In defence of Associative Political Obligation John Horton FIFTH READING IN OUR PRINTED MATERIAL 429-30 John Horton wants

s to defend the idea of associative political obligation against the criticisms raised by Simmons. Two main points: one, criticisms rely on pol ob being voluntary but assoc pol ob basically denies that it is voluntary; two, that assoc pol ob doesnt depend on whether the group is evil or not. Simmons identifies five characteristic features of assoc pol ob: 1. Antivoluntarism pol ob need not be explained by some voluntary choice to assume them by the person obligated 2. Authority of shared moral experience pol ob explanation must match realistic moral phenomena 3. Particularity pol ob must be directed at some particular govt or community above all 4. Analogy with family 5. Normative power of local practice local practice generates obligations which are self justified pol and moral. Gives rise to two theories of assoc pol ob non-voluntarist contract theory and communitarian theory 430-33 Non-Voluntarist contract theory Margaret Gilbert Social groups have plural subjects who are constituted into joing commitments which immediately generate obs. Obligation directly arising from membership of a community. Simmons criticisms, Hortons defence: 1. Confusion of felt obs with real obs people may feel like they have obs but it doesnt mean they are actually obligated -Chinmayi

What Simmons alludes to is a mass delusion which Horton says is not quite compelling. Especially considering Simmons says they may be deluded. The theory is not talking about what the people believe or whether its true. 2. Confusion of political assent with positive, obligation generating acts/rlationships Simmons is assuming that obligations can arise only from such acts/relationships. But there are general non-voluntary duties that bind us, for example, which demonstrate that obligations can exist even without those acts/relationships. Also many circumstances in which silent pol assent does mean obligations are created; some versions of consent theory.

3. Confusion of reasonable expectation and obligation & entitlement Obs may arise from custom, tradition, social conventions etc which create some reasonable expectation. eg., right of easement. Obs arising from reasonable expectations rather than proper relationships are essential for society to continue functioning. 4. Objection to Dworkins idea that people have equal concern for eachother in political practice, giving rise to assoc pol ob Yeah, people dont feel deep, abiding concern for everybody else, but exceptional circumstances are not important. Ordinarily, many citizens recognise some obligation to support fellow citizens (eg compulsory redistributory taxes) and care about the quality of life and general moral condition of their society/community.

433-36 Communitarian theory 1. Obs are not justified only because social role contributes to my identity. Identity is about identification; it could be bad also Comm theory says the fact that m membership of a community plays some role in defining my identity, my identity includes being under some pol obs. The possibility

of evil or false consciousness exists but the actual fact of being social doesnt have anything to do with how valid beliefs are.

2. Moral judgements require universality or at least high degree of generality (theoretical disposition) and local practices may be unjust oppressive pointless (fact) Comm theory says that local social practices independently determine moral requirements and pol ob are an example of such normative independence. We do assign pol ob based on social role without looking at moral principle. The idea that universal moral constraints on local practices justification leads to weak moral obligation is refuted on the grounds that it only limits what the people will accept as genuine obligation. 436 bottom -438 On the matter of moral standing of communities, the criticism that more than just membership is required for justifying obs is not useful because it can easily be applied to voluntarist theories also. One can voluntarily join an evil association or undertake to do wrong. /Horton bitching about everybody picking on assoc pol ob and ignoring other problematic accounts The point is being member of a group or having a certain relationship may be valuable, but the value extracted from it is not the only reason you have obligations arising from it. The relationship itself is important. Eg. Family. but hes my father is not overridden by he treated me v badly. Local practices give context and substance to values of relationships and thus give rise to obs. Morality is also relative; eg., loyalty among thieves. All groups will have value and negative aspects which are weighed against eachother, but as long as there is value, pol ob is justified in existence. 439 Then Simmons two rly dumb arguments: 1. that communal and assoc obs are too undefined and vague while people know clearly what pol obs are (Horton is just shaking his head incredulously, like me. He says no people can be confused about pol obs also.) and 2. In modern life there is no real communal aspect of being together in a group (Horton says no.

dont have to be together together to be related as members of the group. Even if you keep distance from your neighbour you have obs towards him/regarding him. Maybe you even have ob to keep distance from him.) /a couple pages of Horton dreaming about doing more research about assoc pol ob