Week 7 Advertising ethics

1. Introduction

This week well deal with criticisms of the advertising industry. According to these criticisms, advertising is of no value, or is even harmful. Such criticisms are very broad; they do not focus on particular adverts, or particular kinds of adverts, but rather on advertising in general.

I have not mentioned further readings for this week; the goal is to focus on the four pieces in the course reader, and to identify and evaluate their arguments.

2. General critiques of advertising

oncerns about advertising in general include concerns about the methods of advertisers and the effects that these methods have on us.

The methods of advertising are sometimes said to be undesirable because they do not honestly present the features of the product. Take !puffery, for instance, which Arrington describes as !the practice by a seller of making e"aggerated, highly fanciful or suggestive claims about a product or service. #$% As Arrington points out, puffery is a common and highly successful advertising techni&ue. 'owever, we might suspect that puffery is wrong, since it describes the product or service misleadingly.

The effects of advertising ( its influences on our desires and actions ( are sometimes said to be undesirable because advertising leads us to ac&uire desires that are irrational, or not truly our own, or that are in some other way ob)ectionable.

*e will consider some well+known literature that fleshes out these ob)ections and offers responses to them.

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,irst, though, it is worth asking why general criticisms of advertising matter. -ven if the charges are well+founded ( i.e. even if advertising in general is problematic ( what will the practical conse&uences be. It is one thing to argue that some aspect of advertising is problematic; such an argument might stimulate a reform in that aspect of the industry. /ut #one might say% to argue that advertising in general is ob)ectionable is pointless, because the industry is not going to go away.

0ne response to this argument1 even if a practice is so well+established that there is no significant chance of removing it, it is still important to consider whether this practice is valuable, as this will inform our attitude towards it and the e"tent to which we associate with it. ,or instance, if I decide that the advertising industry is deeply morally dubious, I may decide against a career in it.

The general criticisms and responses well consider are1 2albraiths claim that the desires produced in us by advertising are not worth satisfying, and 'ayeks response. Arringtons list of potential charges against advertising ( that it destroys our autonomy, makes us irrational, etc. ( and his replies to all these charges. 3evitts vigorous defence of advertising against the claim that its elaborations and distortions are undesirable.

3. Galbraiths De endence !ffect

In The Affluent Society #4567; 8ula contains a short but challenging e"tract from the third edition of 459:%, the economist ;.<. 2albraith holds that in a society where peoples basic needs are satisfied, the production of new goods and services must be accompanied by the production of a desire for them. 0therwise, there would be no market for these goods. 'ow can producers generate these desires. ,or this, they turn to the advertising industry. 4 The
central function of advertising is !to create desires ( to bring into being wants that previously did not e"ist. #4=5% *hile !>a? man who is hungry need never be told of his need for food #4$4%, a

more affluent person may need prompting to want an i@ad.

2albraiths claim is that the desire for goods in an affluent society depends on the production of these goods. 'ad the goods not been produced, then they would not have been advertised, ,or 2albraith, another source of desires for new goods is social values. If a society places a special value on new products #because, for instance, they are seen as better than the old%, then the mere production of a new item will generate a desire for it. Since we are focusing on advertising rather than social values, we will not pursue this point.
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so would have been no desire for them. 2albraiths term for the dependence of desire on production is !the Aependence -ffect.

*hen we reflect on the Aependence -ffect, according to 2albraith, we should see that the desire for such goods is not !urgent; by this, he means that the desire is not worth satisfying. The reason is that the source of the desire is not in people themselves, but rather in the producers #or more precisely, in the advertisements for the producers goods%. !If the individuals wants are to be urgent, they must be original with himself. They cannot be urgent if they must be contrived for him. #4=:%

Thus, for 2albraith, the advertising industry performs a worthless activity. It stimulates desires in us that are not urgent ( not worth satisfying ( precisely because they do not originate with us.

The economist ,riedrich 'ayek responds, in a brief and elegant article, by attacking a crucial feature of 2albraiths position1 his notion of an urgent desire. ,or 2albraith, a desire that is urgent, i.e. worth satisfying, must originate in oneself, and not be contrived by e"ternal influences. In response, 'ayek suggests that desires which originate in ourselves include only our desires for food, shelter and se". All our other wants, such as the desires for art and literature, are e"cluded. ,or instance, the desire for literature does not originate in us, independently of e"ternal influences; it is one goal of education to stimulate this desire in us. If we accept that the category of desires originating in ourselves is inade&uate to contain all the desires worth satisfying, then we must re)ect 2albraiths position.

Is 'ayeks criticism convincing. In the reflections below, I shall try to defend 2albraiths views by e"ploring them in a little more detail than 2albraith provides, but will ultimately fail; this seems to confirm the strength of 'ayeks argument.

Becall 2albraiths remark1 !If the individuals wants are to be urgent, they must be original with himself. They cannot be urgent if they must be contrived for him. Suppose we e"plicitly distinguish ( as 2albraith does not ( between two claims that 2albraith seems to accept1

Cy desire for D is urgent ( i.e. worth satisfying ( if and only if it1 #i% #ii% originates in me. # all this the self-origination claim.% does not result from someone elses contrivance. # all this the non-contrivance claim.%

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As 'ayek indicates, the self+origination claim is difficult to sustain. 2albraith does not e"plain e"plicitly what is meant by a self+originating desire #and neither does 'ayek%, but a natural interpretation is that it is a desire that I have formed without any influence from my environment. 'ow am I to identify such desires. *ell, if I have formed a desire without influence from my environment, then presumably I would also have had that desire had my environment been completely different. Thus, it seems that one way to identify self+ originating desires is to consider which desires people tend to have no matter what their environments are.

If this is our approach, then the desire for food would presumably count as self+originating, since #nearly% everyone wants food, no matter what their environment #though of course what food they want ( their more detailed desires ( would be influenced by their particular society%. 'owever, the desire for literature would not count as self+originating, since the production of fiction and the desire to read it is not a feature of all societies; clearly, then, this desire is influenced to some e"tent by ones environment. In short, if 2albraith retains the self+origination claim, then it seems that 'ayek is right to say that he admits far too narrow a range of desires as worth fulfilling.

*hat if 2albraith were to abandon the self+origination claim while still asserting the non+ contrivance claim. ontrivance is sometimes associated with morally dubious &ualities, such as cunning or manipulation. 'ence, the non+contrivance claim seems not to prohibit all kinds of e"ternal influence, but only those which are morally inappropriate. If that is 2albraiths position, then the non+contrivance claim amounts to the position that my desire for D is worth satisfying if and only if it does not result from the morally inappropriate influence of others. 2albraith may then be able to distinguish between the desire for literature and the desire for the latest electronic gadget1 the former has been stimulated by an appropriate social influence #in this case, education%, while the latter has merely been contrived, i.e. stimulated by a morally inappropriate influence #in this case, advertising%.

'owever, to substantiate this view, 2albraith would have to provide much more argument than he has done. ,irstly, he would need to provide a plausible distinction between morally appropriate and inappropriate social influences. Secondly, his distinction would need to imply that all advertising falls into the morally inappropriate category. 'e has not begun to perform these tasks.

Coreover, 2albraith could not simply assume that advertising is a morally inappropriate influence. Becall that he seeks to conclude that advertising is worthless. If he were to assume that advertising is morally inappropriate, then his assumption might be so similar to his conclusion that he would risk begging the &uestion, i.e. assuming what he seeks to conclude.

In short, it seems that neither the self+origination claim nor the non+contrivance claim is acceptable. The self+origination claim admits too few desires as worth satisfying, while the
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non+contrivance claim is either unsubstantiated or #nearly% &uestion+begging. 'ence, since these claims are all that 2albraith makes, it seems that his position is implausible.

*ell now turn to Arringtons discussion of general ob)ections to advertising. It is a natural progression1 the discussion of 2albraiths position raised the &uestion of whether we can identify a category of morally unacceptable influences into which advertising might fall, and Arringtons discussion will e"plore this &uestion. In the ne"t section, I will e"plain Arringtons views; in section 6, I will comment on them.

". Arrington on four otential ob#ections

Arrington identifies four potentially tempting ways to ob)ect to the advertising industry in general. 'e aims to show that all these ob)ections fail. ,or each potential ob)ection, his techni&ue is to analyse that ob)ection and then show that while the ob)ection may apply to some advertising, it does not apply to all advertising.

/elow are the four ob)ections, each followed by Arringtons analysis and response. #Arrington does regard his own analyses as incomplete and tentative, but since these are what he offers, we will consider them.%

Advertising produces desires in us that are not autonomous

*hat is an autonomous desire, i.e. a desire that is truly my own. Arrington takes his notion of autonomy from the philosopher 'arry ,rankfurt. ,rankfurt distinguishes between a first order desire and a second order desire, i.e. wanting D versus wanting to want D. ,rankfurts view is that a persons first order desire is autonomous when it conforms to her second order desires ( i.e. that her wanting D is autonomous when she also wants to want D ( and otherwise it is not autonomous. 'is idea is that autonomy involves conformity to a higher+ order desire, while non+autonomy involves non+conformity.

,or instance, suppose I am in training for a race, and trying to adopt an attitude of wanting only healthy foods. Eet I am tormented by the desire for a slice of chocolate cake. In this situation, I have a first order desire for the cake1 I want that slice. /ut I do not want to want the cake; rather, what I would like is to desire only healthy foods. So my first order desire for the cake does not conform to my second order desires. Thus, on ,rankfurts account, my desire for the cake is not autonomous. And this may seem intuitive, since my desire for the cake torments me; I do not want to have this desire.
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/y contrast, suppose I am trying to want only healthy foods, and in fact I feel like a plate of lentils. Then ( since lentils are healthy ( my desire for the lentils conforms to my second order desire to want healthy food, and is therefore autonomous on ,rankfurts account. Again, this seems intuitive, since I wholly identify with this desire, and am satisfied to have it; it seems appropriate to say that it is truly my desire.

0n ,rankfurts account of autonomy, some desires ac&uired from advertising will be autonomous, and some will not be. To see this, imagine that I ac&uire the desires in the two e"amples ( for cake and for lentils( from watching adverts on T8. The first desire ac&uired as a result of advertising will not be autonomous, but the second desire will be. Thus, it is false that advertising in general produces desires in us that are not autonomous.

Advertising produces irrational desires in us

*hat is it to have a rational desire for a product D. 0ne might think that my desire for D is rational if, in full knowledge of the features of D, I desire D. Such circumstances would ensure that my desire is not based on ignorance of D. /ut Arrington points out that this is too strict a criterion. /ecause we are always ignorant of a product to some e"tent, this criterion would never allow us to have a rational desire for D.

In an attempt to be more moderate, Arrington proposes an account of rational desire that is relative to the interests of the individual1 my desire for D is rational if, in the knowledge of those features of D that I regard as relevant, I desire D. 0n this account, some of my desires ac&uired from advertising will not be rational, but some will be. Suppose I want to buy a motorcycle, and Im interested in #a% its engine capacity and #b% whether itll make me look attractive. If I see an advert for the motorcycle and Im so e"cited by its sleekness and capacity to make me attractive that I want it, despite not knowing its engine capacity, then I have ac&uired an irrational desire from advertising. /ut if I first check the engine details #on the advert or elsewhere% before desiring the motorbike, then my desire is rational. So it would be wrong to say that advertising in general produces irrational desires.

Choices that we make as a result of advertising are not free

*hat is it to choose freely. ,or Arrington, to choose D freely is to be able to cite a reason for doing D. Someone who does D despite not being able to provide any reason for it seems to be acting unfreely1 such a person is yielding to an impulse, rather than making a free choice.

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0n this account, some choices as a result of advertising will be free, while some will not. Suppose I watch an advert for a lawnmower, and as a result I buy the mower. Aid I do so freely. *ell, what do I say when asked to )ustify my purchase. If I can give a reason for my purchase #!I need a lawnmower, and this seemed like a good one%, then I have indeed acted freely. If I can think of no reason #!'m...I already have a lawnmower, and I cant see why this one would be any better...I dont really know% then I have acted unfreely, purely on an impulse stimulated by the advert.

Advertisers control us

Spookily, some people maintain that adverts control our actions. *hat is it for one person to control anothers action. Arringtons position is this1

!A person if?1 #4% #=% #$%

controls the behaviour of another person @ iff >an abbreviation for !if and only

intends @ to act in a certain way A; s intention is causally effective in bringing about A; and intends to ensure that all of the necessary conditions of A are satisfied.= #49$%

To take an e"ample of control, on this account1 suppose ynthia captures @ablo and works for months, brainwashing him to assassinate someone. ynthia manages to convince @ablo that this person deserves to die, manages to remove all of @ablos scruples against killing people, gives him confidence that she can do it, trains him in effective assassination techni&ues, and removes all other obstacles to the assassination. *hen @ablo actually does the deed, it seems right to say that ynthia has controlled him.

Teaching a philosophy class, by contrast, does not amount to controlling the students. If I intend you to learn something about #say% 2albraith, then even if you do so as a result of my intention, I have not controlled you, on Arringtons account. This is because his condition #$% is not fulfilled1 I have not tried to ensure that all obstacles to your learning are removed. As your lecturer, I do not, for instance, pay you to give up your demanding part+time )ob so that you can focus on your studies, or terminate any emotionally draining relationships you might have.

Caybe Arringtons phrase !intends to would be best omitted. Surely a person who controls me is one who does ensure that the conditions described in #$% are satisfied. Someone who intends to ensure the satisfaction of these conditions but fails to do so may well be a controlling sort of person, but she has not actually controlled me.
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Cost, if not all, advertisements would also fall short of control on Arringtons account. I may see a movie as a result of seeing an advert for it, but the advert does not aim to remove all obstacles to my seeing the movie #busy schedule, financial constraints, etc.%.

". Arrington on four otential ob#ections

*hat shall we say about Arringtons approach. 'ere are three useful considerations1 Accuracy. Arrington analyses four key concepts that might be used in general criticisms of advertising. Are all his analyses plausible. Applicability. Cight Arringtons analyses ( at least, those which are plausible ( be useful in conte"ts other than the evaluation of general charges against advertising. Completeness. Is there some other general criticism, not considered by Arrington, that might be levelled against advertising.

-ach will be considered below ( the first at some length, and the others very briefly.

Accuracy

/elow are ob)ections to Arringtons notions of autonomy and rational desires.

To begin with autonomy1 is it the case that a first+order desire of mine is autonomous if and only if it conforms to a second order desire of mine. Caybe not. *e can try to rebut this claim in two ways1 by considering #i% a first order desire that is autonomous despite not conforming to a second order desire, and #ii% a first order desire that is not autonomous despite conforming to a second order desire.

-"ample of #i%1 Ive always loved art ( my desire to paint feels like an e"pression of my true self ( but my parents tell me that law is the appropriate path for me. I am a dutiful child, eager to obey them wholeheartedly ( I want to want to be a lawyer ( and yet I dont actually want to be a lawyer, but an artist. Then, we might think, my first order desire is autonomous ( it is truly mine ( though it fails to conform to my second order desire.

-"ample of #ii%1 onsider 2eorge 0rwells novel 19 !. The main character, *inston Smith, rebels against a totalitarian state and its leader, /ig /rother. 'e is caught, and tortured and
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brainwashed until he becomes a true believer. /y the end of the book, *inston accepts that he loves /ig /rother ( and hence, to put the point in !desire talk, that he wants /ig /rother to thrive, wants /ig /rother to defeat enemy nations, etc. Coreover, it seems that *inston desires to have all these desires too; no part of him rebels against them. Still, we might think that *instons first order desires, despite their perfect conformity to his second order desires, are not autonomous.

Fow for rational desire. Becall that according to Arrington, my desire for D is rational if, in the knowledge of those features of D that I regard as relevant, I desire D. This analysis is acceptable only if we are prepared to accept an account of rational desire so strongly relative to the beliefs of the individual who has the desire that even a person who is deluded about D can have a rational desire for it. -"ample1 I believe that owning a :/ pencil #the darkest, softest kind% will bring me good fortune in my love life, financial status, etc. Bummaging through the pencils in a shop, I spot a :/, and so I want it. Then, on Arringtons account, I have a rational desire for this pencil, since I regard a particular degree of darkness and softness ( :/ ( as the relevant factor in purchasing a pencil, and I know that this pencil is :/. /ut some may reply to Arrington that because my desire for this pencil is based on a delusion about the powers of :/ pencils, I do not rationally desire it.

If these ob)ections are plausible, then different accounts of autonomy and rational desire are called for. ,or all we know, these accounts might imply that advertising in general is problematic.

Applicability

Apart from their use in considering whether general attacks on advertising are plausible, Arringtons analyses can also be used to consider the status of particular cases. ,or e"ample, even if we agree adverts in general do not produce unfree choices, we might still use Arringtons analysis to show that in a certain circumstance, a person has acted unfreely as a result of an advert.

Completeness

Is there a potentially plausible general charge against advertising that Arrington has not considered. @erhaps this charge1

Advertising should provide the plain facts about a product " no more or less " but fails to do so
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Sometimes an advertisement might fail to provide the plan facts by telling a falsehood about a product #e.g. about the litre capacity of a car%; such cases involve uncontroversial wrongdoing, but they are certainly not general to advertising.

Cost if not all adverts, however, do go beyond a plain statement of the facts in other ways1 they seek to appeal to our emotions, for instance, or they associate the product with a certain lifestyle. The charge raised here therefore differs from those discussed by Arrington ( none of those charges were generally applicable to adverts. /ut is this feature of adverts undesirable. If so, we have identified a general and problematic characteristic of adverts. Theodore 3evitt attempts to defend advertising from the charge that it is wrong to go beyond the straightforward facts. #3evitts article, in your reader, is boldly and entertainingly written. The flamboyant style worked for the business magaGine in which he published it, but dont aim to emulate it in your academic writing.% 3evitt admits that people !want less fluff and more fact about the things they buy. They want description, not distortion, and they want some relief from the constant, grating, vulgar noise. #76% /ut 3evitt boldly claims that the very features of advertising that seem unacceptable are what we should value in it. 'e argues that !embellishment and distortion are among advertisings legitimate and socially desirable purposes #76%. 3evitt points out that in many spheres of life, we embellish and distort ob)ects in ways not re&uired by their basic function. These practices can be seen, for instance, in architecture, poetry and clothing. *hy do we do this. 0ne reason is to increase the interest of ob)ects1 !to introduce into an otherwise harsh or bland e"istence some sort of purposeful and distorting alleviation. #79% A second reason is to link the ob)ects strongly with our identity or aspirations.
These points also apply to advertising. Adverts do not merely make the world appear more interesting; they also !describe the products fullness for us #5H%. In other words, they give us a

way of seeing how the product might suit the life we have or want; they are !the symbols of manIs aspirations. #5H%

0n 3evitts view, we do not want bare functionality from an advertisement #e.g. a mere list of the ob)ective features of a product or service%, but rather an alleviation of dullness, and a sense of the broader role that the product might play ( even a vision of our ideal life. Though we do want ob)ective truth to be available to us #e.g. ingredients, guarantee of &uality%, the sub)ective story is crucial to us too.

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