Alawi vs. Alauya 268 SCRA 639 Facts: Alawi was a sales representative of E.B.

Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends. Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on instalments by Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC. On learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him. One of her grounds was Alauyas usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use. Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer. Issue: Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Sharia bar, can use the title of Attorney Held: He cant. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar. As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

In Re Garcia
2 SCRA 985

Facts: Arturo E. Garcia,has applied for admission to the practice of law in the phils. without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers among others that he is a filipino citizen born in bacolod city of filipino parentage. He finished Bachillerato Superior in spain. He was allowed to practice law profession in spain under the provision of the treaty on academic degrees and the exercise of profession between the republic of the phils. Issue: Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the phil. bar. Held: The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on academic degrees between the republic of the Philippines and Spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. The said treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain. The treaty could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason the executive may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of the law in the Philippines. The power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the congress of the Philippines.

In Re: Edillon
84 SCRA 554 (1978)

Diao vs. Martinez

7 SCRA 475
FACTS:

Facts: This is an administrative case against Edillon who refuses to pay his IBP membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same. He contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights of being compelled to be a member of the IBP in order to practice his profession and thus deprives his rights to liberty and property and thereby null and void. Issue: Whether or not it assailed provisions constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property of the respondent Held: The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar associations that are organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership of which is voluntary. The IBP however is an official national body of which all lawyers must be a member and are subjected to the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar which includes payment of reasonable annual fee for the purpose of carrying out its objectives and implementation of regulations in the practice of law. The provisions assailed does not infringe the constitutional rights of the respondent as it is a valid exercise of police power necessary to perpetuate its existence with regulatory measures to implement. The name of Edillon was stricken out from the rolls of attorney for being a delinquent member of the bar.

Two years after passing the Bar exam, a complaint was filed against Diao on false representation of his application to the Bar examination that he has the requisite academic qualification. The Solicitor General made an investigation and recommended to strike the name of Diao off the rolls of attorney because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Diao may continue to practice the law profession.

RULING:

The court held that his admission to the bar was under the pretense that he had acquired a pre-legal education, an academic requirement before one could take the bar exam. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses is thereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-atlaw, taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential. His name thus was stricken out from the Rolls of Attorneys.

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO 66 SCRA 245 Facts: This is a disbarment matter with regards to Attorney Victorio Lanuevo, the Bar Confidant for the 1971 Bar Examinations. Supreme Court received a confidential letter that speaks of the exam notebooks of a examinee named Ramon Galang who has been re-evaluated and re-corrected such that he hurdled the Bar Exams and was admitted to the Bar. Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation or re-checking. The five examiners admitted having re-evaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by the Bar Confidant, stating that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and was on the borderline of passing. Ramon Galang was able to pass the 1971 bar exam because of Lanuevos move but the exam results bears that he failed in 5 subjects namely in (Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial). Galang on the other hand, denied of having charged of Slight Physical Injuries on Eufrosino de Vera, a law student of MLQU. The five examiners were led by Lanuevo to believe that it is the Bar Committees regular activity that when an examinee has failed in one subject alone, the rest he passed, the examiner in that subject which he flunked will review his exam notebook. Afterwards, Lanuevo gained possession of few properties, including that of a house in BF Homes, which was never declared in his declaration of assets and liabilities. Issue: Whether or not Lanuevo was guilty of defrauding the examiners such that Galang passed the Bar? Held: YES. It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevos well-studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang

failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. The Bar Confidant has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. AS TO GALANGS CRIM CASE: The concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well settled. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorneys certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. DECISION: Lanuevo disbarred, Galang stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

ULEP V. LEGAL CLINIC, INC 223 SCRA 398 FACTS: This is a petition praying for an order to the respondent to cease and desist from issuing certain advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law. The said advertisement of the Legal Clinic invites potential clients to inquire about secret marriage and divorce in Guam and annulment, and the like. It also says that they are giving free books on Guam Divorce. Ulep claims that such advertisements are unethical and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of lawyers. He, being a member of the bar, is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements. On the other hand, the respondent, while admitting of the fact of the publication of the advertisements, claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but is merely rendering legal support services through paralegals. It also contends that such advertisements should be allowed based on certain US cases decided. ISSUE: Whether or not the Legal Clinic Inc is engaged in the practice of law. Whether or not the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements complained of. HELD/RATIO: Yes, it constitutes practice of law. No, the ads should be enjoined. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a

practice of law. The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. And applying the criteria, respondent Legal Clinic Inc. is, as advertised, engaged in the practice of law. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The only exceptions are when he appears in a reputable law list and use of an ordinary, simple professional card. The advertisements do not fall under these exceptions. To allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack. Hence, it should be enjoined.

Director of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot 74 SCRA 579

FACTS: In June 1943, Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps people in securing marriage licenses; that he does so avoiding delays and publicity; that he also makes marriage arrangements; that legal consultations are free for the poor; and that everything is confidential. The Director of Religious Affairs took notice of the ad and so he sued Bayot for Malpractice. Bayot initially denied having published the advertisement. But later, he admitted the same and asked for the courts mercy as he promised to never repeat the act again. ISSUE: Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice. HELD: Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. The advertisement he caused to be published is a brazen solicitation of business from the public. . It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. The Supreme Court again emphasized that best advertisement for a lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. But because of Bayots plea for leniency and his promise and the fact that he did not earn any case by reason of the ad, the Supreme Court merely reprimanded him.

Canlas vs. Court of Appeals 164 SCRA 163 Facts: The private respondent own several parcels of land located in Quezon City for which he is the registered owner. He secured loans from L and R corporations and executed deeds of mortgage over the parcels of land for the security of the same. Upon the maturity of said loans, the firm initiated an extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties in question after private respondent failed to pay until maturity. The private respondent filed a complaint for injunction over the said foreclosure and for redemption of the parcels of land. Two years after the filing of the petition, private respondent and L and R corporation entered into a compromise agreement that renders the former to be insured another year for the said properties. Included in the stipulations were the attorneys fees amounting to Php 100,000.00. The private respondent however, remained to be in turmoil when it came to finances and was apparently unable to pay and secure the attorneys fees, more so the redemption liability. Relief was discussed by petitioner and private respondent executed a document to redeem the parcels of land and to register the same to his name. Allegations were made by the private respondent claiming the parcels of land to his name but without prior notice, the properties were already registered under the petitioners name. The private respondent calls for a review and for the court to act on the said adverse claim by petitioner on said certificates for the properties consolidated by the redemption price he paid for said properties. The private respondent filed a suit for the annulment of judgment in the Court of appeals which ruled over the same.

Issue: whether the petitioner is on solid ground on the reacquisition over the said properties. Ruling: By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of respondent Herrera, no financing entity was willing to extend him any loan with which to pay the redemption price of his mortgaged properties and petitioner's P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded in the Compromise Judgment," a development that should have tempered his demand for his fees. For obvious reasons, he placed his interests over and above those of his client, in opposition to his oath to "conduct himself as a lawyer ... with all good fidelity ... to [his] clients." The Court finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of judicial notice, eluded not a few law advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a shakedown" of his own client are not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of his fealty to his oath to "delay no man for money." We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own shortcomings. In condemning Atty. Canlas monetarily, we cannot overlook the fact that the private respondent has not settled his liability for payment of the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas alone liable for damages is to enrich said respondent at the expense of his lawyer. The parties must then set off their obligations against the other.
FACTS:

In Re: Almacen

Vicente Raul Almacens Petition to Surrender Lawyers Certificate of Title, filed on Sept. 26, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is a great injustice committed against his client by Supreme Court. He indicts SC, in his own phrase, as a tribunal peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. His clients he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Courts unjust judgment, has become one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy. He ridicules the members of the Court, saying that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb. He then vows to argue the cause of his client in the peoples forum, so that people may know of the silent injustices committed by this court and that whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated. He ends his petition with a prayer that: a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession. The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Yaptichay v. Calero, in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court rencered judgment agains his client. On June 15, 1966 atty. Almacen receive acopy of the decision. Twenty days later on he moved for its reconsideration but did not notify the latter of the time and plce of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, onJuly 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For lack of proof of service, the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who earlier, that is, on Aug. 22, 1966 had already perfected the appeal. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals.

HELD: Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen. Atty. Almacen is suspended from the practice of law until further orders.

Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course. Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to go slow on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

Zaldivar vs. Gonzales

FACTS

HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country. Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer

Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing informations against Zaldivar. Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored one on the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Courts issuance of the TRO is a manifestation theta the rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the

and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer. Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide. In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case. The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law.

HELD: We now rule on the motion to cite in contempt filed by petitioner against UMPC and its counsel, Castillo and Poblador Law Offices, particularly Atty. Napoleon J. Poblador and Atty. Manuel Joseph R. Bretaa III. Petitioner alleges that they should be cited for contempt for misrepresenting to the Court in their memorandum dated November 17, 2000 that UEM and MARA were still the stockholders of UMPC when in fact the Coastal Road Corporation (CRC) had already bought their shares. UMPC stated: TaHDAS 87.Contrary to petitioner's malicious assertions, the Republic of the Philippines and public respondent PEA selected private respondent (then represented by its stockholders MARA and UEM) based on established guidelines of the national government on joint venture agreements between government agencies and the private sector. . . . Private respondent, therefore, could only assume, as it reasonably assumed, that these government agencies performed their functions in accordance with law and only after scrutinizing the qualifications of private respondent's stockholders UEM and MARA. Private respondent is more than qualified to be the joint venture partner of public respondent PEA based on the track record of its aforementioned stockholders. 88.1MARA is an instrumentality or corporate agency of the Malaysian government. The Malaysian government specifically designated MARA to realize its agreement with the Philippine government "to pursue and enter into joint and cooperative development undertakings,. 2.On the other hand, UEM is a Malaysian company publicly listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange ("KLSE") since 1975. It has an authorized capital stock of RM500,000,000 or approximately P5,000,000,000.00. It is one of Malaysia's largest engineering, design and construction groups with direct and indirect interests in five (5) publicly listed companies on the KLSE. In their comment on the motion, Attys. Poblador and Bretaa stated that they had nothing to do with the sale of UEM and MARA of their 283,744 shares in UMPC as other law firms, namely, Castillo Laman Tan Pantaleon & San Jose Law Offices representing UEM and Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan Law Offices representing CRC were involved. The sale was approved by the TRB on November 18, 1999. We do not think that UMPC and its counsels should be sanctioned for contempt. Counsels can be held in contempt of court for making false statements in the pleadings they file tending to mislead the Court and to degrade the administration of justice. We cannot see any deliberate falsehood or misrepresentation in the aforequoted statements of Attys. Poblador and Bretaa. On the contrary, they truthfully indicated that UEM and MARA were the former stockholders of UMPC. This is the clear import of the phrase "then represented by its stockholders MARA and UEM." This also implied that they had been replaced as such. Besides, the ownership structure of UMPC as a party in this case was never material to the issue for resolution which is the issuance of a writ of injunction for the collection of toll fees. Hence, the Court was not deceived in any way.

Francisco, Jr. vs. EUN-MARA Corporation

536 SCRA 520
Facts: Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. alleged that he is a taxpayer and resident of Cavite. He claimed that he instituted this suit in the RTC in his behalf and in behalf of the other users of the Coastal Road which is the principal road connecting Metro Manila and Cavite. Private respondent UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation (UMPC) is a corporation duly organized and validly existing under Philippine laws. It was incorporated by two Malaysian entities, namely, United Engineers (Malaysia) Berhad (UEM) and Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA). In a "manifestation and motion (in compliance with the Honorable Court's resolution dated August 2, 2000 requiring submission of memorandum) with motion to cite in contempt of court" dated August 15, 2001, petitioner prayed that private respondent UMPC and its counsel be cited in contempt for misrepresenting to the Court that UEM and MARA were still the stockholders of UMPC. EHASaD

Petitioner also insists that they be cited in contempt for showing disrespect and resorting to offensive language against RTC Judge Guadiz, Jr. when they stated: Despite the obvious legality of the project, petitioner, either by sheer arrogance or a malicious refusal to acknowledge the truth that the [MCTEP] and the imposition of toll fees for the use of the Coastal Road are legal and above board initiated what is no more than a nuisance suit and secured from an insufficiently-informed judge an illegal writ of preliminary injunction which public respondent, the Honorable [CA], subsequently reversed. Attys. Poblador and Bretaa, in their defense, countered that there was nothing insulting or disparaging in describing someone as "insufficiently informed." This was not intemperate language amounting to vilification.T hey are correct. In criticizing a judge's decision, the test is whether it is done in good faith: While the Court recognizes a litigant's right to criticize judges and justices in the performance of their functions, "it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges (or justices) thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts." We cannot say that the use of the adjective "insufficiently-informed" is disrespectful, abusive or slanderous. Besides, [it] is well settled that the power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all courts to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the due administration of justice. Judges however are enjoined to exercise such power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and not for retaliation or vindictiveness. Therefore, we deny petitioner's motion to cite in contempt for lack of merit.

Montecillo vs. Gica 60 SCRA 235 Facts: Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica of slander. Atty. Quirico del Mar represented Montecillo and he successfully defended Monteceillo in the lower court. Del Mar was even able to win their counterclaim thus the lower court ordered Gica to pay Montecillo the adjudged moral damages. Gica appealed the award of damages to the Court of Appeals where the latter court reversed the same. Atty. Del Mar then filed a motion for reconsideration where he made a veiled threat against the Court of Appeals judges intimating that he thinks the CA justices knowingly rendered an unjust decision and judgment has been rendered through negligence and that the CA allowed itself to be deceived.The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. Del Mar from using such tone with the court. Del Mar then filed a second MFR where he again made threats. The CA then ordered del Mar to show cause as to why he should not be punished for contempt. Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA justices a copy of a letter which he sent to the President of the Philippines asking the said justices to consider the CA judgment. But the CA did not reverse its judgment. Del Mar then filed a civil case against the three justices of the CA before a Cebu lower court but the civil case was eventually dismissed by reason of a compromise agreement where del Mar agreed to pay damages to the justices. Eventually, the CA suspended Atty. Del Mar from practice. The issue reached the Supreme Court. Del Mar asked the SC to reverse his suspension as well as the CA decision as to the Montecillo case. The SC denied both and this earned the ire of del Mar as he demanded from the

Clerk of the Supreme Court as to who were the judges who voted against him. The Supreme Court then directed del Mar to submit an explanation as to why he should not be disciplined. Del Mar in his explanation instead tried to justify his actions even stating that had he not been convinced that human efforts in [pursuing the case] will be fruitless he would have continued with the civil case against the CA justices. In his explanation, del Mar also intimated that even the Supreme Court is part among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court justices but the judge who handled the case dismissed the same. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be suspended. HELD: Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in violation of his duties to the courts. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the proper administration of justice. It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client. Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely Facts:

Regala vs. Sandiganbayan

262 SCRA 125

Several ACCRA lawyers were included as defendants in the case ( for recovery of ill-gotten) filled by the PCGG against Eduardo Cojuangco, et al. with the sandiganbayan. Their inclusion was intended to compel them to reveal the identity of their clients. The ACCRA lawyers filed a motion for their exclusion from the case as defendants. The court denied the motion for the lawyers refusal to reveal the identity of their clients which one of the condition for their exclusion as defendants. Issue: Whether or not the PCGG compel petitioners to divulge its clients name? Held: NO. As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be shrouded in mystery. The general is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. 1) The court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood. 2) The privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client. 3) The privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship. Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should,

as a general rule, know his adversary. A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is. He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces. Except: 1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers advice. 2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. 3) Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys client unless, by revealing the clients name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the clients name is privileged. That client identity is privileged in those instances where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the client in the very criminal activity for which the lawyers legal advice was obtained.
Facts:

Lim vs. Antonio 41 SCRA 44

In a verified letter addressed to this Court complainant Vicente L. Lim prayed for the disbarment of the respondent, Francisco G. Antonio, on the ground that he is a Chinese citizen and therefore disqualified to be a member of the Bar. In his answer to the complaint respondent denied the material averments thereof and alleged specifically that he and his parents were Filipino citizens, and that the complaint filed by complainant was motivated by personal revenge, he (the respondent) having been instrumental in the filing against said complainant of a number of criminal and civil actions at that time still pending in court. Issues having been joined, the case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General and thereafter Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra was commissioned to conduct the investigation. In the course of the hearings held, both parties presented their respective evidence, and on the basis thereof the Office of the Solicitor General filed, under the corresponding report recommending "that the herein complaint of Vicente L. Lim to disqualify the respondent, Atty. Francisco G. Antonio, from the practice of law be dismissed." Discussing the evidences submitted by the parties, the pertinent portion of the report of the Solicitor General says the following: One of the qualifications of an applicant for admission to the Philippine Bar is that he must be a citizen of the Philippines (Section 2, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court). Of the above evidence introduced by the complainant to support his theory that respondent is not a Filipino citizen but a Chinese national, the following may be considered:b(a) The statements in the marriage certificate that respondent's father (Jose Antonio), his (respondent's) paternal grandfather (Efren Antonio),his paternal grandmother (Ong Pun and his maternal grandfather (Santiago Tan Garcia) are Chinese; (b) The testimony of Lorenzo Reyes that according to Efren Antonio or Lim Samson, the latter has three brothers named Hesing Lim, Hoc Kim Lim, and Cicero Lim and that said brothers came from China and that Lim Samson had a wife who bore him children one of whom is Jose Lim Antonio, the father of respondent; (c) The

testimony of Gelerina Ramirez that Samson Lim is a Chinese; (d) Certification of the Municipal Treasurer of Mobo, Masbate that according to the record of his office, Lim Sing Kim (alias Cicero) is a duly registered alien (Chinese). Issue: Whether or not respondent is a Filipino Citizen Held: On the basis of the above, the Office of the Solicitor General drew the conclusion that the complainant had failed to prove clearly and convincingly that the respondent is not a Filipino citizen, and therefore made the corresponding recommendation mentioned heretofore. In the light of the evidence of record, We are constrained to agree with the finding and recommendation just mentioned. Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, We have consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of either penalty (De Guzman vs. Tadeo, 68 Phil. 554). More so in the instant case where it has been clearly established that complainant's motives are not beyond suspicion. The evidence of record shows that the respondent was instrumental in the filing of Criminal Cases Nos. 3681 and 91293, the first for perjury filed in the Municipal Court of Masbate, Masbate and the second for falsification of a public and/or official document filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila, against said complainant. the complaint filed against respondent is hereby dismissed, without prejudice to any action that the State may deem justified to take in connection with the questioned citizenship of said respondent.