748

749
INTRODUCTION
THERE IS ONE USE of the ,vord "hypothesis" in
mathematics which seems at odds with the
foregoing summary. In Euclid's Elements,
for example, an hypothesis is that which is
given, not as the basis from which the conclu-
sion is drawn or proved, but as a condition of
solving the geometric problem under. consider-
ation. Let us take Proposition 6 of Book I. It
reads: "If ina triangle two angles be equal to
one another, then the sides which subtend the
equal angles will also be equal to one another."
In the demonstration of this theoreln, a tri-
angle having two equal angles is regarded as
given or granted. That figure or geometrical con-
dition is a fact obtained by hypothesis. It is the
fact stated in the hypothesis, or the if-clause, of
the theorem.
If the geometrical reality of that fact itself is
questioned, the ans\ver would have to be ob...
tained by a prior proof that such a figure, con-
forming to the definition of an isosceles tri-
angle, can be constructed by the use of no other
instruments than a straight edge and a compass.
The construction is not made, ho,vever, as part
of the proof of Theorem 6, any more than is the
demonstration ofan antecedent theorem, which
may have to be used in the proof of Theorem
6. In the proof of Theorem 6, the first line, be-
ginning with the word "let," declares that the
constructibility of the figure is to be taken for
granted as a matter of hypothesis.
The whole problem of Theorem 6 is to prove
that the follows from the if-clause.
Euclid appears to accomplish this by introduc-
ing other propositions-drawn from his axioms,
definitions, postulates, or theorems previously
demonstrated-which establish this connection
and so certify the conclusion as following from
the hypothesis. Two points about this proce-
dure should be noted.
First, the conclusion does not follow from
Chapter 36: HYPOTHESIS
,COMPARISON of their Greek and Latin
roots shows that the English words "hy-
thesis" and "supposition" are synonymous.
hypothesize or to suppose is to place under-
1'l1ake one thing the basis of another in the
cess of thought.
he word "hypothesis" is today often popu-
misapplied to nlean a guess or hunch. The
thin a detective story speaks of having an
othesis about who committed the crime.
notion of what itmeans tosuppose
ething, or to entertain a supposition, more
rately reflects the meaning of hypothesis in
c,mathematics, and scientific or philosoph-
l'inethod.
supposition is generally understood to be
ething taken for granted, something .as-
ed for the purpose of drawing implications
making inferences. What is supposed is not
gwnto be true; it may be true or false. '''hen
make a supposition, our first concern is to
what follows from it, and only then to
sider its truth in the light of itsconse-
ences. We cannot reverse this order, when
employ suppositions, and ask first about
ir truth.
he word "if" expresses the essence of sup-
ing. The word "then" or the phrase "it fol-
s that" introduces the consequences for the
sideration of which we make the supposi-
n. We are not interested in the "if" for its
n sake, but for the s'ake of what it may lead
In any statement of the "if ... then ..."
t, it is the if-clause which formulates the sup-
hion or the hypothesis; the other part of the
tement, the then-clause, formulates the
uences or implications. The whole complex
ement, ,vhich makes an if the logical basis
then, is not an hypothesis. Rather it is
at is traditionally called in logic a hypothet-
r proposition.
THE' GREAT" IDEAS
P. SIDNEY. The Countess ofPemhroke'sArcadia SCHILLER. Don Carlos
TAsso. Jerusalem Delivered Wallenstein
SPENSER. The Faerie Queene, BK VI W. SCOTT. Ivanhoe
ALEMA.N. The Rogue (Tlte Life of Guzman de Alfa- TOCQUEVILLE. Democracy in America,
rache) III, CH 18
BROOKE. An Inquisition upon Fame and Honour VIGNY. Military Servitude and Grandeur
BEAUMONT and FLETCHER. The Maid's Tragedy WARE. The Law of Honor
CALDERON. The Physician of His Own Honour STENDHAL. The'Red and the Black
CAREW. A Rapture --. The Charterhouse
CORNEILLE. Le Cid T. CARLYLE. On Heroes, 01'snZ'fJ andtf1l"1+L,";i
--. Horace .
tn History
RACINE. Andromaque ' .,' EMERSON. Representative Men
MOLIERE. Le bourgeoisgentilhomme{The Cit.Turned GALTON. HereditalyGenius
Gentleman) MEREDITH.' The Egoist
DRYDEN. All for Love HOWELLS. The Rise of Silas Laphanz
CharacteristicsofMen, Manners, Opin- NIETZSCHE. Beyond Good and Evil, CII IX
tons, Ttmes F 'T
M .1. 'he Golden Bough, PART VII, CH 3
ANDEVILLE. An Enquiry into the Origin ofHonor, 1. VEBLEN. The Theory ofthe LeiJure
and the Usefulness of Christianity in War ROSTAND. L'Aiglon
SAINT-SIMON. Memoirs T. HARDY. The Dynasts
HURD. Letters on Chivally and Romance FARNELL. Greek Hero Cults and Ideas
VOLTAIRE. in A Philosophical Dictionary tality
MILLAR. Observattons Concerning the Distinction of T. S. ELI9T. Murder in the Cathedral
Ranks in Society RAGLAN. The Hero
SHERIDAN. The Rivals, ACT 4, SC I CASSIRER. The Myth ofthe State, PART
751
Both of these methods seem to be valid only
if a prerequisite condition is fulfilled. To verify
one of a series ofmultiple hypotheses through
the elimination of the others, the scientist must
know that the hypotheses enumerated are truly
exhaustive. In the verification of a single hy-
pothesis by the confirmation of its prediction,
the scientist must know that the observed con-
sequences can follow .. from no other supposi-
tion. Since such kno\vledge is often unavailable,
probability rather than complete proof results
from the testing of hypotheses by observation
or experiment.
In his Treatise on the Vacuum, Pascal offers a
summary of the logical situation by distinguish-
ing the true, the false, and the doubtful or
probable hypothesis. "Sometimes its negation
brings a conclusion of obvious absurdity, and
then the hypothesis is true and invariable. Or
else one deduces an obvious error from its affir"
mation, and then the hypothesis is held to be
false. And ,vhen one has not been able to find
any mistake either in its negation or its affir-
mation, then the hypothesis remains doubtful,
so that, in order that the hypothesis may be
demonstrable, it is not enough that all the phe-
nomena result from it, but rather itisnecessary,
if there ensues something contrary to a single
one of the expected phenomena, that this.suflice
to establish its falsity."
BOTH THE USE of hypotheses and themethod of
verifying them vary from science to science, ac"
cording as the character of the science happens
to be purely empirical (e.g., the ,vork of Hip..
pacrates,Darwin, Freud), or experinlental
(e.g., the work of Harvey and Faraday), or a
combination of experimentation with mathe..
matical reasoning (e.g., the work of Galileo,
Newton, Fourier) . Not all scientific work is
directed or controlled by hypotheses, but in
the absence of well-formulated hypotheses, the
research can hardly be better than exploration.
A well-constructed experiment, especially
what Bacon calls an experimentu1ncrucis, derives
its demonstrative character from the hypothet..
ical reasoning which formulates the problem to
be solved. The value of such a cr\.tcial experi-
ment appears in Bacop's reasoning about the
rise and fall of. the tides. "If it be found," he
\vrites, "that during the ebb the surface of the
CHAPTER 36: HYPOTHESIS
e.preliminary.diagnosis/states an hypothe..
nat the disease may be) and the prognosis
set of consequences (what is likely to
if the diagnosis is correct). Observation
of the symptoms and the patient's
condi tion .\vill either confirm or in-
the prognosis. Confirmationleaves the
alucky guess, but fails to prove it. If
sease does not run the predicted course,
er, the diagnosis on which the prognosis
ased can be dismissed as a false hypothesis.
N AN HYPOTHESIS takes the form ofa pre-
on of what should happen if thehypothe..
trUe, the failure of the consequences to oc"
efutes the hypothesis. Though discussions
ientific method frequently speak of "pre...
on. and verification," it would seem as
ghprediction can only lead to the refuta..
of an hypothesis rather than to its verifica"
hypothesis is overthrown when its pre"
ion fails, but it is not verified when its pre-
f on comes true. To think that it can be veri-
in this way is to commit the logical fallacy
guing from the truth ofa conclusion to the
hof its premises. How, then, do empirical
tists prove an hypothesis to be true ? What
hey mean. by prediction and verification in
tlon to the use of hypothesis?
here seem to be two possible ways in which
ypothesis can be proved by empirical or
rimental research. One way can be used
we know that the consequences implied
only from the truth of the hypothesis.
ld the consequences implied be impossible
the supposed condition exists, then the
rmation of the prediction verifies the hy-
eSlS.
he other possible method of verification has
e to be called "the method of multiple
king hypotheses." The validity of this
hod depends on our knowing that the sev-
hypotheses being entertained exhaust all
relevant possibilities. Each hypothesis gen-
tesa prediction; and if upon investigation
observed facts negate every prediction ex..
tone, then that one remaining hypothesis is
'led. If negative instances have eliminated
false hypotheses, the hypothesis remaining
tbe true, on the condition, ofcourse, that
the only possibility which is left.
In the J:1eno, example, Socrates pc
at a certaIn turn In the conversation abo
tue and knowledge, that he and Meno
tain the hypothesis that virtue is know
Socrates immediately inquires about the
quences. "If virtue is knowledge," he
"will itbe taught ?"Since Meno already
stands that knowledge is teachable, hea.n
the question affirmatively. The utility
vancing the hypothesis that virtue is
gradually appears in the next phase
logue, wherein it is discoveredthat virtue!
teachable at all, or at least not in thew
"vhich the arts and sciences are teachable
discovery throws some doubt on
the hypothesis that virtue is knowledg
least it does not seem to be knowledgei
same sense as science or art.
This mode of reasoning exemplifies the
an hypothesis to test its truth in term.S
consequences.. The underlying logical p .
is the denial of the consequenresreq!tl
denial of the antecedent hypothesis, just!
affirma of the antecedent would ireqt.li
affirmation of the consequent. Nothingfo
logically from a denial. of the hypothesi
from an affirmation of its consequen<:es..
This example from the Meno also iln.ls
the difference between Euclid's and Plato
of hypotheses. Socrates is not here tryi
prove that ifvirtue is knowledge, then vi
teachable. The validity of the foregoingiJ
statement is already understood in terms
fact that knowledge is teachable. With>t
then statement accepted as valid, Socrate
it for the purpose of ascertaining whether
what sense virtue is knowledge. It is not t
pothetical or if-then statement\vhich is pg
but the hypothesis-the antecedent in
statement-which is tested.
1"1he same general method of e.mployin
potheses and testing them is found in the
pirical sciences. In medical practice, the p
cian, according to Hippocrates, "mustbe
to form a judgment from having made hi
acquainted with all the symptoms, and est'
ing their powers in comparison with on
other"; he should then "cultivate progn
since "he will manage the cure bestwh
foreseen what is to happen from the pre
state of rnatters."
750 THE GREAT IDEAS
the hypothesis directly, for if that were so, the
"if-then" proposition would be self-evident and
would need no proof. Olind ""hich im-
mediately that the sides opposite to the equal
angles in an isosceles triangle are necessarily
equal does not need any demonstration of the
connection between equal angles and equal
sides. The Euclidean demonstration consists in
making this connection, which isnot immediate-
ly evident, mediately evident; that is, evident
through the mediation of other propositions.. It
is not the hypothesis alone which proves. the
conclusion, but the hypothesis in the company
of other propositions which serve to take the
mind step by step from the hypothesis granted
to the conclusion implied.
Second, the proposition with the truth of
which the reasoning seems to end is not the
proposition to be proved. !The Q.E.D. at the
end of a Euclidean demonstration does not ap..
ply to the last proposition in the line of proof,
but to the theorem itself, for that is the propo.;.
sition to be proved. The last proposition in the
reasoning is merely consequent which,ac"
cording to the theorem, is proposed as follow-
ing from the hypothesis. When he is ,able to
verify the proposed connection between the
hypothesis and its conclusion or consequent,
Euclid says Q.E.D. to the theorem as a whole-
the whole if-then statement.
The. process of proof seems to. be the same
when the theorem is stated categorically rather
than hypothetically. For example, Theorem 6
might have been stated, as other Euclidean
theorems are, in the following manner: "The
sides subtended by equal angles. in a triangle
are also equal to one another." This variation
in mode of statement raises a question, not
about the meaning of "by hypothesis" inEu-
clidean proof, but about the difference between
hypothetical and categorical propositions,
which we will consider later.
THE EUCLIDEAN USE ofa given (that is, a con-
structible) figure as .an hypothesis does not
seem to be a method of making a supposition in
order to discover its implications. Nor does it
seem to be a way of testing the truth of an
hypothesis by reference to Ii ts consequences.
Both of these aspects of hypothetical reasoning
do appear, however, in Plato's dialogues.
THE GREr\T IDEAS
CHAPTER 36: HYPOTHESIS
752
\vaters at sea is more curved and round, from
the \vatersrising in the middle, and sinking at
the sides or coast, and if, during a flood, it. be
more even and level, from the \vaters returning
to their former position, then assuredly, by this
decisive instance, the raising of them by a mag-
netic force can he admitted; if other\vise, it
must be entirely rejected."
In the field of mathematical physics, and par-
ticularly in astronomy, the meaning of hypoth-
esis is both enlarged and altered. So far we have
considered hypotheses \vhich are single propo-
sitions implying certain consequences. But in
mathematical physics, a whole theory-a com-
plex system of propositions-comes to he re-
garded as a single hypothesis.
In his preface to the" work of Copernicus,
Osiander says that the task of the astronomer is
"to use painstaking and skilled observation in
gathering together the history of the celestial
movements; and then-since he cannot by any
line of reasoning reach the true causes of these
movements-to think up or construct whatever
causes or hypotheses he pleases, such that, hv
the assumption of these causes, those
movements can be calculated from theprinci-
pIes. of geometry, for the past and for the future
too." The elaborate system constructed by
Copernicus and the system constructed by
Ptolemy which Copernicus hopes to replace
are sometimes called" the Copernican hypothe-
sis" and "the Ptolemaic hypothesis"; and some-
times these two theories are referred to as "the
heliocentric hypothesis" and "the geocentric
hypothesis. "
A \vhole theory, regarded as an hypothesis,
must be tested in a different way fron1 a single
proposition whose implication generates a pre-
diction. As rival hypotheses, one theory may be
superior to another in internal consistency or in
mathematical simplicity and elegance. Kepler
is thus able to argue against Ptolemy by appeal-
ing to criteria which Ptolemy accepts, pointing
out that Ptolemy himself \vishes "to construct
hypotheses which are as simple as possible, if
that can be done. And so if anyone constructs
simpler hypotheses than he-understanding
simplicity geometrically-he, on the contrary,
will not defend his composite hypotheses."
But even if the Copernican hypothesis is su-
perior on the grounds of being geometrically
simpler, it must meet another
in the chapter on ASTRONOMY,
theories about physical phenomena
more than ideal constructions of rnp.<
verses. They lnust try to account
real \vorid and are therefore subj ect
of their applicability to reality. - ........
gantit maybe rnathernatically, an
-\"hen considered from the point
physics-is satisfactory only if it ----..... 'UoJII ....
the phenomena it ,vas invented to
the of Simplicius, it must
appearances. "
An hypothesis can therefore be
application to reality by the way in
fits the observed facts. "In those
rnathematical demonstrations are
natural phenomena," Galileo writes,
ciples" which are "the foundations
superstructure" Inust be "established
chosen experiments." By such
chooses bet\veen the hypothesis that
form acceleration of a freely falling
proportional to the units of space r ....... .
the hypothesis that it is
units of time elapsed.
To borrow PIato's expression in the
the mathematical consistency ofa
it "a likely story." The theoretical
the hypothesis makes it credible.
competing credible hypotheses exist,
ing the relevant appearances
which is to be believed? The fact
them, as in the case of the '"""....
maic controversy, is rnathematically
cannot decide the question, since the
is, Which is true of reality?
Son1etimes a single fact, such as the
enon of the Foucault pendulum, may
decisive influence, if one of the two
theories finds that fact congenial and
leaves it inexplicable. Sometinles, as
the discussion of the Copernican h"ltT'........... 1f-h""<'f,
the chapter on ASTRONOl\1Y, of two
which are equally satisfactory so far
astronomical phenomena are
may have the additional virtue of
other fields of phenolnena which that
sis was not originally designed to
As interpreted by Kepler and as
in Ne\vton's theory of universal
...... nl
o
rn,1r-:lln hypothesis brings the terrestrial
pnOI!IJ.c;U(:t., of the tides. a!1d. of falling bodies
the same set of laws \vhich applies to the
stial motions. The hypothesis then has the
zing quality of consilience-a bringing to-
her under one formulation of phenomena
previously thought to be related. This
IllS to be what Huygens has in mind when he
siders the degree of probability that is at-
able through experimental research." We
e "scarcely less than complete proof," he
es, \vhen "things which have been demon-
ted by the principles assumed, correspond
fecdy to the, phenomenawhica experiment
brought under observation; and further,
cipally, when one can imagine and foresee
phenomena which ought to follo\v from
hypotheses which one employs, and ,,,hen
finds that therein the fact corresponds to
prevision."
hen, in common parlance, we say that it is
longer a theory, but has become a fact. Yet
question remains whether the empirical
ts which eliminate the less satisfactory hy-
thesis can ever make the more satisfactory
othesis more than a likely story.
THE Mathematical Principles of Natural
itosophy, Newton says, "1 have not been able
discover the cause of those properties of
ity from phenomena, and I frame no hy-
heses; for whatever is not deduced from
phenomena is to be called an hypothesis;
hypotheses, whether metaphysical or phys-
l,whether of occult qualities or mechanical,
eno place in experimental philosophy." The
text of this passage, and of a similar state"
nt at the end of the Optics, as well as the
Deiation in Newton's mind of hypotheses
h occult qualities, substantial forms, and
den causes, seems to indicate a special mean"
of "hypothesis."
ewton criticizes the vortices in the physics
Descartes on the ground that it is unneces-
ry to appeal to occult or unobservable entities
order to explain natural phenomena. The
rtesian vortices, like the substantial forms of
istotle, are, for Newton, hypotheses in a very
eial sense. They are hypothetical entities.
not inferred from the phenomena. AI-
treated as if they were realities under-
753
lying the phenomena, they are, as Gilbert says
of the primum mobile, a "fiction, something not
comprehensible by any reasoning and ... evi-
denced by no visible star, but purely a product
of imagination and mathematical hypothesis."
There is almost a play on words in this iden-
tification of hypotheses with imaginary en-
tities to which reality is attributed; for in their
Greek and Latin roots, the words "hypothesis"
and "hypostasis," "supposition" and "sub-
stance," are closely related. The first word in
each of these pairs refers to a proposition \vhich
underlies reasoning, the second to a reality
which, underlies observable qualities or phe-
nomena. To make hypotheses, in the sensein
which Ne\vton excludes them from experi-
mental philosophy, is to hypostatize or tortify,
that is, to make a thing out of, or to give reality
to, a fiction or construction of the n1ind.
It has seemed to some critics that, no less
than the Cartesian vortices, the ether in New..
ton's theory of light is an hypothesis in pre-
cisely this sense-an imaginary entity. For
many centuries, the atoms and pos-
tulated to explain chemical combinations and
changes were attacked as fictions and defended
as useful hypotheses. On the one hand, there
is an issue concerning the theoretic usefulness
of such constructions; on the other. 'a question
concerning their counterparts in reality.
It is sometimes thought that fictions are use-
ful for purposes of explanation even when their
unreality is admitted. Rousseau, for example,
explicitly denies any historical reality to the
idea of man living in a state of nature prior to
the formation of society by the social contract.
In this matter, he says, we can lay "facts aside,
as they do not affect the question." These re-
lated notions-the state of nature and the so"
cial contract-are "rather calculated to explain
the nature of things, than to ascertain their
actual origin; just like. the hypotheses which
our physicists daily form respecting the; for"
rnation of the world."
Similarly Lavoisier posits the existence of
"caloric" for its explanatory value. "It isdif-
ficult," he writes, "to comprehend these phe-
nomena, without admitting them as the effects
of a real and material substance, or very subtile
fluid, which, insinuating itself between the
particles of bodies, separates. them from each
THE GREAT IDEAS CHAPTER 36: HYPOTHESIS 754
other; and, even aUowingtheexistence of this
fluid to he hypothetical, we shall see in ,the
sequel, that it explains the phenomena of na-
ture in a very satisfactory manner."
ONE OTHER MEANING of hypothesis' remains to
be considered. It is the sense in which postu--
lates or' assumptions are distinguished from
axioms in the foundations of a science. In Eu-
clid's geometry, as in Descartes', both sorts of
principles appear. The axioms or common no-
tions are those propositions which are imme-
diately seen to be true without proof. The
postulates or assumptions are hypotheses ,in
the sense that their truth is taken for granted
without proof.
Both sorts of propositions serve as principles
or starting points for the demonstration of
theorems, or the conclusions of the science.
Both are principles of demonstration in that
they are used to demonstrate other propositions
without themselves being demonstrated. But
axioms are traditionally regarded as intrinsi-
cally, indemonstrable, whereas hypotheses--
postulates or assumptions'-:-may,' not" he inde-
They are simply asserted without
demonstration.
The possibility of detnonstratingan hypoth-
esis- gives the -character, of a provisional as-
sumption. In the Discourse on Method, Des-
cartes refers ,; to certain' matters assumed in his
Dioptrics and Meteors,. and expresses his con-
cern lest the reader should take "offence he-
cause I call them hypotheses and do not appear
to care about their proof." He goes on to say:
"I -have not named them hypotheses with any
other object than that it, may' be known that
while I consider myself able to deduce them
from the primary truths which I explained
above, yet- I particularly desired not to do so,
in order that certain persons .may not for this
reason take occasion to buildup someextrava-
gant philosophical system ,on what they take
to be my principles."
The distinction between axioms and postu-
latesor hypotheses raises two issues. The, first
concerns the genuineness of the distinction'
self. Axioms, self.-evident proposi tions, or what
William James calls "necessary truths," have
been denied entirely or dismissed as tautologies.
The only principles of science must then be
vqluntarily mad.
conventionally agreed upon. This issue is
fully discussed in the chapter onPRIN
The other issue presupposes the reality
distinction, but is concerned \vith different
plications of it in the analysis of science.
Aristotle, for example, defines scie
knowledge in terms of three elements,o
which consists of the primary premises
which demonstrations rest. The principl<:t
particular science may be axioms in the
sense of being self-evident truths and
absolutely indemonstrable; or they in
provisional assumptions which, thoug
proved in this science, can nevertheles
proved by a higher science, as in "the'app
tion of geometrical demonstrationstotheo
in mechanics or optics, or of arithmetical
onstrations to those of harmonics." The
are not axioms because they are demons
yet in a particular science they may' pIa.
role ofaxioms insofar as they are used, wi.
being demonstrated, to demonstrate
propositions.
Reasoning which rests either on axioms 0
demonstrable principles Aristotle calls SCi
tific, but reasoning which rests only on
potheses he regards as Reasonin
suIts in scientific demonstration, accordi
Aristotle, "when the premises from whic
reasoning starts are true and primary,o
such that our knowledge of them has Qrigi"
come "through premises which are primary
true." In contrast, reasoning is dialectical'
reasons from opinions that are generally a
ed," and, Aristotle explains, "those op
are 'generally accepted'
everyone or by the -maj.ori ty or by the p
phers---i.e., by all, or by ia majbrity,.or
most notable and illustrious of them."
otherplace, he adds one important qualifica.
In defining a dialectical proposi tion as, one
is "held by all men or by most men or })
philosophers," he adds: "provided it be no
trary to 'the general opinion; for a man
assent to the view of the philosophers, ()ul
were not cantrary to theopinions ofmost
For .Aristotle, dialectical reasoning 0
ment moves entirely within the sp
opinion. Even an opinion generally ac
not only by the philosophers but also by.
, ,remains an opinion. The best opinions are
are not self-
ent and which cannot be proved. They are
lllerely provisional assumptions. Resting on
11lptions which. cannot ever be more than
bable, the conclusions of dialectical reason-
are also never more than probahIe. _Since
lack the certain foundation which axioms
,they cannot have the certitude of science.
ato, on the other hand, seems to think that
athematicalsciences are hypothetical in
foundation, and that only in the science of
ctic, \vhich he considers the. highest sci-
does the mind rise from mere hypotheses
e ultimate principles of knowledge. "The
nts of geometry, arithmetic, and the kin-
sciences," Socrates says in the RepubZz'c,
me the odd and the even, and the figures
the three kinds of angle and" the like' in
several branches of science;' these are their
theses, which they and everybody aresup-
to know, and therefore they do not deign
ve an accountof them either to themselves
hers." There is a higher sort of knowledge,
es on, "which reason herself attains by
ower of dialectic, using the hypotheses
sfirst principles, but-only as hypotheses-
is.to say, as steps and points of departure
a ,\vorld which is above hypotheses, ,in
r. that she may soar beyond them to first
ciples. "
he issue bet\veen Plato and Aristotle may
nly verbal--a difference in the use of such
s as "science" and "dialectic." Whether
verbal or real is considered in the chapters
IALECTIC and METAPHYSICS. In any case,
issue throws light on the difference between
ypothesis as a merely provisional assump-
, susceptible to proof by higher principles,
an hypothesis as a probability taken for
ted for the purposes of argument, \vhich is
incapable of being proved.
LLY WE COME to the meaning of "hypo-
cal" in the analysis of propositions and
gisms. The distinction between the cate-
cal and the hypothetical proposition or
gism, briefly touched on in Aristotle's
anon, is developed in the tradition of logic
ch begins with that book.
his \vorkon Interpretation he distin-
755
guishes between simple .and compoundpropo-
sitions. The; compound proposition consists of
several simple propositions in' some logical re-
lation to one another. In the tradition of logical
analysis, three basic types ofrelation have been
deflnedas constituting three different kinds of
compound proposition. One type of relation is
the conjunctive; it is signified by the word
"and." Another is the disjunctive; it is signified
by the words "either . . . or ..." The third
type is the hypothetical and is signified by the
words "if ... then .."
To take an example we have already used,
"virtue is knowledge" and "virtue is teach-
able" are simple propositions. In contrast,. the
statement, "ifvirtue is knowledge, then virtue
is teachable," is a compound proposition, hy-
pothetical in form. If" the proposition were
stated in the sentence, "either virtue is knowl-
edge or it is not teachable," it would be dis-
junctive in form; if stated in the sentence "vir-
tue is knowledge and virtue is teachable," it
would be conj unctivein form. In each of these
three cases, the compound proposition consists
of the two simple propositions with which we
began, though in each case they appear to be
differently related.
Whereas Aristotle divides propositions into
simple and compound, Kant divides all judg-
ments into the categorical, the hypothetical,
and the disjunctive. In the categorical judg-:
ment, he says, "we consider two concepts''.; in
the hypothetical, "two judgements"; in the dis-
junctive, "several judgements in their relation
to one another." As an example of the hypo-
thetical proposition, he offers the statement,
"Ifperfect justice exists, the obstinately wicked
are punished." As an example of the disjunc-
tive judgment, "we may say ... [that] the
world exists either by blind chance, or by in-
ternal necessi ty, or by an external cause." Each
of these three alternatives, Kant points out,
"occupies a part of the sphere of all possible
knowledge with regard to the existence of the
world, while all together occupy the whole
sphere." The hypothetical judgment does no
more than state "the relation of two proposi-
tions ... Whether both these propositions are
true remains unsettled. It is only the conse-
quence," Kant says, "which is laid do\vn by
this judgement."
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
I. The use of hypotheses in the process of dialectic
2. Hypothetical reasoning and hypothetical constructions in philosophy
3. The foundations of mathematics: postulates, assumptions
757
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 23a-c /
PART II-III, 44c-50b passiIn; PART VI, 66a.. b /
Meditations, 72b,d; I-II, 7Sa-78a / Objections
and Replies, I23d-124c
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH I, SECT I 2Sa-c /
lluman Understanding, BKII, CH I, SECT 10
I23b-d; CH XIII, SECT 19-20 I52c-d; CH xX.III,
SECT 1-2 204a-c
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XI, DIV
107 499c-500b
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 329a-33Idpassim, esp
329d-330b; 333d-334a; 348a,c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 7a-d; I76d-177b; I86d-
I87a; 194b-200c; 227a-230c; 232c-233d I
Science of Right, 457a-b / fudgement,603b-c
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, I56d-
IS8a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 84a-119b passiln;221a-
238b; 820b-827a; 880b-886a esp 884b-886a
3. The foundations of mathematics: postulates,
assumptions
7 PLATO: Meno, I83b-c / Republic,BK VI, 386d-
388a; BK VII, 397c-d
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH I
[7IaI-I6] 97a.. b; CH 2 [72aI9....24] 98d; CH 10
104d-I05d; CH 12 [77a36-bIS] 106c-d; BK II,
CH 9 [93b21-2S] 128a-b I Physics, BK I, GH 2
[I8S
a
I-3] 259c-d I Heavens, BK III, cn 4
[302b27-3I] 394a I Metaphysics, BK XI, CH 3
REFERENCES
CHAPTER 36: HYPOTHESIS
use of hypotheses in the process of dia-
lectic
Charmides, 9d-I0a / Protagoras, 49a I
183b-190a,c / Phaedo, 242b-243c /
BK IV, 3S0d-35Ib; BK VI, 383d-388a
BK VII, 397a-398c / Timaeus,
Parmenides, 49Ia-5IId / Sophist,
the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 floMER: Iliad, BK II [ 265-283] I2d, the
4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number I2d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: '''hen the textis printed in one column, the letters a arid b refer to the
upper and lo\ver halves of the page. For in 53 JAMES: Psychology, II6a-119b,
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends In the lower half of page 119. When the text IS
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower of left-
hand side of the page,the letters c and d to the upper and lo\ver halves of th.e t-hand slde of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposiuln, I63b-164c, the passage begIns In the lower half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page
16
4.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART,BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [26S-283l12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follo\vs; e.g., QLD l'ESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:4S-(D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one- or more especially
relevant parts ofa whole reference; "passim" signifies that the.topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
1 Prior Analytics, BK I, CH I [24
a2I
-
39a-c / Posterior Analytics, BK I, .CH 6
103a-b / Topics 143a-223a,c esp
I, CH 1-3 143a-144b, CH 10-11 147b-148c,
14 I49a-d, BK VIII 2IIa-223a,c
..... r."'1"TT'C' Discourses, BK I, CH 7 I12b-113d
Pure Reason, 227a-230c esp 227d-228b
Science ofRight, 457a-b / Judgement, 603b-c
reasoning and hypothetical
COJtlstru(:tu)ns in philosophy
I83b-190a,c I Phaedo, 242b-
BK VI, 386d-388a; BK VII,
Parmenides, 49Ia-51Id
ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 2
98d; BK II, CH 6 125d-126b /
BK I, CH 12 [28I
b
J-2S] 373a-b I
BK IV, CH 3 [IOOS
b
S-17] 524c-d
Theologica, PART I-II, Q 14,
"If anything is a man, it is mortal."
like Bertrand Russell think that the
ical form is more exact because it r:Xllllt"tf-l ...
frains from suggesting that men
states that if the class 'man' should
existent members, they ,vill also
class 'mortal.'
Apart from the question \vhether a
proposition should or should not be
as asserting the existence of n.'.. Trl ....
seems to be a formal difference
categorical and hypothetical prC)PC)SI1tlOfl
is manifest only ,,,hen the h ... r .... "1t-h ........ I
a compound proposi tion, not \vhen
statement of a simple proposition in
thetical form, as, for example, the
osition "All men are mortal," is stated
thetical form by "If anything is a
mortal." Because it is truly a COJtl1plOUnd
sition, and not merely the h'l:7 ........... t- ... ""' ...
ment of a general proposition,
"If virtue is knowledge, then virtue
able," cannot be restated in the
sinlple categorical proposition.
A simple proposition, whether
gorically or hypothetically, may be
elusion of either a or a t'\,rt""\ro.f-h ... .
syllogism. But the
which is really a compound
never be the conclusion of any sort
though it may be one of the
pothetical reasoning.
THE GREAT IDEAS 756
4. The role of hypotheses in science
4a. Theories, provisional assumptions, fictions, reifications
4b. The purpose of hypotheses: saving the appearances; the formulation of
tions
4c.Consistency, simplicity, and beauty as standards in the construction of hy..
potheses
4d. The task of verification: the plurality of hypotheses
5. Hypothetical propositions and syllogisms: the distinction between the h'T..... r.1f-ht:>,t'1r'll
and the categorical
In the Prior Analytics, Aristotle distinguishes
bet,veen the categorical and. the hypothetical
syllogism. The following reasoning is categori..
cal in form: "Knowledge is teachable, virtue
is kno\vledge; therefore, virtue is teachable."
The following reasoning is hypothetical.. in
form:"Ifvirtue is knowledge, it is teachable;
but virtue is knowledge; therefore it is teach..
able"; or "if virtue is knowledge, it is teach..
able; but virtue is not teachable; therefore it is
not kno,vledge."
The basic issue with respect to the distinction
between categorical and hypothetical syllo..
gisms is ,,,hether the latter are always reducible
to the former. One thing seems to be clear. The
rules for the hypothetical syllogism fonnally
parallel the rules for the categorical syllogisln.
In hypothetical reasoning, theconsequentmust
be affirmed if the antecedent is affirmed; the
antecedent must be denied if the consequent
is denied. In categorical reasoning, the affirma-
tion of the premises requires an affirmation of
the conclusion, and a denial of the conclusion
requires a denial of the premises.
With respect to the distinction between the
categorical and hypothetical proposition, there
is also an issue whether propositions stated in
one form can always be converted into propo-
sitions having the other form of statement. In
modern mathematical logic, for example, gen-
eral propositions, such as "All men are mortal,"
are sometimes expressed in hypothetical form:
4d. The task of verification: the plurality of
hypotheses
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK II, 49a.:.c
8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK II, CH I4387d-389d;
BK III, CH 7 [306a6-18] 397b-c . .
10 GALEN: NaturalFaculties,BK I, CH 14, I77a-
178d
11 ARCHIMEDES: Sand-Reckoner, 520a-b
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK VI [73-711]
8ge-d
16 PTOLEMY: J1lmagest, 13K I, 9a-12b;:BK:III, 86b-
93a; 'BK IV, 120a.:.122b
16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly
Spheres, 505a-506a; BK I, S14b-515b; BK III,
653b-656b
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 852a-b; 857b-860b;
907b-916a I Harmonies of the World, 1014b-
1016a
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK v, par 3-6 27c-28c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 32, A
I, REP 2 I75d-178a
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences,THIRD DAY,
203d-205b
28 HARVEY: Motionaf the Heart, 268d-273e esp
268d, 273e; 286b-304a,e esp 286b-e, 295d-
296a I Circulation of fhe Blood, 31Ic-312c;
324e-d ' '.
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BKiI, APH'36 164a-
I68d
31 DESCARTES:Discourse, PARTVI, 61d-62e;66a-b
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VIII [66-178] 233b-
236a .
33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 368b-370a/ Weight ofAir,
404a-405b; 425a-429a
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK II,PROP 52, SCHOL,
265a-b; PROP 53, SCHOL 266a-267a; BK III,
GENERAL SCHOL, 369a / Optics, BK I, 453a>
455a; BK III, 525b-530b; 543a-b
34 HUYGENS: Light, PREF, 551b-552a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BKIV, CH XII,
SECT 13 362c-d
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART III,
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 8d [En 2]
43 MILL: Liberty, 283d-284b
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Cheniistry, PREF, 2a-b
45 FOURIER: TheQry of Heat, 181b
45FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 385b-c;
440b,d; 830b-832c
49 DARWIN: Origin ofSpecies, ' 42a-b; 239c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 655a-659a esp 655a-b;
863a-865a; 882a-884b
o 4d CHAPTER 36: HYPOTHESIS 759
DARWIN: Origin of Species, 42a ' Spheres,
JAMES: 95a;'231b [En 3] 678a esp677b-678a;' 740a-b;784b-785b
FREUD: Narcissism, 400d-401d I Instincts, 16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 888b-890a; BK V,
412a-b I General Introduction, 483d-485a / 984b-98Sb
New-Introductory Lectures, 818c--819b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 227d-228d / judgement,
551a-553e
he purpose of hypotheses: saving the ap- 45 LAVOISIER: Elelnents of Chemistry, PART II,
pearances; the formulation. of predic- 62a-'63a
tions 53 JAMES :Psychdlogy, esp 655S., 657b-
PLATO: Meno, 183b-c IRepublic,BK VI, 658b
3BBa; BK VII, 397a-398e / Ti,naeus, 447a-d54FREUD: Narcissism, 400cl-401a
ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK II, CH 5 379b-c;
BK III, CH 7 [j06
a
I-I8] 397b-e I Meteorology,
IlK I, CH 7 [344
a
5-9] 450b
HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 1 1a-b /
Prognostics, parI,19a-b; par 25
PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK III, 83a; 'BK IX, 270b-
273a; BK XIII, 429a-b
, COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly
Spheres, 505a-506a ., ' .. , :
KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 852a-b; 888b-890b;
911a-b; 929a; BK V, 964b
AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK V, par427d-28a
AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I,Q32,A
I, REP 2 175d-178a
GILBERT: Loadstone, BK VI, 119a-b
HARVEY: Circulation ofthe Blood,
BACON: NovumOrganum, BKII, APH :t8,149d;
APH 36, 165d-166a
DESCARTES: Discourse, PART VI, 66a-b .
2 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VIII ...
234a
4 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, GENERAL SCHOL,
371b-372a I OptiCS,BKI; 379a
4 Light, PREP, 551b-552a; CH I,
553a-b
5LOCKE: Human Understanding, BKIV, CH!III,
SECT 16 317a-e; CH XII, SECT 13 362c-d
BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, ,SECT
433b-c
HUME: Human SECT IV, DIV-.26
460b-e; SECT IX, DIV 82 487b-c; SECT XI, DIV
I07,499d-500a ' .. "
6 STERNE: TristrarrJ Shandy, 272b-273.b
8 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 329d-330a; 333d-334a
2 KANT: Pure Reason" ,228b-c I"Science ofRight,
457a-b "', .
'LAVOISIER: Elements ofChemistry, PAIl'!'I, 9d-
lOa; PART II, 62a--63a
FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 850b,d-
851e
DARWIN: Origin of Species, 42a; 23ge
JAMES: Psychology, 357b;367b [En 5]; 6S5a;
862a-863a; 883a-884b
FREUD: General Introduction, 483d-484a I
Group Psychology, 686c-d / New Introductory
Lectures, 840a-b
Consistency, simplicity, and beauty asstand-
ards in the constru'ttion of hypotheses
16. PTOLEMY: Almagest, .BK 'III, 93a; BKXIII,
429a-b
16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly
4a. Theories, provisional assumptions, fictio
reifications
7 PLATO: Meno, 183b-c/ Republic, BK VI, 386
388a; BK VII, 397e-d I Timaeus, 447d-450
Laws, BK VII, 730a-c
8 ARISTOTLE : . Posterior Analytics, 'BK I," CH
[76b22-77a4] 10Se-d I Heavens, BK I, CH
[28Ib3-25] 373a-b; BK II, CH 5 379b-cl Me.
physics, BK VI, CH I (I02S
b
I-I3] 547b; BI(
CH 7 [I064
a
4-c9] 592b;BK XII,CH 6 [Io7IbI
GH 7 [I072a22] 601b-602b; CH 8 603b-605a
11 ARCHIMEDES: Equilibrium of Planes, BI(
POSTULATES 502a-b I Floating Bodies, BI(
POSTULATE I 538a; POSTULATE 2 541b
16 PTOLEMY: 4lmagest, BK III, 83a; 86b-87a;
IX, 270b-273a; 291a-292a; BK XIII, 429a-b
16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heave
Spheres, BK I, 513b-514b; BK In, 628b-629
BK IV, 675b-678a; BK V, 740a-b; 784b-785
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK IV, 863b-872b; 890
892a; 929a-b; 932a-933a;BK v, 964b; 96
967a; 984b-985b; 991a-994b I Harn10nies
the World, 1023b-1080b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q32 ,
I, REP 2 175d-178a
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 258d-259a
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK VI, 108b-110b
28GALILE:O: Two New Sciences. SECOND D.A.
17ge-d; THIRD DAY, 203d-205
FOURTH DAY, 240d-241e
28 HARVEY: Circulation of the Blood, 316a-31
passim, esp 316a-b / On 4nimal Generatio
.
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK I, A;H 66 114-
l15c,; BK II, APH 36, 165d-166b; APH 46, 17
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 23a-c
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 72, 182bl Vacuunz,367a-37
34 N E\VTON: Principles, BK II, HYPOTHESIS. 259
BK III, HYPOTHESIS I 285a; HYPOTHESIS
331b; GENERAL SCHOL, 371b-372a I Opt
BK I, 3.79a; BK III, 516a-544a esp 520a-522
525b-530'b '
34 HUYGENS: Light, CH I, 557b-560b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, CHI
SECT 16 317a-e; CH XII,SECT 13 362e-d
36 S'VIFT: Gulliver, PART III, 118a-119a '
42 KANT: Pure Reason, ; Science
Right, 457a-b I judgement, 603b-c
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 44Sb-e
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART:!,
lOb
4SFARADAY: Researches in Electricity,
758a-75ge; 777d-778e; 830b-832c; 850b
85Sa,e esp850b,d-851c
THE GREAT.IDEAS 4to
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 239c I Descel
Man, 590a
5,1 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XUI, 563a-b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 324b; 862a-866a; 882
884b
54FREUI>: Interpretation :of Dreams, 351c ! N
cissism, 400d-401il/ Beyond the PleasurePri
pIe, 661c-662b
(3. The joundations oj mathematics: postulates,
assumptions. )
[I06Ia29-b4] 58ge; BK XIII, CH 2 [I077blt]...;.
CH 3 [I078a3I] 609a-d
9 ARISTOTLE:' Ethics, BK VII, CH 8 [II5IaI5-I9]
402a
11 EUCLID: Elements, BK I, POSTULATES-COMMON
NOTIONS 2a
11 ARCHIMEDES: Sphere and Cylinder, .BK. I, AS-
SUMPTIONS 404b I Spirals, 484b I Quadrature.
ofthe Parabola, S27a-b '. . .'.' ,
31 DESCARTES: Rules, II, 2d-3b /Meditations,
73a I Geometry, BK II,304a-305a; 316a-b
33 PASCAL:' Pensees, 1-5 171.a-173a I Vacuum,
365b-366a I Geolnetrical Demonstration, 430b-
439b passim; 442a-443b '
34 NEWTON: Principles, 1a-b
34 HUYGENS: Light, PREF, 551b-552a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH XII,
SECT 1-7 358c-360c passim
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 17d-18d; 24e-25b; 46a-c;
l10a; 211c-218d esp 217a-c I Practical Reason,
302d-303b; 312e-d; 330d-331a I Pref. Meta-
physical Elements ofEthics, 376e-d I judgement,
551a-553c
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103c-l04a
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445b-c
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 175b
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BKV, 120d;.
121b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 869a-870a; 874a-878a
758
4. The role of hypotheses in science
7 PLATO: Meno, 183b-e/ Republic" BK VI, 386d-
3B8a I Timaeus, 447a-d
8 ARISTOTLE: Meteorology, BK T [344
a
5-9]
450b I Metaphysics, BK,XII, CH 6
7 [I072a22] 601b-602b; CH8
10 HIPPOCRATES: Prognostics, par I 19a-b; par 25
26a,c
16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly
Spheres, 505a-506a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 32, A
I, REP 2 175q.-178a; PART I-II,QI4, A 6, ANS
680e-681a
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK I, APH 15-106
128b-c
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 23a-c I Discourse,
PART VI, 66a-b
33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 368b-370a
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, RULE I 270a;RULE
IV 271b; GENERAL SCHOL, 371b-372a I Optics,
BK III, 543a-b
35 LOCKE: I!uman Understanding,' BK' IV, CH III,
SECT 16 317a-e; CH XII,SECT 12-I3362a-d
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART III, 118a-119a
42 KANT: Pure Reason,7a-d I judgement, 603b-c
45 LAVOISIER: Elements ofChemistry, PREF, 2a-b;
6d--7a;PART I, 23b-c
45 FOURIER: Theory ofHeat, 184a
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 467a-b;
607a,c; 851a-c
ADDITIONALREADINGS
idea; and they also say that they have different
ideas about the same thing, meaning that they
understand the same thing differently.
The word "idea" has many other oppositions
of meaning in its tremendous range of ambigu-
ity. It is sometimes used exclusively for the
eternal types in the divine mind .or the intel-
ligible forms that exist apart from material
things which are their copies;<sometimes for
concepts in the human mind, abstracted from
sense-experience; sometimes the seeds of
understanding which belong. innately to the
intellect and so do not need to be derived from
sense. Sometimes "idea" means a sensation or a
perception as well as an abstract tho,ught; and
then its connotation extends to almost every
type of mental content; sometimes it is denied
that there are any abstract or general ideas; and
sometimes "idea" has the extremely restricted
meaning of an image which is the memory of a
sense-impression.
Kant vigorously protests against what he
thinks is a needless abuse of the term idea. "I
beg those who really have philosophy at heart,"
he writes, "to exert themselves to preserve to
the expression idea its original signification."
There is, he insists, "no want of words to de-
nominate adequately every mode of representa-
tion wi thout encroaching upon terms which are
proper to others."
Kant proposes a "graduated list" of such
terms. He begins with perception, which he di-
vides into sensation and cognition, according as
it is subjective or objective. A cognition, he
then goes 011, "is ei ther an intuition or a con-
ception, " according as it has ei ther an imlne-
diate or a mediate relation to its object. Di-
viding conceptions into the empirical and the
pure, Kant finally reaches the term idea as one
sub-division of pure conceptions. If the pure
conception "has its origin in the understanding
761
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 3T IDEA
S THE WORD "idea," when it is used in the
nical discourse of metaphysics or psychol-
, signify that which is known or under-
d? Does it signify, not the object of thought,
the thought jtself? Or both? Certainly in
ular speech the word is. used both ways, for
speak of understanding an idea and note
erences in their understanding of the same
the .topical analysis or outline in each
chapter indicates, the great ideas are not
Ie objects of thought. Each of the great
sseems to have a complex interior structure
order of parts involving related meanings
diverse positions which, when they are
sed to one another, determine the basic
es in that area of thought.
he great ideas are also the conceptions by
ch we think about things. They are the
sin which we state fundamental problems;
are the notions we employ in defining
s and discussing them. They represent the
,ipal content of our thought. They are
we think as well as what we think about.
, in addition to its objects and content,
ish to think about thought itself-its acts
rocesses-we shall find in the tradition of
great books a number of related terms
ch indicate the scope ofsuch inquiry. Some
hem are: idea, judgment, understanding,
reasoning; perception, memory, and imag-
tion; sense and mind. Here we are concerned
.h one of these-the idea IDEA. It is probably
most elementary of all these related terms,
according to different conceptions of the
re and origin of ideas, the analysis of
ught and knowledge will vary. Different
itions will be taken concerning the faculties
which men know, the acts and processes of
king, and the limi ts of human understand-
58a-b; CH 29 62d-63d; CH44 68d-690'
CH I I -14 81b-84b / Posterior Analytics: B
CH 6 125d-126b '
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q
A 13, REP 2 86d-88c;Q 19, A 8, RE
116a-d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 3ge-41e e'sp 40
51d-52a; 110d-111e esp 111h;1
17ge-180e; 193a-200e esp 194b-d; 232
/ Fund. Prin.Metaphysic of lv10rals
267a esp 266a-e / Practical Reason,' 2
298a
BERNARD. Introduction to Experimental' Me
PART I, CH 2
TYNDALL. Scientific Use ofthe Imagination
JEVONS. The Principles of Science, CH 23
BRADLEY. The Principles of Logic, BK I, CH 2
BOSANQUET. Logic, VOL II, CH 5
C. S. PEIRCE. Collected Papers, VOL II, par 619
755-791; VOL vI,par 7-34
VENN. Principles of Empirical or Inductive
CH 16
POINCARE. Science and llypothesis, PART I
9-10
MACH. Erkenntnis und Irrtum (Die Hypothese
DUHEM. La theorie physique, son objet-sa
ture
PARETO. The Mind and Society, VOL I, ClI 4-5
N. R. CAMPBELL. Physics) the Elements, cH6
-.-. WhatIs Science?, GH 5
BOHR. Atomic Theory and the Description of
NORTHROP. Science and First Principles .....
EINSTEIN. On the Method of Theoretical Phys
FISHER. The Design of Experiments
DEWEY. Logic, the Theory of Inquiry, Cli 7
THE GREAT IDEAS
(4. The role of hypothe,ses in science. 4d.The task
of verification: the plurality oj hypotheses.)
54 FREUD: Narcissism, 401a / General Introduc-
tion, 502d-503e I New Introductory Lectures,
815a-b; 818e-819b
5. Hypothetical propositions and syllogisms:
the distinction between the hypothetical
and the categoricai
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics,BK I, CHI [24a2I-
b I 6] 39a-e; CH 23 [40b23-29] 57b-e; [4Ia21-41]
760
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: The distinction between axioms and. postulates, assumptions, and hypotheses, see JUDG
Sa; PRINCIPLE 2b(2}, 3c-3c(3); TRUTH 4c, 7a.
Other discussions of the use of hypotheses in dialectic and philosophy, see DIALECTICl
LOGIC 4d;PHILOSOPHY 3b-3c; and for the distinction between scientific and dialect
reasoning, see PRINCIPLE 3C(2); REASONINGSb-sc.
Other discussions of postulates in mathematics, see LOGIC 4a; 3a; an
other treatments of hypothetical judgments and hypothetical reasoning, see JUDGMEN
REASONING 2h.
The employment and verification. of hypotheses in empirical science, see ASTRONOM
EXPERIENCE sa-5c; LOGIC 4b; MECHANICS 2b;PHYSICS 4b-4d; SCIENCE 4e, se..
Listed below are works not included in Great Books ofthe Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
I. Works by authors represented in this collection.
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings \vhich follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
I.
DESCARTES. The Principles of Philosophy, PART III,
43-47
HOBBES. Concerning Body, PART IV, CH 26
SPINOZA. Correspondence, VI, XIII
KANT. Introduction to Logic, x
J. S. MILL. A System of Logic, BK III,CH 14
II.
ARNAULD. Logic or the Art of Thinking, PART II
BOYLE. Reflections upon the Hypothesis ofAlkali and
Acidum
T. REID. Essays on the Intellectual Powers ofMan, I,
ClI 3
BROWN. Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human
Mind, VOL I, pp 220-241
HERSCHEL. A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of
Natural Philosophy, par 202, 208, 210, 216
COMTE. The Positive Philosophy, BK III, CH I
WHEWELL. The Philosophy ofthe Inductive Sciences,
VOL II, BK XIII
--. On the Philosophy of Discovery, APPENDIX H