10.

1177/0022167804268008
Psychologists
Jerry L. Kernes,
’ Search
Richard
for T.
theKinnier
Good Life ARTICLE
PSYCHOLOGISTS’ SEARCH
FOR THE GOOD LIFE

JERRY L. KERNES is a new assistant professor of psychology at the Uni-

versity of La Verne. He received his Ph.D. in counseling psychology at Ari-
zona State University. His research interests include values, moral and
ethical reasoning, subjective well-being, meaning-in-life, and positive
psychology.

RICHARD T. KINNIER is a professor of counseling psychology in the

Department of Psychology in Education at Arizona State University. His
research interests include topics related to values and meaning in life. He
recently wrote a book titled The Point of It All in which he explores various
issues concerning the human search for meaning.

Summary

Psychologists working in three settings (academia, university coun-

seling centers, and community mental health) completed three mea-
sures of the “good life” as part of a study examining psychologists’
personal and professional values and beliefs. Psychologists gener-
ally endorsed accepting something from all ways of life, appreciating
and preserving the best of humanity, showing sympathetic concern
for others, and enjoying the easily obtainable pleasures as preferred
ways to live. They also supported feeling or expressing love, having
or being part of a family, having good physical and/or mental health,
and having significant friendships as the most desired characteris-
tics of life. Psychologists were generally divided into moral absolut-
ists and moral situationists with regard to their views about the
moral dimensions of the good life.

Keywords: values; meaning-in-life; subjective well-being; positive

psychology

The search for the good life stretches back throughout human his-
tory. The ancient Greeks called the “highest good” eudaimonia.
Socrates contended that intellectual inquiry led to the discovery of

Journal of Humanistic Psychology, Vol. 45 No. 1, Winter 2005 82-105

DOI: 10.1177/0022167804268008
© 2005 Sage Publications

82
 Jerry L. Kernes, Richard T. Kinnier 83

the “Good” and that knowledge of the good resulted in virtuous

action. Plato held that virtue came from a balance among the three
parts of the soul. Aristotle considered happiness the greatest good.
In England, the philosopher Jeremy Bentham held that good
behavior was that which minimized pain while maximizing plea-
sure, whereas John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism argued that the
“greatest good” was that which brought the most happiness to the
most people. In Germany, Immanual Kant linked the good life with
performing one’s duty. In the United States, there has been the con-
cept for at least the past 100 years of the “American dream,” which
has largely equated the good life with material success and wealth
(Tyson, 1994). In traditional Chinese society, the good life was mea-
sured by filial piety and the ability to harmoniously live with oth-
ers (A. Y. C. King & Bond, 1985; Munro, 1969). Similarly, in many
traditional African societies, the good life has involved the preser-
vation of order and harmony within the community (Paris, 1995).
It quickly becomes clear that the way in which one defines a
good life is closely tied to one’s culture (Markus & Kitayama, 1991;
Shweder, 1993). According to Christopher (1996) “the social prac-
tices, habits, institutions, family structures, and so on presuppose
certain views of human nature and the good life” (p. 17). Focus on
internal states such as happiness and individual fulfillment are by
and large modern Western concerns (Baumeister, 1987). The Dec-
laration of Independence of the United States has elevated the
“pursuit of happiness” as a “self-evident truth.” Such concerns are
peculiar to non-Western cultures (Christopher, 1999; Geertz, 1983;
Shweder & Bourne, 1984). Eastern cultures, for example, tend to
have a more collective focus that relates a life well lived to duty and
shared emotional experience.
Definitions of the good life can also shift over the life span. Dur-
ing youth and early adulthood, priorities may focus on establishing
self-identity, identifying career options, finding an intimate rela-
tionship, and perhaps starting a family (Erikson, 1963; Levinson,

AUTHORS’ NOTE: This article is based on the doctoral dissertation of Jerry L.

Kernes under the direction of Richard T. Kinnier. An earlier version of this article
was presented in August 2001 at the 109th Annual Convention of the American
Psychological Association in San Francisco. The authors wish to thank J. Jeffries
McWhirter, Charles D. Claiborn, and Anna Larson Kernes for their comments and
assistance in writing this article. Correspondence concerning this article may be
sent to Jerry L. Kernes, Department of Psychology, University of La Verne, 1950 3rd
Street, La Verne, CA 91750; e-mail: JLKernes@att.net; jkernes@ulv.edu.
84 Psychologists’ Search for the Good Life

1986; Super, 1957; Vaillant, 1977). In midlife, priorities may shift

from the self to contributing something to society or to leaving
a legacy. Finally, in their later years, individuals may turn their
focus toward the spiritual dimensions of life (Kinnier & Freitag,
1990; Payne, 1994).
Priorities may shift not only over individual life spans but also
across generations. For example, Conger (1988) identified a clear
shift in priorities between American teenagers of the 1960s and
1980s. Whereas teenagers of the 1960s rated the priorities of “de-
veloping a meaningful philosophy of life” and “contribution to soci-
ety” as very important in their lives, teenagers of the 1980s focused
their priorities more on “personal well-being and material suc-
cess.” Similarly, the number of students entering their 1st year of
college who stated that their primary reason for pursuing a college
education was “to make more money” rose from 50% in 1971 to 75%
in 1998 (Astin, Green, & Korn, 1987; Sax, Astin, Korn, & Mahoney,
1998).
One framework for defining the good life that seems to be useful
regardless of culture or developmental period is to conceptualize a
“life well lived” according to its desirability and moral goodness
(Griffin, 1986). Several contemporary philosophical accounts of
the goods in life are available (Becker, 1992; Griffin, 1986; Norton,
1976; Nozick, 1989; Rawls, 1971; Ruddick & Rachels, 1989; Taylor,
2000). In general, a “desirable” life may be one filled with wealth,
health, and happiness, whereas a “morally good” life might involve
doing good deeds and helping others. These two dimensions are by
no means exclusive of one another. To some, a desirable life might
be one lived in accordance with one’s moral values. Likewise, a
morally good life might be one that maximizes pleasure while min-
imizing pain. Again, cultural variables influence these definitions.
Yet although various cultures may implicate different aspects of
what makes for a desirable life or for a life lived in accordance with
moral values, the division of the good life into these two dimen-
sions seems to make common sense. The biblical tale of Job can be
used to more clearly understand this distinction. At the beginning
of the story, Job was a rich, righteous man with flocks, land, and
sons. One could say of Job that his life at this point was desirable.
As Job underwent his tests, he lost his wealth, his sons, and his
health but refused to curse God. Clearly, one would not say that
Job’s life at this point was desirable, but one could argue that Job
lived a morally good life.
 Jerry L. Kernes, Richard T. Kinnier 85

Much of the social science research on psychological and subjec-

tive well-being has examined what makes for a desirable life.
Cantril’s (1965) landmark worldwide study surveyed thousands of
people about their personal hopes and concerns. Participants’
three most frequently cited priorities were personal health, family
health, and a decent standard of living. In a study of American col-
lege students, Klinger (1977) found that about 90% mentioned inti-
mate relationships as being most central to their lives. In a study of
individuals’ major regrets and priorities in life, Kinnier and Metha
(1989) found that education, family, and love were all viewed as
central aspects to life. Similar findings have been reported else-
where (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995; Stewart & Vandewater, 1999).
Ryff and Singer (1998) concluded that Western and non-Western
cultures alike generally held meaningful goals and quality rela-
tionships as characteristic of the good life.
Research has also equated personal happiness or life satisfac-
tion with the good life (Diener, 1984, 2000; Diener, Suh, Lucas, &
Smith, 1999; L. A. King & Pennebaker, 1998). Several studies seem
to support the commonsense notion that happiness is a common
desire (L. A. King & Broyles, 1997; Richards, 1966; Schwartz &
Bilsky, 1987). Diener, Sapyta, and Suh (1998) reported they have
found happiness to be important not only to Westerners but to peo-
ple living in Brazil, Ghana, and Indonesia as well. Despite some
criticism that happiness is “elusive” (Kinnier, 1991), happiness
remains an important variable in most efforts to monitor subjec-
tive well-being (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998; Diener, 2000; Myers, 2000;
Myers & Diener, 1995).
Today, there is an expression among many American adoles-
cents and young adults that “it’s all good.” In some ways, this is
meant to express an acceptance of various value systems, behav-
iors, and approaches toward life. Yet in other ways, this expression
reflects a relativism not unlike Meursault’s value nihilism in
Camus’s (1942) The Stranger. “It’s all the same to me,” Meursault
says repeatedly throughout Camus’s novel, as he reacts to the
events of his life with moral indifference. Little research has inves-
tigated what makes for a life lived in a morally good way. In fact,
Ebersole (1998) suggested that future measures of meaning
include an assessment of the morality of one’s meaning. The need
for a moral measure of the good life becomes clearer when one con-
siders that history is replete with examples of genocidal tyrants
whose lives were by many accounts happy and even desirable in
86 Psychologists’ Search for the Good Life

that they were filled with such things as wealth, family, and inti-
mate relationships. Yet few individuals would regard a life like
Hitler’s as desirable. Certainly, then, the moral quality of a life
flavors its goodness in the minds of many.
Despite the importance of the moral dimension in measuring
the good life, few studies in the social sciences literature have
explicitly explored this variable. L. A. King and Napa (1998) had
participants judge the desirability and moral goodness of fictional
persons’ lives as a function of the amount of happiness, meaning in
life, and wealth experienced. Individuals high on all three vari-
ables were judged as more likely to go to heaven. The study did not
provide any information, however, on participants’ specific evalua-
tions of the qualities necessary to live a good moral life. Although
various dimensions of moral and ethical goodness have been
explored philosophically (e.g., Becker, 1992; Griffin, 1986; Taylor
2000), and there exists a rich tradition of research in moral devel-
opment (e.g., Gilligan, Kohlberg, Piaget), very little is known about
individuals’ specific beliefs concerning a morally good life.
Research has uncovered information about individuals’ moral ide-
ology. For example, Forsyth (1980) developed a questionnaire to
assess individuals’ moral judgments regarding the specific behav-
ior of others or of certain types of behaviors viewed abstractly. By
the nature of their responses, individuals were categorized as
situationists, subjectivists, absolutists, or exceptionists. Similarly,
Tooke and Ickes (1988) developed a measure of adherence to con-
ventional moral standards as prescribed by the Ten Command-
ments and proscribed by the seven deadly sins. Their findings sug-
gested a division into idealist and relativist ideologies. Further
research is still needed, however, to assess directly individuals’
specific beliefs concerning an ideal morally good life.
In their search for meaning and pursuit of the good life, individ-
uals may naturally turn to highly respected spiritual leaders,
authority figures, or those believed to be self-actualized or some-
how wise (Ebersole & DeVogler-Ebersole, 1985). A number of pro-
fessions are intimately connected to questions of life’s meaning
and the pursuit of the good life. Ideas about those things that are
important in life are related to ideas about how to live. By nature of
their occupation, psychologists are intimately connected to ques-
tions about meaning and the pursuit of the good life.
Psychologists’ values and ideologies can have an important in-
fluence on what enters the public domain as “acceptable, accepted
 Jerry L. Kernes, Richard T. Kinnier 87

knowledge” (Bevan & Kessel, 1994). Psychotherapy training gen-

erally holds that therapist self-awareness is an important aspect
of effective and ethical therapy (Haug, 1998). It has also been sug-
gested that therapists’ belief and meaning systems can influence
their clinical conceptions, attitudes, and behavior (Egan, 1986;
Haug, 1998). Furthermore, there is the recognition among some
theorists that we “cannot not communicate” as a truism of human
interactions (Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 1967). Yet few data
are available regarding psychologists’ concepts of a good life. It
would therefore seem desirable for psychologists to become more
aware of their own belief systems in order to better understand the
ways in which they communicate these beliefs to others. This study
was designed as an exploration of psychologists’ beliefs about what
constitutes the good life in both a desirable and morally good sense.

METHOD

Participants
Participants consisted of 175 psychologists (97 female, 78 male)
working in three different settings: clinical and counseling aca-
demic departments (66), university counseling centers (69), and
community mental health (40). The participants held the following
doctoral degrees: counseling psychology Ph.D. (85), clinical psy-
chology Ph.D. (55), clinical psychology Psy.D. (21), and other doc-
torate (14). The following primary theoretical orientations were
represented among the participants: cognitive behavioral (57), psy-
chodynamic (41), eclectic/integrative (39), humanistic/existential
(21), other (11), systems theory (3), and feminist (3).
Participants ranged in age from 26 to 64 years, with a mean age
of 42.50 years and a standard deviation of 8.88 years. The average
age of males was greater than the average age of females (45.08,
SD = 9.38; and 40.43, SD = 7.90, respectively). Mean ages for psy-
chologists working in different settings were as follows: academic
departments (43.04, SD = 9.53), university counseling centers
(41.51, SD = 8.40), community mental health (43.33, SD = 8.59).
The self-reported relationship status of the participants was as
follows: married (114), single (27), separated or divorced (14), part-
nered (14), or committed relationship (6). The majority of the par-
ticipants (52.60%) reported that they had at least one child,
88 Psychologists’ Search for the Good Life

whereas 47.40% reported they did not have any children. The eth-
nic representation of the participants was as follows: European
American/White (141), African American (14), Chicano/Latino/
Hispanic (9), Asian American (4), Native American (3), multi-
ethnic (2), and other (2). Religious preferences identified were
agnostic/atheist (61), Protestant (50), Catholic (23), Jewish (14),
Unitarian (8), Buddhist (6), other (5), Latter-day Saint (4), spirit-
ual (3), or Muslim (1).

Instruments

Ways to live. A revised version of the short form of the Ways to

Live Scale was used in this study. The Ways to Live Scale (Morris,
1956) presents 13 philosophies of the good life, which respondents
can endorse on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (I dislike it very
much) to 7 (I like it very much). Dempsey and Dukes (1966) devel-
oped a short form of this scale, which reduced the description of
these life philosophies to 50 words or less and changed partici-
pants’ endorsements to preference rankings for all 13 philoso-
phies. The revised version used in this study removed sexist lan-
guage present in Dempsey and Dukes’s short form (i.e., use of
“man” for humanity, exclusive use of “his” to refer to both men and
women).
The Ways to Live items were originally developed from combin-
ing three basic components of personality expressed in major reli-
gious, ethical, and philosophical systems in the world: Dionysian
(the tendency to release and indulge desires), Promethean (the
tendency to change and remake the world), and Buddhistic (the
tendency to regulate self by holding desires in check). Dempsey
and Dukes (1966) classified the 13 ways to live as follows: appreci-
ate and preserve the best humanity has attained, cultivate inde-
pendence and self-knowledge, show sympathetic concern for oth-
ers, experience festivity and sensuous enjoyment, act and enjoy life
through group participation, master threatening forces by con-
stant practical work, admit diversity and accept something from
all ways of life, enjoy the simple easily obtainable pleasures, wait
in quiet receptivity for joy and peace, control the self and hold firm
to high ideals, meditate on the inner life, use the body’s energy in
daring and adventurous deeds, and let oneself be used by the great
cosmic purpose.
 Jerry L. Kernes, Richard T. Kinnier 89

Few studies of the reliability and validity of the Ways to Live are
available. Morris (1956) provided evidence for the convergent
validity of the original scale by comparing cultural groups in order
to map value changes over time. Bhatt and Fairchild (1984) found
the original scale useful in showing that the length of time Indian
students spent in the United State was related to endorsement of
typically American values. Dempsey and Dukes (1966) reported an
average correlation of .57 between the shortened form and the
original.
Morris (1956) reported a 3-week test-retest correlation of .85
and a 14-week test-retest correlation of .78 on the original version
of the instrument. Morris has also reported 3-week test-retest
reliabilities of each of the Ways to Live with a mean reliability of
.67. Dempsey and Dukes (1966) reported a 10-day test-retest reli-
ability coefficient of .80 for the short form of the Ways to Live.

Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ). The EPQ (Forsyth, 1980)

consists of 20 items on a 9-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1
(completely disagree) to 9 (completely agree), which are designed to
measure stance toward ethics. Ten of the items are designed to
measure moral idealism, whereas the other 10 items are designed
to measure moral relativism. An example of an item on the ideal-
ism scale is “If an action could harm an innocent other, then it
should not be done.” An example of an item on the relativism scale
is “What is ethical varies from one situation to another.” Partici-
pant scores on both scales can range from 10 to 90, with higher
scores indicating higher levels of idealism or relativism. These two
scales can be taken together to form four distinct personal moral
philosophies: situationists, absolutists, subjectivists, and
exceptionists. Situationists are individuals who score high on both
idealism and relativism. They reject moral rules and codes and
advocate a personal analysis of each act in each situation.
Situationists are most closely aligned with Fletcher’s (1966) “situ-
ation ethics” school of ethical thought. Absolutists are individuals
who score high on idealism but low on relativism. They accept
moral rules and codes and believe that moral decisions should fol-
low universal moral rules. Absolutists are most closely aligned
with Immanuel Kant’s deontological moral philosophy. Subjec-
tivists are individuals who score low on idealism and high on re-
lativism. Like the situationists, subjectivists reject adherence to
moral codes. However, wherein situationists argue for a contextual
90 Psychologists’ Search for the Good Life

appropriateness for moral decisions, subjectivists contend that

moral evaluations must depend ultimately on personal perspec-
tives. Subjectivists are most closely aligned with the ethical egoist
school of ethical thought. Finally, exceptionists are individuals
who score low on both idealism and relativism. Although they ac-
cept moral codes to guide their judgments, exceptionists are open
to exceptions in these standards. Exceptionists are most closely
aligned with teleological and utilitarian schools of ethical thought.
Forsyth and his colleagues have demonstrated evidence for the
EPQ’s construct and criterion validity. Forsyth (1980) showed that
scores on the EPQ predict attitudes toward a variety of moral is-
sues, including abortion, euthanasia, and test-tube babies. Forsyth
and Berger (1982) showed that EPQ scores were related to feelings
of guilt after behaving in unethical ways. In addition, Forsyth and
Pope (1984) showed that EPQ scores were related to beliefs about
the ethics of various psychological research methods.
Forsyth, Nye, and Kelley (1988) reported internal consistency
coefficients of .82 and .84 for the Idealism and Relativism scales,
respectively. Bass, Barnett, and Brown (1998) reported similar
findings of .81 for the Relativism scale and .86 for the Idealism
scale. Several other studies have consistently reported similar lev-
els of reliability and have supported the two-factor structure of the
EPQ (Barnett, Bass, & Brown, 1994, 1996; Ho, Vitell, Barnes, &
Desborde, 1997; Tansey, Brown, Hyman, & Dawson, 1994).

Good Life Questionnaire. Participants were asked to respond to

an exploratory questionnaire concerning their beliefs about the
good life. Characteristics of a good life were based on Becker’s
(1992) description of the 17 “criterial goods” in life (e.g., self-love,
benevolence, sexuality) as well as on his categorization of the 10
most influential accounts of the good life (e.g., congruence to an
external order, inner unity, personal achievement, right conduct).
Because these conceptualizations were mainly philosophical in
nature, they were operationalized, and a list of 21 specific views
about the good life was created. Participants were asked to rate the
importance of each view using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not
at all) to 7 (very important).
Two-week test-retest reliability was established through a pilot
sample of 52 graduate students. Graduate students enrolled in
counseling courses at two separate southwestern universities
were administered the Good Life Questionnaire (GLQ) during
 Jerry L. Kernes, Richard T. Kinnier 91

class sessions. Participants were administered the same question-

naire again 2 weeks later. Reliability coefficients for the 21 items of
the GLQ ranged from .55 to .88, with an average correlation of .66.

Procedure

Surveys were mailed to 60 training directors of the American

Psychological Association (APA)–approved counseling psychology
programs, 60 training directors of APA-approved clinical psychol-
ogy programs, 60 training directors of university counseling cen-
ters with APA-approved internships, and 60 training directors of
community mental health agencies with APA-approved intern-
ships. Programs were randomly selected from those appearing in
the December 1999 American Psychologist. Surveys were counter-
balanced to prevent any possible order effects. In the initial mail-
ing, 480 surveys were mailed. In the cover letters, the training
directors of academic programs were asked for their assistance in
gathering data by passing the materials on to two full-time faculty
members, whereas training directors of University Counseling
Centers and Community Mental Health Agencies were asked to
pass the materials on to two full-time staff psychologists. All train-
ing directors were invited to serve as one of the participants if they
so desired. Surveys were anonymous and identified only by a code
number on the outside of the return envelope. Code numbers were
used only to track that institutions had responded.
Data collection occurred over a 4-month period, with a new
packet being sent approximately every 4 weeks to each institution
that had not yet responded to the previous mailing. Three packets
were returned over the course of data collection as nondeliverable.
Another seven packets were returned due to noncompliance (i.e.,
the training directors did not wish to participate). Twenty-two
individual surveys were rejected due to missing data. The data col-
lection procedure resulted in the return of 175 complete surveys,
which represented a 36.46% return rate.

RESULTS

Summary of Analyses

Because of the exploratory nature of the study, descriptive sta-

tistics were computed for all psychologists on each of the three
92 Psychologists’ Search for the Good Life

dependent measures. Four demographic variables (age, gender,

work setting, and religious preference) were carefully selected for
analyses due to their conceptual relationship to the study’s focus.
For purposes of analyses, age was divided into four age groups (late
20s to mid 30s, n = 42; late 30s to mid 40s, n = 58; late 40s to mid 50s,
n = 57; and late 50s to mid 60s, n = 18). In addition, because very
few respondents identified themselves as being Latter-day Saints,
spiritual, Muslim, or other, these data were removed from analyses
of the influences of religious preference on psychologists’ views of
the good life.
Separate cross-tabulations and chi-square analyses were used
to compare the categorical data supplied by participants’ re-
sponses to the Ways to Live Scale and Ethics Position Question-
naire. Separate multivariate analyses of variance were performed
between the four demographic variables and psychologists’ ratings
on the 21 items of the Good Life Questionnaire. Uncorrected inter-
correlations among the 21 items of the GLQ ranged from –.199 to
.581, with a mean of .201. Intercorrelations corrected for the pooled
influence of the independent variables ranged from –.169 to .594,
with a mean of .204.1 Follow-up one-way analyses of variance
(ANOVAs) were performed on the significant results of the mul-
tivariate analyses. These univariate tests were subjected to
Bonferroni post hoc comparisons where necessary to test for differ-
ences among groups and to adjust for alpha inflation caused from
multiple comparisons.

Ways to Live Scale

Psychologists only identified 6 of the 13 ways as their most
desired ways to live. Psychologists identified “admitting diversity
and accepting something from all ways” as their most desired way
of living (n = 49, 28.00%). The remaining endorsements were as fol-
lows: “appreciating and preserving the best humanity has at-
tained” (n = 39, 22.28%), “showing sympathetic concern for others”
(n = 33, 18.85%), “enjoying the simple, easily obtainable pleasures”
(n = 31, 17.71%), “act and enjoy life through group participation”
(n = 15, 8.57%), and “meditate on the inner life” (n = 8, 4.57%).
No significant results were observed for psychologists’ age,
gender, or religious preference. There was a significant result for
work setting, χ2 (10, 175) = 48.461, p = .001. Results are presented
in Table 1. As can be seen in Table 1, academic psychologists
 Jerry L. Kernes, Richard T. Kinnier 93

TABLE 1: Psychologists’ Most Desired Ways to Live by Work Setting

University Community
Academic Counseling Mental
Departments Center Health

Appreciate and preserve the

best of humanity 21 (31.82) 14 (20.29) 4 (10.00)
Show sympathetic concern for others 11 (16.66) 17 (24.64) 5 (12.50)
Act and enjoy life through group
participation 7 (10.61) 6 (8.69) 2 (5.00)
Admit diversity and accept something
from all ways 19 (28.79) 24 (34.78) 6 (15.00)
Enjoy the simple pleasures 6 (9.09) 4 (5.80) 21 (52.50)
Meditate on the inner life 2 (3.03) 4 (5.80) 2 (5.00)
NOTE: Percentages in parentheses.

favored “appreciating and preserving the best of humanity.” Coun-

seling center psychologists’ most favored way of living was to
“admit diversity and accept something from all ways of life.”
Finally, psychologists working in community mental health cen-
ters favored “enjoyment of the simple pleasures.”

EPQ
Psychologists’ scores on the EPQ’s moral Idealism and Relativ-
ism scales were taken together to classify their responses into one
of four moral philosophies. The largest percentage of psychologists
(38.86%, n = 68) were categorized as moral absolutists. A large per-
centage of psychologists (31.43%, n = 55) were also categorized as
moral situationists. Exceptionists accounted for 22.86% (n = 40) of
categorizations, whereas subjectivists accounted for 6.86% (n = 12)
of the categorizations.
There were no significant results for psychologists’ age group or
work setting. There was a significant result for psychologists’ gen-
der, χ2(3, 175) = 19.034, p = .001. The majority of men (51.28%, n =
40) were classified as moral absolutists, whereas the majority of
women (42.27%, n = 41) were classified as moral situationists. Only
17.95% of men (n = 14) were classified as moral situationists,
whereas 28.87% (n = 28) of women were classified as moral abso-
lutists. Moral exceptionists accounted for 19.23% (n = 15) of male
94 Psychologists’ Search for the Good Life

TABLE 2: Psychologists’ Classification on the Ethics Position

Questionnaire by Religion

Agnostic/
Catholic Protestant Jewish Atheist Buddhist Unitarian

Absolutists 12 (52.17) 21 (42.00) 7 (50.00) 20 (32.79) 1 (16.66) 2 (25.00)

Situationists 10 (43.48) 12 (24.00) 2 (14.28) 18 (28.50) 5 (83.33) 4 (50.00)
Exceptionists 1 (4.35) 14 (28.00) 5 (35.71) 16 (26.23) 0 1 (12.50)
Subjectivists 0 3 (6.00) 0 7 (11.48) 0 1 (12.50)
NOTE: Percentages in parentheses.

responses and 25.77% (n = 25) of female responses. Finally, moral

exceptionists accounted for 11.54% (n = 9) of male responses and
3.09% (n = 3) of female responses.
There was also a significant result for religious preference,
χ2(15, 162) = 25.098, p = .049. Results are presented in Table 2.
As can be seen in Table 2, most Catholics (52.17%), Protestants
(42.00%), Jews (50.00%), and agnostics/atheists (32.79%) were
classified as moral absolutists, whereas the majority of Buddhists
(83.33%) and Unitarians (50.00%) were classified as moral
situationists.

GLQ
As a group, psychologists generally supported “feeling or
expressing love,” “having or being part of a family,” “having good
physical and/or mental health,” and “having significant friend-
ships” as characteristics of the good life. Psychologists showed lit-
tle support for “having a lot of money and nice things,” “consump-
tion of fine foods and other physical pleasures,” and “living in
accordance with spiritual beliefs” as characteristics of the good life.
No significant results were observed for age group. There was a
significant main effect for gender (Λ = .495, F = 7.427, p = .001, η2 =
.505). Follow up one-way ANOVAs indicated significant differ-
ences between men and women with regard to 12 of the 21 items on
the GLQ. Results are presented in Table 3.
Means and standard deviations of these gender differences are
presented in Table 3. As can be seen in Table 3, although there was
general agreement on the relative importance of the various char-
acteristics of the good life, women viewed feeling secure in life, hav-
 Jerry L. Kernes, Richard T. Kinnier 95

TABLE 3: Psychologists’ Ratings on the Good Life Questionnaire by

Gender

Men Women

M SD M SD F p

Being physically fit and in shape 6.00 1.22 5.66 1.07 12.403 .001
Feeling secure in life 5.19 1.23 5.80 1.18 11.226 .001
Having a sense of purpose in life 5.95 .806 6.29 .989 5.136 .025
Feeling or expressing love 5.96 .860 6.72 .688 42.240 .001
Helping and caring for others 5.87 .917 6.41 .625 21.382 .001
Living with honor and integrity 5.94 .998 6.35 .830 9.007 .003
Having significant friendships 5.95 1.08 6.47 .678 15.417 .001
Experiencing sexual pleasure 5.97 1.06 4.89 1.47 29.643 .001
Consumption of foods/physical
pleasures 4.85 1.27 4.37 1.52 4.867 .029
Having or being part of a family 6.13 1.07 6.53 .817 7.732 .006
Having significant meaningful
work 6.00 .897 6.33 .787 6.703 .010
Possessing self-knowledge 5.98 .904 6.29 .860 5.373 .022

ing a sense of purpose in life, feeling or expressing love, helping

and caring for others, living with honor and integrity, having sig-
nificant friendships, having or being part of a family, having signif-
icant meaningful work, and possessing self-knowledge more favor-
ably than did men. Men viewed being physically fit and in shape,
experiencing sexual pleasure, and consumption of fine foods and
other physical pleasures more favorably than did women.
There was a significant main effect for religious preference (Λ =
.317, F = 1.508, p = .001, η2 = .174). Follow up ANOVAs indicated
significant differences among religious groups with regard to
four of the good life questions: having a sense of purpose in life, F(6,
168) = 5.730, p = .001; living with honor and integrity, F(6, 168) =
2.723, p = .015; doing the right thing and living morally, F(6, 168) =
2.727, p = .015; and living in accordance with spiritual beliefs, F(6,
168) = 14.009, p = .001.
Post hoc comparison indicated a significant difference between
agnostics/atheists and Protestants (p = .001) and agnostics/atheists
and Jews (p = .026) for ratings on having a sense of purpose in life.
Generally speaking, agnostics/atheists viewed having a sense of
96 Psychologists’ Search for the Good Life

purpose in life as less important for living the good life (M = 5.74,
SD = 1.07) than did Jews (M = 6.57, SD = .514) or Protestants (M =
6.58, SD = .609). There was also a significant difference between
agnostics/atheists and Protestants for ratings of “living with honor
and integrity” and “doing the right thing and living morally” (p =
.020 and .010, respectively). Generally speaking, Protestants
viewed living with honor and integrity as more important for liv-
ing the good life (M = 6.40, SD = .783) than did agnostics/atheists
(M = 5.82, SD = 1.02). Protestants also viewed “doing the right
thing and living morally” as more important for living the good life
(M = 5.94, SD = 1.13) than did agnostics/atheists (M = 5.08, SD =
1.35).
Post hoc comparison also indicated a significant difference be-
tween agnostics/atheists and Catholics (p = .001), Protestants (p =
.001), and Buddhists (p = .041) with regard to ratings of the “impor-
tance for living in accordance with spiritual beliefs.” Generally
speaking, Catholics (M = 5.65, SD = 1.07), Protestants (M = 5.82,
SD = 1.17), and Buddhists (M = 5.50, SD = .837) each viewed living
in accordance with spiritual beliefs as more important for living
the good life than did agnostics/atheists (M = 3.41, SD = 1.97).
There was a significant main effect for work setting (Λ = .681,
F = 1.534, p = .023, η2 = .175). Follow-up one-way ANOVAs indi-
cated significant differences among groups with regard to ratings
on three of the good life questions: feeling or expressing love, F(2,
172) = 9.297, p = .001; having significant meaningful work, F(2,
172) = 4.544, p = .012; and being successful, achieving, and accom-
plishing, F(2, 172) = 4.032, p = .019.
Post hoc comparison indicated a significant difference between
counseling center psychologists and academic psychologists (p =
.024) and counseling center psychologists and psychologists work-
ing in community mental health (p = .001) with regard to ratings
for feeling or expressing love. Counseling center psychologists (M =
6.68, SD = .581) viewed feeling or expressing love as more impor-
tant for living the good life than did both academicians (M = 6.30,
SD = .877) or psychologists working in community mental health
(M = 6.00, SD = 1.04). There was also a significant difference be-
tween counseling center psychologists and academicians (p = .016)
with regard to ratings on being successful, achieving, and accom-
plishing. In general, academicians viewed being successful,
achieving, and accomplishing as more important for living the
 Jerry L. Kernes, Richard T. Kinnier 97

good life (M = 5.86, SD = 1.02) than did counseling center psycholo-

gists (M = 5.29, SD = 1.35).
Finally, post hoc comparison indicated a significant difference
between academicians and psychologists working in community
mental health (p = .009) with regard to ratings on having signifi-
cant meaningful work. Academicians viewed having significant
meaningful work as more important for living the good life (M =
6.38, SD =.697) than did psychologists working in community men-
tal health (M = 5.88, SD = .966).

DISCUSSION

Psychologists’ Search for the Good Things in Life

Psychologists appeared to have clear ideas about how to live the
good life. As can be seen from their responses to the Ways to Live
Scale and GLQ, psychologists rejected outright some philosophies
and endorsed others. With regard to the Ways to Live Scale, psy-
chologists generally favored admitting diversity and accepting
something from all ways of life, appreciating and preserving the
best humanity has attained, showing sympathetic concerns for
others, and enjoying the simple, easily obtainable pleasures. These
values appeared to be influenced by work setting. For example,
academicians appeared to favor appreciating and preserving the
best of humanity, whereas psychologists working in community
mental health centers appeared to favor enjoying the simple plea-
sures as the way to the good life. Similarly, counseling center psy-
chologists appeared to favor appreciating diversity and accepting
something from all ways of life and showed less support for the
other ways to live. It remains unknown whether psychologists with
preferences for different ways to live seek different work environ-
ments or if such preferences emerge after having worked in these
environments.
With regard to the GLQ, psychologists, as a group, generally
supported feeling or expressing love, having or being part of a fam-
ily, having good physical and/or mental health, and having signifi-
cant friendships as characteristics of the good life. Psychologists
generally rejected having money and nice things, consumption of
fine foods and physical pleasures, and living in accordance with
spiritual beliefs as indicators of a life well lived. Psychologists’ re-
98 Psychologists’ Search for the Good Life

sponses on the GLQ appeared to be influenced by gender, work

setting, and religious preference.
Women viewed feeling secure in life, having a sense of purpose
in life, feeling or expressing love, helping and caring for others, liv-
ing with honor and integrity, having significant friendships, hav-
ing or being part of a family, having significant meaningful work,
and possessing self-knowledge as more important for living the
good life than did their male counterparts. Men, on the other hand,
viewed being physically fit and in shape, experiencing sexual plea-
sures, and consumption of fine foods and other pleasures as more
important for living the good life than did women. These findings
seem to mirror many traditional gender role value orientations.
For example, women consistently rank family and friendships as
priorities in life (Beutel & Marini, 1995; Kinnier & Metha, 1989).
Men typically place more value on physical sexual pleasure than
do women (Baldwin & Baldwin, 1997).
Psychologists working in university counseling centers viewed
feeling or expressing love as more important for living the good life
than did psychologists working in either academic or community
mental health settings. Academicians viewed being successful,
achieving, and accomplishing as more important for living the
good life than did counseling center psychologists. These findings
may be related to gender differences in work settings. There were
nearly twice as many female psychologists as male psychologists
working in university counseling centers. There were slightly
more men working in community mental health settings and
approximately equal numbers of men and women working in aca-
demic settings. Studies of value orientations have consistently
shown women to be more focused on caregiving, helping, kindness,
compassion, and the ability to devote oneself completely to others
(Beutel & Marini, 1995; Eagly, 1987; Spence & Helmreich, 1978).
Studies have also shown men are more likely than women to dem-
onstrate a competitive, success-driven orientation in their work
environments (Spence & Helmreich, 1983). Finally, academic psy-
chologists viewed having significant meaningful work as being
more important for living the good life than did psychologists
working in community mental health settings. This finding may
not be related to gender differences in work settings as much as it
reflects something about the work settings themselves. Psycholo-
gists working in agency settings have been shown to experience
greater burnout than psychologists working in other settings
 Jerry L. Kernes, Richard T. Kinnier 99

(Raquepaw & Miller, 1989). Motivation to seek purpose has been

shown in other studies to be a significant correlate of burnout for
mental health professionals (Yiu-kee & Tang, 1995).
Catholics, Protestants, and Buddhists all viewed living in accor-
dance with spiritual beliefs as more important for living the good
life than did agnostics/atheists. Similarly, both Protestants and
Jews viewed having a sense of purpose in life as more important for
living the good life than did agnostics/atheists. In addition, Protes-
tants viewed both living with honor and integrity and doing the
right thing and living morally as more important for living the
good life than did agnostics/atheists. It seems natural to assume
that religious people view religious and spiritual values as impor-
tant elements of the good life. Those without a clear religious pref-
erence may focus on other “goods” in life.

Psychologists’ View of a Morally Good Life

Psychologists’ responses on the EPQ indicated that they were
generally divided into moral absolutists and moral situationists. A
small percentage of psychologists were classified as exceptionists,
and very few were classified as moral subjectivists. Moral absolut-
ists reject the use of an action’s consequences as a basis for moral
evaluation. In a moral absolutist philosophy, acts are to be judged
as to their moral “goodness” through comparison with some uni-
versal, absolute moral rule (Forsyth, 1980). Moral situationists
take an opposite approach to judging the moral goodness of
actions. Moral situationists distrust absolute moral principles and
argue that each act must be examined in each situation in order to
determine its moral goodness.
Psychologists’ moral philosophy appeared to be influenced by
religious preference. The majority of Catholics, Protestants,
Jews, and agnostics/atheists were classified as moral absolutists,
whereas the majority of Buddhists and Unitarians were classified
as moral situationists. These results generally fit with the belief
systems of their respective religions. American society has been
called a “society of law.” The Constitution of the United States has
as one of its central features the notion of “equality under the law.”
To a large degree, these ideals are based on Judeo-Christian values
of right and wrong. In Judeo-Christian ethics, God is the ultimate
judge of humanity. God’s laws are absolute. Many Eastern philoso-
100 Psychologists’ Search for the Good Life

phies and spiritual forms of religion approach ethics and morality

in a less absolute manner.
Psychologists’ moral philosophy was also strongly influenced by
gender. The majority of men were classified as moral absolutists,
whereas the majority of women were classified as moral situa-
tionists. There is a long history of debate regarding gender differ-
ences in moral reasoning (Walker, 1967/1995). The present find-
ings may be viewed as consistent with arguments that men and
women differ in the relative emphasis they place on the principles
of justice and caring in their moral judgments (Gilligan, 1982;
Gilligan, Ward, & Taylor, 1988). These findings might also be seen
as consistent with research indicating that women display greater
situation-embedded ethical sensitivity (Bebeau & Brabeck, 1989).
Further research is clearly needed to more explicitly draw out any
potential differences between male and female psychologists with
regard to their beliefs about living a morally good life.

CONCLUSIONS

This study is limited by several factors common to survey re-

search. Both sample size and return rate of questionnaires was
less than desired. There was also very little variability with regard
to some important demographic characteristics such as racial/
ethnic background. Overall, however, the sample does appear to be
a fair demographic representation of APA members (APA, 1999).
Clearly, further research must also continue to investigate the
psychometric properties of the instruments used in this study. One
particular variable this study did not adequately explore was psy-
chologists’ specific beliefs about the moral dimensions of the good
life. Future research should specifically explore psychologists’
beliefs concerning both ideal moral behaviors as well as beliefs
about “immoral” actions.
This study is not intended to serve as a definitive “answer” as to
what all psychologists believe about the good life. Some have
argued that the social and behavioral sciences can play a role in
articulating the good life (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000)
and sketching the “good person” (Ruark, 1999). Some have further
argued that psychologists have become the “de facto moral teach-
ers” in contemporary American society (Doherty, 1995, p. 9). We do
not believe that it is our role as psychologists to teach others what
 Jerry L. Kernes, Richard T. Kinnier 101

the good life should be. We do think, however, that we as psycholo-

gists cannot help but to communicate our beliefs about what con-
stitutes a life well lived. We further believe that psychologists
should actively engage clients in exploration of what it means to
live “a good life” in both a desirable and morally good sense. Stud-
ies and debates about the things that psychologists (and other
groups) find desirable and/or morally good are important. We in-
vite others to participate in this debate.

NOTE

1. The full interitem correlation matrices may be obtained upon

request.

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