, represented by RITA K. LEE, as Attorney-in-Fact, respondents. DECISION ABAD, J p: This case is about the grounds for quashing a subpoena ad testificandum and a parent's right not to testify in a case against his children. IcaEDC The Facts and the Case Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China. They had 11 children, namely, Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Rosa Lee-Vanderlek, Melody Lee-Chin, Henry K. Lee, Natividad Lee-Miguel, Victoriano K. Lee, and Thomas K. Lee (collectively, the Lee-Keh children). In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another property of Lee nearby, and had a relation with him. Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu's children with Lee (collectively, the Lee's other children) claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter. After conducting such an investigation, the NBI concluded in its report:

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[I]t is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG is in a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with his grand design of making his 8 children as their own legitimate children, consequently elevating the status of his second family and secure their future. The doctor lamented that this complaint would not have been necessary had not the father and his second family kept on insisting that the 8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG. 1 aIHSEc The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the eldest of the Lee's other children, Marcelo Lee (who was recorded as the 12th child of Lee and Keh), was born of a 17-year-old mother, when Keh was already 38 years old at the time. Another of the Lee's other children, Mariano Lee, was born of a 23-year-old mother, when Keh was then already 40 years old, and so forth. In other words, by the hospital records of the Lee's other children, Keh's declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly gave birth to such other children, numbering eight. On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two separate petitions, one of them before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City 2 in Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from the certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lee's other children, the name Keh and replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate her true mother's name. In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lee's presumed mother, to testify in the case. The RTC granted the motion but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lee's stepmother. 3 On August 5, 2005 the RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and oppressive considering that Tiu was already very old and that the obvious object of the subpoena was to badger her into admitting that she was Emma Lee's mother. HCaEAT Because the RTC denied the Lee-Keh children's motion for reconsideration, they filed a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 92555. On December 29, 2006 the CA rendered a decision, 4 setting aside the RTC's August 5, 2005 Order. The CA ruled that only a subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena ad testificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive or unreasonable under Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA also held that Tiu's advanced age alone does not render her incapable of testifying. The party seeking to quash the subpoena for that reason must prove that she would be unable to withstand the rigors of trial, something that petitioner Emma Lee failed to do. Since the CA denied Emma Lee's motion for reconsideration by resolution of May 8, 2007, 5 she filed the present petition with this Court. The Question Presented

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The only question presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court may compel Tiu to testify in the correction of entry case that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to show that she is not Keh's daughter. The Ruling of the Court Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC correctly quashed the subpoena ad testificandum it issued against Tiu on the ground that it was unreasonable and oppressive, given the likelihood that the latter would be badgered on oral examination concerning the Lee-Keh children's theory that she had illicit relation with Lee and gave birth to the other Lee children. cTECIA But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds cited unreasonable and oppressive are proper for subpoena ad duces tecum or for the production of documents and things in the possession of the witness, a command that has a tendency to infringe on the right against invasion of privacy. Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus provides: SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena. The court may quash a subpoena duces tecum upon motion promptly made and, in any event, at or before the time specified therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear, or if the person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of the production thereof. Notably, the Court previously decided in the related case of Lee v. Court of Appeals 6 that the Lee-Keh children have the right to file the action for correction of entries in the certificates of birth of Lee's other children, Emma Lee included. The Court recognized that the ultimate object of the suit was to establish the fact that Lee's other children were not children of Keh. Thus: SDTIaE It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners' records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners' contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter's children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners. 7 (Underscoring supplied) Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh children's action, obviously, they would want Tiu to testify or admit that she is the mother of Lee's other children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had died and so

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could not give testimony that Lee's other children were not hers. The Lee-Keh children have, therefore, a legitimate reason for seeking Tiu's testimony and, normally, the RTC cannot deprive them of their right to compel the attendance of such a material witness. But petitioner Emma Lee raises two other objections to requiring Tiu to come to court and testify: a) considering her advance age, testifying in court would subject her to harsh physical and emotional stresses; and b) it would violate her parental right not to be compelled to testify against her stepdaughter. aCHDST 1. Regarding the physical and emotional punishment that would be inflicted on Tiu if she were compelled at her age and condition to come to court to testify, petitioner Emma Lee must establish this claim to the satisfaction of the trial court. About five years have passed from the time the Lee-Keh children sought the issuance of a subpoena for Tiu to appear before the trial court. The RTC would have to update itself and determine if Tiu's current physical condition makes her fit to undergo the ordeal of coming to court and being questioned. If she is fit, she must obey the subpoena issued to her. Tiu has no need to worry that the oral examination might subject her to badgering by adverse counsel. The trial court's duty is to protect every witness against oppressive behavior of an examiner and this is especially true where the witness is of advanced age. 8 2. Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her stepdaughter, petitioner Emma Lee, invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, which reads: SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege. No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants. The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct ascendants or descendants. cCDAHE But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus provides: Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends. Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.

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WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 92555. SO ORDERED. CSTcEI 2 0 1 0 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s

the

decision

and

C o p y r i g h t

A s i a,

I n c.

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