LATEST KEY EVENTS

Blast targets opposition red shirt rally Some 30 people have been injured by an explosion at a rally by the opposition in Bangkok. The origin of the blast remains unclear, though some reports speak of a grenade attack. The leader of the opposition, Mr. Suthep was quite close to the blast but is uninjured.

TRAVEL ADVICE AT THIS POINT

This advice is offered based on the situation at this point rather than how things may develop. See section on scenarios for risk assessments. At this point travellers to Bangkok and other main urban areas should mainly face some risk of incidental injury and disruption to travel, delays and denial of normal services and activities, provided some simple advice is adhered to: On arrival contact the Tourist Friend Center at the main airport for the latest official update. Curtail movement and stay updated on events several times per day. Maintain a high degree of situational awareness: rallies can be very large and there is a risk of getting caught up inadvertently. Avoid any and all rallies, crowds, gatherings and demonstrations and keep a good distance to these events at all times. Avoid certain areas all together: Government buildings, police stations, military barracks, universities and main squares and roads used by protestors. Make sure your mobile is charged and store emergency numbers for tourist police (1155), ambulance (1669), tourist information center (+66 (0) 2314 1212) and your embassy to enable speed-dialing in an emergency. Do not take a stance on the issue with locals at any time, anywhere. This is a local conflict, and foreigners are not targeted per se, but talking a stance could change that. Expect delays and travel disruption. If you come into contact with uniformed security personnel, show respect and be patient. Remember you must carry our passport at all times by law for ID purposes.

The main winter tourist areas have so far been largely unaffected. Travellers here should stay updated at this point, and may wish to enquire their travel agent regarding contingency planning in place, if any. If you are dependent on special medicine or similar (e.g. insulin or anti-histamine), make sure you bring sufficient stock in case your stay becomes prolonged.

BRIEF OVERVIEW AND CURRENT SITUATION

Thailand continues to face a grave political situation. The red shirt government, led by political newcomer Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, sister of former Prime Minister Thaksin who was ousted by the army in 2006 and went into exile in 2008, is challenged by the yellow shirt opposition led by Mr. Suthep Thaugsuban. The government duly won the 2011 elections, but the opposition believes the result and the government lacks legitimacy, partly because they believe Thaksin is pulling the strings and that his sister is a puppet, and partly because they feel the electorate who voted for the government is uneducated and basically has been bought by the Thaksin clan. They are demanding the resignation of the government and the establishment of a special, un-elected council to take charge. In pursuing their aims, the opposition has demonstrated and marched, mainly in Bangkok, disrupting normal life and the process of government both. The government responded in late 2013 by calling snap elections, to be held on 5 February (which it will almost certainly win). Whatever the merits of their claims, the opposition has clearly undermined what democracy Thailand had. They refuse to accept the result of the 2011 elections, and implicitly of the upcoming election too. There have been several incidents of violence, mainly shootings and small-scale grenade attacks. The perpetrators remain elusive and speculation rife. One concern is that this is the work of agent provocateurs, endeavoring to derail the situation further.

PERSPECTIVE AND RISK ASSESSMENT

The conflict is not new. It reflects deep-running cleavages in Thai society, which are ethno-lingualgeographic but also political and cultural in nature. To no small degree this is a case of competing elites in a test of strength; of old vs. new. It has a structural quality to it, and thus there are no quick-fixes here. For ease of description we divide the conflict into two main groups: Government, reds-shirt Thaksins supporters and opposition, yellow-shirt opposition. The real picture is more complex. The traditional powerbrokers in Thailand have been concentrated in Bangkok, linked to the army and the royal family. They represent the old Thailand, and they have become outnumbered in recent decades by the population in the, mainly rural, north and northeast. The population here is a mix of Thai and Lao, and they have traditionally been marginalized and partly disenfranchised (as has the Malays in the south, where violent unrest has persisted for more than 10 years. Thaksins party took advantage of this in 2001 when his new Thai love Thai party won the first of five elections, backed by the northeastern population, challenging the rule of the old elite. By 2005-2066 his rule become somewhat controversial with claims that officers had tried to murder him; Thaksin was then ousted in a military coup (Thailands 18th coup) in 2006, and fled the country amid charges of corruption in 2008. Thus, in one sense this remains a tug-of-war between a nouveau riche elite and the old guard; a conflict which is mirrored in urban vs. rural, central vs. fringe and, to some degree, ethnicity.

The conflict is also a zero-sum game, where winner takes all. There has been no room for compromise at any point, and it is hard to see how one could be made. Weak institutions of state and society act as permissive causes here too, and the conflict has weakened them further. It is important to realize that, while Thaksins supporters will likely win any election (they have the numbers), and while this certainly bestows a significant degree of democratic legitimacy, Thailand lacks the societal infrastructure necessary and conducive to a functioning democracy. Facing the Thaksin supporters are the supporters of the old system, who certainly are not democrats themselves, and who have traditionally relied on the army as ultima ratio regum if their privileges came under threat. Which brings us to a key issue: Does the army still support the old guard unconditionally? This seems less than clear. While upper echelons of the officer corps certainly do, they are, by nature, part if the system themselves. On the other hand it is believed that many of the ordinary soldiers and police are Thaksin supporters (we see here how the cleavage between rulers and ruled is mirrored also in the army itself). So perhaps the real issue becomes whether middle-ranking officers, ever the source of gamechanging coups, also support Thaksin or not.

SCENARIO MODELS
Making predictions is ever a difficult game. For purposes of risk management it makes better sense to look at various outcomes, which all seem conceivable at this point. Note that things may pan out differently, and in particular that sudden events may have a gamechanging potential (e.g. the king dies). Note too that these scenarios are not all mutually exclusive. Some could follow others. 1. Negotiated settlement This seems unlikely. As said the crisis is a zero-sum game, and there is little room for compromise. Were Thailand to have democratic institutions and a strong civil society catering to many interests, it would certainly be an option. But that is not the case. We rate this as a low probability-scenario 2. Protests fizzle, government retains power The opposition is largely dependent on its own momentum, or the presence of an adversary. So far the government has played it smart by not offering much resistance on the streets of Bangkok. So could the opposition simply run out of steam, especially if elections are actually held on 5 February and subsequently recognized internationally? This seems a possibility if not probability. It could defuse the conflict in the short run, but would not solve it in the longer run. It seems the only thinkable scenario with a peaceful outcome for now. We rate this as a medium probability-scenario 3. The opposition or the government quits

Very unlikely. Both have a real powerbase, and both have much to loose by simply caving. This will not happen. We rate this as a very low probability-scenario 4. The government responds with force As said the government has so far, mostly, refrained from using force against the opposition demonstrators. Likely motivated by the wise consideration that it robs the opposition of an enemy they can fight in the street, but also probably because the government is unsure as to how the security forces would actually do if ordered to use force. However, as the elections approach and the conflict drags on, events could well force the governments hand, especially if critical infrastructure or key symbols of power become affected; or if the demonstrators would otherwise physically prevent elections taking place. Should the government use force, then the game changes; especially if casualty numbers are high, in which case a coup becomes more probable (see 5). We rate this as a medium-probability scenario, with risk rising as elections approach 5. Coup! The army steps in, topples the government and ends the impasse as it did in 2006. No doubt some high-ranking officers would already like to do this, even if the longer term perspectives of it are most unclear. The army knows it cannot rule and that a coup does not solve the issues at hand, but it may serve to prevent a worse outcome and restore order in the short run, while weakening the red shirts too both likely aims of the high command. A backlash in the shape of red shirts seems likely, including in Bangkok, and as short-ish burst of violence is likely here and possibly in the north and east. If the army can contain it, it should be short, if not, we could see option 6. instead. We rate this as a medium or high probability scenario 6. Counter-coup or mutiny The worst outcome we can see at this point, short of a civil war like scenario which is too far away to contemplate for now. This scenario sees reds shirt supporters in the army, likely middleranking officers, making their own coup, or counter-coup/mutiny in case of a coup. This could see army and security forces fighting each other in the streets, and violence escalate well beyond anything seen so far. It could also well spread beyond Bangkok, potentially to anywhere in the country. We rate this as a low-medium probability scenario, conditional upon a regular coup.