ColonialAmericaexperiencedanincreaseinpopulationinmajorcitiesduringthe1700s.Some ofthesecitiesbegantoseeaninfluxofimmigrantgroupsmovinginfromvariouscountries (includingGermany,Ireland,Italy,andseveralScandinaviancountries),whichdirectly contributedtotherapidincreaseinpopulation.Thegrowthinpopulationalsocreatedanincrease insocialdisorderandunrest.Thesourcesofsocialtensionvariedacrossdifferentregionsof ColonialAmericahowever,theintroductionofnewracialandethnicgroupswasidentifiedasa commonsourceofdiscord.RacialandethnicconflictwasaproblemacrossColonialAmerica, includingboththenorthernandsouthernregionsofthecountry.Sincethewatchgroupscouldno longercopewiththischangeinthesocialclimate,moreformalizedmeansofpolicingbeganto takeshape.Mostofthehistoricalliteratureneglectstodocumenttheeventsthattookplaceinthe southernregionspecifically,thecreationofslavepatrolsintheSouth. SlavePatrols Slavepatrols(orPaddyRollers)firstemergedinSouthCarolinaintheearly1700s,buthistorical documentsalsoidentifytheexistenceofslavepatrolsinmostotherpartsofthesouthernregion.

SamuelWalkeridentifiedslavepatrolsasthefirstpubliclyfundedpoliceagenciesinthe AmericanSouth.Slavepatrolswerecreatedtomanagetheracebasedconflictoccurringinthe southernregionofColonialAmericathesepatrolswerecreatedwiththespecificintentof maintainingcontroloverslavepopulations.Threeprincipaldutiesplacedonslavepatrolsinthe Southduringthistime,includingsearchesofslavelodges,keepingslavesoffofroadways,and disassemblingmeetingsorganizedbygroupsofslaves.SlavePatrolswereknownfortheirhigh levelofbrutalityandruthlessnessastheymaintainedcontrolovertheslavepopulation.The membersofslavepatrolswereusuallyWhitemales(occasionallyafewwomen)fromevery echeloninthesocialstrata,rangingfromverypoorindividualstoplantationownersthatwanted toensurecontrolovertheirslaves. SlavepatrolsremainedinplaceduringtheCivilWarandwerenotcompletelydisbandedafter slaveryended.DuringearlyReconstruction,severalgroupsmergedwithwhatwasformerly knownasslavepatrolstomaintaincontroloverAfricanAmericancitizens.Groupssuchasthe federalmilitary,thestatemilitia,andtheKuKluxKlantookovertheresponsibilitiesofearlier slavepatrolsandwereknowntobeevenmoreviolentthantheirpredecessors.Overtime,these groupsbegantoresembleandoperatesimilartosomeofthenewlyestablishedpolice departmentsintheUnitedStates.Infact,By1837,theCharlestonPoliceDepartmenthad100 officersandtheprimaryfunctionofthisorganizationwasslavepatrol,theseofficersregulated themovementsofslavesandfreeblacks,checkingdocuments,enforcingslavecodes,guarding againstslaverevoltsandcatchingrunawayslaves.Scholarsandhistoriansassertthatthe transitionfromslavepatrolstopubliclyfundedpoliceagencieswasseamlessinthesouthern regionoftheUnitedStates.

FugitiveSlaveLaws TheFugitiveSlaveLawshelpedenforcethenecessityforslavepatrolsinordertoabidebythe law.Althoughinitiallytheselawswerecreatedtokeeptensionslowbetweenthenorthandthe south,itcausedthephysicalformationofslavepatrols.DuringtheCivilWar,thetheory ofContrabandpreventedthereturnofSouthernslaveswhoreachedUnionheldterritory.This helpedlimittheroleofslavepatrols/catchersandchangedthewar.Anotherformofhelpfor slaveswastheUndergroundRailroadwhichaidedslavesintheirescapetonorthernstates.The useandphysicalformationofslavepatrolscametoitsendin1865whentheCivilWarended. Afterthecivilwar,policingbecamemoreparamilitaryincharacter,withtheincreaseduseof uniformsandmilitaryranks.Beforethis,sheriff'sofficeshadbeennonuniformedorganizations withoutaparamilitaryhierarchyIntheAmericanOldWest,policingwasoftenofverypoor quality.TheArmyoftenprovidedsomepolicingalongsidepoorlyresourcedsheriffsand temporarilyorganisedposses.Publicorganizationsweresupplementedbyprivatecontractors, notablythePinkertonNationalDetectiveAgency,whichwashiredbyindividuals,businessmen, localgovernmentsandthefederalgovernment.Atitsheight,thePinkertonAgency'snumbers exceededthoseofthestandingarmyoftheUnitedStates.Inrecentyears,inadditiontofederal, state,andlocalforces,somespecialdistrictshavebeenformedtoprovideextrapolice protectionindesignatedareas.Thesedistrictsmaybeknownasneighborhoodimprovement districts,crimepreventiondistricts,orsecuritydistricts. WhilesomeregardslavepatrolasthefirstformalattemptatpolicinginAmerica,othersidentify theunificationofpolicedepartmentsinseveralmajorcitiesintheearlytomid1800sasthe beginningpointinthedevelopmentofmodernpolicingintheUnitedStates.

DevelopmentofModernPolicing Policingwasinitiallyprovidedbylocalelectedofficials.Forinstance,theNewYorkSheriff's Officewasfoundedin1626,andtheAlbanyCountySheriff'sDepartmentinthe1660s.Inthe colonialperiod,policingwasprovidedbyelectedsheriffsandlocalmilitias.In1789theUS MarshalsServicewasestablished,followedbyotherfederalservicessuchastheUSParks Police1791,USMintPolice1792.Thefirstcitypoliceserviceswereestablishedin Philadelphiain1751,Richmond,Virginiain1807,Bostonin1838,andNewYorkin1845.TheSt. LouisMetropolitanPoliceDepartmentin1846,theChicagoPoliceDepartmentin1854,andthe LosAngelesPoliceDepartmentin1869,TheUSSecretServicewasfoundedin1865andwas forsometimethemaininvestigativebodyforthefederalgovernment. ThesenewlycreatedpoliceagenciesadoptedthreedistinctcharacteristicsfromtheirEnglish counterparts: 1. Limitedpoliceauthoritythepowersofthepolicearedefinedbylaw 2. Localcontrollocalgovernmentsbeartheresponsibilityforprovidingpoliceservice. 3. Fragmentedlawenforcementauthorityseveralagencieswithinadefinedareashare theresponsibilityforprovidingpoliceservices,whichultimatelyleadstoproblemswith communication,cooperation,andcontrolamongtheseagencies. ItisimportanttopointoutthatthesecharacteristicsarestillpresentinmodernAmericanpolice agencies. OtherissuesthatcauseddebatewithinthenewlycreatedAmericanpolicedepartmentsatthis timeincludedwhetherpoliceofficersshouldbearmedandwearuniformsandtowhatextent physicalforceshouldbeusedduringinteractionswithcitizens.SirRobertPeelspositionon thesematterswasclearwhenheformedtheLondonMetropolitanPoliceDepartment.He wantedhisofficerstoweardistinguishableuniformssothatcitizenscouldeasilyidentifythem. Hedidnotwanthisofficersarmed,andhehiredandtrainedhisofficersinawaythatwouldallow themtousetheappropriatetypeofresponseandforcewheninteractingwithcitizens.American policeofficersfeltthattheuniformswouldmakethemthetargetofmockery(resultinginless legitimacywithcitizens)andthatthelevelofviolenceoccurringintheUnitedStatesatthattime warrantedthemcarryingfirearmsandusingforcewhenevernecessary.Despitetheirobjections, policeofficersincitieswererequiredtowearuniforms,andshortlyafterthat,theywereallowed tocarryclubsandrevolversinthemid1800s.IncontemporaryAmericanpoliceagencies,the disputeconcerninguniformsandfirearmshaslongbeenresolvedhowever,theuseofforceby thepoliceisstillanissuethatincitesdebateintoday.

PoliticsandthePoliceinAmerica(1800s1900s) AdistinctcharacteristicofpolicingintheUnitedStatesduringthe1800sisthedirectand powerfulinvolvementofpolitics.Duringthistime,policingwasheavilyentrenchedinlocal politics.Therelationshipbetweenthepoliceandlocalpoliticianswasreciprocalinnature: politicianshiredandretainedpoliceofficersasameanstomaintaintheirpoliticalpower,andin returnforemployment,policeofficerswouldhelppoliticiansstayinofficebyencouragingcitizens tovoteforthem.Therelationshipwassoclosebetweenpoliticiansandthepolicethatitwas commonpracticetochangetheentirepersonnelofthepolicedepartmentwhentherewere changestothelocalpoliticaladministration. Politicianswereabletomaintaintheircontroloverpoliceagencies,astheyhadadirecthandin choosingthepolicechiefsthatwouldruntheagencies.Theappointmenttothepositionofpolice chiefcamewithaprice.Byacceptingtheposition,policechiefshadlittlecontroloverdecision makingthatwouldimpacttheiremployeesandagencies.Manypolicechiefsdidnotacceptthe strongpoliticalpresenceintheiragencies,andasaresult,theturnoverrateforchiefsofpoliceat thistimewasveryhigh.Forexample,Cincinnatiwentthroughsevenchiefsbetween1878and 1886Buffalo(NY)triedeightbetween1879and1894Chicagosawninecomeandgobetween 1879and1897andLosAngeleschangedheadsthirteentimesbetween1879and1889. Politicsalsoheavilyinfluencedthehiringandpromotionofpatrolofficers.Inordertosecurea positionasapatrolofficerinNewYorkCity,thegoingratewas$300,whileofficersinSan Franciscowererequiredtopay$400.54Inregardtopromotedpositions,thegoingrateinNew YorkCityforasergeantspositionwas$1,600,anditwas$12,000to$15,000forapositionas captain.Uponbeinghired,policemenwerealsoexpectedtocontributeaportionoftheirsalaryto supportthedominantpoliticalparty.Politicalbosseshadcontrolovernearlyeverypositionwithin policeagenciesduringthisera. Duetotheextremepoliticalinfluenceduringthistime,therewerevirtuallynostandardsforhiring ortrainingpoliceofficers.Essentially,politicianswithineachwardwouldhirementhatwould

agreetohelpthemstayinofficeandnotconsiderwhethertheywerethemostqualifiedpeople forthejob.AugustVollmerbluntlydescribedthelackofstandardsduringthisera: Undertheoldsystem,policeofficialswereappointedthroughpoliticalaffiliationsand becauseofthistheywerefrequentlyunintelligentanduntrained,theyweredistributed throughtheareatobepolicedaccordingtoahitormisssystemandwithoutadequate meansofcommunicationtheyhadlittleornorecordkeepingsystemtheirinvestigation methodswereobsolete,andtheyhadnoconceptionofthepreventivepossibilitiesofthe service. Policeservicesprovidedtocitizensincludedavarietyoftasksrelatedtohealth,socialwelfare, andlawenforcement.RobertFogelsondescribedpolicedutiesduringthistimeasofficers cleaningstreets...inspectingboilers...distributedsuppliestothepoor...accommodatedthe homeless...investigatedvegetablemarkets...operatedemergencyvehiclesandattemptedto curbcrime.Alloftheseactivitieswereconductedundertheguisethatitwouldkeepthecitizens (orvoters)happy,whichinturnwouldhelpkeepthepoliticalwardbossinoffice.Thiswasaway toensurejobsecurityforpoliceofficers,astheywouldlikelylosetheirjobsiftheirwardboss wasvotedoutofoffice.InothercitiesacrosstheUnitedStates,policeofficersprovidedlimited servicestocitizens.Policeofficersspenttimeinlocalsaloons,bowlingalleys,restaurants, barbershops,andotherbusinessestablishmentsduringtheirshifts.Theywouldspendmostof theirtimeeating,drinking,andsocializingwithbusinessownerswhentheyweresupposedtobe patrollingthestreets. Therewasalsolimitedsupervisionoverpatrolofficersduringthistime.Accountabilityexisted onlytothepoliticalleadersthathadhelpedtheofficersacquiretheirjobs.Inanessay,August Vollmerdescribedthelimitedsupervisionoverpatrolofficersduringearliertimes: Apatrolsergeantescortedhimtohispost,andathourlyintervalscontactedhimby meansofvoice,baton,orwhistle.Thesergeanttappedhisbatononthesidewalk,or blewasignalwithhiswhistle,andthepatrolmanwasobligedtorespond,thusindicating hispositiononthepost. Sometimeinthemidtolate1800s,callboxescontainingtelephonelineslinkeddirectlytopolice headquarterswereimplementedtohelpfacilitatebettercommunicationbetweenpatrolofficers, policesupervisors,andcentralheadquarters.Thelackofpolicesupervisioncoupledwithpolitical controlofpatrolofficersopenedthedoorforpolicemisconductandcorruption.

EarlyPoliceMisconduct Incidentsofpolicecorruptionandmisconductwerecommonduringthiseraofpolicing.Corrupt activitieswereoftenrelatedtopolitics,includingtheriggingofelectionsandpersuadingpeopleto voteacertainway,aswellasmisconductstemmingfromabuseofauthorityandmisuseof forcebyofficers.Policeofficerswoulduseviolenceasanacceptedpracticewhentheybelieved thatcitizenswereactinginanunlawfulmanner.Policemenwouldphysicallydisciplinejuveniles, astheybelievedthatitprovidedmoreofadeterrenteffectthanarrestorincarceration.Violence wouldalsobeappliedtoallegedperpetratorsinordertoextractinformationfromthemorcoerce confessionsoutofthem(thiswasreferredtoasthethirddegree).Violencewasalsobelievedto bejustifiedininstancesinwhichofficersfeltthattheywerebeingdisrespectedbycitizens.Itwas acceptabletodoleoutstreetjusticeifcitizenswerenoncomplianttoofficersdemandsor requests.Ifcitizenshadacomplaintregardingtheactionsofpoliceofficers,theyhadverylittle recourse,aspolicesupervisorsandlocalcourtswouldusuallysidewithpoliceofficers. OneofthefirstgroupsappointedtoexaminecomplaintsofpolicecorruptionwastheLexow Commission.Afterissuing3,000subpoenasandhearingtestimonyfrom700witnesses(which producedmorethan10,000pagesoftestimony),thereportfromtheLexowinvestigation revealedfourmainconclusions:First,thepolicedidnotactasguardiansofthepublicpeaceat theelectionpollsinsteadtheyactedasagentsofTammanyHall.Second,insteadof suppressingviceactivitiessuchasgamblingandprostitution,officersallowedtheseactivitiesto occurwiththeconditionthattheyreceiveacutoftheprofits.Third,detectivesonlylookedfor stolenpropertyiftheywouldbegivenarewardfordoingso.Andfinally,therewasevidencethat thepoliceoftenharassedlawabidingcitizensandindividualswithlesspowerinthecommunity insteadofprovidingpoliceservicestothem.AftertheLexowinvestigationended,severalofficers werefiredand,insomecases,convictedofcriminaloffenses.Sometimelater,thecourts reversedthesedecisions,allowingtheofficerstoberehired.Theseactionsbythecourts demonstratethestrengthofpoliticalinfluenceinAmericanpolicingduringthistimeperiod. PolicingReforminAmerica(1900s1940s) PoliticalinvolvementinAmericanpolicingwasviewedasaproblembyboththepublicandpolice reformersinthemidtolate19thcentury.Earlyattempts(inthe19thcentury)atpolicereformin theUnitedStateswereunsuccessful,ascitizenstriedtopressurepoliceagenciestomake changes.Lateronintheearly20thcentury,reformeffortsbegantotakeholdandmade significantchangestopolicingintheUnitedStates. AgoalofpolicereformincludedtheremovalofpoliticsfromAmericanpolicing.Thiseffort includedthecreationofstandardsforrecruitingandhiringpoliceofficersandadministrators politicianstoappointtheseindividualstohelpthemcarryouttheirpoliticalagendas.Anothergoal ofpolicereformduringtheearly1900swastoprofessionalizethepolice.Thiscouldbeachieved bysettingstandardsforthequalityofpoliceofficershired,implementingbetterpolicetraining, andadoptingvarioustypesoftechnologytoaidpoliceofficersintheirdailyoperations(including motorizedpatrolandtheuseoftwowayradios).Theprofessionalizationmovementofthepolice

inAmericaresultedinpoliceagenciesbecomingcentralizedbureaucraciesfocusedprimarilyon crimecontrol.TheimportanceoftheroleofcrimefighterwashighlightedintheWickersham Commissionreport(1931),whichexaminedrisingcrimeratesintheUnitedStatesandthe inabilityofthepolicetomanagethisproblem.Itwasproposedinthisreportthatpoliceofficers couldmoreeffectivelydealwithrisingcrimebyfocusingtheirpolicedutiesprimarilyoncrime controlinsteadofthesocialservicesthattheyhadonceprovidedinthepoliticalera. Manyagenciesalsobegantoadoptmorereliablerecordkeepingsystems,improvedmethods foridentifyingcriminals(includingtheuseoffingerprintingsystems),andmoreadvanced technologiesusedincriminalinvestigations(suchasliedetectorsandsciencebasedcrime labs).Despitetheheavyemphasisoncrimecontrolthatbegantoemergeinthemid1930s, someagenciesbegantousecrimepreventiontechniques.Andfinally,thiserasawthe emergenceofstatehighwaypolicetoaidinthecontroloftraffic,whichhadincreasedafterthe automobilewasintroducedintheUnitedStates. PoliceReforminAmerica(19501960) Policereformsofthe1950sand1960sneglectedtherelationshipbetweenthepoliceandthe public.Therelationshipdeterioratedbetweenthetwogroupsbecausethecitizenscalledfor policeservicesthatweremostlynoncriminalinnature,andthepolicerespondedwithaheavy emphasisoncrimecontrol.Thedistancebetweenthesetwogroupswouldbecomeevengreater asthesocialclimatebegantochangeintheUnitedStates. The1950smarkedthebeginningofasocialmovementthatwouldbringracerelationstothe attentionofallAmericans.SeveraleventsinvolvingAfricanAmericancitizensignitedaseriesof civilrightsmarchesanddemonstrationsacrossthecountryinthemid1950s. InDecember1955,RosaParkswasarrestedaftersheviolatedasegregationordinanceby refusingtomovetothebackofthebus.Herarresttriggeredwhatisnow referredtoastheMontgomerybusboycott.AfricanAmericancitizens carpooledinsteadofusingthecitybussystemtoprotestsegregation ordinances.LocalpolicebegantoticketBlackmotoristsatanincreasing pacetoretaliateagainsttheboycott.Inoneinstance,MartinLutherKingJr. wasarrestedfordriving5milesperhouroverthepostedspeedlimit. Arrestsweremadeatanytypeofsitinorprotest,whethertheywere peacefulornot.Researchfocusedontheprecipitantsandunderlyingconditionsthatcontributed toraceriotsduringthistimeperiodidentifiedpolicepresenceandpoliceactionsasthemajor conditionsthatwerepresentpriortomostoftheraceriotsinthe1950sand1960s.Inaddition, thePresidentsCommissiononCivilDisorder(alsoknownastheKernerCommission)reported thatalmostinvariablytheincidentthatignitesdisorderarisesfrompoliceaction. Socialdisorderresultingfromprotests,marches,andriotinginthe1960sresultedinfrequent physicalclashesbetweenthepoliceandthepublic.Itwasduringthistimethatpeopleacrossthe UnitedStatesbegantoseephotographsinnewspapersandnewsreportsontelevisionthat featuredincidentsofviolencebetweenthesetwogroups.Thelevelofviolenceandforcebeing

usedbypoliceofficerswasshockingtosomecitizens,astheyhadnotbeenexposedtoit throughvisualnewsmediainthepast.Oneofthemostrecognizedexamplesofthistypeof violencewastheclashbetweenpoliceandprotestersattheDemocraticNationalConventionin ChicagoinAugustof1968.Graphicphotosofthepolicehitting,pushing,andarrestingprotesters werefeaturedonthenationalnewsandinmanynationalprintedpublications.Thesetypesof incidentscontributedtothepublicrelationsproblemexperiencedbyAmericanpoliceduringthe 1960s. Anypolicereformeffortstakingplaceinthe 1960swerebasedheavilyonatraditional modelofpolicing.Traditionalpolicingfocuses onrespondingtocallsforserviceand managingcrimesinareactivemanner.This approachtopolicingfocusesonserious crimeasopposedtoissuesrelatedtosocial disorderandcitizensqualityoflife.The traditionalpolicingmodelplacesgreat importanceonthenumberofarrestspolice officersmakeorhowfastofficerscan respondtocitizenscallsforservice.In addition,thispolicingstrategydoesnot involveacooperativeeffortbetweenthepoliceandcitizens.RichardAdamsandhiscolleagues describeditbestwhentheystatedthattraditionalpolicingtendstostresstheroleofpolice officersincontrollingcrimeandviewscitizensroleintheapprehensionofcriminalsasminor playersatbestandaspartoftheproblematworst.Theuseoftraditionalpolicingpractices coupledwiththesocialunrestthatwastakingplaceduringthe1960scontributedtothegulfthat waswideningbetweenthepoliceandcitizens.

CommunityPolicing(1970s1980s) Bythe1970s,researchbegantoshowthatarapidresponsetocrimedoesnotnecessarilylead tomorearrestsandthathavingmorepoliceofficersusingmethodsmadepopularunderthe professionalorreformmodeldoesnotsignificantlyreducecrime.Whatwasemergingwasthe viewthatunattendeddisorderlybehaviorinneighborhoodssuchasunrulygroupsofyouths, prostitution,vandalism,drunkanddisorderlyvagrants,andaggressivestreetpeopleisasignal tomoreseriouscriminalsthatresidentsdonotcarewhatgoesonintheircommunityandthat thecriminalscanmoveinandoperatewithimpunity. The1970sand1980ssawsomeexperimentationwithcommunityandneighborhoodbased policingprojects.Thoseprojectsgotmixedresults,andmanywereabandonedbecauseofhigh costs,administrativeneglect,andcitizenapathy.However,highercrimerates,continued communitydeterioration,andrecognitionofthefailuretocontrolcrimecausedlawenforcement

toagainquestiontheroleitwasplaying.Theenforcerrolestillwasnotworkingwellenough.It appearedsenselesssimplytorespondtocallsforserviceandarriveatscenesofcrimeand disordertimeandtimeagainwithoutresolvingtheproblemsorhavinganylastingeffectonthe livesoftheresidentsofthecommunity.Outofthisfailureandfrustrationcamethecontemporary conceptofcommunitypolicing. Underacommunitypolicingphilosophy,thepeopleofacommunityandthepoliceformalasting partnershipinwhichtheyjointlyapproachtheproblemsofmaintainingorder,providingservices, andfightingcrime.Ifthepoliceshowtheycareabouttheminorproblemsassociatedwith communitydisorder,twopositivechangesarelikelytooccur:Citizenswilldevelopbetter relationswiththepoliceastheyturntothemforsolutionstothedisorder,andcriminalswillsee thatresidentsandthepolicehaveacommitmenttokeepingallcrimeoutoftheneighborhood. Onceagain,theemphasishasshiftedfromfightingcrimetokeepingpeaceanddeliveringsocial services.Thegoaliseradicatingthecausesofcrimeinacommunity,notsimplyrespondingto symptoms. Intheearly1990s,manycommunitiesacrossthenationbeganimplementingcommunity policingstrategies.Communitypolicingcalledforashiftfromincidentbasedcrimefightingtoa problemorientedapproachinwhichpolicewouldbepreparedtohandleabroadrangeof troublesomesituationsinacitysneighborhoods.Therewasgreateremphasisonfootpatrolso thatofficerscouldcometoknowandbeknownbytheresidentsofaneighborhood.Those citizenswouldthenbemorewillingtohelpthepoliceidentifyandsolveproblemsinthe neighborhood. ABriefHistoryofBlacksinPolicing FormostofAmericanhistory,blackswhohavewantedtobepoliceofficershavefacedblatant discriminationandhavegenerallybeendeniedtheopportunity.Thefirstblackpoliceofficersin theUnitedStateswerefreemenofcolor.Theywerehiredaround1805toserveasmembers oftheNewOrleanscitywatchsystem.Theywerehiredprimarilybecauseotherpeopledidnot wantthejob.Inadditiontoservingonthewatch,theywereresponsibleforcatchingrunaway slavesandgenerallypolicingblackslavesinNewOrleans. By1830,policinghadbecomemoreimportantinNewOrleans,andthefreemenofcolorlost theirjobsonthecitypoliceforcetootherswhowantedthem.NotuntilaftertheCivilWarwere BlackAmericansallowedtobepoliceofficersagain.DuringReconstruction,blackAmericans wereelectedtopoliticalofficeandhiredaspoliceofficersthroughouttheSouth.Thisdidnotlast long..By1877,thebacklashtoReconstructiondroveBlackAmericansandtheirWhite Republicanalliesfromelectiveoffices,andblackpoliceofficersthroughouttheSouthlosttheir jobs.By1890,mostsoutherncitieshadallwhitepolicedepartments.Thefewblackpolice officersinthesoutherncitiesthatretainedthemgenerallycouldnotarrestwhitepeopleandwere limitedtopatrollingonlyareasandcommunitieswhereotherblackAmericanslived.By1910, therewerefewerthan600blackpoliceofficersintheentireUnitedStates,andmostofthem wereemployedinnortherncities.

Thehiringofblackpoliceofficersdidnotbeginagaininmostsoutherncitiesuntilthe1940sand 1950s.Theywerehiredprimarilytopatrolblackcommunities,topreventcrime,andtoimprove racerelations.Still,fewblackAmericanseverrosetocommandpositionsintheirdepartments. Indeed,priortothe1950s,onlytwoblackAmericanshadeverbeenpromotedtothecommand positionofcaptain:OctaveReyofNewOrleansandJohnScottofChicago.Bothserved relativelyshorttenuresintheposition:Reyfrom1868to1877andScottfrom1940to1946. TheFederalBureauofInvestigation(FBI) WhenthewarendedandtheColdWarbegan,theFBIcontinueditsdomesticsecurity responsibilities.Forexample,itwasgiventhejobofinvestigatingallegationsofdisloyaltyamong federalemployeesandwasrelentlessincombatingthecommunist,whichHooveralways equatedwithU.S.laborunionactivity.Hooverbegantoconsiderhimselfasinternalsecurity czar,whowasnotsubordinatetotheAttorneyGeneralbutratheracoequalconsultantand advisor.TheBureaualsobegandevotingalargerportionofitsresourcestohelpingstateand locallawenforcementagencies. Inthe1960s,CongresspassednewlawsgivingtheFBItheauthoritytofightcivilrights violations,racketeering,andgambling.However,underHoover,theFBIdraggeditsfeetinthe fieldofcivilrights,primarilybecauseHoover,avirulentracist,maintained,despiteevidenceto thecontrary,thatcivilrightsorganizationssuchastheSouthernChristianLeadership Conference(SCLC)hadbeeninfiltratedandwerebeingledbyCommunists.Theleaderofthe SCLCwasMartinLutherKingJr.Hooveralsowaslessthanenthusiasticaboutenforcementof thecivilrightslawsbecausehedidnotwanttojeopardizemutuallybeneficialrelationshipswith powerfulsouthernCongressmenandlocallawenforcementagencies,whoseofficerswere oftensympathetictoKuKluxKlanactivities. Asfororganizedcrime,newlawspassedbyCongressin1968enabledtheFBItoengagein courtorderedelectronicsurveillance,andtogetherwithincreasedundercoverwork,to successfullydevelopcasesagainstnearlyalltheheadsoftheU.S.organizedcrimefamilies. Ironically,until1957,HooverinsistedthatorganizedcrimeintheUnitedStates(atleastan Italiandominatednationalsyndicate)didnotexist.Accordingtoextensivedocumentation,the reasonforHooversdenialoforganizedcrimesexistencewasthattheMafiahadevidenceof Hooversgamblingdebtsandhishomosexuality.However,in1957,themajorU.S.organized crimefamiliesheldaconferenceinApalachin,NewYork,andweredetectedbyNewYorkstate policeofficers.ThiseventprovedthatorganizedcrimeexistedintheUnitedStates,and Mafiadeniers,includingHoover,wereforcedtoadmitasmuch.In1961,AttorneyGeneralRobert KennedycreatedanOrganizedCrimeandRacketeeringSectionintheDepartmentofJusticeto coordinateactivitiesagainstorganizedcrimebytheFBIandotherdepartmentagencies. Asjustshownwithregardtocivilrightsandorganizedcrime,theFBIanditslongtimedirector hadadarker,moresinisterside.ThiswasepitomizedbytheFBIsinfamouscovertdomestic counterintelligenceprograms.(COINTELPRO),whichwereusedagainstdissidentsandtheir organizationsfrom1956through1971.ThepurposeofCOINTELPRO,accordingtoHoover,

wastoexpose,disrupt,misdirect,discreditandotherwiseneutralizespecificgroupsand individuals.Toimpedeconstitutionallyprotectedpoliticalactivityagainstgroupsandindividuals whoopposedgovernmentdomesticandforeignpolicy,provocation,mediamanipulation,and otheroftenillegaltactics,includingcomplicityintheallegedassassinationofBlackPanther leaderFredHampton.COINTELPROtargetsincludedtheCommunistPartytheSocialist WorkersPartytheNationalAssociationfortheAdvancementofColoredPeople(NAACP)the AmericanCivilLibertiesUnion(ACLU)theNationalLawyersGuild(NLG)theAmericanFriends ServiceCommittee(aQuakerserviceorganizationthatreceivedtheNobelPeacePrizein1947) theAmericanIndianMovementBlackNationalistgroups,suchastheBlackPantherPartyand manymembersoftheNewLeftincludingtheStudentsforaDemocraticSociety(SDS)and numerousantiwar,antiracist,feminist,lesbianandgay,environmentalist,andothergroups.It alsotargetedindividualssuchascivilrightsleaderMartinLutherKingJr.,whomtheBureauset outtodestroyin1963,andcivilrightsleaderandlabororganizerCesarChavez.Someofthe aforementionedgroups,suchastheACLU,hadbeenunderFBIsurveillancesincethe1920s becauseoftheircriticismoftheBureau. Hooverwasabletofreelypursuetheseclandestineandoftenillegalactivitiesbecausehewas abletosuccessfullyinsulatehimselfandtheBureaufromexecutiveandlegislativecontrol.He didthisbyamassingsecretfilesontheconductandassociationsofpresidentsandlegislators thatmightproveembarrassingtothemifrevealed.Healsokeptextensiveinvestigativefileson thousandsofotherindividualswhohadbeeninvolvedincontroversialcausesanddissident organizations,includingdeafandblindeducatorHelenKellerU.S.SupremeCourtJusticeFelix FrankfurterfootballplayerJoeNamathactorsMarlonBrando,PaulNewman,andRockHudson andboxersJoeLouisandMuhammadAli.Yet,asanenduringmonumenttohisgovernment service,adoration,andpower,themammothFBIheadquartersinWashington,DC,the preoccupationofhislastyears,wasnamedtheJ.EdgarHooverBuilding.Thebuilding,formally dedicatedin1975,dwarfstheJusticeDepartmentheadquartersbuildinganddominatesthe inauguralroutebetweentheCapitolandtheWhiteHouse. TheFBIsimagewastarnishedbythemishandlingoftwocrisissituations:onein1992,atRuby Ridge,Idaho,wherethewifeoffugitiveRandallWeaverwasaccidentallyshotandkilledbyan FBIsniper,andtheotherin1993,atWaco,Texas,where74membersoftheBranchDavidian religioussect,includingwomenandchildren,diedasaresultofthegovernmentsmisguided attackoftheircompound.Duringthesummerof1993, DrugEnforcementAgency(DEA)TheWaronDrugs OnJune1971RichardNixonofficiallydeclaresa"warondrugs,"identifyingdrugabuseas "publicenemyNo.1."July1973:NixoncreatestheDrugEnforcementAdministration(DEA)to coordinatetheeffortsofallotheragencies. Hedramaticallyincreasedthesizeandpresenceoffederaldrugcontrolagencies,andpushed throughmeasuressuchasmandatorysentencingandnoknockwarrants.Nixontemporarily placedmarijuanainScheduleOne,themostrestrictivecategoryofdrugs,pendingreviewbya

commissionheappointedledbyRepublicanPennsylvaniaGovernorRaymondShafer.In1972, thecommissionunanimouslyrecommendeddecriminalizingthepossessionanddistributionof marijuanaforpersonaluse.Nixonignoredthereportandrejecteditsrecommendations. Between1973and1977,however,elevenstatesdecriminalizedmarijuanapossession.In January1977,PresidentJimmyCarterwasinauguratedonacampaignplatformthatincluded marijuanadecriminalization.InOctober1977,theSenateJudiciaryCommitteevotedto decriminalizepossessionofuptoanounceofmarijuanaforpersonaluse. Withinjustafewyears,though,thetidehadshifted.Proposalstodecriminalizemarijuanawere abandonedasparentsbecameincreasinglyconcernedabouthighratesofteenmarijuanause. Marijuanawasultimatelycaughtupinabroaderculturalbacklashagainsttheperceived permissivenessofthe1970s. The1980sand90s:DrugHysteriaandSkyrocketingIncarcerationRates ThepresidencyofRonaldReaganmarkedthestartofalongperiodofskyrocketingratesof incarceration,largelythankstohisunprecedentedexpansionofthedrugwar.Thenumberof peoplebehindbarsfornonviolentdruglawoffensesincreasedfrom50,000in1980toover 400,000by1997. Publicconcernaboutillicitdrugusebuiltthroughoutthe1980s,largelyduetomediaportrayalsof peopleaddictedtothesmokeableformofcocainedubbedcrack.SoonafterRonaldReagan tookofficein1981,hiswife,NancyReagan,beganahighlypublicizedantidrugcampaign, coiningtheslogan"JustSayNo."Thissetthestageforthezerotolerancepoliciesimplemented inthemidtolate1980s.LosAngelesPoliceChiefDarylGates,whobelievedthatcasualdrug usersshouldbetakenoutandshot,foundedtheDAREdrugeducationprogram,whichwas quicklyadoptednationwidedespitethelackofevidenceofitseffectiveness.Theincreasingly harshdrugpoliciesalsoblockedtheexpansionofsyringeaccessprogramsandotherharm reductionpoliciestoreducetherapidspreadofHIV/AIDS. Inthelate1980s,apoliticalhysteriaaboutdrugsledtothepassageofdraconianpenaltiesin Congressandstatelegislaturesthatrapidlyincreasedtheprisonpopulation.In1985,the proportionofAmericanspolledwhosawdrugabuseasthenation's"numberoneproblem"was just26percent.Thefiguregrewthroughtheremainderofthe1980suntil,inSeptember1989,it reachedaremarkable64percentoneofthemostintensefixationsbytheAmericanpublicon anyissueinpollinghistory.Withinlessthanayear,however,thefigureplummetedtolessthan 10percent,asthemedialostinterest.Thedraconianpoliciesenactedduringthehysteria remained,however,andcontinuedtoresultinescalatinglevelsofarrestsandincarceration. AlthoughBillClintonadvocatedfortreatmentinsteadofincarcerationduringhis1992presidential campaign,afterhisfirstfewmonthsintheWhiteHouseherevertedtothedrugwarstrategiesof hisRepublicanpredecessorsbycontinuingtoescalatethedrugwar.Notoriously,Clinton rejectedaU.S.SentencingCommissionrecommendationtoeliminatethedisparitybetween

crackandpowdercocainesentences.Healsorejected,withtheencouragementofdrugczar GeneralBarryMcCaffrey,healthsecretaryDonnaShalalasadvicetoendthefederalbanon fundingforsyringeaccessprograms.Yet,amonthbeforeleavingoffice,Clintonassertedina RollingStoneinterviewthat"wereallyneedareexaminationofourentirepolicyon imprisonment"ofpeoplewhousedrugs,andsaidthatmarijuanause"shouldbedecriminalized." Attheheightofthedrugwarhysteriainthelate1980sandearly1990s,amovementemerged seekinganewapproachtodrugpolicy.In1987,ArnoldTrebachandKevinZeesefoundedthe DrugPolicyFoundationdescribingitastheloyaloppositiontothewarondrugs.Prominent conservativessuchasWilliamBuckleyandMiltonFriedmanhadlongadvocatedforendingdrug prohibition,ashadcivillibertarianssuchaslongtimeACLUExecutiveDirectorIraGlasser.Inthe late1980stheywerejoinedbyBaltimoreMayorKurtSchmoke,FederalJudgeRobertSweet, PrincetonprofessorEthanNadelmann,andotheractivists,scholarsandpolicymakers.In1994, NadelmannfoundedTheLindesmithCenterasthefirstU.S.projectofGeorgeSorosOpen SocietyInstitute.In2000,thegrowingCentermergedwiththeDrugPolicyFoundationtocreate theDrugPolicyAlliance. LawEnforcementInThePresent BasedontheexperienceattaineddealingwithIndigenousNations,Africanslavesandother threats,thestatehasconstantlyupdatedandperfecteditsstrategies.Onepracticeremains untouchedintodayspolicingandlawenforcingmethods,thoughthetraditionofupholdingthe kindoflawsthatmadepossibleslavery,racism,segregationanddiscriminationinthecountry. Inthe21stcentury,policeattitudetowardspoorcommunitiesofcolorstillresemblesthatofits precursors300yearsago.Ifwesubstitutethewordsslavepatrolsforpolicedepartmentsandto thelistofNativeAmericansandslavesweaddundocumentedmigrants,Muslims,political activists,etcetera,wellseethatthenarrativehistoryofourpeoplesintheUnitedStateshasnt changedmuch. Analyzingpolicesloganslike:ToProtectandtoServeandCommittedtoExcellence,ina historicalcontext,itbecomesobviousthattheyrenotdirectedatthepolicedneighborhoodsbut atthoseinpositionsofpower,sincemostofthetimeinteractionsanddialoguewithworking class,migrant,andcommunitiesofcoloringeneral,arereducedtowhathaslegitimatedthe institutioninthefirstplaceabusivebehaviorandthemonopolyoflegalizedviolence. In2005,TheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesruledthatpolicedonothavea constitutionaldutytoprotectapersonfromharm. Therearemorethan900,000swornlawenforcementofficersnowservingintheUnited States.