Prepared by The National Center for Security & Preparedness on behalf of The New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Executive Summary 4
Overview of Hurricane Sandy 5
Hurricane Sandy Response & Recovery 7
Methodology 8
Areas of Study
Personnel 9
Technology & Facilities 12
Procedures & Plans 17
Concluding Recommendations 22
Appendix 1 AAR Development Team 23
Appendix 2 Acronyms Used in this Report 24
Appendix 3 Hurricane Sandy Chronology 27
Appendix 4 Executive Orders Issued During Hurricane Sandy 31
Appendix 5 Persons Interviewed for this Report 35
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3
FOREWORD
July 1, 2013
As the recovery operations began following Hurricane Sandy, Commissioner Jerome Hauer of the New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services (the Division) reached out to the National Center for Security & Preparedness (NCSP) to develop a comprehensive After Action Report (AAR) assessing the Division's response to the disaster. The NCSP previously developed a limited scope AAR on the response to Hurricane Irene and Tropical Storm Lee. Subsequently, the NCSP conducted a confidential functional exercise to help the Division assess processes and procedures during a simulated Level 1 activation of the State's Emergency Operations Center. These efforts are part of the NCSP's wider strategic partnership with the Division and provided a strong foundation for the Hurricane Sandy AAR process.
AAR development can vary in terms of scope, focus, methodology, and purpose. The Commissioner emphasized this AAR's essential role in New York State's continuing emergency management efforts. He asked that the report be accurate, comprehensive, and clear in its findings and conclusions. It is equally important to note that the Commissioner did not provide any guidance as to which subject matter experts to use, approach to take, or how to accomplish the mission. In other words, we were not only allowed but entrusted to complete the project objectively.
I selected the subject matter experts (SMEs) based on their experience, expertise, and in most cases, my personal knowledge of their capabilities. The AAR Development Team produced a report keeping with the guidance provided to us. We have confidence that this report will guide the Division's continuing efforts to serve the citizens of New York State.
Respectfully submitted,
Rick C. Mathews Director
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Hurricane Sandy sorely tested the New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services Office of Emergency Management (OEM), which was still in the process of implementing changes and improvements prompted by the response to 2011's Hurricane Irene and Tropical Storm Lee. Although a relatively weak storm in terms of wind speed, Sandy was extraordinarily large in size and impeccable in her timing, striking the New York and New Jersey coastlines at high tide. The resulting storm surge caused unprecedented damage: it smashed coastal communities in both states, flooded large areas of New York City, and disrupted transportation, energy, and communications for millions of residents.
The storm killed 48 persons in New York State, and another 24 in neighboring states. Property damage exceeded $72 billion (second only to Katrina). Despite efforts by City, County, State, and Federal emergency agency personnel that can only be described as heroic, Hurricane Sandy for a time simply overwhelmed every plan and contingency. The scale of the event was larger and the needs of the victims greater than most communities had anticipated.
OEM was and continues to be centrally involved in the Hurricane Sandy response and recovery effort. The agency's staff has worked endless hours and days to meet the needs of the people of New York State. For the most part, OEM's performance can be considered successful despite confusion, delays, and missteps along the way. In the words of many who were involved in the process and interviewed for this report, it could have been worse. But is that outcome acceptable? Moreover, would that level of marginally acceptable performance be replicable in the face of a Category 2 or 3 hurricane along Sandy's path?
Many of the problems OEM encountered in mounting operations for Sandy were predictable, and echoed gaps and shortfalls called out after the Irene and Lee responses the previous year. Staffing, technology, and doctrine were issues in 2011 and they remained issues in 2012, and the challenging circumstances of the Sandy response certainly exacerbated those problems. Many of these pre-existing conditions were being addressed, albeit slowly, when Sandy appeared on the horizon and forced the question.
The lessons learned from the Hurricane Sandy response are clear because many of the findings are not new. The herculean efforts to meet the "superstorm's impacts notwithstanding, the State of New York and OEM need to move forward quickly on all fronts to ensure the citizens of the Empire State have the response capability they not only deserve but, based on recent events, need.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5 OVERVIEW OF HURRICANE SANDY
On October 22, 2012, Tropical Depression Sandy developed 320 miles south of the Jamaican Islands, and the National Weather Service forecasted possible extreme weather for the Mid- Atlantic and Northeastern United States. Hurricane Sandy made landfall on the evening of October 29, 2012, with an effective diameter of 485 miles and sustained winds of 75 mph. The storm caused extensive flood and wind damage, compounded by wide spread power outages, fires, and fuel shortages. On October 30, 2012, a major federal disaster declaration was signed by President Obama.
Three days prior to landfall, the New York State (NYS) Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services (DHSES) Office of Emergency Management (OEM) activated the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) in preparation for the landfall of Hurricane Sandy. That same day, Governor Cuomo issued an emergency declaration for NYS to expedite pre- landfall emergency response operations. Two days later, President Obama signed Emergency Declaration 3351 for NYS and mandatory evacuations were ordered for NYC "Zone A as well as the Rockaways, City sland, and Hamilton Beach. By that evening, all major bridges and tunnels, air and sea terminals, and rail lines into the NYC Metropolitan area were shut down.
Damage estimates from Sandy exceed $72 billion, with 24 states impacted by the storm. Sandy was so large that tropical storm force winds extended over an area about 1,000 miles in diameter. Sandy caused water levels to rise along the entire East Coast of the United States from Florida northward to Maine. The highest storm surges and greatest inundation, which reached record levels, occurred in New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, and especially in and around the New York City area. In many of these locations especially along the coasts of central and northern New Jersey, Staten Island, and southward-facing shores of Long Island the surge was accompanied by powerful damaging waves. Storm surge caused flooding that exceeded 8 feet above ground level in some locations. Power outages from the combined effects of wind and surge left some coastal communities without power for months.
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 6 The National Hurricane Center (NHC) Tropical Cyclone Report estimated the death count from Sandy at 147 direct deaths. In the United States, the storm was associated with 72 direct deaths in eight states: 48 in New York, 12 in New Jersey, 5 in Connecticut, 2 each in Virginia and Pennsylvania, and 1 each in New Hampshire, West Virginia, and Maryland. The storm also resulted in at least 75 indirect deaths (i.e., related to unsafe or unhealthy conditions that existed during the evacuation phase, occurrence of the hurricane, or during the post-hurricane/clean-up phase). These numbers make Sandy the deadliest hurricane to hit the U.S. mainland since Hurricane Katrina in 2005, as well as the deadliest hurricane/post-tropical cyclone to hit the U.S. East Coast since Hurricane Agnes in 1972.
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 7 HURRICANE SANDY RESPONSE & RECOVERY (Current as of 5/2013)
Hurricane Sandy required the largest emergency response in the NYC area since the 9/11 terror attacks with support from more than 4,650 personnel deployed from 42 federal agencies and volunteer organizations and Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) support from 29 states across the nation. Throughout response operations, over 5500 State Police and National Guard members were deployed and 14 swift water rescue teams executed 161 reported missions. Additionally, 9 functional branches and personnel from over 35 state agencies operated in the SEOC, and 124 shelters were stood up to house approximately 8,000 displaced citizens.
The storm resulted in nearly 400,000 evacuations and extensive flood and wind damage to critical infrastructure, including 2.1 million power outages and flooding in major NYC tunnels and subway lines. Furthermore, significant fuel shortages ensued with 2 of 6 major petroleum refineries shut down and 4 operating at reduced rates. Additionally, over 149.7 million gallons of water were pumped from NYC infrastructure, the Defense Logistics Agency delivered 2.3 million gallons of fuel, and over 5.7 million cubic yards of debris were removed from impacted regions.
In order to facilitate recovery operations, mobile Disaster Recovery Centers (DRCs) were opened in Queens, Brooklyn and Staten Island on November 1 st , and a total of 65 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) DRCs were operational throughout the response. Recovery efforts were complicated by the arrival of a strong coast storm system (Nor'easter) on November 7, 2012, which brought strong winds, storm surge, and freezing temperatures to the NYC region. Despite the inclement weather, the ports of New York and New Jersey re- opened the same day, with most subways and the Queens-Midtown Tunnel returning to operations two days later.
The New York State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) began demobilization on November 12, 2012. Deactivation of the Emergency Operation Center (EOC) from a Level I to Level II came on November 16, 2012. On January 29, 2013, Congress passed the "Sandy Recovery mprovement Act of 2013 allocating 100% reimbursement to states through federal assistance. By May of 2013, $6.6 billion in total FEMA assistance was awarded to New York State. NYSDHSES Twitter
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 8 METHODOLOGY
The National Center for Security & Preparedness (NCSP) at the University at Albany, State University of New York was asked by the New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services to develop the Hurricane Sandy After Action Report (AAR). To this end, the NCSP assembled a team of subject matter experts to prepare the AAR (the roster of SMEs is provided in Appendix A of this document). The subject matter experts were charged with conducting interviews of key local, state, and federal personnel, as well as individuals in the private sector and non-governmental organizations, who had first-hand perspectives on OEM's operations and performance in the days leading up to and during the Sandy response. These interviews, conducted on a strictly not-for-attribution basis, included numerous OEM staff, other New York State agency officials, emergency management personnel from Nassau, Suffolk and Greenwich counties and New York City, FEMA officials, and other leaders in the affected areas.
Interviewers used baseline questions to establish information on their subjects' backgrounds, where they were during the response, and the nature of their responsibilities, but were free to follow topics raised in conversations. Results were shared among the AAR Development Team and discussed prior to development of the draft report. On the basis of those discussions, key themes were defined and areas for further investigation developed.
The resulting data was accumulated and integrated into the draft After Action Report, which was then provided to the NCSP for review and final editing.
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 9 AREAS OF STUDY PERSONNEL
STRENGTHS
An organization succeeds or fails on the quality and commitment of its personnel. While OEM has a number of significant personnel issues, including staffing, the overall performance of its staff prior to, during, and after Sandy was remarkable. OEM staff worked long hours supporting a mission that was dynamic, challenging, and often frustrating. The dedication reflected throughout extended operations ultimately made an important difference between success and failure.
The men and women of OEM were asked to work12-hour shifts under difficult conditions for extended days. For some, due to additional tasks and understaffing, that translated into 16+ hour days, which they accepted as a necessary part of getting the job accomplished. The dedication of OEM staff in Albany and in the field was critical to the success of the response over a series of seemingly never-ending days. The experience of a small number of long- serving professionals in past events helped compensate for too many vacant positions in the organization, allowing OEM to mount a response that met the majority of the unprecedented needs of the citizens of New York State in a timely and effective manner.
Strong sense of commitment by most staff to the mission. Demonstrated expertise delivering emergency management services. Succeeded in the face of unprecedented challenges. Effective collaboration with volunteers from other agencies in EOC operations.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 10 A number of OEM personnel forfeited vacation time to stay at their posts. Others labored to the point of exhaustion, staying at their position despite the physical and emotional stress born of a long-term round-the-clock activation. Moreover, OEM staff members were leveraged to provide needed expertise and leadership to EOC volunteers from other State agencies.
OEM personnel deserve recognition for their contributions to public safety during and after Sandy's landfall. As a group they have been asked to do too much, with too little, for too long. It is a testimonial to these public employees that they have largely found ways to succeed in that pursuit.
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 11 AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT
Staffing
Staffing within OEM is down 50% over the past two years, from the 2011 level of 125 to approximately 65 (post-Sandy). New York State OEM has roughly the same number of staff as agencies in states with 80% fewer residents. During routine operations, OEM staffers are carrying out a broad range of tasks, including the development of plans, conduct of exercises and delivery of training. They are also tasked with managing the disbursement and use of hundreds of millions of dollars of Federal grant funds and payments, including monies for victims of past disasters. The shortage of trained personnel delays getting funds into the hands of citizens and emergency agencies across New York.
During Sandy, the lack of seasoned personnel forced many OEM employees to work beyond their 12 hour shifts for days on end. Many assignments and requests were delayed due to the lack of knowledgeable personnel positioned to fulfill orders and respond to calls for information.
The lack of trained staff also adversely impacted the integration into the EOC of untrained volunteers from other State agencies. Upon arrival, several representatives had almost no experience, and received training (EEOC, 300, and 400 classes) from OEM staff.
Loss of Experienced Staff
OEM needs to recruit and retain more qualified staff, preferably with operational experience. In the past, there were opportunities to train and partner with replacements; that cycle is not currently working.
There is a need to address differences among positions to ensure both the slot and incumbent match OEM requirements. Cross-training among key staff can help to support retention of staff and institutional knowledge. Moreover, there is a need for a clearly defined and meaningful professional development/career path for OEM personnel.
Staff Sustainment
The sustainability of OEM staff at all levels does not appear to be a sufficiently high priority. There is no specific office or individual assigned the broad responsibility for the maintenance of staff well-being. Even prior to landfall, several individuals had been working 14-to-16 hour days. Many in the EOC were already tired and underperforming before the full activation was ordered. Professional development, staff sustainment, and succession planning have not received a sustained commitment. The consequence impacts staff knowledge, professionalism, and retention.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 12 TECHNOLOGY & FACILITIES
STRENGTHS
New York State OEM has access to the full range of technology necessary to support emergency operations across the state. As evidenced throughout the Sandy response, there were no meaningful barriers to data, voice and visual communications between the EOC in Albany and personnel operating in County-level operations centers or at the State's offices in New York City.
DLAN reflects the requirements of OEM. EOC technology base is first class. GIS is being employed to support EOC operations and decision making.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 13 Although there has been substantial criticism of DisasterLAN (DLAN), the State's incident management support system, it should be noted that OEM personnel familiar with and trained in the use of DLAN feel it is an effective tool for supporting EOC operations. Over the past decade it has been customized to meet the needs of OEM and has a proven track record with many of the EOC staff. Contractor staff (on-site at the EOC) is highly knowledgeable of OEM operations and is responsive to requests to prepare reports and provide assistance to new users.
OEM employs Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to present information on a wide range of subjects of importance to emergency managers and response agencies. OEM's GS staff is experienced and eager to employ a wide range of tools in support of the Office and its mission.
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 14 AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT
DLAN
The principal tool used by OEM to obtain and manage requests for assistance from counties across the State is DisasterLAN. Although the State has invested substantially over the past decade in making DLAN the electronic backbone for OEM incident management, it is not widely embraced by emergency managers at the local level. Local jurisdictions in New York have invested in other systems that are unable to communicate with DLAN.
Since DLAN is felt to be too hard to use, it is not used on a daily basis by most OEM staff nor by local-level responders, which means most personnel are not familiar with its operation.
Tracking the status of specific entered requests is difficult, making management and planning for those resources and assignments challenging.
DLAN does not readily allow users to generate custom reports the DLAN contractor at the EOC must develop these for users.
DLAN is not compatible with WebEOC and eTeam, the systems in use in most counties and major cities in the State, including New York City, which means data must be entered twice and that the databases downstate and in Albany cannot speak to each other.
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 15 Asset Tracking
The volume of material flowing into and out of staging areas, most prominently Citi Field, was staggering. A modern asset tracking system, tied to DLAN (or some other incident management support software package) and to the State's procurement system, would streamline the acquisition and delivery of requested resources to the parties that need them, help assure positive control during the operation, and facilitate recovery and return of rented, purchased and borrowed items.
OEM should conduct both internal and external software requirements reviews to ensure that whatever system the state will be using meets the operational and recovery needs of the state and stakeholders. There are a number of commercial off the shelf systems (COTS) that provide the functionality the interviewees described as a need.
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 16 New York State Emergency Operations Center
Although the communications capabilities of the EOC are completely up to date, the process of communications within the EOC is a challenging one. Modern, functional EOCs around the world are wide-open and well-lit, with signage and information screens that can be seen from anywhere in the room. The State's current facility does not afford OEM staff and participants from other agencies with the operational environment, including meeting space, to carry out their missions. The EOC should be assessed for further updates and improvements; alternate space should be considered.
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 17 PROCEDURES & PLANS
STRENGTHS
Relocating Staff to New York City and the ROC
The unprecedented scope of the storm damage and corresponding response effort challenged "business as usual for OEM, prompting a lean-forward, operational posture on the part of OEM leadership. While still playing its traditional role of supporting resource requests from county and city governments, OEM personnel (both staff and consultant) were engaged in hands-on roles across the region, working in city and county EOCs, staffing logistics staging areas, performing field inspections and damage assessments, and augmenting other agency staff.
Relocating key staff to the New York City area was hugely successful from local jurisdiction perspectives. Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) personnel were invaluable to sustaining EOC operations, but need to be effectively managed. The State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) provided a solid basis for operations.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 18 The decision to put personnel on the scene was characterized by local officials in New York City and other affected communities as a new, best practice for OEM. It allowed OEM to effectively follow-up on commitments made by the Governor's Office, coordinating those requests with the EOC staff in Albany. New York City emergency management officials went so far as to describe the forward deployment of OEM personnel as a game changer and a 180 shift from their experience with the State in past disasters. In their opinion, the presence of OEM staff on the scene after Sandy resulted in better communication and coordination, more prompt fulfillment of requests, and a stronger sense of collaboration.
EMAC
EMAC assistance was requested early in the activation timeline, although the first "loaned staff didn't step into the EOC until several days after Sandy's landfall. EMAC personnel were used to augment logistics and finance, and assisted in planning and operations, while OEM staff filled most of the core ICS positions. Even though the EMAC deployed staff were not fully conversant with New York's specific plans and procedures, they knew emergency management, and most were willing and able to adapt to their roles "filling holes. By one estimate, 29 staff positions were filled by EMAC.
CEMP
The State's Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan reflects many years of OEM work, analysis, and institutional lessons-learned. The CEMP remains the "bible for OEM operations; the plans and procedures embodied within the CEMP were the basis for actions taken in the field and at the EOC throughout the activation.
As with any plan, maintenance is critical. The CEMP clearly needs to be revised to reflect changes in the operational and decision-making environments (e.g., the more active role played by the Governor's Office).
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 19 AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT
Regional Operations Center
Establishing a so-called Regional Operations Center, or "ROC, at the State offices in Midtown Manhattan was seen by the Commissioner as a straightforward task to ensure the Governor and his key staff had access to the same information they could receive in the NY State EOC in Albany. To this end, he had OEM personnel go to New York City to assemble the systems necessary to convert a conference room into a viable Regional Operations Center. While the equipment, including video screens and computers, was purchased for this purpose and much of it was employed in another command and control facility, the ROC was never assembled as envisioned. The transfer of senior personnel from Albany also severely stretched OEM's staff resources.
If OEM is going to continue to support a forward leaning posture in major events, including the utilization of assets in the field in the manner displayed during Sandy, it must: Incorporate the ROC concept into the CEMP; Strengthen its available staff resources, both at the headquarters level and in the State Regions (see discussion under Personnel, above) and; Clarify and define, train and exercise OEM support roles to Executive Leadership.
The decision to establish the so-called ROC was not understood nor supported by OEM rank and file. The OEM leadership team must be bolstered. The change in procurement rules installed for OEM during the Sandy response is inconsistent with effective emergency operations. OEM must do a better job of building and sustaining its staff. OEM and Executive Leadership expectations need to be better defined and integrated into planning and operations. Planning needs to be strengthened across the board.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 20 EMAC
OEM would benefit from refining their EMAC request procedure to ensure that the requirements for detailees are specified in greater detail. In addition, the request should be initiated earlier in the activation to help ensure personnel are in place when needed and most helpful.
To make their integration into EOC operations easier, the CEMP should be updated with quick reference guides, job action sheets, and the forms and other tools to perform each function in the EOC. This will help greatly when augmenting staff with EMAC and other personnel who are unfamiliar with New York State EOC operations.
CEMP
There is a need to promote greater understanding of the CEMP and supporting procedures among senior officials in the State, their roles and resonsibilities during a disaster, and to establish the working rules of engagement between the Executive Leadership and the agencies charged with coordinating emergency response. This will enhance the effectiveness of senior-level decisions within context of the larger response.
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 21 OEM Leadership Team
Due to the retirement or voluntary transfers of key staff over the past two years, OEM entered the Sandy response with a seriously depleted leadership cadre.
Effective emergency management is frequently a function of strong hands-on leadership and pre-existing personal relationships. In this case, the absence of a deep bench of experienced emergency managers within the office was felt almost immediately. The Commissioner and then Director clearly recognized this problem and had taken steps to address gaps in the organization, but this process was in its very early stages when the storm hit in October.
Use of experienced consultants allowed OEM to actively engage on a variety of issues that would have probably been outside the range of available State personnel. This should not, however, be seen as a substitute for recruiting, training, and retaining experienced management staff.
OEM and Executive Leadership Expectations
OEM needs to modify its current organizational structure, procedures, and culture to accommodate the new model of proactive senior leadership demonstrated by the Governor and his senior staff. This will require close coordination with the State's executive leadership to define expectations and evolve standard operating procedures, addressing "breaks" with pre- Sandy processes.
At the same time, the Governor and senior leadership need to better understand how OEM functions and can support them during a disaster. This will require executive reinforcement of cabinet and interagency roles and support in preparedness, participation, and response so that the overall state response is stronger.
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 22 CONCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS
The New York State Office of Emergency Management was in poor condition on October 28, 2012. Too few experienced staff members, a system based in part on tools that the users in the field didn't understand or use, and a leadership that was trying to build a team while fighting too many fires around the State. All of these vulnerabilities were exposed when Sandy made landfall on October 29.
While the core strength of OEM its staff includes many dedicated professionals, there are too many others that lack the experience to effectively meet the needs of New York's citizens. The technology backbone of the State EOC is solid, but undercut by an incident management software system that is not accepted by the local communities that need to use it and a physical plant that is not conducive to efficient operations. It is also operating in a dynamic government environment in which its plans and SOPs are being overtaken by new demands and requirements. These challenges must be seen as an opportunity.
The Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services should initiate a ground up review of each position and the personnel filling those roles. This bench review should assess the position's role and the capabilities and experience of the staff filling that role. Personnel should be reassigned to maximize strengths, replaced if necessary. Staff members should also be shown a career path and an opportunity for professional growth commensurate with their efforts and sacrifices.
OEM must review the viability of its continued use of DLAN. If DLAN is to be retained, it must allow more system flexibility and greater integration with other systems in the State. The EOC needs to be reconfigured to create more flexible and dedicated space for use by planners, working groups, and other personnel during activations.
The new paradigm of leading from the front, demonstrated by the Governor during Sandy and likely to be replayed in future disasters, demands OEM adopt a fresh approach to supporting the State's executive leadership while still fulfilling its core responsibilities to the counties, cities, and citizens of the Empire State. To this end, the CEMP needs a thorough review and revision specifically addressing responses to "all in scenarios. The resulting roadmap for OEM operations must then be effectively communicated to New York's local jurisdictions and to its senior officials, ensuring coordination and efficient use of resources.
New York State's Office of Emergency Management has been a standard for the world. It should be again.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 23 APPENDIX 1: AAR DEVELOPMENT TEAM
The development of this document was led by Rick C. Mathews, Director, National Center for Security & Preparedness, University at Albany, State University of New York.
NCSP Staff & Subject Matter Experts
Andrew Vitek, Research Assistant Carlos H. Millan, Project Analyst Jeffrey Knaack, Project Coordinator Derek T. Morrison, Senior Analyst Steve Sin, Senior Research Associate Cyndi Mellen, Senior Project Coordinator Brandon J. Kennedy, Senior Project Coordinator Jayson L. Kratoville, Chief of Staff Rick C. Mathews, Director
The Olson Group, LLC, supported the NCSP staff and subject matter experts in the organization, layout, and editing of the After Action Report.
Primary Subject Matter Expert Team
Thomas J. Lockwood William Nagle Kyle Olson Dorothy Lowry Adam Montella Glenn Epler
Secondary Subject Matter Expert Team
The development team consulted was a team of secondary subject matter experts embedded within the DHSES during the Hurricane Sandy Response. This team provided direct information, comments, and recommendations.
Donald Hiett James Ellson Patrick Bahnken Howard Murphy William Savarese Randall Duncan
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 24 APPENDIX 2: ACRONYMS USED IN THIS REPORT
ACE: Army Corps of Engineers AG & MKTS: Department of Agriculture and Markets APB: Animal Protection Branch ARC: American Red Cross CEMP: Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan CIKR: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources COTS: Commercial off the Shelf Systems DCJS: Division of Criminal Justice Services DEC: Department of Environmental Conservation DFS: Department of Financial Services DHS: US Department of Homeland Security DMNA: Division of Military and Naval Affairs DOCCS: Department of Corrections and Community Services DOH: Department of Health DOL: Department of Labor DOS: Department of State DOT: Department of Transportation DPC: Disaster Planning Commission DRC: Disaster Recovery Center DSP: Division of State Police EMAC: Emergency Management Action Compact EOC/SEOC: New York State Emergency Operations Center ESB: Emergency Services Branch ESD: Empire State Development ESF: Emergency Support Functions FB: Functional Branch FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 25 GP: General Population HCF: Health Care Facility HCR: Homes and Community Renewal HSB: Human Services Branch IMT: Incident Management Team IOF: Initial Operating Facility IOGS: Interstate Oil and Gas Commission JFO: Joint Field Office JIC: Joint Information Center JOC: Joint Operations Center LESB: Law Enforcement and Security Branch LIRR: Long Island Rail Railroad LOC: Logistics Operation Center MTA: Metropolitan Transit Authority NCSP: National Center for Security & Preparedness NLT: No Later Than NRCC: National Resource Coordinating Center NRF: National Response Framework NWS: National Weather Service NYSDHSES: New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services NYSDOT: New York State Department of Transportation NYSE: New York Stock Exchange NYSERDA: New York State Energy Research and Development Authority NYSOEM: New York State Office of Emergency Management NYSTWA: New York State Thruway Authority OCFS: Office of Children and Family Services OEIC: Office of Interoperable and Emergency Communications OFA: Office of the Aging OFPC: Office of Fire Prevention and Control
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 26 OFT: Office for Technology OGS: Office of General Services OMH: Office of Mental Health OPRHP: Office of Parks, Recreation and Historical Preservation OPWDD: Office for People with Developmental Disabilities OTA: Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance PA NY/NJ: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey PHB: Public Health Branch POTUS: President of the United States PSC: Public Service Commission ROC: Regional Operational Center RRCC: Regional Resource Coordinating Center SED: State Education Department SOE: State of Emergency SUNY: State University of New York SWC: State Watch Center TIG: Transportation Infrastructure Group
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 27 APPENDIX 3: HURRICANE SANDY CHRONOLOGY
Time/Date Event
1100 22 OCT Tropical Depression Sandy 320 miles SSW of Jamaica; forecast possible extreme weather in the Mid-Atlantic and Northeast regions.
2300 24 OCT NWS Advisory 11: Hurricane Sandy 85 miles SW of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 0800 25 OCT SITREP 10-25: New York City (NYC) Office of Emergency Management (OEM) Situation Room Activated. 1030 25 OCT Principals: Downstate Conference Call. 1130 25 OCT Principals: Conference Call NWS. 1300 25 OCT Hurricane Strategic Planning Meeting Director Kuhr's Office. 1400 25 OCT Principals Meeting. 2300 25 OCT NWS Advisory 15: Hurricane Sandy 15 miles NNE of Eleuthera Island, Bahamas. 0800 26 OCT SITREP 10-25: NYS Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) Level 3 Activation. 26 OCT (DAY) SITREP 10-26: Gov. Cuomo Declares a State of Emergency for New York State. 26 OCT (DAY) FEMA Liaisons Arrive at the New York State Emergency Operations Center. 26 OCT (DAY) SITREP 10-26: NYC OEM Begins 24 Hour Operations. 26 OCT (DAY) Nassau and Suffolk Counties' EOCs Activated from 0900-1700. 1200 26 OCT NYC OEM Coastal Storm Steering Committee Conference Call. 2300 26 OCT NWS Advisory 19: Hurricane Sandy 395 mile SSE of Charleston SC. 0800 27 OCT SITREP 10-26: DMNA Joint Operations Center Level 3 Activation. 0800 27 OCT SITREP 10-27: SEOC Level 1 Activation with 9 Functional Branches operational.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 28 0700 28 OCT SITREP 10-28: JOC Level 1 Activation. 28 OCT (DAY) SITREP 10-28 #2 President Obama (POTUS) Issues Presidential Emergency Declaration #3351 for New York State. 28 OCT (DAY) New Jersey Evacuations in Atlantic City, Sandy Hook South to Cape May, and the Barrier Islands. 28 OCT (EVE) SITREP 10-28 #2: Select medical facilities/nursing homes in zone A/B begin voluntary evacuation. 28 OCT (EVE) SITREP 10-28 #2: Nassau and Suffolk Counties' EOCs Begin 24 Hour Operations. 1400 28 OCT NYC Zone A evacuation as well as the Rockaways, City Island and Hamilton Beach. 1500 28 OCT SITREP 10-27: New York State Fire Mobilization and Mutual Aid Plan Activated. 1900 28 OCT Suspension of Subway Service. 2100 28 OCT All NYC Mass-Transit Suspended. 29 OCT (EVE) ***Hurricane Sandy Impact NY*** 29 OCT (EVE) SITREP 10-29 #2: New York State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT) reports numerous closures throughout the Hudson Valley, NYC and Long Island. Major closures include: Tappan Zee Bridge, Holland Tunnel, and the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel. There are travel restrictions on a number of other bridges due to high wind. NYSDOT has banned oversized and overweight travel on and south of I-84. 2030 29 OCT Queens Breezy Point Fire. 30 OCT (DAY) SITREP 10-30: Major Federal Disaster Declaration for Public Assistance and Individual Assistance. 30 OCT (DAY) SITREP 10-30 #2: Of the six refiners located in the Mid-Atlantic area that supply petroleum fuels to the New York market, two are shut down and the remaining four are operating at reduced rates.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 29 30 OCT (DAY) SITREP 10-30 #2: Human Services Branch Tasked with Establishing Disaster Recovery Centers(DRCs) Starting 1 Nov. 31 OCT (DAY) SITREP 10-31: NYSE Reopens. 1 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-1: Mobile DRC For the City of New York opened in Queens, Brooklyn and Staten Island. 2 NOV NYC Marathon Cancelled. 0800 2 NOV SITREP 11-2: Emergency Services Functional Branch Demobilized. 3 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-3: Significant Fuel Shortages Acknowledged. 3 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-3: New York State Regional Operation Center Begins Operations. 3 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-3 #2: EMAC IMT Assistance Arrived to Support NYC OEM operations. 3 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-3 #2: FEMA Footprint in the NYC EOC triples in size to support Disaster Resolution 4805. FEMA Initial Operating Facility (IOF) established in the NYC OEM EOC. FEMA Branch II Includes the Five Boroughs of New York City. FEMA Joint Field Office (JFO) was established in Queens. 4 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-4: NYC OEM Establishes Two Command Posts in Impacted areas; one in Staten Island and one in the Rockaways. 5 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-4 #2: FEMA requests a List of Facilities that can Accept a Delivery of 24 million Gallons of Gasoline Being Brought Into Regions 1 & 2. 5 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-5: Branch Members Begin Staffing Fuel Task Force to prioritize Federal Fuel. 6 NOV (DAY) Presidential Election.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 30 7 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-7 #2: Nor'easter: Strong Coastal System mpacts Areas of Southeastern New York. Forecast: Storm Surges of 3-5 feet, Strong Winds with Gusts up to 60 mph, Snow with 3-6" of Accumulation in the Catskills and Hudson Valley,1-3" in the New York City Metro area, Temperatures Cold with wind chills in the 20s possible in areas affected by Sandy. 7 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-7 #2: Port of New York and New Jersey is open to all Traffic. 8 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-8 #2: New York City Subways Operating Normally on Most Lines with Some Weather Related Delays. 9 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-8 #2: NYC, Suffolk, and Nassau County Gas Rationing Begins. 9 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-9: The Queens Midtown Tunnel reopened. 2000 12 NOV SITREP 11-12 #2: SEOC begins demobilizing several state agencies from being present in the EOC overnight from the hours of 8:00 p.m. 8:00 a.m. 2000 12 NOV SITREP 11-12 #2: Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS), Department of Financial Services (DFS), Office for Technology (OFT), Air Operations Branch, Animal Protection Branch and Emergency Services Branch Dully Demobilized. 15 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-15 Power Restored to All Areas Other than those that Cannot be Restored Due to Flooding. 16 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-16 #2: The Division of Military and Naval Affairs (DMNA) reduces activation level and operating hours of the Joint Force Headquarters Joint Operations Center to Level II (no night shift). 16 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-17: EOC Reduced to Level II Activation. 18 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-18: State Fire Mobilization and Mutual Aid plan deactivated. 10 DEC (DAY) SITREP 12-7: Brooklyn Battery Tunnel fully reopened. 14 DEC (DAY) LAST SITREP
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 31 APPENDIX 4: EXECUTIVE ORDERS ISSUED DURING HURRICANE SANDY
Number Executive Order 47 Governor Cuomo Declares A Disaster In The Following Counties 48 Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To Authority Of Police Officers Employed By New York State Agencies 49 Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To Transportation For The State Disaster Emergency 50 Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To Transportation For The State Disaster Emergency 51 Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To Residences And Businesses Affected By The State Disaster Emergency 52 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Statutory Provisions Establishing Time Limitations On Actions And Time In Which To Take An Appeal 53 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Statutory Provisions Establishing Time Limitations For Holding A Defendant In Custody Pending Disposition Of A Felony Complaint 54 Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To Motor Fuel Distribution And Transportation For The State Disaster Emergency 55 Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To Repair Of State Facilities For The State Disaster Emergency
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 32 56 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Regulatory Provisions Of The State Office For The Aging During The State Disaster Emergency 57 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Education Law Provisions Regarding Dialysis Services During The State Disaster Emergency 58 Temporary Suspension Regarding The Certification Of Donated Water During The State Disaster Emergency 59 Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To Limitations On Motor And Home Heating Fuel 60 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Statutory Provisions Relating To The Powers Of Certain Security Guards 61 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Statutory Provisions Establishing Time Limitations For Holding A Defendant In Custody Pending Disposition Of A Felony Complaint 62 Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To The Election Law 63 Declaring Certain Conditions Caused By Hurricane Sandy In And Around Federally Declared Counties To Be Public Nuisances Impacting Public Health And Ordering The Removal Of Those Conditions 64 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Regulatory Provisions Regarding Home Health Care During The State Disaster Emergency 65 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Statutory Provisions Relating To The Transportation Of School Children In The City Of New York 66 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Emergency Shelter Statutes And Regulations
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 33 67 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Regulations Related To The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 68 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Statutes And Regulations To Expand Access To Tetanus Immunizations During The State Disaster Emergency 69 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Statutory Provisions Relating To Payment Of Fees For Duplicate State-Issued Documents And Extension Of Expiration Dates 70 Extending The Period For Paying School District Taxes In Certain School Districts Within The Counties Of Nassau And Orange 71 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Statutes And Regulations Regarding Services Provided To Individuals With Developmental Disabilities, Mental Illnesses And Alcohol And Substance Abuse Disorders During The State Disaster Emergency 72 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Health Statutes And Regulations During The State Disaster Emergency 73 Designation Pursuant To Section 6 Of The Executive Law 74 Extending The Period For Paying School District Taxes In Certain School Districts Within The Counties Of Nassau And Rockland 75 Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To Contracts To Conduct Surveys Of Electrical Systems In Residences And Buildings On Long Island 76 Designation Pursuant To Section 6 Of The Executive Law 77 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Provisions Of The Insurance Law
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 34 78 Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Related To Child And Family Welfare, Child Day Care, Juvenile Justice, Runaway And Homeless Youth, Adult Protective Services, And Residential And Non-Residential Care For Victims Of Domestic Violence 79 Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To State Contracts And For The Repair Of State Facilities For The State Disaster Emergency 80 Extending The Period For Paying School District Taxes In Certain School Districts Within The County Of Nassau 81 Continuing The Suspension Of Certain Provisions Of Law 82 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Provisions Of The Insurance Law 83 Temporary Modification Of Provisions Related To The New York City Juvenile Justice Services Close To Home Initiative 85 Continuing The Suspension Or Modification Of Certain Statutory Provisions Relating To Payment Of Fees For Duplicate State-Issued Documents And Extension Of Expiration Dates 86 Temporary Suspension Of Real Property Actions And Proceedings Law During The State Disaster Emergency 87 Continuing The Suspension Or Modification Of Certain Provisions Of Law And Regulations
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 35 APPENDIX 5: PERSONS INTERVIEWED FOR THIS REPORT
These names and titles reflect those positions held during Hurricane Sandy response as reported to the AAR Development Team.
DHSES Executive Team Jerome Hauer, Commissioner Steven Kuhr, Executive Deputy Commissioner (Through November 4, 2012) James Sherry, Deputy Commissioner for Downstate Operations Andrew Feeney, Deputy Commissioner for Special Projects Jeff Bender, Deputy Commissioner for Administration and Finance Thomas McCarren, Chief Counsel James Clark, Deputy Counsel
New York State Office of Emergency Management
Executive Team Steven Kuhr, Director (Through November 4, 2012) Gregory Brunelle, First Deputy Director (Through October 15, 2012); Acting Director, (Through 3/2012) Anthony Sutton, Deputy Director for Field Operations (As of August 13, 2012)
Operations Brian Head, Operations Section Chief (includes NYS Watch Center) Shaun Bertok, Deputy Operations Chief William Campbell, Section Chief IMT William Bowen, Logistics Section Chief (Through November 9, 2012) Dan Connor, Operations Section Vince Fargione, Operations Section Amy Benequista, Watch Center
Regional Directors Gene Lucchese, Region 1 NYC David Zatlin, Region 1 Long Island Jim Soto, Region 2 East of Hudson Shannon Green, Region 3 Capital District Bruce Jordan, Region 3 Northern NY Mike Sprague, Region 4 Central NY Tom McCartney, Region 4 Southern Tier William Correa, Region 5 Finger Lakes Doug Winner, Region 5 Western NY
Planning and Preparedness David DeMatteo, Section Chief, Planning Theodore Fisch, Section Chief, Radiological Preparation Dan O'Brien, Section Chief, GIS Richard French, Section Chief, Training and Exercises
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 36 Recovery and Mitigation Susan Mutch, Deputy Director for Recovery and Mitigation Kim Panting, Section Chief, Disaster Finance William Dugan, Section Chief IA & Human Services
NYSOEM Staff Town hall meeting was conducted with NYSOEM EOC staff.
State Agency Representatives & Liaisons Robert Limoges, Department of Transportation Radworth Anderson, Office of General Services Kelly Nilsson, Department of Agriculture and Markets Dorothy Wheeler, Department of Health and Human Services Mike Primeau, Department of Health Robert Mitchell, Division of Military and Naval Affairs
American Red Cross Steve Taylor Sharon Adler
Office of Fire Prevention and Control Bryant Stevens, Commissioner William Davis, Deputy Commissioner
Office of Interoperable and Emergency Communications Robert Barbato, Director
Office of Cyber Security William Johnson, Deputy Director
Office of Information Technology Chris Murray, ITS OEM
Office of Counter Terrorism F. David Sheppard, Deputy Director for Federal Grants Jamie Daley (Formerly Jamie Ian), Deputy Director for Intelligence & Analysis Brian Wright, Deputy Director for CIKR James Horton, Deputy Director for Public Safety
New York City Office of Emergency Management Joseph Bruno, Commissioner
County Emergency Management Craig Craft, Commissioner Nassau County Emergency Management Joseph Williams, Commissioner Suffolk County Emergency Management Jennifer Wacha, Deputy Commissioner Westchester County Emergency Management
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 37 New York Hospital Association Susan Waltman, Senior VP & General Counsel
Others Interviewed Elizabeth Davis & EAD Associates, NCSP SMEs Patrick Bahnken, NCSP SME Randall Duncan, NCSP SME Howard Murphy, NCSP SME Donald Hiett, NCSP SME William Savarese, NCSP SME Ed Beban, NCSP SME
Multivariate Analysis—III: Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Multivariate Analysis Held at Wright State University, Dayton, Ohio, June 19-24, 1972