BP AMOCO OIL HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDIES (HAZOP)

Training Course Notes

Prepared by:

Ian W Morrison Refining Technology Group BP Amoco Oil, Sunbury

H:/Hazop/Training/BPA Hazop Trg Notes Rev 3 Sep 99.doc

CONTENTS

1.

INTRODUCTION

2.

WHAT IS A HAZOP?

3.

WHY DO WE DO HAZOPS?

4.

TYPICAL HAZOP STUDY

4.1 Terms of Reference & Scope of Work 4.2 Timing 4.3 Documents Required 4.4 Team Membership 4.5 Study Initiation 4.6 Process Element Selection 4.7 Process Parameters 4.8 Guidewords 4.9 Causes 4.10 Consequences 4.11 Existing safeguards 4.12 Recommended Actions 4.13 Recording and Reporting 4.14 Follow-up

5.

APPENDICES

6.

Additional Reading

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1.

INTRODUCTION BPA seeks to be distinctive world-wide in its pursuit and attainment of health, safety and environmental practice - no accidents, no harm to people and no damage to the environment. Getting HSE Right presents the HSE Management Systems Framework and the Key Processes to be put in place in order to achieve the companys HSE Expectations. The HAZOP technique is one of many used to meet the HSE Expectations - particularly in Elements 2, 5 & 6 of Getting HSE Right.

The HAZOP technique is widely recognised as the most effective method currently available for satisfying two basic requirements. The first is checking a new design for safety and operability problems whilst it is at the process and instrumentation diagram stage. The second is the identification of latent safety and operability problems in existing plant which have yet to be revealed during operations.

The technique is very powerful in terms of its ability to identify the potential for incidents. It is, however, a significant consumer of resources and needs to be an integral pan of a project development activity. It is not an add on.

HAZOP has developed over a number of years and there are a number of ways in which it is applied. This manual describes the BPA approach to the technique. It has been prepared for two purposes.

a) To be support material for BPA's HAZOP training programme which provides an insight into the technique for engineers new to HAZOP and gives more experienced people the opportunity for practice at an advanced level.

b) To be a handbook for study chairmen when they carry out Studies and need to promote in their team an awareness of how the technique will be applied.

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The successful practice of the technique is very dependent on the skills of the chairman. Whilst this manual identifies his tasks, separate training is available in chairmanship skills. Both those who will participate in studies, either as chairman or team member, and those who will be recipients of study reports are encouraged to participate in this training to learn the behaviours necessary to contribute and respond optimally in the performance of a HAZOP study.

2.

WHAT IS A HAZOP?

2.1

WHAT

HAZOP stands for HAZard and OPerability. It is a method of study for identifying hazards and operability problems in a process design. It is a systematic technique which is applied repetitively to small sections of the process design until all parts of the design have been studied. It is a qualitative means of identifying potential problems; it does not quantify the problems nor offer solutions to them.

2.2

WHO

The HAZOP study is carried out by a team which includes members with detailed knowledge of the process system being studied and discipline engineers to provide expertise in their own discipline. What all team members contribute to a successful HAZOP study is an open and imaginative approach to searching for potential hazards and operability problems.

2.3 The HAZOP technique is applied to Process and Instrumentation Drawings (P&IDs) of the process. As stated above, a small section of the process is selected for study - the PROCESS ELEMENT. A combination of a GUIDEWORD and a PROCESS PARAMETER is applied to that process element to establish CAUSES of deviation from the intended design conditions. The
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CONSEQUENCES of the deviation(s) in terms of hazards or operability problems are established. Any EXISTING SAFEGUARD in the process design which mitigates the effect of the consequence is identified. Finally, if considered necessary by the team, a RECOMMENDATION is made for action to be taken to improve the safety or operability of the process system.

This cycle is then repeated on the same process element with different combinations of guidewords and process parameters until all guidewords and process parameters have been applied.

The whole process is then repeated for the next process element and so on until the entire process system has been studied. 2.4 TO WHAT

The HAZOP technique was developed to identify inadequacies with respect to safety and operability in the design of complex chemical processes and it is ideally suited for this purpose. It can be applied just as readily to existing plant and to plant modifications. The important factor in application of the HAZOP technique is that the P&IDs to be studied must be accurate and adequately detailed. The material in this manual addresses application of the HAZOP technique to continuous processes. With some modification of the application method, the technique can be applied to batch processes also.

2.5 WHEN

For a new facility, ideally a HAZOP study would be carried out at the end of the detailed design stage when all P&IDs have been finalised and issued for construction. However, this would lead to a delay (or, at least, potential delay) to the project while the HAZOP study is carried out, its recommendations evaluated and any engineering checks or changes implemented. Few projects can accommodate a delay of this kind. Therefore, in practical terms, the HAZOP study is carried out as late as possible in the detailed design stage when P&IDs are as
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complete as possible while still allowing sufficient time for HAZOP recommendations to be considered and incorporated into the design. The precise timing of the HAZOP study is, therefore, a matter of judgement on the part of the project management in discussion with the HAZOP chairman.

The paragraphs above refer to a full HAZOP on the detailed process design of a facility. It is possible also to carry out a preliminary HAZOP on Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs) or preliminary P&IDs at the end or near the end of basic engineering. The objective of the preliminary study is to identify major hazards or operability problems in the basic process design so that they may be overcome in detailed engineering or, in some cases, an alternative process can be selected.

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3.

WHY DO WE DO HAZOPS?

Any plant design, new or existing, will have been prepared using input from more than one engineer. Often a large team is involved. Whilst an engineer might be totally competent in his discipline there is always scope for misunderstanding where one engineers work overlays or interfaces with that of another.

Designs that connect to existing installations can be prepared in isolation from all the experience and knowledge at the facility. It is frequently the case that design teams lack operational input so that an important perspective on the design is very limited or totally lacking.

Given the above, there is a need to have proposed, and existing, designs reviewed for hazards and operability problems by a multi-disciplined team in a thorough, structured manner. The Hazard and Operability Study technique satisfies this need and, for new designs, using process and instrumentation diagrams close to design freeze, allows improvements to be made when it is least expensive.

We carry out HAZOP studies for the following purposes: to provide assurance to Business management that a design, whether for a new facility, a modification to an existing facility or an operating plant is acceptably safe. to be part of the process for satisfying legislators that plants are acceptably safe. to provide a reference point for accident/near miss investigations. to provide a reference point for future design or plant modification. to provide a reference point for operational personnel when considering operational procedures for the plant.

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Our approach in the project environment is to encourage the design contractor to use the technique as a design tool. Likewise, if our own engineers view their work from a HAZOP perspective more of it will be right first time and there will be fewer findings when the work is subjected to a formal HAZOP study.

It should be remembered that the design contractor's perspective on a HAZOP study is unlikely to be the same as BPAs unless we have made some effort for this to be so. Design contractors may concentrate only on issues that require project actions. They may ignore operability considerations completely since they often have no personnel with operating experience. They may report by exception leaving no audit trail. They may use a team consisting only of people concerned with the project. None of this is acceptable to BPA.

Attempts have been made to produce the same result with less effort and, therefore, less cost. Amongst the techniques often mentioned in this context are 'What If?' studies, Check Lists, Failure Mode and Effect Analyses and Fault Tree Analyses. The first two can require as much effort as a HAZOP study and it can be demonstrated that they are nowhere near as effective. The last two are not designed to assess an overall process design and cannot be compared to HAZOP.

It can be stated that the HAZOP study is the best technique available to us for the purposes for which it should be used. When performed well it is a cost effective mechanism for qualitatively checking for potential hazards and operability problems.

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4.

TYPICAL HAZOP STUDY

4.1

Terms of Reference & Scope of Work

4.1.1 Terms of Reference

The terms of reference should be agreed formally between the client/project and the HAZOP Chairman before the study commences. It should not be assumed that the client always knows what a HAZOP study is, what requirements are necessary for a study to be effective, what the limitations of the technique are and what should be the extent of the responsibilities of the HAZOP team. In particular the terms of reference should emphasise that the HAZOP study is concerned with identifying hazards and operability problems and not with solving these problems or with quantifying them. However, if the team has the expertise to recommend specific solutions to identified problems with confidence it should do so.

If the client requires the HAZQP team to carry out further HAZOP studies on solutions to the identified problems proposed by the project this requirement should be covered in the terms of reference. Follow-up studies should be undertaken only after the main study is completed and must not be allowed to disrupt the main study.

4.1.2 Scope of Work

Either included in the Terms of Reference or under separate heading, it is important that the physical and procedural Scope of Work is stated.

The physical Scope of Work for a new facility may state simply that all P&IDs for the facility will be studied. Alternatively, there may be exclusions such as : - all vendor equipment may be excluded. It is important that the limits of study are stated and understood clearly by both client/project and HAZOP team.

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For modification work, it may be the intention of the client/project that only new works are studied. However, it is often necessary for the HAZOP team to study the effect of new work on existing equipment and vice versa. To ensure that there is dear understanding between client/project and the HAZOP team, a statement Such as, as much of the existing equipment as is necessary to ensure that any interactions between new and existing facilities have been addressed" should be included in the Scope of Work.

A common area of problems between client/project and HAZOP teams is the manner in which "vendor boxes" on P&JDs are treated. Designers will often show considerable detail in vendor boxes which may be based on either their knowledge of the vendor equipment they expect to be purchased or on their best guess at what major items may be included by the vendor. In general, lines and equipment in vendor boxes should be excluded from the scope of the HAZOP study and a clear statement of this made in the Scope of Work. This will avoid possible problems later. If "vendor boxes" are required specifically by the client/project to be studied in the HAZOP, it must be made clear in the Scope of Work and in the HAZOP report that the study of any "vendor box" is of preliminary HAZOP standard only. Whether "vendor boxes" are excluded or studied it must be recorded in the HAZOP report that full HAZOP of the vendor details should be carried out when they become available. The full HAZOP should be done to the same standard as the main HAZOP study.

The same guidance should be applied to "future" equipment identified on the P&IDs.

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4.2

Timing

The HAZOP procedure can be applied at any stage in the life of a project although the most detailed study is carried out when the process and instrumentation diagrams have been finalised. A plan showing how HAZOP studies fit into the development stages of a Project is given in Appendix 1

4.2.1 For a full HAZOP of the detailed design of a project (or modification), ideally, the entire design would be frozen and issued for procurement and construction. This would include the receipt of vendor details and incorporation of those details into the project P&IDs. This ideal situation can be achieved only if the project can afford, and has planned for, an interruption in its schedule while the HAZOP study is carried out AND the HAZOP recommendations are evaluated and, where appropriate, incorporated into the design P&IDs. For a large project, this would take a period of months.

Obviously, this ideal situation seldom arises. The timing of a HAZOP study becomes a compromise between design being sufficiently advanced to make the application of the HAZOP technique realistic and leaving sufficient time after the HAZOP study for recommendations to be followed-up by the designers. Most commonly, the HAZOP study is carried out when the "inhouse" design is complete and only vendor information on items of equipment is awaited ie. "vendor boxes" on P&IDs. The missing design information can be HAZOP'd by reconvening the HAZOP team to review vendor information at a later date. 4.2.2 For preliminary HAZOP the timing is quite different. A preliminary HAZOP is carried out on either process flow diagrams (PFDs) or preliminary P&1Ds with limited detail (eg. no piping specifications, no line sizes, "best guess" instrumentation). The preliminary HAZOP is carried out near the end or at the end of the basic engineering stage.

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The aim of the preliminary HAZOP is to identify any major hazards inherent in the process under study. It must be emphasised that the preliminary HAZOP does not remove the need for a full HAZOP at the detailed design stage.

Deciding the appropriate starting time for the HAZOP study is a matter for careful discussion between the HAZOP chairman and project management.

4.2.3 The aims of the preliminary HAZOP and the full HAZOP are quite different although the techniques used in both are similar.

Preliminary HAZOP aims to identify major process hazards to allow the designers to remove the hazard or provide adequate means of minimising the hazard. This avoids costly delays at later stages of the design.

Full HAZOP aims to identify any hazards or operability problems so that a safe and operable plant can be constructed and put into service.

4.2.4 In a different context, timing for the duration of the HAZOP study has to be estimated before the study starts. No two P&IDs are of the same complexity nor do two HAZOP teams work at exactly the same rate, but, as a rule of thumb, an "average" HAZOP team will complete two "average" P&IDs in one working day. However, with a complex process and a less experienced HAZOP team the completion rate might fall to one P&ID in two days.

4.2.5 HAZOP study requires a continuously high level of concentration by all team members to be effective. The repetitive nature of the application of the technique is not conducive to maintaining concentration. The HAZOP chairman has to be alert to the signs of loss of concentration and tiredness on the part of team members and make every effort to stimulate the team.

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Due to the mental efforts required it is seldom productive to try to carry out the formal meetings of HAZOP studies in long sessions and day after day over a long period. Ideally, two three-hour sessions per day and four days per week should be aimed for. As well as avoiding undue tiredness and, therefore, maintaining concentration for the team it allows the chairman and secretary to keep up to date with the necessary administrative tasks involved in carrying out the study.

4.2.6 Summarising 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 above, it can be stated that no two HAZOP studies are likely to be the same in terms of the time required to execute them. The main variables to be considered in estimating the duration of a HAZOP study are:

experienced/inexperienced team complex/simple process complex/simple P&IDs computer/manual recording system secretarial availability need for/availability of specialists language number of hours/day, days/week

4.3 Documents Required

The essential documents for 2 HAZOP study are Process and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs). Without them a full HAZOP cannot be attempted. Dependent on the depth of knowledge of HAZOP team members, additional information may be required from documents such as:

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Flow diagrams, heat and material balances Cause and Effect charts General Arrangement Plan and Elevation drawings Safety Analysis Function Evaluation (SAFE) Charts API-RP-14C Shutdown Philosophy Document Operations and Maintenance Philosophy document Safety Philosophy document Vendor Information Packages/P&IDs Relief/Venting Philosophy, Relief Device Data Sheets Drainage Chemicals - Data Sheets Piping Specification Pressure vessel, pump, compressor, turbine etc. data sheets Technical Specification Document Operating Instructions (particularly for batch operations) Pipework isometrics (if available) Previous Health, Safety & Environment Review or HAZOP reports

4.4

Team Membership

In order to carry out an effective HAZOP it is necessary to assemble a balanced, multi-discipline team. Two types of person are required to run a HAZOP effectively. those with detailed technical knowledge of the process eg. process, control, operations, electrical engineers.

those with the knowledge and experience of applying the highly structured, systematic HAZOP approach.

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The Chairman of the HAZOP team should be selected for his ability to effectively lead the study and have sufficient seniority to give the study recommendations the proper level of authority. Ideally the Chairman or Team leader should be independent of the project.

Engineers and scientists of relevant disciplines should be chosen for the positive contributions they can make to the study through their specialist knowledge and ability. It is preferable to keep the size of the team down to a manageable level in order to preserve objectivity. However, this does not preclude bringing in specialists to discuss particular aspects.

A typical team structure might be: Core Team: Chairman/Team Leader Secretary Process Design Engineer Control Engineer Operations Specialist Project Engineer

Specialists to be consulted on specific points may include: Safety Specialist Electrical Engineer Piping Engineer Research Scientist Civil Engineer Chemist etc.

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For new plant the operations specialist may be replaced by the commissioning engineer. The presence of the project engineer is desirable but not essential. If the project engineer's responsibility is purely 'budget and programme' then a systems engineer is also desirable.

The typical team structure above would be appropriate for a HAZOP study on new facilities. If the HAZOP was to be done on an existing facility or a modification, the team structure would be made up to benefit from those personnel on the site who had experience of the facility. It must not be forgotten that one way of identifying hazards and operability problems is to put plant into operation and "suck it and see". In the case of the existing facility, direct experience replaces the project development experience in the HAZOP team.

The attitude of the team must at all times be positive and constructive. HAZOP studies are extremely intensive exercises and can take an appreciable time so it is essential that the Chairman/Team Leader maintains the team's enthusiasm and motivation throughout This can be brought about by displaying positive leadership, bringing everybody in the team into the discussion (particularly 'drawing out the more reticent team members), giving team members specific tasks under recorded 'actions' and keeping work periods intensive but relatively short.

Occasionally, where a study may progress over an extended time, there may be pressure to accept alternates for team members. As far as practicably possible, this should be resisted. Replacement of team members disrupts the flow of the study and, most importantly, tends to break up the established team effort which is the whole essence of the HAZOP technique.

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4.5

Study Initiation

In preparation for the HAZOP study, the chairman will have agreed with the client/project on:

terms of reference documents required team membership and availability estimated duration of Study venue for study meetings reporting method

4.5.1 It is worth noting that due to the intensive concentration necessary to carry out an effective HAZOP study, considerable care has to be taken in selecting the venue for the study. The chosen location should be reasonably quiet and should be free from distractions such as telephones or team members being called away for other matters. In this sense, a portacabin in the heart of a construction site would be inappropriate. Equally a section of an open-plan office would not be suitable. A room which can accommodate a table arrangement giving everyone a dear view of the P&IDs and allowing good team communication should be the aim. Suitable layouts are shown in Appendix 2.

Other factors to be considered in arranging the venue for a HAZOP meeting are: chairs are comfortable for all day use ventilation is adequate smoking/no smoking policy is established lighting, either natural or artificial, is adequate all necessary equipment is available eg. power supply for computer, flipchart or blackboard for discussing detailed points, means of putting drawings on a wall or stand.

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4.5.2 When the HAZOP team meet for the first time, prior to starting the formal study, the chairman should: i) Have each team member introduce himself (eg. current post, background, HAZOP experience, married, golfer, gardener, etc.), as an icebreaker. ii) iii) Reiterate the terms of reference and programme for the study. If appropriate, identify additional specialists who are available to be called upon. iv) Have someone make a presentation describing the facilities to be studied and, if available, review a model of the facilities. v) State the arrangements for meetings ie. Start/finish times, lunch arrangements etc. vi) Explain how he/she intends to proceed with the application of the HAZOP technique and how reporting will be affected.

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4.6

Process Element Selection

The Process Element is the section of line or item of equipment selected for study. The process element should be large enough to allow sensible discussion in the teamof potential deviations from the design intent BUT small enough to ensure that the guide words apply uniformly throughout every part of the element. A few examples might explain the meaning above more easily.

i)

[ diagram to be inserted here]

This would not allow any meaningful discussion.

ii)

[ diagram to be inserted here]

This would be too large to apply the guidewords uniformly throughout the section.

iii)

[diagram to be inserted here]

These two process elements - combined pump discharge to vessel, and, the vessel itself would be about right.

4.7

Process Parameters

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These are the physical characteristics considered by the HAZOP team (in conjunction with guide words) to establish deviations from the design intent. eg. no FLOW more TEMPERATURE less PRESSURE incorrect CHEMICAL REACTION

The process parameters to be used in the HAZOP study may have to be varied according to the section of the process being studied. At the start of a study, parameters should be carefully selected from the list provided in Appendix 3. Judgement is required in selecting the parameters to avoid repeated consideration of those which are inappropriate while still ensuring that occasional special cases are not missed.

The list provided in Appendix 3 is not necessarily exhaustive and additional parameters may be used at the discretion of each HAZOP study team.

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4.8

Guide Words

These are the conditional words applied to each of the Process Parameters to give rise to deviations. eg. NO flow REVERSE flow MORE temperature LESS pressure INCORRECT chemical reaction.

A list of Guide Words is given in Appendix 4.

4.9

Causes

Having created a deviation the HAZOP team have to search their minds and apply their knowledge and experience to establish a cause of that deviation.

eg. NO FLOW

Cause - pump failure - valve closed - filter blockage

- vessel

empty

- control failure

MORE TEMPERATURE

- fire

- control failure - valve closed - solar heat - flare radiation

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A larger list of common causes is given in Appendix 5. Two Important issues must be stressed in arriving at causes of a deviation.

(i) Team members must not be inhibited in putting forward their thoughts on possible causes. Although their suggestion may prove to be inappropriate in the circumstances, that suggestion may trigger a very important cause in the mind of another team member which might have been overlooked otherwise.

(ii) Only credible causes should be put on record on the HAZOP log sheets. The definitions of 'credible' and 'not credible' is one to be resolved in the HAZOP team. The reason for this restriction is a simple one; to limit the amount of paper produced by the HAZOP study and, therefore, the amount of reading and evaluation to be carried out by the recipients of the study report.

4.10 Consequences

Having established a cause of a deviation the HAZOP team should then consider the consequence(s) of the deviation. The consequences to the overall process as well as to the line section or equipment item under review should be considered.

eg. DEVIATION

CAUSE

CONSEQUENCE

more pressure

control failure

(i) over-pressure of vessel (ji) process disturbance downstream

4.11 Existing Safeguards

The consequences of a particular cause may have been considered by the designers already. As a result, the designers may have included of equipment to reduce the likelihood of the cause arising or to reduce the severity of the consequences.

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eg. CONSEQUENCE

EXISTING SAFEGUARD

(i) overpressure of vessel

- PSV ON VESSEL - PAH ON VESSEL

(ii) pump damage due to cavitation

- FAL ON PUMP SUCTION - SUCTION VALVES LOCKED OPEN (by Operating Procedures)

Note that it may be necessary to check on adjacent lines and items of equipment for existing safeguards, not only within the process element under review.

4.12 Recommended Actions

Arising from the consequences of a deviation, and making due allowance for the existence and adequacy of existing safeguards, the HAZOP team have to decide if they should recommend any further action on the part of the client/project. The decision which has to be made is whether the consequences of a deviation are acceptable or not. In the majority of cases, the experience and judgement of the HAZOP team will be sufficient to make a qualitative decision on whether action should be recommended. Occasionally it will not be possible for the team to make that decision and their recommendation should then be for further evaluation of the potential hazard to be carried out by others using quantitative techniques such as HAZAN or QRA.

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There are four main types of recommendations likely to arise from a HAZOP study.

(i) The solutions to some problems may be obvious and the team may recommend firm changes to the plant hardware which will either eliminate the problem or positively reduce the likelihood of occurrence or reduce the severity of the consequences.

(ii) Not all problems can economically be solved by means of hardware and the HAZOP team may make firm recommendations for controlling them by procedures.

(iii) In some cases the solutions to identified problems may be complex or costly and may have to be referred back to the Project for solution or cost benefit analysis. In such circumstances the team may suggest several possible solutions for consideration.

(iv) On occasions the HAZOP team may identify serious problems for which they do not feel competent to suggest any solution. In such cases the recommendation would be simply that solutions must be found to permit the plant to be operated safely.

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4.13 Recording and Reporting

4.13.1 Recording during the HAZOP study

(i) Why? It is an essential requirement that an auditable record of a HAZOP study is produced. Auditable in this case means that there has to be a clear record of why recommendations have been made and, where a recommendation has not been made, a clear record that the potential deviation was considered by the HAZOP team but found not to create a hazard.

The purpose of an auditable record is to facilitate checking of the HAZOP study record at some later date eg. by PHSER 3 team to be able to satisfy themselves that an adequate HAZOP has been carried out, by a Board of Inquiry following a serious incident to establish if specific potential deviations had been considered, by operating staff to familiarise themselves with potential hazards and operating problems for the development of Operating Procedures.

(ii)

How?

A log sheet is used to keep the record of a HAZOP study. A variety of different forms of log sheet are available within BPA and from contractors. A standard BPA log sheet is shown in Appendix 6 (shown A4 but use A3 normally) which represents the preferred log sheet format. A wide variety of computer-based recording systems are available. An example of a log sheet from one of these computer programmes is given in Appendix 7.

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Whatever recording method is used, what has to be recorded on the log sheet is: Study name P&ID number(s) (including revision no) Process element Design intent Process parameter Guide word Cause Consequence Existing safeguard Recommendation/Recommended Action

It is important that the entries made under the heading Cause, Consequence and Recommendation are worded with the agreement of the full HAZOP team to ensure that the precise intention of the team is stated. The HAZOP log sheets are completed by the secretary as the study progresses.

The question arises in most HAZOP studies as to how much or how little should be recorded on the log sheets. To satisfy auditability requirements it is essential that any deviation established by the HAZOP team for which a cause is identified is put on record on the log sheet. This is the case whether a consequence or recommended action arises from that cause or not. This ensures that there is a record that the HAZOP team identified the cause but considered that no hazard or operability problem arose from it. If a deviation does not give rise to a credible cause, there is no requirement to make an entry on the log sheet.

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As well as the log sheets1 the secretary should keep a record of: Dates of meetings Team membership at meetings (including part-time) Reference documents used

Additionally, during the conduct of the HAZOP study the chairman will mark up a master set of P&IDs to identify each process element studied. These master P & IDs will form a part of the formal record of the study.

However, to provide overall auditability, at the front of the log sheets in the report there should be a list of the process parameters and guidewords applied to each process element throughout the HAZOP study. A statement must be added to that list to state:'These process parameters and guide words were applied to all process elements".

If, during the course of the HAZOP study, it is found necessary to change the list of process parameters and guidewords then a revised list should be included in front of the log sheets to which the revised parameters were applied. If necessary the statement above can be modified to include "-on P&IDs xxxx to xxxx".

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4.13.2 Reporting A formal report of the HAZOP study is issued after the study. Dependent on the client/project, the required format of the report may vary. A typical BPA report format is given in Appendix 8.

The major part of the report is provided by the study log sheets. This is a further reason for ensuring that the team's intention is stated unambiguously in the log sheets.

Apart from the standard sections required of any other report, a HAZOP report should include a section in which the main findings, in the opinion of the HAZOP team, are discussed in more detail than is possible on the log sheets. There is no average number of main findings in a HAZOP report - it could be none and it could be twenty or more - the size of the facility studied and the nature and magnitude of the recommendations made will determine the number of findings considered main.

4.14 Follow-up

4.14.1 Many different ways of implementing follow-up of a HAZOP study exist dependent on who the client is and what system they may have/may not have in place. The essential point to be made is that without the follow-up on actions recommended by the HAZOP team the HAZOP study is of no value whatsoever it becomes a dusty (and expensive) ornament on a shelf!!

One way of implementing follow-up is: (i) the project evaluate the recommendations and decide which to accept/reject (ii) one individual is made responsible for recording project evaluations and project actions. (iii) individuals are made responsible for ensuring that specific recommendations

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are actioned by a fixed date. (iv) the proposed actions from the responsible individuals are collated. (v) the HAZOP team (or selected members) are reconvened to review the actions proposed and either accept or recommend further action on the part of the project.

4.14.2 Action Status List A simple action status list which can be used to keep track of progress on followup activities is shown in Appendix 9. This form of list would be applicable for most forms of auditing.

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APPENDIX 3

LIST OF PROCESS PARAMETERS

FLOW TEMPERATURE PRESSURE LEVEL HEIGHT CHEMICAL REACTION RADIOACIWITY POWER CORROSION EROSION COMPOS~ON START-UP SHUT DOWN MAINTENANCE INSPECTION ACCESS INSTALLATION DEMOLITION WEATHER CATALYST REGENERATION OTHER

The above list of Process Parameters is neither mandatory nor comprehensive. It should be treated as a menu from which relevant items can be selected for use by the HAZOP team. (Additional items may be used as appropriate, for example TENSION was identified as an important process parameter during a study of a North Sea well riser pipe to be connected to a dynamically positioned stabilisation unit).

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APPENDIX 4

LIST OF GUIDE WORDS

NO MORE LESS REVERSE MISDIRECTED HIGHER LOWER VACUUM LIFTING FALLING INCORRECT EXCESS

The above list of Guide Words is neither mandatory nor comprehensive. It should be treated as a menu from which relevant words can be selected to form a deviation in conjunction with a Process Parameter.

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APPENDIX 5

COMMON CAUSES OF DEVIATIONS

NO FLOW:-

WRONG ROUTING - BLOCKAGE - INCORRECT BLINDING - INCORRECTLY FITTED NRV - BURST PIPE LARGE LEAK - EQUIPMENT FMLURE (CV/ISOLATION VALVE, PUMP, VESSEL, ETC.) - INCORRECT PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL - ISOLATION IN ERROR - ETC

REVERSE FLOW:-

DEFECTIVE NRV - SYPHON EFFECT - INCORRECT DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE - TWO WAY FLOW EMERGENCY VENTING - INCORRECT OPERATION ETC

MORE FLOW:-

INCREASED PUMPING CAPACITY - INCREASED SUCTION PRESSURE - REDUCED DELIVERY HEAD GREATER FLUID DENSITY - EXCHANGER TUBE LEAKS RESTRICTION ORIFICE PLATES DELETED - CROSS CONNECTION OF SYSTEMS - CONTROL FAULTS - ETC

LESS FLOW:-

LINE RESTRICTION - FILTER BLOCKAGE - DEFECTIVE PUMPS - FOUUNG OF VESSELS, VALVES, REEERICTOR OR ORIFICE PLATES - DENSITY OR VISCOSITY PROBLEMS - INCORRECT SPECIFICATION OF PROCESS FLUID - ETC

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MORE PRESSURE:SURGE PROBLEMS - LEAKAGE FROM INTERCONNECTED HP SYSTEM - GAS BREAKTHROUGH (INADEQUATE VENTING) - ISOLATION PROCEDURES FOR REUEF VALVES DEFECTIVE - THERMAL OVERPRESSURE POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMPS - FAILED OPEN PCVS - ETC

LESS PRESSURE:-

GENERATION OF VACUUM CONDITION CONDENSATION - GAS DISSOLVING IN LIQUID RESTRICTED PUMP/COMPRESSOR SUCTION UNE UNDETECTED LEAKAGE - VESSEL DRAINAGE - ETC

MORE TEMPERATURE:- AMBIENT CONDITIONS - FOULED OR FAILED EXCHANGER TUBES - FIRE SITUATION - COOUNG WATER FAILURE - DEFECTIVE CONTROL - FIRED HEATER CONTROL FAILURE - INTERNAL FIRES REACTION CONTROL FAILURES - ETC

LESS TEMPERATURE:-

AMBIENT CONDITIONS - REDUCING PRESSURE FOULED OR FAILED EXCHANGER TUBES - LOSS OF HEATING - ETC

MORE VISCOSITY:-

INCORRECT MATERIAL SPECIFICATION - INCORRECT TEMPERATURE

LESS VISCOSITY:-

INCORRECT MATERIAL SPECIFICATION - INCORRECT TEMPERATURE

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COMPOSITION CR:LEAKING ISOLATION VALVES - LEAKING EXCHANGER TUBES - PHASE CHANGE - INCORRECT FEEDSTOCK/SPECIFICATION - INADEQUATE QUALITY CONTROL - PROCESS CONTROL PROCEDURES - ETC

CONTAMINATION:-

LEAKING EXCHANGER TUBES OR ISOLATION VALVES INCORRECT OPERATION OF SYSTEM INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS - EFFECT OF CORROSION WRONG ADDITIVES - INGRESS OF AIR-SHUTDOWN AND STARTUP CONDITIONS - ETC

RELIEF:-

RELIEF PHILOSOPRY - 'TYPE OF RELIEF DEVICE AND RELIABILITY - RELIEF VALVE DISCHARGE LOCATION POLLUTION IMPLICATIONS - ETC

INSTRUMENTATION:CONTROL PHILOSOPHY - LOCATION OF INSTRUMENTSRESPONSE TIME - SET POIWIS OF ALARMS & TRIPS TIME AVAILABLE FOR OPERATOR INTERVENTION ALARM & TRIP TESTING - FIRE PROTECTION ELECTRONIC TRIP/CONTROL AMPUFIERS - PANEL ARRANGEMENT AND IDCATION - AUTO/MANUAL FACILITY & HUMAN ERROR - ETC

SAMPLING:SAMPLING PROCEDURE - TIME FOR ANALYSIS RESULT CALIBRATION OF AUTOMATIC SAMPLER/RELIABILITY ACCURACY OF REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE - DIAGNOSIS OF RESULT-ETC

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CORROSION/ EROSION:- CATHODIC PROTECTION ARRANGEMENTS INTERNAL/ EXTERNAL CORROSION PROTECTION ENGINEERING SPECIFICATIONS - ZINC EMBRITTMENT STRESS CORROSION CRACKING (CHLORIDES) - FLUID VELOCITIES - RISER SPLASH ZONES - ETC

SERVICE FAILURE:-

FAILURE OF INSTRUMENT AIR/STEAM/ NITROGEN/COOLING WATER/HYDRAULIC POWER/ELECTRIC POWER - TELECOMMUNICATIONS HEATING & VENTILATING SYSTEMS - COMPUTERS ETC

MAINTENANCE:-

ISOLATION - DRAINAGE - PURGING - CLEANING DRYING - BLINDS/BLANKS - ACCESS - RESCUE PLAN TRAINING - PRESSURE TESTING - WORK PERMIT SYSTEM - CONDITION MONITORING - ETC

STATIC:-

EARHTING ARRANGEMENTS - INSULATED VESSELS/ EQUIPMENT - LOW CONDUCTANCE FLUIDS SPLASH FILLING OF VESSELS - INSULATED FLUIDS SPLASH FILLING OF VESSELS - INSULATED STRAINERS & VALVE COMPONENTS - DUST GENERATION & HANDLING - HOSES - ETC

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SPARE EQUIPMENT:-

INSTALLED/NON-INSTALLED SPARE EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY OF SPARES - MODIFIED SPECIFICATIONS - STORAGE OF SPARES - CATALOGUE OF SPARES - ETC

SAFETY:-

FIRE & GAS DETECTION SYSTEM/ALARMS EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN ARRANGEMENTS - FIRE FIGHTING RESPQNSE TIME - EMERGENCY & MAJOR EMERGENCY TRAINING - CONTINGENCY PLANS TLV'S OF PROCESS MATERIALS & METHODS OF DETECTION -NOISE LEVELS - SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS -KNOWLEDGE OF HAZARDS OF PROCESS MATERIALS -FIRST AID/MEDICAL RESOURCES - EFFLUENT DISPOSAL HAZARDS CREATED BY OTHERS (ADJACENT STORAGE AREAS/PROCESS PLANT ETC) - TESTING OF EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT - COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL/NATIONAL REGULATIONS - ETC

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APPENDIX 8

RECOMMENDED REPORT FORMAT

COVER PAGE

CONTENTS PAGE

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

TERMS OF REFERENCE

HAZOP STUDY LOG SHEETS

DISCUSSION OF MAIN FINDINGS

APPENDIX LIST

APPENDIX I APPENDIX II APPENDIX III

LIST OF PIPING AND INSTRUMENT DIAGRAMS STUDIED REFERENCE DOCUMENTS PROCESS PARAMETERS AND GUIDEWORDS USED

DISTRIBUTION LIST

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