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CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa !!"- !!


Jurisdiction VILLENA vs. PAYOYO (April 27, 2007) FACTS: Payoyo and Novaline, Inc., through its president, Villena, entered into a contract for the delivery and installation of itchen ca!inets in Payoyo"s residence. #he ca!inets $ere to !e delivered $ithin %0 days fro& do$npay&ent of '0( of the purchase price. A do$npay&ent $as paid. Another contract $as entered into for the delivery of ho&e appliances and Villena also paid the do$npay&ent. Villena faled to install the itchen ca!inets and deliver the appliances. Payoyo filed a co&plaint for recovery of a su& of &oney and da&ages against Villena. Petitioner posits that the )#* has no +urisdiction over the co&plaint since it is &ainly for recovery of a su& of &oney in the a&ount of P,-.,-2,.'0 $hich is !elo$ the +urisdictional a&ount set for )#*s. ISSUE: /hether or not the trial court has +urisdiction over the case RULING: 012, )#* has +urisdiction. In deter&ining the +urisdiction of an action $hose su!+ect is incapa!le of pecuniary esti&ation, the nature of the principal action or re&edy sought &ust first !e ascertained. If it is pri&arily for the recovery of a su& of &oney, the clai& is considered capa!le of pecuniary esti&ation and the +urisdiction of the court depends on the a&ount of the clai&. 3ut, $here the pri&ary issue is so&ething other than the right to recover a su& of &oney, $here the &oney clai& is purely incidental to, or a conse4uence of, the principal relief sought, such are actions $hose su!+ects are incapa!le of pecuniary esti&ation, hence cogni5a!le !y the )#*s. Verily, $hat deter&ines the nature of the action and $hich court has +urisdiction over it are the allegations of the co&plaint and the character of the relief sought. Th co!"#$int% $#& it ntit# d $s on 'or co## ction o' $ su! o' !on ( )ith d$!$* s% is on inc$"$&# o' " cuni$r( sti!$tion+ thus% on )ithin th RTC,s -urisdiction. Th $## *$tions th r in sho) th$t it is $ctu$##( 'or &r $ch o' contr$ct . A case for !reach of contract is a cause of action either for specific perfor&ance or rescission of contracts. An action for rescission of contract, as a counterpart of an action for specific perfor&ance, is incapa!le of pecuniary esti&ation, and therefore falls under the +urisdiction of the )#*. #he aver&ents in the co&plaint sho$ that Payoyo sought the cancellation of the contracts and refund of the do$npay&ents since Villena failed to co&ply $ith the o!ligation to deliver the appliances and install the itchen ca!inets su!+ect of the contracts. /hile the respondent prayed for the refund, this is +ust incidental to the &ain action, $hich is the rescission or cancellation of the contracts. Petition 61NI16. (7a55ie 2arona ) LARANO vs. SPS. CALEN.ACION (7une ,%, 2007) FACTS: 8arano o$ns a parcel of riceland. Petitioner and respondents e9ecuted a *ontract to 2ell. 6o$npay&ent of P '00,000 of the P ': purchase price $as &ade. Pending full pay&ent of the purchase price, possession of the riceland $as transferred to respondents under the condition that they shall account for and deliver the harvest fro& said riceland to petitioner. )espondents, ho$ever, failed to pay the install&ents and to account for and deliver the harvest fro& said riceland. Petitioner sent respondents a de&and letter to vacate !ut such de&and $ent unheeded. Petitioner filed a co&plaint against the respondents for unla$ful detainer !efore the :#*, praying that respondents !e directed to vacate the riceland and to pay P.00,000.00 per year fro& 2epte&!er ,%%- until they vacate, as reasona!le co&pensation for the use of the property, P,20,000.00 as attorney;s fees, and P'0,000.00 as litigation e9penses. )espondents alleged that the :#* has no +urisdiction over the case !ecause the co&plaint failed to allege that a de&and to pay and to vacate the riceland $as &ade upon the&. ISSUE: /hether or not the co&plaint is one for unla$ful detainer. RULING: N<, it is not for unla$ful detainer. 7urisdiction in e+ect&ent cases is deter&ined !y the allegations pleaded in the co&plaint. #he test for deter&ining the sufficiency of those allegations is $hether, ad&itting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid +udg&ent in accordance $ith the prayer of the plaintiff. In unla$ful detainer, the possession $as originally la$ful !ut !eca&e unla$ful !y the e9piration or ter&ination of the right to possess= hence, the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff;s cause of action is the ter&ination of the defendant;s right to continue in possession. Petitioner, as vendor, &ust co&ply $ith t$o re4uisites for the purpose of !ringing an e+ect&ent suit> (a) there &ust !e failure to pay the install&ent due or co&ply $ith the conditions of the *ontract to 2ell= and (!) there &ust !e de&and !oth to pay or to co&ply and

vacate $ithin the periods specified in 2ection 2 of )ule 70, na&ely> ,' days in case of land and ' days in case of !uildings. #hus, ! r '$i#ur to "$( th inst$##! nt du or vio#$tion o' th t r!s o' th Contr$ct to S ## do s not $uto!$tic$##( r nd r $ " rson,s "oss ssion un#$)'u#. Furth r!or % th *ivin* o' such d !$nd !ust & $## * d in th co!"#$int+ oth r)is % th /TC c$nnot $c0uir -urisdiction ov r th c$s . /hat is clear is that in the *o&plaint, petitioner alleged that respondents had violated the ter&s of the *ontract to 2ell. ?o$ever, the *o&plaint failed to state that petitioner &ade de&ands upon respondents to co&ply $ith the conditions of the contract @ the pay&ent of the install&ents and the accounting and delivery of the harvests fro& the su!+ect riceland. #he ,0Aday period granted respondents to vacate even fell short of the ,'Aday period &andated !y la$. /hen the co&plaint does not satisfy the +urisdictional re4uire&ents of a valid cause for unla$ful detainer, the :#* does not have +urisdiction to hear the case. Petition 61NI16. (7a55ie 2arona ) 1AUTISTA vs. /AG2ISA V.A. .E VILLENA (2ept. ,B, 200.) FACTS: A parcel of land $as originally o$ned !y *aluag. #he original tenantAtiller of this land $as A4uilino Villena, hus!and of respondent. #he tenancy relationship dated !ac to ,%.C and continued even after the de&ise of A4uilino through his surviving spouse, 2usana. Dpon the instruction of *aluag, the house of 2usana $as transferred to the su!+ect lot, !ecause *aluag had given 2usana a portion thereof $ith an area of ,000 s4uare &eters as ho&e lot and seed!ed. 2ince then, 2usana had !een in peaceful possession thereof until ,%-7 $hen a case for e+ect&ent $as filed against her !y petitioners. Petitioners argue that no tenancy relationship e9ists $ith respect to the su!+ect lot, since the property is a residential and not an agricultural land. #hey further contend that even on the assu&ption that a tenancy relationship e9isted, the *A erred in considering the area as respondent;s ho&e lot. According to the&, a ho&e lot should !e constituted on the far& that the lessee is tilling, not on the residential lot of the lando$ner. Eor these reasons, they clai& that +urisdiction lies $ith the regular courts, not $ith the 6A)A3. ISSUE: /hether or not this case falls under the e9clusive +urisdiction of the 6epart&ent of Agrarian )efor& Ad+udication 3oard (6A)A3) 3EL.: 012, it falls under the e9clusive +urisdiction of the 6A)A3. Eor agrarian refor& cases, +urisdiction is vested in the 6epart&ent of Agrarian )efor& (6A))= &ore specifically, in the 6A)A3. #he instant case involves the tenancy rights of respondent against petitioners. *onse4uently, there e9ists an agrarian dispute cogni5a!le !y the 6A)A3. )espondent $as a tenant of petitioners; predecessors. )espondent;s rights as an agricultural lessee are therefore enforcea!le against :aria 8ope5 and 8oren5o *aluag;s transferees, herein petitioners. #here is no legal !asis for petitioners; restrictive interpretation of the +urisdiction of the 6A)A3. Its -urisdiction nco!"$ss s 4$## $*r$ri$n dis"ut s% c$s s% controv rsi s% $nd !$tt rs or incid nts invo#vin* th i!"# ! nt$tion o' $## $*r$ri$n #$)s.5 A ho! #ot is incid nt to $ t n$nt6s ri*hts. Th ri*ht to r t$in or r !ov it is th r 'or $n $*r$ri$n dis"ut th$t shou#d & r so#v d &( th .ARA1. ?aving situated the ho&e lot on the su!+ect lot since ,%'7, respondent can !e e+ected therefro& only for cause or upon proof that the tenancy relationship has already !een severed. Petitioners should prove !efore the 6A)A3 their grounds for e+ect&ent. Petition 61NI16. (7a55ie 2arona )

O/ICTIN% vs.COURT OF APPEALS (7anuary 22, 2007) FACTS:Private respondent Feorge I. 8agos $as charged $ith the cri&e of estafa under Article B,', par. ,(!) of the )evised Penal *ode !efore the )egional #rial *ourt ()#*). ?e filed a &otion to suspend proceedings on the !asis of a pre+udicial 4uestion !ecause of a pending petition $ith the 2ecurities and 19change *o&&ission (21*) involving the sa&e parties. #he trial court denied respondent"s &otion to suspend proceedings. #he *A granted the &otion to suspend proceedings. #he 21* case $as transferred to the )egional #rial *ourt ()#*) pursuant to A.:. No. 00A,,A0BA2* i&ple&enting the 2ecurities and )egulation *ode ()epu!lic Act No. -7%%) enacted on 7uly ,%, 2000, vesting in the )#*s +urisdiction over intraAcorporate disputes. ISSUE:/hether or not a pre+udicial 4uestion e9ists to $arrant the suspension of the cri&inal proceedings pending the resolution of the intraAcorporate controversy that $as originally filed $ith the 21*. RULING:0es. A "r -udici$# 0u stion is d 'in d $s th$t )hich $ris s in $ c$s % th r so#ution o' )hich is $ #o*ic$# $nt c d nt o' th issu invo#v d th r in $nd th co*ni7$nc o' )hich " rt$ins to $noth r tri&un$#. ?ere, the case $hich $as lodged originally !efore the 21* and $hich is no$ pending !efore the )#* !y virtue of

CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa !!"- !!#$

)epu!lic Act No. -7%% involves facts that are inti&ately related to those upon $hich the cri&inal prosecution is !ased. Dlti&ately, the resolution of the issues raised in the intraAcorporate dispute $ill deter&ine the guilt or innocence of private respondent in the cri&e of estafa filed against hi& !y petitioner !efore the )#* of :a ati. ISSUE:/hether or not the doctrine of pri&ary +urisdiction applies RULING: 0es.8i e$ise, !y analogy, the doctrin o' "ri!$r( -urisdiction &ay !e applied in this case. #he issues raised !y petitioner particularly the status of 2aag Phils., Inc. visAGAvis 2aag (2) Pte. 8td., as $ell as the 4uestion regarding the supposed authority of the latter to &a e a de&and on !ehalf of the co&pany, are proper su!+ects for the deter&ination of the tri!unal hearing the intraA corporate case $hich in this case is the )#* of :andaluyong,. #hese issues $ould have !een referred to the e9pertise of the 21* in accordance $ith the doctrine of pri&ary +urisdiction had the case not !een transferred to the )#* of :andaluyong. 2trictly spea ing, the o!+ective of the doctrine of pri&ary +urisdiction is to guide a court in deter&ining $hether it should refrain fro& e9ercising its +urisdiction until after an ad&inistrative agency has deter&ined so&e 4uestion or so&e aspect of so&e 4uestion arising in the proceeding !efore the court. Th court c$nnot or )i## not d t r!in $ controv rs( invo#vin* $ 0u stion )hich is )ithin th -urisdiction o' th $d!inistr$tiv tri&un$# "rior to r so#vin* th s$! % )h r th 0u stion d !$nds th 8 rcis o' sound $d!inistr$tiv discr tion r 0uirin* s" ci$# 9no)# d* % 8" ri nc $nd s rvic s in d t r!inin* t chnic$# $nd intric$t !$tt rs o' '$ct. /hile the a!ove doctrine refers specifically to an ad&inistrative tri!unal, the *ourt !elieves that the circu&stances in the instant case do not proscri!e the application of the doctrine, as the role of an ad&inistrative tri!unal such as the 21* in deter&ining technical and intricate &atters of special co&petence has !een ta en on !y specially designated )#*s !y virtue of )epu!lic Act No. -7%%. ?ence, the )#* $here the intraAcorporate case is pending has the pri&ary +urisdiction to deter&ine the issues under contention relating to the status of the do&estic corporation, 2aag Phils., Inc., visAGAvis 2aag Pte. 8td.= and the authority of petitioner to act on !ehalf of the do&estic corporation, the deter&ination of $hich $ill have a direct !earing on the cri&inal case. Th #$) r co*ni7 s th$t% in "#$c o' th SEC% th r *u#$r courts no) h$v th # *$# co!" t nc to d cid intr$2cor"or$t dis"ut s. (Norli5a :a&u id )

#he $ord int r#ocutor( refers to so&ething intervening !et$een the co&&ence&ent and the end of the suit $hich decides so&e point or &atter !ut is not a final decision of the $hole controversy. A I 'in$#; -ud*! nt or ord r is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing &ore to !e done !y the *ourt in respect thereto, e.g., an ad+udication on the &erits $hich, on the !asis of the evidence presented on the trial, declares categorically $hat the rights and o!ligations of the parties are and $hich party is in the right= or a +udg&ent or order that dis&isses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. <nce rendered, the tas of the *ourt is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or deter&ining the rights and lia!ilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing &ore re&ains to !e done !y the *ourt e9cept to a$ait the parties" ne9t &ove ($hich a&ong others, &ay consist of the filing of a &otion for ne$ trial or reconsideration, or the ta ing of an appeal) and ulti&ately, of course, to cause the e9ecution of the +udg&ent once it !eco&es IfinalI or, to use the esta!lished and &ore distinctive ter&, Ifinal and e9ecutory.I *onversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the *ourt"s tas of ad+udicating the parties" contentions and deter&ining their rights and lia!ilities as regards each other, !ut o!viously indicates that other things re&ain to !e done !y the *ourt, is ;int r#ocutor(; e.g., an order denying &otion to dis&iss under )ule ,C of the )ules, or granting of &otion on e9tension of ti&e to file a pleading, or authori5ing a&end&ent thereof, or granting or denying applications for postpone&ent, or production or inspection of docu&ents or things, etc. Dnli e a ;'in$#; -ud*! nt or ord r% $hich is appeala!le, as a!ove pointed out, an ;int r#ocutor(; ord r &ay not !e 4uestioned on appeal e9cept only as part of an appeal that &ay eventually !e ta en fro& the final +udg&ent rendered in the case. Sinc $n Ord r d n(in* $ /otion to .is!iss do s not 'in$##( dis"os o' th c$s % $nd in '' ct% $##o)s th c$s to "roc d unti# th 'in$# $d-udic$tion th r o' &( th court% th n such ord r is ! r #( int r#ocutor( in n$tur . /e find occasion here to state the rule, once &ore, that $n ord r d n(in* $ !otion to dis!iss is ! r #( int r#ocutor( $nd th r 'or not $"" $#$&# % nor c$n it & su&- ct o' $ " tition 'or r vi ) on c rtior$ri. 2uch order &ay only !e revie$ed in the ordinary course of la$ !y an appeal fro& the +udg&ent after trial. #he ordinary procedure to !e follo$ed in that event is to file an ans$er, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal fro& the final +udg&ent. As a * n r$# ru# , an interlocutory order is not appeala!le until after the rendition of the +udg&ent on the &erits for a contrary rule $ould delay the ad&inistration of +ustice and unduly !urden the courts. ?o$ever, $e have ruled that certiorari is an appropriate re&edy to assail an interlocutory order <=> $hen the tri!unal issued such order $ithout or in e9cess of +urisdiction or $ith grave a!use +urisdiction and <?> $hen the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the re&edy of appeal $ould not afford ade4uate and e9peditious relief. ISSUE:/hether or not petitioner is in estoppel to 4uestion the +urisdiction of the *ourt. RULING:0es.IDnli e :anchester, ho$ever, $ere the +urisdictional issue arising fro& insufficiency of the doc et fee paid $as seasona!ly raised in the ans$er of the defendant in the trial court, in this case, the issue is !eing raised for the first ti&e. Petitioner su!&itted to the +urisdiction of the trial court $ithout 4uestion. It filed a counterclai& see ing affir&ative reliefs, and actively too part in the trial. A "$rt( )ho vo#unt$ri#( "$rtici"$t s in th tri$# c$nnot #$t r on r$is th issu o' th Court,s #$c9 o' -urisdiction. In the case at !ar, the said JpetitionerK filed their counterAclai& see ing affir&ative relief and then filed a &otion to dis&iss $ithout raising the issue of nonApay&ent of doc et fees. And $hen plaintiff"s $itness 6ra. 8ourdes 2. Pascual $as presented on direct e9a&ination the said JpetitionerK did not o!+ect and participated in the proceedings. It is only $hen the said $itness $as to !e cross e9a&ined that the issue of nonA pay&ent of doc et fees $as raised. *learly, the said JpetitionerK JisK in estoppel to 4uestion the +urisdiction of the *ourt. It is incu&!ent upon the petitioner to file a :otion to 6is&iss at the earliest opportune ti&e to raise the issue of the court"s lac of +urisdiction, &ore so, that this issue is suscepti!le to laches. P tition r,s '$i#ur to s $son$&#( r$is th 0u stion o' -urisdiction # $ds us to th in vit$&# conc#usion th$t it is no) &$rr d &( #$ch s to $ss$i# th /$ni#$ RTC,s -urisdiction ov r th c$s . (Norli5a :a&u id ) RIVERA vs. RIVERA 3EL.: Dnla$ful detainer case is still under the +urisdiction of the :e#* even if there $as an assertion of o$nership. 8o$er court;s ad+udication of o$nership is only provisional. (Hahlil 1l!an!uena ) SEA PO@ER vs. CA

RIVERA vs. .EL ROSARIO 3EL.: )espondents paid doc et fees as assessed !y cler of court !ut $as later found incorrect. #hey should only pay the deficiency and +urisdiction is not auto&atically lost. (Hahlil 1l!an!uena ) UNITE. OVERSEAS 1AN: VS. 3ON. JU.GE REYNAL.O ROS August 07, 2007 FACTS:Private respondent )ose&oor :ining and 6evelop&ent *orporation filed an action for da&ages, accounting, release of the !alance of the loan and &achinery and annul&ent of foreclosure sale against petitioner !efore the )#* of :anila. Petitioner filed an Drgent :otion to 6is&iss the private respondent"s co&plaint on the ground of i&proper venue. *onse4uently, the private respondent a&ended its *o&plaint, this ti&e praying for Accounting, )elease of the 3alance of the 8oan and 6a&ages. #he )#* of :anila issued an <&ni!us )esolution denying the sa&e for lac of &erit. Private respondent filed a 2econd A&ended *o&plaint, dropping 8ourdes Pascual as plaintiff and i&pleaded the officers of the petitioners as defendants. Private respondent filed another action for In+unction $ith 6a&ages !efore the )#* of :alolos, 3ulacan. #he filing of the a!ove &entioned case pro&pted the petitioner to file a second :otion to 6is&iss !efore the )#* of :anila on the ground of foru& shopping. #he :anila )#* denied the second :otion to 6is&iss for lac or &erit. A third :otion to 6is&iss *ivil *ase $as filed !y the petitioner $ith the :anila )#* this ti&e raising the issue of +urisdiction. #he :anila )#* denied petitioner"s third :otion to 6is&iss *ivil *ase on the ground that petitioner $as already estopped to raise the issue. *ourt of Appeals affir&ed the :anila )#* <rders. ISSUE:/hether or not an appeal &ay !e ta en fro& an interlocutory order RULING:No appeal under )ule .' of the )evised )ules of *ourt, &ay !e ta en fro& an interlocutory order. In case of denial of an interlocutory order, the i&&ediate re&edy availa!le to the aggrieved party is to file an appropriate 2pecial *ivil Action for Certiorari under )ule C' of the )evised )ules of *ourt.

CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa !!"- !!#$

3EL.: Ero& N8)* to 2* not valid. Petition should !e )ule .' to *A. )ule C' to 2* only if there is grave a!use of discretion (Hahlil 1l!an!uena ) LAN. 1AN: OF T3E P3ILIPPINES VS. ASCOT 3OL.INGS <cto!er ,%, 2007 FACTS: After the Philippine Airlines (PA8) $as privati5ed, 8and 3an purchased fro& the National Fovern&ent PA8 shares. :inority stoc holders in P) ?oldings filed a case $ith the 2ecurities and 19change *o&&ission (21*), see ing the distri!ution of P) ?oldings; shares of stoc in PA8 to its stoc holders in proportion to their e4uity. 8and 3an , along $ith PN3, 63P, AEPA)232 and F2I2, have the soA called put-option to sell their PA8 shares of stoc to respondents and the latter are o!ligated to !uy the sa&e at Eive Pesos (P'.00) per share on the si9th year after the effectivity of the 2toc holders; Agree&ent. Instead of honoring the 2toc holders" Agree&ent, respondents filed $ith the )#* of :a ati a co&plaint against 8and 3an , PN3, 63P, F2I2, AEPA)232 and the )epu!lic of the Philippines, praying that they !e released fro& the o!ligation to !uy the PA8 shares of petitioner and other defendants therein at P'.00 per share, as earlier agreed upon under the 2toc holders" Agree&ent, on ground of alleged radical change in the conditions prevailing at the ti&e the said agree&ent $as entered and the present. . #rial court ruled in favor of the respondents. #rial court denied 8and 3an "s &otion for reconsideration. #herefro&, 8and 3an decided to go to the *A on a petition for revie$. Eor the purpose, it filed $ith the *A, a &otion for e9tension of ti&e to file the intended petition for revie$. #he &otion $as denied !y the *A. ISSUE:/hether or not the filing of a &otion for reconsideration !efore the trial court toll the regle&entary period to appeal the +udg&ent RULING:No. It is !eyond 4ui!!ling that the assailed L7udg&entM in *ivil *ase $as issued !y the )#* in the e9ercise of its special +urisdiction over intraAcorporate controversies under ).A. No. -7%%. *ivil *ase $as, therefore, governed !y the Interi& )ules of *orporate )eha!ilitation and the Interi& )ules of Procedure Foverning IntraA *orporate *ontroversies under ).A. No. -7%%, as $ell as A.:. No. 0.A%A07A2* of this *ourt prescri!ing the &ode of appeal fro& decisions of the )#* in intraAcorporate controversies. Dnder 2ection -(B), )ule , of the Interi& )ules of Procedure Foverning IntraA*orporate *ontroversies Dnder ).A. No. -7%%, motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of judgment or order, or for re-opening of trial are prohibited pleadings in said cases. 3 nc % th 'i#in* &( " tition r o' $ !otion 'or r consid r$tion & 'or th tri$# court did not to## th r *# ! nt$r( " riod to $"" $# th -ud*! nt via $ " tition 'or r vi ) und r Ru# AB o' th =CCD Ru# s o' Civi# Proc dur % $s $! nd d. As a conse4uence, the *A has no &ore +urisdiction to entertain the petition for revie$ $hich 8and 3an intended to file !efore it, &uch less to grant the &otion for e9tension of ti&e for the filing thereof. Th "rohi&it d !otion 'or r consid r$tion 'i# d &( th " tition r )ith th tri$# court did not sus" nd th " riod to $"" $# th RTC6s 4Jud*! nt5 . Cons 0u nt#(% th$t 4Jud*! nt5 & c$! 'in$# $nd 8 cutor( =E2d$(s th r $'t r. /hen petitioner filed a &otion for e9tension to file a petition for revie$ in the *A one hundred t$enty four (,2.) days after it received the )#* L7udg&ent,M there $as no &ore period to e9tend. Fiven these undenia!le facts, the *A cannot !e faulted for denying petitioner;s &otion for e9tension. #here is no a!use, &uch less grave a!use, of discretion, to spea of. (Norli5a :a&u id ) PILIPINO TELEP3ONE V. .ELFINO TECSON 3EL.: A contract of adhesion per se is not inefficacious. )espondent also secured si9 contracts, and therefore cannot !e said to have no opportunity to read and go over the ter&s and conditions of the contracts. (Hahlil 1l!an!uena ) Ru# A F V nu o' Actions UNIVERSAL RO1INA CORPORATION vs.AL1ERT LI/ <cto!er ', 2007 FACTS: Petitioner filed $ith the )egional #rial *ourt, a co&plaint against respondent for a su& of &oney. #he trial court issued an <rder dis&issing the co&plaint motu proprio on grounds of lac of +urisdiction and i&proper venue. ISSUE: /hether the trial court &ay dis&iss &otu proprio petitioner"s co&plaint on the ground of i&proper venue.

RULING: No. In personal actions, the plaintiff &ay co&&ence an action either in the place of his or her residence or the place $here the defendant resides. ?o$ever, the parties &ay agree to a specific venue $hich could !e in a place $here neither of the& resides. *orollarily, 2ection ,, )ule % of the ,%%7 )ules of *ivil Procedure provides for the instances $hen the trial court &ay motu proprio dis&iss a clai&, thus> Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. I&plicit fro& the a!ove provision is that i&proper venue not i&pleaded in the &otion to dis&iss or in the ans$er is dee&ed $aived. #hus, $ court !$( not dis!iss $n $ction motu proprio on th *round o' i!"ro" r v nu $s it is not on o' th *rounds )h r in th court !$( dis!iss $n $ction motu proprio on th &$sis o' th "# $din*s. (Norli5a :a&u id ) Ru# E F Su!!$r( Proc dur LUCAS vs. FA1ROS 7anuary B,, 2000 FACTS: Floria 8ucas charged respondent 7udge A&elia A. Ea!ros $ith Fross Ignorance of the 8a$ and Frave A!use of 6iscretion. *o&plainant alleged that 7udge Ea!ros issued an <rder in an e+ect&ent case granting the plaintiff"s :E) of the <rder $hich dis&issed the case for failure of plaintiff and her counsel to appear at the Preli&inary *onference. *o&plainant averred that it is ele&entary, under the )ules of 2u&&ary Procedure that an &otion :E) is prohi!ited, !ut respondent +udge, in violation of the rule, granted the &otion. 2he added that, not$ithstanding the fact that the respondent herself had pointed out in open court that the case is governed !y the )ules on 2u&&ary Procedure= the +udge ordered the revival of the case. Eurther, co&plainant alleged that the actuations of the respondent is in !latant disregard of the esta!lished rules on procedure, and it is an instance $here the doctrine of IP2A 8<NDI#<) &ay once again &ay !e applied !y the *ourt to discipline +udges. )espondent 7udge Ea!ros &aintained that she could not !e guilty of gross ignorance of the la$ as she no$s that a &otion for reconsideration of +udg&ent is a prohi!ited &otion in an e+ect&ent case. 2he e9plained that although there is already a +udg&ent dis&issing the case, she granted the plaintiff"s &otion for reconsideration in the interest of +ustice since the reasons stated in the &otion for reconsideration are &eritorious. ISSUE: /<N 7udge Ea!ros erred in granting the :E) RULING: No. As a rule an :E) is a prohi!ited pleading under 2ection ,% of the )evised )ule on 2u&&ary Procedure. #his rule, ho$ever, applies only $here the +udg&ent sought to !e reconsidered is one rendered on the &erits. As held !y the *ourt in an earlier case> I#he &otion prohi!ited !y this 2ection is that $hich see s reconsideration of the +udg&ent rendered !y the court after trial on the &erits of the case.I ?ere, the order of dis&issal issued !y respondent +udge due to failure of a party to appear during the preli&inary conference is o!viously not a +udg&ent on the &erits after trial of the case. ?ence, a &otion for the reconsideration of such order is not the prohi!ited pleading conte&plated under the present )ule on 2u&&ary Procedure. #hus, respondent +udge co&&itted no grave a!use of discretion, nor is she guilty of ignorance of the la$, in giving due course to the &otion for reconsideration su!+ect of the present co&plaint. (8endl Eloyd :ontes ) Ru# D F P$rts o' $ P# $din* PONCIANO vs. PARENTELA :ay %, 2000 FACTS: )espondents Ildefonso and 8eonora *la&osa filed a co&plaint for a su& of &oney against petitioners *laro and Floria Ponciano for unpaid cost of la!or and &aterials incurred !y the& in repairing petitioner"s house. Petitioners filed their ans$er $ith co&pulsory counterclai&, clai&ing that they have paid the total contract price agreed upon= that despite this, the $or of respondents $as defective= and that respondents a!andoned the renovation !efore it $as co&pleted. #he trial court ordered that petitioners; counterclai& !e stric en off for failure to co&ply $ith Ad&inistrative *ircular No. 0.A%., $hich re4uires an affidavit of nonAforu& shopping for all initiatory pleadings in all courts. Petitioners filed an :E) $hich the trial court denied.

CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa !!"- !!#$

ISSUE: /<N an ans$er $hich asserts a co&pulsory counterclai& &ust include a certificate of nonAforu& shopping, and if so, $hether or not the dis&issal of such co&pulsory counterclai& !y the trial court due to the a!sence of such certification has the effect of a dis&issal $ith pre+udice so as to !ar the party fro& reAfiling such co&pulsory counterclai&. RULING: No. #his very sa&e issue $as confronted in the case of 2anto #o&as Dniversity ?ospital v. 2urla, - $herein $e held that the a!oveA4uoted provisions of ad&inistrative *ircular No. 0.A%. do not apply to co&pulsory counterclai&s. 2pea ing for the *ourt, 7ustice Vitug e9plained that> It !ears stressing, once again, that the real office of Ad&inistrative *ircular No. 0.A%., &ade effective on 0, April ,%%., is to cur! the &alpractice co&&only referred to also as foru&Ashopping. #he language of the circular distinctly suggests that it is pri&arily intended to cover an initiatory pleading or an incipient application of a party asserting a clai& for relief. In the case at !ar, there is no dou!t that the counterclai&s pleaded !y petitioners in their ans$ers are co&pulsory in nature. #he filing of a separate action !y petitioners $ould only result in the presentation of the sa&e evidence as in *ivil *ase No. #:AC0,. Proceeding fro& our ruling in 2anto #o&as Dniversity ?ospital, petitioners need not file a certification of nonAforu& shopping since their clai&s are not initiatory in character, and therefore, are not covered !y the provisions of Ad&inistrative *ircular No. 0.A%.. (8endl Eloyd :ontes ) Ru# C F E'' ct o' F$i#ur to P# $d Phi#i""in 1$n9in* Cor"or$tion v. CA 3EL.: As a rule, proceedings already ta en should not !e distur!ed. /here a $itness of the plaintiff $as presented $hile the defendant $as declared in default, and the order of default $as su!se4uently lifted, it is $ithin the trial court;s decision to reopen the evidence su!&itted !y the plaintiff and allo$ the defendant to challenge the sa&e, !y crossAe9a&ining the plaintiff;s $itnesses or introducing countervailing evidence. (Hahlil 1l!an!uena ) RULE =G F A! nd d $nd Su""# ! nt$# P# $din*s P3ILIPPINE EHPORT AN. FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION vs. P3ILIPPINE INFRASTRUCTURES% INC.% 7anuary ,B, 200. FACTS> #he Petitioner filed a co&plaint for collection of su& of &oney against herein respondents on the !asis of 8etters of Fuarantee it issued in favor of the PN3 as security for various credit acco&&odations e9tended !y PN3 to respondents. 6uring the hearing, petitioner presented as its $itness its treasury depart&ent &anager $ho testified that the a&ount of P,%: $as paid !y it to the PN3 to cover the principal loan and interests, as guaranteed !y petitioner. *onse4uently, petitioner filed a :otion to A&end *o&plaint to *onfor& to 1vidence pursuant to 2ection ', )ule ,0 of the )evised )ules of *ourt, see ing to a&end its *o&plaint. Acting on the &otion to a&end, the trial court dis&issed the case $ithout pre+udice on the ground of failure of the co&plaint to state a cause of action. <n petition for revie$ on certiorari, the *A li e$ise dis&issed the petition on the ground that the real purpose of petitioner in as ing the trial court for leave to a&end its co&plaint $as not ostensi!ly to &a e the co&plaint confor& to the evidence presented, as petitioner alleges, !ut to introduce a cause of action then nonA e9isting $hen the co&plaint $as filed. ISSUE> /hether or not the lo$er court and the *A erred in dis&issing the case instead of granting Petitioner;s :otion to A&end. 3EL.> 0es. It should !e stressed that a&end&ent $as sought after petitioner had already presented evidence, &ore specifically, the testi&ony of petitioner;s #reasury 6epart&ent :anager. It is settled that even if the co&plaint !e defective, !ut the parties go to trial thereon, and the plaintiff, $ithout o!+ection, introduces sufficient evidence to constitute the particular cause of action $hich it intended to allege in the original co&plaint, and the defendant voluntarily produces $itnesses to &eet the cause of action thus esta!lished, an issue is +oined as fully and as effectively as if it had !een previously +oined !y the &ost perfect pleadings. 8i e$ise, $hen issues not raised !y the pleadings are tried !y e9press or i&plied consent of the parties, they shall !e treated in all respects as if they had !een raised in the pleadings. 1vidently, herein respondents; failure to o!+ect to the evidence at the ti&e it is presented in court is fatal to their cause inas&uch as

$hatever perceived defect the co&plaint had $as cured !y the introduction of petitioner;s evidence proving actual loss sustained !y petitioner due to pay&ent &ade !y it to PN3. #hus, the contention of respondents that the a&end&ent $ould introduce a su!se4uently ac4uired cause of action as there $as none at the ti&e the original co&plaint $as filed, is untena!le. ( 2ahara Alia 2ilongan ) Ru# =B2 Fi#in* $nd S rvic P$" rs o' P# $din*s% Jud*! nts $nd Oth r

ALFONSO vs. AN.RES <cto!er ., 2002 FACTS: #he original case involved a co&plaint for accion pu!liciana. It $as decided against herein petitioners in favor of the spouses Andres, no$ the respondents. <n 7uly ,', ,%%7, a copy of the decision $as served upon petitioners. <n 7uly ,7, ,%%7, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal, $ithout the assistance of counsel and $ithout pay&ent of the doc et and other la$ful fees. <n 7uly 2,, ,%%7, the )#* granted the notice of appeal. <n August 2', ,%%7, respondents herein, through counsel, filed a &otion to dis&iss petitioners; appeal, citing 2ection ,(c), )ule '0 of the ,%%7 )ules of *ivil Procedure. <n <cto!er %, ,%%7, the trial court dis&issed the &otion and directed petitioners to pay the proper fees to cure the technical defect. <n the sa&e date, petitioners paid the su!+ect fees. )espondents elevated the case to the *ourt of Appeals. Dpon a revie$ of the records, $hich included the proofs of pay&ent of the doc et and appeal fees, the appellate court nevertheless resolved to dis&iss the appeal. ISSUE: /<N the pay&ent of doc et and other la$ful fees $ithin the period for perfecting an appeal is &andatory and /<N petitioners have sho$n sufficient reason for the rela9ation of $hat other$ise should !e a stringent application of the rule RULING: At the outset, it should !e stressed that failure to pay the appellate doc et and la$ful fees is a serious &atter affecting the court;s +urisdiction. #i&e and again, $e have consistently held that Ithe pay&ent of doc et fees $ithin the prescri!ed period is &andatory for the perfection of an appeal. /ithout such pay&ent, the appellate court does not ac4uire +urisdiction over the su!+ect &atter of the action and the decision sought to !e appealed fro& !eco&es final and e9ecutory.I Appeal is not a right !ut a statutory privilege= thus, appeal &ust !e &ade strictly in accordance $ith provisions set !y la$. #he pay&ent of appellate doc et fee is not a &ere technicality of la$ or procedure !ut an essential re4uire&ent for the perfection of an appeal. ?o$ever, not$ithstanding the &andatory nature of such re4uire&ent, this *ourt has also held that Ithe strict application of the +urisdictional nature of the a!ove rule on pay&ent of appellate doc et fees &ay !e &itigated under e9ceptional circu&stances to !etter serve the interest of +ustice.I ?ence, $e resolve the second issue. ?as petitioners presented any sufficient or satisfactory reason for the rela9ation of the rulesO /e note that at the ti&e petitioners filed said notice of appeal on 7uly ,7, ,%%7, the )evised )ules of *ivil Procedure had then very recently ta en effect on 7uly ,, ,%%7. Indeed, as averred !y petitioners in the present case, at the ti&e of the filing of the notice of appeal, the changes introduced !y the ,%%7 )ules of *ivil procedure $ere yet novel, and even +udges and la$yers needed ti&e to fa&iliari5e the&selves $ith the rules intricacies. #he trial court ac no$ledged this fact $hen it resolved to grant the appeal, and favora!ly considered a li!eral application of the rules in the &eanti&e. Also &aterial is the fact that petitioners $ere not assisted !y counsel $hen they filed their notice of appeal. Indeed, it appears that on August 20, ,%%7, petitioners; for&er counsel &ade for&al the $ithdra$al of appearance fro& this case. /e also note that petitioners $ere not infor&ed !y the trial court that the doc et fees $ere already due at that ti&e. #his failure of the trial court &ight have ste&&ed fro& the recency of the rules. ?ence, fairness !ids us not to ta e this circu&stance against petitioners. (8endl Eloyd :ontes ) Ru# =A 2 Su!ons GO/EI v. COURT OF APPEALS% A.OLFO TROCINO AN. /ARIANO TROCINO F) N<. ,27C%2, ,- :arch 200. FACTS> 2o&eti&e in ,%7', spouses 7esus and *aridad #rocino &ortgaged 2 parcels of land to 6r. 0u+uico in *e!u *ity. #he &ortgage $as su!se4uently foreclosed. )espondentAspouses #rocino sold the lands to petitionerA spouses, $ho in turn redee&ed the lands fro& the &ortgagee.

CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa !!"- !!#$

?o$ever, the spouses #rocino refused to deliver the titles to petitionerAspouses. #hus, spouses Fo&e5 sued spouses #rocino for delivery of the titles. #he hus!and #rocino died !efore the suit $as filed, thus his children, including Adolfo #rocino and :ariano #rocino, $ere i&pleaded in the suit. 2u&&ons $as served, and it )$s on#( r c iv d &( C$rid$d Trocino in !ehalf of the children. #he trial court rendered +udg&ent against the spouses #rocino and their heirs. Adolfo and :ariano #rocino petitioned for the annul&ent of the +udg&ent of the )#* $ith the *A, alleging that no +urisdiction $as ac4uired over the&. At that ti&e, Adolfo #rocino $as a resident of <hio, D2A $hile :ariano #rocino $as a resident of #ali!on, 3ohol, and !oth $ere not found in *e!u *ity at the ti&e su&&ons $as served. ISSUES> ,. /hat $as the nature of the co&plaint, upon $hich the &anner of the service of su&&ons should !e !asedO 2. /as there a valid service of su&&onsO B. If personal service $ere i&possi!le to co&ply, $hat should have !een doneO RULINGS> ,. #he action $as an action in persona&. /hile it is a real action !ecause it affects title to or possession of land, it does not auto&atically follo$ that the action is one in re&. In a personal action, the plaintiff see s the recovery of personal property, the enforce&ent of a contract or the recovery of da&ages. A real action is one affecting title to real property or for the recovery of possession, or for partition or conde&nation of, or foreclosure of a &ortgage on real property. An action in persona& is an action against a person on the !asis of his personal lia!ility, $hile an action in re& is an action against the thing itself, instead of against the person. #he present case is an action in persona&, !ecause it is an action against persons, on the !asis of their personal lia!ility of nonAdelivery of titles. #hus, personal service of su&&ons upon the private respondents is essential in order for the court to ac4uire +urisdiction over their persons. 2. #here $as none. In actions in persona&, su&&ons on the defendant &ust !e served !y handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, !y tendering it to hi&. In su!stituted service, it is &andated that the fact of i&possi!ility of personal service should !e e9plained in the proof of service. /here the defendant in an action in " rson$! is a nonAresident $ho does not voluntarily su!&it hi&self to the authority of the court, personal service of su&&ons $ithin the 2tate is essential to ac4uire +urisdiction over his person. An e9ception $as accorded in Fe&perle v. 2chen er $herein service of su&&ons through the nonAresident;s $ife, $ho $as a resident of the Philippines, $as held valid, as the latter $as his representative and attorneyAinAfact in a prior civil case filed !y the nonAresident, and the second case $as &erely an offshoot of the first case. In an action in r ! or 0u$si in r !, +urisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prere4uisite to confer +urisdiction on the court provided the court ac4uires +urisdiction over the res, although su&&ons &ust !e served upon the defendant for purposes of due process. #hus, $here the defendant is a nonAresident and not found in the Philippines, and> ,. the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff= 2. the action relates to, or the su!+ect &atter of $hich is property in the Philippines in $hich the defendant has or clai&s a lien or interest= B. the action see s the e9clusion of the defendant fro& any interest in the property located in the Philippines= or .. the property of the defendant has !een attached in the Philippines, su&&ons &ay !e served e9tra+udicially !y> a. personal service out of the country, $ith leave of court= !. pu!lication, also $ith leave of court= or c. any other &anner the court &ay dee& sufficient. #he &anner of service of su&&ons &ust !e distinguished !et$een Adolfo #rocino and :ariano #rocino. 2ince Adolfo #rocino is a resident of a foreign country, the court cannot ac4uire +urisdiction over his person and validly try and decide the case against hi&= the action !eing in persona&. :ariano #rocino is a resident of 3ohol and not of *e!u *ity. #hus, su&&ons &ust !e served on hi& personally, or through su!stituted service, upon sho$ing of i&possi!ility of personal service. 2uch

i&possi!ility, and $hy efforts e9erted to$ards personal service failed, should !e e9plained in the proof of service. #he pertinent facts and circu&stances attendant to the service of su&&ons &ust !e stated in the proof of service or <fficer;s )eturn. Eailure to do so $ould invalidate all su!se4uent proceedings on +urisdictional grounds. B. Inas&uch as the sheriff;s return failed to state the facts and circu&stances sho$ing the i&possi!ility of personal service of su&&ons upon spouses #rocino $ithin a reasona!le ti&e, spouses Fo&e5 should have sought the issuance of an alias su&&ons. Dnder 2ection ', )ule ,. of the )ules of *ourt, alias su&&ons &ay !e issued $hen the original su&&ons is returned $ithout !eing served on any or all of the defendants. Petitioners, ho$ever, did not do so, and they should no$ !ear the conse4uences of their lac of diligence. (Hahlil 1l!an!uena ) /ILLENIU/ IN.USTRIAL CO//ERCIAL CORPORATION% vs. JAC:SON TAN G.R. No. =B=D?A. Ee!ruary 2-, 2000 FACTS: :illeniu& *orporation e9ecuted a 6eed of )eal 1state :ortgage in favor of respondent 7ac son #an to secure pay&ent of petitioner"s inde!tedness to respondent. 2u!se4uently, respondent filed a co&plaint for foreclosure of &ortgage. 2u&&ons and a copy of the co&plaint $ere served upon petitioner through a certain 8ynverd *inches, descri!ed in the sheriff"s return as Ia 6rafts&an, a person of sufficient age and (discretion) $or ing therein, he is the highest ran ing officer or <fficerAinA*harge of defendant"s *orporation, to receive processes of the *ourt.I Petitioner &oved for the dis&issal of the co&plaint on the ground that there $as no valid service of su&&ons upon it, as a result of $hich the trial court did not ac4uire +urisdiction over it. Petitioner invo ed )ule ,., P,B of the ,%C. )ules of *ourt and contended that service on 8ynverd *inches, as alleged in the sheriff"s return, $as invalid as he is not one of the authori5ed persons on $ho& su&&ons &ay !e served and that, in fact, he $as not even its e&ployee. Petitioner also sought the dis&issal of the co&plaint against it on the ground that it had satisfied its o!ligation to respondent $hen the latter opted to !e paid in shares of stoc under the follo$ing stipulation in the &ortgage contract (affir&ative defense of pay&ent). ISSUES: I../<N service of su&&ons upon a &ere drafts&an $ho is not one of those upon $ho& su&&ons &ay !e served in case of a defendant corporation as &entioned in the rules is valid. II. /<N the inclusion of another affir&ative relief in a &otion to dis&iss a!andons and $aives the ground of lac of +urisdiction over the person of the defendant therein also pleaded under prevailing la$ and +urisprudence. 3EL.: 2u&&ons is the &eans !y $hich the defendant in a case is notified of the e9istence of an action against hi& and, there!y, the court is conferred +urisdiction over the person of the defendant. If the defendant is corporation, )ule ,., P,B re4uires that service of su&&ons !e &ade upon the corporation;s president, &anager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. Petitioner contends that the enu&eration in )ule ,., P,B is e9clusive and that service of su&&ons upon one $ho is not enu&erated therein is invalid. #his is the general rule. ?o$ever, it is settled that su!stantial co&pliance !y serving su&&ons on persons other than those &entioned in the a!ove rule &ay !e +ustified. In Porac ruc!ing, "nc. v. Court of #ppeals , this *ourt enu&erated the re4uisites for the application of the doctrine of su!stantial co&pliance, to $it> (a) there &ust !e actual receipt of the su&&ons !y the person served, i.e., transferring possession of the copy of the su&&ons fro& the 2heriff to the person served= (!) the person served &ust sign a receipt or the sheriff"s return= and (c) there &ust !e actual receipt of the su&&ons !y the corporation through the person on $ho& the su&&ons $as actually served. #he third re4uisite is the &ost i&portant for it is through such receipt that the purpose of the rule on service of su&&ons is attained. In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second re4uisites $ere fulfilled. /ith respect to the third, the appellate court held that petitioner"s filing of a &otion to dis&iss the foreclosure suit is proof that it received the copy of the su&&ons and the co&plaint. #here is, ho$ever, no direct proof of this or that 8ynverd *inches actually turned over the su&&ons to any of the officers of the corporation. In contrast, in our cases applying the su!stantial co&pliance rule, there $as direct evidence, such as the ad&ission of the corporation"s officers, of receipt of su&&ons !y the corporation through the person upon $ho& it $as actually served. #he 4uestion is $hether it is allo$a!le to &erely infer actual receipt of su&&ons !y the corporation through the person on $ho& su&&ons $as served. /e hold that it cannot !e allo$ed. Eor there to !e su!stantial co&pliance, actual receipt of su&&ons !y the

CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa !!"- !!#$

corporation through the person served &ust !e sho$n. /here a corporation only learns of the service of su&&ons and the filing of the co&plaint against it through so&e person or &eans other than the person actually served, the service of su&&ons !eco&es &eaningless. #his is particularly true in the present case $here there is serious dou!t if 8ynverd *inches, the person on $ho& service of su&&ons $as effected, is in fact an e&ployee of the corporation. 19cept for the sheriff"s return, there is nothing to sho$ that 8ynverd *inches $as really a drafts&an e&ployed !y the corporation. : $econd. /e no$ turn to the issue of +urisdiction !y estoppel. 3oth the trial court and the *A held that !y raising the affir&ative defense of pay&ent and !y praying for other reliefs in its :otion to 6is&iss, petitioner in effect $aived its o!+ection to the trial court"s +urisdiction over it. /e thin this is error. <ur decision in %a &aval Drug Corporation v. Court of #ppeals settled this 4uestion. #he rule prior to %a &aval $as that if a defendant, in a &otion to dis&iss, alleges grounds for dis&issing the action other than lac of +urisdiction, he $ould !e dee&ed to have su!&itted hi&self to the +urisdiction of the court. #his rule no longer holds true. Noting that the doctrine of estoppel !y +urisdiction &ust !e une4uivocal and intentional, $e ruled in %a &aval: 7urisdiction over the person &ust !e seasona!ly raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a &otion to dis&iss or !y $ay of an affir&ative defense. Voluntary appearance shall !e dee&ed a $aiver of this defense. #he assertion, ho$ever, of affir&ative defenses shall not !e construed as an estoppel or as a $aiver of such defense. (Harla 6eles )

.. #he failure to co&ply $ith these re4uire&ents $as fatal the case of Norris. /hile in certain instances, the *ourt allo$s a rela9ation in the application of the rules, it never intended to forge a $eapon for erring litigants to violate the rules $ith i&punity. /hile it is true that litigation is not a ga&e of technicalities, it is e4ually true that every case &ust !e prosecuted in accordance $ith the prescri!ed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy ad&inistration of +ustice. (Hahlil 1l!an!uena ) ALVAREI v. Jud* .IAI A: No. :#7A00A,2-B, B :arch 200. FACTS> 2pouses Farcia sued petitioner Alvare5 for forci!le entry !efore the :#* of Nue5on *ity. :#* 7udge 6ia5 decided against Alvare5 and ordered hi& and his coAdefendants to vacate the pre&ises and pay da&ages to spouses Farcia. Plaintiff spouses then &oved to e9ecute the decision of the :#* !ecause there $as no perfected appeal nor pay&ent of the supersedeas !ond to stay the decision. #he &otion $as $orded as follo$s> #he *ler of *ourt :#* 3ranch B7 Nue5on *ity Hindly include this &otion in your calendar for Ee!ruary B, ,%%-at ->B0 in the &orning during $hich the &atter and parties &ay !e heard. 2gd. *.A.8. Atty. 8eaRo, counsel for plaintiff spouses, personally delivered the &otion for e9ecution to the counsel of Alvare5. #he court granted the &otion. ISSUE> 2hould the +udge have acted upon the &otion for e9ecutionO

Ru# =E 2 /otions NORRIS v. Jud* PARENTELA% JR. F) N<. ,.B2,C, 27 Ee!ruary 200B FACTS> <n April ., ,%77, private respondents purchased a lot fro& the govern&ent. ?o$ever, through fraud, spouses Halugdan had the title over the lot cancelled, and a ne$ title $as issued in their na&e. #hey then sold the lot to petitioner Norris. <n August 27, ,%%7, private respondents sued for the annul&entQcancellation of titles and da&ages $ith the )#* against Norris. 2u&&ons $as served upon Norris through su!stituted service. Norris failed to ans$er, and )#* declared her in default and decided the case against her. <n April B0, ,%%%, Norris, assisted !y a neophyte la$yer, filed a petition for relief fro& +udg&ent. ?o$ever, this petition $as not certified against foru& shopping. )#* dis&issed the petition. Norris &oved for reconsideration. ?o$ever, this &otion $as only addressed to the cler of court and not to all parties. #he &otion $as denied !y )#*. <n Nove&!er -, ,%%%, Norris filed a petition for certiorari $ith the *A under )ule C'. ?o$ever, petitioner did not attach a certified true copy of the orders appealed fro&, nor did it sho$ the &aterial dates of the receipt of the said orders. #hus, *A dis&issed the petition and the su!se4uent &otion to reconsider. ISSUES> ,. /as the petition for relief fro& +udg&ent properO 2. /as the &otion to reconsider the )#* decision properO B. /as the petition for certiorari properO .. /hat is the effect of these failures to co&ply $ith the procedural re4uire&entsO RULINGS> ,. No. 2* *ircular 0.A%. re4uires that co&plaints and other initiatory pleadings in all courts and agencies other than the 2upre&e *ourt and the *ourt of Appeals &ust !e acco&panied !y a certification against foru& shopping. Norris; petition is one of the said pleadings !ecause it is a ne$ petition $here a party see s relief !ased on grounds different fro& those in the original case, na&ely, fraud, accident, &ista e or e9cusa!le negligence. 2. No. 2ection ' of )ule ,' of the )ules of *ourt clearly provides that notice of hearing shall !e addressed to all parties concerned. Notice addressed to the cler of court and not to the parties does not suffice as notice to all. A &otion that does not contain a notice of hearing to the adverse party is nothing !ut a &ere scrap of paper and the cler of court does not have the duty to accept it, &uch less to !ring it to the attention of the presiding +udge. B. No. #he certified true copy of the orders su!+ect of the appeal &ust !e attached to the petition for certiorari under )ule C'. #he failure to sho$ the &aterial dates $hen Norris received the copy of the said orders prevented the *ourt of Appeals fro& deter&ining $hether the petition $as filed on ti&e or not.

RULING> No. 1ven if there $as no perfected appeal nor pay&ent of the supersedeas !ond, respondent 7udge should not have granted plaintiff;s :otion for 19ecution !ecause it $as fatally defective. 2ec. ', )ule ,' of the )ules of *ourt provides that the notice of hearing, to !e stated in the &otion, shall !e addressed to all parties concerned and shall specify the ti&e and date of the hearing $hich &ust not !e later than ,0 days after the filing of the &otion. It is $ellAsettled that any &otion $ith a notice of hearing that is not addressed to all parties is a &ere scrap of paper $hich should not !e accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to +udicial cogni5ance. If personal service of the &otion $as &ade upon Alvare5; counsel, then proof of service thereof consisting of any of the follo$ing should have !een presented to the court, together $ith the :otion for 19ecution> 2ection ,B. Proof of service. @ 999 J,K a $ritten ad&ission of the party served, J2K the official return of the server, or JBK the affidavit of the party serving containing a full state&ent of the date, place and &anner of service 999. None of the a!ove $as presented. #hus, in accordance $ith 2ection C, )ule ,' of the )ules of *ourt $hich &andates that Lno $ritten &otion set for hearing shall !e acted upon !y the court $ithout proof of service thereof,M the &otion for e9ecution should not have !een acted upon !y 7udge 6ia5. (Hahlil 1l!an!uena ) 1ACELONIA% t $# v. COURT OF APPEALS% $nd SPOUSES 1OLOS% t $# F) N<. ,.B..0, ,, Ee!ruary 200B FACTS> Petitioners filed a &otion to !e dropped as defendants fro& the civil case involving 4uasiAdelicts, as their other coAdefendants have ad&itted responsi!ility to the accident. <n 7anuary ,0, 2000, the trial court denied the &otion and proceeded to schedule the reception of evidence. <n 7anuary B,, 2000, the petitioners filed a &otion for reconsideration of the trial court;s order denying their &otion and set the date of hearing thereof on Ee!ruary ,', 2000 at ->B0 a&. #he trial court denied the &otion to reconsider. Petitioners elevated the denial !efore the *A. #he *A affir&ed the trial court;s decision. ISSUE> /as the denial !y the trial court of the &otion for reconsideration, properO RULING> 0es. 2ection ' of )ule ,' of the )ules of *ourt provides that the notice of hearing shall !e addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the ti&e and date of the hearing $hich &ust not !e later than ,0 days after the filing of the &otion. ?o$ever, the date of hearing $as scheduled !eyond the period, or later than Ee!ruary ,0, 2000.

CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa !!"- !!#$

2ignificantly, the a!ove provision uses the &andatory ter&, L&ustM in fi9ing the period $ithin $hich the &otion shall !e scheduled for hearing. A &otion that fails to religiously co&ply $ith the &andatory provision of )ule ,', 2ection ' is pro for&a and presents no 4uestion $hich &erits the attention and consideration of the court. (Hahlil 1l!an!uena) JE3AN S3IPPING CORPORATION v. NATIONAL FOO. AUT3ORITY F) N<. ,27C%2, ,- :arch 200. FACTS> #he trial court decided in favor of Petitioner and against )espondent in a civil case for the collection of a su& of &oney. <n <cto!er 2, 200,, Petitioner filed a &otion for e9ecution of +udg&ent. <n <cto!er ,C, 200,, )espondent &oved to reconsider the decision. It filed a 2upple&ental :otion for )econsideration on Nove&!er ,2, 200,. <n Nove&!er %, 200,, the trial court held in a!eyance the resolution on the :otion for 19ecution Pending Appeal pending the &otion for reconsideration !y respondent. <n Nove&!er ,', 200,, Petitioner opposed respondent;s &otion for reconsideration. <n 6ece&!er 7, 200,, a hearing $as conducted on the :otion for )econsideration and the 2upple&ental :otion for )econsideration. <n 7anuary -, 2002, trial court denied the &otions, on the ground that the &otion for reconsideration did not contain a notice of hearing. )espondent elevated the denial !efore the *A. *A reversed the decision of the trial court, holding that the re4uire&ent on notice of hearing has !een su!stantially &et. ISSUES> ,. /as the &otion for reconsideration properO 2. 6id the petitioner have the opportunity to !e heardO RULINGS> ,. 0es. 1ven though respondent failed to include a notice of hearing in its :otion for )econsideration filed on the very last day of its appeal period, petitioner $as a!le to oppose the issues raised in the :otion for )econsideration. As a rule, a &otion re4uired to !e heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall !e served in such a &anner as to ensure its receipt !y the other party at least B days !efore the date of hearing unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. #he threeAday notice re4uire&ent is not intended for the !enefit of the &ovant !ut to avoid surprises that &ay !e sprung upon the adverse party, $ho &ust !e given ti&e to study and &eet the argu&ents in the &otion !efore a resolution !y the court. #he test is the presence of the opportunity to !e heard, as $ell as to have ti&e to study the &otion and &eaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon $hich it is !ased. 2. 0es. It appears that the trial court gave petitioner ten days $ithin $hich to co&&ent on respondent;s :otion for )econsideration. Petitioner $as a!le to point out not only that the :otion $as defective for not containing a notice of hearing, !ut also to ventilate its su!stantial argu&ents against the &erits of the :otion and of the 2upple&ental :otion for )econsideration. #hus, under the circu&stances of this case, the purpose of a notice of hearing $as served. (Hahlil 1l!an!uena ) Ru# =J F /otion to .is!iss FRAN:LIN /. .RILON% AURELIO C. TRA/PE% FER.INAN. R. A1ESA/IS $nd EULOGIO /ANANKUIL% " tition rs% vs. COURT OF APPEALS% 3ON. ERI1ERTO U. ROSARIO% JR.% in his c$"$cit( $s Pr sidin* Jud* o' 1r$nch JJ% R *ion$# Tri$# Court o' /$9$ti $nd JUAN PONCE ENRILE% r s"ond nts. F.). No. ,0C%22 April 20, 200, FACTS> After the unsuccessful 6ece&!er ,%-% coup d; etat, the 6<7 headed !y Eran lin 6rilon, re4uested for investigation of 7uan Ponce 1nrile for his alleged participation in the said coup. #he Prosecutors issued a su!poena to 1nrile $ith an order to su!&it his counterAaffidavit to the letterAco&plaint. Instead of filing his counterA affidavit, 1nrile filed a Petition for 2u&&ary 6is&issal of the charge against hi&. <n Ee!ruary 27, ,%%0, the #ea& of Prosecutors filed !efore the )egional #rial *ourt of Nue5on *ity on Infor&ation charging private respondent $ith the co&ple9 cri&e of re!ellion $ith &urder and frustrated &urder. 1nrile then filed a co&plaint accusing the

petitioners of !ad faith in filing the infor&ation for re!ellion co&ple9ed $ith &urder and frustrated &urder. <n <cto!er %, ,%%0, 6rilon;s group filed a :otion to 6is&iss for failure of the *o&plaint to state a cause of action. #hey clai&ed that there $as no allegation of any actiona!le $rong constituting a violation of any of the legal rights of private respondent. <n <cto!er -, ,%%,, respondent trial court issued an <rder denying the :otion to 6is&iss and re4uiring petitioners to file their ans$er and to present evidence in support of their defenses in a fullA!lo$n trial inas&uch as the defense of good faith and i&&unity fro& suit does not appear to !e indu!ita!le. 6rilon;s &otion for reconsideration $as li e$ise denied. ?ence this petition. Foing no$ to the cru9 of the petition, 6rilon;s group contend that the co&plaint sets forth no cause of action against the&. #hey allege good faith, regularity in the perfor&ance of official duties and lac of ulti&ate facts constituting an actiona!le $rong. <n the other hand, 1nrile argues that a cause of action has !een sufficiently pleaded and that the defenses of good faith and perfor&ance of official duties are !est disposed in a +udicial hearing. ISSUE> #he &ain 4uestion in the instant petition is $hether the allegations in the co&plaint sufficiently plead a cause of action to hold 6rilon;s group lia!le for da&ages. 3EL.> #he petition of 6rilon;s group is granted. 8ac of cause of action, as a ground for a &otion to dis&issS&ust appear on the face of the co&plaint itself, &eaning that it &ust !e deter&ined fro& the allegations of the co&plaint and fro& none other. #he infir&ity of the co&plaint in this regard is only too o!vious to have escaped respondent +udge"s attention. Paragraph ,. of the co&plaint $hich states> 999 999 999 ,.. #he &alicious prosecution, nay persecution, of plaintiff for a nonAe9istent cri&e had severely in+ured and !es&irched plaintiff"s na&e and reputation and forever stig&ati5ed his stature as a pu!lic figure, there!y causing hi& e9tre&e physical suffering, serious an9iety, &ental anguish, &oral shoc and social hu&iliation.I is a &ere conclusion of la$ and is not an aver&ent or allegation of ulti&ate facts. It does not, therefore, aid in any $ise the co&plaint in setting forth a valid cause of action against the petitioners. 3o) v r% ) ho#d th$t th s$id $## *$tions sti## '$i# to !$int$in $ c$us o' $ction $*$inst .ri#on6s *rou". To r it r$t % $ c$us o' $ction 8ists i' th 'o##o)in* # ! nts $r "r s nt: <=> $ ri*ht in '$vor o' th "#$inti'' &( )h$t v r ! $ns $nd und r )h$t v r #$) it $ris s or is cr $t d+ <?> $n o&#i*$tion on th "$rt o' th n$! d d ' nd$nt to r s" ct or not to vio#$t such ri*ht+ $nd <B> $n $ct or o!ission on th "$rt o' such d ' nd$nt vio#$tiv o' th ri*ht o' th "#$inti'' or constitutin* $ &r $ch o' th o&#i*$tion o' d ' nd$nt to th "#$inti'' 'or )hich th #$tt r !$( !$int$in $n $ction 'or r cov r( o' d$!$* s. ?C In th c$s $t &$r% ) '$i# to s $n( ri*ht o' th Enri# su""os d#( vio#$t d &( th " tition rs. No)h r in th st$tut &oo9s is $ "ros" ctiv $ccus d *iv n th ri*ht to & noti'i d & 'or h$nd o' th 'i#in* o' $n in'or!$tion $*$inst hi!. Li9 )is % th )ithdr$)$# o' th in'or!$tion $nd th su&s 0u nt r 2'i#in* o' th s$! do not constitut $n $ction$&# )ron* in$s!uch $s th 'i#in* or r 2'i#in* o' $n in'or!$tion #i s )ithin th discr tion o' th "ros cutor )ho !ust $ct ind " nd nt#( o' th $'' ct d "$rti s. #he re&edy of a party $henever the co&plaint does not allege a cause of action is to set up this defense in a &otion to dis&iss or in the ans$er. A &otion to dis&iss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action in the co&plaint hypothetically ad&its the truth of the facts alleged therein. ?o$ever, the hypothetical ad&ission is li&ited to the Irelevant and &aterial facts $ell pleaded in the co&plaint and inferences fairly deducti!le therefro&. #he ad&ission does not e9tend to conclusion or interpretations of la$= nor does it cover allegations of fact the falsity of $hich is su!+ect to +udicial notice.I Priv$t r s"ond nt c#$i!s th$t $n $"" $# or $n ori*in$# $ction 'or c rtior$ri is not th "ro" r r ! d( 'or $ d ' nd$nt )hos !otion to dis!iss h$s & n d ni d &( th tri$# court 'or th r $son th$t th ord r do s not t r!in$t th "roc din*s% nor 'in$##( dis"os o' th cont ntions o' th "$rti s. In its d cision $''ir!in* th tri$# court,s d ni$# o' th !otion to dis!iss% th $"" ##$t court sust$in d this cont ntion. 3o) v r% $s corr ct#( "oint d out &( th " tition rs% th ru# $d!its o' $n 8c "tion. Thus% )h r th d ni$# o' th !otion to dis!iss &( th tri$# court )$s t$int d )ith *r$v $&us o' discr tion $!ountin* to #$c9 or 8c ss o' -urisdiction% $s in th c$s $t &$r% th $**ri v d "$rt( !$( $ss$i# th ord r o' d ni$# on c rtior$ri. A $ide !readth of discretion is granted in certiorari proceedings in the interest of su!stantial +ustice and to prevent a su!stantial $rong. In the 6rilon case, $e also held that the denial !y the trial court of the &otion to dis&iss of herein petitioners !ased on the sa&e grounds as in the instant petition

CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa !!"- !!#$

constituted grave a!use of discretion for the reason that Ithis (private respondent"s !aseless action) $ould un+ustly co&pel the petitioners to needlessly go through a protracted trial and there!y unduly !urden the court $ith one &ore futile and inconse4uential case.I B2 #he appellate court therefore erred in not ruling that the trial court co&&itted a grave a!use of discretion $hen the latter refused to dis&iss the case as against herein petitioners, not$ithstanding the o!vious insufficiency of the co&plaint against the&. (#echie 2ilva )

such preli&inary hearing, the trial court re4uired FA3I to produce *ertificates of #itle to the lands in its na&e. FA3I ad&itted that it did not have such *ertificates, only 6eeds of 2ale fro& the registered o$ners. Anent petitioners" thesis that dis&issal of the co&plaint !y the trial court $as proper of failure to state a cause of action, $e, li e$ise, find no valid !asis to sustain the sa&e. .is!iss$# o' $ Co!"#$int 'or '$i#ur to st$t $ c$us o' $ction is "rovid d 'or &( th Ru# s o' Court. In dis&issal for failure to state a cause, the in4uiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the &aterial allegations. #he test is $hether the &aterial allegations, assu&ing these to !e true, state ulti&ate facts $hich constitute plaintiff"s cause of action, such that plaintiff is entitled to a favora!le +udg&ent as a &atter of la$. #he general rule is that in4uiry is confined to the four corners of the co&plaint, and no other. #his general rule $as applied !y the *ourt of Appeals. 2aid court stated> It is a $ellAsettled rule that in deter&ining the sufficiency of the cause of action, <N80 the facts alleged in the co&plaint and no others, should !e considered. In deter&ining the e9istence of a cause of action, only the state&ents in the co&plaint &ay properly !e considered. If the co&plaint furnish sufficient !asis !y $hich the co&plaint &ay !e &aintained, the sa&e should not !e dis&issed regardless of the defenses that &ay !e assessed J sic K !y defendantsA appellees. #here are $ellArecogni5ed e9ceptions to the rule that the allegations are hypothetically ad&itted as true and in4uiry is confined to the face of the co&plaint. #here is no hypothetical ad&ission of the veracity of allegations if their falsity is su!+ect to +udicial notice, or if such allegations are legally i&possi!le, or if these refer to facts $hich are inad&issi!le in evidence, or if !y the record or docu&ent included in the pleading these allegations appear unfounded. Also, in4uiry is not confined to the co&plaint if there is evidence $hich has !een presented to the court !y stipulation of the parties, or in the course of hearings related to the case. :oreover, FA3I did not have sufficient chance to prove its allegation of o$nership. #hus, the conclusion that FA3I"s allegation of o$nership is false and that its co&plaint stated no cause of action, appears to !e $ithout !asis. In su&, as appears fro& the availa!le records, the *ourt of Appeals $as correct in ruling that the dis&issal !y the trial court of FA3I"s co&plaint $as incorrect. #he case should, therefore, proceed to trial $here the parties &ay adduce evidence to support their clai&s and defenses. (#echie 2ilva ) TEO.ORA A. RIOFERIO% ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS% ET AL. FACTS> After Alfonso <rfinada;s death, his legiti&ate fa&ily discovered that the Petitioner (the para&our and her children) e9ecuted an 19tra+udicial 2ettle&ent of 1state of a 6eceased Person $ith Nuitclai& involving the properties of the estate of the decedent located in 6agupan *ity and that accordingly, the )egistry of 6eeds issued *ertificates of #itles in their favor. #he )espondents also found out that the Petitioners $ere a!le to o!tain a loan fro& the )ural 3an !y e9ecuting a )eal 1state :ortgage over the properties su!+ect of the e9traA+udicial settle&ent. ?ence, the )espondents filed a *o&plaint for the Annul&entQ)escission of 19tra 7udicial 2ettle&ent of 1state of a 6eceased Person $ith Nuitclai&, )eal 1state :ortgage and *ancellation of #ransfer *ertificate of #itles $ith 6a&ages against petitioners, the )ural 3an of :angaldan, Inc. and the )egister of 6eeds. #he Petitioners filed their Ans$er, raising a&ong others the affir&ative defense that respondents are not the real partiesAinAinterest !ut rather the 1state of Alfonso in vie$ of the pendency of the ad&inistration proceedings. #hey filed a :otion to 2et Affir&ative 6efenses for ?earing on the aforesaid ground, $hich the lo$er court denied. ISSUE> /hether or not the lo$er court erred in denying the Petitioners; &otion to set the case for preli&inary hearing on their affir&ative defense. 3EL.> No. It &ust !e stressed that the holding of a preli&inary hearing on an affir&ative defense lies in the discretion of the court. #his is clear fro& the )ules of *ourt, thus> SEC. E. P# $din*s *rounds $s $''ir!$tiv d ' ns s.2 An( o' th *rounds 'or dis!iss$# "rovid d 'or in this ru# % 8c "t i!"ro" r v nu % !$( & "# $d d $s $n $''ir!$tiv d ' ns % $nd $

FI.EL .A1UCO% tc. " tition rs% vs. COURT OF APPEALS AN. GA1I /ULTI PURPOSE COOPERATIVE% REPRESENTE. 1Y /ARIA KUISU/1ING ALVAREI AN. COL. SOLO/ON .ALI.% RET.% r s"ond nts. F.). No. ,BB77' 7anuary 20, 2000 FACTS> #he 8a5arra!al fa&ily $ere the registered o$ners of the properties, su!+ect &atter of this case. In ,%%,, on different occasions, the su!+ect properties $ere sold to the )u!en 3aculi, 1ditha 3elocura, 8ira Puno, )afael 8apu5, 8adrioro :ontealto, 7oel :aseca&po, 6elsa N. :anay, Ilderi& *astaRares, :aria #heresa Puno, JandK 7ill :endo5a. <n 7une 27, ,%%., FA3I :ultiAPurpose *ooperative, a registered nonAstoc , nonAprofit cooperative filed a civil co&plaint against 6A3D*<, et al. $ho $ere found residing andQor tilling the su!+ect properties. #he trial court issued a #)< en+oining 6a!uco, et al. to desist fro& further develop&ent of FA3I;s properties. #he trial court then lifted the #)< upon failure of FA3I to prove its title over the properties. 6a!uco et al. filed their ans$er alleging that FA3I had no personality to sue since they do not appear to !e !uyer of the properties neither $ere the properties titled in its na&e. 6a!uco filed a :otion to 6is&iss on the ground of lac of cause of action, FA3I has no personality to sue and lac of +urisdiction. #he trial court dis&issed the case. FA3I appealed to the *A and the decision $as reversed. #he success of this petition rests on the validity of the dis&issal !y the trial court. Petitioners assert that there $as sufficient reason to dis&iss the action !elo$ on the ground that FA3I had no cause of action against petitioners. #hey also aver in the alternative that the *o&plaint !y FA3I $as properly dis&issed on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. As $ "r #i!in$r( !$tt r% ) )ish to str ss th distinction & t) n th t)o *rounds 'or dis!iss$# o' $n $ction: '$i#ur to st$t $ c$us o' $ction% on th on h$nd% $nd #$c9 o' c$us o' $ction% on th oth r h$nd. Th 'or! r r ' rs to th insu''ici nc( o' $## *$tion in th "# $din*% th #$tt r to th insu''ici nc( o' '$ctu$# &$sis 'or th $ction. F$i#ur to st$t $ c$us !$( & r$is d in $ /otion to .is!iss und r Ru# =J% )hi# #$c9 o' c$us !$( & r$is d $n( ti! . .is!iss$# 'or '$i#ur to st$t $ c$us c$n & !$d $t th $r#i st st$* s o' $n $ction. .is!iss$# 'or #$c9 o' c$us is usu$##( !$d $'t r 0u stions o' '$ct h$v & n r so#v d on th &$sis o' sti"u#$tions% $d!issions or vid nc "r s nt d. ISSUE> /hether or not the dis&issal of the trial court on the ground of lac of cause of action $as proper. 3EL.> #he dis&issal !y the trial court $as not proper. /e note that the issue of sufficiency of FA3I"s cause of action does not appear to have !een passed upon !y the appellate court in its assailed decision. It appears that the trial court dis&issed the case on the ground that FA3I $as not the o$ner of the lands or one entitled to the possession thereof, and thus had no cause of action. In dis&issal for lac of cause of action, the court in effect declared that plaintiff is not entitled to a favora!le +udg&ent inas&uch as one or &ore ele&ents of his cause of action do not e9ist in fact. 3ecause 4uestions of fact are involved, courts hesitate to declare a plaintiff as lac ing in cause of action. 2uch declaration is postponed until the insufficiency of cause is apparent fro& a preponderance of evidence. Dsually, this is done only after the parties have !een given the opportunity to present all relevant evidence on such 4uestions of fact. /e do not here rule on $hether FA3I has a cause of action against petitioners. /hat $e are saying is that the trial court"s ruling, to the effect that FA3I had no title to the lands and thus had no cause of action, $as pre&ature. Indeed, hearings $ere conducted. And the vie$ of the *ourt of Appeals $as that such hearings $ere sufficient. #he *ourt disagrees $ith the appellate court"s ruling. #he hearing of 7uly 27, ,%%. $as on the propriety of lifting the restraining order. At

CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa !!"- !!#$

"r #i!in$r( h $rin* !$( & h$d th r on $s i' $ !otion to dis!iss h$d & n 'i# d., *ertainly, the incorporation of the $ord I&ayI in the provision is clearly indicative of the optional character of the preli&inary hearing. #he $ord denotes discretion and cannot !e construed as having a &andatory effect.2B 2u!se4uently, the electivity of the proceeding $as fir&ed up !eyond cavil !y the ,%%7 )ules of *ivil Procedure $ith the inclusion of the phrase Iin the discretion of the *ourtI, apart fro& the retention of the $ord I&ayI in 2ection C, in )ule ,C thereof. #hus, no !la&e of a!use of discretion can !e laid on the lo$er court;s doorstep for not hearing petitioners; affir&ative defense. (2ahara Alia 2ilongan ) TEO.ORA A. RIOFERIO% VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA $ssist d &( h r hus&$nd IAL.Y EVANGELISTA% AL1ERTO ORFINA.A% $nd RO@ENA O. UNGOS% $ssist d &( h r hus&$nd 1E.A UNGOS% " tition rs% vs. COURT OF APPEALS% ESPERANIA P. ORFINA.A% LOUR.ES P. ORFINA.A% ALFONSO ORFINA.A% NANCY P. ORFINA.A% ALFONSO JA/ES P. ORFINA.A% C3RISTOP3ER P. ORFINA.A $nd ANGELO P. ORFINA.A% r s"ond nts. JF.). No. ,2%00-. 7anuary ,B, 200.K

ISSUE> /hether the heirs have legal standing to prosecute the rights !elonging to the deceased su!se4uent to the co&&ence&ent of the ad&inistration proceedings. 3EL.> 0es they have legal standing. Petitioners vehe&ently fault the lo$er court for denying their &otion to set the case for preli&inary hearing on their affir&ative defense that the proper party to !ring the action is the estate of the decedent and not the respondents. It &ust !e stressed that the holding of a preli&inary hearing on an affir&ative defense lies in the discretion of the court. #his is clear fro& the )ules of *ourt, thus> 21*. '. Pleadings grounds as affir&ative defenses.A Any of the grounds for dis&issal provided for in this rule, e9cept i&proper venue, &ay !e pleaded as an affir&ative defense, and a preli&inary hearing &ay !e had thereon as if a &otion to dis&iss had !een filed.J22K (1&phasis supplied.) *ertainly, the incorporation of the $ord L&ayM in the provision is clearly indicative of the optional character of the preli&inary hearing. #he $ord denotes discretion and cannot !e construed as having a &andatory effect.J2BK 2u!se4uently, the electivity of the proceeding $as fir&ed up !eyond cavil !y the ,%%7 )ules of *ivil Procedure $ith the inclusion of the phrase Lin the discretion of the *ourtM, apart fro& the retention of the $ord L&ayM in 2ection C,J2.K in )ule ,C thereof. 7ust as no !la&e of a!use of discretion can !e laid on the lo$er court;s doorstep for not hearing petitioners; affir&ative defense, it cannot li e$ise !e faulted for recogni5ing the legal standing of the respondents as heirs to !ring the suit. Pending the filing of ad&inistration proceedings, the heirs $ithout dou!t have legal personality to !ring suit in !ehalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance $ith the provision of Article 777 of the Ne$ *ivil *ode Lthat (t)he rights to succession are trans&itted fro& the &o&ent of the death of the decedent.M #he provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and o!ligations to the e9tent and value of the inheritance of a person are trans&itted through his death to another or others !y his $ill or !y operation of la$. J2'K Ev n i' $d!inistr$tion "roc din*s h$v $#r $d( & n co!! nc d% th h irs !$( sti## &rin* th suit i' $n $d!inistr$tor h$s not ( t & n $""oint d. #his is the proper &odality despite the total lac of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation, na&ely 2ection B, )ule BJ2CK and 2ection 2, )ule -7J27K of the )ules of *ourt. In fact, in the case of Fochan v. 0oung, J2-K this *ourt recogni5ed the legal standing of the heirs to represent the rights and properties of the decedent under ad&inistration pending the appoint&ent of an ad&inistrator. #hus> #he a!oveA4uoted rules,J2%K $hile per&itting an e9ecutor or ad&inistrator to represent or to !ring suits on !ehalf of the deceased, do not prohi!it the heirs fro& representing the deceased. #hese rules are easily applica!le to cases in $hich an ad&inistrator has already !een appointed. 3ut no rule categorically addresses the situation in $hich special proceedings for the settle&ent of an estate have already !een instituted, yet no ad&inistrator has !een appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot !e e9pected to $ait for the appoint&ent of an ad&inistrator= then $ait further to see if the ad&inistrator appointed $ould care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased= and in the &eanti&e do nothing $hile the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated. Ev n i' th r is $n $""oint d $d!inistr$tor% -uris"rud nc r co*ni7 s t)o 8c "tions% vi7: <=> i' th 8 cutor or $d!inistr$tor is un)i##in* or r 'us s to &rin* suit+LBGM $nd <?> )h n th $d!inistr$tor is $## * d to h$v "$rtici"$t d in th $ct co!"#$in d o'LB=M $nd h is !$d $ "$rt( d ' nd$nt.LB?M Evid nt#(% th n c ssit( 'or th h irs to s 9 -udici$# r #i ' to r cov r "ro" rt( o' th st$t is $s co!" ##in* )h n th r is no $""oint d $d!inistr$tor% i' not !or % $s )h r th r is $n $""oint d $d!inistr$tor &ut h is ith r disinc#in d to &rin* suit or is on o' th *ui#t( "$rti s hi!s #'. All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of property of the estate during the pendency of ad&inistration proceedings has three e9ceptions, the third !eing $hen there is no appointed ad&inistrator such as in this case. As the appellate court did not co&&it an error of la$ in upholding the order of the lo$er court, recourse to this *ourt is not $arranted. (#echie 2ilva ) /A. CAR/INIA C. ROHAS v. 3ON. COURT OF APPEALS $nd JOSE ANTONIO F. ROHAS F.). No. ,B%BB7 August ,', 200, (issue> dis&iss order not final)

FACTS> <n :ay ,B, ,%%', Alfonso P. <rfinada, 7r. died $ithout a $ill !ut left a $ido$, children and a para&our $ith children too. #he first fa&ily discovered that the Para&our #eodora e9ecuted an 19tra+udicial 2ettle&ent of 1state of a 6eceased Person $ith Nuitclai& involving the properties of the estate of the decedent located in 6agupan *ity and e9ecuting a )eal 1state :ortgage over the properties su!+ect of the e9traA+udicial settle&ent. <n 6ece&!er ,, ,%%', respondent Alfonso L*lydeM P. <rfinada III filed a Petition for 8etters of Ad&inistration doc eted as 2.P. *ase No. ',,- !efore the )egional #rial *ourt of Angeles *ity, praying that letters of ad&inistration enco&passing the estate of Alfonso P. <rfinada, 7r. !e issued to hi&.J-K <n Ee!ruary ', ,%%C, petitioners filed their Ans$er to the aforesaid co&plaint interposing the defense that the property su!+ect of the contested deed of e9traA+udicial settle&ent pertained to the properties originally !elonging to the parents of #eodora )ioferoJ,0K and that the titles thereof $ere delivered to her as an advance inheritance !ut the decedent had &anaged to register the& in his na&e.J,,K Petitioners also raised the affir&ative defense that respondents are not the real partiesAinAinterest !ut rather the 1state of Alfonso <. <rfinada, 7r. in vie$ of the pendency of the ad&inistration proceedings.J,2K <n April 2%, ,%%C, petitioners filed a :otion to 2et Affir&ative 6efenses for ?earingJ,BK on the aforesaid ground. #he lo$er court denied the &otion in its <rder dated 7une 27, ,%%C, on the ground that respondents, as heirs, are the real partiesAinA interest especially in the a!sence of an ad&inistrator $ho is yet to !e appointed in 2.P. *ase No. ',,-. Petitioners &oved for its reconsideration !ut the &otion $as li e$ise denied. #his pro&pted petitioners to file !efore the *ourt of Appeals their Petition for *ertiorari under )ule C' of the )ules of *ourt doc eted as *A F.). 2.P. No. .20'B.J,7K Petitioners averred that the )#* co&&itted grave a!use of discretion in issuing the assailed order $hich denied the dis&issal of the case on the ground that the proper party to file the co&plaint for the annul&ent of the e9tra+udicial settle&ent of the estate of the deceased is the estate of the decedent and not the respondents. #he *ourt of Appeals rendered the assailed 6ecision dated 7anuary B,, ,%%7, stating that it discerned no grave a!use of discretion a&ounting to lac or e9cess of +urisdiction !y the pu!lic respondent +udge $hen he denied petitioners; &otion to set affir&ative defenses for hearing in vie$ of its discretionary nature. A :otion for )econsideration $as filed !y petitioners !ut it $as denied. ?ence, the petition !efore this *ourt.

1 Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. It is Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of

Civil Procedure hich re!ds" Section 6. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. If no #otion to dis#iss h!s $een filed, !n% of the &rounds for dis#iss!l 'rovided for in this Rule #!% $e 'le!ded !s !n !ffir#!tive defense in the !ns er !nd, in the discretion of the court, ! 'reli#in!r% he!rin& #!% $e h!d thereon !s if ! #otion to dis#iss h!d $een filed. (he dis#iss!l of the co#'l!int under this section sh!ll $e ithout 're)udice to the 'rosecution in the s!#e or se'!r!te !ction of ! countercl!i# 'le!ded in the !ns er. *+#'h!sis su''lied,

CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa !!"- !!#$

FACTS> *ar&inia )o9as filed an action for declaration of nullity of &arriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of her hus!and, 7ose Antonio E. )o9as $ith application for support pendent lite for their four(.) &inor children. #he case $as $ith the )egional #rial *ourt of ParaRa4ue *ity presided !y 7udge )olando *. ?o$. 3ut the petitioner, soon thereafter, filed in the said )#* 3ranch 2'7 a Notice of 6is&issal dated Nove&!er 20, ,%%7 $ithout pre+udice, pursuant to the provision of 2ection ,, )ule ,7, of the ,%%7 )ules of *ivil Procedure, considering that su&&ons has not yet !een served and no responsive pleading has yet !een filed. #he sa&e co&plaint, no$ doc eted as *ivil *ase No. %7A0C0-, $as reAfiled on Nove&!er 2', ,%%7. It $as raffled in due course to 3ranch 2C0 of the )egional #rial *ourt of ParaRa4ue *ity presided !y 7udge ?elen 3autistaA)icafort. 7udge 3autistaA)icafort received evidence on the application for support pendente lite . #he private respondent and her counsel, Atty. Al!erto 6ia5, participated in that proceedings !y conducting an e9tensive crossAe9a&ination of the petitioner. #he trial court then issued its <rder dated :ay ,B, ,%%- declaring the proceedings on the application for support pendente lite ter&inated and dee&ed su!&itted for resolution. 7ose )o9as refused to co&ply $ith the 7udge;s order for support. ?e hired a ne$ la$yer and field a te&porary stay e9ecution of the orders. Th $"" ##$t court nu##i'i d th Ord rs $nd th "roc din*s o' th tri$# court 'or th r $son th$t th c rti'ic$t o' non2'oru! sho""in* o' th " tition r did not ! ntion th "rior 'i#in* o' Civi# C$s No. CD2GE?B & 'or th s$#$ o' Jud* 3o) $nd th dis!iss$# th r o' )ithout "r -udic . #he decision of the appellate court ela!orated the reasons for the granting of the petition, to $it> 999 999 999

)ithout "r -udic % u"on h r 'i#in* o' $ notic o' dis!iss$#% "ursu$nt to S ction =% Ru# =D o' th =CCD Ru# s o' Civi# Proc dur . To us th )ordin* o' th$t ru# % Jud* 3o)6s ord r is on ! r #( ;con'ir!in* th dis!iss$#; o' th co!"#$int &( th "#$inti'' <h r in " tition r>. N ith r is th r r s -udic$t$ 'or th r $son th$t th ord r o' dis!iss$# )$s not $ d cision on th ! rits &ut $ dis!iss$# ;)ithout "r -udic ;. Priv$t r s"ond nt is $#so sto"" d in 0u stionin* th "roc din*s $nd ord rs o' Jud* 1$utist$2Ric$'ort. ?e tacitly ac no$ledged the validity of the proceedings and the orders issued !y the said trial +udge !y participating actively in the hearing on the application for support pendente lite. For $ "$rt( to & $d-ud* d *ui#t( o' 'oru! sho""in* in th tri$# courts% $ !otion to dis!iss on th *round o' ith r #itis " nd nci$ or r s -udic$t$ !ust & 'i# d & 'or th "ro" r tri$# court $nd $ h $rin* conduct d th r on in $ccord$nc )ith S ction E% Ru# D o' th =CCD Ru# s o' Civi# Proc dur . Th s$! *round c$nnot & r$is d in $ " tition 'or c rtior$ri & 'or th $"" ##$t court )hi# th !$in $ction in th tri$# court is sti## " ndin* 'or th r $son th$t such *round 'or $ !otion to dis!iss c$n & r$is d & 'or th tri$# court $n( ti! durin* th "roc din*s $nd is not &$rr d &( th 'i#in* o' th $ns) r to th co!"#$int. #he petition for certiorari in the case at !ar on the ground of alleged foru& shopping in the trial court is pre&ature for the reason that there is an ade4uate and speedy re&edy availa!le in the ordinary course of la$ to private respondent, i.e ., a &otion to dis&iss or a &otion for reconsideration on the ground of either litis pendencia or res +udicata !efore the trial court. 3ut private respondent did not file such a &otion !ased on either of said grounds. And $here the ground is short of res +udicata or litis pendencia , as in the case at !ar, the *ourt of Appeals acted $ith grave a!use of discretion a&ounting to e9cess of +urisdiction $hen it granted the petition for certiorari filed !y herein private respondent. #he trial court should have !een given an opportunity to rule on the &atter of alleged foru& shopping in consonance $ith the hierarchy of courts. (#echie 2ilva ) Ru# =O F Pr 2Tri$# TIU vs. /I..LETON 7uly ,%, ,%%% FACTS: #he present petition arose fro& a *o&plaint for recovery of o$nership and possession of real property. #he court a 4uo sent a Notice of PreAtrial *onference, stating in part> I#he parties are /A)N16 that $itnesses $hose na&es and addresses are not su!&itted at the preAtrial &ay not !e allo$ed to testify at the trial.I In his PreAtrial 3rief, petitioner averred that he $ould !e presenting C $itnesses, !ut he did not na&e the&. After the preAtrial conference, the court a 4uo issued a PreAtrial <rder stating that the petitioner $ould present C $itnesses and specifying the hearing dates for the said purpose. #rial ensued, and herein respondents, as plaintiffs in the case, presented their $itnesses in due course. /hen his turn ca&e, petitioner called Antonia #iu as his first $itness. *iting 2ection C, )ule ,- of the ,%%7 )ules of *ourt, respondents o!+ected, arguing that the $itness could not !e allo$ed to testify !ecause petitioner had failed to na&e her in his PreAtrial 3rief. ISSUE: *an Petitioner"s Dnna&ed /itnesses #estifyO RULING: 0es. PreAtrial is an ans$er to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. As earlier stated, preAtrial is essential in the si&plification and the speedy disposition of disputes. In light of the o!+ectives of a preAtrial and the role of the trial court therein, it is evident that +udges have the discretion to e9clude $itnesses and other pieces of evidence not listed in the preAtrial !rief, provided the parties are given prior notice to this effect. #he Notice of PreAtrial *onference $arned the parties that I$itnesses $hose na&es and addresses are not su!&itted at the preAtrial &ay not !e allo$ed to testify at the trial.I In his PreAtrial 3rief, petitioner &erely stated that he intended to present C $itnesses In his PreAtrial <rder, ho$ever, the trial +udge did not e9ercise his discretion to e9clude the unna&ed $itnesses. )ather, it si&ply provided that IJtKhe defendant $ill present C $itnesses.I It &ade no &ention at all that they $ould !e !arred fro& testifying unless they $ere na&ed. Indeed, the court and the parties &ust pay attention not only to the preA trial !riefs, !ut also to the preAtrial order. ?ence, the provision in the PreAtrial <rder allo$ing petitioner to present C $itnesses Ishall control the su!se4uent course of action.I Pre-trial' is an essential device for the speedy disposition of disputes. Hence, parties cannot brush it aside as a mere technicality. (here the

@hi# $ co!"#$int !$( & dis!iss d &( th "#$inti'' &( 'i#in* $ notic o' dis!iss$# $t $n( ti! & 'or s rvic o' th $ns) r <S c. =% Ru# =D>% th r is ho) v r $ n d to st$t th '$ct o' "rior 'i#in* $nd dis!iss$# th r o' in th c rti'ic$tion on non2'oru! sho""in*% in th v nt th co!"#$int is r 'i# d% $s in this c$s . This !ust & so in ord r to "r v nt th "#$inti'' or "rinci"$# "$rt( 'ro! invo9in* S ction = o' Ru# =D in th ho" th$t% i' $nd )h n r 'i# d% th co!"#$int )i## & r$''# d to $ !or s(!"$th tic -ud* . Th CA th n ord r d th $nnu#! nt c$s shou#d & r turn d to 1r$nch ?ED o' th RTC o' P$r$N$0u Cit(% to )hich it )$s ori*in$##( r$''# d. ISSUE> In other $ords, if a case is dis&issed $ithout pre+udice upon the filing !y the plaintiff of a notice of dis&issal pursuant to 2ection , of )ule ,7, !efore the service of the ans$er or responsive pleading, $ould the su!se4uent reAfiling of the case !y the sa&e party re4uire that the certificate of nonAforu& shopping state that a case involving the sa&e issues and parties $as filed and dis&issed $ithout pre+udice !eforehandO /ould the o&ission of such a state&ent in the certificate of nonAforu& shopping render null and void the proceedings and orders issued !y the trial court in the reAfiled caseO 3EL.> It is our considered vie$ and $e hold that the proceedings and orders issued !y 7udge 3autistaA)icafort in the application for support pendente lite (and the &ain co&plaint for annul&ent of &arriage) in the reAfiled case, that is, in *ivil *ase No. %7A0C0- $ere not rendered null and void !y the o&ission of a state&ent in the certificate of nonA foru& shopping regarding the prior filing and dis&issal $ithout pre+udice of *ivil *ase No. %7A0'2B $hich involves the sa&e parties and issues. 2ince a party resorts to foru& shopping in order to increase his chances of o!taining a favora!le decision or action, it has !een held that a party cannot !e said to have sought to i&prove his chances of o!taining a favora!le decision or action $here no unfavora!le decision has ever !een rendered against hi& in any of the cases he has !rought !efore the courts. Eoru& shopping e9ists $here the ele&ents of litis pendencia are present, and $here a final +udg&ent in one case $ill a&ount to res +udicata in the other. Eor the principle of res +udicata to apply, the follo$ing &ust !e present> (,) a decision on the &erits= (2) !y a court of co&petent +urisdiction= (B) the decision is final= and (.) the t$o actions involve identical parties, su!+ect &atter and causes of action. In th c$s $t &$r% th r )$s no $dv rs d cision $*$inst th " tition r in Civi# C$s No. CD2GE?B )hich )$s th 'irst c$s 'i# d $nd r$''# d to th s$#$ <1r$nch ?ED> o' Jud* 3o). Th dis!iss$# )ithout "r -udic o' th co!"#$int in Civi# C$s No. CD2GE?B $t th inst$nc o' th " tition r )$s "ursu$nt to S ction =% Ru# =D o' th =CCD Ru# s o' Civi# Proc dur =E consid rin* th$t it )$s don & 'or s rvic o' $ns) r or $n( r s"onsiv "# $din*. Th dis!iss$# do s not $!ount to #itis " nd nci$ nor to r s -udic$t$ . Th r is no #itis " nd nci$ sinc th 'irst c$s & 'or Jud* 3o) )$s dis!iss d or )ithdr$)n &( th "#$inti'' <h r in " tition r>%


CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa !!"- !!#$

pre-trial brief does not contain the names of witnesses and the synopses of their testimonies as re)uired by the *ules of Court, the trial court, through its pre-trial order, may bar the witnesses from testifying. However, an order allowing the presentation of unnamed witnesses may no longer be modified during the trial without the consent of the parties affected. (8endl Eloyd :ontes ) VERA vs. RIGOR AN. CA (August ,0, 2007) FACTS: 1rnesto )igor, respondent, filed $ith the )egional #rial *ourt a co&plaint for su& of &oney $ith da&ages against 6r. 1&&anuel Vera, petitioner. )espondent alleged in his co&plaint that petitioner purchased fro& hi& a !rand ne$ Dltrasound 2canner, for P.,0,000.00. Petitioner paid P,20,000.00 as do$npay&ent, leaving a !alance of P2%0,000.00. 6espite respondent;s de&and, petitioner failed to pay the sa&e. In his ans$er, petitioner clai&ed that he received the &achine on a trial !asis. ?o$ever, $hen tested, its Lperfor&anceM $as unsatisfactory. :oreover, the hospital $here the &achine $as to !e installed has no funds. )espondent offered a ne$ !rand of Dltrasound 2canner !ut it turned out to !e an old &odel. #he trial court then set the preAtrial. 6uring the preAtrial conference, the parties failed to reach an a&ica!le settle&ent, hence, the trial court ter&inated the preAtrial and set the case for initial hearing. ?o$ever, upon &otion of respondent;s counsel, the trial $as reset to 7uly ,7, ,%%7. 6uring the hearing on this date, the trial court, upon &anifestation of petitioner;s counsel, reali5ed that respondent failed to file a preAtrial !rief. Petitioner filed a &otion to dis&iss the co&plaint raising as ground respondent;s failure to file a preAtrial !rief. #he trial court issued a )esolution granting the &otion and dis&issing the co&plaint. )espondent filed a &otion for reconsideration !ut it $as denied !y the trial court. ISSUE> /hether or not the civil case is dis&issi!le for failure of the respondent to file preAtrial !riefO RULING> #he civil case should !e dis&issed for failure to file preA trial !rief. 2ection C, )ule ,- of the ,%%7 )ules of *ivil Procedure, as a&ended, 2ection ' of the sa&e )ule, and 2ection 7 &andatorily re4uires the parties to seasona!ly file their !riefs and failure to do so shall !e cause for the dis&issal of the action. /hile the trial +udge erroneously proceeded $ith the trial conference, the fact re&ains that respondent did not file a preAtrial !rief. Pursuant to 2ection C, )ule ,- 4uoted a!ove, such failure is a cause for dis&issal of the action. /e have to e&phasi5e that preAtrial and its governing rules are not technicalities $hich the parties &ay ignore or trifle $ith. <!viously, since respondent did not file a preAtrial !rief, it follo$s that the trial +udge failed to conduct the preAtrial conference in $ccord$nc )ith Ru# =O. In fact, he did not issue the re4uired preA trial order stating the various &atters $hich should have !een included therein. Indeed, the trial +udge sho$ed his ignorance of the )ules, specifically )ule ,-. And !y failing to ta e appropriate steps to ena!le the parties reach an a&ica!le settle&ent, the trial +udge sho$ed his gross inefficiency. (Anthony 3alagot ) VILLANUEVA vs. CA (200.) FACTS>Plaintiff 1use!ia Napisa )etuya, is the legal $ife of defendant Nicolas )etuya, having !een &arried to the latter on <cto!er 7, ,%2C. <ut of the la$ful $edloc , they !egot five (') children, na&ely, Natividad, Angela, Napoleon, 2alo&e, and )o!erta. 2pouses )etuya resided at #ipolo, :andaue *ity. 6uring their &arriage they ac4uired real properties and all i&prove&ents situated in :andaue *ity, and *onsolacion, *e!u. Also, defendant, Nicolas )etuya, is coAo$ner of a parcel of land situated in :andaue *ity $hich he inherited fro& his parents 1ste!an )etuya and 3al!ina 2olon as $ell as the purchasers of hereditary shares of appro9i&ately eight (-) parcels of land in :andaue *ity. In ,%.', defendant Nicolas )etuya no longer lived $ith his legiti&ate fa&ily and coha!ited $ith defendant, Pacita Villanueva, $herein defendant, Procopio Villanueva, is their illegiti&ate son. Nicolas, then, $as the only person $ho received the inco&e of the a!oveA&entioned properties. 6efendant, Pacita Villanueva, fro& the ti&e she started living in concu!inage $ith Nicolas, has no occupation, she had no properties of her o$n fro& $hich she could derive inco&e. In ,%-', Nicolas suffered a stro e and cannot tal any&ore, cannot $al any&ore and they have to raise hi& up in order to $al . Natividad )etuya ne$ of the physical condition of her father !ecause they visited hi& at the hospital. Ero& the ti&e defendant Nicolas )etuya suffered a stro e on 7anuary 27, ,%-' and until the present, it is defendant Procopio Villanueva, one of Nicolas; illegiti&ate children $ho has !een receiving the inco&e of these properties. /itness Natividad )etuya $ent to Procopio to negotiate !ecause at this ti&e their father Nicolas $as already senile and has a childli e &ind. 2he told defendant, Procopio that their father $as

already incapacitated and they had to tal things over and the latter replied that it $as not yet the ti&e to tal a!out the &atter. Plaintiff, then, co&plained to the 3arangay *aptain for reconciliationQ&ediation !ut no settle&ent $as reached, hence, the said official issued a certification to file action. /ritten de&ands $ere &ade !y plaintiff, through her counsel, to the defendants, including the illegiti&ate fa&ily as ing for settle&ent !ut no settle&ent $as reached !y the parties. #he trial court rendered its 6ecision on ,C Ee!ruary ,%%. in favor of 1use!ia. #he appellate court dis&issed Pacita;s defense of prescription and laches since she failed to have the issue included in the preAtrial order after raising it in her ans$er $ith her coApetitioners. ISSUE> /hether or not Pacita;s defense of prescription and laches are tena!leO RULING> #he defense of prescription and laches are not tena!le. #he deter&ination of issues during the preAtrial conference !ars the consideration of other 4uestions, $hether during trial or on appeal. JCK 2ection , of )ule % covers situations $here a defense or o!+ection is not raised in a &otion to dis&iss or an ans$er. /hat $e have !efore us is the e9act opposite. ?ere, petitioners in fact raised in their ans$er the defense of prescription and laches. ?o$ever, despite raising the defense of prescription and laches in their ans$er, petitioners failed to include this defense a&ong the issues for consideration during the trial. #he nonAinclusion of this defense in the preAtrial order !arred its consideration during the trial. *learly, 2ection , of )ule % does not apply to the present case. PreAtrial is pri&arily intended to insure that the parties properly raise all issues necessary to dispose of a case. J7K #he parties &ust disclose during preAtrial all issues they intend to raise during the trial, e9cept those involving privileged or i&peaching &atters. J-K Although a preAtrial order is not &eant to catalogue each issue that the parties &ay ta e up during the trial, issues not included in the preAtrial order &ay !e considered only if they are i&pliedly included in the issues raised or infera!le fro& the issues raised !y necessary i&plication. J%K #he !asis of the rule is si&ple. Petitioners are !ound !y the deli&itation of the issues during the preAtrial !ecause they the&selves agreed to the sa&e.J,0K Petitioners argue that in past instances $e have revie$ed &atters raised for the first ti&e during appeal. #rue, !ut $e have done so only !y $ay of e9ception involving clearly &eritorious situations. J,,K #his case does not fall under any of those e9ceptions. #he fact that the case proceeded to trial, $ith the petitioners actively participating $ithout raising the necessary o!+ection, all the &ore re4uires that they !e !ound !y the stipulations they &ade at the preAtrial. J,2K Petitioners $ere $ell a$are that they raised the defense of prescription and laches since they included it in their ans$er. ?o$ever, for reasons of their o$n, they did not include this defense in the preAtrial. A!le counsels represented !oth parties. /e see no clai& that either counsel erred or $as negligent. #his could only &ean that petitioners; counsel chose to $aive, or did not consider i&portant, the defense of prescription and laches. Petitioners are !ound !y their counsel;s choice. <ther than arguing that it is allo$a!le to raise the issue for the first ti&e on appeal, $e have no e9planation fro& petitioners $hy they suddenly decided to change their &ind. Parties are not allo$ed to flipAflop. *ourts have neither the ti&e nor the resources to acco&&odate parties $ho choose to go to trial hapha5ardly. :oreover, it $ould !e grossly unfair to allo$ petitioners the lu9ury of changing their &ind to the detri&ent of private respondents at this late stage. #o put it si&ply, since petitioners did not raise the defense of prescription and laches during the trial, they cannot no$ raise this defense for the first ti&e on appeal. (Anthony 3alagot ) Ru# ?? F Co!"ut$tion o' Ti! 1PI VS CA $nd Ji!!( Go (7une 2-, 200C) FACTS> Petitioner, Ear 1ast 3an and #rust *o&pany, granted a total of eight (-) loans to Noah;s Arc :erchandising (Noah;s Ar , for !revity). Noah;s Ar is a single proprietorship o$ned !y :r. Al!ert #. 8ooyu o. #he said loans $ere evidenced !y identical Pro&issory Notes all signed !y Al!ert #. 8ooyu o, private respondent 7i&&y #. Fo and one /ilson Fo. 8i e$ise, all loans $ere secured !y real estate &ortgage constituted over a parcel of land. Petitioner, clai&ing that Noah;s Ar defaulted in its o!ligations, e9tra+udicially foreclosed the &ortgage. #he auction sale $as set on ,. April ,%%- !ut on - April ,%%- private respondent filed a co&plaint for da&ages $ith prayer JforK issuance of #)< andQor $rit of preli&inary in+unction see ing JtoK en+oin the auction sale. JIKn the <rder dated ,. April ,%%- a te&porary restraining order $as issued and in the sa&e order the application for Preli&inary In+unction $as set for hearing JiKn the afternoon of the sa&e day ()ollo, p. ,.2).2 In an orderB dated April ,', ,%%-, 7udge Victorio e9tended the #)< for another ,' days, for a total of 20 days. PrivateArespondent then filed a !ond as re4uired !y the order. Petitioner &oved for a reconsideration of the afore&entioned order $hich &otion $as denied in the <rder dated B0 7uly ,%%- on the


CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa !!"- !!#$

ground that the e9tra+udicial foreclosure $as pre&ature as to four (.) pro&issory notes. After petitioner;s &otion for reconsideration $as denied . #he *ourt of Appeals partially denied the petition for certiorari. ISSUE> /hether or not the #)< and $rit of preli&inary in+unction $ere properly issued !y the 7udgeO RULING> #he #)< and the $rit of preli&inary in+unction $ere not properly issued !y the 7udge. #he issuance of the #)< $as, on procedural grounds, irregular. 2ection ', )ule '- of the )ules of *ivil Procedure provides> Preliminary injunction not granted without notice+ e,ception. No preli&inary in+unction shall !e granted $ithout hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to !e en+oined. If it shall appear fro& facts sho$n !y affidavits or !y the verified application that great or irrepara!le in+ury $ould result to the applicant !efore the &atter can !e heard on notice, the court to $hich the application for preli&inary in+unction $as &ade, &ay issue a te&porary restraining order to !e effective only for a period of t$enty (20) days fro& notice to the party or person sought to !e en+oined. /ithin the said t$entyAday period, the court &ust order said party or person to sho$ cause, at a specified ti&e and place, $hy the in+unction should not !e granted, deter&ine $ithin the sa&e period $hether or not the preli&inary in+unction shall !e granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order. 7udge Victorio, in an order dated April ,., ,%%-, issued a #)< for five days, then, in an order dated April ,', ,%%-, e9tended it for fifteen &ore days, totaling t$enty days. ?o$ever, in the first order, 7udge Victorio e9cluded 2aturdays and 2undays= and in the latter order he added legal holidays to the e9clusions. As 4uoted a!ove, a #)< is effective only for a period of t$enty days fro& notice to the party sought to !e en+oined. #he rule does not specify that the counting of the t$entyAday period is only li&ited to $or ing days or that 2aturdays, 2undays and legal holidays are e9cluded fro& the t$entyAday period. #he la$ si&ply states t$enty days fro& notice. 2ection ,, )ule 22 It is clear fro& the last sentence of this section that nonA$or ing days (2aturdays, 2undays and legal holidays) are e9cluded fro& the counting of the period only $hen the last day of the period falls on such days. #he )ule does not provide for any other circu&stance in $hich nonA$or ing days $ould affect the counting of a prescri!ed period. ?ence, 7udge Victorio e9ceeded the authority granted to lo$er courts, in 2ection ', )ule '- of the )ules of *ourt, $hen he e9cluded nonA$or ing days fro& the counting of the t$entyAday period. (Anthony 3alagot )

#hus, depositions &ay !e ta en at any ti&e after the institution of any action, $henever necessary or convenient. #here is no rule that li&its depositionAta ing only to the period of preAtrial or !efore it= no prohi!ition against the ta ing of depositions after preAtrial. #here can !e no valid o!+ection to allo$ing the& during the process of e9ecuting final and e9ecutory +udg&ents, $hen the &aterial issues of fact have !eco&e nu&erous or co&plicated. 6epositions are allo$ed, provided they are ta en in accordance $ith the provisions of the )ules of *ourt (that is, $ith leave of court if the su&&ons have !een served, $ithout leave of court if an ans$er has !een su!&itted)= and provided, further, that a circu&stance for their ad&issi!ility e9ists. 6epositions &ay !e used for the trial or for the hearing of a &otion or an interlocutory proceeding, under the circu&stances specified hereunder> 2ection .. Dse of 6epositions. AA At the trial or upon the hearing of a &otion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as ad&issi!le under the rules of evidence, &ay !e used against any party $ho $as present or represented at the ta ing of the deposition or $ho had due notice thereof, in accordance $ith any one of the follo$ing provisions> 999 (c) #he deposition of a $itness, $hether or not a party, &ay !e used !y any party for any purpose if the court finds> 999 (2) that the $itness resides at a distance &ore than one hundred (,00) ilo&eters fro& the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his a!sence $as procured !y the party offering the deposition.999 #he present case involved a circu&stance that fell under the a!oveA cited 2ection .(c)(2) of )ule 2B AA the $itnesses of petitioner in :etro :anila resided !eyond ,00 ilo&eters fro& 2ultan Hudarat, the place of hearing. Petitioner offered the depositions in support of its :otion to Nuash (the /rit of 19ecution) and for the purpose of proving that the trial court;s 6ecision $as not yet final. As previously e9plained, despite the fact that trial has already !een ter&inated, a deposition can still !e properly ta en. /e note, ho$ever, that the )#* did not totally disregard petitioner;s depositions. In its )esolution, the trial court considered and $eighed AA against all other evidence AA that its <rder denying the :otion for Ne$ #rial filed !y petitioner had not !een received !y the latter;s counsels. 6espite their depositions, petitioner failed to prove convincingly its denial of receipt. (2ahara Alia 2ilongan )

Ru# ?E F Int rro*$tori s to P$rti s ELENA S. ONG vs. FRANCISCO V. /AIO% ET AL. 7une ., 200. Ru# ?B F . "ositions & 'or $ction or " ndin* $"" $# JONAT3AN LAN.OIL INTERNATIONAL CO.% INC vs. S"ous s /ANGU.A.ATU August ,C, 200. FACTS> A deposition upon oral e9a&ination of the petitioner;s for&er counsels $as ta en !y the petitioner, $hich $as opposed !y the respondents. #he 6eposition $as intended to prove that 78I had not received a copy of the <rder denying the <&ni!us :otion for Ne$ #rial. <n appeal, the *Aruled that petitioner could no longer avail itself of a deposition under )ule 2B of )ules of *ourt, since trial had already !een ter&inated. It ruled that !et$een the denial of a la$yer and the certification of a post&aster, the latter $ould prevail. ISSUE> /hether the ta ing of oral depositions $as proper under the circu&stances. 3EL.> #he *A erred in declaring that the ta ing of the depositions of petitioner;s $itnesses $as i&proper. A deposition &ay !e ta en $ith leave of court after +urisdiction has !een o!tained over any defendant or over property that is the su!+ect of the action= or, $ithout such leave, after an ans$er has !een served. #he )ules of *ourt and +urisprudence, ho$ever, do not restrict a deposition to the sole function of !eing a &ode of discovery !efore trial. Dnder certain conditions and for certain li&ited purposes, it &ay !e ta en even after trial has co&&enced and &ay !e used $ithout the deponent !eing actually called to the $itness stand. In 6as&ariRas Far&ents v. )eyes, $e allo$ed the ta ing of the $itnesses; testi&onies through deposition, in lieu of their actual presence at the trial. FACTS> After filing her Ans$er in the *o&plaint for 6a&ages against her, the Petitioner served $ritten interrogatories upon respondents and filed a I:anifestation and <&ni!us :otionI see ing, a&ong other things, an order fro& the trial court directing respondents to ans$er the interrogatories. #he trial court, ho$ever, denied the &otion to co&pel respondents to ans$er the interrogatories upon the ground that it constituted a Ifishing e9peditionI $hich $ould !e &ore properly ventilated in a preAtrial conference. ISSUE> /hether or not the trial court erred in denying the &otion. 3EL.> 0es. #he 2* finds that the orders disallo$ing petitioner;s $ritten interrogatories are patently erroneous, hence, the resort to certiorari is $arranted. #his *ourt has long espoused the policy of encouraging the avail&ent of the various &odes or instru&ents of discovery as e&!odied in )ules 2. to 2% of the )evised )ules of *ourt. #hus, in )epu!lic v. 2andigan!ayan,B, it held> . . . Indeed it is the purpose and policy of the la$ that the parties A !efore the trial if not indeed even !efore the preAtrial A should discover or infor& the&selves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only those no$n to the& individually, !ut also those no$n to their adversaries= in other $ords, the desideratu& is that civil trials should not !e carried on in the dar = and the )ules of *ourt &a e this ideal possi!le through the depositionAdiscovery &echanis& set forth in )ules 2. to 2%. #he thrust of the )ules is to even &a e the avail&ent of the &odes of discovery AA depositions, interrogatories and re4uests for ad&issions AA $ithout &uch court intervention since leave of court is not necessary to


CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa !!"- !!#$

put into &otion such &odes after an ans$er to the co&plaint has !een served. #he rationale !ehind the recognition accorded the &odes of discovery is that they ena!le a party to discover the evidence of the adverse party and thus facilitate an a&ica!le settle&ent or e9pedite the trial of the case. #hus, to deny a party the li!erty to have his $ritten interrogatories ans$ered !y his opponent, as $hat the trial court did, on the pre&ise that the interrogatories $ere a Ifishing e9pedition,I is to disregard the categorical pronounce&ent in afore&entioned case of )epu!lic vs. 2andigan!ayan that the ti&eAhonored cry of Lfishing e9peditionM can no longer provide a reason to prevent a party fro& in4uiring into the facts underlying the opposing party;s case through the discovery procedures. (2ahara Alia 2ilongan ) Ru# BG 2 Tri$# U/ALI2PACO vs. KUILALA (<cto!er ,', 2002) 3EL.: #he rules re4uire that, $here the reception of evidence is delegated to the cler of court, he or she &ust also !e a &e&!er of the !ar. Neither agree&ent !y parties nor their ac4uiescence can +ustify its violation. (Hahlil 1l!an!uena ) Ru# B= F Conso#id$tion or S v r$nc 3ONORI.EI vs. /A3INAY (August ,2, 200') FACTS: Petitioners filed a *o&plaint for declaration of nullity of a &ortgage deed and for da&ages, $ith an application for a #)< andQor in+unction to prevent the foreclosure sale of the su!+ect parcel of land. Petitioners alleged that they &ortgaged said parcel of land to 7ocelyn 2orensen and that the &ortgage deed i&posed an unconsciona!le interest of '( per &onth. #hereafter, Petitioners filed an A&ended *o&plaint alleging that the sa&e parcel of land $as earlier &ortgaged to Eeli&on 2uare5 !ut they $ere re4uired to e9ecute a deed of sale instead. #hey clai&ed that $hen the secured o!ligation had &atured, 2orensen offered to help redee& the property and did pay the su& for such purpose. It $as after such pay&ent that petitioners e9ecuted the &ortgage in favor of 2orensen. 6uring the course of the proceedings, Atty. :a ilito :ahinay filed a :otion to Intervene clai&ing that in an earlier case, he and petitioners entered into a co&pro&ise agree&ent $herein he $as given the preferential right to !uy the lot in issue in the event that petitioners decide to dispose of it. 8ater on, he discovered that petitioners e9ecuted a deed of sale over the sa&e lot in favor of 2uare5, there!y pro&pting hi& to file an action for specific perfor&ance. #he su!se4uent action $as decided in :ahinay;s favor, $ith the )#* finding that the contract !et$een 2uare5 and petitioners $as a sale and not an e4uita!le &ortgage, ruling that :ahinay is entitled to redee& the lot fro& 2uare5. #his decision $as affir&ed !y the *A and !eca&e final and e9ecutory. Petitioners and 2orensen opposed the &otion for intervention and then filed a&ong others, a :otion for *onsolidation clai&ing that the rede&ption is a supervening event $hich rendered the decision unenforcea!le and that the deter&ination of $hether such rede&ption is a supervening event is a co&&on issue in the case a 4uo and in *ivil *ase No. *13A,CBB'. ISSUE: /<N the trial court erred in not consolidating *ivil *ase No. *13A2BC'B J$ith *ivil *ase No. *13 ,CBB'K RULING: No. Dnder 2ection ,, )ule B, of the )ules of *ourt, only pending actions involving a co&&on 4uestion of la$ or fact &ay !e consolidated. <!viously, petitioners cannot &a e out a case for consolidation in this case since *ivil *ase No. *13A,CBB', the case $hich petitioners see to consolidate $ith the case a 4uo, has long !eco&e final and e9ecutory= as such it cannot !e reAlitigated in the instant proceedings $ithout virtually i&peaching the correctness of the decision in the other case. Pu!lic policy a!hors such eventuality. 8itigation &ust end and ter&inate so&eti&e and so&e$here, and it is essential to an effective ad&inistration of +ustice that once a +udg&ent has !eco&e final the issue or cause involved therein should !e laid to rest. (8endl Eloyd :ontes ) Ru# B? F Tri$# &( Co!!ission r ALJE/,S CORPORATION <LOGGING .IVISION> vs. COURT OF APPEALS (:arch 2-, 200,) FACTS> Petitioner Al+e&"s *orporation 8ogging 6ivision (Al+e&) $as a +oint venture entered into !et$een petitioner"s representative, Pacifico V. 6i5on, 7r. and private respondent (P)) )udy 0. *hua.

6i5on served as the venture"s president, $hile P) $as its viceA president. #he parties initially agreed upon a ''A.' sharing, $hich they later &odified to '0A'0. <n August ,,, ,%%2, P) sued petitioner for a su& of &oney and for da&ages. In his co&plaint he alleged, a&ong other things, that according to the financial report prepared !y a *PA co&&issioned !y hi&, the logging operations of the +oint venture earned an inco&e of PB,C'%,7,0.07 fro& 7anuary to August ,%%0. 3ut despite repeated de&ands !y hi& for the pay&ent of his '0( share of the inco&e, petitioner refused to pay hi& his share. In its ans$er, petitioner alleged that P)"s auditor !loated the +oint venture"s net operating inco&e for the year ,%%0 to PB,C'%,7,0.07 and that the correct a&ount, as found !y petitioner"s accountant, $as only P2,0-%,,.,.-0. 6uring the preAtrial conference of the case, the parties agreed to refer the case to a co&&issioner. Eor this reason, 8eonora 3. *ainglet $as appointed co&&issioner !y the trial court and ordered to conduct an audit of petitioner"s accounting records. <n :arch 2C, ,%%B, petitioner filed a :anifestation and :otion, alleging that there $ere discrepancies concerning sales, depreciation, and interest !et$een the audit report and the report of its (petitioner"s) auditor. <n :ay 27, ,%%B, petitioner filed its co&&ents and o!+ections to the co&&issioner"s report. <n 6ece&!er C, ,%%B, the trial court issued an order confir&ing the co&&issioner"s report and adopting her findings of facts and conclusions as those of the court. Petitioner filed a &otion for reconsideration, contending that the co&&issioner did not o!serve the &andatory re4uire&ents of )ule BB, sections B and ' of the ,%C. )ules of *ourt relative to the conduct of hearings !efore the co&&issioner. :E) $as denied, hence this petition. ISSUE> /<N the audit report should not !e ad&itted !y the trial court on the ground that co&&issioner &erely !ased her report on her intervie$ of the parties and did not hold any for&al hearing. 3EL.> 2ections B and ' indicate 4uite clearly the necessity for a for&al hearing and the s$earing of $itnesses= other$ise, the co&&issioner cannot deter&ine factual 4uestions $hich arise in the course of his e9a&ination of the accounts. Eor this purpose, the $itnesses &ust necessarily !e s$orn in and offered for crossA e9a&ination !y the parties so that the truth of any 4uestion &ay !e deter&ined. #his $ould not !e possi!le $ere the co&&issioner &erely to intervie$ the parties. /here controversial 4uestions are involved, such as $hether certain ite&s &ust !e allo$ed or disallo$ed, an adversary proceeding is particularly indicated. #hat is $hy the last sentence of PB says that I#he trial or hearing !efore hi& shall proceed in all respects as it $ould !e held !efore the court.I Eor the fact is that the co&&issioner su!stitutes for the +udge, and $hatever the +udge can or cannot do, the co&&issioner also can or cannot do. *onse4uently, if a +udge cannot decide a 4uestion $ithout hearing the parties on oath or affir&ation, neither can the co&&issioner. 2ince the proceedings !efore the co&&issioner $ere null and void !ecause of the denial of due process to petitioner, the nullity of the proceedings can !e raised at any stage of case. It $as error, therefore, for the trial court to approve the co&&issioner"s report over the o!+ection of petitioner. (3hing 6o4uilla ) Ru# BA F Jud*! nt on th P# $din*s /ENESES vs. SECRETARY (<cto!er 2B, 200C) FACTS: Petitioners $ere coAo$ners of a rice land $hich $as distri!uted to far&erA!eneficiaries !y virtue of P.6. No. 27. Petitioners filed a co&plaint for deter&ination and pay&ent of +ust co&pensation. #he far&erA!eneficiaries, the 8and 3an of the PhilippinesA8and Valuation and 8ando$ners" *o&pensation III, the 6A) 2ecretary, and the 6A) all filed their respective Ans$ers. #he )#* dis&issed the co&plaint for lac of cause of action. Petitioners filed an :E) $hich $as partially granted. Petitioners thereafter filed a co&plaint for deter&ination and pay&ent of +ust co&pensation $ith the 6A)A3 $hich $as dis&issed on the ground that it has no +urisdiction to hear and decide valuation cases covered !y P.6. No. 27. 3ecause of the foregoing dis&issal, petitioners filed $ith the )#* a &otion to reAopen and calendar case for hearing, $hich $as granted. Petitioners $ere then scheduled to present their evidence. 6uring the hearing, the parties agreed as to the issue to !e resolved I$hether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to +ust co&pensation as provided for in ).A. No. CC'7M. ()espondents filed a &otion for +udg&ent on the pleadings).#he )#* rendered its 6ecision dis&issing the co&plaint. ISSUE: /<N the *A erred in sustaining the propriety of the &otion for +udg&ent on the pleadings filed !y respondents $ith the )#*.


CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa !!"- !!#$

RULING: 0es. )ule B., 2ection , of the )ules of *ourt, provides that a +udg&ent on the pleadings is proper $hen an ans$er fails to render an issue or other$ise ad&its the &aterial allegations of the adverse party"s pleading. #he essential 4uestion is $hether there are issues generated !y the pleadings. A +udg&ent on the pleadings &ay !e sought only !y a clai&ant, $ho is the party see ing to recover upon a clai&, counterclai& or crossAclai&= or to o!tain a declaratory relief. In this case, the separate Ans$ers filed !y the respondents definitely tendered issues, as it &ade specific denials of the &aterial allegations in the co&plaint and asserted affir&ative defenses, $hich $ould !ar recovery !y petitioners. :oreover, it $as erroneous for the )#* to re4uire the filing of a &otion for +udg&ent on the pleadings and for the 83P and the 6A) 2ecretary to file the sa&e since in the first place, the latter are neither plaintiffs in the case nor counterAclai&ants or crossAclai&ants. /hat the )#* o!viously &eant to !e filed $as a &otion for su&&ary +udg&ent, a procedural device designed for the pro&pt disposition of actions, $hich &ay !e rendered if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and ad&issions on file sho$ that, after a su&&ary hearing, there is no genuine issue regarding any &aterial fact, e9cept as to the a&ount of da&ages, and the &oving party is entitled to a +udg&ent as a &atter of la$, and $hich &ay !e applied for !y either a clai&ant or a defending party. #his is o!vious fro& the fact that although the Ans$ers raised issues, these $ere not factual ones re4uiring trial, nor $ere they genuine issues, as the parties $ere a!le to agree to li&it the sa&e to $hether petitioners are entitled to +ust co&pensation under ).A. No. CC'7 and not P.6. No. 27. (8endl Eloyd :ontes)

!ad faith, or patently unsu!stantial. #he trial court can deter&ine $hether there is a genuine issue on the !asis of the pleadings, ad&issions, docu&ents, affidavits andQor counterAaffidavits su!&itted !y the parties to the court. In the instant case, the ans$er su!&itted !y the petitioner appears on its face to tender issues. #he 4uestion that &ust !e ans$ered then is $hether or not these issues are sha& or fictitious so as to +ustify a su&&ary +udg&entO In ans$ering this 4uestion, the trial court &ay rely on the pleadings, ad&issions, affidavits, and docu&ents su!&itted !y the private respondent in support of his :otion for Partial 2u&&ary 7udg&ent #hese include the affidavits of petitioner;s o$n Feneral :anager and of private respondent;s President and the 8etter *ontract !et$een petitioner and private respondent. #o !egin $ith, petitioner, in its Ans$er, does not deny that it entered into the letterAcontract $ith private respondent for the supply of la!or, trader, tools, e4uip&ent and supervision necessary for the installation of an electrical po$er distri!ution syste&, $aste $ater treat&ent plant, and cat$al railings and ladder. Neither did it specifically deny the invoices issued !y private respondent $hich sho$ the various a&ounts o$ed !y it to private respondent. Einally, petitioner did not dispute the unpaid !alance $hich it still allegedly o$es private respondent. Petitioner insists, ho$ever, that there are genuine issues raised in its Ans$er $hich re4uire a fullA!lo$n trial on the &erits. 2pecifically, petitioner clai&s that paragraphs 7 to ,0 of the Ans$er clearly allege that the pro+ect underta en !y respondent is su!+ect to the acceptance !y the pro+ect o$ner, HyungAIl Phils., Inc. andQor !y the petitioner, as Feneral *ontractor. <n these alleged special and affir&ative defenses, $e agree $ith the trial court and the *A that, rather than tendering genuine issues, these allegations &erely give an un+ustified reason for petitioner;s failure to pay the undisputed !alance o$ing to private respondent. (Harla 6eles ) Ru# BJ F Jud*! nts% Fin$# Ord r $nd Entr( Th r o'

Ru# BE F Su!!$r( Jud*! nts NARRA INTEGRATE. CORPORATION% vs. CA $nd NC IN.USTRIAL TRA.E% INC. F.). No. ,B7%,'. Nove&!er ,', 2000 FACTS: Narra Integrated *orporation contracted fro& N* Industrial #rade, Inc., &anpo$er services and &aterials. Eor failure of Narra Integrated *orporation to pay a !alance of the consideration agreed !y the& N* Industrial #rade, Inc. filed a co&plaint for a su& of &oney and da&ages. NI* filed a thirdAparty co&plaint against HyungAIl Philippines, Inc. #he issues thus +oined, the court a 4uo set the case for preA trial. Alleging that the ans$er filed !y the defendantQthird party plaintiff did not tender an issue on account of the said party;s ad&ission of the &aterial allegations of the co&plaint and the actiona!le docu&ents attached thereto, the plaintiff filed a &otion for su&&ary +udg&ent. #he defendantQthirdAparty plaintiff interposed its opposition thereto. Nevertheless, the &otion $as granted !y the trial court in the partial decision $hich is the su!+ect &atter of the instant appeal ISSUE: /as there a su&&ary +udg&ent or +udg&ent on the pleading rendered !y the lo$er courtO 3EL.: At the onset, $e note that the petitioner, as sho$n in its assign&ent of errors, is guilty of the usual error of e4uating a su&&ary +udg&ent $ith a +udg&ent on the pleadings. /hile the petitioner &a es &ention of the lo$er court;s pro&ulgation of a +udg&ent on the pleadings, $e have gone over the records and it is clear that $hat the trial court actually rendered $as a su&&ary +udg&ent. #he e9istence or appearance of ostensi!le issues in the pleadings, on the one hand, and their sha& or fictitious character, on the other, are $hat distinguish a proper case for su&&ary +udg&ent fro& one for a +udg&ent on the pleadings. In a proper case for +udg&ent on the pleadings, there is no ostensi!le issue at all !ecause of the failure of the defending party;s ans$er to raise an issue . <n the other hand, in the case of a su&&ary +udg&ent, issues apparently e9ist @ i.e. facts are asserted in the co&plaint regarding $hich there is as yet no ad&ission, disavo$al or 4ualification= or specific denials or affir&ative defenses are in truth set out in the ans$er @ !ut the issues thus arising fro& the pleadings are sha&, fictitious or not genuine, as sho$n !y affidavits, depositions, or ad&issions. In other $ords, a +udg&ent on the pleadings is a +udg&ent on the facts as pleaded, $hile a su&&ary +udg&ent is a +udg&ent on the facts as su&&arily proven !y affidavits, depositions, or ad&issions. As such, even if the ans$er does tender issues and therefore a +udg&ent on the pleadings is not proper A a su&&ary +udg&ent &ay still !e rendered on the plaintiff"s &otion if he can sho$ that the issues thus tendered are not genuine, sha&, fictitious, contrived, set up in ROSITA .O/INGO% " tition r% vs. COURT OF APPEALS $nd ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE% r s"ond nts (,%%C) FACTS> Petitioner )osita 6o&ingo $as one of the !ona fide tenantsA occupants of an eightyAseven (-7) hectare land located at 3arrio 3aesa, *aloocan *ity then no$n as the Fon5ales 1state. Dpon petition of the tenants so&eti&e in ,%.7, the )epu!lic of the Philippines through the )ural Progress Ad&inistration ()PA) instituted an action $hich $as doc eted as *ivil *ase No. ,B, $ith the then *ourt of Eirst Instance of )i5al for the e9propriation of the Fon5ales 1state and its su!se4uent resale to the tenants thereof. #he court ruled in favor of the )epu!lic and on appeal to this *ourt, the said decision $as affir&ed. #he )epu!lic of the Philippines thereafter ac4uired title over the estate, ad&inistered !y People"s ?o&esite and ?ousing *orporation (P??*). President ordered P??* to sell a !igger portion of the estate to persons other than the !ona fide tenantsAoccupants of the estate. <n <cto!er 2%, ,%C0, fiftyAt$o ('2) tenantsAoccupants of the estate, petitioner included, filed an action to co&pel the )epu!lic of the Philippines through the P??* to sell the entire estate to the& pursuant to *o&&on$ealth Act No. 'B% and the decision of the 2upre&e *ourt in *ivil *ase No. ,B,. <n :ay B, ,%C,, private respondent Araneta Institute of Agriculture (AIA) filed a co&plaint in intervention on the !asis of a docu&ent entitled "HA2DN6DAN NA :A0 PAF3I3IFA0 HAPANF0A)I?AN ?INFFI8 2A A201N6A F<NTA812 2A 3A12A, *A8<<*AN )ITA8.I <n Nove&!er 2-, ,%C,, AIA su!&itted to the lo$er court a *o&pro&ise Agree&ent it entered into $ith ,B tenantsAoccupants of the estate. #he co&pro&ise states that the tenants sold their lot to intervenor and the &anner of pay&ent thereof. <n 6ece&!er 2B, ,%C,, the trial court approved the a!ove *o&pro&ise Agree&ent in a partial decision e&!odying the said agree&ent. <n Ee!ruary C, ,%C2, counsel for the tenants filed a &otion for i&&ediate e9ecution of the partial decision. #he sa&e $as granted !y the court on Ee!ruary 2B, ,%C2. Petitioner filed a separate petition to annul the partial decision approving their agree&ent. <n :ay 2B, ,%-C, the lo$er court issued an order enforcing the said decision. ?ence this petition. ISSUE> /<N the petitioner is !ound !y the co&pro&ise agree&ent. 3EL.> #he petition is not i&pressed $ith &erit. A co!"ro!is is a contract $here!y the parties, !y &a ing reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already co&&enced. 1ssentially, it is a contract perfected !y &ere consent, the latter !eing &anifested !y the &eeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause $hich are to constitute the contract. <nce an agree&ent is sta&ped $ith +udicial approval, it


CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa !!"- !!#$

!eco&es &ore than a &ere contract !inding upon the parties= having the sanction of the court and entered as its deter&ination of the controversy, it has the force and effect of any other +udg&ent. *onse4uently, a +udg&ent rendered in accordance $ith a co&pro&ise agree&ent is i&&ediately e9ecutory as there is no appeal fro& such +udg&ent. #he reason for this rule !eing that $hen !oth parties enter into an agree&ent to end a pending litigation and re4uest that a decision !e rendered approving said agree&ent, it is only natural to presu&e that such action constitutes an i&plicit $aiver of the right to appeal against said decision. /?1)1E<)1, the instant petition is here!y 61NI16. (3hing 6o4uilla ) Ru# BD F N ) Tri$# or R consid r$tion RIVERA vs. CA 3EL.: If negligence of counsel $ere &ade a !asis for ne$ trial, there $ould never !e an end to litigation so long as a ne$ counsel could !e e&ployed to allege and sho$ that the prior counsel had not !een sufficiently diligent, e9perienced or learned. (Hahlil 1l!an!uena )

Eor a clai& of counsel;s gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear a!andon&ent of the client;s cause &ust !e sho$n. #he negligence of counsel &ust !e so gross that the client is deprived of his day in court, the result of $hich is that he is deprived of his property $ithout due process of la$. #hus, $here a party $as given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot !e said to have !een denied due process of la$, for this opportunity to !e heard is the very essence of due process. ?ere, the case under$ent a fullA !lo$n trial. 3oth parties $ere ade4uately heard, and all issues $ere ventilated !efore the decision $as pro&ulgated. It should !e pointed out that in petitions for relief fro& +udg&ent, &eritorious defenses &ust !e acco&panied !y the ground relied upon, $hether it is fraud, accident, &ista e, e9cusa!le negligence, e9trinsic fraud or lac of +urisdiction. In the instant case, there !eing neither e9cusa!le nor gross negligence a&ounting to a denial of due process, &eritorious defenses cannot alone !e considered. (Harla 6eles )

Ru# BC F E8 cution% S$tis'$ction $nd E'' ct o' Jud*! nts CITY OF ILIGAN V. CITY /ANAGE/ENT Ru# BO F R #i ' 'ro! Jud*! nts% Ord rs or Oth r Proc SPS. .ELA CRUI ETC v. SPS AN.RES F.). No. ,C,-C. April 27, 2007 FACTS: 2pouses 6ela *ru5 filed a co&plaint for annul&ent of title andQor reconveyance $ith da&ages against spouses Andres and the 6irector of 8ands. 2u!se4uently, petitioners, assisted !y Atty. )afael Villarosa, filed $ith the *A a petition for revie$. #he appellate court dis&issed the petition since the *ertification of NonAEoru& 2hopping $as signed !y Atty. Villarosa instead of petitioners in violation of 2ection ', )ule 7 of the ,%%7 )ules of *ivil Procedure. Petitioners &oved for reconsideration !ut it $as denied. #hen petitioners filed $ith the *A a petition for relief fro& +udg&ent praying that the dis&issal of their petition for revie$ !e set aside since the gross negligence of their previous counsel did not !ind the&. #he appellate court, ho$ever, denied their petition. It ruled that petitioners $ere !ound !y the action of their counsel as $ell as !y his &ista e or negligence. ISSUES: *an petitioners avail of a petition for relief under )ule B- of the ,%%7 )ules of *ivil Procedure fro& a +udg&ent of the *A due to their counsel;s negligence $hen he signed the *ertification of NonA Eoru& 2hoppingO 3EL.: Petition is denied for lac of &erit. A petition for relief fro& +udg&ent under )ule B- of the ,%%7 )ules of *ivil Procedure is an e4uita!le re&edy that is allo$ed only in e9ceptional cases $hen there is no other availa!le or ade4uate re&edy. It &ay !e availed of only after a +udg&ent, final order or other proceeding $as ta en against the petitioner in any court through fraud, accident, &ista e, or e9cusa!le negligence. /hile the la$ uses the phrase Iany court,I it refers only to :unicipalQ:etropolitan and )egional #rial *ourts. #he procedure in the *A and this *ourt are governed !y separate provisions of the )ules of *ourt and &ay, fro& ti&e to ti&e, !e supple&ented !y additional rules pro&ulgated !y this *ourt through resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the )ules of *ourt nor the )evised Internal )ules of the *ourt of Appeals allo$s the re&edy of petition for relief in the *A. :oreover, under 2ection ,(!), )ule ., of the ,%%7 )ules of *ivil Procedure, the denial of a petition for relief fro& +udg&ent is su!+ect only to a special civil action for certiorari under )ule C'. In see ing to reverse the appellate court;s decision denying their petition for relief fro& +udg&ent !y a petition for revie$ on certiorari under )ule .', petitioners have availed of the $rong re&edy t$ice. Nevertheless, even if this *ourt $ere to delve into the &erits of this petition, the sa&e &ust still !e denied. /hat petitioners; counsel did in this case $as to attach an i&proper *ertification of NonAEoru& 2hopping to their petition for revie$ $ith the appellate court. /hile this o&ission can plausi!ly 4ualify as si&ple negligence, it does not a&ount to gross negligence to +ustify the annul&ent of the proceedings !elo$. din*s 3EL.: ,. Nor&ally, e9ecution cannot !e o!tained until and unless> a. the +udg&ent has !eco&e final and e9ecutory= !. the right of appeal has !een renounced or $aived= c. the period for appeal has lapsed $ithout an appeal having !een filed= or d. having !een filed, the appeal has !een resolved and the records of the case have !een returned to the court of origin AA in $hich case, e9ecution shall issue as a &atter of right. 2. #he ascertain&ent of good reasons for e9ecution pending appeal lies $ithin the sound discretion of the trial court, and the appellate court $ill not nor&ally distur! such finding. Intervention !y the latter &ay !e proper, if it is sho$n that there has !een an a!use of discretion. (Hahlil 1l!an!uena ) .IESEL CONSTRUCTION CO/PANY% INC. v. JOLLI1EE FOO.S CORP. F.). No. ,BC-0' 7anuary 2-, 2000 he e,ecution of a judgment pending appeal is an e,ception to the general rule that only final judgment may be e,ecuted. #n e,ceptional e,ecution must be founded on -good reason,- which rest on sound judicial discretion. he alleged financial distress of the prevailing juridical entity is nor, by itself, a -good reason.FACTS: 6**I instituted an action for the recovery of escalated construction costs $hich it had allegedly incurred in the construction of !uildings o$ned !y )espondent 7E*. 6**I o!tained a favora!le +udg&ent fro& the )#*. ?o$ever, contending that the )#* failed to order pay&ent of e9tra $or done, 6**I filed a Notice of Appeal= and a :otion for 19ecution Pending Appeal. In said :otion, it cited as Igood reasonsI its financial distress as a s&all !usiness. #he trial court allo$ed e9ecution pending appeal. And in vie$ of !oth parties" appeals, the trial court for$arded the original records of the case to the appellate court for further proceedings. *A directed the )#* to issue a $rit of e9ecution upon petitioner"s posting a !ond, !ut after$ards it issued an order to stay e9ecution upon respondent"s filing of a supersedeas !ond. ISSUE: /<N *A erred in directing the stay of e9ecution pending appeal previously allo$ed !y the lo$er court. 3EL.: #he *A &ay not !e co&pelled to enforce a 2pecial <rder issued !y the trial court. #he *A has its o$n separate and original discretionary +urisdiction to grant or to stay e9ecution pending appeal, e9cept in civil cases decided under the )ules on 2u&&ary Procedure and in other cases $hen the la$ or the )ules provide other$ise. )ule B% of the ,%%7 )ules states> 2ec. 2. Discretionary e,ecution. (a) .,ecution of a judgment or final order pending appeal . <n &otion of the prevailing party $ith notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court $hile it has +urisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case &ay !e, at the ti&e of the filing of such &otion, said court &ay, in its discretion, order e9ecution of a +udg&ent or final order even !efore the e9piration of the period to appeal. After the trial court has lost +urisdiction, the &otion for e9ecution pending appeal &ay !e filed in the appellate court.


CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa !!"- !!#$

6iscretionary e9ecution &ay only issue upon good reasons to !e stated in a special order after due hearing. #he foregoing sections &ean that after the perfection of the appeal and the trans&ittal of the records, the trial court loses +urisdiction over the case. ?enceforth, it &ay no longer grant a &otion for, or issue a $rit of i&&ediate e9ecution= to do so $ould !e an a!use of discretion. /hile it is true that the trial court granted the :otion of the petitioner for e9ecution pending appeal, it did not actually issue a $rit of e9ecution, !ecause the latter had failed to co&ply $ith the 2pecial <rder proviso re4uiring the posting of a !ond. 1ventually, t$o separate appeals filed !y !oth parties $ere perfected, and the records of the case $ere trans&itted !y the )#* to the *A. Ero& then on, the trial court lost +urisdiction to issue the said $rit. /hen the petitioner as ed the *A for the issuance of the $rit at the ti&e, it there!y invo ed the original discretionary +urisdiction of the latter to grant e9ecution pending appeal. ISSUE: /<N there $as good reason for the e9ecution pending appeal to !e allo$ed. #he *ourt &ust stress that the e9ecution of a +udg&ent !efore its finality &ust !e founded upon good reasons. #he yardstic re&ains the presence or the a!sence of good reasons consisting of e9ceptional circu&stances of such urgency as to out$eigh the in+ury or da&age that the losing party &ay suffer, should the appealed +udg&ent !e reversed later. /ood reason i&ports a superior circu&stance that $ill out$eigh in+ury or da&age to the adverse party. In the case at !ar, petitioner failed to sho$ Ipara&ount and co&pelling reasons of urgency and +ustice.I Petitioner cites as good reason &erely the fact that Iit is a s&allAti&e !uilding contractor that could illAafford the protracted delay in the rei&!urse&ent of the advances it &ade for the aforesaid increasedAcosts of construction of the !uildings.I Petitioner"s allegedly precarious financial condition, ho$ever, is not !y itself a +urisprudentially co&pelling circu&stance $arranting i&&ediate e9ecution. #he financial distress of a +uridical entity is not co&para!le to a case involving a natural person such as a very old and sic ly one $ithout any &eans of livelihood, an heir see ing an order for support and &onthly allo$ance for su!sistence, or one $ho dies. Indeed, the alleged financial distress of a corporation does not out$eigh the long standing general policy of enforcing only final and e9ecutory +udg&ents. *ertainly, a +uridical entity li e petitioner corporation has, other than e9traordinary e9ecution, alternative re&edies li e loans, advances, internal cash generation and the li e to address its precarious financial condition. (Harla 6eles ) REPU1LIC OF T3E P3ILIPPINES vs. LOUR.ES A1IERA NILLAS 7anuary 2B, 2007 FACTS: )espondent 8ourdes A!iera Nillas (Nillas) filed a Petition for )evival of 7udg&ent $ith the )egional #rial *ourt ()#*). It $as alleged that the then *ourt of Eirst Instance (*EI) of Negros <riental rendered a Decision #dicional in .,pediente Cadastral &o. 01, captioned as .l Director De errenos contra .steban #bingayan y 2tros. In the decision, the *EI, acting as a cadastral court, ad+udicated several lots, together $ith the i&prove&ents thereon, in favor of na&ed oppositors $ho had esta!lished their title to their respective lots and their continuous possession thereof since ti&e i&&e&orial and ordered the *hief of the Feneral 8and )egistration <ffice, upon the finality of the decision, to issue the corresponding decree of registration. No responsive pleading $as filed !y the <ffice of the 2olicitor Feneral (<2F), although it entered its appearance and si&ultaneously deputi5ed the *ity Prosecutor of 6u&aguete *ity to appear $henever the case $as set for hearing and in all su!se4uent proceedings. #he )#* rendered a 6ecision finding &erit in the petition for revival of +udg&ent, and ordering the revival of the ,%., 6ecision, as $ell as directing the *o&&issioner of the 8and )egistration Authority (8)A) to issue the corresponding decree of confir&ation and registration !ased on the ,%., 6ecision. #he <2F appealed the )#* 6ecision to the *ourt of Appeals, arguing in &ain that the right of action to revive +udg&ent had already prescri!ed #he appeal $as denied !y the appellate court. ISSUE: /hether or not the right of action to revive +udg&ent had already prescri!ed RULING: No. #he rule is that Ineither laches nor the statute of li&itations applies to a decision in a land registration case.I /e fail to understand the argu&ents of the appellant in support of the assign&ent Jof errorK, e9cept insofar as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration case has !eco&e final, it &ay not !e

enforced after the lapse of a period of ,0 years, e9cept !y another proceeding to enforce the +udg&ent or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision in the )ules of *ourt to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 3 years by motion, and after five years but within 04 years, by an action (S c. J% Ru# BC). This "rovision o' th Ru# s r ' rs to civi# $ctions $nd is not $""#ic$&# to s" ci$# "roc din*s% such $s $ #$nd r *istr$tion c$s . This is so & c$us $ "$rt( in $ civi# $ction !ust i!! di$t #( n'orc $ -ud*! nt th$t is s cur d $s $*$inst th $dv rs "$rt(% $nd his '$i#ur to $ct to n'orc th s$! )ithin $ r $son$&# ti! $s "rovid d in th Ru# s !$9 s th d cision un n'orc $&# $*$inst th #osin* "$rt(. In s" ci$# "roc din*sL%M th "ur"os is to st$&#ish $ st$tus% condition or '$ct+ in #$nd r *istr$tion "roc din*s% th o)n rshi" &( $ " rson o' $ "$rc # o' #$nd is sou*ht to & st$&#ish d. A't r th o)n rshi" h$s & n "rov d $nd con'ir! d &( -udici$# d c#$r$tion% no 'urth r "roc din* to n'orc s$id o)n rshi" is n c ss$r(% 8c "t )h n th $dv rs or #osin* "$rt( h$d & n in "oss ssion o' th #$nd $nd th )innin* "$rt( d sir s to oust hi! th r 'ro!. (Norli5a :a&u id ) ISAAC VILLEGAS petitioner, vs. VICTOR LINGAN $nd ATTY. ERNESTO CARREON respondents. G.R. No. =EBOBC 7une 2%, 2007 FACTS: Petitioner $as the registered o$ner of a parcel of land in *agayan. In order to secure the pay&ent of a loan fro& 63P, the petitioner constituted a )1: over the said parcel of land in favor of 63P. #he said loan and &ortgage $as su!se4uently transferred !y the 63P to the ?o&e :utual 6evelop&ent Eund (?:6E). /hen the petitioner failed to settle his loan, the )1: constituted over the property $as foreclosed, the property $as sold at pu!lic auction and, as the ?:6E $as itself the highest !idder at such pu!lic auction, a certificate of sheriff;s sale $as issued. 3y virtue of a po$er of attorney (FPA) e9ecuted !y petitioner;s $ife, :arilou Villegas in favor of Floria *atral, the latter redee&ed the property fro& the ?:6E. In ,%%C, *atral, !y virtue of the sa&e FPA, e9ecuted a 6eed of 2ale in favor of respondent Victor 8ingan. Petitioner filed a *o&plaint for Annul&ent of #itle and Instru&ent $ith 6a&ages $ith the )#* against respondent. Petitioner argued that the FPA e9ecuted in favor of *atral created a principalAagent relationship only !et$een his $ife, :arilou as principal, and *atral, as agent, and then only for the latter to ad&inister the properties of the for&er and that he never authori5ed *atral to ad&inister his properties, particularly, herein su!+ect property. ?o$ever, )#* dis&issed the co&plaint. <n appeal to *A, *A affir&ed the decision of )#* and ruled that $hen the rede&ption of the property had !een &ade !y *atral !y virtue of a FPA e9ecuted in her favor !y :arilou, it follo$s that the petitioner is no longer the o$ner of the su!+ect property !ut his $ife, :arilou= that the issue as to $hether the po$er of attorney $as a special or general one is of no &o&ent !ecause the petitioner $as no longer the o$ner of the property $hen it $as sold= in other $ords, any disposition of the property needs no po$er of attorney fro& the petitioner hi&self. ISSUE> /hether :arilou, the $ife of the petitioner, as successorAinA interest, &ay validly redee& the property in 4uestion. RULING> 012. 2ection 27, )ule B% of the ,%%7 )ules of *ivil Procedure, provides> 21*. 27. (ho may redeem real property so sold. @ )eal property sold as provided in the last preceding section, or any part thereof sold separately, &ay !e redee&ed in the &anner hereinafter provided, !y the follo$ing persons> (a) #he +udg&ent o!ligor, or his successorAinAinterest in the $hole or any part of the property= #he LsuccessorAinAinterestM of the +udg&ent de!tor referred to in the a!ove provision includes a person $ho succeeds to his property !y operation of la$, or a person $ith a +oint interest in the property, or his spouse or heirs. 2ection BB, )ule B%, )ules of *ourt, states> 21*. BB. Deed and possession to be given at e,piration of redemption period+ by whom e,ecuted or given. @ If no rede&ption !e &ade $ithin one (,) year fro& the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property= or% i' so r d ! d )h n v r si8t( <JG> d$(s h$v #$"s d $nd no oth r r d !"tion h$s & n !$d % $nd notic th r o' *iv n% $nd th ti! 'or r d !"tion h$s 8"ir d% th #$st r d !"tion r is ntit# d to th conv ($nc $nd "oss ssion+ &ut in $## c$s s th -ud*! nt o&#i*or sh$## h$v th ntir " riod o' on <=> ( $r 'ro! th d$t o' th r *istr$tion o' th s$# to r d ! th "ro" rt(. U"on th 8"ir$tion o' th ri*ht o' r d !"tion% th "urch$s r or r d !"tion r sh$## & su&stitut d to $nd $c0uir $## th ri*hts% tit# % int r st $nd c#$i! o' th


CIVIL PROCEDURE Notes/Case Digests Selected Cases (4-Manresa !!"- !!#$

-ud*! nt o&#i*or to th "ro" rt( $t th ti! o' th # v(. Th "oss ssion o' th "ro" rt( sh$## & *iv n to th "urch$s r or #$st r d !"tion r &( th s$! o''ic r un# ss $ third "$rt( is $ctu$##( ho#din* th "ro" rt( $dv rs #( to th -ud*! nt o&#i*or. Dnder the a!ove provision, petitioner could have redee&ed the property fro& :arilou after she had redee&ed it. #he pleadings filed and the records of this case do not sho$ that petitioner e9ercised said right. *onse4uently, as correctly held !y the *A, :arilou ac4uired o$nership of the su!+ect property. All rights and title of the +udg&ent o!ligor are transferred upon the e9piration of the right of rede&ption. And $here the rede&ption is &ade under a property regi&e governed !y the con+ugal partnership of gains, Article ,0% of the Ea&ily *ode provides that property ac4uired !y right of rede&ption is the e9clusive property of the spouses redee&ing the property. *learly, therefore, :arilou, as o$ner, had the right to sell the property to another. (#een#een Pague ) Ru# AG F A"" $# 'ro! th /TC to th RC NEYPES v. CA <S "t. =A% ?GGE> 3EL.: #he court no$ allo$ a fresh period of ,' days $ithin $hich to file the notice of appeal in the )egional #rial *ourt, count d 'ro! r c i"t o' th ord r dis!issin* $ !otion 'or $ n ) tri$# or !otion 'or r consid r$tion. ?enceforth, this Lfresh period ruleM shall also apply to Ru# AG governing appeals fro& the :unicipal #rial *ourts to the )egional #rial *ourts= Ru# A? on petitions for revie$ fro& the )egional #rial *ourts to the *ourt of Appeals= Ru# AB on appeals fro& 4uasiA +udicial agencies to the *ourt of Appeals and Ru# AE governing appeals !y certiorari to the 2upre&e *ourt. (Hahlil 1l!an!uena ) INTERNATIONAL SC3OOL% INC. </$ni#$>% petitioner, vs. 3ON. COURT OF APPEALS% SPOUSES ALEH AN. OP3ELIA TORRAL1A% respondents. F.). No. ,B,,0% 7une 2%, ,%%% FACTS: #he )#* of N* rendered a decision in favor of spouses #orral!a in a civil case entitled I2pouses #orral!a vs. International 2chool, Inc. (I2:)M involving a co&plaint for da&ages due to the death of plaintiffs" only son, 1ricson #orral!a $hile in the custody of I2: and its officers. I2: appealed to the *A. 6uring the pendency thereof, the spouses #orral!a filed a &otion for e9ecution pending appeal !efore the lo$er court on the grounds that the appeal is &erely dilatory and that the filing of a !ond is another good reason for the e9ecution of a +udg&ent pending appeal. In an order dated 7une ,%, ,%%C, the lo$er court granted e9ecution pending upon the posting of a !ond !y the spouses #orral!a and the lo$er court issued a Notice of Farnish&ent $hich $as served to *iti!an . <n the other hand, I2: filed a :E) or for approval of supersedeas !ond. ?o$ever, the lo$er court denied I2:"s :E) and authori5ed and directed the 2heriff to encash the *iti!an :anager"s *hec (!an deposits of I2:) and to turn over the proceeds therefor after deducting all legal fees and charges if any, to the plaintiffs or their representative. In vie$ of the a!ove order of the lo$er court, I2: filed a &otion to $ithdra$ the superseads !ond and filed a petition for certiorari !efore the *A. ?o$ever, CA dis&issed the petition and found that the grounds relied upon !y the lo$er court in granting e9ecution pending appeal that the appeal ta en !y I2: is &erely dilatory and the filing of a !ond constitute good reasons. #he CA agreed $ith the lo$er court that I2:"s appeal appears to !e dilatory in vie$ of its Ivirtual ad&ission of fault $hen it adopted the pro+ectI I*ode )edI consisting of safety and e&ergency &easures, only after the death of plaintiffsAspouses #orral!a"s only sonI= and that the delay has already affected the plaintiffsAspouses #orral!a financially. ?ence this petition. ISSUE P=: /QN the grantQissuance of $rit of e9ecution pending appeal $as proper. RULING: It &ust !e stressed that private respondentsAspouses &otionQapplication for an e9ecution pending appeal $as pre&ised on the follo$ing reasons> that the appeal $as !eing ta en for purpose of delay and that they are filing a !ond. #his *ourt has ruled in 2ng vs. Court of #ppeals that, $here the reason given is that an appeal is frivolous and dilatory, e9ecution pending appeal cannot !e +ustified. It is not proper for the trial court to find that an appeal is frivolous and conse4uently to disapprove it since the disallo$ance of an appeal !y said court constitutes a deprivation of the right to appeal. #he authority to disapprove an appeal rightfully pertains to the appellate court. Eor purposes only of deter&ining the correctness of the $rit of e9ecution pending appeal, the 2upre&e *ourt cannot see ho$ the lo$er courts ca&e upon the conclusion of virtual ad&ission of fault or negligence !y I2: !ased on the e9change $here I2:"s s$i&&ing

coach Noli )elo+ ad&itted that he read the school paper article introducing I*ode )edI. As correctly pointed out !y I2:, the article $as not an official state&ent of the school, !ut &erely an opinion of its author. :oreover, 2* cannot see ho$ the state&ent of :r. Noli )elo+ that he read the article on I*ode )edI can !e construed as an ad&ission of lia!ility !y the school. *learly then, the conclusion of the lo$er courts that the appeal is dilatory rests on sha y ground. ISSUE P?: /QN the filing of a !ond can !e considered a good reason to +ustify i&&ediate e9ecution under 2ection 2, )ule B%. RULING: In the case of *o,as vs. Court of #ppeals, the *ourt ruled that, to consider the &ere posting of a !ond a Igood reasonI $ould precisely &a e i&&ediate e9ecution of a +udg&ent pending appeal routinary, the rule rather than the e9ception. 7udg&ents $ould !e e9ecuted i&&ediately, as a &atter of course, once rendered, if all that the prevailing party needed to do $as to post a !ond to ans$er for da&ages that &ight result therefro&. #his is a situation, to repeat, neither conte&plated nor intended !y la$. In fine, the rule is no$ settled that the &ere filing of a !ond !y the successful party is not a good reason for ordering e9ecution pending appeal, as Ia co&!ination of circu&stances is the do&inant consideration $hich i&pels the grant of i&&ediate e9ecution, the re4uire&ent of a !ond is i&posed &erely as an additional factor, no dou!t for the protection of the defendant"s creditor. 2ince $e have already ruled that the reason that an appeal is dilatory does not +ustify e9ecution pending appeal, neither does the filing of a !ond, $ithout anything &ore, +ustify the sa&e. (#een#een )

Change will not come if we wait for some other person or some other time. We are the ones we've been waiting for. We are the change that we seek. -Barack Obama