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BERNATH LECTURE
TheNewInternational History of the
ColdWar:
Three(Possible) Paradigms*
TheCold War isnot what it oncewas. Not only hastheconict itself been
writtenaboutinthepasttenseformorethanadecade,buthistorianscertainties
about the character of the conict have also begun to blur. The concerns
broughtonbytrendsof thepastdecade suchtriesasglobalization,weapons
proliferation, andethnicwarfare havemade evenold strategy busquestion
thedegreetowhichtheColdWar ought tobeput at thecenter of thehistory
of thelatetwentiethcentury.InthisarticleI will trytoshowhowsomepeople
withinour eldareattemptingto meet suchqueriesbyreconceptualizingthe
ColdWar aspart of contemporaryinternational history. Myemphasiswill be
onissuesconnectingtheColdWar denedasapolitical conictbetweentwo
power blocs andsomeareasof investigationthat inmy opinionholdmuch
promisefor reformulatingour viewsof that conict, blithely summed up as
ideology, technology, andtheThirdWorld.
i
I have called this lecture Three (Possible) Paradigms not just to avoid
makingtoopresumptuousanimpressionontheaudiencebut alsotoindicate
that my use of the termparadigm is slightly dierent fromthe one most
peoplehavetaken over from ThomasKuhnsworkon scientic revolutions. In
thehistory of science, aparadigmhascometomeanacomprehensiveexpla-
nation, akindof scienticlevelthat sustainsexistingtheoryuntil overtaken
by anewand dierent paradigm. In thehistory of humansocieties, I would
venture, thetermparadigmmust takeonaslightlydierent meaning, closer,
in fact, to howthetermwasgenerally used beforeKuhnswork in theearly
i,cos.Forour purpose,I wanttolookatparadigmsaspatternsof interpretation,
which may possibly exist side by side, but which each signify a particular
Dirroa+ic His+or\, Vol. z,, No. , (Fall zooo). zooo TheSocietyfor Historiansof American
ForeignRelations(SHAFR). PublishedbyBlackwell Publishers, ,o MainStreet, Malden, MA,
ozi,, USAandio CowleyRoad, Oxford, OX, iJF, UK.
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*Stuart L. BernathMemorial Lecturedeliveredat St. Louis, i April zooo. A draft versionof
thislecturewaspresentedtoafacultyseminar at theLondonSchool of Economicson, March
zooo. Theauthor wishestothank hisLSE colleagues(especially MacGregor Knox) andDavid
Reynoldsof CambridgeUniversityfor their helpful comments(whileabsolvingthemfromany
responsibilityfor thelectures contents).
i. For moreonhowColdWar studiesisdevelopingasaeldof inquiryseeOddArneWestad,
ed., ReviewingtheCold War:Approaches, Interpretations, Theory(London, zooo).
approach anangleof view, if I may tothecomplexproblemsof ColdWar
history.
z
Thisis, of course, alsotoindicategenuinedoubtastowhether comprehen-
siveandmutually exclusiveinterpretations of theColdWar asa phenomenon
arepossible today. It seems to methat both our general approaches to how
history isstudiedandtheemergenceof massivenewbodiesof evidencelead
in the direction of analytical diversity and away fromtheconcentration on
so-called schools of interpretation. If onelooks at theway theCold War is
taught at my school, one nds a multitude of approaches: as U.S. political
history, ashistoryof theSoviet Union, ashistoryof ThirdWorldrevolutions,
as historyof Europeanintegration, as history of gender relations, ashistory of
economicglobalizationjusttomentionafew.Fewof ourcolleaguestwenty-ve
yearsagowouldhaveforeseenhowtheeldhasopenedupandspreadoutway
beyond diplomatic history. Our task now, it seems to me, is to nd ways to
describe, inlookingat thislongaxisof analysis, pointsthat seemparticularly
promisingforfurtherscholarlyinquiry,basedonacombinationof workalready
undertakenandthe availabilityof sources.
I have chosentodiscussthreesuchpossibleparadigms in thisarticle. They
aretheonesthatseemtomebestsuitedforrapidadvancesinourunderstanding
of theCold War asaperiod or asan international system, and not just asa
bilateral conict or asdiplomatichistory.
irroroc\
Perhapsthemostuseful andcertainlythemostmisused of theparadigms
I will beaddressinghereisthatof ideology,understoodasasetof fundamental
conceptssystematically expressedbyalarge groupof individuals. Integrating
the study of such fundamental concepts into our approach to international
history holds tremendous promiseasamethod within aeld that has often
ignoredideasasthebasisfor humanaction. Usedinwaysthat aresensitiveto
historical evidence and consistent in their application, the introduction of
ideologyasapartof our understandingof motivesandbroadpatternsof action
helpsusovercometwo of themainproblemsthat international historiansof
theColdWaroftenface.Oneisthatweareseentobebetteratexplainingsingle
eventsthanweareat analyzingcausesandconsequencesof larger historical
shifts.Theother isthatweare rightly,I believe oftenseenasusinganarrow
concept of causality, mostly connectedtointerests or statepolicies.