Email: danielwalshphilosophy@gmail.com Website: http://danielwalshphilosophy.blogspot.ca PHL 232 tutorial notes Feb. 26th 2014 1. 2. 3. 4. Epistemology (what is it?

) The justified true belief (or JTB) theory of knowledge (internalism) The Gettier objections to the JTB theory The ethics of belief (Clifford/James)

Part 1: Epistemology (What is it?) Etymology of epistemology o episteme (knowledge) o logos (account?) Some core questions in the discipline of epistemology: o What is knowledge? o When are beliefs justified? (under what conditions, that is) What is knowledge? 3 kinds: o Personal (acquaintance) I know (am acquainted with) my daughter. o Procedural (ability) She knows how to paint. o Propositional or factual I know that I am in a classroom. Were interested in propositional knowledge (hereafter just knowledge). We want to know: What is knowledge? We want an analysis of knowledge Were looking for necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. o Necessary conditions (only if) o Sufficient conditions (if) o Necessary and sufficient conditions (if and only if) We want to be able to say that a proposition P is known if and only if X.

Part 2: The justified true belief (or JTB) theory of knowledge (a form of internalism) S knows a proposition P only if: o P is true, and o S believes P.

Intuitively, these are necessary conditions. But theyre not sufficient. Why not? o I believe that my wife is at home. Lets suppose that she is. But do I know that she is? As far as I know, shes to run to the store. o The problem seems to be that the truth of my belief is not guaranteed by anything. o It would seem that there must be some condition that ensures that my belief corresponds veridically to a state of affairs in the world. o JTB theorists have proposed the justification relation as this condition. Justification, on the standard view, completes the set of conditions individually necessary and collectively sufficient for knowledge. On the JTB or standard account of knowledge Knowledge is justified true belief. S knows that P if and only if o S believes that P, o P is true, and o S is justified in believing P. This is a form of internalism. The knowledge that P is guaranted by something internal to the knower (his justification for knowing that P (his beliefs that entail P)).

Part 3: Objections to the JTB theory There are seemingly good reasons to think that the JTB conditions are collectively insufficient for knowledge. Gettier provides counterexamples. A counterexample of an analysis is a possible instance in which the conditions expressed in the analysis obtain but the analysandum does not. Counterexamples to JTB will have to be instances of beliefs that are justified, true and unknown. The key thing: It is possible to be justified in believing something false (Think on this). The justification relation often offers no guarantee. Consider these cases (not, to my knowledge, from Gettier) o I believe a lottery ticket will lose. I am justified in believing this. It is true that it will lose. o The weather channel (a reliable source on the weather) reports a 99% chance of rain for tomorrow. I believe that it will rain tomorrow. I am justified in believing this. And (we can suppose) that it will rain tomorrow. Do I know that the ticket will lose? And do I know that it will rain tomorrow? It would seem not. Here are two of Edmund Gettiers cases:

The ten coins case: o Smith is justified in the false belief that Jones will get the promotion. Hes told this by a trustworthy member of the selection committee. o He knows that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. o He infers that P (the one who will get the position has ten coins in his pocket). o He is justified in believing P. o Smith (and not Jones) gets the position. o By chance Smith also has ten coins in his pocket. o P is a JTB. The Ford case (Gettier) as played out in an episode of FRIENDS: o Sarah is justified in believing that Joey drives a Porche. Joey wears a Porche hat and Jacket, he carries a set of Porche keys and hes always talking about his Porche. o Sarah reasonably infers that P (Joey drives a Porche or Joey lives in the Village). o Joey, it turns out, does not drive a porche. He just pretends to drive a Porche to impress women like Sarah. o But by chance he lives in the Village. o P is a JTB.

Well? One way out for the JTB theorist is to say that one is not justified in these cases. Fine. But if the standard for justification is that high we will have to deny that we know much of what we think we know. Another way, perhaps, is to limit our knowledge to probabilities. But again we will have to deny that we know much of what we think we know.

Part 4: The ethics of belief (Clifford/James) Clifford: It is morally wrong for one to believe any claim without sufficient evidence. Clifford offers a consequentialist argument. o A ship owner has very good evidence that his ship is unseaworthy. o But repairs are expensive so he convinces himself that the ship is fine. o The ship capsizes and the passangers drown. o This was the result of the ship owners believing without sufficient evidence. Clifford extends this argument to society generally. Society will be corrupted by believing apart from sufficient evidence. William James rejects this.

He says that under certain conditions it is acceptable both morally (contra Clifford) and epistemically to believe what one is inclined to believe even where the evidence is far from decisive. He does not, on my reading, advocate belief where the evidence runs strongly against the claim. In sum: Where the option is a genuine option, i.e., where it is live, forced and momentous, one is within ones rights to believe what one is inclined to believe with respect to a question where the evidence is indecisive. o For any proposition P, o If P live (for me), P has some hold on me? (This condition is relative to the person) o And P forced, I must must either believe P or not believe P. (Agnosticism with respect to P is not believing P) o And P momentous, The truth of P has serious implications for my life. o And the evidence for P indecisive, o Then I am within my moral and epistemic rights to believe what I am inclined to believe with respect to P.

Some moral questions are of this kind; as is the question of Gods existence. James on Clifford: o There are two related epistemological aims: seek the truth and avoid error. o Clifford has chosen the latter at the expense of the former. o James compares Clifford to a general who isnt willing to risk any casualties to attain the victory. o Surely, says James, great epistemological gains are forfeited in adhering to this approach. The thesis I defend is, briefly stated, this: Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, "Do not decide, but leave the question open," is itself a passional decision,just like deciding yes or no,and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth.