Existential Analysis 15.

2: July 2004

Choice or Discovery
An Exploration of Kierkegaards Theory of the Self Steve Kirby Abstract
This paper explores the multifaceted nature of Kierkegaards theory of the self. I begin with a description of Kierkegaards conception of the self as consisting in the balance between three polarities (the finite the infinite, necessity freedom, the temporal the eternal), held in tension. I then explore in detail Kierkegaards notion of despair as a catalyst for the emergence of self-consciousness. This evolves into an exposition of his tripartite developmental schema, which comprises of the aesthetic, ethical and religious modes of existence. The orthodox reading of which contends that Kierkegaards theory of the self is predicated upon the enactment of choice. This interpretation is challenged by Edward Mooney, who argues for a more complex reading wherein self-choice is coupled with self-reception. I conclude by considering Mooneys replacement of Kierkegaards Christian God with a secular commitment to community.

Introduction
Kierkegaards understanding of the self is complex and irreducible to a single unified abstract theory. One of the reasons for this is the multiplicity of voices with which he speaks. His use of pseudonyms enabled Kierkegaard to adopt a range of philosophical and moral positions. Either/Or (1992), the first of his two major expositions on the self was published in 1843 and was attributed to two writers, the first known simply as A, and the second, his interlocutor, as Judge Wilhelm. The work was ostensibly edited by one Victor Eremitor. This was followed in 1849 by The Sickness Unto Death (1989) pseudonymously written by Anti-Climacus. Self-awareness and choice are themes common to both texts. However, the form and structure within which these themes emerge is quite different. In Either/Or Kierkegaard uses the epistolary form to explore selfhood in relation to two basic modes or spheres of existence: the aesthetic and the ethical. (He will go on in Fear & Trembling (1985), also written in 1843, but this time under the name of Johannes de Silentio, to explore a third mode, that of the religious.) In contrast The Sickness Unto Death is an exposition on despair, which Kierkegaard conceives as both the fear of and the catalyst for conscious selfhood. Despite the differences between them these works complement one another and allow us to determine the outlines of a Kierkegaardian theory of
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the self, albeit one with unresolved tensions and unanswered questions. The particular tension I intend to focus upon is the problematising of self-choice. Kierkegaard is often credited as the originator of the idea of the self as chosen, as constructed (Gardiner, 1988). Edward Mooney, however, in his comprehensive exploration of the Kierkegaardian self, Selves in Discord and Resolve (1996), challenges this reading and shows how in fact self-choice is bound up with self-discovery or self-reception.

The Sickness Unto Death

For Kierkegaard the sickness of despair is an unavoidable and necessary experience. Indeed one to be welcomed insofar as it is the means and the mechanism by which conscious selfhood may be attained. Kierkegaards famously convolute formula for the self, with which he begins The Sickness Unto Death, is worth quoting in full, as it encapsulates several of the key ideas that he then expands upon over the course of the next 120 pages. The human being is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation which relates to itself, or that in the relation which is its relating to itself. The self is not the relation but the relations relating to itself. A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity. In short a synthesis. (Kierkegaard, 1989: 43) Kierkegaard identifies the self with spirit and reflexivity. Relating is a temporal process, whether involving another or merely oneself. Thus, implicit within this is a notion of the self as a process unfolding over time. As a synthesis the structure of the self comprises of three polarities. The task of each individual self is to achieve a balance between the six elements. Mooney (1996) describes this as the relational field theory of the self. A self dominated by the infinite without the countervailing influence of the finite leads to a life given over to imagination and fantasy ungrounded in reality. Living in the finite in the absence of the infinite leads to a narrow, overly ordered and unspontaneous existence. Balance is achieved when the finite and specific are imbued with imaginative possibilities, and the infinite is tempered by being grounded in the everyday. The freedom and necessity polarity concerns the attempt to find a balance between the freedom to choose possibilities other than the one I am currently living, and the acceptance of the existential givens of my self and my situation. Through our imaginative capacities we have the ability to transcend the givens of the here and now. The temporal-eternal polarity is bound up with the process of increasing self-awareness. Kierkegaard believes that to become aware of the self is to be cognisant of something eternal within the self.
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A clear opposition is discernible between the actual or given, i.e. the finite, necessity and the temporal, and the ideal or possible, i.e. the infinite, freedom and the eternal. Hannay, in his introduction to The Sickness Unto Death (1989), suggests that the sickness of despair is symptomatic of the failure to bring the given and the ideal together. Based upon the above we might simplify Kierkegaards formula thus: the self is a relation-in-imbalance which is conscious of itself.

Despair
I want to look now at Kierkegaards three basic forms of despair; being unconscious in despair of having a self (inauthentic despair), not wanting in despair to be oneself, and wanting in despair to be oneself. (Kierkegaard, 1989: 43) Belief in the Christian God is central to Kierkegaards concept of the self. He asserts that the eradication of despair is possible only when, in relating to itself and in wanting to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the power which established it. (ibid, 44) And it is precisely the refusal or rejection of the self before God that constitutes despair as a sickness of the spirit. Kierkegaards typology of despair is hierarchical and characterised by an incremental expansion in the degree of consciousness of the self and of ones being in despair. He describes being unconscious in despair of having a self, variously as inauthentic despair and more dismissively as ignorance. Those individuals who are unaware of their having a self, tend, argues Kierkegaard, to revel in their ignorance. To be awoken from it is generally regarded as a misfortune. Such a person enjoys the immediate and the sensuous and has little awareness of the eternal or the spiritual. Thus, in order to have a self, one has first of all to be conscious of oneself. Kierkegaard, however, is no Cartesian, self-consciousness alone does not constitute a self. He writes, In general, what is decisive with regard to the self is consciousness, that is to say self-consciousness. The more consciousness, the more will; the more will, the more self. (Kierkegaard, 1989: 59) Thus, consciousness allied to will are the primary components of the Kierkegaardian self. We can infer from this that consciousness for Kierkegaard is intentional. He describes the two remaining forms of despair as the despair of weakness: not wanting in despair to be oneself, and the despair of defiance: wanting in despair to be oneself. In not wanting in despair to be oneself, one seeks to evade or be rid of the self and all that comes with it, i.e. agency, choice and responsibility. This is akin to Sartres notion of bad faith in which I seek to become a thing or a being-in-itself. Attempting thereby to avoid the anxiety and struggle inherent in my being a creature whose being or self is an issue for it. One of the many ways in which such reluctance can

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manifest itself is through investing ones energies in worldly or external distractions. The man/woman who wants in despair to be him/herself possesses an intuitive grasp of the eternal within the self. But seeks defiantly to realise the eternal self, whilst rejecting any relation to the power that established it. Thus, the self he/she seeks to realise is not the self as given but rather the self he/she chooses to be. That is to say, writes Kierkegaard, he wants to begin a little earlier than other people, not at and with the beginning, but in the beginning, he does not want to don his own self, does not want to see his task in his given self, he wants to, by virtue of being the infinite form, to construct it himself. (Kierkegaard, 1989: 99) Kierkegaard considers this to be not only an affront to the power that established it, but also vainglorious and futile. He writes, this absolute ruler is a King without a country, he rules over nothing; his position, his kingdom, his sovereignty, are subject to the dialectic that rebellion is legitimate at any moment. (ibid) What Kierkegaard means by this is that if I am free to choose or create a self, then I am also free at any moment to abandon that self and choose to replace it with another more to my liking. Kierkegaard was not oblivious to the appeal of the idea of the self as chosen. However, on the evidence of the above, to suggest that he advocated such is clearly untenable. Firstly, as defiance he considers it to be an arrogant and misguided rejection of God. Secondly, he regards it as an attempt to avoid or evade the self as given. So where does the attribution to Kierkegaard as the source of the idea of the self as choice come from? These ideas can be traced to Either/Or, wherein Kierkegaard has much more to say about notions of self-choice and self-creation. However, this too is by no means unproblematic, as will become evident below.

Either/Or
As I stated above, Kierkegaards various pseudonyms allow him to present a variety of different viewpoints. In many ways Either/Or epitomises this plurality of competing voices. In Either/Or Kierkegaard explores selfhood in relation to the first two of his three basic modes or spheres of existence: the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious. He does this through an epistolary dialogue between the aforementioned Judge Wilhelm, who represents the ethical individual, and a young man known simply as A who epitomises the dissolute sophisticated aesthete. I want to very briefly sketch the outlines of Kierkegaards tripartite schema, prior to exploring in more detail the notion of self-choice and the challenge posed to this idea by the concept of self-reception. A life lived in the aesthetic mode is characterised by a hedonistic enjoyment of the sensual. The aesthete allows his/her desires to occupy centre stage and become the motivating force of his/her existence. The aim is
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simply to maximise pleasure and minimise displeasure or pain. The aesthetic is the mode of immediacy. This contrasts with the ethical, which is the mode of deferred gratification. To live in the ethical mode is to be motivated by that which is good or right and to eschew that which is evil or wrong. Thus, one is required to resist ones immediate desires and make choices on the basis of ones moral code rather than the maximisation of pleasure. Whilst this might require the exercise of will power and commitment, adherence to a code also provides a degree of certainty and security, to the extent that one is not required to think but simply obey. The introduction of doubt is what enables the shift from the ethical to the religious mode. This shift is the central focus of Fear & Trembling (1985). In doubting the rightness of previously held convictions I am made aware that certainty and security are not to be found in either ethical codes of conduct or scientific rationalism. In a world of uncertainty and moral ambiguity only faith and a relation to the infinite is adequate to the task of providing solace and direction. In seeking to persuade his pen friend to abandon his dissolute existence and embrace the ethical way of being, Judge Wilhelm comes to see selfchoice as the catalyst for the transition from the aesthetic to the ethical mode. Selfhood, for the Judge, consists in self-consciousness, selfresponsibility and self-choice. These are all characteristics of the ethical sphere and as such the aesthete is held to be without a self. Driven by his/her desires the aesthete conceives of his/her traits and dispositions as a fact of nature to which he/she passively succumbs. In advocating that one must choose thyself, the Judge/Kierkegaard is intentionally replacing the Socratic injunction to know thyself. (Mooney, 1996) Self-knowledge is important and a prerequisite of self-choice. However, as any psychotherapist knows only too well, self-knowledge or insight do not necessarily translate into action or behaviour. The Judge advocates self-choice over selfknowledge, because in choosing one is required to exercise the will and, in so doing, make value judgments. Both of which are absent from the aesthetic mode, wherein passivity and indifference occupy the place of the will, and pleasure or pain are the only discriminating criteria for the making of choices. To choose a self is to choose values, beliefs and ideals, which then serve to underpin and guide action. However, it is the exercise of the will that is the actualising force at work here.

Self-Choice & Self-Reception

In the previous section I summarised the standard reading of Kierkegaards advocacy of self-choice as a defining characteristic of selfhood, (cf Gardiner 1988, Macquarrie 1973, Warnock 1970). There is, however, an alternative reading, in which the idea of self-reception exists alongside self-choice. Edward Mooney (1996) argues that Judge Wilhelms conception of will is
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complex; that not only is it actively volitional but also responsively receptive. Reflecting on the moment of transition from the aesthetic to the ethical mode the Judge writes, When around me all has become still, solemn as a starlit night, when the soul is all alone in the world, there appears before it not a distinguished person, but the eternal power itself. It is as though the heavens have parted, and the I chooses itself or more correctly, it accepts itself. (Kierkegaard, 1992: 491). As Mooney correctly asserts, with this last phrase Something other than the productive, choosing or assertive will is now engaged. (Mooney, 1996: 18). He suggests that the Judge hereby eschews the notion of choice alone in relation to the self. The exercise of will in this context is more akin to receptivity; a willing openness to otherness. It might be argued that the distinction between self-choice and selfreception runs the risk of reproducing the opposition between the self as process and the self as essence. This is hard to sustain however, because what Mooney finds in Kierkegaard is not an example of either/or, but rather two components or tendencies held in tension. Furthermore, in drawing our attention to the complex and ambiguous nature of the will, Mooney, not only challenges the more simplistic understanding of Kierkegaardian choice, he also establishes a link with the conception of the self presented in The Sickness Unto Death. In that text Kierkegaard defines selfhood as a relation which relates to itself (Kierkegaard, 1989: 43) and in relating to itself and in wanting to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the power that established it. (ibid) The duality or tension between choice and receptivity is clearly apparent here; in relating to itself and in wanting to be itself, the self chooses or endorses itself. At the same time, however, it also receives itself as grounded transparently in the power that established it. As we saw above to choose a self that is not so grounded is, for Kierkegaard, defiance and an attempt to avoid or evade the self as given. However, in a secular age this begs the question, what is the nature and status of this power in which the self is grounded?

Either God Or Community

All of Kierkegaards writing is underpinned by his belief in the Christian God. In a post-Nietzschean, post-modernist world, however, the ontological and metaphysical status of an external source of power in which the self is grounded is problematic. Rusca (2000) has argued that the Christian framework can be removed without substantial distortion to Kierkegaards philosophy. Mooney, on the other hand, proposes a reconceptualisation rather than expurgation of the Christian scaffolding. Insofar as it appears to embody notions of free will, self-determination, responsibility and autonomy, the idea of self-choice seems compatible with a contemporary sensibility, which has rejected the idea that beliefs, meanings
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and values are conferred and guaranteed by a Supreme Being. The idea of self-receptivity and of a self grounded in an external source of power and meaning, on the other hand, seems to occlude such freedom and diminish personal responsibility. Mooney refutes this, arguing that responsibility is not only or even necessarily initiated by the act of freely choosing. He suggests that self-responsibility involves more than being personally accountable for my individual actions; self-responsibility also incorporates social and community responsibility. He writes, Acknowledging these ties expresses the need to take the boundaries of my self (and hence my responsibility) out beyond the acts I alone have performed or the roles I occupy. (Mooney, 1996: 23) What Mooney goes on to suggest is that Kierkegaards external source of power and meaning can be reconceptualised as consisting in the social, communal and cultural milieu into which I am born. The idea that the social and communal other influence and impact upon my sense of self, and that this self extends beyond the surface of my skin, comes very close to expressing some of the ideas implicit in the concepts of intersubjectivity and Heideggers being-with and being-in-the-world. We are not separate, atomised consciousnesss living in a vacuum but are intimately bound up with others and our environment. Kierkegaards understanding of the self is complex, rich and multifaceted. I have explored in the foregoing some of the main strands running through his work. How, for example, he sees selfhood as consisting in emergent levels of self-consciousness. How the self as synthesis represents the attempt to balance the tension between the actual and the possible. His analysis of despair reveals it to be both the consequence of the attempt to avoid or evade the self, and at the same time, the catalyst for the unfolding of the self. The conceptualisation of the modes of existence: the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious, offers a framework within which the differing degrees of selfawareness and the crucial role of choice and responsibility are brought vividly to life. Finally, I have drawn upon Mooneys work to show, firstly, how the self is both received or given and chosen simultaneously. And secondly, how the power in which the self is grounded can be refigured for a secular age. In practice it is often the tension between these two poles; to accept or receive that which is given and to consciously choose that to which we aspire, that characterises our clients struggle to clarify or better understand their sense of self. Steve Kirby is an existential psychotherapist working in private practice. He also works part-time as a project worker for Turning Point ACAPS and as a group worker for Camberwell Alcohol Service. He has a PGDip in Integrative Counselling and recently completed the MA in Existential Psychotherapy and Counselling at the New School of Psychotherapy and Counselling. E-mail: steve.kirby3@btinternet.com
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References
Gardiner, P. (1988). Kierkegaard. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kierkegaard, S. (1985). Fear and Trembling. Trans. and introduction by Hannay, A. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Kierkegaard, S. (1989). The Sickness Unto Death. Trans. and introduction by Hannay, A. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Kierkegaard, S. (1992). Either/Or: A Fragment of Life. Trans. and introduction by Hannay, A. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Macquarrie, J. (1973). Existentialism: An Introduction, Guide and Assessment. London: Penguin Books. Mooney, E. (1996). Selves in Discord and Resolve. London: Routledge. Rusca, R. (2000). The Self, Angst and Despair. Journal of the Society for Existential Analysis, 11.1. Warnock, M. (1970). Existentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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