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Language Sciences 29 (2007) 733754 www.elsevier.com/locate/langsci

The iconicity of embodied meaning. Polysemy of spatial prepositions in the cognitive framework
Fieke Van der Gucht, Klaas Willems *, Ludovic De Cuypere
Department of General Linguistics, Faculty of Arts and Philosophy, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium Received 12 October 2006; received in revised form 12 December 2006; accepted 13 December 2006

Abstract This paper examines the concept of polysemy which serves as the basis of the principled polysemy model of spatial prepositions proposed by A. Tyler and V. Evans in a number of recent publications [Tyler, Andrea, Evans, Vyvyan, 2001. Reconsidering prepositional polysemy networks: The case of over. Language 77, 724765; Tyler, Andrea, Evans, Vyvyan, 2003a. The case of over. In: Brigitte Nerlich, Zazie Todd, Vimala Herman, Clarke, David D., (Eds.), Polysemy. Flexible Patterns of Meaning in Mind and Language. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin/New York, pp. 99159; Tyler, Andrea, Evans, Vyvyan, 2003b. The Semantics of English Prepositions. Spatial Scenes, Embodied Meaning and Cognition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge]. After situating the polysemy problem in a historical context (its roots can be traced back at least to Leibniz discussion of Lockes semantic account of particles), some merits of Tyler and Evanss model are pointed out. Tyler and Evans support a moderate polysemy view by distinguishing more carefully between an items uses and senses than was previously done in the radical polysemy hypothesis advocated by authors working in the BrugmanLako tradition. The paper then focuses on Tyler and Evanss criteria to postulate a list of 15 distinct senses of a linguistic item, viz. the preposition over. An analysis of the covering sense of over, which according to Tyler and Evans should be considered as a distinct sense because it cannot be pragmatically inferred, shows that Tyler and Evanss argument is not conclusive. This observation leads to the question whether the view that over is a polysemous word with a xed number of distinct senses is valid beyond the cognitive model Tyler and Evans propose. Building on E. Coseriu, we argue, rstly, that the cognitive model in general erroneously conceives of

Corresponding author. Tel.: +32 9 33 12 953. E-mail address: klaas.willems@ugent.be (K. Willems).

0388-0001/$ - see front matter 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.langsci.2006.12.027

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prepositional meanings in terms of lexical rather than instrumental meanings, and that the alleged distinct senses of the preposition over Tyler and Evans postulate are in fact utterance meanings of entire phrases and clauses; this explains the still high number of distinct senses attributed to the prepositional item. Secondly, we attempt to illustrate that the main reason why a battery of senses is postulated in the rst place derives from a non-linguistic criterion we term the iconicity of embodied meaning. This criterion prompts the linguist to accept as many distinct senses as there are prototypical common sense experiences commonly associated with (or, reected by) the use of a specic linguistic item in various instantiations. 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Cognitive semantics; Semantic network analysis; Polysemy; Prepositional meaning; Embodiment postulate; Context dependent uses versus distinct senses of words; Iconicity in language; Locke vs. Leibniz; Coseriu

0. Introduction: Lockes problem and Leibniz solution It has long been observed that words take on dierent senses in dierent contexts. Already in the 17th century, this observation led several scholars to consider the question how the semantic variation of a single linguistic item was to be accounted for. Essentially, two major approaches can be distinguished, which, interestingly, can also be traced back to the very beginnings of the linguistic debate about meaning and semantic variation in the 17th century (Coseriu, 2003, p. 213). The rst approach, arguably the most obvious one, can be found in Book III (Of Words) of John Lockes famous Essay concerning Human Understanding (1689). For Locke, words are means to record Thoughts (or Ideas) (Locke, 1689, III, 2, 2). Locke emphasises apparently for the rst time in the history of Western thought (Coseriu, 2003, p. 206) that the meanings of words dier from language to language and that, accordingly, words of divers languages are intranslatable (III, 5, 8). Moreover, Locke distinguishes between words which are names of ideas in the mind and words that are made use of to signify the connexion that the mind gives to ideas, or to propositions, one with another (III, 7, 1). The latter kind of words he calls Particles, obviously because they are functional items whose meanings are not straightforwardly assessed, unlike the meanings of names which stand for simple or complex ideas, e.g., motion, light or parricide and gratitude (Locke, 1689, III, 4, 810 and 5, 612). Because of the peculiar function of particles (they show what relation the mind gives to its own thoughts, III, 7, 3), Locke engages in a brief but revealing discussion of the meanings of the word but in English, a particle, none more familiar in our language (III, 7, 5). He writes: [But] seems to me to intimate several relations the mind gives to the several propositions or parts of them which it joins by this monosyllable. First, But to say no more: here it intimates a stop of the mind in the course it was going, before it came quite to the end of it. Secondly, I saw but two planets; here it shows that the mind limits the sense to what is expressed, with a negation of all other. Thirdly, You pray; but it is not that God would bring you to the true religion. Fourthly, But that he would conrm you in your own. The rst of these buts intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwise than it should be: the latter shows that the mind makes a direct opposition between that and what goes before it. Fifthly, All animals have sense, but

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a dog is an animal: here it signies little more but that the latter proposition is joined to the former, as the minor of a syllogism (Locke, 1689, III, 7, 5). Locke stresses that the ve meanings he mentions are merely a selection of all the meanings but may assume in speech, for a great many other signications of this particle (Locke, 1689) might be added. Moreover, and more importantly still, he has serious misgivings about an approach in which all these dierent meanings are considered manifestations of a single more abstract meaning: I doubt, Locke writes, whether in all those manners it is made use of, it would deserve the title of discretive, which grammarians give to it (III, 7, 6). Clearly, Lockes approach is informed by the view that meanings in use are not to be dismissed as simply variants of one underlying meaning grammarians may consider invariant, but that words may as well be polysemous in the rst place. Shortly after the publication of Lockes Essay, his account of the meanings of but was made the subject of a no less illuminating critical inquiry in the Nouveaux essais sur lentendement humain by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. In this treatise, Leibniz strictly follows the order of chapters in Lockes essay and contrasts Lockes views with his own.1 First, Leibniz observes that Lockes particles are not the only words which combine ideas or propositions; other words with similar functions being prepositions, conjunctions and even adverbs (Leibniz, 1765, III, 7, 2). Second, and more important, Leibniz takes issue with Lockes claim that a particle such as but has a great number of meanings instead of one meaning. Leibniz readily admits that it is not always possible to nd a general meaning (or: formal meaning) that explains all the instantiations of a particle on particular occasions (III, 7, 4). However, one should at least try to reduce all instantiations to a determinate number of meanings de signications, Leibniz, 1765), Leibniz argues, obviously assum(un nombre determine ing that a mere taxonomic description of the many senses of a particle (or whatever kind of word) is unsatisfactory.2 Remarkably, Leibniz writes that it would not be sucient to take recourse to a mere abstraction (une explication abstraite, III, 7, 5) of the particles meaning. From Lockes reference to the concept of discretive grammarians have attributed to but in English, it may be assumed that here Leibniz too calls for caution as to the claims of grammarians. Instead, Leibniz argues, one ought to seek for a paraphrase (une periphrase) which can substitute the word on every occasion, like a denition should be able to replace the dened expression (Leibniz, 1765). Leibniz then goes on to apply this method to four of Lockes example sentences in which but each time has an allegedly different meaning (see the quotation above). The semantic dierences Locke refers to should not refrain one from formulating a paraphrase which applies to all example sentences, and Leibniz claims that upon closer investigation but can be felicitously rephrased by using the formula non plus ultra, soit dans les choses, soit dans le discours (Leibniz, 1765). Moreover, according to Leibniz, the word but expresses an endpoint, a limit of a course or ` re, Leibniz, 1765). However, this explication is proposed process (un terme de la carrie as a conjecture by Leibniz, and he concludes the discussion by pointing out that, in this

1 For a number of reasons, Leibniz text was not to be published until 1765, more than 60 years after the Nouveaux essais were written. 2 Coseriu (2004, pp. 6371) has convincingly shown that this reasoning, which aims at going beyond the context dependent uses of linguistic items when considering their true meaning, can be found for the rst time in Western history in the writings of Aristotle.

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case like in others, language use is so variable, that in order to choose the right paraphrase all instances of the linguistic item have to be carefully analysed. In his succinct account of Leibniz solution to Lockes problem, Coseriu (2003, pp. 212 213) points out that Leibniz method of replacing a linguistic item by an analytic paraphrase derives from a methodological principle which modern linguistics has failed to recognise. According to Coseriu, it is imperative in semantic analysis not to equate the variable senses (or interpretations) of a word in language use with the knowledge of the meaning conveyed by the word itself. In fact, such an equation would render semantic analysis pointless. Note, however, that Leibniz, in his criticism of Lockes treatment of the various meanings of but, does not a priori hypothesise that a general meaning of the particle exists, nor does he deny that the particle takes on various senses in dierent sentences. On the contrary, the observation that words have many dierent senses in actual speech is the starting point of Leibniz hypothesis that these senses do not constitute the words meaning or meanings proper. The spearhead of Leibniz criticism is that one ought to seek to cover as much semantic variation of a word as possible under a single paraphrase which renders the instances of the word in dierent sentences and on dierent occasions transparent. The reason why we have started this paper by reviewing a widely forgotten chapter in the history of semantics is that some present-day accounts of the semantics of words (lexical items as well as function words such as prepositions and conjunctions) appear to be very similar to Lockes account discussed above. From our discussion, however, it may have become clear that such an account is in need of further clarication and that its seeming naturalness leaves a number of questions unanswered or, better still, unaddressed. In this paper we advance the hypothesis that current cognitive treatments of semantic variation largely correspond to the stance taken by Locke. Moreover we believe that the ` -vis Locke are perfectly legitimate and also apply, mutatis questions raised by Leibniz vis-a mutandis, to current cognitive analyses of the meaning of words. After discussing some of the problems raised by the Lockean-cognitive approach to word meanings, we would, therefore, like to advance an alternative view on semantic variation by reintroducing the point of view advanced by Leibniz. As we saw, this point of view calls for a reduction of the various senses of a word to a limited number of meanings and, ideally speaking, to a single unitary meaning if this is feasible. Linguists who, in the course of the last two centuries, subscribed to the latter view include Wilhelm von Humboldt, Ferdinand de Saussure, Louis Hjelmslev, Roman Jakobson, and Eugenio Coseriu (see Van de Walle et al., 2006 for some discussion). In order to line up with the subject of Lockes controversial treatment of linguistic meaning and of Leibniz alternative view, we will restrict our discussion to the semantics of prepositions, more specically the semantics of over, on which a substantial (and ever increasing) body of literature already exists. The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 introduces the concepts of polysemy and monosemy in current semantic research. Section 2 zooms in on the radical polysemy hypothesis and discusses some of its drawbacks, which explain why polysemy is sought to be attenuated in recent years. In Section 3, the moderate polysemy hypothesis proposed by Tyler and Evans (2001, 2003a,b) is briey discussed. In Section 4, it is rst explained in what respects the radical and the moderate hypothesis are similar to and dier from each other. Then we focus on a key example of the moderate polysemy hypothesis, the analysis of English over by Tyler and Evans, and we demonstrate that the covering instance of over is not a distinct sense of the preposition but rather a context dependent use. In

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Section 5 we argue, drawing on Coserius work, that prepositions are not to be dened in terms of lexical meanings, which are semantically self-contained, but in terms of instrumental meanings which rely on combinations with lexical meanings. In Section 6 we substantiate the view that there is a link between the embodiment postulate underlying the cognitive semantic framework on the one hand and the view in favour of polysemy (viz. distinct senses stored in semantic memory) on the other. Lastly, in Section 7, some nal conclusions are drawn.

1. Polysemy versus monosemy Any linguist acquainted with cognitive semantics will immediately recognise the striking similarity between one of its main tenets and Lockes account of the meanings of the word but discussed in the introduction of this paper. Like Locke, cognitive semanticists are sceptical about the possibility, or better still the desirability, to explain the semantic variation of a linguistic item in terms of a general meaning which is instantiated in various co- and contexts. To cognitive semanticists (most) linguistic items are inherently polysemous, especially lexical items.3 In other words, their semantic variation is a prerequisite of the exibility with which they are instantiated in language use, rather than a consequence of it. In the cognitive approach to the lexicon, polysemy is usually dened as a variety of lexical ambiguity in which the distinct senses associated with a single lexical form are semantically related (Brugman, 1997, p. 4). However, the distinct senses of a linguistic item referred to in Brugmans denition should be distinguished from an items context dependent uses. Whereas the former are supposed to be stored in the speakers semantic memory, the latter are a combination of the meaning of the item with additional contextual knowledge. Unlike distinct senses, context dependent uses need not be stored in memory and are, therefore, not regarded as evidence for polysemy.4 In the LockeLeibniz controversy the distinction between distinct senses and context dependent uses of words is not explicitly addressed. However, this distinction implicitly plays a role in Leibniz observation that the ultimate aim of any semantic enterprise is to reduce the various instantiations of a word to as small a number of meanings as possible, and, ideally, to one single meaning (Leibniz, 1765, III, 7, 2). Thus, Leibniz, unlike Locke, is aware of the fact that not all uses of a word are equally candidates for being selected as its meanings (as opposed to mere senses in context). In the cognitive approach, polysemy is traditionally taken to be a natural and seemingly self-evident characteristic of (most) linguistic items.5 In a number of recent publications, however, an interesting turn may be observed. Whereas early cognitive research e.g.,

Cf. Langacker (1988, p. 50). Whether polysemy applies to all linguistic items or not is a matter of considerable controversy within the cognitive linguistic framework. As a rule, lexical items are generally taken to polysemous, whereas some grammatical items are said to have a non-polysemous, unitary meaning (see Taylor, 1999, p. 33). 4 Taylor (1999, p. 20 and p. 41, note 2), however, notes that there is no clean cut-o point between stored units and ad hoc constructed units. 5 In this paper we will not discuss the relation between linguistic items and other form/meaning pairings, e.g. constructions, which cognitive linguists generally also consider to be polysemous (cf. Goldberg, 1995, 2006; Croft, 2001; and Croft and Cruse, 2004).

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Lako (1987, p. 378), Langacker (1988, p. 48 and 53), Taylor (1988, p. 300), among others focused on the structure of the polysemous items, thereby taking polysemy for granted, more recent cognitive research e.g. Taylor (2002, Chapter 6), Taylor (2003, p. 647.), Taylor et al. (2003, p. 2), Taylor (2006) has turned its attention to the polysemy hypothesis itself in an eort to substantiate the postulate. Although the polysemous nature of lexical items is still the main view adhered to, polysemy is no longer considered self-evident. Tuggy (2003), for instance, oers an explicit defence of the polysemy hypothesis, defending it against the monosemy hypothesis. The debate on the nature of polysemy has, moreover, resulted in a shift from a radical view on polysemy to a more moderate one. The latter can, e.g., be found in Tyler and Evans (2001, 2003a,b) who stress the importance of drawing a distinction between context dependent uses and distinct senses of a lexical item and who explicitly point out the dangers of what Sandra (1998) has called the polysemy fallacy (Tyler and Evans, 2003b, pp. 3839), i.e. the danger to exaggerate ` -vis the mental representation of the number of distinct senses of a linguistic form vis-a a native speaker (cf. also Taylor, 2006, p. 52 who observes that rampant polysemy is not compatible with the storage demands of language users). The continuum point of view (e.g. Geeraerts, 1993a and, more recently, Zlatev, 2003) may also be regarded as an instance of this moderate view, as the conceptual boundaries between homonymy, polysemy and monosemy are no longer regarded as clear-cut but, rather, as intrinsically vague. Finally, a moderate view on polysemy is also held by Allwood (2003), who also leaves some room for monosemy. It should be kept in mind that although moderate interpretations of polysemy are often concerned with the explanatory value of the polysemy postulate, the radical monosemy hypothesis advanced by a number of European structural semanticists is apparently not considered as a possible alternative by the proponents of the moderate view (with the exception of Taylor, 1999; see below). In recent history, this hypothesis has been most prominently articulated in the work of Eugenio Coseriu (see Coseriu, 1966, 1970, 1977, 1985, 1987, 1992a,b, 2000, 2003, 2004, among other publications). In Sections 4 and 5 we will support the view that the radical monosemy approach too deserves to be taken into account in the current discussion about the achievements and limits of the polysemy approach. Contrary to mainstream linguistic thinking about meaning, Coseriu argues for a new interpretation of the isomorphic one-to-one relation between linguistic form ) in the Saussurean sense. One of his central (signiant) and linguistic meaning (signie claims is that, normally, semantic variation can be relegated to two non-systemic levels of semantic competence, i.e. the level of language use or actual speech (parole) and the level of traditional, conventionalised discourse practices (norme). The main point of Coserius argument is, much in the spirit of Leibniz, that the semantic variation of an item in at both parole and norme do not aect the general unity and homogeneity of the signie ` me or langue), cf., e.g., Coseriu (1992a, 7) and the level of the language system (syste Coseriu (2000, p. 30). One of the few papers that seriously take into consideration Coserius theory of meaning from the cognitive perspective is Taylor (1999). Although a noteworthy exception, Taylors discussion suers from a number of misreadings.6 In particular, Taylor seems

Some recent discussions of Coserius semantic theory against the (Aristotelian and Humboldtian) background of his general theory of language are Kabatek (2000), Willems (2003) and Van der Gucht (2005, Chapter 2, 1).

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s) inhabit an idealist world, distinct to believe that for Coseriu, rstly, meanings (signie from the world in which and of which language is used (Taylor, 1999, p. 35); secondly, that Coserius semantic theory aims at arguing away polysemy (p. 33); and, nally, that it s) for lexical items if one recognises is not necessary to postulate unitary meanings (signie that speakers have mastered the usage norms of words (p. 3435). We will not explore these aspects of Taylors interpretation in detail here, for lack of space, yet a few observations are warranted. Taylors rst claim is erroneous and applies to cognitive semantics rather than Coseriu. Taylor takes pains to emphasise that according to cognitive linguists language is not used in order to refer directly to things in the world but, rather, to mental projections of the world (Taylor, 1999, p. 25), a view rejected by Coseriu and which, by the way, equally holds as idealist as long as no independent evidence for mental concepts is provided.7 Taylors second claim too is mistaken, because Coserius distinction s), usage norms and discourse senses is, from its very between systematic meanings (signie conception, conceived as a means to explain the ubiquitous and indisputable semantic variation of linguistic items (lexical as well as grammatical ones) in speech, instead of just describing them in a taxonomic, objectivist way. Thirdly, the well-known and occasionally reiterated Wittgensteinian reasoning that word meanings are in fact identical with the conventionalised uses of these words, is circular and explains nothing: rst the meaning of a linguistic item is explicitly identied with its readily apparent polyvalence (Coseriu, 2004, pp. 6869), then, in a second move, this demonstrable polyvalence i.e., the fact that ) can take on various (theoretically: an innite number of) senses one meaning (signie when applied to dierent referents is declared to be, by at, the meaning (or meanings) of the linguistic item under consideration. As it stands, this reasoning merely reiterates the s) have a wide range of application, without question how it comes that meanings (signie however providing an answer.8 Faced with the current trend towards moderate polysemy in a number of recent publications as well as with some misunderstandings about the monosemy approach, this paper strives to explore the boundaries of polysemy even further. Our main claim is that even the moderate view assumes more distinct senses than strictly necessary. We will focus on two aspects of the polysemy approach in semantic theory to substantiate this view. Firstly, by focusing on a key example of the moderate polysemy hypothesis the analysis of English over it will be demonstrated that the so-called covering instance of over is not a distinct

On the theory of conceptual space, which is foundational to cognitive linguistics, see Croft and Cruse (2004, p. 32. and p. 318.). For a discussion of the way meaningful linguistic signs apply to referents without assuming an additional otherworldly realm of concepts, see in particular Coseriu (1992b, 2003, 56, 2004, 23) (in the two latter publications Coseriu develops his point of view as part of his interpretation of Plato and Aristotle). 8 Note, moreover, that Taylor (1999, p. 34) simply supposes that speakers have learned to use words in their full range of established readings (e.g., the verb climb). However, the bulk of Coserius argument in his 1990 paper (Coseriu, 2000 is the English translation) is that exactly this supposition is fallacious, because the essential step in the mastery of a language semantic theory should be able to explain is not the step from one use of a word to another use and so on until all uses are covered, but the acquisition of the knowledge which is the very precondition that makes these successive steps possible in the rst place. In other words, the essential step is not the inference of the general features of class membership but the intuition of the words universal meaning (Coseriu, 2000, p. 39). As a consequence, claiming that searching for the meaning of a word is a futile exercise, once we take account of the contexts in which the word is used (Taylor, 2006, p. 63), is based on a circular reasoning.

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sense of the preposition as suggested by Tyler and Evans (2003a,b), but rather a context dependent use. This begs the question whether polysemy is as natural as is often assumed, even in moderate approaches, and how one can draw the line between polysemy and monosemy. Secondly, we will argue that the bias towards polysemy, even in its moderate form, stems from an underlying idea that the meaning of prepositions is similar to the meaning of lexemes. We would like to challenge this view. Our position is that prepositional meanings are of an instrumental kind and thus dierent from the lexical meanings with which they are combined in phrases and clauses. All too often, an alleged distinct sense of the preposition over in Tyler and Evanss account turns out to be a complex utterance meaning of an entire phrase or clause in which over happens to appear. Finally, and most importantly, we will argue that the view on the polysemy of prepositions Tyler and Evans advance in their work is based on a deeper epistemological premise which is derived from the cognitive embodiment postulate, but which we believe to be seriously awed for a number of reasons. In particular we want to question the assumption that linguistic meanings essentially reect, iconically, clear-cut bodily and, more specically, visual experiences of human beings. 2. The radical polysemy hypothesis Since the 1980s, cognitive linguistics has become increasingly interested in the radial network analysis as an alternative to structuralist theories of semantics in which meanings were conceived of as highly abstract, yet homogenous and discrete entities. Especially the radial network analysis of English over by Lako (1987), inspired by Brugman (1981), is now considered a key example of the cognitive semantic analyses of polysemy. On Lakos view, the polysemy of lexical items is best represented by means of a motivated semantic network, which is structured by a so-called centre-periphery schema: One subcategory is the center; the other subcategories are linked to the center by various types of links. Non-central categories may be subcenters, that is, they may have further center-periphery structures imposed on them (Lako, 1987, p. 287). Each node of the semantic network represents a distinct sense (in its turn represented as an image schema) of the lexical item in question. The centre of the network is occupied by the primary sense of the lexical item, also called basic sense or central sense. As a rule, the primary sense of lexical items is assumed to be essentially spatial, as cognition or meaning is said to be embodied (cf. the embodied mind model suggested by Lako and Johnson, 1980, 1999 and Johnson, 1987, among others). Semantic structure is grounded in the way humans typically experience and perceive extralinguistic reality, and space is quintessential to meaning (cf. Fauconnier, 1994). Secondary or non-central senses, mostly temporal or abstract in nature, are derived from the central sense and can only be understood indirectly. These senses are connected to the central sense by various types of links, such as metaphorical links, instance links, metonymical links, similarity links, etc. (cf. Lako, 1987). Crucially, derived senses are not predictable from the central sense. Instead, they are motivated, conventional extensions that have to be learned one by one (Lako, 1987, p. 116). However, Lako does not suggest any criterion to neatly distinguish between simple uses and distinct senses of an item. Essentially, it appears, it suces to nd some link between two or more instances to prove that the instances are distinct and, moreover, that the item is polysemous.

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TR

LM
Fig. 1. Above-Across-Schema (Lako, 1987, p. 419).

The dierence between primary and secondary sense can be illustrated by means of the following example. According to Lako, the central node of the radial network of over is the Above-Across Schema as exemplied in the sentence below: (1) The plane ew over. The central sense of over represented in (1) concerns a relation between a trajector (TR) moving above an unidentied landmark (LM) (Fig. 1): Lako assumes, furthermore, that in sentences such as (2) The bird ew over the yard (3) The plane ew over the hill, in which the LM is no longer unidentied, two more distinct senses of over are met: the 1.X.NC Schema, referring to horizontal eXtended LM (i.e. yard), with No Contact with the TR and the 1.VX.NC Schema, or Vertical eXtended LM (i.e. hill), also with No Contact with the TR. On this view, which may be termed the radical polysemy hypothesis, the semantic analysis can be extended virtually ad innitum, as long as a dierence in visual perception (e.g., a horizontal LM, yard, versus a vertical LM, hill) is considered signicant. This is where the polysemy fallacy comes in. Lakos erstwhile very successful analysis of over has inspired numerous other accounts: Taylor (1988), Vandeloise (1990), Geeraerts (1992), Deane (1993, 2005), Dewell (1994, 1996), Bellavia (1996), Krietzer (1997), Meex (1997), and, more recently, Queller (2001), Tyler and Evans (2001), Zlatev (2003) and Tyler and Evans (2003a,b). Most of these studies (before Tyler and Evans, 2003a [2001])9 oer slightly adapted versions of Lakos theory or just mere applications of Lakos view, in which the radial network analysis of English over is often applied to translation equivalents in other languages. Yet, recently, some authors, especially Tyler and Evans (2003a,b), have oered a series of objections against the radial network analysis as conceived by Lako, the most fundamental one being that the radical polysemy hypothesis leads to a semantic analysis that not only is too ne-grained but also fosters a highly problematic rampant polysemy.

Tyler and Evans analysis of over was rst published in 2001 in Language; the 2003 version of the article is a reprint (see the References at the end of the paper for bibliographical details). For the present article, we take Tyler and Evans (2003a) as our starting point, the chapter on over in Tyler and Evans book The Semantics of English Prepositions (Tyler and Evans, 2003b, Chapter 4), being essentially identical to Tyler and Evans (2003a, 2001).

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3. A moderate view on polysemy In a series of recent publications, Tyler and Evans suggest to reduce polysemy by drawing a clearer distinction between context dependent uses or contextualized interpretations of a preposition (also termed on-line meaning constructions, cf. also Croft and Cruse, 2004) and its distinct senses. In the case of over, Tyler and Evans argue that taking into account certain dierences in dimensionality of the LM (e.g., a horizontally extended LM versus a vertically extended LM) as distinct senses in the semantic network of over is a questionable move (Tyler and Evans, 2003a, p. 99; cf. Tyler and Evans, 2003b, pp. 3842 and 5557), and they propose to drop the former radical polysemy hypothesis in favour of a more moderate version which they call the principled polysemy model. Two criteria are proposed to distinguish between a distinct sense and a constructed meaning, or context dependent use, of an item. First, a dierence in meaning is said to correspond to a distinct sense if it involves a meaning that is not purely spatial in nature and/or in which ` -vis the other senses assothe spatial conguration between the TR and LM is changed vis-a ciated with a particular preposition (Tyler and Evans, 2003a, p. 105). The second criterion says that there must be instances of the sense that are context-independent, instances in which the distinct sense could not be inferred from another sense and the context in which it occurs (Tyler and Evans, 2003a, p. 105; cf. Tyler and Evans, 2003b, Chapter 4, passim). In the case of over, the central sense (called protoscene or protoscenic sense, Tyler and Evans, 2003, p. 110; Tyler and Evans, 2003b, pp. 6568) conceptualises a spatial conguration between TR and LM with the TR higher than the LM, within reach of the LM, and smaller than the LM, and the LM within the sphere of inuence of the TR.10 The protoscene is furthermore typically perceived from an ostage vantage point (Tyler and Evans, 2003a, p. 105; Tyler and Evans, 2003b, p. 81). Now we turn to the analysis of some of the distinct senses Tyler and Evans discuss in more detail. In order to show that the covering instances of over involve a distinct sense of the preposition, Tyler and Evans oer examples such as the following: (4) The tablecloth is over the table. (5) Joan nailed a board over the hole in the ceiling. (6) Joan nailed a board over the hole in the wall.11 In all three sentences, the rst criterion is met: in the semantic interpretation of the uses of over in sentences (4)(6) there is always a non-spatial element, a covering aspect, that adds a new, unpredictable semantic aspect to the protoscenic relation between TR and LM:

10 The latter feature, the LM being within the sphere of inuence of the TR, is dropped in some accounts of Tyler and Evans protoscenic description, yet it is essential, e.g., to distinguish over from above (cf. Tyler and Evans, 2003b, Chapter 5). 11 Taylor (2006, p. 63) is right in warning about the dangers of recycling invented examples taken from the literature instead of citing attested data. However, a search on Google suggests that the use of over in the covering sense in phrases such as the substance is over the pipe, mulch is over the roots, the sweater is over the chair seat, the big hand is over the little hand, I spread out a frayed white cloth over the table, the sheet is over the opening, he glued the plate over the whole in the box, she tapes the foil down over the whole in the cap etc. is quite ubiquitous (Google search, December 5, 2006).

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That is, the meaning associated with over appears that of covering, such that the hole, the LM is obscured from view by the TR (Tyler and Evans, 2003a, p. 105). To see whether the second criterion is met, we have to nd out whether the covering aspect can be inferred from the context or from another sense of the preposition. According to Tyler and Evans, the covering aspect in sentence (4) should not be considered as a discrete sense. For in this sentence the covering aspect can be perfectly explained by recurring to the protoscenic sense in combination with a specic cognitive principle on the one hand (i.e. a dierent way of viewing the spatial scene) and the human inferential capability to interpret that protoscenic sense in a meaningful way on the basis of encyclopaedic knowledge on the other. As a matter of fact, the basic ground of the protoscenic sense has not been altered in sentence (4) which, recall, represents a spatial conguration between a TR (tablecloth) higher than and within reach of a LM (table). Still, two important elements have changed. Firstly, the TR (tablecloth) is typically larger than the LM (table) and secondly, a shift in vantage point, which departs from the default ostage vantage point, has taken place. Adult human beings typically view tables from above the top of the table so that both the table and tablecloth are lower than our line of vision: This being so, the vantage point is not that depicted in the default representation of the protoscene, in which the viewer/construer is ostage. Rather the vantage point has shifted so that the TR is between the LM and the construer or viewer (Tyler and Evans, 2003a, p. 133; cf. Tyler and Evans, 2003b, pp. 9092). The shift in vantage point the perception of the tablecloth from above the top of the table combined with our encyclopaedic knowledge that tablecloths are usually larger than tabletops, readily prompts the conclusion that the table is hidden from view by the tablecloth and that we perceive the tablecloth as covering (a part of) the table. One could expect based on the analysis of example (4) that the covering aspect of over has to be considered as a context dependent use, not as a distinct sense. However, Tyler and Evans (2003a, p. 133) claim that, through the ages, [t]he covering implicature has been reanalysed as distinct from the spatial conguration designated by the protoscene (cf. Tyler and Evans, 2003b, p. 91). Through a process of pragmatic strengthening (cf. Tyler and Evans, 2003b, pp. 5861) the covering use has obtained the status of a distinct sense. This can be proved, according to Tyler and Evans, by invoking the senses of sentences like (5) and (6) above containing a context which cannot explain the covering aspect through a combination of the protoscenic sense and contextual inference: Assuming that the primary sense of over involves a spatial conguration between a TR and LM and that this conguration involves some sense of the TR being higher than the LM, we see no way in which the covering meaning component associated with over in (5) and (6) can be derived from context (Tyler and Evans, 2003a, p. 106). Such an inference [the contextual inference of the covering aspect as in sentence (3)] is not possible in (5) as the spatial relation holding between the TR and the LM is one that would normally be coded by below (i.e. the board is below the hole in the ceiling), rather than by over, given the typical vantage point (Tyler and Evans, 2003a, p. 106). As noted with examples (5) and (6), when over prompts for a covering sense, the TR need not be construed as being located higher than the LM; hence, the covering sense must exist independently in semantic memory (Tyler and Evans, 2003a, p. 133). According to Tyler and Evans, in (5) Joan nailed a board over the hole in the ceiling the board has to be situated in a lower position than the ceiling. On their view, the

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extralinguistic situation referred to would be expected to be described as Joan nailed the board BELOW the hole in the ceiling. Tyler and Evans assume, moreover, that the covering aspect in (5) cannot be considered as a context dependent use of the protoscenic sense (as is the case in (3)) because the TR (the board) is lower than the LM (the hole in the ceiling), whereas in the protoscenic sense the TR is higher than the LM. Consequently, the covering aspect cannot be explained as a combination of the protoscenic sense on the one hand and inferred encyclopaedic knowledge on the other. Hence, according to the authors, the covering use is a genuine distinct sense of over, not simply a context dependent use. 4. Polysemy and the embodiment postulate The distinction which Tyler and Evans seek to draw between uses and senses of a lexical item is a valuable counterpoise to Lakos radical polysemous analysis of over, in particular against a possible and undesirable eect of Lakos model, namely that a lexical item may assume a virtually innite range of novel senses in relation to dierent contexts and/ or cognitive construals. Tyler and Evans, on the other hand, acknowledge that language underdetermines the interpretations language users assign to utterances (see Tyler and Evans, 2003b, p. 229). Indeed, not all aspects of meaning construal in language use can be accounted for on the basis of purely linguistic semantic structures; non-linguistic aspects (encyclopaedic knowledge, pragmatics, and inference) are also involved in the process of interpretation. In this respect, we agree with Tyler and Evans. However, we also believe that their analysis is still biased towards polysemy in a way that is open to dispute. However, our problem with their analysis is of a far more fundamental nature and concerns one of the key tenets of the cognitivist paradigm, namely the embodiment postulate. Like Lako, Johnson and most other cognitive linguists, Tyler and Evanss semantic reasoning is theoretically informed by the embodied theory of cognition. The latter view may be described as follows: To say that cognition is embodied means that it arises from bodily interactions with the world. From this point of view, cognition depends on the kinds of experiences that come from having a body with particular perceptual and motor capacities that are inseparably linked and that together form the matrix within which memory, emotion, language, and all other aspects of life are meshed. The contemporary notion of embodied cognition stands in contrast to the prevailing cognitivist stance which sees the mind as a device to manipulate symbols and is thus concerned with the formal rules and processes by which the symbols appropriately represent the real world (Thelen et al., 2001, p. 1). On the embodied view on cognition, language is similarly thought to be determined by the relation between our bodies and the world, or, more precisely, the projected world as represented in the human conceptual system (Tyler and Evans, 2003b, p. 20, 23, 230; cf. Taylor, 1999). We would like to show that, even with a moderate polysemy hypothesis as a starting point, the embodied meaning postulate can lead to assuming unnecessary polysemy. Tyler and Evans (2003b, p. 80) propose an analysis of the multiple meanings of over along the lines of the following semantic network of over (Fig. 2):

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Fig. 2. The semantic network of over (Tyler & Evans, 2003b, p. 80).

Within the connes of this paper it is not possible to deal with all of the 15 distinct senses Tyler and Evans suggest for the preposition (particle) over (cf. Tyler and Evans, 2003a p. 48). In the remaining part of this section, and by way of example, we challenge Tyler and Evanss analysis of over in sentences (5) and (6). There are two major reasons why we object to the view that the covering instance of over should be considered as a distinct sense. Tyler and Evanss assumption that Joan nailed a board over the hole in the ceiling can always (and even should) be coded as Joan nailed a board BELOW the hole in the ceiling is not warranted. It is true that the board can be situated in a lower position with regard to the ceiling and that one perceives the board and either nothing of the hole (i.e. the hole is completely covered by the board) or only a part of it (i.e. the board leaves some part of the hole uncovered). However, from another point of view the board can also be situated higher than the ceiling; for example, when the board covers the hole in the ceiling (entirely or partially) at the upper side of the ceiling. In this case the speaker would only perceive that part of the board that is visible due to the cut-away of the hole in the ceiling. This interpretation is nevertheless neglected in Tyler and Evanss reading which suggests that

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their interpretation of (5) is the only one possible. Joan nailed a board over the hole in the ceiling is thus ambiguous between these two readings: (a)-reading: the board is situated in a lower position with regard to the ceiling, (b)-reading: the board is situated in a higher position with regard to the ceiling. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for sentence (6) Joan nailed a board over the hole in the wall. More importantly, however, the ambiguity between both readings does not necessarily entail that over is polysemous, i.e. is realized in a distinct, unpredictable sense in sentence (5) (just as in (6)). For in both the (a)-reading and (b)-reading the prepositions meaning proper merely expresses that the board is situated in relation to a lower reference point. In both examples (5) and (6) this reference point is the LM: (the hole in) the ceiling and (the hole in) the wall. In the case of the (a)-reading the linguistic conceptualisation parallels what one could legitimately call the most obvious and most common sense experience of the scene referred to. In the case of the (b)-reading, however, the kind of visualisation concerned deviates considerably from the point of view involved in the (a)-reading, although the (b)-reading too is still within the purview of common sense experience and, as far as we can judge from all our informants, easily comprehensible and perfectly natural. In reference to research on linguistic deixis, one can explain the dierence between both readings by distinguishing a focal from a disfocal perspective (cf., e.g., Janssen, 1997, pp. 126133). Let us again consider sentence (5) Joan nailed a board over the hole in the ceiling. Interpreting the scene from a focal perspective means that one interprets the meaning of over from the own point of view of the speaker ((a)-reading). By contrast, interpreting the scene from a disfocal perspective implies that one takes the point of view of the board or, by way of extension, the point of view of another speaker who is to be located at the attic or another room above the ceiling ((b)-reading). In either case, however, it is clear that both points of view are non-linguistic steering mechanisms of interpretation which presuppose one and the same sentence and, consequently, one and the same preposition over. It is, to be sure, denitely not the case that two dierent senses of the preposition are involved which would emerge from opposing points of view. It is important to bear in mind that the linguistic relation between TR and LM, as it is conceptualised through English over, is identical in both the readings (a) and (b). Yet in psychological, experiential terms, there appear to be two possible congurations between the extralinguistic entities referred to by the concepts TR and LM, which happen to correspond to a single linguistic conceptualisation. In other words: over, being a means to conceptualize the relation between a spatially superior TR and an inferior LM and conceivable as a semantically invariable meaning bearing linguistic item, can be said to display a structured polyvalence (or: polyreferentiality) at the experiential level, i.e. at the level of interpreting extralinguistic reality, which is perfectly explainable. We stress that the item is polyvalent in a structured way, because the linguistic meaning constraints the range of interpretations in a principled fashion, due to the fact that over invariably expresses that one object is situated in a specic relation to a lower reference point. Therefore, to assess the relation between the invariable meaning proper and the polyvalence of over, it is imperative not to interpret the specic conguration which holds between the TR and LM in a single call it prototypical way, excluding other possibilities which then have to be accounted for by invoking polysemy or certain kinds of extension. By using over in

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the case of (b) we express, just as in the case of (a), that the hole in the ceiling is in an inferior relation to the board and not the other way around. The case of (b) may correspond to a less frequent experience in statistical terms and it can readily be admitted that the (b)-reading rates lower on an embodied meaning scale than the (a)-reading, because taking the point of view of the board itself or of another human being in an adjoining room diers considerably from the way we normally perceive the world. However, our analysis reveals that it would be a mistake to project this normal experience, i.e. the most frequent perception of or most common interaction with the projected world, directly and without further qualication onto language and assume that linguistic structures reect this kind of experience. This is, however, what Tyler and Evans do when they claim that in sentence (5) Joan nailed a board over the hole in the ceiling the protoscenic sense (i.e. the TR being higher than and within reach of the LM) is no longer valid. But if one considers the above criticism and takes into account the disfocal interpretation of the sentence, the TR is still situated in a higher position than the hole in the ceiling and in this sense the protoscenic sense is perfectly valid. As a consequence, there is no reason to reanalyse the covering aspect as another distinct sense of over. Or, in more general terms, there is a conict between the polysemy postulate and what the linguistic evidence is actually telling us. This example informs us that a distinction needs to be made between, on the one hand, the meaning proper of over and the relation it refers to on the other. Strictly speaking, the item over only expresses a specic relation between an entity Y (e.g., the board) and an entity X (e.g., the hole in the ceiling), and our discussion shows that this relation has to be distinguished from the relation in extralinguistic reality which can be perceived and experienced by the speaker in various ways. We will return to this point in the last section of the paper, where we suggest an important and as yet implicit epistemological link between Tyler and Evanss analysis of the covering sense of over and the way linguistic meaning is supposedly an iconic reection of embodied categories. 5. The nature of prepositional meanings From our discussion of the alleged distinct covering sense of over two additional conclusions may be drawn, one on the nature of prepositional meanings and another on the cognitive embodiment postulate on which the multiple sense analysis oered by Tyler and Evans (as well as others) is ultimately based. It follows from the discussion that it is highly problematic to conceive of a preposition like over in terms of lexical semantics. No matter how many distinct senses one eventually postulates, if one conceives the dierent senses of a preposition in what might be called a lexically self-contained way, one is prone to believe that prepositions are words with meanings similar to the meanings of verbs, nouns, adjectives and adverbs, i.e. that prepositions are linguistic items with autosemantic value. Consider, apart form the covering sense, senses of the preposition over such as the following (cf. Tyler and Evans, 2003b, pp. 80106): higher and within reach (protoscene), on-the-other-side-of (Arlington is over the Potomac River from Georgetown), above-and-beyond (The arrow ew over the target and landed in the woods), completion (The game is over), transfer (She turned the keys over to the janitor), focus of attention (She thought over the problem),

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control (She has a strange power over me), preference (I would prefer tea over coee) etc. What is left unaccounted for in dening the meaning (i.e., enumerating the senses) of over in this way is the fact that the preposition does not mean what the paraphrases suggest as an isolated word. Rather, the suggested paraphrases render the readings of over as a part of utterances, i.e. they are concerned with readings in context, in particular with the way over is conventionally interpreted in combination with other words in phrases and clauses. This focus on utterances constitutes a major bias in the analysis of the preposition over. Like articles and conjunctions, prepositions are instrumental items, not lexical items. Whereas the latter possess lexical meanings which are conceptually self-contained, prepositions only have instrumental meanings (cf., e.g., Coseriu, 1987, p. 149).12 As the term itself suggests, instrumental meanings are relational, i.e. they necessarily rely on grammatical combinations with other words and arrive at semantic self-containment only together with these other words. If one considers the contribution of prepositions to grammatical constructions (in particular phrases and clauses) from this angle, Tyler and Evanss analysis of the many instantiations of over in sentences such as the ones just cited comes across as circular. For claiming that the preposition under analysis means above-and-beyond in, e.g., The arrow ew over the target and landed in the woods, or focus of attention in, e.g., She thought over the problem, is equal to neglecting that meanings such as above-andbeyond and focus of attention are not to be attributed to the preposition itself but to the grammatical combinations of the preposition together with the other words entering the constructions, e.g., y over X (above-and-beyond), think over X (focus of attention), turn X over to Y (transfer), prefer X over Y (preference) etc. We conclude, therefore, that Tyler and Evanss account of the various senses of over is awed by a hysteron-proteron: the meaning that comes about on the basis of the preposition and other words in its immediate linguistic context is declared to be the basic meaning of that preposition. Contrary to this view, we submit that the meaning of over is an instrumental meaning which can only be instantiated in combination with lexical meanings,13 that the meaning of the linguistic context should not be projected into the meaning of the preposition, and that the meaning of over should be conceived of as a general (Leibniz) non-lexical meaning which only species a relation between slots that have to be lled by autosemantic items, e.g., Noun over Noun, Noun BE over, Verb over Noun etc. In this connection, we refer to Van der Gucht (2005, Chapter 4) on the preposition over in Dutch, where it is argued that all productive uses of over in Dutch can be subsumed under a general instrumental meaning which can be paraphrased, in the spirit of Leibniz, as fol` -vis a reference point Y which is inferior to X. Whether this lows: positioning of X vis-a
12 Or, as Peirce rightly observes, prepositions belong to a class of words which assert nothing (Peirce, 1932, p. 164). 13 Of course, it is theoretically always possible that an instrumental meaning itself assumes a lexical meaning function, e.g., if it is transferred into an autosemantic category. In most languages, however, this is rather exceptional (compare, for instance, ups and downs, the in and out, the over and over etc.).

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paraphrase also suces to dene the instrumental meaning of over in English remains to be seen, but our conjecture is that Dutch and English dier only marginally on this point. We do not consider the argument that general instrumental paraphrases, such as the one we propose for Dutch over, are too abstract (cf. Tyler and Evans, 2003b, p. 82, n.11 as well as Taylor, 1999, p. 32.) to be a valid counterargument against a semantic analysis along the lines of Leibniz and Coseriu (apart from the fact that the discussion between the polysemy and monosemy approach is rendered particularly dicult because the crucial distinction between lexical and instrumental meanings is usually neglected).14 Instrumental meaning is bound to be more abstract than lexical meaning, for the simple reason that instrumental meanings depend on the combination with other, i.e. lexical, meanings. Therefore, the claim that the meaning of over is more abstract than that of plane, yard, think etc. is self-evident. Moreover, it has to be kept in mind that in English over X systematically (i.e., paradigmatically) diers not only from its antonymic expressions, under X and below X, but also from on X, above X and beyond X, thus necessitating dierent general paraphrases for each one of these combinations that are able to motivate, albeit from an analytical meta-level, their dierent and highly exible uses in discourse. Furthermore, the proposed paraphrase for Dutch over makes use of linguistically delimited and strictly dened terms that are not to be confused with their counterparts in ordinary language. For example, positioning is to be understood as involving a certain kind of dynamic process (so as to oppose, e.g., over X to on X), not as a spatial act of locating, placing etc. Likewise, the term inferior refers to a scale which is not restricted to space (cf. He hopped over the fence), nor to the vertical dimension (cf. the non-vertical dimension in He lives over the hill); the term equally applies, e.g., to the axis of time (The game is over) and also motivates largely idiomatic uses such as She thought over the problem.15 6. The iconicity of embodied meaning To conclude this paper we would like to uncover the descriptive strategy which informs Tyler and Evanss principled polysemy model in order to elucidate why their analysis necessarily favours those 15 distinct senses of over which supposedly constitute the semantic network of over (cf. Section 4). We believe that it is important to semantic theory in general to understand the underlying line of reasoning behind the cognitive semantic analysis Tyler and Evans, among others, promote. This will also clarify why we cannot agree with
14 This is also the case in, e.g., Ruhl (1989). For an extensive discussion of Ruhls monosemy model, see Van der Gucht (2005, Chapter 2, 2). 15 We consider the view put forward by Tyler and Evans (2003b, p. 37) that psycholinguistic experiments oer strong evidence in favour of the polysemy approach of linguistic items and against the monosemy approach (cf. Sandra and Rice, 1995; Rice et al., 1999) as invalid, for two reasons. Firstly, we consider it to be an error to equate contextual meanings with meanings created on-line, and systematic meanings in the language system with distinct meanings represented in memory (Tyler and Evans, 2003b, p. 37). Distinct meanings represented in memory are also created on-line. Secondly, not everything that is available in semantic memory is linguistic meaning (cf. Willems, 2005, pp. 398400). The psycholinguistic experiments mentioned refer to what speakers know about traditional uses of linguistic items (norms in the terminology of Coseriu, 1992a, pp. 297300), by no s). Being set up to prove the existence of the vast domain of semantic means to linguistic meanings (signie memory in a psycholinguistically valid and readily elicitable sense, psycholinguistic experiments do not say s). anything about linguistic meanings proper (signie

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their analysis from a point of view which takes seriously both the assertion that a context dependent use of a linguistic item is to be distinguished from a distinct sense, and the assertion that language itself radically underdetermines the rich interpretations regularly assigned to naturally occurring utterances (Tyler and Evans, 2003b, p. 229). It appears that there are basically two motivations for Tyler and Evans to posit 15 different senses for over. First of all, Tyler and Evans regard these senses as being distinct because they would not be inferable from context or other instantiations of the preposition. This suggests that the 15 senses are likely candidates for being memorized as separate (psychologically real) concepts which are straightforwardly distinguishable from an embodied point of view. Secondly, the 15 distinct senses are essentially 15 distinct ways in which one can experience or visualise the concept over in the context of utterances (cf. also Deane, 2005, pp. 245271); if there are more ways to experience the concept, these are said to be inferable from pragmatic and encyclopaedic knowledge or from combinations of the already established senses of the preposition. Both motivations are thus based on psychological assertions. But are these 15 senses also supported by what the linguistic evidence is telling us? We believe that the answer to this question is negative. Tyler and Evanss analysis draws exclusively upon entire utterances in the form of phrases and clauses, not on the single linguistic item over the meaning of which the authors claim to describe. Accordingly, the psychological extrapolation of the contexts of phrases and clauses associated with over is the true basis for Tyler and Evanss claims concerning the distinct senses of the preposition. Let us briey return to our analysis of the covering sense proposed by Tyler and Evans to illustrate the line of reasoning we are referring to. In Section 4 we saw that Tyler and Evanss statement that a speaker would normally rephrase the situation referred to in (7) The board is OVER the hole in the ceiling as (7) The board is BELOW the hole in the ceiling, ` -vis the ceilis only valid if the (b)-reading (the board is situated in a higher position vis-a ` -vis the ing) is excluded and the (a)-reading (the board is situated in a lower position vis-a ceiling) is regarded as the only possible interpretation. This conclusion, however, appeared to be unwarranted. But even if we would accept the (a)-reading as the only possible interpretation of sentence (7), this would still not demonstrate that speakers normally express (a) by saying The board is BELOW the hole in the ceiling instead of The board is OVER the hole in the ceiling. In Tyler and Evanss account the equivalent of normally spoken means that The board is BELOW the hole in the ceiling captures the speakers experience of extralinguistic reality somehow better than The board is OVER the hole in the ceiling. Better in this context means in a manner that parallels the way in which this experience can be conceptualized most transparently iconically through language. This view is in line with a strong version of the cognitive embodiment postulate in semantics: language mirrors underlying conceptual structures, which in turn are determined by ` -vis extralinguistic reality (cf. Tyler the typically human experiences of human beings vis-a and Evans, 2003b, p. 23). The expression The board is OVER the hole in the ceiling, then, is considered less normal because it comes across as less natural than The board is

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BELOW the hole in the ceiling. The latter sentence has, so to speak, a higher embodied meaning potential than the former because its iconic value is higher. Yet, rst of all, it is doubtful whether speakers refer to the scene mentioned above more frequently by using below than over. Observe, moreover, that by way of analogy, sentence (6) The board is over the hole in the wall, in which the TR is situated next to the wall instead of above it, would have to be more felicitously coded as The board is NEXT TO the hole in the wall which is clearly not the case. Secondly, no linguistic evidence is adduced that linguistic meanings ought to be dened according to the kind of transparency the human bodily and visual systems engender. It suces to take a look at the variations in the semantics of languages cross-linguistically to convince oneself that naturalness is a relative, ultimately useless concept when comparing meanings in dierent languages with one another: One language is never more natural than another language, and the range of resources dierent languages make use of is notwithstanding many recent eorts to establish universal or primitive constraints on linguistic meanings virtually innite. Tyler and Evanss line of reasoning concerning the competition between over and below with regard to sentence (5) holds, mutatis mutandis, for the entire list of 15 distinct senses which constitute their semantic network of over. We believe that this kind of reasoning is based on what we propose to call the iconicity of embodied meaning. With this term we refer to the idea that various instantiations of a single lexical item are considered distinct, memorized senses of that item within a continuous semantic network when these instantiations are actually inferred iconically from the specic ways humans experience and conceptualize the world, bodily and above all visually (for a more extensive critique of the visual paradigm in cognitive linguistics, see Willems, 1997). Although there can be no doubt about the anthropomorphic anchoring of natural language in man, the natural polysemy view mixes up linguistic meanings proper, which are language-specic, and psychological inferences individual language users may draw when processing the meanings of linguistic items in context. These psychological inferences are basically associative insofar as they relate general language-specic meanings to non-linguistic scenes which are experientially relevant to humans. Indeed, it not only means a lot for us humans to be able to distinguish between conceptual construals such as above-and-beyond, on-the-other-sideof, transfer, preference etc., such construals are also conceptually readily available. To nd them associated with a nite set of sentences in which a single preposition (over) plays a more or less important role, can lead one to postulate an intimate link between the conceptual construals and the linguistic item under analysis. While we concede that such a link exists and that it has to be analysed from the point of view of linguistics, it is denitely not the meaning of over. 7. Conclusions In order to locate the object of this paper in the history of the language sciences, we started o with a reminder of Lockes and Leibniz dierent approaches towards semantic variation. Locke subscribes to a polysemy view ante litteram on linguistic meaning, while Leibniz maintains that meaning variation does not exclude the possibility of constructing semantic paraphrases which aim at understanding the determinate number of meanings or even the single unitary meaning of linguistic items. In the last decade, polysemy is less taken for granted than it was in the 1980s, and there is also a growing consensus that there is a limit to the number of meanings a word may take. In this paper the polysemy postulate

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was scrutinised based on Tyler and Evanss (2003a,b) moderate view on polysemy, in particular their analysis of English over. Against mainstream cognitive accounts, we adduced evidence that the monosemy approach in the vain of Leibniz, which was most strongly advocated in modern linguistics by E. Coseriu, might be protably applied to the meaning of over. We focussed in particular on Tyler and Evanss treatment of the covering instance of over and showed that it is not a distinct sense, i.e. meaning, of the preposition, but rather a context dependent use. We additionally argued that a distinction, which we also adopt from E. Coseriu, should be made between lexical meanings, which are semantically self-contained, and instrumental meanings of, e.g., prepositions, which rely on combinations with lexical meanings. This distinction is important not in the least because it refutes the argument that a monosemy approach necessarily leads to meanings which are too abstract. Finally, we tackled Tyler and Evanss semantic analysis of over for being based on purely psychological and common sense readings of the phrases and clauses in which over is used, rather than on language-specic grounds (i.e. the linguistic meaning of over stricto sensu). References
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