MIDFIELD TUNNEL OPERATIONAL PROCEDURE OUTLINE

Arnold Dix Facility

Hamad

Rev.No: 0 Midfield Tunnel Hamad International Airport Issue Date: Pages:

DEPARTMENT NAME Subject

Standard Operating Procedures

Prepared by: Checked by: Reviewed by: Approved by:

Arnold Dix

Normal Operational Procedure Midfield Tunnel

1.0

31 12 2013

Operational Procedure

Rev. No:

DATE

DESCRIPTION

BY

CHCK

Review

APPR.

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Procedure No. 1 MIDFIELD TUNNEL BASIC OPERATION Rev No. 0

Introduction These procedures describe a pragmatic methodology for the interim safe public operation of the Midfield Tunnel. They recognize the strategic importance of the Midfield Tunnel in terms of access to the Midfield region of Hamad International Airport (HIA) and the fact that it underlies and provides support to the western runway. These procedures also respond to observed driver indifference to existing emergency signage and the absence of: A dedicated control room; CCTV coverage of the tunnel area in the control room; Automated physical road barriers; High visibility traffic control signage; Dedicated traffic response (e.g. stopped vehicle); and Aggressive traffic control. Furthermore the design of the roadways is such that the last opportunity to divert vehicles in the event of an incident is at the over-height gantries (U-turn facility). This means that human traffic control must be located at least 150 meters before the tunnel portals rendering vision of inside the tunnels impossible from this traffic control point. In combination all these factors mean that although the tunnel is short and unremarkable (well built and inherently robust) in the specific circumstances for its specific HIA function safe and secure operations demand an unusually labour intensive management strategy to ensure basic levels of asset protection and safety are achieved. The skilled labour demands are summarized in Appendix F. These procedures have been developed following extensive field testing of the currently installed electromechanical systems and rely heavily upon their limited manual operation from a substation which was not designed for habitation or to function as a control room. These interim procedures rely heavily upon a trained and motivated skilled workforce rapidly detecting and responding to an incident at or within the tunnel. The principal motivation for these procedures is the recognition that Midfield Tunnel is the sole access way to HIAs midfield activities center and that it also supports the airports main western runway. These procedures also provide an easily upgradable framework for the safe passage of dangerous goods such as high volumes of jet fuel, explosives and other high risk cargos on an as needs airport operational basis. These procedures are readily adaptable for escorted high risk convoys. These procedures also respond to the practical needs of the men required to operate the tunnel in the absence of basic facilities such as prayer rooms, ablution facilities, shade, water and cover. Once automated physical traffic control and remote surveillance of the tunnel is centralized with Midfield Control (at whatever location physically that may be), the substantive reliance upon Tunnel Safety Officers for tunnel safety can be reassessed. Managing the risks of the Midfield Tunnel regions subsurface link will remain a priority as it is the only access to the Midfield area and will always pass under the western runway making it a key functional asset of HIA. The rationale for the following procedure is summarized in Appendix A of this document.

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Procedure No. 1 MIDFIELD TUNNEL BASIC OPERATION Rev No. 0

Table of Contents
1. 2. 3. 4. PREMABLE ............................................................................................................................. 5 PURPOSE & SCOPE ............................................................................................................... 5 DEFINITIONS & ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................................................... 5 RESPONSIBILITIES ................................................................................................................ 6 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 5. 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 Administrative Authority ..................................................................................................... 6 Midfield Safety Officer (MSO) ............................................................................................ 6 Tunnel Operations Manager (TOM) ................................................................................... 7 Tunnel Controllers (TC) ..................................................................................................... 7 Operational Support Officer (OSO) .................................................................................... 7 Tunnel Safety Officer (TSO) .............................................................................................. 7 Tunnel Controller ............................................................................................................... 8 Tunnel Safety Officers ....................................................................................................... 9 Operational Support Officer (OSO) ................................................................................ 10 Alarm Testing .................................................................................................................. 10 Tunnel Closure ................................................................................................................ 10 Partial Tunnel Closure (Single Lane) ............................................................................... 11 Partial Tunnel Re-opening ............................................................................................... 11 Full Tunnel Opening ........................................................................................................ 11 Bi-Directional Traffic Operation in a Single Tunnel ........................................................... 12 Draft Procedure for Bi Directional Traffic Operations in a Single Tunnel ................... 12 To reestablish dual tunnel operation ......................................................................... 12

Normal Operations of the Midfield Tunnel ............................................................................ 8

5.9.1 5.9.2 5.10 5.11 5.12 5.13 5.14 5.15

Emergency Communications Systems............................................................................. 12 Emergency Communications Comprehension ................................................................. 13 Emergency Communications Protocol ............................................................................. 13 Emergency Communications Protocol with QCAA ........................................................... 13 Use of Public Address System ......................................................................................... 13 Assisting Emergency Services ......................................................................................... 13

Appendix A Handover Report 18.12.13 ................................................................................... 15 Appendix B - English for Emergencies Example ..................................................................... 19 Appendix C Checklists ............................................................................................................ 20 Appendix D Emergency System Activation ............................................................................ 21 Appendix E TC Emergency Communications Protocol (TC mark up sheet) ........................ 22 Appendix F Personnel Required .............................................................................................. 23 Appendix G Key Performance Indicators ................................................................................ 24 Appendix H - Emergency Communications and Activity Protocol for TSOs .......................... 25 Appendix I - EU Directive 2004/54/EC ......................................................................................... 26

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Procedure No. 1 MIDFIELD TUNNEL BASIC OPERATION Rev No. 0

1.

PREMABLE

The Midfield Tunnel is one of several tunnels servicing Hamad International Airport. It is currently operating without QCDD approval and is open to the public. It is contemplated that an operator (HIA or perhaps MOI) will in time be in command of this and other tunnels. The following procedure provides a template for operation of the Midfield Tunnel and an administrative framework for operational consistency of the tunnels in the future. As with other buildings at HIA there is a difference between building a structure according to its design and operating it safely. This procedure is designed to operate the tunnel safely and is based upon the learnings of full scale operations and exercises. 2. i. PURPOSE & SCOPE This procedure defines standard work process for the normal operation of the Midfield Tunnel. This procedure is applicable to the Midfield roadway extending from and in-between the over height gantries on either side of the Western main runway, and the tunnel, including its walls, structural elements and the ancillary buildings which contain and or control systems associated with the tunnel and its operation. Requirements for compliance with labor laws, health and safety or other local regulatory requirements are not specifically dealt with in this procedure although the mandated 8 hour shift sequence is used for rostering purposes. This procedure should be wherever necessary harmonized to accord with any overarching requirements of HIA safety and any lawful requirements from other agencies such as MOI, QCAA and QCDD. Such harmonization should form amendments to this procedure and when approved by the Midfield Safety Officer be given new revision names. DEFINITIONS & ABBREVIATIONS Authority responsible for all aspects of safety of the tunnel who takes the necessary measures to ensure that this procedure is complied with. (Presumed to be DIA) The physical location of the Tunnel Controller whom has the authority, skill and capacity to immediately make decisions, command and implement or request; tunnel closures, emergency ventilation, emergency lighting, lane closures, QCAA emergency response, QCDD emergency response, MOI emergency response, or any matters related to the immediate operation of Midfield Tunnel. Officers of the Ministry of Interior responsible from time to time for Hamad International Airport. A named individual with recognized expertise and track record of pragmatic risk management in road tunnels. The function is to be discharged generally in accordance with the requirements of a Safety Officer as prescribed in EU Directive 2004/54EC (Minimum requirements for tunnels in the Trans European Road Network see Appendix I). The Safety Officer must be tertiary qualified to at least degree level and have a demonstrated high level of communications

ii.

iii.

iv.

3.

Administrative Authority

Midfield Control

MOI

Midfield Safety Officer

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Procedure No. 1 MIDFIELD TUNNEL BASIC OPERATION Rev No. 0

skills and sensitivity to modifying the requirements of the Directive to application in Qatar in an Airport context. OSO QCDD Tunnel Operational Support Officer Qatar Civil Defence Department Fire and Rescue Services In this procedure the Tunnel" refers to the Midfield roadway extending from and in-between the over height gantries on either side of the Western main runway, and the tunnel, including its walls, structural elements and the ancillary buildings which contain and or control systems associated with the tunnel and its operation such as the two substations, communications equipment and other facilities and utilities upon which the tunnel relies for safe operation. Tunnel Safety Officer. Tunnel Safety Officers are principally responsible for the surveillance of the tunnel and its systems, mitigation of risks, physical lane closures, directing and assisting emergency services, traffic control, and emergency communications with Midfield Control on an immediate operational basis. TSOs should hold at least a post schooling qualification or certificate in Safety, fire safety, road safety or hold a specific operational safety related qualification such as OSHA, ALISON, NEBOSH, EDUWHERE, HIAFW or be able to demonstrate competency through work experience or hold an equivalent qualification to the satisfaction of the Midfield Safety Officer. Qatar Civil Aviation Authority Fire and Rescue Services

TSO

QCAA

4.

RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 Administrative Authority

The administrative authority ensures that the following tasks are performed: That the operational performance of the Midfield Tunnel is consistent with and complements the requirements for safe and sustainable operation of HIA. Testing and inspecting tunnels on a regular basis and drawing up the related safety requirements; Putting in place organisational and operational schemes (including emergency response plans) for the training and equipping of emergency services; Establishing the procedure for immediate closure of a tunnel in case of an emergency Implementing the necessary risk reduction measures.

The administrative authority has power to suspend or restrict the operation of a tunnel if the safety conditions are not met. 4.2 Midfield Safety Officer (MSO) A named tunnel expert whom has long standing specific experience operating tunnels and managing tunnel risks should be appointed to oversee safe tunnel operations and provide an operational safety audit report to the Administrative Authority every three months initially for 12 months and then biannually thereafter or at such other interval as is agreed appropriate. The MSO shall consider any revisions to these procedures or any special procedures proposed for the tunnels operation and shall offer his opinion to the operational safety level achieved by the tunnel.
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Procedure No. 1 MIDFIELD TUNNEL BASIC OPERATION Rev No. 0

4.3 Tunnel Operations Manager (TOM) The Tunnel Operations Manager shall be in command of all tunnel controllers and shall be responsible for the day to day safe operation of the tunnel including assessment of sufficiency of system operability , interim risk mitigation strategies, fitness of TCs and TSOs to work (competency, attitude, training, health and disposition). It shall be his responsibility to liaise with all stake holders including Keppel, DIA FM, MOI, and QCAA about all day to day operational issues and ensure that the tunnel is operationally safe. His role shall include liaising with stake holders and refining existing procedures and developing new procedures for safe tunnel operations for assessment by the MSO. It is specifically required that the TOM make recommendations to the MSO on measures (including amendments to these procedures, equipment and third party assistance) about measures to ensure the risks of disrupted access to Midfield are minimized and the western runway is protected. 4.4 Tunnel Controllers (TC) The Tunnel Controller shall be in command of the tunnel including TSOs, traffic control, systems operation, communications and inter agency liaison on an immediate operational requirements basis from the Control Room (sub-station). The Tunnel Controller shall be primarily responsible for all immediate operational matters including , lane closures, special vehicles, escorts, convoys, user safety (including for maintenance works) emergency response and liaising with emergency services and other agencies at an operational level during actual events. The TC must be trained and competent as a TSO in addition to being trained and competent to perform the duties of the TC. 4.5 Operational Support Officer (OSO) The Operational Support Officers primary task is to assist the TC in ensuring the tunnel is operationally ready and fully staffed in an emergency and to provide assistance where needed during an incident. The OSO is under the command of the TC and is trained and qualified to perform the TC and TSO roles as well as holding a current drivers licence and be able to man the emergency escort vehicle (for high risk vehicle transit). He is also tasked with ensuring that all personnel reporting to duty are fit for work and responsible for ensuring 24 hour labour coverage. In the event of sickness, prayer time and toilet breaks he is responsible for ensuring consistency of labour cover by providing relief to the relevant TC or TSOs. 4.6 Tunnel Safety Officer (TSO) Tunnel Safety Officers are skilled safety trained and motivated officers whom assume principle responsibility for proactive response to tunnel incidents. They report to and are under the command of the Tunnel Controller (TC) and are responsible for protecting the integrity of the Midfield Tunnel (and thereby access to the Midfield area and the physical integrity and support of the Western runway), and the safety of tunnel users, vehicles and freight by supervising, controlling and thereby regulating vehicle movements so as to ensure the safe passage of vehicles, people and cargoes. They shall discharge such duties by conducting traffic control, system inspections and diligently attending to incidents and accidents in accordance with the letter and spirit of their special training and these procedures.

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Procedure No. 1 MIDFIELD TUNNEL BASIC OPERATION 5. Normal Operations of the Midfield Tunnel 5.1 Tunnel Controller A Tunnel Controller (TC) must be present in Midfield Control at all times. The TC must record all incidents which occur in the tunnel in a logbook which must remain at Midfield Control. Details recorded must include time and date of incident, nature of incident, action taken and time of end of incident. For the purposes of the TCs logbook an incident includes: A vehicle stopping in the tunnel Pedestrians in the tunnel Foreign objects in the tunnel Faulty equipment identified Unauthorized cargos passing through the tunnel Speeding vehicles or otherwise dangerous driving through the tunnel Works being conducted on any tunnel function related equipment (e.g. work in a substation) Any fire, smokey vehicle, crash, collision or impact in the tunnel No works, maintenance or repairs are permitted in the tunnel without approval from the TC. In addition to any conditions on any permit or authorization held by a person or organization seeking to work in the tunnel or on safety critical tunnel systems (including people within his own organization or the maintenance contractor for the tunnel) the TC may apply such other conditions as he believes are reasonable in all of the circumstances, to ensure safe operation of the tunnel and meet the operational requirements of HIA including: The time such activities can occur; Any special traffic control; Restrictions on what vehicle types or materials or cargos can be taken in the tunnel; Any special personal protective equipment At the commencement of a shift the TC must brief the relieving TC on: Any continuing or planned works, maintenance, special convoys or other activities which may impact upon the normal operation of the tunnel. Any faults, irregularities or other matters impacting operation regarding electromechanical, supervisory control or structural aspects of the tunnel. Any other matters that a competent Tunnel Controller would reasonably expect to impact upon the safe operation of the Midfield Tunnel. At the commencement of a shift the TC should: Seek a briefing from the systems maintenance contractor on the health of all systems and any works which may be scheduled during the shift period. Contact QCAA and advise them of the status of safety systems at the tunnel and where necessary alert them as to any issues impacting safe operations. During the course of the shift the TC must: Ensure that communications with all Tunnel Safety Officers are working and ensure that the TSOs are in position and known to be fit for duty. Have the TSOs inspect and test such equipment as is deemed necessary (and record the results of such testing). Advise the systems maintenance personnel of any revealed faults and seek an estimation of when the faults will be repaired. Confirm that traffic control devices are in position and operable. (e.g. traffic control barriers, emergency signs, lane usage signs) Rev No. 0

i. ii.

iii.

vi. vii.

viii.

ix.

x.

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Procedure No. 1 MIDFIELD TUNNEL BASIC OPERATION Rev No. 0

xi.

Conduct such system tests as are agreed with the Tunnel Safety Officer to provide confidence that the safety systems are fit and proper for use. Such tests include simulated fires, crashes, thermal alarms or such other drills or exercises as are agreed in collaboration with the TSOs, Administrative Authority, maintenance contractor, MOI, QCAA or other interested parties. Record any suggestions on improvement to these procedures or concerns about system operability that may impact the safe operation of the tunnel and convey them to the Tunnel Manager. 5.2 Tunnel Safety Officers

i.

There shall be three Tunnel Safety Officers on duty at each of the two tunnels at all times (total 6). TSOs shall be responsible for conducting surveillance within the tunnel. Surveillance shall include identification and notification to Midfield Control of issues including: Stopped vehicles Vehicle crashes Smell of burning Fire Fuel tankers Pedestrians Animals Objects, packages, rubbish Faulty lights, emergency telephones, firefighting equipment etc. Immediately identify any incident or circumstance which increases the risk of an incident Two Tunnel Safety Officers shall be positioned near the over height gantry on either side of the inbound roadway. The primary duties of these two TSOs are to: Calm traffic flow to minimize the probability of an incident by: Reminding drivers to abide by the speed limit; Reminding drivers to put on their headlights; Segregating slow vehicles into the emergency lane; Providing immediate traffic control to protect stopped vehicles in the tunnel; Stopping over height vehicles; Stopping dangerous vehicles; Liaising with the TC for the safe passage of stopped vehicles (if approved by the TC); Closing the tunnel in an emergency and facilitating emergency services access. The third Tunnel Safety Officer shall be on surveillance and inspection patrol between the tunnel entrance portal and the exit portal. The emphasis of the duties for the third TSO are to urgently respond to any incident by firstly contacting Midfield Control and responding immediately according to procedures and/or instructions to: Have stopped vehicles leave the tunnel; Provide protection for stopped vehicles and their passengers (e.g. manual lane closure); Remove foreign objects from active tunnel lanes; Direct people to a safe place (e.g. walkways); Honk horn, blow whistle or perform such other acts as are necessary to notify other TSOs to close the tunnel; Assist emergency services locate incident; Liaise with Midfield Control by whatever communications system works best (e.g. mobile telephone, Tetra radio, yellow emergency tunnel phone);
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ii.

iii.

iv.

v.

Procedure No. 1 MIDFIELD TUNNEL BASIC OPERATION vi. Query authority of vehicles and/or people found in or around the tunnel; Rev No. 0

Hourly checks by the third TSO shall be conducted generally in accordance with the checklists attached in Appendix C. These checklists shall be given to the Tunnel Controller at the end of each shift. Any faults identified by the TSOs must be immediately reported to Midfield Control. All TSOs shall change position on an hourly rotation basis. 5.3 Operational Support Officer (OSO)

vii.

i.

The OSO is under the command of the TC and shall provide such assistance as directed by the TC to ensure the continuity of safe tunnel operations and asset protection. These duties shall include relieving the TSO and TC where necessary, providing support to implement emergency traffic control, liaising with third parties in the field as necessary. 5.4 Alarm Testing

i.

Prior to conducting any test, trial, maintenance or other activity which may trigger an alarm (audible or electronic, local or remote) the Tunnel Controller must contact all parties that may receive notice of the test alarm. In practice this would likely include: QCAA watch room, MOI operations, QCDD Central Command, DIA safety and such other organizations or locations which may be revealed from time to time. At the conclusion of such test, trials maintenance or other activities which may trigger an alarm each of the entities contacted to inform them of the test must be contacted to advise them that the tests are completed and operations have resumed to normal.

ii.

5.5 Tunnel Closure i. If in the opinion of the TC there is a risk due to traffic of an incident occurring in the tunnel as indicated by any one or combination of alarms, indications or information including: Activation of a manual pull station alarm Activation of a thermal heat detector alarm Receiving information of an incident (including crashes, fire, dangerous vehicles, flooding, suspicious goods or packages etc.) Catastrophic or serious malfunction of emergency systems The TC must close the tunnel and request QCAA attendance. ii. Tunnel closure should be implemented by the manual stimulation of the Thermal Heat Detector Test Procedure from the fire alarm control panel in the Eastern Substation in accordance with the procedures in Appendix D of this report. This is necessary in order to ensure the correct sequencing and timing of emergency system implementation and the correct shut down procedure following an emergency. Unless absolutely unavoidable the TC should not manually activate the jet fans or other emergency systems as this may cause serious damage and or lead to a catastrophic failure of the emergency ventilation system and its power supplies. Tunnel closure shall be implemented by the TSOs immediately any one or combination of the following events occurs: Midfield Control commands the tunnel closed
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iii.

iv.

Procedure No. 1 MIDFIELD TUNNEL BASIC OPERATION Rev No. 0

Lane usage signs change to red X Jet fans are heard operating Emergency lighting is seen activate The sounds of a motor vehicle crash are heard Smoke is seen or smelt coming from either tunnel There is a report of any of the above heard on the Tetra radio In the TSOs expert opinion there is the unacceptable risk of an incident occurring in the tunnel (e.g. a large slow moving vehicle enters the tunnel in the non-emergency lanes, several fuel tankers refuse to stop, vehicles are observed to be engaging in high risk activities like racing)

v.

Manual Pull Stations may be activated in the event of an incident in the tunnel as a means of triggering the tunnel arms and causing TSOs to close the tunnels. Stopping traffic and notifying Midfield Control should occur concurrently. The highest priority is stopping traffic entering the tunnel. The immediate second priority is to advise Midfield Control that the traffic is stopped. 5.6 Partial Tunnel Closure (Single Lane)

vi.

i.

Where a TSO observes an obstruction within the tunnel such as a stopped vehicle or debris which cannot be immediately removed an emergency partial lane closure shall be implemented by the TSO and the TSO shall inform Midfield Control of the closure. A partial tunnel closure shall be implemented urgently and include the obstruction of the lane or lanes from the point of the obstruction to a position at least 50 meters outside the tunnel on the approach side of the obstruction. The reason for extending the partial tunnel closure 50 meters outside the tunnel is to ensure that approaching drivers observe the road obstruction prior to entering the tunnel. In severely restricted visibility (such as intense storms and at night) it may be safer to obstruct the lane within the tunnel only to take advantage of the tunnel lighting. A decision to implement reduced tunnel obstruction can only be made by the TC on advice from the TSOs at the scene of the incident. It should be noted that local drivers do not respect lane closures and that the obstructions must be as continuous and consistent as is reasonably possible in order to minimize the risk of driver non-compliance. 5.7 Partial Tunnel Re-opening

ii.

iii.

iv.

i.

Upon removal of the obstruction the TC can direct the reopening of the partially closed tunnel. The removal of barriers should commence from a point near the obstruction and proceed towards the oncoming traffic in order to protect the TSOs from harm and in recognition of the risk of noncompliance by local drivers to obstructions.

5.8 Full Tunnel Opening i. Only the TC may authorize one or two tunnels to be reopened. If emergency services have been in attendance the TC cannot open the tunnel until emergency services have confirmed that the incident is over and that they are no longer in command (i.e. the TC is in command).

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Procedure No. 1 MIDFIELD TUNNEL BASIC OPERATION ii. Rev No. 0

Before opening a tunnel the Tunnel Controller must satisfy himself that the tunnel is safe to resume traffic flow. The Tunnel Controller may direct the TSOs to conduct such inspections and tunnel surveys as he deems appropriate to be satisfied that the road is free of vehicles, debris, obstructions and people and that the tunnel (including walkways) are clear. The TC may also request the tunnel maintenance contractor to confirm the operability of any systems that may have been impacted by the incident. The TC must personally authorize the tunnel reopening and the TSOs must confirm they have received the instruction to open the tunnel. Upon the tunnel being opened the TSOs must confirm to the TC that the tunnel is open. The TSOs are prohibited from opening the tunnel unless directed by the TC. 5.9 Bi-Directional Traffic Operation in a Single Tunnel

iii.

iv.

v.

vi. vii.

i.

There is no approved procedure to operate bidirectional traffic in a single tunnel. At the time of writing this procedure there was insufficient equipment to facilitate lane separation and no appetite to extend the exercise program to trial such a procedure. Such a procedure should be developed as a matter of urgency using full scale exercises to prove its integrity. 5.9.1 Draft Procedure for Bi Directional Traffic Operations in a Single Tunnel TC to stop traffic in both tunnels. TC to advise QCAA, MOI and DIA of tunnel closure and proposed pending bi-directional operation including an estimated time until reopening. TSOs and OSO to arrange traffic control devises to physically separate lanes within the tunnel to become operational. OSO to inspect control device installation and when satisfied advice TC. TC to open one direction of traffic flow only. When OSO reports one directional traffic established and stable the TC to direction the opening of the other direction of traffic flow into the tunnel.

ii.

5.9.2 To reestablish dual tunnel operation Traffic should be closed by TSOs at the command of the TC. Traffic obstructions should be removed to the satisfaction of the OSO. Traffic restarted as per the procedure for opening the tunnels to traffic.

5.10 i.

Emergency Communications Systems

All communications systems trialed have functional limitations. The current use of three independent systems for emergency communications should be maintained until it can be demonstrated otherwise safe. I.e. dedicated individual mobile telephones to key personnel from the control room and tetra radio and in tunnel emergency telephones. It is the responsibility of the TC to ensure all modes of emergency communications are maintained (e.g. charging and sufficient credit) to ensure their reliability.
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ii.

Procedure No. 1 MIDFIELD TUNNEL BASIC OPERATION Rev No. 0

5.11 i.

Emergency Communications Comprehension

In addition to the form of communications it is essential that the phrasing, timing and accents of personnel be managed to ensure intelligibility between staff and other stakeholders. All personnel must speak English for Emergencies to the satisfaction of the TM. An example of the phrases to be used and tested for competency testing forms Appendix B.

ii.

5.12 i.

Emergency Communications Protocol

Immediately events occur that require tunnel closure such as a crash, fire, flood or explosion the TSO must communicate with Midfield Control and implement tunnel closure. The form of communication should be generally in accordance with Appendix E. Tetra radio, mobile telephone or in tunnel emergency phone can be used. If all else fails the in tunnel emergency phone has been found to be most reliable. In the event Midfield Control do not answer the telephone it will divert the call to QCAA watch room. The TSO must be prepared to request QCAA emergency attendance directly with QCAA either by emergency in tunnel phone or by mobile telephone if Midfield Control cannot be reached.

ii.

5.13 i.

Emergency Communications Protocol with QCAA

The communications protocol has been developed over many exercises in consultation with QCAA and should as far as reasonably practicable be followed strictly in order to minimize confusion and shorten emergency response times. The standard from incident report sheet should be populated by the Tunnel Controller on receipt of information about an incident and used as the basis for emergency communication. The format of that communication is attached in Appendix E.

ii.

5.14 i.

Use of Public Address System

Although installed no reliance should be placed upon the public address system as a means of emergency communications until those required to use it are certified as competent and its intelligibility for tunnel users is confirmed in operational scenarios. Therefore this procedure gives no instructions as to the actual use of this equipment.

ii.

5.15 i.

Assisting Emergency Services

TSOs must provide assistance to emergency services on an as requested basis. This includes facilitating access past the road closure blockage for fire engines, DIA safety, MOI, QCDD, and such other emergency services as may be prescribed. Assistance during an incident may include: Assisting people find a safe place;

ii.

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Procedure No. 1 MIDFIELD TUNNEL BASIC OPERATION Rev No. 0

Directing emergency services to emergency cross passages, firefighting equipment, emergency telephones, the eastern substation; Assisting emergency services carry stretchers, fetch equipment, administer aid on a strictly as requested basis.

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Procedure No. 1 MIDFIELD TUNNEL BASIC OPERATION Appendix A Handover Report 18.12.13 This report is produced hereto to provide a context for these procedures. Handover Report I was asked by NDIA to attend Hamad Airport for a fixed 6 week period in order to ensure the Midfield tunnel was safe for public use and to prepare for its QCDD inspection. Inspection of the tunnel revealed a low level of operational readiness in terms of operational capability and a generally poor understanding of the importance and correct use of installed systems. The result of which was a low level of safety and asset protection operationally. In the local context there is no available pool of experts to deal with such matters within a short time frame. A non-confrontational facilitative approach to delivering a safe operational environment was adopted. This meant no blame was attributed to any individual or organisation during the process of training and system operational testing and upgrade. The fact that operational safety had not yet been robustly dealt with in the tunnel contexts was of great professional concern to professionals in NDIA, Bechtel, DIA , DIA FM and Keppel. The overall driving factor for the operational limitations is that the tunnel was NEVER INTENDED TO BE MANNED and was designed and constructed to be run in a 100% automatic mode. Such a design concept was probably reasonable for such a short simple tunnel in the abstract (ie on a designers desk) . The design concept is also reflected in the contractual arrangements the facilities manager Keppel now finding themselves in a pseudo operators role for a complex tunnel while obliging Keppel must be surprised by this burden. However at this moment (December 18 2013) it is my view that operating the tunnel in Automatic mode would have been unreasonably risky for tunnel users and place the integrity of the Western Main Runway at unacceptable risk because: There is no supervisory control room of the type contemplated by the designer (e.g. A habitable place with 24/7 monitoring and control of systems and CCTV) There is an eclectic inherently risky mix of vehicle types (from large slow cranes to Fuel tankers and sports cars) There is an extraordinarily high proportion of antisocial, high risk driving undertaken by some drivers. There is no compliance (Zero) with installed lane use signals The thermal detection alarm system will not detect traffic crashes unless there is a fairly well developed fire. The tunnel has been substantially modified by the introduction of beautification works which reduce the inherent safety of the tunnel by: o Obscuring emergency exits o Creating visually isolated quasi corridors which are NOT safe places from smoke The security officers in the tunnel had no training or capacity to respond constructively to an incident individually or collectively with the Tunnel technicians. o Introducing additional elements to the tunnel which may become physically involved in a tunnel incident or subsequently become a hazard as fuel or as obstructions and debris. Rev No. 0

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Procedure No. 1 MIDFIELD TUNNEL BASIC OPERATION Rev No. 0

Having formed the view that a manual operational mode is required for safety and to protect he western runway the next issue was manually operating the systems given that is NOT the mode it was designed to operate in. The operator (Keppel) had also come to the same view. (I considered returning the tunnel to fully automated operation but that is less safe than the current Auto mode with manual intervention.) The challenges of operating in manual mode then revealed themselves upon close investigation (and trials) The operator had no reliable way of operating the jet fans in the same direction in two tunnels concurrently The operator was in the practice of operating the jet fans at the low level (machine) control level co-ordinating between two substations and thereby running the real risk of: o Selecting the wrong fan direction o Selecting either a high current option, or witching directions of fan too quickly and thereby: Blowing up the jet fans Blowing up the substation o Selecting an adverse ventilation configuration There is no way of manually selecting lane closures (there is NO manual lane closure control) There were constant PLC failures rendering he tunnel unserviceable. (but it remained open) In these circumstances the option chosen was to upgrade the systems control for manual operation in a single substation. Sub Station Upgrade The Substation was never designed to be a control room. The substation: Contains a non isolated array of rechargeable UPS batteries Is noisy Has no natural light No facilities (bathroom etc.) However the substation does contain three levels of control for some of the installed systems in the tunnel. Interim System Operation As an interim measure a method has been developed to reliably and safely activate all E and M safety systems including emergency lighting (falls back) lane closers and safe sequenced jet fan operations. The technique artificially stimulates the supervisory computers by simulating a thermal alarm in the incident tunnel. This method ensures the systems are protected from overload while also guaranteeing correct direction activation. This followed numerous catastrophic failures useful ventilation in prior exercises. The major weakness in this technique is that it requires entering a multi digit alarm address code into an alarm panel. Scripted message sheets and colored batons are used to assist the operator with the keyboard tasks. To further mitigate this risk literally hundreds of exercises have been conducted to train the operators. Despite the training there is a residual risk of a keyboard entry failure. Once QCDD inspection s complete CP10 have advised a simple button (big red type) can be introduced. This will substantially decrease the failure risk and reduce the number of people in the Substation control room.
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Procedure No. 1 MIDFIELD TUNNEL BASIC OPERATION Interim Traffic Control With a substantial risk of collision and significant fire aggressive traffic control was introduced to: Calm traffic Enforce a no stopping in tunnel policy Protect contractors and broken down vehicles in the tunnel Stop vehicles entering the tunnel if here is an incident Assist Fire Brigade gain access These measures demanded training of new Tunnel Safety Officers and retraining of GSS personnel. At present the labor arrangements for these men are unsatisfactory with no contract, and no official payment received for more than one months work. Initial deployment of these men was mostly unsuccessful due to a lack of uniform. This was mitigated by creation of an ad hoc Tunnel Safety officer uniform. This created an appearance of authority. Training Training was conducted for Keppel Staff, QCAA fire officers and the TSOs. DIA FM also had a dedicated training day. 19 full scale exercises with QCAA Fire brigade attendance have been conducted with another 300 (or so) exercises involving radio and systems operation. Upgrades Tetra radio has been upgraded via QTEL and more Tetra sets have been distributed to all TSOs. A parallel dedicated mobile phone is also used along with the in tunnel phones. A desk and chairs have also been provided to the control room. Conditions are simple. Upgrade Requests A range of requests remain outstanding. A summary are tabulated below: What CCTV for Substation control room Guard houses near each over height barrier x2 Traffic control boom at/near guard house Land Line Phone Number for Control Room Why So operator can see type and location of issue To offer protection to traffic control officers from severe weather To stop traffic entering tunnel So Midfield control has a reliable phone line to call and be called by emergency services To help stop vehicles To allow emergency protection of stopped vehicles and potentially bidirectional running of a single tunnel Try and re-enforce idea of no Status Was agreed but no longer seems to be an action item Awaiting proposal to NDIA from Keppel Awaiting proposal to NDIA from Keppel Unknown Rev No. 0

Signage Before Tunnel STOP Barriers (portable) inside tunnel

Unknown Did have them but have been retrieved by contractors. Status now unknown

Solid Line dividing lanes

Unknown
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Procedure No. 1 MIDFIELD TUNNEL BASIC OPERATION overtaking Leadership by example from professional drivers Waqood and Qjet could have special procedures TSOs trained to help in an emergency For tunnel Safety Rev No. 0

Information Cards for regular drivers / regular driver training Dangerous Cargo program Dangerous truck assistance program Employment of TSOs

Training material with graphic designers project stopped Project stopped Project Stopped Pending Keppel proposal (informally provided at request of author) Unknown Unknown

Emergency Signage - lacking Manual Control of Lane usage sigs Conclusions

To direct people in an emergency To re enforce lane closures

The risk profile of the midfield Tunnel is NOT as presumed (by inference) from its design and original operating concept. The combination of vehicles and cargoes with extremely risky driving practices makes a serious crash and substantial fire more likely than originally (by inference) expected. This situation is complicated by a lack of a real supervisory control room with actual expertise and control capabilities. Running the tunnel from a substation via an artificial stimulation of a heat detector is not desirable. Furthermore the facilities maintainer has been placed in a very difficult position of being expected to operate manually a complex piece of high risk infrastructure. They appear to be giving this task their best endeavours but it is not their core business nor expertise. In this context, and given the Midfield Tunnel is under the Western Runway and the only egress point to Midfield - I view safe operation of the tunnel via a manual mode as both unavoidable and problematic. However from a QCDD inspection point of view apart from the deficient signage the systems (from an automated cause and effect perspective) seem stable and design spec compliant (except for two broken redundant jet fans) And I so advise Arnold Dix 18 December 2013

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Procedure No. 1 MIDFIELD TUNNEL BASIC OPERATION Appendix B - English for Emergencies Example Rev No. 0

The following script is an example of some of the phrases used in an emergency. Staff are encouraged to practice these words in this sequence and say nothing else.

SAY: Midfield Control THIS IS Tunnel Safety Officer We Have: Road Traffic Crash CONFIRMED FIRE? SMOKE ISSUING? FUEL SPILL ? SMELL OF BURNING ? People trapped ? Eastbound Inbound or Westbound Outbound involving o CARS? o TRUCKS? o LORRY? o BUSES? o TANKER? CASUALTIES ?

PLEASE READ BACK

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Procedure No. 1 MIDFIELD TUNNEL BASIC OPERATION Appendix C Checklists TSO Hourly Checklist
MIDFIELD TUNNEL WEST BOUND TRAFFIC LIGHTS, MANUAL PULL STATIONS, EMERGENCY TELEPHONES, FIRE HORSE CABINETS, AND EXIT DOORS CHECK LIST. DATE: ... EQUIPMENT 1:00 2:00 3:00 4:00 5:00 6:00 7:00 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 24:00 24:00:00 MPS D/N 196 MPS N0. 101 MPS N0. 102 MPS N0. 103 MPS N0. 104 MPS N0. 105 MPS N0. 106 MPS N0. 107 MPS N0. 108 MPS N0. 109 MPS N0. 110 MPS D/N 191 HOSE CABINET 101 HOSE CABINET 102 HOSE CABINET 103 HOSE CABINET 104 HOSE CABINET 105 HOSE CABINET 106 HOSE CABINET 107 HOSE CABINET 108 EMERGENCY TEL 101 EMERGENCY TEL 102 EMERGENCY TEL 103 EMERGENCY TEL 104 EMERGENCY TEL 105 EMERGENCY TEL 106 EMERGENCY TEL 107 EMERGENCY TEL 108 EXIT DOOR 1 EXIT DOOR 2 EXIT DOOR 3 EXIT DOOR 4 TRAFFIC LIGHT 01 TRAFFIC LIGHT 02 TRAFFIC LIGHT 03 TRAFFIC LIGHT 04 TRAFFIC LIGHT 05 TRAFFIC LIGHT 06

Rev No. 0

Controllers Check List

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Procedure No. 1 MIDFIELD TUNNEL BASIC OPERATION Rev No. 0

Appendix D Emergency System Activation The following picture is posted in to the inside of the alarm cabinet located inside the sub-station. It details how to activate all emergency systems by stimulating the thermal heat detector test sequence and thereby activating the supervisory control computers to sequentially activate all the electromechanical systems.

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Procedure No. 1 MIDFIELD TUNNEL BASIC OPERATION Appendix E TC Emergency Communications Protocol (TC mark up sheet) IN THE EVENT OF A TUNNEL INCIDENT CONTACT Rev No. 0

HAMAD FIRE - (RING) 4010 9222

If and exercise (say) EXERCISE, EXERCISE, EXERCISE If it is just a system test and you do not actually want the fire brigade to come say No response

required
When an actual incident occurs the TC is to circle the relevant information below and report it as follows:

IN THE EVENT OF AN ACTUAL INCIDENT

Say HAMMAD FIRE - THIS IS MIDFIELD TUNNEL MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT o o o o CAR ? TRUCKS LORRY? BUSES ? TANKER ? (e.g. water fuel etc.)

SMELL OF BURNING ? SMOKE ISSUING ? COMFIRMED FIRE ? FUEL SPILL ? CASUALITIES ?

OUTBOUND (WESTBOUND)

INBOUND (EASTBOUND)

PLEASE READ BACK

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Procedure No. 1 MIDFIELD TUNNEL BASIC OPERATION Appendix F Personnel Required Number per 8 hour shift 1 1 1 1 6 Number required to cover roster 1 1 4 4 24 Standby 0 0 0 0 2 Rev No. 0

Midfield Safety Officer (not full time) Midfield Tunnel Manager Tunnel Controller Operational Support Officer Tunnel Safety Officers Total workforce 36 persons

Page 23 of 26

Procedure No. 1 MIDFIELD TUNNEL BASIC OPERATION Appendix G Key Performance Indicators In order to protect the Midfield Tunnel structure and to minimize the number of people involved as casualties in an incident, rapid incident detection and response is essential (for manual or automated systems). The following table summarizes performance goals for this tunnel with the proposed workforce in place. Incident Type Stopped vehicle in tunnel Time to Respond 2 minutes How Measures TSO at vehicle and having reported vehicle to TC TSOs to implement traffic protection by physical barrier positioning TSO at debris and having reported debris to TC TC has received call Rev No. 0

6 minutes

Debris on road

2 minutes

Smoke, crash, fire in tunnel

2 minutes to report to the TC

TC response to call received 2 minutes TSO response to TC call 2 minutes

TC having called Hamad Fire and initiated emergency system response TSOs to close tunnel within 2 minutes of report of smoke or TC notification to close tunnel or jet fans activating (whichever is the sooner)

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Procedure No. 1 MIDFIELD TUNNEL BASIC OPERATION Appendix H - Emergency Communications and Activity Protocol for TSOs EMERGENCY PHONE AIRPORT FIRE & AMBULANCE 40109222 Remember: Lights ON Driver Sunglasses adjusted No stopping in tunnel Slow Vehicles Emergency Lane Implement Lane protection for stopped vehicles/people in tunnel from 100 M outside tunnel Be friendly to drivers! (Everyone likes good news) Say Exercise Exercise Exercise when training Say EMERGENCY or EXERCISE - All Stations SILENCE when Exercise or Emergency dont use radio except for emergency Say All stations EMERGENCY or Exercise completed Emergency finished back to normal *** Yellow In Tunnel Phone contacts Midfield Control. If no Answer call diverts to Airport Fire Brigade *** when exercise or Rev No. 0

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Procedure No. 1 MIDFIELD TUNNEL BASIC OPERATION Appendix I - EU Directive 2004/54/EC The EU Directive is limited in application to Trans European Road Network Tunnels legally due to constitutional restrictions within the European Union. It is included as an appendix to this document to illustrate how tunnel risks are managed in the EU. Due to the high importance of DIA to Qatar and the criticality of the tunnel to Midfield access and western runway stability it is included for assistance in this procedure. The following is the consolidated version as amended 2009. Rev No. 0

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2004L0054 EN 07.08.2009 001.001 1

This document is meant purely as a documentation tool and the institutions do not assume any liability for its contents

C1 DIRECTIVE 2004/54/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 29 April 2004 on minimum safety requirements for tunnels in the trans-European road network (OJ L 167, 30.4.2004, p. 39)

Amended by: Official Journal No M1 Regulation (EC) No 596/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 L 188 page 14 date 18.7.2009

Corrected by: C1 Corrigendum, OJ L 201, 7.6.2004, p. 56 (2004/54/EC)

2004L0054 EN 07.08.2009 001.001 2 B C1 DIRECTIVE 2004/54/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 29 April 2004 on minimum safety requirements for tunnels in the trans-European road network

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT EUROPEAN UNION,

AND

THE

COUNCIL

OF

THE

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 71(1) thereof, Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee (1), Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions (2), Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 251 of the Treaty (3), Whereas:
(1)

In its White Paper of 12 September 2001 on European transport policy for 2010: time to decide the Commission announced that it would propose minimum safety requirements for tunnels belonging to the trans-European road network. The transport system, notably the trans-European road network defined in Decision No 1692/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 1996 on Community guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network (4), is of paramount importance in supporting European integration and ensuring a high level of well-being among Europes citizens. The European Community has the responsibility of guaranteeing a high, uniform and constant level of security, service and comfort on the trans-European road network. Long tunnels of over 500 m in length are important structures which facilitate communication between large areas of Europe and play a decisive role in the functioning and development of regional economies. The European Council has on several occasions, and notably at its meeting on 14 and 15 December 2001 in Laeken, underlined the urgency of taking measures to improve tunnel safety. On 30 November 2001, the Transport Ministers of Austria, France, Germany, Italy and Switzerland met in Zurich and adopted a Common Declaration recommending the alignment of national legislations on the most recent harmonised requirements for improving safety in long tunnels. Since the objective of the proposed action, namely the achievement of a uniform, constant and high level of protection for all European citizens in road tunnels, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the level of harmonisation required, be better achieved at Community level, the Community may adopt measures, in

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(1) OJ C 220, 16.9.2003, p. 26. (2) OJ C 256, 24.10.2003, p. 64. (3) Opinion of the European Parliament of 9 October 2003 (not yet published in the Official Journal), Council Common Position of 26 February 2004 (OJ C 95 E, 20.4.2004, p. 31) and Position of the European Parliament of 20 April 2004 (not yet published in the Official Journal). 4 ( ) OJ L 228, 9.9.1996, p. 1. Decision as last amended by the 2003 Act of Accession.

2004L0054 EN 07.08.2009 001.001 3 C1 accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.
(7) (8)

Recent accidents in tunnels emphasise their importance in human, economic and cultural terms. Some tunnels in Europe, put into operation a long time ago, were designed at a time when technical possibilities and transport conditions were very different from those of today. There are thus disparate safety levels and this must be rectified. Safety in tunnels requires a number of measures relating, amongst other things, to the geometry of the tunnel and its design, safety equipment, including road signs, traffic management, training of the emergency services, incident management, the provision of information to users on how best to behave in tunnels, and better communication between the authorities in charge and emergency services such as the police, fire-brigades and rescue teams. As the work of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) has already made clear, the conduct of road users is a decisive aspect of tunnel safety. Safety measures should enable people involved in incidents to rescue themselves, allow road users to act immediately so as to prevent more serious consequences, ensure that emergency services can act effectively and protect the environment as well as limit material damage. The improvements brought about by this Directive will improve safety conditions for all users, including disabled persons. However, as disabled persons have more difficulty in escaping in an emergency, particular consideration should be given to their safety. In order to implement a balanced approach and due to the high cost of the measures, minimum safety equipment should be defined taking into account the type and the expected traffic volume of each tunnel. International bodies such as the World Road Association and the UNECE have for a long time been making invaluable recommendations to help improve and harmonise safety equipment and traffic rules in road tunnels. However, as these recommendations are not binding, their full potential can only be maximised if the requirements they identify are made mandatory through legislation. Maintaining a high safety level requires proper maintenance of the safety facilities in tunnels. An exchange of information on modern safety techniques and accident/incident data between the Member States should be systematically organised. In order to ensure that the requirements of this Directive are properly applied by tunnel managers, Member States should designate one or more authorities at national, regional or local level with responsibility for ensuring that all aspects of tunnel safety are assured. A flexible and progressive timetable is needed for implementation of this Directive. This will allow for completion of the most urgent works without creating major disturbances in the transport system or bottlenecks in public works in the Member States. The cost of refurbishing existing tunnels varies considerably from one Member State to another, particularly for geographical reasons, and Member States should be allowed to stagger any

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

2004L0054 EN 07.08.2009 001.001 4 C1 refurbishment works needed to meet the requirements of this Directive where the density of tunnels on their territory is well in excess of the European average.
(19)

For tunnels already in operation or tunnels whose design has been approved but which have not been opened to the public within 24 months following the entry into force of this Directive, Member States should be allowed to accept the adoption of risk-reduction measures as an alternative to application of the requirements of the Directive, where the tunnel does not allow for structural solutions to be implemented at reasonable cost. Further technical progress is still necessary to improve tunnel safety. A procedure should be introduced to allow the Commission to adapt the requirements of this Directive to technical progress. That procedure should also be used to adopt a harmonised risk-analysis method. The measures necessary for the implementation of this Directive should be adopted in accordance with Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission (1). Member States should submit a report to the Commission on the measures they plan to adopt to meet the requirements of this Directive, with a view to synchronising works at Community level in order to reduce traffic disturbances. Where the requirements of this Directive necessitate the construction of a second tube for a tunnel in the design or construction phase, this second tube to be constructed should be considered as a new tunnel. The same applies if the requirements of this Directive necessitate the opening of new legally binding planning procedures, including planning permission hearings for all related measures. Work should continue in the appropriate forums in order to arrive at a large degree of harmonisation as regards the signs and pictogrammes used on variable message signs in tunnels. Member States should be encouraged to harmonise the user interface for all tunnels on their territory. Member States should be encouraged to implement comparable safety levels for road tunnels located in their territory that do not form part of the trans-European road network and consequently do not fall within the scope of this Directive. Member States should be encouraged to develop national provisions aiming at a higher tunnel safety level,

(20)

(21)

(22)

(23)

(24)

(25)

(26)

HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:

Article 1 Subject matter and scope 1. This Directive aims at ensuring a minimum level of safety for road users in tunnels in the trans-European road network by the prevention of critical events that may endanger human life, the environment and tunnel installations, as well as by the provision of protection in case of accidents. 2. It shall apply to all tunnels in the trans-European road network with lengths of over 500 metres, whether they are in operation, under construction or at the design stage.
(1) OJ L 184, 17.7.1999, p. 23.

2004L0054 EN 07.08.2009 001.001 5 C1 Article 2 Definitions For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions shall apply: 1. trans-European road network means the road network identified in Section 2 of Annex I to Decision No 1692/96/EC and illustrated by maps and/or described in Annex II to that Decision; 2. emergency services means all local services, whether public or private or part of the tunnel staff, which intervene in the event of an accident, including police services, fire brigades and rescue teams; 3. tunnel length means the length of the longest traffic lane, measured on the fully enclosed part of the tunnel. Article 3 Safety measures 1. Member States shall ensure that tunnels in their territory falling within the scope of this Directive meet the minimum safety requirements laid down in Annex I. 2. Where certain structural requirements laid down in Annex I can only be satisfied through technical solutions which either cannot be achieved or can be achieved only at disproportionate cost, the administrative authority as referred to in Article 4 may accept the implementation of risk reduction measures as an alternative to application of those requirements, provided that the alternative measures will result in equivalent or improved protection. The efficiency of these measures shall be demonstrated through a risk analysis in conformity with the provisions of Article 13. Member States shall inform the Commission of the risk-reduction measures accepted as an alternative and provide justification therefor. This paragraph shall not apply to tunnels at the design stage as referred to in Article 9. 3. Member States may specify stricter requirements, provided that they do not contravene the requirements of this Directive. Article 4 Administrative authority 1. Member States shall designate (an) administrative authority(ies), hereinafter referred to as the administrative authority, which shall have responsibility for ensuring that all aspects of the safety of a tunnel are assured and which shall take the necessary steps to ensure compliance with this Directive. 2. The administrative authority may be set up at national, regional or local level. 3. Each tunnel in the trans-European road network located on the territory of a single Member State shall fall under the responsibility of a single administrative authority. For each tunnel located on the territory of two Member States, each Member State shall designate an administrative authority or, alternatively, the two Member States shall designate a joint administrative authority. If there are two different administrative authorities, the decisions of either taken in the exercise of its respective competencies and responsibilities with regard to tunnel safety shall be adopted with the prior agreement of the other authority. 4. The administrative authority shall commission accordance with the procedure laid down in Annex II. tunnels in

5. Without prejudice to further arrangements on this subject at national level, the administrative authority shall have power to suspend or restrict the operation of a tunnel if safety requirements are

2004L0054 EN 07.08.2009 001.001 6 C1 not met. It shall specify the conditions under which normal traffic may be resumed. 6. The administrative authority shall ensure that the following tasks are performed: (a) testing and inspecting tunnels on a regular basis and drawing up safety requirements pertaining thereto; (b) putting in place organisational and operational schemes (including emergency response plans) for the training and equipping of emergency services; (c) defining the procedure for immediate closure of a tunnel in an emergency; (d) implementing the necessary risk-reduction measures. 7. Where bodies designated as administrative authorities existed prior to the designation referred to in this Article, those administrative authorities may continue their previous activities provided that they comply with this Directive. Article 5 Tunnel manager 1. For each tunnel located on the territory of one Member State, whether it is in the design, construction or operating stage, the administrative authority shall identify as Tunnel Manager the public or private body responsible for the management of the tunnel at the stage in question. The administrative authority itself may perform this function. 2. For each tunnel located on the territory of two Member States, the two administrative authorities or the joint administrative authority shall recognise only one body in charge of the operation of the tunnel. 3. Any significant incident or accident occurring in a tunnel shall be the subject of an incident report prepared by the Tunnel Manager. This report shall be forwarded to the Safety Officer referred to in Article 6, to the administrative authority and to the emergency services within a maximum period of one month. 4. Where an investigation report is drawn up analysing the circumstances of the incident or accident referred to in paragraph 3 or the conclusions that can be drawn from it, the Tunnel Manager shall forward this report to the Safety Officer, the administrative authority and the emergency services no later than one month after he/she receives it himself/herself. Article 6 Safety Officer 1. For each tunnel, the Tunnel Manager shall, with the prior approval of the administrative authority, nominate one Safety Officer who shall coordinate all preventive and safeguards measures to ensure the safety of users and operational staff. The Safety Officer may be a member of the tunnel staff or the emergency services, shall be independent in all road tunnel safety issues and shall not be under instructions from an employer in respect of those issues. A Safety Officer may perform his/her tasks and functions at several tunnels in a region. 2. The Safety Officer shall perform the following tasks/functions:

(a) ensure coordination with emergency services and take part in the preparation of operational schemes; (b) take part in the planning, implementation and evaluation of emergency operations;

2004L0054 EN 07.08.2009 001.001 7 C1 (c) take part in the definition of safety schemes and the specification of the structure, equipment and operation in respect of both new tunnels and modifications to existing tunnels; (d) verify that operational staff and emergency services are trained, and he/she shall take part in the organisation of exercises held at regular intervals; (e) give advice on the commissioning of the structure, equipment and operation of tunnels; (f) verify that the tunnel structure and equipment are maintained and repaired; (g) take part in the evaluation of any significant incident or accident as referred to in Article 5(3) and (4). Article 7 Inspection entity Member States shall ensure that inspections, evaluations and tests are carried out by inspection entities. The administrative authority may perform this function. Any entity performing the inspections, evaluations and tests must have a high level of competence and high quality procedures and must be functionally independent from the Tunnel Manager. Article 8 Notification of the administrative authority The Member States shall notify the Commission of the name and address of the administrative authority by 1 May 2006. In the event of a change in this information they shall notify the Commission thereof within three months. Article 9 Tunnels whose design has not yet been approved 1. Any tunnel whose design has not been approved by the responsible authority by 1 May 2006 shall be subject to the requirements of this Directive. 2. The tunnel shall be commissioned in accordance with the procedure laid down in Annex II. Article 10 Tunnels whose design has been approved but which are not yet open 1. In the case of tunnels whose design has been approved but which have not been opened to public traffic by 1 May 2006, the administrative authority shall assess their compliance with the requirements of this Directive, with specific reference to the safety documentation provided for in Annex II. 2. Where the administrative authority finds that a tunnel does not comply with the provisions of this Directive, it shall notify the Tunnel Manager that appropriate measures must be taken to increase safety and shall inform the Safety Officer. 3. The tunnel shall then be commissioned in accordance with the procedure laid down in Annex II.

2004L0054 EN 07.08.2009 001.001 8 C1 Article 11 Tunnels already in operation 1. In the case of tunnels which are already open to public traffic by 30 April 2006, the administrative authority shall have until 30 October 2006 to assess their compliance with the requirements of this Directive, with specific reference to the safety documentation provided for in Annex II and on the basis of an inspection. 2. The Tunnel Manager shall, if necessary, propose to the administrative authority a plan for adapting the tunnel to the provisions of this Directive and the remedial measures he intends to put in place. 3. The administrative authority shall give its approval to the remedial measures or ask for them to be modified. 4. Thereafter, if the remedial measures include any substantial modification in the construction or operation, then once these measures have been taken, the procedure laid down in Annex II shall be implemented. 5. Member States shall by 30 April 2007 submit a report to the Commission on how they plan to meet the requirements of this Directive, on planned measures, and, where appropriate, on the consequences of opening or closing the main access roads to the tunnels. In order to minimise disturbances to traffic at European level, the Commission may comment on the timetable of the work intended to ensure that tunnels comply with the requirements of this Directive. 6. The refurbishment of tunnels shall be carried out according to a schedule and shall be finished by 30 April 2014. 7. Where the total tube length of existing tunnels divided by the total length of the part of the trans-European road network located on their territory exceeds the European average, Members States may extend the period stipulated in paragraph 6 by five years. Article 12 Periodic inspections 1. The administrative authority shall verify that regular inspections are carried out by the inspection entity to ensure that all tunnels falling within the scope of this Directive comply with its provisions. 2. The period between two consecutive inspections of any given tunnel shall not exceed six years. 3. Where, on the basis of the report of the inspection entity, the administrative authority finds that a tunnel does not comply with the provisions of this Directive, it shall notify the Tunnel Manager and the Safety Officer that measures to increase tunnel safety must be adopted. The administrative authority shall define the conditions for continuing to operate the tunnel or for re-opening the tunnel which will apply until the remedial measures and any further relevant restrictions or conditions are implemented. 4. If the remedial measures include any substantial modification in the tunnels construction or operation, then once these measures have been taken, the tunnel shall be made the subject of a new authorisation to operate in accordance with the procedure laid down in Annex II. Article 13 Risk analysis 1. Risk analyses, where necessary, shall be carried out by a body which is functionally independent from the Tunnel Manager. The content and the results of the risk analysis shall be included in the safety documentation submitted to the administrative authority. A risk

2004L0054 EN 07.08.2009 001.001 9 C1 analysis is an analysis of risks for a given tunnel, taking into account all design factors and traffic conditions that affect safety, notably traffic characteristics and type, tunnel length and tunnel geometry, as well as the forecast number of heavy goods vehicles per day. 2. Member States shall ensure that, at national level, a detailed and well-defined methodology, corresponding to the best available practices, is used and shall inform the Commission of the methodology applied; the Commission shall make this information available in electronic form to other Member States. M1 3. By 30 April 2009 the Commission shall publish a report on the practice followed in the Member States. Where necessary, it shall make recommendations for the adoption of a common harmonised risk analysis methodology in accordance with the regulatory procedure referred to in Article 17(2). C1 Article 14 Derogation for innovative techniques 1. In order to allow the installation and use of innovative safety equipment or the use of innovative safety procedures which provide an equivalent or higher level of protection than current technologies, as prescribed in this Directive, the administrative authority may grant a derogation from the requirements of the Directive on the basis of a duly documented request from the Tunnel Manager. 2. If the administrative authority intends to grant such a derogation, the Member State shall first submit a derogation application to the Commission containing the initial request and the opinion of the inspection entity. 3. The Commission shall notify the application to the Member States within one month of receipt. 4. If, within a period of three months, neither the Commission nor a Member State formulates objections, the derogation shall be treated as granted and the Commission shall inform all Member States accordingly. 5. If objections are expressed, the Commission shall make a proposal in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 17(2). Where the decision is negative, the administrative authority shall not grant the derogation. 6. After an examination in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 17(2), a decision to grant a derogation may allow this derogation to be applied to other tunnels. 7. Whenever justified by the derogation requests submitted to it, the Commission shall publish a report on the practice followed in the Member States and, if necessary, make proposals for amendment of this Directive. Article 15 Reporting 1. Every two years, Member States shall compile reports on fires in tunnels and on accidents which clearly affect the safety of road users in tunnels, and on the frequency and causes of such incidents, and shall evaluate them and provide information on the actual role and effectiveness of safety facilities and measures. These reports shall be transmitted to the Commission by the Member States before the end of September of the year following the reporting period. The Commission shall make the reports available to all Member States.

2004L0054 EN 07.08.2009 001.001 10 C1 2. Member States shall make a plan which includes a timetable for the gradual application of the provisions of this Directive to tunnels already in operation as described in Article 11 and notify it by 30 October 2006 to the Commission. Thereafter, Member States shall inform the Commission every two years of the state of implementation of the plan and of any changes made to it, until the end of the period referred to in Article 11(6) and (7). M1 Article 16 Adaptation to technical progress The Commission shall adapt to technical progress the Annexes to this Directive. Those measures, designed to amend non-essential elements of this Directive, shall be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 17(3).

Article 17 Committee procedure 1. The Commission shall be assisted by a committee.

2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Articles 5 and 7 of Decision 1999/468/EC shall apply, having regard to the provisions of Article 8 thereof. The period laid down in Article 5(6) of Decision 1999/468/EC shall be set at three months. 3. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5a(1) to (4) and Article 7 of Decision 1999/468/EC shall apply, having regard to the provisions of Article 8 thereof. C1 Article 18 Transposition 1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 30 April 2006. They shall immediately forward to the Commission the text of those provisions, together with a table correlating those provisions with this Directive. 2. The provisions adopted by the Member States shall contain a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official publication. Member States shall determine how such reference is to be made. Article 19 Entry into force This Directive shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. Article 20 This Directive is addressed to the Member States.

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ANNEX I Safety measures as referred to in Article 3 1. 1.1. 1.1.1. Basis for deciding on safety measures Safety parameters Safety measures to be implemented in a tunnel shall be based on a systematic consideration of all aspects of the system composed of the infrastructure, operation, users and vehicles. The following parameters shall be taken into account: tunnel length, number of tubes, number of lanes, cross-sectional geometry, vertical and horizontal alignment, type of construction, uni-directional or bi-directional traffic, traffic volume per tube (including its time distribution), risk of congestion (daily or seasonal), access time for the emergency services, presence and percentage of heavy goods vehicles, presence, percentage and type of dangerous goods traffic, characteristics of the access roads, lane width, speed considerations, geographical and meteorological environment. 1.1.3. Where a tunnel has a special characteristic as regards the aforementioned parameters, a risk analysis shall be carried out in accordance with Article 13 to establish whether additional safety measures and/or supplementary equipment is necessary to ensure a high level of tunnel safety. This risk analysis shall take into consideration possible accidents, which clearly affect the safety of road users in tunnels and which might occur during the operating stage and the nature and magnitude of their possible consequences. Minimum requirements The safety measures required by the following paragraphs shall be implemented at a minimum in order to ensure a minimum level of safety in all the tunnels covered by the Directive. Limited derogations from these requirements may be allowed provided that the following procedure is completed successfully. Member States or the administrative authority shall send to the Commission information on the following: the limited derogation(s) envisaged, the imperative reasons underlying the limited derogation envisaged, the alternative risk-reduction measures which are to be used or reinforced in order to ensure at least an equivalent level of safety, including proof therefor in the form of an analysis of relevant risks. The Commission shall transmit any request for a limited derogation to the Member States as soon as possible, and in any case within one month of receipt. If, within a period of three months after receipt of the request by the Commission, neither the Commission nor a Member State formulates objections, the limited derogation shall be deemed granted and the Commission shall inform all Member States accordingly. If objections are expressed, the Commission shall make a proposal in accordance with

1.1.2.

1.2. 1.2.1.

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the procedure referred to in Article 17(2). Where the decision is negative, the limited derogation shall not be allowed. 1.2.2. In order to provide a unified interface in all tunnels to which this Directive applies, no derogation from the requirements of the following paragraphs shall be allowed regarding the design of the safety facilities at the disposal of the tunnel users (emergency stations, signs, lay-bys, emergency exits, radio re-broadcasting when required). Traffic volume Where traffic volume is mentioned in this Annex, it refers to the annual average daily traffic through a tunnel per lane. For the purpose of determining the traffic volume, each motor vehicle shall be counted as one unit. Where the number of heavy goods vehicles over 3,5 tonnes exceeds 15 % of the annual average daily traffic, or seasonal daily traffic significantly exceeds the annual average daily traffic, the additional risk will be assessed and taken into account by increasing the traffic volume of the tunnel for the application of the following paragraphs. Infrastructure measures Number of tubes and lanes The main criteria for deciding whether to build a single or a twin-tube tunnel shall be projected traffic volume and safety, taking into account aspects such as the percentage of heavy goods vehicles, gradient and length. In any case, where, for tunnels at the design stage, a 15-year forecast shows that the traffic volume will exceed 10 000 vehicles per day per lane, a twin-tube tunnel with unidirectional traffic shall be in place at the time when this value will be exceeded. With the exception of the emergency lane, the same number of lanes shall be maintained inside and outside the tunnel. Any change in the number of lanes shall occur at a sufficient distance in front of the tunnel portal; this distance shall be at least the distance covered in 10 seconds by a vehicle travelling at the speed limit. When geographic circumstances prevent this, additional and/or reinforced measures shall be taken to enhance safety. Tunnel geometry Special consideration shall be given to safety when designing the crosssectional geometry and the horizontal and vertical alignment of a tunnel and its access roads, as these parameters have a significant influence on the probability and severity of accidents. Longitudinal gradients above 5 % shall not be permitted in new tunnels, unless no other solution is geographically possible. In tunnels with gradients higher than 3 %, additional and/or reinforced measures shall be taken to enhance safety on the basis of a risk analysis. Where the width of the slow lane is less than 3,5 metres and heavy goods vehicles are allowed, additional and/or reinforced measures shall be taken to enhance safety on the basis of a risk analysis. Escape routes and emergency exits In new tunnels without an emergency lane, emergency walkways, elevated or not, shall be provided for use by tunnel users in the event of a breakdown or an accident. This provision does not apply if the construction characteristics of the tunnel do not allow it or allow it only at disproportional cost and the tunnel is unidirectional and is equipped with a permanent surveillance and lane closure system. In existing tunnels where there is neither an emergency lane nor an emergency walkway, additional and/or reinforced measures shall be taken to ensure safety. Emergency exits allow tunnel users to leave the tunnel without their vehicles and reach a safe place in the event of an accident or a fire and also provide access on foot to the tunnel for emergency services. Examples of such emergency exits are: direct exits from the tunnel to the outside,

1.3. 1.3.1.

1.3.2.

2. 2.1. 2.1.1.

2.1.2.

2.1.3.

2.2. 2.2.1.

2.2.2. 2.2.3. 2.2.4.

2.3. 2.3.1.

2.3.2.

2.3.3.

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cross-connections between tunnel tubes, exits to an emergency gallery, shelters with an escape route separate from the tunnel tube. 2.3.4. 2.3.5. Shelters without an exit leading to escape routes to the open shall not be built. Emergency exits shall be provided if an analysis of relevant risks, including how far and how quickly smoke travels under local conditions, shows that the ventilation and other safety provisions are insufficient to ensure the safety of road users. In any event, in new tunnels, emergency exits shall be provided where the traffic volume is higher than 2 000 vehicles per lane. In existing tunnels longer than 1 000 metres, with a traffic volume higher than 2 000 vehicles per lane, the feasibility and effectiveness of the implementation of new emergency exits shall be evaluated. Where emergency exits are provided, the distance between two emergency exits shall not exceed 500 metres. Appropriate means, such as doors, shall be used to prevent smoke and heat from reaching the escape routes behind the emergency exit, so that the tunnel users can safely reach the outside and the emergency services can have access to the tunnel. Access for emergency services In twin-tube tunnels where the tubes are at the same level or nearly, cross-connections suitable for the use of emergency services shall be provided at least every 1 500 metres. Wherever geographically possible, crossing of the central reserve (median strip) shall be made possible outside each portal of a twin- or multi-tube tunnel. This measure will allow emergency services to gain immediate access to either tube. Lay-bys For new bi-directional tunnels longer than 1 500 metres where traffic volume is higher than 2 000 vehicles per lane, lay-bys shall be provided at distances which do not exceed 1 000 metres, if emergency lanes are not provided. In existing bi-directional tunnels longer than 1 500 m with a traffic volume higher than 2 000 vehicles per lane but no emergency lane, the feasibility and effectiveness of the implementation of lay-bys shall be evaluated. If the construction characteristics of the tunnel do not allow it or allow it only at disproportionate cost, lay-bys do not have to be provided if the total tunnel width which is accessible to vehicles, excluding elevated parts and normal traffic lanes, is at least equal to the width of one normal traffic lane. Lay-bys shall include an emergency station. Drainage Where the transport of dangerous goods is permitted, the drainage of flammable and toxic liquids shall be provided for through well-designed slot gutters or other measures within the tunnel cross sections. Additionally, the drainage system shall be designed and maintained to prevent fire and flammable and toxic liquids from spreading inside tubes and between tubes. If in existing tunnels that requirement cannot be met or can be met only at disproportionate cost, this shall be taken into consideration when deciding whether to allow the transport of dangerous goods on the basis of an analysis of relevant risks. Fire resistance of structures The main structure of all tunnels where a local collapse of the structure could have catastrophic consequences, e.g. immersed tunnels or tunnels which can cause the collapse of important neighbouring structures, shall ensure a sufficient level of fire resistance.

2.3.6. 2.3.7.

2.3.8. 2.3.9.

2.4. 2.4.1.

2.4.2.

2.5. 2.5.1.

2.5.2.

2.5.3.

2.5.4. 2.6. 2.6.1.

2.6.2.

2.7.

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2.8. 2.8.1. Lighting Normal lighting shall be provided so as to ensure appropriate visibility day and night for drivers in the entrance zone as well as in the interior of the tunnel. Safety lighting shall be provided to allow a minimum visibility for tunnel users to evacuate the tunnel in their vehicles in the event of a breakdown of the power supply. Evacuation lighting, such as evacuation marker lights, at a height of no more than 1,5 metres, shall be provided to guide tunnel users to evacuate the tunnel on foot, in the event of emergency. Ventilation The design, construction and operation of the ventilation system shall take into account: the control of pollutants emitted by road vehicles, under normal and peak traffic flow, the control of pollutants emitted by road vehicles where traffic is stopped due to an incident or an accident, the control of heat and smoke in the event of a fire. 2.9.2. A mechanical ventilation system shall be installed in all tunnels longer than 1 000 metres with a traffic volume higher than 2 000 vehicles per lane. In tunnels with bi-directional and/or congested unidirectional traffic, longitudinal ventilation shall be allowed only if a risk analysis according to Article 13 shows it is acceptable and/or specific measures are taken, such as appropriate traffic management, shorter emergency exit distances, smoke exhausts at intervals. Transverse or semi-transverse ventilation systems shall be used in tunnels where a mechanical ventilation system is necessary and longitudinal ventilation is not allowed under point 2.9.3. These systems must be capable of evacuating smoke in the event of a fire. For tunnels with bi-directional traffic, with a traffic volume higher than 2 000 vehicles per lane, longer than 3 000 metres and with a control centre and transverse and/or semi-transverse ventilation, the following minimum measures shall be taken as regards ventilation: air and smoke extraction dampers shall be installed which can be operated separately or in groups, the longitudinal air velocity shall be monitored constantly and the steering process of the ventilation system (dampers, fans, etc.) adjusted accordingly. 2.10. Emergency stations

2.8.2.

2.8.3.

2.9. 2.9.1.

2.9.3.

2.9.4.

2.9.5.

2.10.1. Emergency stations are intended to provide various items of safety equipment, in particular emergency telephones and extinguishers, but are not intended to protect road users from the effects of fire. 2.10.2. Emergency stations can consist of a box on the sidewall or preferably a recess in the sidewall. They shall be equipped with at least an emergency telephone and two fire extinguishers. 2.10.3. Emergency stations shall be provided near the portals and inside at intervals which for new tunnels shall not exceed 150 metres and which in existing tunnels shall not exceed 250 metres. 2.11. Water supply A water supply shall be provided for all tunnels. Hydrants shall be provided near the portals and inside at intervals which shall not exceed 250 metres. If a water supply is not available, it is mandatory to verify that sufficient water is provided otherwise. 2.12. Road signs Specific signs shall be used for all safety facilities provided for tunnel users. Signs and panels for use in tunnels are given in Annex III.

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2.13. Control centre 2.13.1. A control centre shall be provided for all tunnels longer than 3 000 metres with a traffic volume higher than 2 000 vehicles per lane. 2.13.2. Surveillance of several tunnels may be centralised at a single control centre. 2.14. Monitoring systems

2.14.1. Video monitoring systems and a system able to automatically detect traffic incidents (such as stopping vehicles) and/or fires shall be installed in all tunnels with a control centre. 2.14.2. Automatic fire-detection systems shall be installed in all tunnels which do not have a control centre where the operation of mechanical ventilation for smoke control is different from the automatic operation of ventilation for the control of pollutants. 2.15. Tunnel-closing equipment

2.15.1. In all tunnels longer than 1 000 metres, traffic signals shall be installed before the entrances so that the tunnel can be closed in case of an emergency. Additional means, such as variable message signs and barriers, can be provided to ensure that instructions are obeyed. 2.15.2. Inside all tunnels longer than 3 000 metres, with a control centre and a traffic volume higher than 2 000 vehicles per lane, equipment to stop vehicles in the event of an emergency is recommended at intervals not exceeding 1 000 metres. This equipment shall consist of traffic signals and possibly additional means, such as loudspeakers, variable message signs and barriers. 2.16. Communication systems

2.16.1. Radio re-broadcasting equipment for emergency service use shall be installed in all tunnels longer than 1 000 metres with a traffic volume higher than 2 000 vehicles per lane. 2.16.2. Where there is a control centre, it must be possible to interrupt radio rebroadcasting of channels intended for tunnel users, if available, in order to give emergency messages. 2.16.3. Shelters and other facilities where evacuating tunnel users must wait before they can reach the outside shall be equipped with loudspeakers for the provision of information to users. 2.17. Power supply and electrical circuits

2.17.1. All tunnels shall have an emergency power supply capable of ensuring the operation of safety equipment indispensable for evacuation until all users have evacuated the tunnel. 2.17.2. Electrical, measurement and control circuits shall be designed in such a way that a local failure, such as one due to a fire, does not affect unimpaired circuits. 2.18. Fire resistance of equipment The level of fire resistance of all tunnel equipment shall take into account the technological possibilities and aim at maintaining the necessary safety functions in the event of a fire. 2.19. Table displaying informative summary of minimum requirements The table set out hereafter gives a summary of the minimum requirements laid down in the previous paragraphs. The minimum requirements are those set out in the operative text of this Annex.

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3. 3.1. Measures concerning operations Operating means Tunnel operation shall be organised and dispose of such means as will ensure the continuity and safety of the traffic through the tunnel. The personnel involved in the operation as well as the emergency services shall receive appropriate initial and continuing training. 3.2. Emergency planning Emergency response plans shall be available for all tunnels. In tunnels starting and finishing in different Member States, a single bi-national emergency response plan shall involve the two countries. 3.3. Works in tunnels Complete or partial closure of lanes due to construction or maintenance works planned in advance shall always begin outside the tunnel. Variable message signs, traffic signals and mechanical barriers may be used for this purpose. 3.4. Management of accidents and incidents In the event of a serious accident or incident, all appropriate tunnel tubes shall be closed immediately to traffic. This shall be done by simultaneous activation not only of the abovementioned equipment before the portals, but also of variable message signs, traffic signals and mechanical barriers inside the tunnel, if available, so that all the traffic can be stopped as soon as possible outside and inside the tunnel. Tunnels of less than 1 000 metres may be closed by other means. Traffic shall be managed in such a way that unaffected vehicles can quickly leave the tunnel. The access time for emergency services in the event of an incident in a tunnel shall be as short as possible and shall be measured during periodic exercises. In addition, it may be measured during incidents. In major bidirectional tunnels with high traffic volumes, a risk analysis in accordance with Article 13 shall establish whether emergency services shall be stationed at the two extremities of the tunnel. 3.5. Activity of the control centre For all tunnels requiring a control centre, including those starting and finishing in different Member States, a single control centre shall have full control at any given time. 3.6. Tunnel closure In the event of tunnel closure (long or short-term), users shall be informed of the best alternative itineraries, by means of easily accessible information systems. Such alternative itineraries shall form part of systematic contingency plans. They should aim to maintain traffic flow as much as possible and minimise secondary safety effects on the surrounding areas. Member States should make all reasonable efforts to avoid a situation in which a tunnel located on the territory of two Member States can not be used due to the consequences of bad weather conditions. 3.7. Transport of dangerous goods The following measures shall be applied concerning access to tunnels for vehicles transporting dangerous goods, as defined in the relevant European legislation regarding the transport of dangerous goods by road: perform a risk analysis in accordance with Article 13 before the regulations and requirements regarding the transportation of dangerous goods through a tunnel are defined or modified, place appropriate signs to enforce the regulation before the last possible exit before the tunnel and at tunnel entrances, as well as in advance so as to allow drivers to choose alternative routes, consider specific operating measures designed to reduce the risks related to some or all of the vehicles transporting dangerous goods in tunnels, such as declaration before entering or passage in convoys

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escorted by accompanying vehicles, on a case by case basis further to the aforementioned risk analysis. 3.8. Overtaking in tunnels A risk analysis shall be carried out in order to decide whether heavy goods vehicles should be allowed to overtake in tunnels with more than one lane in each direction. 3.9. Distances between vehicles and speed The appropriate speed of vehicles and the safe distance between them are especially important in tunnels and shall be given close attention. This shall include advising tunnel users of appropriate speeds and distances. Enforcement measures shall be initiated as appropriate. Road users driving passenger cars should under normal conditions maintain a minimum distance from the vehicle in front of them equivalent to the distance travelled by a vehicle in two seconds. For heavy goods vehicles this distance should be doubled. When traffic stops in a tunnel, road users should maintain a minimum distance of five metres from the vehicle in front, except if this is not possible due to an emergency stop. 4. Information campaigns Information campaigns regarding safety in tunnels shall be regularly organised and implemented in conjunction with interested parties on the basis of the harmonised work of international organisations. These information campaigns shall cover the correct behaviour of road users when approaching and driving through tunnels, especially in connection with vehicle breakdown, congestion, accidents and fires. Information on the safety equipment available and proper road user behaviour in tunnels shall be provided in convenient places for tunnel users (for example at rest areas before tunnels, at tunnel entrances when the traffic is stopped or on the Internet).

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ANNEX II Approval of the design, safety documentation, commissioning of a tunnel, modifications and periodic exercises 1. 1.1. 1.2. Approval of the design The provisions of this Directive shall be applied from the preliminary design stage onward. Before any construction work begins, the Tunnel Manager shall compile the safety documentation described under points 2.2 and 2.3 for a tunnel at the design stage and shall consult the Safety Officer. The Tunnel Manager shall submit the safety documentation to the administrative authority and attach the opinion of the Safety Officer, and/or of the inspection entity when available. The design, as appropriate, shall be approved by the responsible authority, which shall inform the Tunnel Manager and the administrative authority of its decision. Safety documentation The Tunnel Manager shall compile safety documentation for each tunnel and keep it permanently up to date. He/she shall provide a copy of the safety documentation to the Safety Officer. The safety documentation shall describe the preventive and safeguard measures needed to ensure the safety of users, taking into account people with reduced mobility and disabled people, the nature of the route, the configuration of the structure, its surroundings, the nature of the traffic and the scope for action by the emergency services defined in Article 2 of the Directive. In particular, the safety documentation for a tunnel at the design stage shall include: a description of the planned structure and access to it, together with the plans necessary for understanding its design and anticipated operating arrangements, a traffic forecast study specifying and justifying the conditions expected for the transport of dangerous goods, together with the risk analysis requested by point 3.7 of Annex I, a specific hazard investigation describing possible accidents which clearly affect safety of road users in tunnels which might occur during the operating stage and the nature and magnitude of their possible consequences; this investigation must specify and substantiate measures for reducing the likelihood of accidents and their consequences, an opinion on safety from an expert or organisation specialising in this field, which could be the inspection entity. 2.4. The safety documentation for a tunnel which is at the commissioning stage shall include in addition to the documentation required at the design stage: a description of the organisation, human and material resources and instructions specified by the Tunnel Manager to ensure operation and maintenance of the tunnel, an emergency response plan drawn up jointly with the emergency services which also takes into account people with reduced mobility and disabled people, a description of the system of permanent feedback of experience through which significant incidents and accidents can be recorded and analysed. 2.5. The safety documentation for a tunnel which is in operation shall include in addition to the documentation required at the commissioning stage: a report and analysis on significant incidents and accidents, which have taken place since the entry into force of this Directive, a list of the safety exercises carried out and an analysis of the lessons learned from them.

1.3.

2. 2.1.

2.2.

2.3.

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3. 3.1. Commissioning The initial opening of a tunnel to public traffic shall be subject to authorisation by the administrative authority (commissioning) in accordance with the following procedure. This procedure also applies to the opening of a tunnel to public traffic after any major change in construction or operation or any substantial modification work on the tunnel which might significantly alter any of the constituent components of the safety documentation. The Tunnel Manager shall transmit the safety documentation mentioned in point 2.4 to the Safety Officer, who shall give his/her opinion on the opening of the tunnel to public traffic. The Tunnel Manager shall forward this safety documentation to the administrative authority, and shall attach the opinion of the Safety Officer. The administrative authority shall decide whether or not to authorise the opening of the tunnel to public traffic, or whether to do so with restrictive conditions, and shall notify this to the Tunnel Manager. A copy of this decision shall be forwarded to the emergency services. Modifications For any substantial modification in the structure, equipment or operation, which might significantly alter any of the constituent components of the safety documentation, the Tunnel Manager shall ask for a new authorisation of operation following the procedure described under point 3). The Tunnel Manager shall inform the Safety Officer of any other change in construction and operation. Furthermore, prior to any modification work on the tunnel, the Tunnel Manager shall provide the Safety Officer with documentation detailing the proposals. The Safety Officer shall examine the consequences of the modification and in any event give his/her opinion to the Tunnel Manager, who shall send a copy to the administrative authority and to the emergency services. Periodic exercises The Tunnel Manager and the emergency services shall, in cooperation with the Safety Officer, organise joint periodic exercises for tunnel staff and the emergency services. Exercises: should be as realistic as possible and should correspond to the defined incident scenarios, should yield clear evaluation results, should prevent any damage to the tunnel, may also, in part, be conducted as table-top or computer simulation exercises for complementary results. (a) Full scale exercises under conditions that are as realistic as possible shall be conducted in each tunnel at least every four years. Tunnel closure will only be required if acceptable arrangements can be made for diverting traffic. Partial and/or simulation exercises shall be conducted every year in between. In areas where several tunnels are located in close proximity to each other, a full scale exercise must be conducted in at least one of those tunnels. (b) The Safety Officer and the emergency services shall evaluate jointly these exercises, draw up a report and make appropriate proposals.

3.2.

3.3.

3.4.

4. 4.1.

4.2.

4.3.

5.

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ANNEX III Signing for tunnels 1. General requirements The following are road signs and symbols to be used for tunnels. Road signs mentioned in this section are described in the Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals of 1968, unless otherwise specified. In order to facilitate international understanding of signs, the system of signs and signals prescribed in this Annex is based on the use of shapes and colours characteristic of each class of sign and, wherever possible, on the use of graphic symbols rather than words. Where Member States consider it necessary to modify the signs and symbols prescribed, the modifications made shall not alter their essential characteristics. Where Member States do not apply the Vienna Convention, the prescribed signs and symbols may be modified, provided that the modifications made shall not alter their essential intent. 1.1. Road signs shall be used to designate the following safety facilities in tunnels: lay-bys, emergency exits: the same sign shall be used for all kinds of emergency exits, escape routes: the two nearest emergency exits shall be signed on the sidewalls at distances of no more than 25 metres, at a height of 1,0 to 1,5 metres above escape route level, with an indication of the distances to the exits, emergency stations: signs to indicate the presence of emergency phones and fire extinguishers. 1.2. Radio: In tunnels where users can receive information via their radio, appropriate signs placed before the entrance shall inform users on how to receive this information. 1.3. 2. Signs and markings shall be designed and positioned so that they are clearly visible. Description of signs and panels Member States shall use appropriate signs, if necessary, in the advance warning area of the tunnel, inside the tunnel and after the end of the tunnel. When designing the signs for a tunnel, local traffic and construction conditions as well as other local conditions shall be considered. Signs according to the Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals shall be used, except in Member States which do not apply the Vienna Convention. 2.1. Tunnel sign The following sign shall be put at each entrance of the tunnel:

Sign E11A for Road Tunnels of the Vienna Convention; The length shall be included either in the lower part of the panel or on a additional panel H2. For tunnels over 3 000 metres, the remaining length of the tunnel shall be indicated every 1 000 m. The name of the tunnel may also be indicated.

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2.2. Horizontal signing Horizontal delineation should be used at the roadside edge. In the case of bi-directional tunnels, clearly visible means should be used along the median line (single or twin) separating the two directions. 2.3. Signs and panels for signing of facilities Emergency stations Emergency stations shall bear informative signs, which shall be F signs according to the Vienna Convention and indicate the equipment available to road users, such as:

In emergency stations which are separated from the tunnel by a door, a clearly legible text, written in appropriate languages, shall indicate that the emergency station does not ensure protection in case of fire. An example is given below: THIS AREA DOES NOT PROVIDE PROTECTION FROM FIRE Follow signs to emergency exits Lay-bys The signs to indicate lay-bys should be E signs according to the Vienna Convention. Telephones and fire extinguishers shall be indicated by an additional panel or incorporated in the sign itself.

Emergency exits The signs to indicate Emergency exits should be G signs according to the Vienna Convention. Examples are shown below:

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It is also necessary to sign the two nearest exits on the sidewalls. Examples are shown below.

Lane signals These signs can be circular or rectangular

Variable message signing Any variable message signs shall have clear indications to inform tunnel users of congestion, breakdown, accident, fire or any other hazards.