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Faith Roser, Response to Norcrosss Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases

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Norcross makes several arguments for the immorality of consuming factory-farmed meat. I agree with these points, and will highlight several of them. I will go on to further support two of his strongest arguments. These concern the ability of one persons actions to make a difference, and the moral importance of a consequence that is foreseen, but unintended. By considering possible objections to these arguments, and adding further arguments in support of Norcrosss position, I will highlight the strength of the authors arguments.

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Norcross argues that consuming meat produced by factory farming is immoral for several reasons. He notes that factory farming involves torturing livestock for the purpose of human enjoyment. Because consuming meat isnt necessary for mankinds survival, the benefits of producing food in this way do not justify the torture to which these animals are subjected. Norcross additionally argues that the potential impact of even one newly converted vegetarian on the level of production of factory-farmed meat is important enough to morally obligate abstaining from its consumption. Furthermore, there is not enough potential benefit from the factory farming system to justify the suffering of animals, the author claims. Finally, Norcross does not believe that there is any way to justify the greater moral importance of humans over farm animals because of some trait or characteristic that one group possesses, and that the other does not. There are no differences between animals and humans significant enough to rule out problematic marginal cases, where there will be some overlap between the traits possessed by humans and other animals. Animals cannot, therefore, be considered with any less moral importance than humans, according to the author.

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One could object to Norcrosss statement about the importance of a single persons choice. The assertion that the potential positive impact of a single person choosing not to consume factory-farmed meat is more important than the small chance that one person can actually make a difference may not be obviously true. But, taking into account the authors thoughts about one persons actions adding to the total impact of all people making similar decisions, and even influencing others to make similar decisions,

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it seems that even one persons actions will make some difference, even if that difference is small. Furthermore, while the author discusses choosing vegetarianism as an alternative to consuming factoryfarmed meat, those arent the only dietary options available. Supporting small-scale farming that provides for a more humane and natural life for farm animals is also a way to avoid the evils of factory farming, and to increase the positive impact of ones actions. Choosing to do so directly promotes better treatment of animals by providing income to an industry that values the moral importance of animal welfare, in addition to negatively impacting the economics of immoral factory farms, and potentially decreasing their production. The combined effects of withdrawing income from the factory farming industry, and using that income to support ethical farming, surely mean that one persons potential impact justifies avoiding factory-farmed meat. And this impact is in addition to that which Norcross mentioned.

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Furthermore, one might object to the idea that it is wrong to support factory-farming because of the suffering it causes, saying that its purpose isnt to inflict this suffering. Norcross argues that although no one intends factory-farming to cause suffering, and this result is merely a foreseeable outcome, it still carries moral weight. The author suggests that this suffering is an unavoidable outcome, and that this fact, combined with the lack of potential benefits associated with factory farming, negate this potential objection. I would argue that the benefits of supporting small-scale farming can also play a role in defending against this objection to the authors argument. Humane farming on a smaller scale offers an alternative to suffering as a by-product of the farming process. It is easily possible to choose to consume humanely-raised meat instead, which produces the same end product as factory farming, but without the unintended suffering. One could highlight the disadvantages of the increased cost associated with smallscale farming, but if animal suffering can easily be eliminated by supporting these more costly farming practices, it seems that price increases are a small price to pay. Consumers only have to be willing to spend more for humanely-farmed meat to eliminate a great deal of unnecessary animal cruelty, and that surely implies a moral obligation to abstain from consumption of factory-farmed meat.

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In summation, I conclude that these potential objections to Norcrosss arguments do not morally permit consuming meat produced through factory farming. One persons potential positive impact on

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animal suffering is morally significant enough to outweigh the probability that this persons actions will have no affect. Furthermore, although factory farming does not intentionally inflict suffering on animals, its benefits and the existence of an alternative method of production do not morally allow for these unintended consequences. For these reasons, consuming factory-farmed meat is clearly impermissible from a moral standpoint.