CONTEMPORARARY ENGLISH LANAGUAGE PRAGMATICS What is pragmatics all ab !

!t" If you want to know what a particular human activity is all about, you may start asking questions like: What are the rules of baseballs? or What is cricket like? But pretty soon you will get to the point where you want to figure out what these sports enthusiasts actually are oing out there in the fiel ! "imilarly, if you want to know what a particular religion is all about, you are of course entitle to ask what its beliefs are# but you will be more intereste in, an enlightene by the practices that are sai to be characteristic of such a religion! We coul apply this line of thought to the $young% science of pragmatics! &sk any pragmatician what pragmatics is all about, an he'she will tell you that it is a science that has to o with language an its users, or some such thing! But if you want to know what pragmatics really stan s for, you must try an fin out how the game is playe , what pragmaticians o for a living an how they are ifferent from the people active in other relate branches of language stu ies such as synta( or semantics! "o the question is #What c !l$ b% call%$ a t&pical pragmatic l ' at matt%rs ( la)g!ag%"* )ere is an e(ample of how pragmatics works! *he +hicago cultural weekly Reader ha an a vertisement in its ,- &ugust, -.., issue for a owntown cocktail lounge "weet &lice! *he a carrie the te(t: I brought some sushi home and cooked it, and it wasnt bad at all. /ow what are you going to make of this? 0f course, this sentence is a 1oke: everybo y knows that sushi is eaten raw, an that you are not suppose to cook it! +ooking sushi may strike someone as funny or stupi or outrageous, epen ing on ones point of view! In an informal way, we coul say that the sentence above makes no sense! &n a linguist might want to a that, since everybo y knows that sushi is efine as being eaten raw, a sentence such as the above is wrong in the same way as are sentences of the type +olourless green i eas sleep furiously which ma e a certain &merican linguist famous in the early si(ties! When aske about the o choice of wor ing in the a vertisement quote above, the linguist might go on to say that the sentence is semantically wrong# it oes not make sense because the semantics of one its parts 2the sushi3 contra icts the semantics of another part 2the cooking3! "o far, so goo ! But, one coul ask, why use such a silly sentence in an a vertisement for a cocktail bar? *his is where pragmatics comes into picture! 4ragmatics tells us its alright to use language in various, unconventional ways, as long as we know, as language users, what were oing! "o we can let ourselves be semantically shocke if there is a reason for it, or if it is one for a purpose! /ow what coul that reason or purpose be? In this particular case, the 1oke has a euphoric effect# it invokes the silly state of min that becomes our privilege after a couple of rinks, which is precisely why this a is effective as an invitation to 1oin the crow at "weet &lices! "o pragmatics is where action is! But what is the action that goes with the above a ? +learly the above a is an attempt to sell something: a cocktail bar, a particular ambiance, a particular clientele, a promise of goo times! *he a invites us in, so to speak! But it oesnt o that by saying +ome into my parlour'or cocktail bar 2such an invitation woul be too blatant to be effective3, an it oesnt invite us in by appealing to our basic instincts of gree , se(, violence! /ever min that certain establishments o 1ust that: they an their customers get what they are in the market for# "weet &lice uses a more roun about technique! It talks to us in a voice that appeals to us as in ivi ual language users with a particular history an a living conte(t! *he parlour or the cocktail bar is sketche as a esirable place an the invitation is by innuen o only: a pragmatic act of inviting, rather than a specific, co ifie linguistic formula, such as a speech act!

+%(i)iti )s a)$ bac'gr !)$, pragmatics a)$ th%r ar%as ( la)g!ag% i)-%stigati ) *he mo ern usage of the term pragmatics is attributable to the philosopher +harles 5orris who was concerne to outline the framework of a science of signs, he calle s%mi tics. Within semiotics, 5orris istinguishe three istinct branches linguistic inquiry: / S&)ta0 the stu y of the $formal relation of signs to one another%! In other wor s, s&)ta0 is the stu y of the relationships between linguistic forms, how they are arrange in sequences an which sequences are well6forme ! *his type of stu y generally takes place without consi ering any worl of reference or any user of the forms! / S%ma)tics the stu y of $the relations of signs to the ob1ects to which the signs are applicable 2their esignata3%! "o s%ma)tics is the stu y of the relationships between linguistic forms an entities in the worl , i!e! how wor s literally connect to things! "emantic analysis also attempts to establish the relationship between verbal escription an states of affairs in the worl as accurate 2true3 or not 2i!e! false3, regar less of who pro uces that escription! In this regar , we can speak of semantics as being truth6con itional! / Pragmatics the stu y of $the relation of signs to interpreters%! 4ragmatics is the stu y of the relationships between linguistic forms an the users of those forms! In this three6part istinction, only pragmatics allows humans into the analysis! *he a vantage of stu ying language via pragmatics is that one can talk about peoples inten e meanings, their assumptions, their purposes, their goals an the kin s of actions that they are performing when they speak! 4ragmatics is concerne with the stu ying of meaning as communicate by a speaker an interprete by a listener 2or rea er3! It has more to o with the analysis of what people mean by their utterances rather than what the wor s or phrases that occur in those utterances might mean by themselves! Pragmatics is the study of speaker meaning. *his type of stu y necessarily involves the interpretation of what people mean in a particular conte(t an how the conte(t influences what is sai ! It requires a consi eration of how speakers organi7e what they inten to say in accor ance with who they are talking to, where, when an un er what circumstances! Pragmatics is the study of contextual meaning. *his branch of linguistic investigation also e(plores the way listeners make inferences about what is sai in or er to arrive at an interpretation of the speakers inten e meaning! Pragmatics is the study of how more gets communicated than is said. *he choice between what is sai an what remains unsai may be tie to the notion of istance! +loseness whether it is physical, social or conceptual implies share e(perience! *aking into account how close or istant the listener is, speakers etermine how much nee s to be sai ! Pragmatics is the study of the expression of relative distance. "ince 5orriss intro uction of the trichotomy synta(, semantics, an pragmatics, the last term has come to be use in two very istinct ways! 8irst, accor ing to the Am%rica) appr ach, pragmatics is the stu y of those relations between language an conte(t that are grammaticali7e , or enco e in the structure of language! In other wor s this approach eals with the e(pression of pragmatic relations with the help of strictly linguistic means, such as the rules of grammar operating on phonological, morphological an syntactic elements! *his is a strictly linguistically oriente efinition! "uch a scope for pragmatics woul inclu e the stu y of $%i0is an probably the stu y of pr%s!pp sit ) an sp%%ch acts. It woul e(clu e the stu y of principles of language usage that coul not be shown to have an impact on the grammar of languages! *hus the e(tremely important pragmatic concept of c )-%rsati )al implicat!r% an th% pri)cipl% ( p lit%)%ss woul lie outsi e the scope of this approach to pragmatics! )owever, such a scope for pragmatics has the a vantage of rawing a clear6cut istinction between pragmatics an neighbouring fiel s like sociolinguistics an psycholinguistics! "econ , within the C )ti)%)tal appr ach to pragmatics a theory of language as a users interest shoul rest on a theory of the user! "ince the user is a member of a particular

human society, such a theory shoul comprise everything that characteri7es the user as a person whose use of language epen s on the rules an norms that are vali at any time, in any place in the community in which he'she is living! *his is a return to the view of pragmatics espouse by 5orris that $pragmatics is about everything human in the communication process, psychological, biological an sociological%! *his efinition, which is still generally use on the +ontinent, incorporates as much societal conte(t as possible! Within this theoretical framework sociolinguistics, for instance, becomes part of pragmatics, being, as some linguists argue , applie pragmatics! In this course of lectures we shall assume, for working purposes, that pragmatics equates with a theory of language un erstan ing that takes conte(t into account, in or er to complement the contribution that semantics makes to meaning! In other wor s, pragmatics is the stu y of all those aspects of meaning not capture in a semantic theory! )owever, one ob1ection to such a efinition coul be that the scope of pragmatics woul vary accor ing to the kin of semantic theory a opte ! &t this point one shoul attempt a conceptual clarification an try to elimit the scope of pragmatics by a boun ary rawing e(ercise! *hus the upper boun of pragmatics is provi e by the bor ers of semantics an the lower boun by sociolinguistics 2an perhaps psycholinguistics, too3 9iven the ifficulties of rawing a neat ivi ing line between semantics an pragmatics, the best strategy seems to restrict semantics to truth6con itional content! 4ragmatics is meaning minus truth con itions! &s far as the lower boun is concerne , i!e! the bor er between pragmatics an sociolinguistics, here things are even more problematic! :rawing a boun ary between sociolinguistic an pragmatic phenomena is an e(tremely ifficult enterprise! ;et us consi er an instance of sociolinguistic phenomena an ask how it falls with respect to , of our efinitions of pragmatics, the most restrictive efinition 2i!e! the &merican approach3 an the broa est one 2i!e! the +ontinental approach3! +onsi er h ) ri(ics most simply e(emplifie by the polite singular pronoun of a ress in some <uropean languages 2i!e! the *'= istinction3! If we take the view that pragmatics is concerne only with grammatically enco e aspects of the conte(t, then we might propose a ti y ivision of labour between pragmatic an sociolinguistic accounts of honorifics: a! 4ragmatics woul be concerne with the meaning of honorifics 2e!g! with the specification that = enco es that the a ressee is socially istant or superior3 b! "ociolinguistics woul be concerne with the recipes for the usage of such items 2e!g! the specification that among some segment of the speech community, = is use to aunts, uncles, teachers, etc!3! If we take pragmatics to be the stu y of the contribution of conte(t to language un erstan ing, consi er what happens when an aunt that normally gives her nephew *, switches on one occasion to =! In or er to pre ict an account for the inten e ironic or angry meaning a pragmatic theory must have available the etaile recipe for usage that tells us that = is not the normal usage, an thus not to be taken at face value! "o on this broa er scope for pragmatics, pragmatic accounts of language un erstan ing will at least nee access to sociolinguistic information! It is from this point of view that we can consi er sociolinguistics to be applie pragmatics! +EI1IS ;anguage is use to refer to persons an 'or things either irectly 2i!e! irect reference6 e!g! names3 thus lea ing us to persons or things or in irectly by means of in irect reference! When using language in irectly we nee to have recourse to other linguistic as well as non6linguistic strategies in or er to establish the correct reference! +onsi er the following e(ample:

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&: Whos there? B: Its me! *he pronoun me refers to an I an any I is a speaking me! *he utterance Its me is always true but is totally uninformative when it comes to establishing the speakers i entity! *he referent of I changes with the person uttering it! <verybo y can say I an whoever says it points to another ob1ect than everybo y else! ?ust the same point coul be ma e about first6 an secon 6person pronouns we an you, about emonstratives an specific time an place a verbs like now an here, to mention 1ust a few! *hese le(ical items are referre to as deictic terms/indexical expressions or simply indexicals. *hey are a particular kin of referential e(pressions where the reference is not 1ust semantic but inclu es a reference to a particular conte(t in which the semantics is put at work! In other wor s, we shoul always refer to the conte(t if we want to establish the proper reference of eictic wor s! *hus the function of such in e(ing e(pressions is to tell us where to look for a reference! We are now in a position to efine this phenomenon! +EI1IS is a phenomenon that irectly relates an utterance to a time, place, person, an social backgroun ! <tymologically coming from the 9reek wor for pointing or in icating, it has as focal elements the use of first6 an secon 6person pronouns, emonstratives, specific time an place a verbs, tense an a variety of other grammatical features linke in a straightforwar way to the conte(t of utterance! :ei(is concerns the ways in which languages enco e or grammaticali7e features of the conte(t of utterance'speech event, as well as ways in which the interpretation of utterances epen s on the analysis of that conte(t of utterance! In the <uropean linguistic an philosophic tra itions one usually mentions the categories of person, place an time in this connection! *he e(planation for this tripartition is that all in e(ing'pointing is one by living human beings an therefore all in e(ical e(pressions have to be relate to: 6 the person who has uttere them 6 pointing in a particular place 6 an at a particular time! P%rs ) $%i0is concerns the enco ing of the role of participants in the speech event in which the utterance is elivere ! *he category first person is the grammaticali7ation of the speakers reference to himself, the secon person is the enco ing of the speakers reference to one or more a resses, the thir person is the grammaticali7ation of the speakers reference to persons an entities that are neither speakers nor a resses of the utterance in question! 8amiliar ways in which such participant6roles are enco e are the pronouns an their associate pre icate agreements as well as vocatives! In some conte(ts thir 6person pronouns are distal forms in terms of person ei(is# using a thir 6person pronoun where a secon 6person one coul be possible is a way of communicating istance, not necessarily spatial, but emotional an social istance! Plac% $%i0is concerns the enco ing of spatial locations relative to the location of the participants in the speech event! 5ost languages grammaticali7e at least a istinction between PRO1IMAL 2i!e! close to speaker3 an +ISTAL 2i!e!non6pro(imal to speaker, sometimes close to a ressee3! *his istinction is enco e in emonstratives 2this that3, eictic a verbs of place 2here there3 an in some verbs such as come an go! +ome to be ! @ come signals movement towar s the speaker' eictic centre'central place 9o to be ! @ go signals movement away from the speaker' eictic centre'central place "peakers may pro1ect themselves into other locations prior to their actually being in those locations! Ill come later @ come signals movement towar s the a ressees location

Tim% $%i0is concerns the enco ing of temporal points or spans relative to the time at which an utterance was spoken, that is relative to co ing time! *ime ei(is is grammaticali7e in the system of tenses eictic a verbs of time, such as now, yesterday, this week, last year, etc! &ll these e(pressions epen for their interpretation on knowing the relevant utterance time! If we ont know the co ing time of a note on an office oor such as: Back in an hour! we wont know if we have a short or a long wait ahea ! &part from the tra itional categories of ei(is mentione so far, pragmaticians have i entifie other categories namely $isc !rs% $%i0is2 s cial $%i0is2 %mphatic $%i0is an r%mi)$%r $%i0is! *o begin with let us consi er the case of $isc !rs% $%i0is. +isc !rs% $%i0is concerns the use of e(pressions within some utterance to refer to some portion of the iscourse that contains that utterance! e!g! I bet you havent hear this story this story refers to a forthcoming portion of iscourse !hat was the funniest story Ive ever hear @ where that refers to a prece ing portion of iscourse! :iscourse ei(is also concerns the way in which an utterance signals its relation to surroun ing te(t! 8or instance, the utterance6initial anyway in icates that the utterance that contains it is not a resse to the imme iately prece ing iscourse, but to one or more steps back! "ince iscourse unfol s in time, time6 eictic an place6 eictic e(pressions can be use to refer to portions of iscourse: in the last''ne(t chapter''paragraph in this chapter S cial $%i0is concerns the social istinctions that are relative to participant roles, particularly aspects of the social relationship hol ing between speaker an a ressees or speaker an some other referent! It is enco e throughout the morphological system in honorifics an in choices regar ing pronouns, summon forms, vocatives an titles of a ress! "o far as social ei(is is concerne there are two basic kin s of socially eictic information: relational an absolute! *he former has to o with the following relations that typically get e(presse : -! the relation between speaker an referent 2e!g! referent honorifics3# by employing referent honorifics, respect is conveye by referring to the target of respect# e!g! in the tu'vous type of istinction the referent coinci es with the a ressee ,! the relation between speaker an a ressee 2e!g! a ressee honorifics3# this relation enco es respect to the a ressee without referring to him! >! the relation between speaker an bystan er 2i!e! bystan er'au ience honorifics3 2bystan er is a cover6term for participants in au ience role an for non6participating over hearers3 @ e!g! taboo, aspects of royal honorifics A! the relation between speaker an setting @ has to o with the formality levels# although most languages are use ifferently in formal settings, in some the istinction formal vs! informal is firmly grammaticali7e in the e(istence of high an low iglossic variants! *he relations mentione in 2-3, 2,3 an 2>3 concerns relative rank an respect! *he secon type of socially eictic information is referre to as abs l!t% s cial $%i0is! It concerns 2a3 the forms reserve for certain speakers, i!e! authori7e speakers 2e! g! in *hai the morpheme khrob is a polite particle that can only be use by male speakers3 an 2b3 forms reserve for authori7e recipients 2e!g! restrictions on most titles of a ress such as "our #onour, $r President3! Emphatic $%i0is concerns the shift from that to this to show empathy an from this to that to signal emotional istance 2;yons -.BB3! 5ey 2-..>3 mentions another kin of ei(is that he calls r%mi)$%r $%i0is as in: I met this girl the other ay!

In the above utterance this girl is use to refer to a certain young la y whose i entity nee s no further intro uction because either her i entity is of no interest to the story, or her i entity is alrea y establishe in some other way! :ei(is is generally, but not invariably organi7e in an egocentric way, i!e! the speaker an I are i entical 2;evinson -.D>3! If we think of eictic e(pressions as anchore to specific points in the communicative event, then the unmarke anchorage points constituting the eictic centre are assume to be as follows: -! the central person E the speaker ,! the central time E the time at which the speaker pro uces the utterance, i!e! the co ing time >! the central place E the speakers location at utterance time A! the iscourse centre E the point which the speaker is currently at in the pro uction of his utterance C! the social centre E the speakers social status an rank, to which the status an rank of the a ressee2s3 or referents is relative )owever, eictic wor s may be use in ways that shift this eictic center to other participants! *his state of affair is referre to as deictic pro%ection 2;yons -.BB3 or shifts in point of view 28illmore3: I am going to ;on on I am coming to ;on on 5oreover in some languages istal terms can be use to istinguish between near to the a ressee an away from both the speaker an the a ressee! Distinct kinds of deictic usage :eictic e(pressions have as basic or central a eictic usage! )owever, most of these e(pressions have non6 eictic usages as well! *hus it is essential to istinguish between eictic usage an non6 eictic usage on the one han , an , within eictic usage, between gestural usage an symbolic usage! 8ollowing 8illmore 2-.B-3, we shall efine terms use in a gestural eictic way as those eictic e(pressions that can only be interprete with reference to an au io6visual6 tactical, an in general a physical, monitoring of the speech event! <(amples of in e(ical e(pressions use in a gestural eictic way woul inclu e emonstratives use with a selecting gesture, as in: !his ones genuine, but this one is a fake! or secon or thir person pronouns use with some physical in ication of the referent 2e!g! gesture or irection of ga7e3, as in: #es not the :uke, he is! #es the butler! By contrast, symbolic usages of eictic terms generally require for their interpretation only knowle ge of the basic spatio6temporal parameters of the speech event an , on some occasion, participant6role an iscourse an social parameters! *hus it is sufficient to know the location of the participants in or er to interpret: !his city is really beautiful an to know the set of potential a ressees in the situation in or er to interpret: "ou can all come with me if you like an to know when the interaction is taking place in or er to know which calen ar year is being referre to in: We cant affor a holi ay this year *o sum up, gestural usages require a moment6by6moment physical monitoring of the speech event for their interpretation, while symbolic usages make reference only to co6 or inates of the social conte(t available to participants antece ent to the utterance!

NON/+EICTIC USAGES In non6 eictic usages, the eictic terms are interprete relative to the te(t an not relative to the situation of utterance! Within non6 eictic usage we nee to istinguish between a)aph ric an ) )/a)aph ric usages! &n anaphoric usage is when some term picks out as referent the same entity or class of ob1ects that some prior term in the iscourse picke out! *hus in the following e(ample he can be interprete as referring to whoever it is that &ohn refers to: ?ohn came in an he lit the fire! )owever, as ;yons 2-.BB3 points out a eictic term may be use both anaphorically an eictically! 8or e(ample, in: I was born in 'ondon an have live there ever since !here refers back to whatever place 'ondon refers to, but at the same time contrasts with here on the eictic imension of space, locating the utterance outsi e ;on on! "imilarly, it is possible for gestural usage to combine with non6 eictic anaphoric usage: I cut a finger: this one )ere this one refers to whatever a finger refers to, but simultaneously must be accompanie by a presentation of the relevant finger! IMPLICATURE +onsi er the following problem: )ow is it that when you ask me how 5anchester Gnite i , an I reply: - *hey won you sometimes know that I am telling you that they playe brilliantly 2i!e! when they were playing in an <uropean competition3 an sometimes that they i rather poorly 2i!e! when they were playing a non6league si e in the 8& +up3? *he meaning of they won is clear: the team referre to by they score more goals than the team they were playing against! &n yet this state meaning is often less important than the other meaning that you un erstan from my utterance an I nowhere state! ;ets consi er another e(ample: the a vertisement for instant tea which, like the a vertisement for +oca6+ola, promotes its pro uct with the legen : , Its the taste By itself this statement means very little, because we are not tol what the taste is or oes! &n yet you an I un erstan it to mean that the taste is goo ! 5ore pu77ling still, when a chil comes back from school an starts his estructive 1ourney through the biscuit barrel an he is aske why he i nt eat his school inner an he replies > Its the taste we un erstan him to mean e(actly the opposite: that the taste is not goo ! )ow can the same sentence be un erstoo to convey two meanings that are e(actly the opposite of one another? Grices theory of conversational implicature In or er to solve this problem we nee first to raw a istinction between what the linguistic philosopher 4aul 9rice 2-.FB3 calle the )at!ral an ) )/)at!ral m%a)i)g 3))/m%a)i)g4 of utterances like they won! *he )at!ral m%a)i)g is that the team referre to by they score at least one goal more than the team they were playing against! Gnlike this natural meaning, the ) )/)at!ral m%a)i)g is variable an on ifferent occasions, as we have seen, coul be that the team referre to playe particularly well or only rather mo estly! *his non6natural meaning is not part of the conventional meaning of the e(pression!

9rice argue that speakers inten to be cooperative when they engage in conversation! 0ne way of being cooperative is for a speaker to give as much information as is e(pecte ! *hus an a ressee who knew that 5anchester Gnite were playing a top team in an <uropean competition might be e(pecting the speaker to say that they ha one quite well consi ering the circumstances! "ince they won woul be more than was e(pecte , it woul imply that 5anchester Gnite ha one brilliantly! +onversely, an a ressee who knew that 5anchester Gnite were playing a non6league si e might be e(pecting the speaker to say that they ha score o7ens of goals or that they ha wipe the opposition out! )earing only they won, less than might be e(pecte , the a ressee woul raw the inference that they playe rather poorly! Because they won in the first conte(t is more than the a ressee was e(pecting an in the secon less, in each case it gives rise to a non6conventional meaning which was calle by 9rice implicat!r%. 9rice coine this wor to cover any non6conventional meaning that is implie , i!e! conveye in irectly through hints an un erstoo implicitly without ever being e(plicitly state ! &ccor ing to 9rice, there is a set of assumptions which gui e the con uct of conversational e(changes an which can be formulate as gui elines for efficient an effective use of language in conversation to further cooperative en s! 9rice i entifie as gui elines of this sort four basic ma(ims of conversation which 1ointly e(press a general c p%rati-% pri)cipl%. *he cooperative principle states: Ma'% & !r c )trib!ti ) s!ch as is r%5!ir%$ at th% stag% at 6hich it acc%pt%$ p!rp s% ( th% tal' %0cha)g% i) 6hich & ! ar% %)gag%$. Within this principle, 9rice suggeste the following four ma(ims: 7!a)tit&, 2i3 5ake your contribution as informative as is require 2for the current purposes of the e(change3 2ii3 :o not make your contribution more informative than is require 7!alit&, 5ake your contribution one that is true! 2i3 :o not say what you believe to be false! 2ii3 :o not say that for which you lack a equate evi ence R%lati ), Be relevant Ma))%r, Be perspicuous 2i3 &voi obscurity of e(pression 2ii3 &voi ambiguity 2iii3 Be brief 2iv3 Be or erly )owever, people o not always follow these gui elines to the letter! When talk oes not procee accor ing to their specifications 2i!e! when they are not a here on a superficial level3, hearers assume that contrary to appearances the principles are nevertheless a here to at some eeper level! *he inferences that arise in or er to preserve the assumption of cooperation are calle by 9rice c )-%rsati )al implicat!r%. *here are at least two ways in which c )-%rsati )al implicat!r%s can be create : either by abi ing by the ma(ims, in which case we have to o with what ;evinson 2-.D>3 calls sta)$ar$ implicat!r%, or by flouting them giving thus rise to floutings or e(ploitations! 9rice further istinguishe between g%)%rali8%$ an partic!lari8%$ c )-%rsati )al implicat!r%s. G%)%rali8%$ c )-%rsati )al implicat!r%s arise irrespective of the conte(t in which they occur# in other wor s, they arise without a particular conte(t or special scenario being necessary! I walke into a house! CI, *he house is not mine! cc!rs2 b& th%

"ome people believe in 9o ! CI, /ot all people believe in 9o ! :amon )ill i well in his first season in 8ormula -! CI, )e i not win the championship! *hese utterances always give rise to the same implicature, no matter what the conte(t! Partic!lari8%$ c )-%rsati )al implicat!r%s, on the other han , are erive not from the utterance alone, but from the utterance in conte(t! *he utterance *he og is looking very happy! may implicate 4erhaps the og has eaten the roast beef if it occurs in a particular setting illustrate by: &: What on earth has happene to the roast beef? B: *he og is looking very happy? 9enerali7e conversational implicatures are inferre irrespective of the conte(t of utterance an result from the e(istence of the Huantity an 5anner 5a(ims! 4articulari7e conversational implicatures are inferre in relation to a conte(t an result from the e(istence of the 5a(im of Ielation! In both cases, however, these inferences arise from the assumption that the speaker is observing the ma(im an the +4! *hus both generali7e an particulari7e conversational implicatures can be regar e as subtypes of stan ar implicature! +onversational implicatures can also be erive on the basis of the speakers flouting or e(ploiting a ma(im 2i!e! on the speakers not abi ing by the ma(im3 as in the following e(amples where the speaker flouts the ma(im of quantity: If he oes it he oes it! CI, Its no concern of ours! War is War! CI, *errible things may happen! 8loutings or e(ploitations of the ma(im of quality give rise to irony an metaphor! C )-%)ti )al implicat!r%s, unlike conversational implicatures, are pragmatic inferences that are not erive from pragmatic inferences like the ma(ims, but are simply attache by convention to particular le(ical items! *hey are not epen ent on the conversational conte(t an cannot therefore be change by invoking another conte(t! (ut for instance has the same truth6con itional content as the con1unction and! 8rom a logical point of view the value of but in con1oining two phrases or sentences is the same as that of and 2i!e! the con1oine sentences with but have the same truth con itions as those with and: one is true in e(actly the same cases as the other3! )owever, but has an a itional conventional implicature to the effect that there is some contrast between the two con1uncts, although there is no strict universally vali law that woul impose but rather than and in any particular conte(t# in many cases the two are almost interchangeable! PRESUPPOSITION 5any of the issues that are central to the concept of presupposition were first raise by 8rege 2-D.,3 who argue that if anything is asserte there is always an obvious presupposition that the simple or compoun proper names use have a reference! If one asserts: 2-3 Jepler ie in misery there is a presupposition that the name )epler esignates something! 5oreover, he went on to say that Jepler esignates something is not part of the meaning of Jepler ie in misery# if it was then Jepler ie in misery woul have the logical form Jepler ie in misery K Jepler esignates something an thus the sentence Jepler i nt ie in misery woul be equivalent to Jepler i nt ie K the name Jepler has no reference! *hat he felt woul be absur ! *herefore Jepler esignates something is the presupposition of both Jepler ie in misery an its negative counterpart Jepler i nt ie in misery! 8rege sketches a theory of presupposition along the following lines:

Ieferring phrases an temporal clauses carry presuppositions to the effect that they o in fact refer! 2ii3 & sentence an its negative counterpart share the same set of presuppositions! 2iii3 In or er for a sentence or assertion to be true or false its presupposition must be true or satisfie ! In the early CLs "trawson istinguishe between sentences an uses of sentences to make statements that are true or false! &ccor ing to "trawson, sentences are not true or false, only statements are! )ence the statement: 2,3 *he Jing of 8rance is wise may have been true in say -FBL an false in -BBL, but in -.BL the statement cannot be sai to be either true or false# the question of its truth or falsity oes not even arise! "trawson claime that there is a special kin of relationship between *he Jing of 8rance is wise an 2>3 *here is a present Jing of 8rance namely that 2>3 is a precon ition for 2,3 being 1u geable as either true or false! )e calle this relation pr%s!pp siti ) an argue that it is a special species of inference, istinct from logical implication or entailment, a species which erives from conventions about the use of referring e(pressions! 5ore formally, he hel that a statement & presupposes a statement B iff B is a precon ition of the truth or falsity of &! 8ollowing 8rege, "trawson argue that a negative sentence, when uttere , will preserve its presuppositions! *he simplest view of semantic presupposition woul be base on the following efinition: & sentence & semantically presupposes another sentence B iff 2a3 in all situations where & is true, B is true 2b3 in all situations where & is false, B is true 8reges an "trawsons claim that presuppositions are preserve in negative sentences an statements provi es us with an operational test for i entifying presuppositions generally referre to as c )sta)c& !)$%r )%gati ). In or er to i entify the presupposition2s3, we simply take a sentence, negate it 2i!e! negate the main verb or the topmost clause in a comple( sentence3 an see what inferences survive, i!e! what inferences are share by both the positive an the negative sentence! 2A3 ?ohn manage to stop in time has the following inferences: 2C3 ?ohn stoppe in time 2F3 ?ohn trie to stop in time 8rom the of 2A3 2B3 ?ohn i nt manage to stop in time we cannot infer 2C3 since its main point is to eny 2C3! *hus on the basis of the negation test an the assumption of its sufficiency 2F3 is the presupposition of both 2A3 an 2B3# 2C3 is the entailment of 2A3! "o negation alters a sentences entailments, but it leaves its presuppositions untouche ! & semantic entailment is efinable as follows: & semantically entails B 2&MNB3 iff every situation that makes & true, makes B true i!e! in all worl s in which & is true, B is true! TYPES O9 PRESUPPOSITION -! *he %0ist%)tial pr%s!pp siti ) is assume to be present in possessive constructions: your car OO you have a car

2i3

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an more generally in any efinite noun phrase! By using any of the following e(pressions the " is assume to be committe to the e(istence of the entities name : the Jing of "we en OO the Jing of "we en e(ists the cat OO there is a cat the girl ne(t oor OO there is a girl living ne(t oor ,! *he presuppose information following a verb like know can be treate as a fact an is referre to as (acti-% pr%s!pp siti )! & number of other verbs such as reali*e, regret as well as phrases involving be an aware, odd an glad have (acti-% pr%s!pp siti )s, "he reali7e he was ill! OO )e was ill! We regret telling him! OO We tol him! Im gla that its over! OO Its over! >! *here are also other forms that may be treate as the source of l%0ical pr%s!pp siti )s. In le(ical presuppositions, the use of one form with its asserte meaning is conventionally interprete with the presupposition that another non6asserte meaning is un erstoo ! <ach time we say that someone managed to do something the asserte meaning is that the person succee e in some way! When we say that someone didnt manage the asserte meaning is that the person i nt succee ! In both cases, however, there is a presupposition 2non6 asserte 3 that the person trie to o something! "o managed is conventionally interprete as asserting succee e an presupposing trie ! 0ther e(amples of le(ical items that trigger le(ical presuppositions inclu e stop, start, again: )e stoppe smoking! OO )e use to smoke! *hey starte complaining! OO *hey werent complaining before! Pou are late again! OO Pou were late before! A! In a ition to the presuppositions associate with the use of certain wor s an phrases, we can also i entify the class of str!ct!ral pr%s!pp siti )s. In this case, certain sentence structures have been analy7e as conventionally an regularly presupposing that part of the structure is alrea y assume to be true! 8or e(ample, a wh6 interrogative construction is conventionally interprete with the presupposition that the information after the wh6 form is alrea y known to be the case! When i he leave? OO )e left! Where i you buy that book? OO Pou bought the book! Who is the professor of linguistics at 5I*? OO "omeone is the professor of linguistics at 5I*! "es/no interrogatives an alternative interrogatives presuppose the is1unction of their possible answers: Is there a professor of linguistics at 5I*? OO <ither there is a professor of linguistics at 5I* or there isnt! Is /ewcastle in <nglan or is it in &ustralia? OO/ewcastle is in <nglan or /ewcastle is in &ustralia! "o far we have consi ere conte(ts in which presuppositions are assume to be true! *here are, however, instances of ) )/(acti-% pr%s!pp siti )s associate with a number of verbs such as dream, imagine, pretend, etc! *hese verbs are use with the presupposition that what follows is not true! I reamt that I was rich! OO I was not rich! We imagine we were in )awaii! OO We were not in )awaii! )e preten s to be ill! OO )e is not ill! "econ type if6 clauses are associate with c !)t%r/(act!al pr%s!pp siti )s, meaning that what is presuppose is not only not true, but is the opposite of what is true, i!e! it is contrary to facts! If you were my frien , you woul have helpe ! OO Pou are not my frien !

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&ssociate with these types of presuppositions are various wor s or aspects of surface structure in general! *hese presupposition6generating linguistic items are referre to as pr%s!pp siti ) trigg%rs. *he following list inclu es various types of presupposition triggers: a! +%(i)it% $%scripti )s ?ohn saw the man with two heads! OO *here e(ists a man with two hea s! b! 9acti-% -%rbs 5artha regrets going to ?ohns party! OO 5artha went to ?ohns party! ?ohn was aware that 5artha was at home! OO 5artha was at home! ?ohn reali*ed that he was in ebt! OO ?ohn was in ebt! It was odd how prou he was! OO )e was prou ! 8urther factive verbs inclu e: know, be sorry/indifferent/sad/glad Q that6 clause! c! Implicati-% -%rbs ?ohn managed to open the oor! OO ?ohn trie to open the oor! ?ohn forgot to post the letter! OO ?ohn ought to have poste the letter' inten e to post the letter! ! Cha)g% ( stat% -%rbs ?ohn stopped beating his chil ren! OO ?ohn ha been beating his chil ren! ?oan began to beat her husban ! OO ?oan ha nt been beating her husban ! Bush continued to rule the worl ! OO Bush ha been ruling the worl ! 8urther change of state verbs: start, finish, carry on, cease, leave, enter, arrive, come. e! It%rati-%s *he flying saucer came again. OO *he flying saucer came before! +linton returned to power! OO +linton hel power before! 8urther iteratives: another time, come back, repeat. f! T%mp ral cla!s%s (efore "trawson was even born, 8rege notice presuppositions! OO "trawson was born! +hile +homsky was revolutioni7ing linguistics, the rest of social science was asleep! OO +homsky was revolutioni7ing linguistics! ,ince +hurchill ie weve lacke a lea er! OO +hurchill ie ! -s ?ohn was getting up, he slippe ! OO ?ohn was getting up! g! N )/r%stricti-% r%lati-% cla!s%s )illary, who climbed .verest in /012, was the greatest e(plorer of our ay! OO )illary climbe <verest in -.C>! "o far we have ealt with semantic presuppositions! )owever, no semantic theory of presupposition is likely to be viable! &ny purely semantic approach to presupposition is unsatisfactory since it cannot account for statements like the following )e ie before he ma e a will as oppose to )e suffere a series of illnesses before he ma e a will OO )e ma e a will #e died before he made a will oes not presuppose #e made a will! +learly what we know about the worl will not be consistent with assuming that later he ma e a will! In this case the presupposition is an inference we raw as a result of bringing together a linguistic form an an un erstan ing of the worl ! PRAGMATIC PRESUPPOSITION Imagine someone says: *ell 5a onna Im at lunch

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*here woul nt be much point in saying this unless the " e(pecte 5a onna to appear in the near future an assume that the ) knew who 5a onna was an was willing to pass the message on! Gnless these con itions are met there is something wrong with 23! We can therefore assume that these con itions are presuppose ! *ell 5a onna Im at lunch OO 5a onna is likely to appear soon ) knows who she is ) will pass the message on *his sort of backgroun assumption will be calle pragmatic pr%s!pp siti ) because it is clearly relate to the conte(t of utterance! !ell $adonna Im at lunch also presupposes !here is such a person as $adonna# this presupposition is not relate to the conte(t of utterance, it is therefore conventional! +onventional or semantic presuppositions are triggere by le(ical or structural items! 4ragmatic presuppositions are non6conventional in the sense that they are not etermine by a linguistic item alone, but by a combination of a linguistic item an what we know about the worl ! Both conventional an pragmatic presuppositions share a common feature, namely they both prece e working out the implicature which in this case is that the person who left the message is an(ious to avoi 5a onna!

THE THEORY O9 SPEECH ACTS In a series of lectures given in -.CC an later publishe un er the title #ow to 3o !hings with +ords, &ustin attacke the octrine of l gical p siti-ism which flourishe in the >Ls! &ccor ing to logical positivism, unless a sentence can be teste for its truth or falsity, it was strictly speaking meaningless! *hus accor ing to this octrine, most ethical, aesthetic an literary iscourses, not to mention most every ay utterances were meaningless! &ustin argue that some or inary language eclarative sentences, contrary to logical positivist assumptions, are not use with any intention of making true or false statements! *hese sentences are not use to escribe states of affaires, but are rather actively use to do things! &ustin refers to these special sentences an the utterances reali7e by them as p%r( rmati-%s. P%r( rmati-%s, unlike c )stati-%s which can be assesse in terms of truth or falsity, cannot be true or false! )owever, they can go wrong i!e! they can be !)happ& or i)(%licit !s! If someone says I christen this ship Hueen <lisabeth he may not succee in so christening the vessel, if, for instance, it is alrea y name otherwise or his not the appointe namer or there are no witnesses or bottles of champagne! 4erformatives have to meet certain con itions if they are to succee or be happy! &ustin refers to these con itions as (%licit& c )$iti )s an istinguishes the following three categories: &! 2i3 *here must be a conventional proce ure having a conventional effect! 2ii3 *he circumstances an persons must be appropriate, as specifie in the proce ure! B! *he proce ure must be e(ecute 2i3 correctly an 2ii3 completely! +! *he person must have the requisite thoughts, feelings an intentions as specifie in the proce ure, an if consequent con uct is specifie then the relevant parties must so o! =iolations of these con itions are all of equal status! =iolations of & an B give rise to mis(ir%s i!e! the inten e actions fail to come off an consequently the act is voi as in the following e(amples 6 the clergyman bapti7ing the wrong baby or the right baby with the wrong name 2violation of &3#

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the absence of an uptake in the case of bets i!e! the proce ure is not carrie out completely 2violation of B3 =iolations of + con itions are ab!s%s! *he act is not voi , but it is infelicitous! In other wor s the action is performe but infelicitously or insincerely! <(amples inclu e insincerities, promising to o something without having the intention of oing so! 0n the basis of these observations &ustin argues that 6 some sentences, performatives, are special: uttering them :0<" things an oes not merely say things i!e! report states of affairs# 6 these performative sentences achieve their correspon ing actions because there are specific +0/=</*I0/" linking the wor s to institutional proce ures# 6 unlike constatives, which can be assesse in terms of truth or falsity, performatives can only be assesse as felicitous or infelicitous accor ing to whether their felicity con itions are met or not! :rawing the istinction between p%r( rmati-%s an constatives allows &ustin to characteri7e the former as (irst p%rs ) i)$icati-% acti-% s%)t%)c%s i) th% simpl% pr%s%)t t%)s%. +onsi er the following e(amples I bet you C poun s it will rain tomorrow as oppose to I am betting youR!! I bette you!! )e bets youR! 0nly the first one is a performative, the others are constatives! )owever, there are plenty of other uses of first person in icative sentences in the simple present that can be sai in emonstration, as a report of a concurrent action: I now beat the eggs till fluffy "o &ustin makes use of another criterion in or er to isolate performatives alone! )e argues that only performative usage can co6occur with the a verb hereby an thus one can isolate the performative verbs by seeing whether they will take the a verb hereby! *hus performative utterances are i entifiable because they have the form of first person, in icative active sentences in the simple present with one of a elimite set of performative verbs as the main verb, which will collocate with the a verb hereby! )owever, the following performative utterance I hereby warn you can be e(presse equally well as: Pou are hereby warne I fin you guilty of oing it Pou i it 9uiltyS 5oreover, performative verbs can be use non6performatively, performative utterances may contain no verb at all, utterances evincing the properties that are sai to be characteristic of performatives, are not necessarily performative as in: &: )ow o you get me to throw all these parties? B: I promise to come! In view of all these problems, &ustin eventually re1ects what he proposes at the beginning! 8irst, there is a shift from the view that performatives are a special class of sentences with peculiar syntactic an pragmatic properties to the view that there is a general class of performative utterances that inclu e both %0plicit p%r( rmati-%s 2the ol familiar class3 an implicit p%r( rmati-%s or primar& p%r( rmati-%s, the latter inclu ing lots of other kin s of utterances, if not all! *hus there is a shift from the ichotomy performative vs! constative to a general theory of speech acts in which constatives are 1ust particular members of a special sub6 case!

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<(plicit performatives such as I hereby warn you are seen as a relatively speciali7e way of being unambiguous or specific about what act one is performing in speaking! Instea one can employ implicit p%r( rmati-%s that make recourse to less e(plicit evices like: 6 m $ as in: "hut itS @ instea of I or er you to shut it 6 a$-%rbs Ill be there without fail @ instea of I promise Ill be there 6 particl%s *herefore T @ instea of I conclu e that T 6 i)t )ati ) to istinguish between a warning a question or a protest in Its going to charge &n important feature of implicit performatives, accor ing to &ustin, is that in principle any implicit performative can be put into the form of an e(plicit performative! Initially &ustin claime that the only kin s of utterances that are not oing actions as well as, or instea of reporting facts or events are stat%m%)ts:c )stati-%s! ;ater in his course of lectures, however, &ustin re1ects the ichotomy between perfomatives an constatives, arguing that there is no incompatibility between utterances being truth6bearers an simultaneously performing actions! *he utterance: I warn the og will bite seems simultaneously to perform the action of warning an to issue a pre iction, which can later be assesse as true or false! 5oreover, he argue that presupposition failure, in the omain of constatives plays the same role as felicity con itions o in the case of perforamatives! &ustin conclu es that the istinction between statements, as truth6bearers, an performatives, as action6performers, can no longer be maintaine ! & statement such as I am alone can be put into the form of an e(plicit performative as in: I state that I am alone *hus statements or constative are merely a special case of performatives! &ll utterances, in a ition to conveying a certain meaning, perform specific actions, through having specific ( rc%s! &ustin isolates three basic senses in which in saying something one is oing something, an hence three kin s of acts that are simultaneously performe : 2i3 th% l c!ti )ar& act2 having a l c!ti )ar& m%a)i)g2 can be efine as the utterance of a sentence with a specific sense an reference! 2ii3 th% ill c!ti )ar& act2 having an ill c!ti )ar& ( rc% is the making of a statement, offer, promise, etc!, in uttering a sentence by virtue of the conventional force associate with it, or with its e(plicit performative paraphrase! 2iii3 th% p%rl c!ti )ar& act2 having a p%rl c!ti )ar& %((%ct, is the bringing about of effects on the au ience by means of uttering the sentence! *o take an e(ample, in the following utterance uttere by a husban to his wife at a party Its getting late the l c!ti )ar& m%a)i)g of the utterance is a simple reference to the lateness of the hour# the ill c!ti )ar& ( rc% of the act, which constitutes a suggestion or a proposal, is equivalent to saying ;ets go home now# the p%rl c!ti )ar& %((%ct may be that of persua ing the a ressee to perform the suggeste action! &ustin argues that the locutionary act an the illocutionary act are etachable an therefore the stu y of meaning may procee in epen ently but is necessarily supplemente by a theory of illocutionary acts! 5ore troublesome is the istinction between the illocutionary act an the perlocutionary act! *he following e(amples of his will in icate how he inten it to apply: "hoot herS

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in appropriate circumstances has the illocutionary force of, variously, ordering, urging, advising the a ressee to shoot her, but the perlocutionary effect of persuading, forcing or frightening the a ressee into shooting her! Pou cant o thatS )as the illocutionary force protesting an the perlocutionary effect of, say, checking the a ressees action, or bringing him into his senses or even annoying him! &ustin suggests the following operational test that helps us istinguish between the illocutionary an the perlocutionary acts: if the hypothetical illocutionary force can be paraphrase as an e(plicit performative, then the act performe is an illocutionary act# if this is not possible , then the act performe is a perlocutionary act! &ustins work has given rise to many theories regar ing speech acts, the most significant of which being "earles ta(onomy 2-.BB3! )is classification system lists five types of illocutionary acts, characteri7e as follows: R%pr%s%)tati-%s:ass%rti-%s @ represent a state of affairs# they have a 6 r$/t /6 rl$ irection of fit, i!e! the intention is to make the wor s fit the worl # the psychological state e(presse is a b%li%(, in which any proposition can occur# characteristic performative verbs that help us i entify the illocutionary force, an therefore referre to as illocutionary force in icating evices, inclu e: claim, assert, report, confirm. confess, etc. # e!g! @ statements# they carry the value true or false: they shoul match the worl in or er to be true# their illocutionary point is to commit the " to something being the case, to the truth of the e(presse proposition! +ir%cti-%s irect the a ressee towar s oing something, i!e! they get the ) to o some volitional act# they a 6 rl$/t /6 r$ irection of fit, i!e! the worl is a apte to the uttere wor s 2they make the worl fit wor s via the hearer3# the psychological state e(presse : a wish, a esire# e(amples of irectives inclu e or ers, wishes# performative verbs: ask, order, command, implore, beg, challenge, etc. C mmisi-%s are those kin s of "&s that speakers use to commit themselves to some future action# they have a 6 rl$/t /6 r$ irection of fit, i!e! they make the worl fit wor s via the speaker# the psychological state e(presse : an intention 2they e(press what the speaker inten s3# e(amples of commisives inclu e promises, threats, refusals, ple ges, etc!# performative verbs: promise, swear, vow, etc. E0pr%ssi-%s are those kin s of "&s that state what the speaker feels! *hey e(press a wi e range of psychological states an can be likes, islikes, statements of pleasure, pain, 1oy, sorrow! *hey have no irection of fit# e(amples of e(pressives inclu e congratulations, con olences, etc!# performative verbs: thank, congratulate, apologi*e, condole, etc. +%clarati )s are those kin s of "&s that change the worl via their utterance! *hey correspon to &ustins original class of performatives 2i!e! e(plicit performatives3! *hey e(press no psychological state# they heavily rely on e(tralinguistic conventions: the speaker has to have a special institutional role, in a specific conte(t in or er to perform a eclaration felicitously# they have two irections of fit: 6 r$/t /6 rl$ 2make wor s fit the worl 3 an 6 rl$/t /6 r$ 2make the worl fit wor s i!e! wor s change the worl 3# e(amples of eclarations inclu e e(communication, christening, etc!# performative verbs: declare, bapti*e, name, appoint, elect, pronounce, etc. IN+IRECT SPEECH ACTS & ifferent approach to istinguishing types of speech acts can be ma e on the basis of structure! & fairly simple structural istinction between three general types of speech acts is provi e , in <nglish, by the three basic sentence types! *here is an easily recogni7able relationship between the three structural forms 2 eclarative, interrogative, imperative3 an the three general communicative functions 2statement, question, comman 'request3 as in: Pou wear a seat belt! 2 eclarative @ statement3

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:o you wear a seat belt? 2interrogative @ question 3 Wear a seat beltS 2imperative @ comman 3 Whenever there is a irect relationship between a structure an a function, we have a irect speech act! Whenever there is an in irect relationship between a structure an a function, we have an in irect speech act! *hus a eclarative use to make a statement is a irect "&, but a eclarative use to make a request is an I"&! *he utterance: Its col outsi e is a eclarative when it is use to make a statement, being paraphrase as I hereby tell you about the weather it is functioning as a irect "&! When it is use to make a request'comman , in which case it can be paraphrase as I hereby request of you that you close the oor, it is functioning as an I"&! :ifferent structures can be use to accomplish the same basic function as in the following e(ample where the " wants the ) not to stan in front of the *=: 5ove out the wayS :o you have to stan in front of the *=? Poure stan ing in front of the *=! Pou make a better oor than a win ow! &n in irect speech act is an illocutionary act that is performe subor inately to another 2literal3 illocutionary act! It is in irect in the sense that its success is tie to the success of the first act! *hus the a ressee shoul correctly i entify the first act 2i!e! the irect'literal act3 if he wants to interpret the in irect speech act felicitously! *he speakers primary illocutionary intent is that of the in irect speech act! )is secon ary illocutionary intent is that of the act literally associate with the particular sentence form! In irect speech acts are also base on the mechanism of conversational implicature! *here will be an inferential chain linking the literal an the in irect speech acts! *he first step within this inferential chain is to notice that the literal illocutionary force is not relevant enough un er the circumstances! +onsi er the following utterance: +an you pass the salt? In uttering it the speaker is performing two speech acts: the literal act an the in irect speech act! Interrogative sentences are use to formulate questions, which in their turn are requests for information! In our e(ample the information is about the ability of the ) to pass the salt an the relevant answers are yes, I can or no, I cant! *his is the irect'literal act such an utterance is oing! )owever, this is not the speakers primary illocutionary intent! *he inten e meaning'interpretation is that of an in irect speech act, i!e! a request for action or a irective the e(plicit performative being I request of you to pass the salt! In or er to arrive at the interpretation inten e by the speaker we nee to raw a series of inferences! *his inferential chain inclu es the following steps: -3 " coul not be merely asking whether I 2the a ressee3 have the ability to pass the salt because it is mutually believe that the answer is yes# so the question will be irrelevant, it will flout the ma(im of relevance an it will also sin against the ma(im of quality by breaching the sincerity con ition associate with yes'no questions, namely " oes not know an he sincerely wants to know whether something is or is not the case! ,3 "ince " is believe to be cooperative 2he is believe to be abi ing by the +43 than there is another illocutionary act that he is performing an that links the circumstances to asking whether I 2the a ressee3 have the ability to pass the salt, such that in asking this question " is performing that act! 2a3 & preparatory con ition for any irective is )s 2the a ressees3 ability to perform the act pre icate , in this case passing the salt!

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2b3 *herefore " has aske me a question, the affirmative answer to which woul entail that the preparatory con ition for requesting me the salt is satisfie 2c3 "ince " has allu e to the satisfaction of a preparatory con ition for a request, then it is likely that he wants me to bring about the obe ience con itions for that request! *hus applying this line of reasoning we reach the conclusion that: >3 " is asking me 2)3 whether I have the ability to pass the salt an is thereby requesting me 2)3 to pass him the salt! +onsi er the following statement which can be use as an apology! 0nly the erivation of the in irect speech act is iscusse : I shoul never have one that! -3 " coul not be merely stating that " shoul never have one that! Because it is mutually believe by " an ) that the act affecte ) in some negative way, that " shoul not o such things! "o " is not conveying information an woul be violating the ma(im of quantity! ,3 "ince " is believe to be cooperative, there is another illocutionary act that " is performing an that links the circumstances to stating that one shoul never have one that act, such that in stating that one shoul never have one that act, " coul also be performing a secon act! >3 " is stating that " shoul never have one that an thereby apologi7ing for having one it! Basis for this inference: it is mutually believe that people often regret oing things they believe they shoul not have one! *herefore "s primary illocutionary intent un er these circumstances is to apologi7e for oing &! ;ibli graph& A!sti)2 <. 3=>?@42 #ow to 3o !hings with +ords, 2,n e n!3, +lare on 4ress ;r 6)2 P. a)$ L%-i)s )2 S. 3=>A?42 Politeness4 some universals in language usage +ambri ge Gniversity 4ress! +a-is2 S. 3=>>=42 Pragmatics. - Reader, 0(for Gniversity 4ress Gr%%)2 G. 3=>>B42 Pragmatics and 5atural 'anguage 6nderstanding, 78 nd edn9, ;awrence <rlbaum &ssociates, Inc! 4ublishers L%%ch2 G. 3=>AC42 Principles of Pragmatics, ;ongman L%-i)s )2 S. 3=>AC42 Pragmatics, +ambri ge Gniversity 4ress M%&2 <. 3=>>C42 Pragmatics4 -n Introduction, Blackwell S%arl%2 <. .xpression and $eaning. ,tudies in the !heory of ,peech -cts, +ambri ge Gniversity 4ress Sp%rb%r2 +. D Wils )2 +. 3=>AB42 Relevance4 :ommunication and :ognition, Blackwell

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