UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE

Communities and Change: Racial and Ethnic Transition and Crime in Los Angeles

DISSERTATION

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

Criminology, Law and Society

by

Lyndsay Nicole Boggess

Dissertation Committee: George E. Tita, Chair M. Victoria Basolo Michael R. Gottfredson John R. Hipp

2009

UMI Number: 3370089

INFORMATION TO USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI
UMI Microform 3370089 Copyright 2009 by ProQuest LLC All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

2009 Lyndsay Nicole Boggess

The dissertation of Lyndsay Nicole Boggess is approved and is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and in digital formats:

IfVWfl^jVti^t^.m)

jfetaL*.
>

foiulr^

Committee Chair

University of California, Irvine 2009

ii

This dissertation is dedicated to those who are celebrating its completion in spirit:

My friends, Gerard "Rod" Walter Burke, Jr August 16,1966 - March 23, 2006 and Michael David Gulla March 31,1978 - October 31,2008 my grandfather, William Anthony Mucci January 26,1918 - December 7,2004 and especially my father, James Senttell Boggess II July 11,1946-May 2,2006

<f(est in (Peace

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES LIST OF TABLES ACKNOWLEDGMENTS CIRRICULUM VITAE ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION Why Los Angeles? Research questions and hypotheses Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 "Roadmap" for the dissertation REFERENCES CHAPTER2 ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION Contributions to the literature ..

viii ix xii xiv xv 1 1 2 5 7 7 8 10 11 12 14 15 16 ..16

THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS
Endogenous nature of community effects Spatial dynamics DATA Crime data. Demographic data Racial and ethnic change data RESEARCH METHOD Instrumental variables iv ,

. . . 1 8
24
;.26

27 28 31 33 35 ..38

Spatial effects Models FINDINGS Tests of Spatial Autocorrelation Two-stage least squares regression results Racial/Ethnic Heterogeneity Models Model la.- Racial/Ethnic Heterogeneity on Total Crime Model Lb.- Total Crime on Racial/Ethnic Heterogeneity Model 2.a-Racial/Ethnic Heterogeneity on Violent Crime Model 2. b. - Violent Crime on Racial/Ethnic Heterogeneity. Model 3.a-Racial/Ethnic Heterogeneity on Property Crime Model 3. b. - Violent Crime on Racial/Ethnic Heterogeneity Racial/Ethnic Churning Model 4.a - Racial/Ethnic Churningon Total Crime Model 4.b. - Total Crime on Racial/Ethnic Churning Model 5.a-Racial/Ethnic Churning on Violent Crime Model 5. b. - Violent Crime on Racial/Ethnic Churning Model 6.a-Racial/Ethnic Churning on Property Crime Model 6. b. - Property Crime on Racial/Ethnic Churning DISCUSSION REFERENCES CHAPTER3 ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS Competition Theories Defended Neighborhood Perspective and Group Threat Theory Cooperation Theories Social Disorganization Theory........ Why youths? DATA.... Racial/Ethnic composition 2006 Population estimates by race/ethnicity v .

41 44 46 46 47 48 48 51 53 54 55 57 57 58 60 60 62 62 64 65 73 79 80 81 84 85 85 .94 ...96 97 .98 101 102

Macrostructural Opportunity Theory and Consolidated Inequality Theory.. 90

Crime data Inter- and intra-group rates Exogenous socio-demographic control variables Latent indicator of residential stability RESEARCH METHOD FINDINGS Aggravated Assault..... AggravatedAssaults - Accountingfor Economic Inequality Robbery Robberies - Accounting for Economic Inequality DISCUSSION REFERENCES.. CHAPTER 4 ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION Why schools? Contributions to the literature THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS DATA Defining "community" School data School crime data School demographic data School racial and ethnic change data Community data Community crime data Community demographic data Community racial and ethnic change data Linking school and community racial and ethnic change RESEARCH METHODS Spatial effects Sample size and statistical power FINDINGS Bivariate analysis vi ..

105 110 113 114 115 117 118 122 125 127 129 ,....135 ....141 142 ...143 144 147 149 157 .159 162 162 166 169 170 170 770 173 174 178 182 183 184 185

Sample size and statistical power FINDINGS Bivariate analysis Cross-sectional Testing for potential mediation effect School Models High schools versus middle schools Community Models High schools versus middle schools.... Interaction effects Change in heterogeneity Racial and ethnic churning Summary DISCUSSION REFERENCES CHAPTERS CONCLUSION Discussion of Chapter Findings Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Linking the chapters Strengths, weaknesses, and extensions "Take-home" message REFERENCES .1 ,

..183 184 185 185 186 187 190 193 196 199 200 204 208 209 216 223 224 224 224 227 229 231 235 240 242

vii

LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2.1. Location of the City of Los Angeles within Los Angeles County Figure 2.2. Path diagram of the general neighborhood change and crime relationships investigated in this chapter Figure 3.1. Location of South Los Angeles within the City of Los Angeles Figure 3.2. Average number of aggravated assaults by victim-offender racial/ethnic composition, 2001 to 2006, N = 149 tracts Figure 3.3. Average number of robberies by victim-offender racial/ethnic composition, 2001 to 2006, N = 149 tracts Figure 4.1. Location of middle and senior high schools in Los Angeles Figure 4.2. Average number of serious school offenses by school type, 2001 2002 school year to 2006 - 2007 school year Figure 4.3. Percent change in school enrollment between 2000 and 2006 by racial/ethnic category, N = 93 . 30 37 100 109 110 161 165 167

Figure 4.4. Change in percent average community racial/ethnic composition for the four largest racial/ethnic groups between 2000 and 2005, N = 93 172 Figure 4.5. Example of a mediating relationship Figure 4.6. Example of a moderating relationship 175 176

Figure 4.7. Frequency distribution of the number of serious offenses in schools, N = 93 179 Figure 4.8. Predicted change in the percent of serious school offenses in middle schools based on change in school and community heterogeneity between 2000 and 2006 203 Figure 4.9. Predicted change in the rate of school serious offenses in high schools based on school and community racial and ethnic churning between 2000 and 2006...

207

viii

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1. Summary statistics for the City of Los Angeles census tracts, 1990 and 2000, N = 82 Table 2.2. Moran's I values for the endogenous variables Table 2.3a. 2SLS regression results predicting change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity controlling for change in the total crime rate and spatial lag effects, N = 816 Table 2.3b. 2SLS regression results predicting change in the total crime rate controlling for change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity and spatial lag effects, N = 816 Table 2.4a. 2SLS regression results predicting change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity controlling for change in the violent crime rate and spatial lag effects, N = 816 Table 2.4b. 2SLS regression results predicting change in the violent crime rate controlling for change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity and spatial lag effects, N = 816 Table 2.5a. 2SLS regression result predicting change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity controlling for change in the property crime rate and spatial lag effects, N = 816 Table 2.5b. 2SLS regression results predicting change in the property crime rate controlling for change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity and spatial lag effects, N = 816 Table 2.6a. 2SLS regression result predicting racial/ethnic churning controlling for change in the total crime rate and spatial lag effects, N = 809 Table 2.6b. 2SLS regression results predicting change in the total crime rate controlling for racial/ethnic churning and spatial lag effects, N = 809 Table 2.7a. 2SLS regression result predicting racial/ethnic churning controlling for change in the violent crime rate and spatial lag effects, N = 809 Table 2.7b. 2SLS regression results predicting change in the violent crime rate controlling for racial/ethnic churning and spatial lag effects, N = 809 Table 2.8a. 2SLS regression result predicting racial/ethnic churning controlling for change in the property crime rate and spatial lag effects, N = 809. .32 46

50

52

53

54

...56

57 59 60 61 62 63

IX

Table 2.8b. 2SLS regression results predicting change in the property crime rate controlling for racial/ethnic churning and spatial lag effects, N = 809 Table 3.1. Average tract racial and ethnic composition of South Los Angeles, 1970,1980,1990,2000, and estimated 2006, N = 149 Table 3.2. Average tract racial and ethnic composition of South Los Angeles, 2000, and estimated 2006, N = 149

..64 101 101

Table 3.3. Average school racial and ethnic composition of South Los Angeles, 1990,2000, and 2006, N = 522 102 Table 3.5. Age of offenders, 2001 and 2006 (when victim and offender race known) Table 3.6. Age distribution of victims, 2001 and 2006, (when victim and offender race known) Table 3.7. Percent of total crime by victim-offender racial/ethnic composition, 2001 and 2006. 106 107 108

Table 3.8. Average number of homicides, robberies, and aggravated assaults by group type in South Bureau Los Angeles, 2001 and 2006, N = 147 (Standard deviation in parentheses) 108 Table 3.9. South Los Angeles Summary Characteristics, 2000, N = 149 Table 3.10. Mean rates of inter- and intra-group youth violence Table 3.11. Fit statistics for Model 1, inter- and intra-group aggravated assault Table 3.12. Regression results estimating the relationship between inter- and intra-group aggravated assault and racial/ethnic composition (Standard error in parentheses), N = 144 Table 3.13. Regression results estimating the relationship between inter- and intra-group aggravated assault and racial/ethnic composition while accounting for Black - Latino income inequality, (Standard error in parentheses), N = 144 Table 3.14. Regression results estimating the relationship between inter- and intra-group robberies and racial/ethnic composition, N = 144 114 118 119

120

124 126

Table 3.15. Regression results estimating the relationship between inter- and intra-group robbery and racial/ethnic composition while accounting for Black Latino income inequality, N = 144 .....128 Table 4.1. Average crime counts and rate per 1000 students by school type, 2001 - 2002 school year and 2006 - 2007 school year, N = 93 x ..165

Table 4.2. Average school characteristics for all schools, middle schools, and high schools, 2001 - 2002 school year and 2006 - 2007 school year Table 4.3. Average community characteristics, 2000 and 2005, N = 93 Table 4.4. Correlations between school and community characteristics Table 4.5. Negative binomial regression models of school serious offenses, comparing alternative definitions of racial and ethnic change, n = 93 Table 4.6. Negative binomial regression model of school serious offenses on school change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity by school type Table 4.7. Negative binomial regression model of school serious offenses on school racial/ethnic churning by school type Table 4.8. Negative binomial regression models of school violent crime, comparing alternative definitions of racial and ethnic change, controlling for change in community characteristics n = 93 Table 4.9. Negative binomial regression model of school serious offenses on school change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity by school type, controlling for change in community characteristics Table 4.10. Negative binomial regression model of school serious offenses on school racial/ethnic churning by school type, controlling for change in community characteristics Table 4.11. Negative binomial regression models of school serious offenses by school type, controlling for change in heterogeneity and the interaction between community and school change in heterogeneity Table 4.12. Negative binomial regression models of school serious offenses by school type, controlling for population churning and the interaction between community and school racial and ethnic churning. 168 173 177 189 191 191

194

197

198

201

205

xi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

After writing and rewriting (and then rewriting again) this dissertation, I am * at a loss for words. So instead of trying to write something eloquent or witty, I would simply like to acknowledge the unwavering support of those who have stood by me and encouraged me through the ups and downs of the PhD and dissertation process. I am grateful for all the support from my family: Jim Boggess and Meghan Ross, Sean and Jennie Boggess, Nick Boggess, my stepfather Bob Davis, my grandmothers Sonja Mucci and Mildred Boggess, my cat Loki, and especially my mother and best friend, Kathy. Even though we're related (so they sort of have to), I am exceptionally grateful they put up with me. I would also like to thank my friends who weathered this storm with me: Heather Stein Aguirre, Adam Boesson, Murray Bognovitz, Steve Boutcher, Stephanie DiPietro, Chris Edenbach (and my buddies Jackson and Jazzers), Marissa Handler (and her parents), Aaron Hipp, Myesa Nichole Knox, Joseph Lutche, Tony Mulkey, Johnny Nhan, Lynn Pazzani, Tia Peterson, Victor Perez, Dan Shay, Samantha Smith, Lisa Tita, Alyssa Whitby - Chamberlain, Ted Wulfers, and the best Loki-sitters a cat mom could want: Tim and Jenny Goddard, and Matt and Molly Valasik. I could easily write pages specifying the multitude of ways they have each helped me, but instead I'll just say that their friendships are all significantly and positively related to my completion of this program at p < 0.05. I would never have traveled down this road without the guidance of Charts Kubrin at The George Washington University. Her friendship, mentoring, and

xii

mutual admiration for snack breaks helped me realize that academia is where I belong. It is difficult to put into words how indebted I am to William Alex Pridemore at Indiana University for his friendship and help navigating the world of social science research. Thank you too, to William Chambliss at The George Washington University, Robert Greenbaum at The Ohio State University, Gary Jensen at Vanderbilt University, and John Laub at the University of Maryland for professional (and sometimes personal) advice. I am thankful for the generous support from the National Center for Injury Prevention and Control at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Without their funding, this project would have been even more onerous! My success is largely due to the guidance and steadfast support of many UCI faculty members, including Victoria Basolo, Michael Gottfredson, and Val Jenness, but especially John Hipp whose enthusiasm and generosity are unparalleled and whose door truly is always open. They provided me encouragement and direction with a grace I can only hope to emulate in my professional career. And last, but certainly not least, thanks to George Tita. He is quite possibly the best advisor a graduate student could ask for. I have learned, laughed, gossiped, and cried in his office and he has always been there for me. His confidence got me through the rough times (and there were many) and his humor helped me learn not to take things so seriously; I will forever remember to tell a story when I write, not sing when I present, and to swirl my wine before I taste it. George, I would not have been able to make it without you and I am proud to be your student.

Xlll

CIRRICULUM VITAE Lyndsay Nicole Boggess 2009 PhD. Criminology, Law and Society University of California, Irvine Committee: George E. Tita (Chair), Victoria Basolo, Michael R. Gottfredson, and John R. Hipp 2003 M.A. Criminal Justice The George Washington University Sociology and Psychology Vanderbilt University

2000 B.A.

Research interests Community context of crime Race/ethnicity and crime Urban sociology Quantitative research methodology Mapping, GIS Spatial analysis Structural Equation Modeling

Publications Hipp, John R., George Tita, and Lyndsay Boggess. 2009. Inter- and Intra-Group Violence: Is Violent Crime an Expression of Group Conflict or Social Disorganization? Criminology ,47, 501 - 544. Cole, Simon, William Tobin, Lyndsay Boggess and Hal Stern. 2005. A Retail Sampling Approach to Assessing Impact of Regional Bullet Distribution Concentrations on Probative Value of Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis. Law, Probability, and Risk, 4,199-216. External Grants Neighborhood Change and Crime: Assessing the Relationship between the Local Housing Market, Racial and Ethnic Transition, and Youth Violence. National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. September 2007' August 2008. Principal investigator. The Impact of Crime on Local Housing Demand: A Longitudinal Analysis of Home Sales in Los Angeles. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Early Doctoral Student Research Program. November 2005 - May 2007. Principal investigator.

xiv

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Communities and Change: Racial and Ethnic Transition and Crime in Los Angeles Lyndsay Nicole Boggess Doctor of Philosophy in Criminology, Law and Society University of California, Irvine, 2009 Professor George E. Tita, Chair This dissertation takes a multi-faceted look at the relationship between community change and crime. Social scientists have long argued that social and demographic factors play a role in the persistence of crime in particular communities. One of the most arguedfactors is that residential stability has a positive effect on crime rates; it is in communities where the population fluctuates that crime flourishes because the unstable population is unable to unite to address local incivilities and crime. Indeed, residential mobility is one of the three main criminogenic community factors of Shaw and McKay's seminal work on which most neighborhood effects literature is based. In this dissertation I examine a specific form of residential instability: racial and ethnic turnover. Beyond the theorized detrimental effect of residential turnover generally, racial and ethnic transition specifically can potentially fuel animosity and/or competition between groups and exacerbate the crime problem. Therefore, Ifocus on the dynamics of racial/ ethnic change in the City of Los Angeles and examine 1) change in the city as a whole between 1990 and 2000; 2) African American to Latino transition in South Los

xv

Angeles and the effect on inter- and intra-group youth violence; and 3) the impact of school-specific and community racial and ethnic change on school serious offense rates. In the process, I acknowledge the importance of reciprocal causal effects and spatial effects in my analyses and employ methodological techniques to account for the complexities of community-based research. Major findings include the robust effect of changes in the crime rate on neighborhood racial and ethnic composition. This holds true regardless of crime type, specification by victim - offender race/ethnicity, and whether racial and ethnic change is defined as heterogeneity or racial/ethnic churning (turnover). Surprisingly, there is limited evidence supporting social disorganization theory: change in the racial/ethnic composition of student enrollment significantly affects changes in offense rates in schools but not in neighborhoods. The characteristics of geographically proximate neighborhoods are significant predictors of change in communities and schools. Overall, this study demonstrates the importance of considering alternative definitions of residential instability, and reciprocal relationships and spatial effects in neighborhood-level research.

xvi

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

The goal of this dissertation is to examine the relationship between neighborhood changes in racial and ethnic composition and change in crime. I investigate why crime is persistently high in certain communities over time despite changes in who lives there and how racial and ethnic change may or may not play a role in this perpetuation. Prior research has shown that social and economic characteristics of place are associated with the local crime rates. In particular, communities characterized by racial segregation, high levels of family disruption, higher rates of unemployment, and concentrated poverty often have higher rates of violence. Racial/ethnic heterogeneity in particular is related to higher crime (Bellair, 1997; Hipp, 2007; Warner and Pierce, 1993; Warner and Rountree, 1997). Studies dating back to the 1920s have explored how these community-level attributes are related to crime, paying particular attention to the effect on violence and juvenile delinquency (Shaw and McKay, 1942). One of the most consistent correlates of community level crime is residential (instability. Previous work argues that structural conditions of neighborhoods affect crime primarily through their impact on neighborhood social cohesion/bonds and informal social control; neighborhoods characterized by elements of disadvantage have lower level of social control and cohesion that is necessary to reduce crime. There is robust evidence of an instability - increased crime link in empirical research (for example, Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Sampson and Groves, 1989; Sampson,

Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997). Neighborhoods characterized by higher levels of population turnover often have higher crime rates because residents are unable to form relationships with their neighbors (Bursik, 1988; Bursik and Grasmick, 1993). Essentially, neighborhood instability makes "the development of deep and lasting affective relational networks very difficult" (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993, p. 35). In the last couple of decades, however, neighborhood change has strongly correlated with racial and ethnic change; especially as the geographic distribution of race and ethnicity in U.S. cities has shifted, particularly in Miami, New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and other cities that are major destinations of immigrant traffic. Typically, these studies have examined models of majority-minority violence by examining Black - White tensions. Just as the Chicago School suggests that local residential turnover will induce crime through the breaking down of local levels of informal social control, others argue that racial and ethnic composition will increase tension and the possibility of violence either through competition (Blalock, 1965) or propinquity (Blau and Blau, 1982). The current work expands this research by exploring what happens when neighborhoods diversify in general through increasing heterogeneity and what happens when a local minority group (African-Americans) is displaced by Latinos. Though Blalock's work - and most that has followed since focuses on African Americans as the minority group, the large proportion of Latino residents in Southern California raises questions regarding the transportability of intergroup theses for explaining the consequences of an influx of Latino residents into traditionally Black communities. Racial and ethnic transition can therefore

influence a neighborhood's vulnerability to crime and violence, and the type of violence that occurs (whether it is intra- or intergroup). Other gaps in the knowledge about racial and ethnic change in communities exist. Research on racial and ethnic change is still focused on counties and cities, whereas it needs to examine racial and ethnic relations in smaller communities where the likelihood of racial/ethnic mixing is higher. Factors that affect crime at the neighborhood (or census tract level) can also play out on a smaller scale, such as within schools. Indeed, prior literature shows that schools whose student body is poorer (Gottfredson and Gottfredson, 1985) and less stable (Welsh, Stokes, and Greene, 2000) have more student disorder; and schools with larger class sizes and increased student to teacher ratios, which indicate less oversight and increased opportunity for student misbehavior, also have higher levels of disobedience (Gottfredson and Gottfredson, 1985; Hellman and Beaton, 1986). There is also a dearth of neighborhood effects research that accounts for the endogeneity of neighborhood factors and/or examines the effect of geography. Though research continues to show that crime can also impact neighborhood structure (e.g., Bellair, 2000; Boggess and Hipp, in progress; Cullen and Levitt, 1997; Morenoff and Sampson, 1997), and extensive evidence shows that social phenomena in nearby communities is a significant predictor of outcomes in the community of interest (e.g., Browning, Feinberg, and Dietz, 2004; Hipp, Tita, and Boggess, 2009; Morenoff, 2003) few studies explicitly examine these relationships in neighborhoods as conventionally defined census tracts or block groups, or within schools.

This dissertation fills in some of those gaps. I investigate the relationships between racial and ethnic change in Los Angeles in three different settings: the city, South Los Angeles, and middle and senior high schools. I investigate different aspects of change, heterogeneity and population turnover (referred to as racial and ethnic churning). My analytical strategies account for reciprocal relationships and spatial effects. Before I present the research questions and hypotheses driving this research, I discuss why I chose to study Los Angeles and the special role that immigration plays in Los Angeles racial/ethnic relations.

Why Los Angeles? Los Angeles is a particularly relevant place to study racial and ethnic dynamics. As some authors have agreed upon, Los Angeles "in the throes of unprecedented ethnic transformation" (Waldinger and Bozorgmehr, 1996, p. 30). The city has transformed from a primarily non-Hispanic white metropolis to a majority - minority culture, perpetuated in part by the large influx of workers during World War II and the rapid immigration following the changes implemented by the 1965 Hart-Celler Act.1 Though ethnically diverse, Los Angeles is more geographically dispersed than the older Eastern cities where social disorganization theory originated. But despite the multi-ethnic composition, the city is historically considered "hyper-

The Hart-Celler Act passed in 1965 removed country-of-origin quotas, introduced two primary criteria for new residents: family ties or needed skills, and increased the total number of authorized immigrants to the U.S.

segregated" (Massey and Denton, 1993; Zubrinsky-Charles, 2004); with racial and ethnic groups settling in particular enclaves and having minimal interaction with other groups. Early racial prejudices and restrictive covenants helped segregate LA, pushing Latino migrants to the east and Black residents south. More recently, the growth of the Latino and Asian populations spurred dynamic changes in the racial and ethnic distribution in the city; between 1990 and 2000 the Latino population in Los Angeles County increased nearly 30% and the size of the Asian population rose 22%. The most noticeable change occurred in South Los Angeles, where a number of predominantly Black tracts were supplanted by majority Latino tracts. At the same time, some Black residents relocated to the suburban northern county areas. Black and Latino residents therefore, compete for residential space in a way that Asians and non-Latino Whites do not; new Asian residents settled closer to the county line and in tracts that were more likely to have no racial/ethnic majority (ZubrinskyCharles, 2004). Some research argues that this drastic population shift, from almost entire Black in the 1960s to predominantly Latino in 2000, coupled with the growth of Korean business in the area, spurred the 1992 riots after the acquittal of four white police officers accused of beating Rodney King (Baldasarre, 1994; Johnson, Jones, Farrell, and Oliver, 1992). As the city's burgeoning population continues to grow, the persistent economic inequality and negative intergroup attitudes remain. Evidence suggests that non-Latino white and Asian residents hold negative stereotypes against Blacks and Latinos (Bobo et al., 1994). Some Black residents of the formerly Black - dominated South Central feel that Latinos have taken over their community and their jobs, while

the new Latino residents believe that with their increasing size should come political power and increased access to resources (Oliver and Johnson, 1984). While Los Angeles is a unique city on some accounts, the findings obtained from this study are generalizable to other diverse cities undergoing racial and ethnic change and immigration. Though Los Angeles has an extensive history of tenuous race relations, my investigation of the appropriateness of Chicago-based theories to explain transition and change in structurally different Western US cities can contribute to a wider understanding of population change in different types of cities with different racial and ethnic groups beyond black and white.

Research questions and hypotheses The overall research question guiding this dissertation is: What is the relationship between racial and ethnic change and changes in crime? I explore this more specifically by investigating the following research questions. My expected findings are also listed. Chapter 2 1. What is the relationship between racial and ethnic transition and change in crime in Los Angeles neighborhoods between 1990 and 2000 when controlling for reciprocal and spatial effects? I expect that as neighborhoods transition, crime will increase (as would be predicted by social disorganization theory). I also expect the opposite relationship to be significant and positive: it is logical that increases in crime motivate residential

out-migration to safer communities. Change in spatially contiguous communities will be strongly associated with change in the focal tract.

2. Does the relationship differ based on the operational definition of racial and ethnic change: change in heterogeneity or racial and ethnic churning? It is likely that because the racial and ethnic churning measure is an indicator of population turnover, it will be more strongly associated with changes in crime. It is the process of change, not the groups involved, which is related to delinquency rates (Bursik and Webb, 1982).

3. Does the relationship differ depending on type of crime: violent or property offenses? The social disorganization framework that guides this research does not distinguish between the effects of residential instability on property versus violent crime; therefore, I do not expect to find any difference between the two crime types.

Chapter 3 1. How does Black to Latino transition in South Los Angeles impact inter and intragroup violence in neighborhoods, and what is the role of income inequality? Though prior theories of interracial/ethnic conflict are primarily based on Black White relations, I believe that similar factors will motivate Black and Latino violence. Black to Latino change then, would lead to increased violence because of 8

general population turnover, but also because the increasing size of the incoming group presents new threats to the formerly dominant group. I expect that income inequality will mediate (or attenuate) the effect of racial and ethnic change on increased violence (see Hipp, 2007).

2. Is there evidence of a reciprocal effect of specific types of inter or intragroup violence on the size of Black and Latino populations? Though I predict change in the overall crime rate to be significantly associated with changes in residential turnover in general, there is less research examining specific types of violence and population change. Therefore, I do expect increases in inter and intragroup crime to affect population change, but I do not have any expectations as to the magnitude of impact or whether Latino on Black or Black on Latino violence has a stronger effect.

3. Do the relationships differ between aggravated assaults and robberies? Based on prior research by Hipp, Tita, and Boggess (2009), I expect that there may be some difference between the impact of racial and ethnic change on assaults and robberies, that is, in part, potentially explained by robberies as instrumental crimes (to attain something) versus assaults that may be considered more expressive forms of violence. I expect less of a differential impact of changes in assaults or robberies on population change since both are types of serious violent crime.

Chapter 4 1. Does the relationship between racial and ethnic change and change in crime extend to Los Angeles middle and senior high schools? I expect to find a significant effect of racial and ethnic change on offending within schools, both middle and high schools. Schools represent smaller communities and the characteristics of disorganization likely impact the school environment in a similar manner as more conventional definitions of communities. Therefore, increased heterogeneity and racial and ethnic transformation will increases in all crime (property, assaults, batteries, and robberies). Schools that are disorganized and have an unstable population, therefore, will have higher incidents of crime and misconduct.

2. Is this relationship mediated or moderated by change in the local community? I believe that the direct effects of community change on school level outcomes will be mediated by school level change. That is, the effects of community change are likely to be picked up in their impact on change in student enrollment composition rather than in school crime or deviance (Welsh et al., 2000). At the same time, however, I also expect high transitioning schools that are located in highly changing neighborhoods will have the highest rates of crime, in which case, community effects exacerbate the negative consequences of racial/ethnic change.

10

"Roadmap" for the dissertation This dissertation is a collection of three manuscripts designed to address specific components of the overall research agenda. The following three chapters will each explore a different facet of the intricate relationship between neighborhood change and crime in Los Angeles. Within in each chapter, I present a thorough discussion of the relevant literature and theories guiding the research. I then introduce the data used in each chapter, including summary characteristics, and follow with an extensive discussion of the chosen research strategy and the results. I conclude with a discussion of the findings, study limitations, and possibilities for future research. In Chapter 5 I discuss the findings from the dissertation overall and link them together for a larger understanding of race/ethnicity, change, and crime in Los Angeles neighborhoods.

11

REFERENCES Baldasarre, Mark. 1994. The Los Angeles Riots: Lessons for the Urban Future. Boulder, CO: Westview. Bellair, Paul E. 1997. Social Interaction and Community Crime: Examining the Importance of Neighbor Networks. Criminology, 35,677-703. Bellair, Paul E. 2000. Informal surveillance and street crime: A complex relationship. Criminology, 38,137 - 170. Blalock, Hubert M. 1965. Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations. New York: Capricorn Books. Bobo, Lawrence, Melvin L. Oliver, James H. Johnson, and Abel Valenzuela Jr. 2000. Prismatic Metropolis: Inequality in Los Angeles. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Browning, Christopher R., Seth Feinberg, and Robert Dietz. 2004. The paradox of social organization: Networks, collective efficacy, and violent crime in urban neighborhoods. Social Forces, 83, 503 - 534. Bursik, Robert J. 1988. Social disorganization and theories of crime and delinquency: Problems and prospects. Criminology, 26, 519-551. Bursik Robert and Harold Grasmick. 1993. Neighborhoods and Crime: The Dimensions of Effective Community Control. New York: Lexington Books. Bursik, Robert, and Jim Webb. 1982. Community change and patterns of delinquency. American Journal of Sociology, 88,24-42. Cullen, Julie Berry and Steven D Levitt. 1999. Crime, urban flight, and the consequences for cities. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 81, 159-169. Gottfredson, Gary, and Denise Gottfredson. 1985. Victimization in schools. New York: Plenum. Hellman, Daryl, and Susan Beaton. 1986. The Pattern of Violence in Urban Public School: The Influence of School and Community. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 23,102 - 1 2 7 . Hipp, John R. 2007. Income inequality, race, and place: Does the distribution of race and class within neighborhoods affect crime rates? Criminology, 45, 665 - 697.

12

Hipp, John R., George Tita, and Lyndsay Boggess. 2009. Inter- and Intra-Group Violence: Is Violent Crime an Expression of Group Conflict or Social Disorganization? Criminology, 47, 501 - 544. Johnson, James H., Cloyzelle K. Jones, Walter Farrell Jr., and Melvin L. Oliver. 1992. The Los Angeles Rebellion: A retrospective view. Economic Development Quarterly, 6, 356 - 372 Massey, Douglas S. and Nancy Denton. 1993. American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Morenoff, Jeffrey D. 2003. Neighborhood mechanisms and the spatial dynamics of birth weight. American Journal of Sociology, 5, 976 - 1017. Morenoff, Jeffrey D. and Robert J. Sampson. 1997. Violent crime and the spatial dynamics of neighborhood transition: Chicago, 1970- 1990. Social Forces. 16, 31 64. Oliver, Melvin L. and James H. Johnson. 1984. Interethnic conflict in an urban ghetto: The case of Blacks and Latinos in Los Angeles. Research in Social Movements, Conflict, and Change, 6, 5 7 - 9 4 . Rountree, Pamela Wilcox and Barbara D Warner. 1999. Social ties and crime: Is the relationship gendered? Criminology, 37, 789-813. Waldinger, Roger, and Mehdi Bozorgmedr (Eds.). 1996. Ethnic Los Angeles. New York: Russell Sage. Warner, Barbara D. and Glenn L. Pierce. 1993. Reexamining Social Disorganization Theory Using Calls to the Police as a Measure of Crime. Criminology, 31, 493-517. Warner, Barbara D. and Pamela Wilcox Rountree. 1997. Local Social Ties in a Community and Crime Model: Questioning the Systemic Nature of Informal Social Control. Social Problems, 44, 520-536. Welsh, Wayne, Robert Stokes, and Jack Greene. 2000. A Macro-Level Model of School Disorder. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 37, 243 - 283. Zubrinsky-Charles, Camille. 2004. Won't You Be My Neighbor: Race, Class, and Residence in Los Angeles. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

13

CHAPTER 2

RACIAL AND ETHNIC TRANSITION AND CRIME IN THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES

ABSTRACT

This study examines the relationship between racial and ethnic transition and change in crime rates in Los Angeles, California between 1990 and 2000. Residential turnover disrupts friendships, reduces the ability of community members to monitor behavior, and obscures social norms, all of which contribute to increased crime and deviance. Prior research argues, however, that changes in the crime rate motivate population change and the true relationship between neighborhood change and crime is a feedback loop. In this chapter I define racial and ethnic change in two ways; one, I examine the change in racial and ethnic heterogeneity and compare it to two, racial and ethnic churning. I model the reciprocal relationship between crime and neighborhood change using two-stage least squares and I account for the effect of neighboring communities by using the Land-Dean/Anselin two-stage least squares estimator model. My results reveal that increases in total, violent, and property crime are associated with increases in racial and ethnic heterogeneity and to a lesser extent racial and ethnic churning. Contrary to current neighborhood theory, I find no evidence that changes in community racial and ethnic composition increase local crime rates.

15

INTRODUCTION This study examines the relationship between changes in crime and residential change in communities. I am specifically interested in how change in the racial and ethnic composition of neighborhoods is linked to crime. I test whether the definition of "neighborhood change" matters by comparing two different measures of change: a traditional heterogeneity index and compare it to an alternative measure of racial and ethnic churning that captures the process of racial/ethnic transition in a neighborhood. While there is extensive research on the social organization of neighborhoods and the impact on crime, few studies have been able to account for the reciprocal relationship between residential change and crime. Furthermore, I argue that beyond change in the focal area, what is happening in the surrounding communities has important implications for the neighborhood change - crime relationship. That is, social phenomena in one neighborhood, such as racial and ethnic turnover, likely affect social phenomena in geographically proximate neighborhoods. Therefore, I estimate a non-recursive two-stage least squares model controlling for neighborhood socioeconomic and demographic characteristics using data from Los Angeles between 1990 and 2000.

Contributions to the literature This chapter supplements the current body of research on neighborhood effects in three important ways. One, though many studies are becoming more methodologically complex, few projects account for simultaneity and endogeneity of

16

community level factors; whereas I make the reciprocal relationship between change in the racial and ethnic composition of communities and change in crime rates a central focus of this chapter. I utilize a sophisticated methodological strategy that controls for endogenous bi-directional relationships and can account for spatial dynamics (as an additional endogenous effect). Two, I compare two different operational definitions of racial and ethnic change. I use the conventional heterogeneity index and a more recently developed measure of "racial and ethnic churning." Three, I focus on a more dynamic model by utilizing indicators of neighborhood change rather than examining cross-sectional relationships. Much of the current research on neighborhoods fails to account for the influence of changes over time despite the fact that the original premise of social disorganization theory emphasize the "social processes," "growth of the city," and urban dynamics in general (Shaw and McKay, 1942). In this chapter of my dissertation, I use a series of two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression models to examine the simultaneous relationship between racial and ethnic change and change in crime rates in the City of Los Angeles. In the next section I elaborate on the theoretical premises guiding this research and discuss the current literature. After summarizing the data used in this chapter I present my chosen research methodology, including an extensive presentation of the 2SLS model and how I account for reciprocal and spatial effects. Results suggest that the relationship between neighborhood change and change in crime may be unidirectional, from change in crime motivating racial and ethnic turnover. I conclude with a discussion of the findings and their implications for future research.

17

THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS

The location of crime in Los Angeles, like many other urban areas, is distributed in a nonrandom fashion. In LA, high crime neighborhoods are concentrated in the southern areas of the city and near the downtown area, but not along the coast. Why some neighborhoods continuously have high crime compared to others has long been a focal point of criminological research, stemming from Shaw and McKay's early research on juvenile delinquency in Chicago. Shaw and McKay discovered that crime persists in specific areas of the city despite population changes, leading the authors to conclude that the actual source of crime is neighborhood ecological structure, not individual characteristics of the residents. More specifically, Shaw and McKay concluded that high crime neighborhoods are socially disorganized and characterized by low economic status, high rates of residential mobility, and racial and ethnic heterogeneity. These factors decrease the community's capacity to monitor and control behavior, and crime increases as a result of those insufficient controls. More recent work has expanded Shaw and McKay's original formulation of social disorganization theory into what is considered a systemic model of crime that more explicitly links ecological factors to crime (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974). The systemic model emphasizes informal social control as the mediating factor between community characteristics and crime. Informal social control extends from the private friendship networks established by community residents, and is weaker in disadvantaged communities with highly mobile populations. Public social control comes from the ability of a community to 18

self-regulate, regardless of deep interpersonal attachments (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993). The transitory population in disadvantaged areas makes it difficult for residents to form primary relationships because forming bonds takes time and break when households move, and because short-term residents are less likely to invest in the community (Rohe and Stewart, 1996), and reduces the ability of residents to supervise the neighborhood (in part because they are unable to recognize who belongs) or collectively address community incivilities (Bursik, 1988). Residential stability, therefore, is an important condition for the emergence of social ties, community attachment, and cohesion (Sampson, 1992). In empirical work, stability is often measured as the proportion of residents who own their own home, the average residential length of stay in the neighborhood, or the proportion of households who moved within the past five years (of the Census). The opposite of which, instability, is associated with increased crime. In this study, I focus on a specific type of instability conceptualized as the change in the racial and ethnic composition over time. Neighborhoods with high racial change are indicative of population fluctuation, while communities with little change are more likely to be more stable. Neighborhoods with low racial and ethnic change, however, may still be unstable if the residents moving in and out of a community are members of the same racial group. Residential fluctuation also prevents residents from establishing a consensus on acceptable social norms. Without clear guidance as to the appropriate behavior in the community, potential offenders do not know what is expected of them and society is no longer able to control their behavior. In communities with sudden

19

disruptive social change, such as those with drastic shifts in the population composition, this normlessness is more likely to occur (Durkheim, 1897). Social ties are not strong enough to reinforce conventional norms. Other structural characteristics of disorganized communities are associated with decreased social control and high crime. Sampson and Groves (1989) found that friendship networks, participation in community organizations, and the supervision of youths explain much of the relationship between disadvantage and crime. Racial and ethnic heterogeneity impedes social control because community members will be less likely to develop meaningful social connections (and private forms of social control) with members of different racial-ethnic groups (e.g., McPherson, SmithLovin, and Cook, 2001). Heterogeneity also imposes anonymity which can facilitate crime. Merry (1981) found that juvenile residents of a racially heterogenous public housing project were undeterred in their commission of crime because of the low likelihood they would be recognized. Social control is also reduced because residents of low socioeconomic status neighborhoods are less likely to participate in volunteer organizations and form social ties within those groups (Wandersman, Florin, Friedman, and Meier, 1987); and the ability of a community to supervise general neighborhood activities is weakened by higher rates of family disruption (as indicated by single parent households) in disadvantaged areas (Sampson, 1987). The social characteristics of communities most strongly related to social disorganization in current research are socioeconomic status, family structure, residential mobility, and racial/ethnic composition.

20

The lack of surveillance in transitioning communities is strongly associated with routine activity theory's concept of reduced guardianship. Routine activity theory is an opportunity theory which argues that three main factors - motivated offenders, ineffective guardians, and the availability of potential targets - lead to crime. Assuming motivation is constant (a classical criminological assumption) (e.g., Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990), disadvantaged areas have high crime because there are ample potential targets and because the transitory nature of the population reduces the ability to monitor behavior. Furthermore, high population density and racial/ethnic heterogeneity within the community further increases anonymity and the ability of the offender to offend without being detected. Some researchers argue that the role of social networks goes beyond the ties themselves as means to facilitating social control, but that the resources embodied in the relationships are also essential elements to control crime (Coleman, 1990). These intangible resources are referred to collectively as social capital. Though the definition of social capital varies, social capital is essentially "the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures" (Portes, 1998, p. 6). Elements of social capital include norms of reciprocity and sanctions, trust, cooperation, and sharing information. Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer (2001) tested the relationship between social capital and homicide using structural equation models. The authors measured social capital as a construct comprised of social trust and civic engagement. While controlling for the reciprocal relationship of homicide on social capital, the authors found that higher rates of social capital significantly decrease homicide rates, controlling for structural factors.

21

In an effort to link social disorganization and social capital, Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) performed a systematic multilevel study of Chicago neighborhoods. The authors conclude that an interdependence between trust (developed out of social ties) and purposive action for the benefit of the community, which they term collective efficacy. Collective efficacy is, in sum, "the linkage of cohesion and mutual trust with shared expectations for intervening in support of neighborhood social control" (Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999, p. 612-13), and is exhibited in public actions to maintain social order such as participation in community organizations, neighborhood patrols, and notifying the police when crime occurs. Sampson et al. (1997) argue that neighborhoods high in concentrated disadvantage and high residential turnover have lower levels of collective efficacy, and that a lack of collective efficacy leads to disorder and crime. Collective efficacy is independent of social ties, however, and neighborhoods with weak social ties can have low crime rates if the level of collective efficacy in the community is high (Sampson etal., 1997). Recent research, however, draws the link between collective efficacy and the community's responses to neighborhood issues into question (Wells, Schafer, Varano, Bynum, 2006). Wells and colleagues found that residents of neighborhoods with high collective efficacy2 were no more likely to notify community associations, the police, or other government agencies when confronted with local problems.

Wells, Schafer, Varano, and Bynum operationalized collective efficacy based on survey responses to questions social cohesion and shared expectations. Wells et al. point out that though the measurement of collective efficacy overall can be questioned, their measure is consistent with prior research (i.e., Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997; Gibson, Zhao, and Lovrich, 2002; and Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush, 2001).

22

Communities also vary in their degree of formal social control, or police protection. Neighborhoods with more social capital or collective efficacy generally have better formal social control and local institutions. That is, residents are better able unite in order to influence municipal services and policymakers, raise funds to create and maintain community service centers, and secure necessary resources (such as law enforcement). Kubrin and Weitzer (2003) suggested that effective formal control may encourage informal control through community policing, but that when police presence is weak, it may actually deflate residents willingness to work together. Furthermore, though transitioning communities are becoming more racially and ethnically diverse, they remain segregated from non-Latino white and middleclass neighborhoods. Sampson and Wilson (1995) elaborate on social disorganization theory by incorporating the effect of segregation on the geographic and social isolation of disorganized neighborhoods. Social isolation from middle class neighborhoods impedes upward social mobility by residents of impoverished areas and deprives lower-class (primarily black) residents of opportunities and resources available in more affluent communities. Additionally, this segregation from mainstream middle-class values and norms hinders the creation of social capital necessary for economic advancement, prevents protection from abusive behaviors of police and government, and limits positive social interactions with mainstream role models (Wilson, 1987). In such communities, despite change in the racial and ethnic composition, the continued lack of interaction with more affluent non-minority society increases the likelihood of crime and deviance as cultural adaptations to

23

social isolation develop that further undermine social control (Massey and Denton, 1993; Wilson, 1987). According to Fagan (1992), as legitimate work opportunities decline and conventional values yield little payoff in terms of money or status, an illegitimate opportunity structure (or subculture) emerges in which deviant peer networks replace formal and informal social control networks. It is through these systems of deviant peers that the transmission of this alternative value system is propagated (Anderson, 1990; Wilson, 1996). These cultural adaptations are more tolerant of violence and alternative means to achieving goals, and would be associated with higher crime rates. Social disorganization theory as originally formulated is applicable to all crime types, but empirical analysis has found mixed results. Bellair (2000) showed that neighborhood surveillance is significantly associated with robbery and stranger assault, but is not related to burglaries. (When looking at reciprocal effects, however, he found the relationship between surveillance and robbery/assault significant only in the negative impact robbery/assault has on surveillance.) Similarly, though homicide can affect mobility decisions in general, certain types of homicide, such as between strangers, may have a stronger effect than domestic killings (Kubrin, 2003).

Endogenous nature of community effects Much prior research on social disorganization theory, however, has overlooked the effect that increases in crime have on community structure. There is considerable evidence that crime and violence can affect neighborhood conditions. 24

For example, Taub, Taylor, and Dunham (1994) argue that crime affects neighborhood change through its impact on residential mobility and Dugan (1999) found that the probability a household moves increases with victimization at or near their residence. Liska and Bellair (1995) determined that violent crime, robbery in particular, is associated with residential out-migration and racial change in cities between 1950 and 1990. The effect of crime on population change has differential impacts on blacks versus whites. Morenoff and Sampson (1997) discovered that high levels of initial homicide were related to total population loss, but increases in neighborhood homicide were associated with black population gain. Out-migration is also often associated with income (Cullen and Levitt, 1997); as (primarily white) households with financial resources leave communities, they reduce the local tax base and leave behind neighborhood with concentrated poverty and disadvantage, which only perpetuates the crime. More recently, Hipp, Tita, and Greenbaum (forthcoming) showed that increased in violent and property crime rates in tracts are associated with higher rates of residential home sales. Emerging evidence argues that the relationship between crime and community structure is a feedback loop (Bellair, 2000; Liska and Warner, 1991; Morenoff and Sampson, 1997). For example, crime increases because social control is weak; but the increasing crime further decreases social control by breaking up social networks, decreasing participation in community activities and inducing residential out-migration. Much of the current research on non-recursive feedback models finds that crime influences interpersonal behavior by affecting residents' fear of victimization (Liska, Sanchirico, and Reed, 1987; Liska and Warner, 1991;

25

Markowitz et al., 2001). Increased fear of crime constrains social interaction and reduces residents' participation in civic organizations and social activities that are the mechanisms of informal social control. As social cohesion decreases then, crime and disorder increase, which then further increases fear and social isolation. Indeed, Messner, Baumer, and Rosenfeld (2004) found evidence of a reciprocal relationship between elements of social capital and homicide. Little research specifies between crime type - violent or property - on fear of victimization. It is plausible, however, that increased rates of violent crime in a community may have a differential impact than higher property crime rates.

Spatial dynamics In addition to acknowledging the reciprocal relationships inherent in communities, neighborhood effects researchers have begun to account for spatial dependence in geographically based models of crime (Pyle, 1974). That is, just as individuals are influenced by other people, neighborhoods likely affect and are affected by the other communities surrounding them. Prior research supports this notion (e.g., Browning, Feinberg, and Dietz, 2004; Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush, 2001, among others). Within ecologically based models of crime, crime in one neighborhood can impact crime in a nearby or adjoining community through a process of contagion or diffusion. For example, several studies have shown that homicide in one neighborhood is associated with future homicides in nearby neighborhoods (Cohen

26

and Tita, 1999). Evidence of similar diffusion of crime also applies to larger areas such as counties (Bailer et al., 2001; Messner et al., 1999). Structural processes (besides crime) beyond the immediate neighborhood also influence outcomes. That is, social and demographic characteristics of spatially proximate communities influence crime in the focal neighborhood. Hipp, Tita, Boggess (2009) found evidence that racial and ethnic transition in the nearby communities is related to increased rates of intergroup violence, and Mears and Bhati (2006) determined that the effect of resource deprivation on homicide goes beyond the immediate neighborhood. Neighborhood level researchers also need to acknowledge and account for the clustering of similar communities within geographic space (Cliff and Ord, 1973; 1981). Research continuously shows that crime is distributed in a non-random fashion in counties (Messner et al., 1999), census tracts (Griffiths and Chavez, 2004), and other operational definitions of neighborhoods (Garcia, Taylor, and Lawton, 2007; Mears and Bhati, 2006). For example, Messner and colleagues (1999) found strong evidence of clustering among homicide rates in a subset of counties around St. Louis and in Southern U.S. counties (Bailer et al., 2001).

DATA

In order to investigate the relationship between change in racial and ethnic composition of neighborhoods and change in local crime rates, I rely on data from two sources: the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the 1990 and 2000 27

U.S. Census. Census tracts are used as a proxy for neighborhood. Census tracts are official designations of approximately 4,000 residents that are often used in sociological analysis to approximate communities. In 2000 there were 822 census tracts in the city. To account for potential changes in tract boundaries between 1990 and 2000,1 apportion the 1990 data to 2000 census tract boundaries (though the majority of tracts did not change). I exclude two tracts with fewer than 500 residents and tracts missing data. In the final analysis for the churning models the total number of tracts included is 809 and in the heterogeneity models there are 816 tracts included. Figure 2.1 (page 41) shows the location of the City of Los Angeles within Los Angeles County by census tract.

Crime data The crime data includes all crimes reported to police in the City of Los Angeles for the years 1992 and 2000. The 1990 data is recorded by LAPD reporting district; reporting districts are geographic areas that approximate census tracts and are used by the LAPD to coordinate community law enforcement. The 1990 crime data is apportioned to the census tract using a Geographic Information Systems (GIS) overlay function. The Los Angeles crime data for 2000 was provided by reported incident. The individual crimes were then aggregated to the 2000 census tracts for a total crime count by tract. The dataset includes the total number of all Part 1 offenses, that I categorize into violent crimes (homicide, robbery, and aggravated assault), and property crime (burglary and theft). Crime rates are

1 will use 1992 data as a proxy for 1990 because I do not have 1990 crime data.

28

calculated as the total number of offenses per 1,000 residents. I compute a measure of change in the crime rate between 1990 and 2000 as the difference between the two time points. In 1990, there was an average of 7.66 violent crimes and 8.82 property crimes per 1,000 residents. These rates decreased to 7.15 violent and 8.27 property offenses in 2000. The average difference between the two years is a decrease of approximate 0.50 for both property and violent crime rates. The mean crime rates for 1990 and 2000 and the change between the two years are shown in Table 2.1 (page 30).

29

Figure 2.1. Location of the O t y of Los Angeles within Los Angeles County Location of the City of Los Angeles within Los Angeles County by 2000 Census tracts City of Los Angeles, percent non-white population 2000

50.01%-73% greater than 75%

Demographic data I use demographic explanatory and control variables from the 1990 and 2000 Census Summary Tape Files Three (STF3). I construct four variables to account for neighborhood differences in income, age composition, immigrant population, and housing. These chosen variables, along with the instrumental variables discussed next, encompass the key correlates of differences in neighborhood crime rates. I include the tract level median household income as an indicator of community socioeconomic status since poverty and low-income communities are associated with higher crime rates and residential turnover. I also include a measure of the percent youths in a community aged 15 to 24 to account for those most likely to offend; the percent recent immigrants measured as the percent of residents who lived in a foreign country five years ago; and the proportion occupied housing units out of total housing units. I include the percent immigrants because recent research suggests that early generation immigrants may have a protective effect against crime (or at least not a criminogenic effect) within communities (Lee, Martinez, and Rosenfeld, 2001). The occupied housing units variable should be negatively correlated with crime; fewer vacant properties reduces "un-guarded" areas where crime can occur and also fewer abandoned properties to be vandalized and fewer to buy/rent when households move in. In order to capture neighborhood demographic change, I use the difference score between the 1990 and 2000 values in the models. A summary of demographic and socioeconomic variables for Los Angeles in 1990 and 2000 is shown in Table 2.1.

31

Table 2.1. Summary statistics for the City of Los Angeles census tracts, 1990 and 2000, N = 822
Crime variables Violent crime rate (per 1,000) 1990 Violent crime rate (per 1,000) 2000 1990 - 2000 change in violent crime rate Property crime rate (per 1,000) 1990 Property crime rate (per 1,000) 2000 1990 - 2000 change in property crime rate Total crime rate (per 1,000) 1990 Total crime rate (per 1,000) 2000 1990 -2000 change in total crime rate Community racial/ethnic composition Percent Asian 1990 Percent Asian 2000 Change in percent Asian Percent Black 1990 Percent Black 2000 Change in percent Black Percent Latino 1990 Percent Latino 2000 Change in percent Latino Percent non-Hispanic White 1990 Percent non-Hispanic White 2000 Change in percent non-Hispanic White Community characteristics Total population 1990 Total population 2000 Percent immigrant residents 1990 Percent immigrant residents 2000 Change in percent immigrant residents Percent youths 15 to 24 1990 Percent youths 15 to 24 2000 Change in percent youths Percent occupied housing units 1990 Percent occupied housing units 2000 Change in percent occupied housing Median household income 1990 Median household income 2000 Change in median household income Mean 7.66 7.15 -0.51 8.82 8.27 -0.56 16.48 15.42 -1.07 9.56 9.91 0.35 13.02 10.66 -2.35 40.11 47.19 7.08 36.75 29.27 -7.48 4,160 4,411 38.52 40.92 2.40 16.66 14.79 -1.86 93.98 95.28 1.30 $33,586 $40,933 $7,348 S.D. 0.88 0.94 0.54 0.58 0.61 0.46 1.35 1.42 0.91 9.78 10.40 4.87 20.82 16.66 6.69 27.67 29.15 9.22 32.00 28.90 9.04 1,173 1,380 18.02 15.83 6.86 7.37 7.87 3.34 4.55 3.56 5.27 $19,283 $25,476 $8,709

32

Racial and ethnic change data The racial and ethnic change information was obtained from the 1990 and 2000 Census data. I test two measures of general neighborhood change (i.e., not race-specific). My first indicator of neighborhood change is a measure of heterogeneity. Increasing racial/ethnic heterogeneity is related to increased crime by negatively impacting the formation of social connections. Neighborhoods that are becoming more heterogeneous then, would be expected to have increasing crime. Traditionally, heterogeneity is measured using a Herfindahl index. The Herfindahl index is a measure of racial/ethnic concentration at the neighborhood level that is calculated as the sum of the squared proportions of each race or ethnicity in the tract. The formula for racial/ethnic heterogeneity is below, where G represents the proportion of the population that is group y out of J ethnic groups.
j

(2.1)

Heterogene z Y y = 1 - ^T G ;
j=\

Subtracting from 1 makes this a measure of heterogeneity with values ranging from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates a completely homogenous community. To examine the change in heterogeneity between 1990 and 20001 calculate the heterogeneity for each time period and take the difference. On average, tracts had a heterogeneity score of 0.45 in 1990 and 0.46 in 2000. The average change in heterogeneity is 0.18, with a range from -0.38 to 0.32 and a standard deviation of 0.11. Additionally, I calculate a measure of population churning as an indicator of neighborhood change. Other studies have employed a similar measure in the

33

examination of the siting of toxic facilities (Pastor, Sadd, and Hipp, 2001), or inter and intragroup crime (Hipp, Tita, and Boggess, 2009). The equation for my churning variable is shown below.

(2.2)

Churning =

^^(G^-G^)2

In Equation 2, G represents the percent of the population that is ethnic group y out of J ethnic groups from the 2000 (00) or 1990 (90). I take the square root in order to place the measure back into approximately the same metric as the difference in percentage over the decade. High values indicate a lot of churning and low values indicate stability. The average amount of racial and ethnic churning between 1990 and 2000 is 15.2%, ranging from a low of less than 1% to a high of 62.6%, and a standard deviation of 10.6%. I compare these two definitions of racial and ethnic change in part because I believe they are capturing different effects. That is, racial/ethnic churning directly accounts for change in group size by measuring the difference between group size in 1990 and the same group in 2000 whereas the change in heterogeneity score only captures composition at one point in time. In addition, it is possible that changes in composition by race/ethnicity are masked by using the difference in heterogeneity score. For example, a hypothetical community that is 50% Black, 15% non-Latino White, 8% Asian, and 27% Latino would have a heterogeneity score of 0.6482 in 1990. If the same community changed to 40% Black, 10% non-Latino White, 7% Asian, and 43% Latino in 2000, the heterogeneity score would be nearly identical (0.6402); the difference would be nil, when in fact, the community composition has

34

changed. This change is captured when using the corresponding measure of racial/ethnic churning for the same tract, which is 19% churning (or change).

RESEARCH METHOD

In order to examine the simultaneous relationship between racial and ethnic change in neighborhoods and change in local crime rates, I employ a two stage least squares (2SLS) approach with multiple endogenous regressors. Two-stage least squares is an alternative to maximum likelihood (ML) or ordinary least squares (OLS) regression that is able to model equations that violate conventional regression assumptions. In particular, 2SLS can estimate models with endogenous variables (feedback loops) or correlated errors. In the first stage, exogenous instrumental variables are used to estimate the predicted values of the endogenous variables; in the second stage, the predicted values are substituted into the regression as an instrument of the problematic or endogenous variable. Both stages use OLS regression. Once substituted, the predicted values are no longer correlated with the error term and are no longer a direct predictor of the dependent variable. The 2SLS approach that I utilize incorporates both the reciprocal relationship between the dependent variables and the influence of neighboring census tracts (spatial effects). The general equation for a two stage least squares model is shown below. Equation 2.3a is the first-stage regression, representing the reduced form regression of endogenous variable Y on the full set of instruments Z. Equation 2.3b is the structural equation of interest (the second stage regression).

35

(2.3a) r=nz+a>x+v
(2.3b) y = fi? +TX+[i In the first-stage regression, Y is the problematic endogenous variable(s) to be instrumented; Z is a matrix of instruments used to predict Y, and X is a matrix of exogenous regressors. n is a parameter representing the effect of instrumental variables Z, G > is a vector of parameters estimating the effects of the exogeneous variables, and v is a disturbance term. In the second-stage regression, ? represents the predicted values of Y and P is a vector of parameters estimating the effect o f f on the dependent variable of interest v. X is a matrix of exogenous regressors and T is the vector of the effect of the exogenous variables on v. |o. is the error term. A path diagram of the specific model used in this chapter is shown in Figure 2.2 (page 37).

36

Figure 2.2. Path diagram of the general neighborhood change and crime relationships investigated in this chapter
Change in crime instrument Change in crime instrument z2

z1

Change in % immigrant residents

x1
Change in crime rate 1990-2000 yi Change in neighboring crime rate

Change in % occupied housing units x2

Wy1
Neighboring exogenous variables WX Change in neighboring heterogeneity Wy2

Change in median income x3

Racial/Ethnic Change y2

Change in % youths age 15 to 24 x4

Racial/ethnic change instrument z3

Racial/ethnic change instrument z4

At the center, yj (change in crime rate) a n d ^ (racial/ethnic change) are the dependent/endogenous variables of interest. They are each predicted by exogenous variables xy through X4 and instrumented for identification purposes by two different instrumental variables, z; through Z4. Wyi is the spatially weighted change in crime rate variable, and Wy2 is the spatially weighted neighborhood racial/ethnic change variable;
WYZXQ

instrumented by WX, a matrix of spatially lagged X variables.

37

The above path diagram shown as 2SLS equations is shown after the following discussion elaborating on the use of the instrumental variables and spatial effects employed in this chapter.

Instrumental variables In OLS regression instrumental variables (IV) are used when the explanatory variables are correlated with the disturbance terms, when the covariates are subject to measurement error, and in models with simultaneous causation. Since I hypothesize that the relationship between racial/ethnic change and change in crime will have a simultaneous reciprocal effect, I rely on IVs to aid in model identification. A model is said to be "just identified" if the number of known parameters (observed variances and covariances) is equal to the number of unknown parameters to be estimated, and "overidentified" if the number of knowns exceeds the number of unknowns. The addition of instrumental variables, therefore, increases the ratio of known information to unknown parameters. Instrumental variables must meet three requirements in order to be valid instruments. One, the IV cannot be a direct predictor of For correlated with its error term; two, the IV must be related to or correlated with X; and three, within reciprocal models the IV cannot be an instrument for both variables in the feedback loop. Instrumental variables should be derived from relevant theory. In models with multiple endogenous regressors, there must be at least one instrument for each endogenous variable. With two endogenous variables neighborhood racial/ethnic change and crime - 1 must use two additional exogenous

38

IVs to predict each dependent variable. I first used Census data to compute two variables that estimate change in crime but are not related to neighborhood racial and ethnic change. Though many neighborhood factors predict both racial and ethnic change and crime, I rely on 1) the change in percentage of students enrolled in private schools, and 2) change in overall income inequality to instrument change in crime. Communities that have increasing proportion of students enrolled in private schools have reduced crime rates. Schools, public schools in particular, can be considered "hot spots" for crime. Los Angeles public schools are large, typically overcrowded, institutions and have fairly high offending rates, particularly for gangrelated offenses (see Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of Los Angeles middle and high schools), whereas private schools typically have lower rates of student victimization (Nofziger, 2008). It is likely that private institutions are smaller and better funded and can be more selective in their student body (and therefore less likely to have problems) (e.g., Neal, 1997 for Catholic schools). The students themselves are likely better behaved and come from more affluent households. (In this way, the percentage of students enrolled in private schools can also be a proxy for income.) Change in the percent of private school students was computed as the difference between the 1990 and 2000 percentages of students in private schools (out of all students in school). On average, the percent of students enrolled in private schools decreased less than 1% between 1990 and 2000, ranging from - 45% to an increase of 47%. Income inequality is a consistent predictor of crime (e.g., Hipp, 2007). Though income level itself may predict residential turnover, the dispersion of

39

inequality in the tract is less likely to motivate relocation. Income inequality was computed using the Gini coefficient and ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 indicates perfect income equality and 1 is perfect income inequality.4 The change in income inequality was computed as the 2000 inequality measure minus the 1990 inequality value. I also use the same two instrumental variables in violent crime and property crime models. I utilize 1) the change in average housing value, and 2) the change in the percent of families with children as instruments for racial and ethnic churning. Because churning is considered a more dynamic version of racial and ethnic change, both of these variables are directly related to related turnover in general: as property values increase, households may decide to sell and move to another neighborhood to capitalize on their investment, and may be motivated to move into communities that have a large proportion of children (particularly if the homebuyer has children). Likewise, families without children may move out of the neighborhood into areas where residents are closer to their age or lifestyle. Therefore, as both median housing value and the proportion of families with children increases, residential churning also increases. Change in the average housing value is calculated as the difference between the mean value in 2000 and the mean value in 1990; property values increased approximately $105,000 over the decade. On average, the proportion of families with children (out of all families) increased 4.2% between the 2000 and 1990. Lastly, I use 1) change in the percent marriedfamilies with children, and 2) change in the percent crowded households to instrument change in racial and ethnic
Thanks to John Hipp for the calculation of the Gini coefficient and the income inequality variable that was used in this analysis. For more information on this particular variable see Hipp (2007) or Nielson and Alderson (1997).
4

40

heterogeneity. In both instances, as households or families become larger, heterogeneity is likely to decrease. That is, since the majority of married couples, households, and friendships are of the same racial/ethnic group (Kennedy, 2003; McPherson, Smith - Lovin, Cook, 2001; Smith, 2002), as there are more families with children and more crowded households with a greater number of people, homogeneity increases. The percent of married families with children is out of all families, and the percent crowded households is the number of households averaging more than one resident per room out of the total number of households in the tract. The change variables are the differences between the 1990 and 2000 values. The percent married families with children decreased less than 1% over the decade, with a standard deviation of 11%; the proportion crowded households increased between 1990 and 2000 by approximately 4%.

Spatial effects In non-spatial models I would utilize a non-recursive structural equation model to estimate the reciprocal effects between neighborhood change and change in crimes rates. Neighborhoods, however, are not isolated units and exist within a geographic context. Often communities with similar social and demographic characteristics cluster in physical space, exhibiting patterns of positive spatial autocorrelation. (Negative spatial autocorrelation is the clustering of dissimilar values.) Spatial autocorrelation violates OLS assumptions of independence. In addition to observations having patterns in physical space, social phenomena in one neighborhood can also affect observations in nearby

41

neighborhoods. It is likely that racial/ethnic turnover in one tract is related to racial/ethnic change in nearby tracts and as previously discussed, the crime rate in one neighborhood is often related to crime rates in geographically proximate areas. This interaction between communities is considered a spatial lag effect.5 By definition, spatial lag effects introduce endogeneity into the model, since every focal tract is a neighbor to another tract. To account for spatial lag effects, I compute spatially weighted6 values for all variables included in the analysis by multiplying the variable by a spatial weight matrix (W). Spatial weights can be defined as a distance matrix, where observations closer to the focal tract are weighted more heavily than further values, or a continuity matrix where observations adjacent to the focal tract are considered neighbors. To account for the effects of only the closest communities, I use a Queen's case continuity matrix; tracts that share a line segment with the focal tract are neighbors and given a value of 1 (or a 0 otherwise). I used GeoDa 9.5.i software to construct my spatial weights matrix and test for spatial autocorrelation. On average, a focal tract has 4 neighbors, ranging from one neighbor (four tracts) to 15 neighbors (two tracts).7 The spatially lagged variables are referred to as WX for the exogenous predictors and WYfox the endogeneous variables. The most common test of spatial autocorrelation is the Moran's I. Moran's I reflects the degree of spatial dependence across the study area and is an indicator of the association between neighboring units. Results range from -1 to 1 where zero

A second major spatial modeling strategy is the spatial error model in which spatial autocorrelation is influenced by some unmeasured variable. 6 Also referred to as spatially lagged variables. 7 Tracts located on the perimeter of the City of Los Angeles whose geographic neighbors lie outside of LAPD jurisdiction, and those tracts that border the Pacific Ocean will have fewer neighbors than more centrally located tracts (i.e., the spatial data is limited because of boundary effects).

42

represents spatial randomness (the observations have no geographic pattern), 1 is perfect positive spatial autocorrelation, and -1 is perfect negative spatial autocorrelation. With the inclusion of spatial weights and an endogenous WY term in the regression model, conventional OLS or ML regressions are not computationally efficient to produce accurate results (and some computer programs simply cannot handle the size of the matrices computed during analysis). Anselin (1988) and Land and Deane (1992) suggest a variation on the two-stage least squares model that provides numerical estimates that are comparable to ML results; referred to as the Land-Deane/Anselin 2SLS model. Their strategy requires instrumental variables that are used along with the full set of exogenous variables to predict a generalized population potential variable, y*, which is then substituted for the Wy variable in the second stage equation. The inclusion of the predicted .y* values eliminates the endogeneity between > > and Wy. In this case, I use the WX variables as instruments to compute "crime potential" and "neighborhood change potential" variables. The Land-Deane/Anselin 2SLS approach has been successfully implemented by Hipp (2007) and Morenoff (2003). This method is shown in the series of equations below. (2.4a) y* = Wy = p + riX + r 2 WX + C (2.4b) y = py* + pX + s In the first-stage equation (2.4a), y* is the estimated potential variable, W represents the spatial contiguity matrix and Wy is the spatially lagged value of the dependent variable y. X is a matrix of exogenous variables used to predict the dependent variable, and WX'vs, a matrix of spatially lagged X variables. P represents

43

the random intercept, H is the vector of parameters estimating the effect of X, and Y2 is a vector of the effect of the spatially lagged exogenous variables. C, is the error term. The second-stage equation (2.4b) represents the general form of spatial effects models where p is the estimate of spatial effects, P is a vector of the coefficients for exogenous independent variables X, and 8 is the error term; all other terms remain the same as in Equation 4a. As I show in the models below, y* is actually estimated in conjunction with the instrumental variables discussed above. My final models incorporating the spatially weighted potential variables and the exogenous instruments are shown below.

Models The following models (on page 45) show the steps of this analysis. Equation series 5 tests the effect of changes in crime on changes in neighborhood racial and ethnic composition and Equation 6 shows the effect of neighborhood change on change in crime. Equation 5a shows the first-stage regression using the instrumental variables change in private school enrollment (Z/) and change in income inequality (Z2) to predict crime. Equation 5b is another first-stage regression predicting the spatially weighted crime potential variable (Y*) from the spatially weight exogenous variables (WX). And Equation 5c represents the structural equation of interest, testing the effects of both criffte and Y* and the exogenous predictors on neighborhood change.

44

(2.5a) Acrvme = p1 + p2Z1 + p3Z2 + r x X + T2WX + ^ (2.5b) Yl= /?4 + T3X + T4WX + C,2 (2.5c) Aheterogeneity = p5 + p6Acrvme + p7Y{ + Y5WX + ex

(2.6a) Aheterogeneity

- fa + p9Z3 + p10Z4 + T6X + T7WX + ^

(2.6b) Yi = pxx + T8X + T9WX + C4 (2.6c) Acrime = /?12 + (213Aheterogeneity + p14Y2* + T10WX + e2

The analysis yields a total of six models, each consisting of two equations where the dependent variable is alternately neighborhood change or change in crime (as shown in the series of equations above). First, I will analyze the relationship using the change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity between 1990 and 2000 as an indicator of neighborhood change, and second, I will analyze an alternative model, using churning as my indicator of neighborhood change; this is a dynamic measure that accounts for the process of change in a neighborhood. Therefore, the six models are as follows: the relationship between change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity and (1) change in total crime, (2) change in violent crime, and (3) change in property crime, and the relationship between racial/ethnic churning and (4) change in total crime, (5) change in violent crime, and (6) change in property crime. I estimate the models in Stata using the ivreg2 command. After discussing the results of the Moran's I tests for spatial autocorrelation I present my findings from the 2SLS in the order outlined above.

45

FINDINGS Tests of Spatial Autocorrelation The Moran's I values for the dependent variables are shown in Table 2.2. Using the spatial weights matrix, W, to compute the Moran's I, there is evidence of significant positive spatial autocorrelation in the distribution of social phenomena in Los Angeles; the Moran's I for all dependent variables is significant at p < 0.001.8 This means that similar values cluster. For example, neighborhoods that have high residential turnover are likely to be close to other neighborhoods with high residential turnover, and relatedly, communities with little residential change are clustered with other stable neighborhoods. The racial/ethnic change variables change in heterogeneity (0.564) and racial/ethnic churning (0.440) - show evidence of greater clustering than the change in crime rate variables (Moran's I ranging from 0.275 to 0.358).

Table 2.2. Moran's I values for the endogenous variables Variable Change in heterogeneity Racial/ethnic churning Change in total crime rate Change in violent crime rate Change in property crime rate Moran's I 0.5635 0.4400 0.3416 0.2752 0.3580 p-value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001

The reported results of significance testing for the Moran's I are pseudo p-values generated through a series of 999 permutations comparing the generated results to spatial randomness. 46

Two-stage least squares regression results Before I present the results of the 2SLS models, I also report the results of various tests run during the first-stage regression analysis that test for model identification and the validity of the instruments. As discussed above, valid instruments must not be correlated with the disturbance term of the dependent variable (i.e., it must be exogenous), but must be correlated with the endogenous regressor to be instrumented (i.e., that the instruments are relevant). The Sargan test statistic is a test of instrument exogeneity. It tests the joint null hypothesis that model is correctly specified and that the instruments are uncorrelated with the disturbance term. The Sargan test has a % distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of instruments minus the number of endogenous variables; non-significant results indicate that the instruments are valid. The most common indicator of instrument relevance is the R2 which reports the explanatory power of the excluded instrument. The Shea partial R is a modification of the partial R that also takes into account the intercorrelation between multiple endogenous variables (Shea, 1997). According to Baum (2006) the presence of a large standard partial R2 compared to a small value of the Shea R2 may indicate that the instrumental variables lack sufficient relevance to explain all the endogenous variables. Additionally, I report a Cragg-Donald (CD) statistic that tests for weak instruments (Cragg and Donald, 1993; Stock and Yogo, 2005). Stock and Yogo (2005) developed a series of critical values for the Cragg-Donald statistic based on the level of user-defined acceptable bias compared to OLS models, the number of

47

instruments, and the number of endogenous variables. The critical value for my models with two endeogenous regressors and ten instruments with an allowable 5% distortion is 18.76; for 10% bias the critical value is 10.58; 20% bias is 6.23; and 30% is 4.66 (Stock and Yogo, 2005). When the obtained CD statistic fails to exceed the critical value at a specified level of acceptable bias, the instruments are potentially weak. Poor instruments increase the standard errors and bias the results; in the tables below I report the CD statistic in relation to the critical value at 10% allowable bias which appears to be the most commonly reported level of acceptable bias (see Stock and Yogo, 2005). 9 In the series of tables below, each model consists of two 2SLS equations. In the first table of each model (Models a), I report the results using neighborhood racial and ethnic change as the dependent variable, and in the second table (Models b) I show the effects in the other direction, when change in crime is predicted. Within each table, I first present the results of the standard and Shea partial R2, the Sargan test, and the Cragg-Donald statistic from the first-stage regressions and then the corresponding second-stage regression coefficients and centered total R value.

Racial/Ethnic Heterogeneity Models Model la.-Racial/Ethnic Heterogeneity on Total Crime

To test the relationship between change in community level heterogeneity and the simultaneous change in the community crime rate, I ran a sequence of two
In models with only one endogenous regressor, the F test ofjoint significance is also often reported and where values less than 10 are indicative of weak instruments (Staiger and Stock, 1997), but the F test alone is not sufficient to determine instrument relevance in models with multiple instrumented variables (Baum, 2006).
9

48

2SLS estimations. I first present the results predicting the effect of changes in crime on racial/ethnic heterogeneity change, shown in Table 1.3a. As discussed above, I also control for the effect of neighboring tracts' racial and ethnic change by incorporating the spatially weighted change in heterogeneity as an additional instrumented variable.10 The results below indicate that the exogenous instruments increase the explanatory power of the equation between approximately 0.10 and 0.33. The inclusion of the spatially lagged neighborhood change variable in particular substantially increases the ability to explain variance in the focal tract's change in heterogeneity, suggesting that the influence of neighboring communities is quite strong. The difference between the standard and the Shea partial R2 is relatively small, suggesting that the instrumental variables are relevant. The significant value of the Sargan statistic rejects the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid and the model is overidentified, suggesting that my chosen exogenous predictors may be correlated with the disturbance term of the dependant variable. The low Cragg-Donald statistic raises the possibility of bias in the model and weak instruments. Though this will be discussed in more detail in the Discussion section following, the rejection of the null hypothesis under the Sargan test may be an artifact of using WX variables as instruments. In models run without accounting for spatial effects (not shown), the evidence shows that the instruments are valid (Sargan = 0.815), though still potentially weak (CD = 8.05). But the partial R2 in the non-spatial value is extremely small (R2 = 0.012). I move forward with the analyses despite the low Sargan and CD statistic because the instrumental variables were
Remember that the term instrumented variable refers to the endogenous regressor, and the terms instruments and instrumental variables refer to the exogenous predictors used to estimate the instrumented variable.
10

49

theoretically derived and add a non-trivial amount of explanatory power to the models. Table 2.3a. 2SLS regression results predicting change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity controlling for change in the total crime rate and spatial lag effects, N = 816
First-stage statistics Instrumented variable Change in total crime rate Spatially lagged change in heterogeneity Sargan statistic Cragg-Donald statistic Second-stage results Change in total crime Neighboring change in heterogeneity Percent youths 15 to 24 Percent immigrant residents Median household income (in thousands) Percent occupied housing units Crowded households Percent married families with children Constant Centered R2 Shea R2 0.099 0.327 R2 0.104 0.342 p-value 0.010 critical value 10.58 S.E. 0.927 0.673 0.081 0.053 0.033 0.068 0.048 0.024 1.047 p-value 0.016 < 0.001 0.250 < 0.001 0.130 0.872 < 0.001 0.003 < 0.001

jftdf)
20.07(8) obtained 8.79 b 2.2297 8.7443 0.0935 0.3736 0.0500 -0.0109 -0.4959 -0.0721 4.9853 0.5765

The second-stage regression results indicate that change in the tract level total crime rate significantly and positively predict change the tract racial and ethnic heterogeneity (b = 2.23,p < 0.05). That is, as the crime rate increases over time, the population becomes more heterogeneous. This means that for each increase of one crime per 1,000 residents, the heterogeneity score is expected to increase 0.022 on a scale of 0 to 1 (the scale of the change in heterogeneity score included the model is multiplied by 100). The effect of change in racial and ethnic heterogeneity in the
Though not explicitly labeled as such in Table 2.3a and all tables that follow, the exogenous regressors are all change variables that measure the difference in X between 1990 and 2000.
11

50

neighboring tracts also significantly and positively affects racial and ethnic change in focal tract (b = 8.74, p < 0.001); this is not surprising considering the relatively large and significant Moran's I (0.5635, p < 0.001) of the distribution of change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity. The effect of the explanatory variables on change in the racial and ethnic heterogeneity is in line with theoretical expectations. As the proportion of crowded households (b = -0.496, p < 0.001) and married families with children increase (b--

0.072, p < 0.01), heterogeneity decreases. Since households, families, and married couples are more likely to be racially homogenous units (Kennedy, 2003; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001), this trend makes intuitive sense. Likewise, as the percent immigrants in the tract increases, heterogeneity also increases (b = 0.374, p < 0.001). In Los Angeles in the 1990s there was a relatively large influx of new residents from not only Latin American countries, but also Asian nations. These new residents would therefore contribute to increased diversity.

Model Lb. - Total Crime on Racial/Ethnic Heterogeneity At the same time that changes in the crime rate affect the racial and ethnic composition of neighborhoods, it is posited that racial/ethnic change (particularly increased heterogeneity) is likely to affect increase crime. In Table 2.3b below I replicate the analysis above but substitute change in the total crime rate as the dependent variable, and change in the racial/ethnic heterogeneity score as the endogenous variable to be instrumented. The results suggest that the chosen instruments are valid (Sargan = 0.261) and not weak (CD = 14.93) and substantially increase the variance explained by 0.31 for the change in heterogeneity instrumented 51

variable and 0.16 for the endogenous spatial variable. Compared to Model l.a, the spatially lagged dependent variable in this case does not contribute as much to the model. Table 2.3b. 2SLS regression results predicting change in the total crime rate controlling for change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity and spatial lag effects, N = 816
First-stage statistics Instrumented variable Change in heterogeneity Spatially lagged change in total crime rate Sargan statistic Cragg-Donald statistic Second-stage results Change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity Neighboring community change in total crime Percent youths 15 to 24 Percent immigrant residents Median household income (in thousands) Percent occupied housing units Percent students in private school Income inequality Constant Centered R2 Shea R2 0.309 0.162 R2 0.372 0.195 p-value 0.261 critical value 10.58 S.E. 0.005 0.115 0.009 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.412 0.046 p-value 0.715 < 0.001 0.199 0.297 0.944 0.214 0.909 0.418 < 0.001

jftdf)
10.05(8) obtained 14.93 b -0.0017 1.0730 -0.0110 -0.0046 0.0002 0.0094 -0.0004 -0.0033 -1.0430 0.3039

Table 2.3b reveals that there is no evidence that changes in population heterogeneity influences change in the local crime rate (b = -0.002, p = 0.715). There is evidence, however, of a spatial lag effect: increases in crime in the neighboring communities predict increases in crime in the focal tract (b=l .07, p < 0.001). Indeed, no other explanatory variables are able to meaningful predict change in the crime rate between 1990 and 2000.

52

Model 2.a-Racial/Ethnic Heterogeneity on Violent Crime I next replicated the two 2SLS equations above in Models la and lb but substituted change in the violent crime rate for the total crime rate; results are shown in Tables 2.4a and 2.4b. Some literature suggests that racial and ethnic change is more likely to be associated with change in violence because of the potential increase in between group racial tension (e.g., Blalock, 1965; Blumer, 1958; Wilson and Taub, 2006); this is explored in more detail in Chapter 2 where I examine the effect of racial and ethnic change on intergroup youth violence.

Table 2.4a. 2SLS regression results predicting change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity controlling for change in the violent crime rate and spatial lag effects, N = 816
First-stage statistics Instrumented variable Change in violent crime rate Spatially lagged change in heterogeneity Sargan statistic Cragg-Donald statistic Second-stage results Change in violent crime Neighboring change in heterogeneity Percent youths 15 to 24 Percent immigrant residents Median household income (in thousands) Percent occupied housing units Crowded households Percent married families with children Constant Centered R2 SheaR 2 0.103 0.339 X^df) 18.38(8) obtained 9.13 b 4.1081 8.5373 0.0988 0.3768 0.0524 -0.0032 -0.5039 -0.0691 4.7220 0.5737 R2 0.104 0.342 p-value 1 0.019 critical value 10.58 S.E. 1.521 0.658 0.081 0.053 0.033 0.068 0.048 0.024 0.867 p-value 0.007 < 0.001 0.225 < 0.001 0.114 0.963 < 0.001 0.005 < 0.001

53

Model 2. b. - Violent Crime on Racial/Ethnic Heterogeneity Table 2.4b. 2SLS regression results predicting change in the violent crime rate controlling for change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity and spatial lag effects, N = 816
First-stage statistics Instrumented variable Change in heterogeneity Spatially lagged change in violent crime rate Sargan statistic Cragg-Donald statistic Second-stage results Change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity Neighboring community change violent crime Percent youths 15 to 24 Percent immigrant residents Median household income (in thousands) Percent occupied housing units Percent students in private school Income inequality Constant Centered R2 Shea R2 0.327 0.160 R2 0.372 0.182 j-value 1 0.082 critical value 10.58 S.E. 0.003 0.079 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.028 p-value 0.864 < 0.001 0.435 0.184 0.326 0.637 0.951 0.926 < 0.001

jftdf)
14.01(8) obtained 14.67 b 0.0005 0.7047 -0.0042 -0.0038 -0.0022 0.0022 0.0001 0.0002 -0.4855 0.1956

The pattern of results in the violent crime models is similar to that in Model 1. The first stage regressions indicate that the chosen instruments are better in Model 2a (Sargan = 0.082, CD = 14.67) than in Model 2b, though the instrumental variables are relevant in both permutations and add between 0.10 and 0.34 to the model's explanatory power. Likewise, as in the total crime models, the results show that only change in the violent crime rate predicts changes in community racial and ethnic heterogeneity (b = 4.11, p < 0.01) and, contrary to theoretical expectation, change in the racial/ethnic composition has no meaningful impact on rates of violence (b - 0.001,

54

p = 0.864). The magnitude of the effect of violent crime, however, is near double the effect in the total crime model: an increase of one crime per 1,000 residents is associated with an increase of 0.041 in the heterogeneity score. The spatial effects remain significant predictors in both models, and the percent immigrants, crowded households, and married families with children remain significant predictors of change in heterogeneity.

Model 3.a- Racial/Ethnic Heterogeneity on Property Crime Replications of the above models but examining the relationship between racial and ethnic change and change in property crime are presented in Tables 2.5a and 2.5b. Immediately noticeable in Table 2.5a is the relatively low R values compared to the previous models. This suggests that the instrumental variables are not as powerful instruments for the change in the property crime rate as they were for change total or violent crime. The instruments perform better modeling spatially lagged heterogeneity (Shea R = 0.30), change in heterogeneity (Shea R = 0.29), and even spatially lagged change in the property crime rate (Shea R = 0.14). Again, the instruments perform better in models instrumenting neighborhood change (Table 2.5b) moreso than as instruments for change in property crime (Table 2.5a). The effect of change in the crime rate on heterogeneity change is no longer significant at a < 0.05 when limiting the analysis to property crimes (b = 3.59, p = 0.09), though the model approaches significance at an alpha level of 0.10 and is in the theoretically expected direction. As expected, neighborhood change positively

55

predicts property crime (b = 0.50, p < 0.001) and heterogeneity change (b = 8.82, p < 0.001) in the focal tract. Table 2.5a. 2SLS regression result predicting change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity controlling for change in the property crime rate and spatial lag effects, N = 816
First-stage statistics Instrumented variable Change in property crime rate Spatially lagged change in heterogeneity Sargan statistic Cragg-Donald statistic Second-stage results Change in property crime Neighboring change in heterogeneity Percent youths 15 to 24 Percent immigrant residents Median household income (in thousands) Percent occupied housing units Crowded households Percent married families with children Constant Centered R2
Shea R2

0.075 0.300
X2(df)

23.63(8) obtained 6.49 b 3.5880 8.8208 0.0918 0.0370 0.0432 -0.0302 -0.4801 -0.0735 4.6070 0.5884

R2 0.086 0.342 p-value 0.003 critical value 10.58 S.E. 2.082 0.699 0.080 0.052 0.032 0.066 0.046 0.024 1.193 p-value 0.085 < 0.001 0.253 < 0.001 0.182 0.647 < 0.001 0.002 <0.0Q1

56

Model 3.b- Violent Crime on Racial/Ethnic Heterogeneity Table 2.5b. 2SLS regression results predicting change in the property crime rate controlling for change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity and spatial lag effects, N = 816
First-stage statistics Instrumented variable Change in heterogeneity Spatially lagged change in property crime rate Sargan statistic Cragg-Donald statistic Second-stage results Change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity Neighboring community change property crime Percent youths 15 to 24 Percent immigrant residents Median household income (in thousands) Percent occupied housing units Percent students in private school Income inequality Constant Centered R2 Shea R2 0.291 0.135 R2 0.372 0.173 p-value 0.512 critical value 10.58 S.E. 0.002 0.062 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.234 p-value 0.371 < 0.001 0.132 0.561 0.222 0.062 0.869 0.112 < 0.001

jftdi)
7.23(8) obtained 12.34 b -0.0021 0.5004 -0.0066 -0.0012 0.0022 0.0073 -0.0003 -0.0032 -0.5560 0.3306

In the next series of three models I repeat the above sequence of analyses using racial/ethnic churning as my operational definition of neighborhood change instead of change in the racial/ethnic heterogeneity score.

Racial/Ethnic Churning I replicate the change in heterogeneity models in order to compare an alternative definition of neighborhood racial and ethnic change. Though the heterogeneity score is the conventional index of neighborhood diversity, a population 57

churning variable models turnover as a process over time rather than a single crosssectional indicator. As discussed in the Data section, a neighborhood can have meaningful change in the racial and ethnic composition that can be missed when relying on a change in heterogeneity score. Again, I present the results first for the 2SLS estimations of total crime and then specified by crime type.

Model 4a - Racial/Ethnic Churning on Total Crime First-stage regression results in Table 2.6a indicate that the chosen instrumental variables in Model 4.a may not be relevant enough to explain the multiple endogenous regressors utilized, particularly for the spatially lagged churning instrumented variable. The Shea R (0.382) and standard R (0.531) values differ by a magnitude of about 0.15; though there are not definitive values for such, Baum (2005) posits that large discrepancies between the Shea and standard R indicates that the model may be underindentified or the instruments irrelevant. Similarly, the Cragg-Donald statistic indicates the presence of weak instruments, which could be related to the large difference between the two R2 values. In Model 4.b, there is no equivalent large difference between the two R2 indicators, suggesting that the potentially problematic instrument lies in the association between the WX matrix and the spatially lagged value of neighborhood change. In general, I find that substituting an alternative definition of change in neighborhood racial and ethnic composition has little effect on the pattern of results when examining the relationship between neighborhood change and total crime rates.

58

As in the heterogeneity models, racial and ethnic change does not predict change in crime, but increases in crime influence racial and ethnic turnover. Specifically, in Table 2.6b, it is clear that racial and ethnic churning has no impact on change in total crime rates (b = -0.0002, p = 0.979), though increases in total crime are significantly associated with increased population churning at a 10% significance level (6=1.98, p = 0.089) (Table 2.6a). This means that for each increase of one crime per 1,000 residents, racial/ethnic churning is predicted to increase by nearly 2%.

Table 2.6a. 2SLS regression result predicting racial/ethnic churning controlling for change in the total crime rate and spatial lag effects, N = 809 First-stage statistics
Instrumented variable Change in total crime rate Spatially lagged racial/ethnic churning Sargan statistic Cragg-Donald statistic Second-stage results Change in total crime Neighboring churning Percent youths 15 to 24 Percent immigrant residents Median household income (in thousands) Percent occupied housing units Average housing value (in thousands) Percent families with children Constant Centered R2 Shea R2 0.057 0.382 ^(df) 17.18(8) obtained 4.78 b 1.9817 4.7501 0.3517 0.5012 -0.1462 0.0384 -0.0024 0.2852 16.9600 0.5326 R2 0.080 0.531 p-value 0.028 critical value 10.58 S.E. 1.660 0.688 0.081 0.042 0.033 0.073 0.004 0.043 1.200 p-value 0.089 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 0.597 0.473 <0.001 < 0.001

59

Model 4.b. - Total Crime on Racial/Ethnic Churning Table 2.6b. 2SLS regression results predicting change in the total crime rate
First-stage statistics Instrumented variable Racial/ethnic churning Spatially lagged change in total crime rate Sargan statistic Cragg-Donald statistic Second-stage results Racial/ethnic churning Neighboring community change total crime Percent youths 15 to 24 Percent immigrant residents Median household income (in thousands) Percent occupied housing units Percent students in private school Income inequality Constant Centered R2

Shea R2 0.136 0.101

jftdf)
8.13(8) obtained 7.00 b -0.0002 1.0150 -0.0102 -0.0040 -0.0004 0.0076 -0.0051 -0.0042 -1.0380 0.3136

R2 0.185 0.138 p-value 1 0.421 critical value 10.58 S.E. 0.009 0.144 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.009 0.003 0.004 0.147 p-value 0.979 < 0.001 0.268 0.598 0.903 0.382 0.875 0.314 < 0.001

Model 5.a-Racial/Ethnic Churning on Violent Crime The results for the change in violent crime models are fairly straight-forward to summarize. Again, as in Model 4, the evidence indicates that the instrumental variables employed to measure spatially lagged churning are weak (judging by the 0.16 differential in R values, a significant Sargan test, and a low Cragg-Donald statistic). The models also show no significant relationship between change in violent crime rates and change in population churning in either direction. In Table 2.6a there was slight evidence that increases in the total crime rate motivated racial and ethnic churning, but that relationship does not hold when looking solely at 60

violent offenses (b = -1.46, p = 0.47). The opposite relationship is also nonsignificant: racial and ethnic change has no impact on change in violent crime rates (b = -0.003, p = 0.62). Spatial effects continue to exert strong positive effects in models, as do various explanatory variables in the model predicting racial change. The majority of exogenous regressors remain non-significant predictors of change in crime.

Table 2.7a. 2SLS regression result predicting racial/ethnic churning controlling for change in the violent crime rate and spatial lag effects, N = 809 First-stage statistics
Instrumented variable Change in violent crime rate Spatially lagged racial/ethnic churning Sargan statistic Cragg-Donald statistic Second-stage results Change in violent crime Neighboring churning Percent youths 15 to 24 Percent immigrant residents Median household income (in thousands) Percent occupied housing units Average housing value (in thousands) Percent families with children Constant Centered R2 Shea R2 0.052 0.368 R2 0.075 0.531 9-value 1 0.008 critical value 10.58 S.E. 2.007 0.675 0.078 0.043 0.031 0.069 0.003 0.042 1.019 p-value 0.466 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 0.924 0.457 < 0.001 < 0.001

jftdf)
20.67(8) obtained 4.28 b 1.4612 5.0980 0.3508 0.4898 -0.1587 0.0066 -0.0025 0.2834 15.7556 0.5578

61

Model 5. b. - Violent Crime on Racial/Ethnic Churning Table 2.7b. 2SLS regression results predicting change in the violent crime rate
First-stage statistics Instrumented variable Racial/ethnic churning Spatially lagged change in violent crime rate Sargan statistic Cragg-Donald statistic Second-stage results Racial/ethnic churning Neighboring community change violent crime Percent youths 15 to 24 Percent immigrant residents Median household income (in thousands) Percent occupied housing units Percent students in private school Income inequality Constant Centered R2

Shea R2 0.125 0.086 17.35(8) obtained 5.82 b -0.0029 0.6426 -0.0021 -0.0009 -0.0025 0.0030 -0.0005 -0.0012 -0.0441 0.2203

7?m

R2 0.185 0.126 p-value 0.027 critical value 10.58 S.E. 0.006 0.107 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.098 p-value 0.624 < 0.001 0.723 0.859 0.278 0.562 0.796 0.657 < 0.001

Model 6.a- Racial/Ethnic Churning on Property Crime The results of 2SLS estimations of the relationship between racial and ethnic churning and change in property crime are shown below. Looking at the first-stage results, I find that the chosen instrumental variables are slightly better instruments in the property crime models; the large difference in the Shea R and the standard R is reduced to less than 0.10 and the Sargan test of correct model-specification and overidentification is non-significant. The Cragg-Donald statistic remains below the critical value.

62

Table 2.8a. 2SLS regression result predicting racial/ethnic churning controlling

First-stage statistics Instrumented variable Change in property crime rate Spatially lagged racial/ethnic churning Sargan statistic Cragg-Donald statistic Second-stage results Change in property crime Neighboring churning Percent youths 15 to 24 Percent immigrant residents Median household income (in thousands) Percent occupied housing units Average housing value (in thousands) Percent families with children Constant Centered R2

SheaR2 0.064 0.436 X'(df) 13.50(8) obtained 5.34 b 5.2828 4.7103 0.3447 0.5075 -0.1374 0.0599 -0.0027 0.2828 17.6880 0.5090

R2 0.077 0.531 p-value 0.100 critical value 10.58 S.E. 2.232 0.651 0.082 0.045 0.004 0.075 0.004 0.044 1.203 p-value 0.018 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 0.422 0.442 < 0.001 < 0.001

63

Model 6.b. - Property Crime on Racial/Ethnic Churning Table 2.8b. 2SLS regression results predicting change in the property crime rate controlling for racial/ethnic churning and spatial lag effects, N = 809 First-stage statistics
Instrumented variable Racial/ethnic churning Spatially lagged change in property crime rate Sargan statistic Cragg-Donald statistic Second-stage results Racial/ethnic churning Neighboring community change property crime Percent youths 15 to 24 Percent immigrant residents Median household income (in thousands) Percent occupied housing units Percent students in private school Income inequality Constant Centered R2 Shea R2 0.151 0.105 R2 0.185 0.129 p-value 0.575 critical value 10.58 S.E. 0.004 0.069 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.070 p-value 0.691 <0.001 0.097 0.474 0.320 0.254 0.914 0.168 <0.001

jftdi)
6.65(8) obtained 7.79 b 0.0017 0.5022 -0.0078 -0.0027 0.0019 0.0051 0.0002 -0.0029 -0.5828 0.3269

Importantly, I find that impact of change in crime on racial/ethnic churning is specified only for property crime. In Table 2.6a there was weak evidence that increases in the total crime increased churning (p < 0.10); in limiting the crime rate to property offenses, the relationship becomes stronger and larger (b = 5.28, p < 0.05). This translates into a 5% increase in racial and ethnic churning for each one unit increase in the property crime rate. The effect of the spatially weighted variables and the pattern of effects of the exogenous regressors remains consistent with previously reported results in Models 4 and 5.

64

DISCUSSION

This study has shed light on three important issues. One, I find that the relationship between racial and ethnic change and change in crime over time may actually exist only in one direction: that of the effect of increased crime on increased racial/ethnic change. Two, by modeling two alternative definitions of neighborhood change I am able to determine that crime impacts racial/ethnic change differently depending on crime type and operational definition of racial/ethnic change. And three, as expected, the effect of changes in the neighboring communities is a strong predictor of change in the focal tract. First, one of the most important contributions of this study is that I account for reciprocal (and endogenous) relationships among neighborhood effects. In doing so, I find that despite numerous prior studies showing the negative effects of residential turnover in general, and racial and ethnic change specifically, on crime, my analysis finds no evidence that neighborhood change increases crime. Instead, I find robust evidence that changes in crime actually motivate racial and ethnic turnover, even when controlling for the influence of geographically proximate communities. This finding reiterates prior studies that have shown that crime is yet another source for population change in communities. Sampson and Wooldredge (1986) showed that crime is negatively related to Black and White population growth. Households leave a community as it crime becomes more pervasive, and is often tied to higher income and race (primarily white households) (Liska, Logan, and Bellair, 1998; Morenoff and Sampson, 1997). Indeed, this conclusion is not unique, 65

even in previous non-recursive analyses. For example, in a study investigating the directionality of the effect between change in violent crime rates and residential home sales in Los Angeles, Boggess and Hipp (in progress) concluded that increases in violent crime motivated increases in residential turnover. The relationship between race/ethnicity, change, and crime is complex and needs to be expounded in future research. It is important to highlight that although social disorganization theorists emphasize the importance of residential instability as a key factor in predicting neighborhood crime rates, my results did not support this hypothesis. The original theories postulate that neighborhood change disrupts social connections and informal control, but I looked at a specific form of residential instability - racial and ethnic change - as opposed to more conventional measures (percent homeowners, new residents, or average length of tenure). It is possible that racial change in particular has no effect but other indicators such as the length of stay are more accurately measures of social networking or informal control. Likewise, residential change likely has little impact on formal mechanisms of control such as law enforcement. Therefore, if the presence or absence of law enforcement is the actual driving force behind changes in crime, the population turnover would be irrelevant. Finally, it worth noting that other studies have found that the major tenants of social disorganization theory may be too broad to encompass the true dynamics of neighborhoods. That is, Warner and colleagues have found no evidence that increased social ties decreases crime (Warner and Pierce, 1993; Warner and Rountree, 1997)

66

Second, change in crime by type has differential effects on the two different definitions of racial/ethnic transition, though regardless of definition, increases in the crime rate predict increased racial/ethnic change. Simply put, more crime equates to more neighborhood change. This makes sense because as prior studies have shown, increased crime heighteners residents' perceptions of fear which can lead to outmigration (Skogan, 1986) and victimization itself leads to residential relocation (Dugan, 1999). But my analysis reveals more specified relationships based on crime type and type of racial/ethnic change. More specifically, the total crime and violent crime rates predict a significant increase in neighborhood change when neighborhood change is defined as the difference in heterogeneity score; change in property crime is not significantly related to changes in heterogeneity. Heterogeneity at any one time point is an index of degree of population mixing, and the difference score is simply an indicator of how the diversity in 1990 changed in 2000, but it does not provide any information on populations changed. The results, then, show that higher total and violent crime rates increase neighborhood diversity. Increased property crime, however, is a significant predictor of racial/ethnic churning. Though racial/ethnic churning is also an indicator of change, it captures a more dynamic process. That is, within the computation of churning, I specifically account for how each racial/ethnic group has changed over the decade, and the churning score is equivalent to a percentage of turnover: a higher churning score means that racial/ethnic groups had bigger differences between 1990 and 2000. So one can say that increased property crime leads to increased turnover, as opposed to diversity per se.

67

I note that additional analysis which examined the effect of change in crime on change in the specific different racial groups (i.e., the effect of changes in crime on the change in the percent Latino; percent Black; percent Asian; and the percent non-Latino White) yielded non-significant findings in both directions (results not shown). This means that changes in the crime rates do not affect one group versus another, but rather impact the community composition as a whole. And that change in any one group size do not influence change in crime. Third, consistent with prior research, the effect of spatially contiguous tracts is significant and positive. Specifically, as the surrounding tracts increase in crime, crime in the focal tract also increases, and as the racial/ethnic composition of the neighboring tracts increases, so does the racial/ethnic turnover in the focal tract. This supplements evidence of clustering of similar tracts of the large and significant Moran's I values and reiterates the need for neighborhood level research to account for the influence of geographically proximate areas. It is likely that relocating households move into nearby communities or, and in keeping with the fact that Census tract are artificial boundaries of neighborhoods, move across the street, etc. Also, if crime is decreasing in one tract, it is possible that whatever is motivating the decrease in crime spills over into nearby areas. This could mean increased police attention in Tract A indirectly influences crime in Tract B because potential criminals in Tract B see the increased arrests in and are deterred from offending. Or, if crime is increasing in both Tract A and B, it could represent the diffusion of phenomenon across boundaries, such as the spread of a gang's territory to encompass more than one community, an enlarged drug market, or reduced police attention.

68

There are several reasons that could potentially explain how crime and racial/ethnic change crosses boundaries, but they all emphasize the need to incorporate spatial effects. Indeed, the inclusion of spatial effects in elaborate reciprocal models, however, can get even more complex. That is, I investigate only how neighboring tracts affect the outcome in the focal tract without explicitly examining the reciprocal effect of the focal tract on those neighbors. Future permutations of this study may be able to tackle more complex analyses such as this. As with most studies that rely on instrumental variables, the choice of valid instruments is essential. Valid instruments must not be correlated with the disturbance term (i.e., not related to Y), but they must be related to the variable to be instrumented. Valid instruments can be weak instruments are not sufficiently correlated with the endogenous variable (the variable to be instrumented). In this chapter, I utilized multiple instrumented variables. One, because my structural equation of interest is a non-recursive model, I needed to include two instruments for each Y in order to ensure model identification. Among the strengths of this study is my selection of IVs for racial and ethnic change. Since churning is strongly related to residential turnover, I used two variables that would likely influence relocation: change in the percent families with children and the change in the average housing value. For change in heterogeneity, I used the change in the percent married families with children and change in the percent of overly crowded households; as the values of both of these variables increase over time, the heterogeneity of the community should decrease. Indeed, the results of the first stage regressions show that the instruments for the racial/ethnic change variables meet the requirements for valid,

69

non-weak, instruments: the Shea partial R values hover around 0.13 for the churning instruments, and a very high 0.32 for the change in heterogeneity instruments. On the other hand, there is evidence that my chosen IVs in the change in crime models do not fare as well. The IVs used as instruments for the change in crime variables (change in percent private school students and change in overall income inequality), however, yield much smaller R values. I believe this is the case because the majority of theoretically relevant potential crime instruments also predict changes in racial/ethnic composition, whereas the IVs used in the racial/ethnic change models are not associated with changes in crime. For example, I relied on change in the percent of private school students as an instrument for change in crime. This works theoretically because it is known that a large proportion of crime is committed by youth and especially at or near school (Gottfredson, 2001; Gottfredson and Gottfredson, 1985), but that private schools are typically safer than public schools (Dinkes, Forrest-Cataldi, and Lin-Kelly, 2007). This may not work well as an instrument because enrollment in private schools can be linked to race (may have a disproportionate number of non-Latino White students) and income, which are also tied to racial/ethnic change. In the future, I will need to reassess my choice of instrumental variables to more accurately predict change in crime but not racial/ethnic change. Two, in order account for the influence of neighboring tracts I relied on a series of WX variables to instrument WY. That is, I was interested in how changes in crime in the surrounding areas (WY) influence crime change (Y) in the focal tract. If I simply included a spatially weighted change in crime variable, it would violate the

70

assumptions for valid instruments because the WY variable is correlated with the outcome (since each focal tract is also a neighboring tract of another). Therefore, I predict WY using the WX variables and substituted WY into the model predicting Y. Tests of instrument strength indicated that the WX variables are good predictors of WY: the partial R of many spatially lagged instrumented variables neared 0.30 indicating that the instruments add an additional 0.30 of explanatory power to the specified model. Tests of instrument validity, however, suggest that there may still be some correlation between the WY and Y. In particular, the Cragg-Donald statistic of many of the permutations failed to surpass the critical value, indicating greater than 10% bias in the results (as compared to OLS models). Additionally, the significant Sargan test results imply that the instruments may not be truly uncorrelated with the error term. It is notable that in tests of instrument validity prior to the inclusion of the spatially weighted variables, the majority of Cragg-Donald statistics for the change in crime and neighborhood change endogenous variables were actually higher than the critical value and the corresponding Sargan test for overidentification yielded the appropriate non-significant p-value. This suggests that something about the use of the WX variables as instruments weakens the model. The Sargan test, however, tests that all instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. In models such as these that include ten instruments, it is plausible that any single IV that is correlated with Y is causing the Sargan test to invalidate the results. I believe that by using WX variables to predict WY I am unintentionally introducing correlation with the disturbance term. More specifically, since the evidence suggests that like values cluster, it is

71

unlikely that predicted WYvalues are all that different from predicted rvalues. Future analysis should investigate the use of WX variables to predict WY and should compare the results using the Land-Deane/Anselin 2SLS model to the Anselin Alternative model. While this study makes up for methodological shortcomings in prior studies, future projects can further improve our understanding of complex neighborhood effects. A simple modification to the current study would be to use the three year averages of crime instead of simply 1990 and 2000 values. This helps control for any anomalies in 1990 (really 1992) or 2000. In particular, it would smooth the crime rate so that potential effects of the areas where the 1992 Los Angeles riots occurred do not have higher crime rates. Additionally, this study makes no attempt to measure the mechanisms through which neighborhood change in racial/ethnic composition or crime operate. That is, Bellair (2000) (and others) have argued that increases in crime operate through the impact on perception of and fear of crime; increases in crime thereby increase fear and reduce residential interaction that in turns reduces informal control thereby increasing crime. My study illuminates the complexity of reciprocal and spatial effects, but is unable to investigate more closely how these effects actually influence residential behavior.

72
(

REFERENCES Anderson, Elijah. 1990. Streetwise: Race, Class and Change in an Urban Community. Chicago: Chicago Press. Anselin, Luc. 1988. Spatial Econometrics: Methods and Models. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Bailer, Robert, Luc Anselin, Steven Messner, Glenn Deane, and Darnell Hawkins. 2001. Structural covariates of US county homicide rates: incorporating spatial effects. Criminology, 39, 561 - 588. Baum, Christopher. 2006. An Introduction to Modern Econometrics Using Stata. College Station, TX: Stata Press. Bellair, Paul E. 1997. Social Interaction and Community Crime: Examining the Importance of Neighbor Networks. Criminology, 35,677-703. Bellair, Paul E. 2000. Informal surveillance and street crime: A complex relationship. Criminology, 38,137 - 170. Boggess, Lyndsay, and John Hipp. 2008. Examining the directionality of the violent crime and residential instability relationship in Latino and African American neighborhoods. Unpublished manuscript. Bobo, Lawrence, and Vincent Hutchings. 1992. Perceptions of racial competition in a multiracial setting. American Sociological Review, 61, 951 - 972. Browning, Christopher R., Feinberg, Seth, and Robert Dietz. 2004. The paradox of social organization: Networks, collective efficacy, and violent crime in urban neighborhoods. Social Forces, 83, 503 - 534. Bursik Robert and Harold Grasmick. 1993. Neighborhoods and Crime: The Dimensions of Effective Community Control. New York: Lexington Books. Bursik, Robert J. 1988. Social disorganization and theories of crime and delinquency: Problems and prospects. Criminology, 26, 519 551. Cohen, Jacqueline, and George Tita. 1999. Diffusion in homicide: Exploring a general method for detecting spatial diffusion processes. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 15,451-493. Coleman, JS. 1988. Social capital in the creation of human capital. American Journal of Sociology, 94, 95 - 120.

73

Coleman, J., T. Hoffer, and S. Kilgore. 1982. High School Achievement: Public, Catholic, and Private Schools Compared. New York: Basic. Cliff, A.D., and J.K. Ord.1973. Spatial Autocorrelation. London, UK: Pion. 1981. Spatial Process: Models and Applications. London, UK: Pion Cragg, J.G. and S.G. Donald. 1993. Testing Identifiability and Specification in Instrumental Variable Models, Econometric Theory. 9, 222 - 240. Cullen, Julie Berry and Steven D Levitt. 1999. Crime, urban flight, and the consequences for cities. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 81,159-169. Deane, Glenn, E.M. Beck, and Stewart Tolnay. 1998. Incorporating space into social histories: How spatial processes operate and how we observe them International Review of Social History, 43,143 - 166. Dinkes, Rachel, Emily Forrest Cataldi, and Wendy Lin-Kelly. 2007. Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2007. National Center for Education Statistics. Accessed online at http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsirifo.asp?pubid=:2008021 on May 22, 2009. Dugan, Laura. 1999. The effect of victimization on a household's moving decision. Criminology, 37,903-931. Durkheim, Emile. 1897 (reprinted 1951). Suicide. A Study in Sociology London: Routledge. Fagan, Jeffrey. 1992. Drug selling and licit income in distressed neighborhoods: The economic lives of street-level drug users and dealers. In G..E. Peterson & A. V. Harrell (Eds.), Drugs, crime and social isolation: Barriers to urban opportunity pp. 99-142. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press. Fagan, Jeffrey, and Garth Davies. 2004. The natural history of neighborhood violence. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 20,127-147. Garcia, R. Maria, Taylor, Ralph B., and Brian Lawton. 2007. Impacts of Violent Crime and neighborhood structure on trusting your neighbors. Justice Quarterly, 24, 679-704. Gottfredson, Michael and Travis Hirschi. 1990. A General Theory of Crime. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

74

Griffiths, Elizabeth, and Jorge M. Chavez. 2004. Communities, street guns and homicide trajectories in Chicago, 1980 - 1995: Merging methods for examining homicide trends across space and time. Criminology, 42,941 - 975. Hipp, John R. 2007. Income inequality, race, and place: Does the distribution of race and class within neighborhoods affect crime rates? Criminology, 45, 665 - 697. Hipp, John R., George Tita, and Lyndsay Boggess. 2009. Inter- and Intra-Group Violence: Is Violent Crime an Expression of Group Conflict or Social Disorganization? Criminology, 47, 501 - 544. Kasarda, John, and Morris Janowitz. 1974. Community Attachment in Mass Society. American Sociological Review, 39, 328 - 339. Kubrin, Charis. 2003. Structural covariates of homicide rates: does type of homicide matter? Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 40,139-170. Kubrin, Charis and Ronald Weitzer. 2003. New Directions in Social Disorganization Theory. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 40, 374-402 Land, Kenneth C , and Glenn Deane. 1992. On the large-sample estimation of the regression models with spatial effects terms: A two-stage least squares approach. Sociological Methodology, 22,221 - 248. Lee, Matthew T., Martinez, Jr., Ramiro, and Richard Rosenfeld. 2001. Does immigration increase homicide? Negative evidence from three border cities. The Sociological Quarterly, 42, 559 - 580. Liska, Allen E., and Paul E. Bellair. 1995. Violent-Crime rates and racial composition: Convergence over time. The American Journal of Sociology, 101, 578 -610. Liska, Allen E., Andrew Sanchirico, and Mark Reed. 1988. Fear of crime and constrained behavior specifying and estimating a reciprocal effects model. Social Forces, 66, 827 - 837. Liska, Allen, E. and Barbara D. Warner. Functions of Crime: A paradoxical process. The American Journal of Sociology, 96,1441 - 1463. Markowitz, Fred E., Bellair, Paul E., Liska, Allen, E. and Jianhong Liu. 2001. Extending social disorganization theory: Modeling the relationship between cohesion, disorder, and fear. Criminology, 39,293 - 319. Massey, Douglas S. and Nancy Denton. 1993. American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

75

McPherson, Miller, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James M. Cook. 2001. Birds of a feather: Homophily in social networks. Annual Review of Sociology, 27,415 - 444. Mears, Daniel P., and Avinash S. Bhati. 2006. No community is an island: The effects of resource deprivation on urban violence in spatially and socially proximate communities. Criminology, 44,509 - 548. Merry, Sally. 1981. Urban Danger: Life in a Neighborhood of Strangers. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Messner, Steven F., Luc Anselin, Robert D Bailer, Darnell Hawkins, Glenn Deane, and Steward Tolnay. 1999. The spatial patterning of county homicide rates: an application of exploratory data analysis. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 15, 423-450. Messner, Steven F., Baumer, Eric, and Richard Rosenfeld. 2004. Dimensions of social capital and rates of criminal homicide. American Sociological Review, 69, 882 -903. Morenoff, Jeffrey D. 2003. Neighborhood mechanisms and the spatial dynamics of birth weight. American Journal of Sociology, 5, 976 - 1017. Morenoff, Jeffrey D. and Robert J. Sampson. 1997. Violent crime and the spatial dynamics of neighborhood transition: Chicago, 1970 - 1990. Social Forces, 76, 31 64. Morenoff, Jeffrey, Sampson, Robert, and Stephen W. Raudenbush. 2001. Neighborhood inequality, collective efficacy, and the spatial dynamics of urban violence. Criminology, 39, 517 - 559. Neal, Derek. 1997. The Effects of Catholic Secondary Schooling on Educational Achievement. Journal of Labor Economics, 15, 98 - 123. Pastor, Manuel Jr., Sadd, Jim, and John R. Hipp. 2001. Which came first? Toxic facilities, minority move-in, and environmental justice. Journal of Urban Affairs, 23, 1-21. Portes, Alejandro. 1998. Social capital: Its origins and applications in modern sociology. Annual Review of Sociology, 2 4 , 1 - 2 4 . Pyle, Gerald F. 1974. The Spatial Dynamics of Crime, vol. 159. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Rosenfeld, Richard, Messner, Stephen F., and Eric P. Baumer. 2001. Social capital and homicide. Social Forces. 80,283 - 309.

76

Rountree, Pamela Wilcox and Barbara D Warner. 1999. Social ties and crime: Is the relationship gendered? Criminology, 37, 789-813. Sampson, Robert J. 1984. Group size, heterogeneity, and intergroup conflict: A test of Blau's inequality and heterogeneity. Social Forces, 62, 618-639. Sampson, Robert J. 1985. A demographically disaggregated analysis of urban homicide. Crime & Delinquency, 31,47-82. Sampson, Robert J. and W. Bryon Groves. 1989. Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social-Disorganization Theory. American Journal of Sociology, 94, 774-802. Sampson, Robert J., Morenoff, Jeffrey, D., and Thomas Gannon-Rowley. 2002. Assessing neighborhood effects: Social processes and new directions in research. Annual Review of Sociology, 28,443 - 478. Sampson, Robert J. and Stephen W. Raudenbush. 1999. Systematic social observation of public spaces: a new look at disorder in urban neighborhoods. AmericanJournal'ofSociology, 105,603-651. Sampson, Robert J, Stephen W. Raudenbush and Felton Earls. 1997. Neighborhoods and violent crime: A multilevel study of collective efficacy. Science, 277, 918-992 Sampson, Robert J. and William J. Wilson. 1995. Race, crime, and urban inequality. In J. Hagan and R. Peterson (Eds.), Crime and Inequality (pp. 27 - 54). Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Schuerman, Leo and Soloman Kobrin. 1986. Community careers in crime. In Albert Reiss Jr and Michael H. Tonry (Eds), Communities and Crime. Chicago :The University of Chicago Press. Shaw, Clifford, and Henry D. McKay. 1942. Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Skogan, Wesley. 1986. Fear of crime and neighborhood change. Crime and Justice, 8,203-229. :--. 1990. Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods. New York: Free Press. Skogan,Wesley and Michael Maxfield. 1980. Coping with Crime: Individual and Neighborhood Reactions. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Smith, Tom W. 2002. Measuring inter-group friendships. Social Science Research, 31,576-593.

77

South, Scott J., and Glenn D. Deane. 1993. Race and residential mobility: Individual determinants and structural constraints. Social Forces, 72,147 - 167. Staiger, Douglas and James H. Stock. 1997. Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments. Econometrica, 65, pp. 557-586. Stock, James, H., and Motohiro Yogo. 2005. Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression. In D.W.K. Andrews and J.H. Stock (Eds), (pp. 80 - 108). Identification and Inference for Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Taylor, Ralph B., and Jeanette Covington. 1993. Community structural change and fear of crime. Social Problems, 40,3 74 - 395. 1988. Neighborhood changes in ecology and violence. Criminology. 26, 553589. Taub Richard, D. Garth Taylor, and Jan D. Dunham, 1984. Paths of neighborhood change: race and crime in urban America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Wandersman, Abraham, Paul Florin, Robert Friedman, and Ron Meier. 1987. Who Participates, Who Does Not, and Why? An Analysis of Voluntary Neighborhood Organizations in the United States and Israel. Sociological Forum, 2, 534 - 555. Warner, Barbara D. and Glenn L. Pierce. 1993. Reexamining Social Disorganization Theory Using Calls to the Police as a Measure of Crime. Criminology, 31, 493-517. Warner, Barbara D. and Pamela Wilcox Rountree. 1997. Local Social Ties in a Community and Crime Model: Questioning the Systemic Nature of Informal Social Control. Social Problems, 44, 520-536. Wilson, William Julius. 1987. The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner city, the Underclass, and Public Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Wilson, William Julius. 1996. When work disappears. New York: Vintage Books.

78

CHAPTER 3 AFRICAN AMERICAN TO LATINO TRANSITION AND INTER- AND INTRA-GROUP YOUTH VIOLENCE IN SOUTH LOS ANGELES

79

ABSTRACT

Sociological research argues that as neighborhoods turnover, violent crime increases, but does a specific type of residential turnover - racial and ethnic succession - impact who is involved in the violent crime event? That is, do neighborhood residential composition changes simply increase levels of crime, or do patterns also change such that one group victimizes another at a higher rate? To further explore the complex relationship between racial and ethnic change and crime, this chapter is a more specific examination of the racial-ethnic composition of the victim-offender dyadfor youth violent crimes in a section of Los Angeles that has undergone significant African American to Latino transition. I utilize structural equation modeling to estimate a series of six simultaneous equations testing the rates of Black on Black, Black on Latino, Latino on Latino, and Latino on Black aggravated assaults and robberies between 2000 and 2006 while controlling for the reciprocal effect of changes in group size. Since many theories of intergroup violence cite the economic differential between groups as a motivating factor, I incorporate the ratio of Black to Latino median household income. Ifind little evidence that change in the size of either the Black or Latino population affects any type of violence, but some evidence that violent victimizations of Latinos influences population change. Contrary to theoretical expectation, income inequality is not a significant predictor of changes in intergroup violence.

80

INTRODUCTION

The geographic distribution of racial and ethnic groups in the United States is changing. In the past two decades the Latino population has surpassed Blacks as the largest minority group, particularly in South Los Angeles. Though many newcomers settled in already existing Latino enclaves there, a large number of Latinos relocated into traditionally Black neighborhoods. In 1980, Los Angeles was just over onequarter (28%) Latino, but by 2000, Latinos comprised nearly half (46.8%) of the population. As the geographic distribution of race/ethnicity changes, studies that focus solely on black - white interactions are often unable to fully explain other types of between group encounters. In Los Angeles, the racial and ethnic transition of the last two decades has had significant impacts on Black and Latino relations; the media is preoccupied by a supposed "race war" between the two groups, particularly in South Los Angeles, an area known for high crime rates and gang activity. Once presumed to be natural allies against the marginalization imposed by whites, Black and Latino competition and racially motivated (gang) attacks have "absolutely gone up" in recent years (Alex Alonso, quoted in LA Times, 1/21/2007). Significant racial/ethnic transition is often cited as a source for the increasing conflict; referring to neighborhoods like Florence-Firestone that was 80% black in the late 1980s but now is about 90% Latino (LA Times, 11/13/2007) and the home of Florencia 13, a Latino gang that is being prosecuted federally for their targeted attacks on Black residents (Newsweek, 10/24/2007). The media has predominantly portrayed Latino on Black violence as a product of anti-black discrimination (see Hernandez 2007), but black on Latino 81

violence is generally seen as the result of increased competition between the two groups. According to black radio host Terry Anderson (as quoted in the LA Times, 11/25/2007) the Black community feels that "[They've] been invaded" by Latinos, who, some residents argue, have stolen jobs, overtaken schools, and gained control of local politics. But what is the truth behind these proclamations? Has the racial/ethnic shift in Los Angeles led to an unprecedented increase in Latino on black or black on Latino violence? Sociological research argues that as neighborhoods turnover, violent crime increases, but does a specific type of residential turnover - racial and ethnic succession - impact who is involved in the violent crime event? That is, do neighborhood residential composition changes simply increase levels of crime, or do patterns also change such that one group victimizes another at a higher rate? Theories on intergroup behavior suggest different mechanisms to explain local patterns of intergroup violence. For instance, the income differential is strongly linked to between group tensions. While some theorists argue that that increasing inequality leads to increased violence as a result of hostility and a perception of social injustice, alternative theories argue the opposite, that as the income differential between the two groups is minimized, violence increases because the formerly dominant group is threatened (competition) by the newcomers. Even other theories posit that increased interaction between different groups and higher rates of racial/ethnic heterogeneity will actually reduce racial/ethnic prejudice and hostility. This study will provide key evidence to supplement the insights of earlier research that has failed to explicitly disentangle the effect of income inequality. I

82

will also test facets of social disorganization theory, which predict an increase in all crime regardless of who is involved. I also take the analysis a step further, and will control for the complexity of the social context in neighborhoods by accounting for the reciprocal affect that neighborhood change has on violence and that change in violence can affect neighborhoods. Furthermore, violent crime can be argued as a problem of youth. Even the Los Angeles media portrays youths as the perpetrators of violence (though victims can clearly be of any age). Therefore, I limit my analysis to those offenders most likely to commit violent acts - young males. Despite evidence that the majority of violent crimes are committed between the ages of (approximately) 12 and 24,1 am aware of no study on interracial/ethnic violence that examines specifically youths as perpetrators. In addition, most prior studies have relied on cities, metropolitan areas, or counties as the unit of analysis, but high levels of racial segregation question whether such are the appropriate level for assessing intergroup interaction (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000; Quillian 1995), or if the higher rates of intragroup crime are simply a function of segregation and reduced intergroup propinquity. In the following section I will more explicitly discuss the theories of intergroup violence and the results of previous studies. I also examine social disorganization theory and the how the predications under that framework are different from specific race-based theories. I will pay particular attention to how these theories do - or do not - apply to the current trend in Los Angeles. I next discuss the data that I use in this chapter and provide a description of the unique method that accounts for the probability of interaction between these two groups and

83

a summary of the trends in violent crime in South Los Angeles between 2000 and 2005, results, findings and applicability to theories discussed previously, and conclusions.

THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS

Changes in the geographic distribution of racial/ethnic groups in the United States in recent decades have resulted in increasingly diverse cities. The implications of increased between-group contact for residents in multiethnic communities, however, are unclear. City or county level analyses provide macrostructural clues about the correlates of intergroup violence, it overlooks the importance of neighborhood characteristics on social interaction. Two primary schools of thought explaining interracial interaction exist. A large body of research suggests that this increased mixing leads to increased conflict (Blau, 1977; Blau and Blau, 1982; Quillian, 1996), though competing theories argue that increased interracial/ethnic relations leads to more positive interactions and camaraderie between groups (Allport, 1954; Ellison and Powers, 1994; Sigelman and Welch, 1993). Comparatively, and as discussed in Chapter 2, social disorganization theory posits that regardless of the racial/ethnic change, the process of residential insatiability will affect all types of crime. Previous research from either perspective, however, focuses on white and black relations, and the little research on other racial relations often emphasizes white response to the incoming minority residents. Even more so, research on the 84

reaction of minority residents to the encroachment of other minority groups is lacking. And studies that specifically compare black on Latino and Latino on black crimes as different phenomenon, are rare; though these crimes may be differentially motivated (as the theories discussed below argue), most empirical studies collapse them into one intergroup crime category.

Competition Theories The major theories of interracial/ethnic violence often focus on competition as a major factor inciting between-group violence. Two theories, defended neighborhood theory and group threat theory, focus primarily on the size of the minority group as a threat to the existing group's hegemony. Group threat theory combines this threat with the added inciting factor of economic competition as another source of inter-group conflict. Blau's macrostructural theory argues that the structural conditions of the area promote or constrain between-group associations, but that consolidation of negative structural conditions and racial/ethnic minority group status result in increased competition and hostility when the income differential is great.

Defended Neighborhood Perspective and Group Threat Theory The defended neighborhood perspective is a relatively straight-forward structural theory of racial attitudes based on group size. These theorists argue that as the subordinate group increases in numerical size, the dominant group becomes more

85

hostile fearing a loss of social and economic superiority. Indeed, prior research has consistently shown a positive relationship between the black population size and white racial antagonism, prejudice, or discrimination (Pettigrew, 1959; Glaser 1994; Quillian 1996; Taylor, 1998). For example, Fossett and Kiecolt (1989) found that white support for racial integration decreases and the perceived threat from Blacks increases as the proportion of black residents in the metropolitan area grows. Under a defended neighborhood perspective, group size is the operationalization of competition and threat. Closely related theories on intergroup relations extend the basic tenet of the defended neighborhood position to incorporate the influence of factors beyond the relative group size. Such theories consider the economic inequality, political positions, and the differential in social privilege between the two groups. Specifically, Blumer's (1958) group position theory (also called "group threat," "power threat" or "racial threat") incorporates the importance of in-group ethnocentricism and entitlement combined with out-group stereotyping and perceived threat as necessary elements to breed between-group hostility. The theory posits that competition between groups is more likely in neighborhoods where the economic gap between groups is narrowing (Blumer 1958). Inter-group conflict is the result of the superordinate group perceiving the incoming group as threatening to the dominant group's social position, encroaching on the dominant groups' advantage within the local economy, or in competition with the majority for limited resources (i.e., jobs, political positions, and housing) (Blumer 1958; Quillian 1995). The notable difference between defended neighborhood models and group threat

86

research is that under a group threat framework, competition and threat are defined more specifically as some form of group inequality. For example, Oliver and Mendelberg (2000) found that feelings of racial antagonism in the South were more than just the size of the black population but were strongly influenced by how economically vulnerable white residents felt. For others, intergroup conflict is strictly a function of economic and class struggles (Bonacich and Light, 1991). In part, however, these competition theories work because they are based on the historical racial/ethnic hierarchy and power differential between whites and blacks (Blumer, 1958). Historically, whites have ostracized black Americans to a greater extent than Asian Americans or Latinos. For example, historic laws regarding interracial marriage and adoption explicitly forbade the intermarriage or adoption of whites and blacks, but no such laws existed for other races (Kennedy, 2003). Recent research continues to suggest that, in general, whites are less hostile to Latinos than Blacks and consider Asian Americans as the "model minority" (Kim, 1999). Dixon and Rosenbaum (2004) concluded that whites are not threatened by large populations of Latinos in the same manner that they fear the presence of large numbers of black residents. They also found that between-group contact within communities dispelled anti-Latino stereotypes but not anti-black prejudice (Dixon and Rosembaum, 2004). If this is the case, than increasing populations of other non-black minority groups would not evoke the same negative reaction from whites. Though few studies examine the white response to non-black minorities, Bobo and Hutchings (1996) found that white residents' perceived less competition from other minorities and whites continue to 'hold a special sense of grievance against blacks."

87

But, and as is the case in South Los Angeles, more often than not the incoming minority residents relocate in predominantly minority neighborhoods rather than traditionally white communities. In LA, migrating Latinos settled in the already Latino enclaves in East LA or into the Black communities in the south. When two minority groups come into increasing contact, it is often unclear which group has the superordinate position. This may be particularly true for South Los Angeles, where both the incoming (Latinos) and outgoing (Blacks) groups are relatively impoverished. Research suggests that this mix of Latino and black residents may be particularly hostile. That is, other minority groups perceive Blacks as more welfare dependent (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996), and the least desirable marriage partners (Yancey, 2003). In particular, Latinos exhibit a strong anti-black sentiment, particularly foreign-born immigrants (Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodriguez, 2002), and Zubrinsky-Charles showed that Latinos favored all other racial/ethnic groups as neighbors over blacks. Indeed, Taylor (1998) argues that group threat theory may not be applicable to explain prejudice towards and stereotypes of racial/ethnic groups besides blacks. Bobo and Hutchings (1996) survey of Los Angeles households found that black residents are more likely to perceive other groups as threatening or in competition for employment, housing, and political control. The perceived threat can be over real or physical space, but also over symbolic resources and social space (such as local ideological beliefs and political attitudes, and residents' behaviors and lifestyles) (Quillian 1995). In South Los Angeles blacks likely feel competition from

88

income Latino residents; as the Latino population in Los Angeles increases, neighborhoods show increasing signs of ethnic diversity, including Spanish language signs, shops, and taquerias. Established residents view this as an encroachment on their territory and respond with hostility/violence directed at the newcomers. But little work on inter-minority negative perceptions has examined how these attitudes translate into intergroup conflict. It is likely that the established racism and increased perception of competition leads to conflict. In general however, empirical work examining between minority conflicts has focused on large-scale events like riots. Backlash by previously dominant group against the incoming migrants, often white response to new black residents, appears to explain racial violence in riots in the early 1900s, but not in the 1992 LA riots or the riots in the 1960s. In the late 1980s and early 1990s the racial succession in South LA contributed, in part, to the 1992 LA riots. Bergesen and Herman's (1998) study of census tracts in the city found that Latino and Asian inmigration into Los Angeles neighborhoods was positively associated with riot violence even after controlling for economic conditions and racial/ethnic composition, including the influence of incoming Latino residents. McCall and Parker (2005) found evidence for the group threat model in their analysis of black - white homicides in cities. They concluded that black interracial homicides were higher in cities where employment opportunities for blacks decreased in relation to a growth of opportunities for whites. Hipp, Tita, and Boggess (2009) also found support for group threat theory: as the income differential between Blacks and Latinos shrank, black on brown violence increased. Using a ratio of black

89

to white unemployment rates as an indicator of economic threat, Jacobs and Woods (1999) concluded that as competition for employment between blacks and whites increases, whites commit more homicides against black residents. D'Alessio, Stolzenberg, and Eitle (2002) found similar results using the same measure of economic competition. As the races became more economically similar, the rate of violent crimes perpetrated by whites on black victims increases significantly. Economic competition, however, was not a significant predictor of black on white violence. In South Los Angeles, racial-ethnic conflict develops as a result of incoming low-skilled Latinos competing with the formerly dominant black population for low-level employment.

Macrostructural Opportunity Theory and Consolidated Inequality Theory Blau's (1977) macrostructural theory of social interaction is a general theory on the social structural determinants of group associations. He argues that "structural conditions constrain or create opportunities for individuals in different groups to engage in social relationships," and is premised on the argument that "social associations depend on opportunities for interaction." Like the theories discussed above, group size is a major component of the theory. The likelihood of betweengroup contact is predicated on the probability of intergroup interaction and the opportunities for members of one group to affiliate with members of another. The opportunities to associate with an out-group are greater for smaller minority populations than for larger ones. Empirical evidence shows this to be the case. Segregated populations that have reduced opportunities for out-group contact have

90

lower rates of interracial robberies, and the percent black is positively associated with robberies perpetrated by black offenders (Messner and South, 1986). Population heterogeneity is another major dimension of Blau's theory; areas that are more heterogeneous, or more mixed, supply more opportunities for acrossgroup association. Greater opportunities for intergroup contact are more likely to result in meaningful social relations between group members and are thus associated with higher rates of interracial/ethnic marriage and friendship. At the same time, however, increased racial/ethnic heterogeneity is also associated with increased opportunities to commit interracial violence (Messner and South, 1992; Sampson, 1986). When controlling for income equality, racial/ethnic heterogeneity is positively related to intergroup marriage (Blum, 1984; South and Messner, 1986), and the interracial crime rate (Sampson, 1984). Inequality is a third facet of macrostructural opportunity theory and has a distinct influence on social interactions, particularly when correlated with racial/ethnic group membership. When nearly all members of the group experience similar deprivations, such as the black - white income differential, the inequity is considered "consolidated." Accordingly, consolidated inequality theory posits that the combined influenced of minority race and inequality inhibits across-group interaction (Blau and Blau, 1982; Blau and Schwartz, 1984). Blau's macrostructural theory focuses primarily on the opportunity for across-group contact and the notion that racial inequality and segregation reduce opportunities for interaction. The related consolidated inequality theory, however, emphasizes the unequal distribution of resources along a nominal measure (i.e.,

91

race). Racial inequality leads to more intense between-group violence when the economic differential breeds a sense of injustice among the disadvantaged group, and leads to hostility against the more advantaged group (Jacobs and Wood, 1999; Messner and Golden, 1992). Blau and Blau (1982) present a theory of racial inequality based on relative deprivation between groups; more impoverished groups are more likely to have higher rates of criminal offending. Considering the history of economic inequality, this is particularly salient in black - white relations, in which case the theory would predict violent crimes perpetrated by blacks against white victims as the likely outcome. As such, in examining consolidated inequality, it is important to disaggregate the victim-offender dyad, though many prior studies have not done so. Research has, however, examined income inequality as a predictor of violence overall, and specifically to predict violent events between groups. Evidence shows that the black - white income differential is positively related to overall rates of violent crime (Blau and Blau, 1982), black on black violence (Stolzenberg, D'Alessio, and Eitle, 2006), and black on white homicide (Parker and McCall, 1999). On the other hand, relative inequality is inconsequential to explain white on black violence. Most prior studies of the consolidated inequality theory have relied on the analysis of total crime rates or race-specific offenders (i.e., black or white offenders regardless of victim's race/ethnicity), and have not explicitly examined inter-group crime. And even fewer have extended the theory to relationships beyond black and white. The applicability of consolidated inequality theory to other races/ethnicities is

92

hard to gauge; average black and Latino incomes are both lower than whites, but are relatively similar. An exception is Hipp, Tita, and Boggess (2009). Recent empirical examination of income inequality and racially disaggregated violence has looked at the within race income distribution as a marker for inter/intragroup crime instead of between-group comparisons. Some researchers argue that it is likely that blacks use other black households as a reference point rather than comparing their status to whites (McCarthy and Yancy, 1971), and Harer and Steffensmeir (1992) argue that measures of within income differentials are better predictors of race-based crime rates. Blau and Blau (1982) included an indicator of intragroup income inequality in their study of cities, and concluded that it has a direct effect only on homicide and assault, the two types of crime that occur largely between members of the same racial/ethnic category. On the other hand, Stolzenberg, Eitle, and D'Alessio (2006) determined that intraracial inequality was not a significant predictor of within or between-group crime. Again, however, these studies predominantly rely on analysis of only blacks and whites. Applying the black - white income differential to a study of South Los Angeles, however, is inappropriate, since less than 10% of the population is nonLatino white. Rather, comparison of inequality and heterogeneity in South LA should compare black to Latino residents. According to the macrostructural theory and the consolidated inequality perspective, an income differential between blacks and Latinos should lead to increased violence committed by the disadvantaged group. In South Los Angeles, however, absolute difference in income between

93

Latinos and Blacks in South LA is small and it is difficult to discern who would be considered the advantaged group. Two groups similar in economic status more contact (less segregated) according to macrostructural theory would lead to more intergroup interaction and more interracial violence/crime.

Cooperation Theories In contrast to the previously discussed theories of intergroup relations based on competition, Allport's (1954) contact hypothesis predicts that increased betweengroup interactions ultimately lead to reduced racial antagonism or conflict between races. The theory postulates that frequent contact between different groups can reduce prejudice by disconfirming stereotypes. "The effects of contact on prejudice vary" depending on the degree to which certain optimal conditions are met. That is, favorable between-group attitudes are only generated when the groups can be considered equal status, the associations are voluntary and occur in collaborative and cooperative environments, and the interactions are meaningful and repeated over duration of time (Allport, 1954; Zajonc, 1968). Presuming the above conditions are satisfied, numerous studies find evidence supporting the contact hypothesis among interracial/ethnic friendships (Jackman and Crane, 1986), attitudes towards homosexuals (Herek and Capitanio, 1996), disabled persons (Link and Cullen, 1986), and the homeless (Lee, Farrell, and Link, 2004). Moody (2001) found support for contact theory within extracurricular activities and sports in the middle school environment.

94

Furthermore, contact hypothesis has successfully explained more favorable racial attitudes of whites (Sigelman and Welch, 1993), and blacks (Ellison and Powers, 1994). Welch, Sigelman, Bledsoe, and Combs' (2001) in their extensive studies on black and white race relations in Detroit show that residential integration promotes intergroup contact and reduces intergroup hostility. Their prior work, however, demonstrated that the majority of black - white 'contact' in Detroit largely consisted of superficial encounters in the shopping mall or at sporting events (Sigelman et al., 1996). Research has found support for contact hypothesis in neighborhoods; Oliver and Wong (2003) determined that block groups with greater racial/ethnic integration reported lower levels of out-group stereotyping and animosity. Though more work has addressed the interactions between non-black and non-white groups than other theoretical analysis, the results are inconclusive. Stein, Post, and Rinden (2000) determined that white - Latino acquaintanceships are related to more positive feelings towards Latinos. Welch and Sigelman (2000) found some evidence that interaction between Mexican Americans and whites is associated with more favorable out-group impressions, but they did not find the same association for Puerto Ricans, and found a negative relationship for Cubans' interactions with whites. They also concluded that interaction between non-Latino whites and Latinos is greater than non-Latino white contact with blacks, though their findings replicate their results on black - white associations in Detroit, that despite the higher rates of Latino - white contact, most of the interactions were casual interactions in public settings and not meaningful friendships (Welch and Sigelman, 2000).

95

Little research has applied the contact hypothesis directly to the study of crime or intergroup violence. The theory would postulate that as groups come into increasing contact with each other, intergroup interaction would increase and between-group animosity would lessen. In mixed neighborhoods, there would be low rates of intergroup hostility and crime, similar to Blau's prediction on heterogeneity and crime under the macrostructural theory. In essence, under a contract theory framework, racial/ethnic succession should not affect who is involved in crime, and perhaps, may even decrease between-group violence. The biggest critique of the contact hypothesis is the stringent 'optimal conditions' that can be difficult to attain that are required for intergroup interaction to reduce animosity and have beneficial results.

Social Disorganization Theory As discussed in Chapter 1, broader theories of social interactions such as social disorganization theory are applicable to studies of intergroup interaction even though they do not specifically address who is involved in crime. Under a social disorganization framework, the neighborhood instability caused by racial and ethnic transition reduces interaction and cooperation among community members. As a result, residents are unable to join together in order to prevent and control crime, leading to increases in both rates of intra- and inter-group offenses. Though some research suggests that socially disorganized neighborhoods are likely to have higher rates of inter-group violence than communities that are more advantaged (McCall and Parker, 20G5), few studies have explicitly tested this. Hipp, Tita, and Boggess

96

(2009) determined that racial and ethnic mixing in socially disorganized neighborhoods leads to higher levels of both inter- and intra-group violence. And one of the most robust findings from Stolzenberg, Eitle, and D'Alessio's (2006) study of black and white violence was that overall disadvantage was significantly related to violent crime regardless of the victim - offender racial/ethnic composition.

Why youths? In this study, I investigate only the violent crime committed by young males, ages 12 to 24. It has long been established that criminal offending increases during the adolescent years, peaks in the late teens or early twenties, and then declines as the youth enters adulthood. In fact, age is such an essential construct in the explanation of crime rates that it has been designated as the 'age-crime curve' and has even been considered 'invariant' (Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1983). How the rates of inter- versus intra-group homicides, and violent crime in general, change as neighborhood racial and ethnic composition shifts, is understudied, particularly as it is related to youths. While overall violent offending and victimization rates have been declining, youth violence specifically remains a critical issue. Homicide is the leading cause of death for young males, particularly for Black males between the ages of 14 and 24, in which case homicide is responsible for approximately 48 percent of deaths in that age group (in 2005) . Comparatively, homicide accounts for 25.5 percent of the deaths of young Latino males and only 4.4 percent of the deaths of non-Latino white males of the same ages.

97

Just as homicide rates vary among races, the prevalence of violence and homicide varies by neighborhood, with higher rates of serious youth violence concentrated predominantly in disadvantaged (and minority dominated) urban communities. Studies have found evidence that residence in a disadvantaged neighborhood increases the likelihood that youths associate with deviant peer networks, thereby increasing youth involvement in delinquent behavior (Haynie et al. 2006). Self-reported felony assault and robberies are twice as common among youth living in poverty as among middleclass youth (Elliott, Huizinga, and Menard 1989). And evidence from the Pittsburgh Youth Study, a longitudinal study following 1,517 inner-city boys, suggests that living in a bad neighborhood doubles the chance of delinquency (Loeber et al. 1998). Recent research also suggests that youths from disadvantaged communities are more likely to carry a firearm (Bingenheimer et al. 2005), which plays a large role in youth homicides. Firearm related violence account for the majority of homicides of young males 14 to 24, regardless of race or ethnicity: 68% of non-Latino white homicides involved a gun; 82% of Latino homicides were firearm related; and 92% of Black male youth homicides were with a gun.

DATA

The data in this section of my dissertation come from several primary sources. Individual level crime data was provided by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD); annual Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD)

98

enrollment data by race/ethnicity was obtained through personal communication with the LAUSD Planning, Assessment and Research Division. Additional LAUSD information was publically available online from the LAUSD website. I used population and demographic information for 2000 from the U.S. Census Bureau, and the 2006 population estimates by census tract were obtained from the Los Angeles Department of City Planning (LADCP). The LADCP calculated the estimates using a housing unit method that adds the growth in housing units to the 2000 housing unit count and then multiplied by the average number of persons per occupied housing unit; housing growth is measured by the number of new building permits lagged to allow time for actual construction. In 2000, the area of South Bureau in Los Angeles was comprised of 149 census tracts with an average population of 4,440 residents; median household income is just over $29,000. A map of the location of South Bureau is shown in Figure 3.1 (page 100).

99

Figure 3.1. Location of South Los Angeles within the City of Los Angeles

Sooth Bureau tract | Los Angeles city tract

100

Racial/Ethnic composition This chapter of my dissertation examines racial and ethnic change between 2000 and 2006 in South Los Angeles. Over the past few decades, the racial/ethnic composition of South LA changed dramatically, and continued to change over this study period. As you can see in Table 3.1, the average South LA tract changed from predominantly white in 1970, to majority black, to currently mostly Latino residents. Table 3.2 shows only the average tract racial/ethnic composition for 2000 and 2006 for South Bureau Los Angeles and the change over the six years. On average, tracts were about 33% black and 50% Latino in 2000; by 2006, the average tract was only about a quarter black and 58% Latino.

Table 3.1. Average tract racial and ethnic composition of South Los Angeles, 1970,1980,1990,2000, and estimated 2006, N = 149 2000 2006 1970 1980 1990 41% Black 53.7% 53% 33.79% 27.57% 20% 29% 37% 50.77% 58.17% Latino (Non-Latino) 44% 93% 56% 9.46% 7.72% White* 4.20% * Asian Other 1.78% * Total 100% 100%
*In 1970 the "White" category includes all white residents of Latino and non-Latino ethnicity, which is why the total percent is greater than 100%; in 1980 and on, non-Latino whites are counted separately in the Census.

Table 3.2. Average tract racial and ethnic composition of South Los Angeles, 2000, and estimated 2006, N = 149 Black Latino Non-Latino White Asian Other Total 2000 33.79% 50.77% 9.46% 4.20% 1.78% 100% 2006 27.57% 58.17% 7.72% * * 100% Change -6.22% +7.40% -1.74%

* Asian and other populations not calculated for 2006

101

I also relied on the Los Angeles elementary and middle school enrollment data by race/ethnicity in order to estimate tract level composition. For comparison purposes, the average school composition by race/ethnicity in 2000 and 2006 is presented below in Table 3.3. The school enrollment data follows the same pattern as the census tracts: decreasing black student body and an increasingly large Latino presence.

Table 3.3. Average school racial and ethnic composition of South Los Angeles, 1990,2000, and 2006, N = 522 Black Latino Non-Latino White Asian Other Total 1990 35.40% 56.31% 5.41% 1.30% 1.59% 100% 2000 28.82% 66.36% 2.91% 0.71% 1.25% 100% 2006 23.91% 71.53% 2.43% 0.68% 1.45% 100%

The method for calculating the 2006 racial/ethnic estimates using the school enrollment data is discussed below.

2006 Population estimates by race/ethnicity Unlike the 2000 demographic data, the 2006 racial and ethnic data by census tract is not readily available. Therefore, in order to estimate 2006 population by race/ethnicity, I used the rate of change in school enrollment by race/ethnicity as a proxy. Prior to estimating my models, I predicted the proportion of white, black, and Hispanic residents in each tract using 2006 school enrollment data to approximate the tract level racial composition. Annual enrollment data for all public elementary and middle schools in the tract and within a one mile perimeter of the tract boundary were summed to provide total enrollment counts by race/ethnicity for each census 102

tract. These values were then computed to proportions using the total summed school enrollment as the denominator. I used schools outside the City of Los Angeles boundary (that were still operated by LAUSD) because they are representative of the local area. I excluded information from the public high schools because the high drop-out rate renders it unreliable. Additionally, changes in enrollment of the younger students more likely estimates the relocation of their family (since children most often do not move in isolation without their family) and is less likely to represent the choice of the student to drop-out, as it would in high school. On average, each tract contained information from approximately eight schools; three tracts had only two or three schools information included, and three tracts included information for 16 or 17 schools. Alternatively, I created an additional school-to-tract data set with elementary schools within half-mile, and one where I used the tract centroid and joined schools within a one or two mile radius of the tract center. Both strategies, however, yielded too many tracts with zero or one to two schools. Therefore, I decided that using schools within one mile of the perimeter is a better estimate of change in the focal tract. Using OLS regression with robust standard errors, I then predicted the 2000 percent of each race/ethnicity in the tract using the same race/ethnicity percentage in the schools in 2000. This allowed me to determine how well the school values predict the tract level population percents. The school percent black and the school percent white were good predictors of tract population (R = 0.8234 for black and 0.7158 for white), though the school percent Latino students was only a fair predictor

103

of the tract percent Latino (R = 0.5028). In different permutations I also included the percent of students who were classified as English as a second language (ESL) learners and the total percent minority enrollment, but neither variable significantly improved my ability to predict the tract percent Latino and were therefore excluded to keep the estimation as parsimonious as possible. It is likely that the Latino student enrollment overestimates the Latino population in the tract; Latino families generally have a greater number of children, and the Latino adults may be undercounted in the census because of concerns related to their immigrant status (i.e., unauthorized residents may not be counted). Likewise, including the squared proportion of each race/ethnicity did not significantly improve the predictably of the models . Using the obtained regression coefficients, I predicted the 2006 tract proportion of each race/ethnicity by substituting the 2006 school enrollment information and then multiplying by the tract total population. This method, however, did not limit the total population to a maximum of 100%. Therefore, I adjusted the 2006 population estimates by constraining the total population percent in 2006 equal to the total population percent Latino, Black, and non-Latino White in 2000). I then scaled the predicted proportion of each race by the difference between the 2000 and 2006 total percent. By multiplying these adjusted proportions by the 2006 LADCP population estimates, I was able to obtain estimated 2006 population counts for whites, blacks, and Latinos that would be incorporated into the denominator of the crime rates. The 2000 Census tract race/ethnicity variables and my 2006 computed tract race/ethnicity variables are all highly correlated and significant at an alpha of .05 or

104

less. Likewise, the tract and school race/ethnicity data are also strongly correlated; the 2000 tract and school variables are correlated at 0.7091 for Latinos, 0.8233 for non-Latino whites, and 0.9091 for blacks. In 2006, the school and tract correlations are even higher: 0.9366 for Latinos, 0.9949 for non-Latino whites, and 0.9911 for black residents.

Crime data The crime data consists of all crimes reported to police in the City of Los Angeles by individual offense for the years 2001 and 2006. The dataset includes the total number of all Part 1 offenses per district, but I include only homicide, robbery, and aggravated assault; rape and sexual assaults were excluded because these crimes are more likely to be underreported. Prior studies of interracial/ethnic violence have had limited access to data and therefore rely on homicide only as a measure of between group violence. Though homicides are the most likely offenses known/reported to the police so there is little measurement error, homicides are also infrequent occurrences and between-group homicides even rarer (Hepburn and Voss, 1970). Each record includes information on one victim and the offender's race or ethnicity, age, and gender, along with geographic coordinates of the crime, possible motives, and the date of occurrence. Crime events with multiple victims were treated as independent events. I limited my analysis to male youths, defined as offenders between the ages of 12 and 24. The age range typically comprising 'youth' varies by author, but commonly ranges from 12 or 14 to the early to mid-twenties. Table 3.4

105

below shows the distribution of ages by offenders for 2001 and 2006; the majority of offenders were between 15 and 22 years old; in 2001 the average age for an offender was 18.6 years, and 19.1 years old in 2006. Though this study focuses on factors related to offending, information on the age of the victims is reported in Table 3.5. In both years, just over three-fourths of the victims were male. Reports missing information on the gender or race/ ethnicity of the offender or race/ethnicity of the victim were excluded.

Table 3.4. Age of offenders, 2001 and 2006 (when victim and offender race known) 2001 N = 5,742 2006 N = 5,933

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Total Average age:

N 87 89 226 438 577 522 958 431

1,496

220 257 242 199

Percent 1.52 1.55 3.94 7.63 10.05 9.09 16.68 7.51 26.05 3.83 4.48 4.21 3.47

N 41 95 203 353 619 641 699 830 642 476 851 217 266

Percent 0.69 1.60 3.42 5.95 10.43 10.80 11.78 13.99 10.82 8.02 14.34 3.66 4.48

5,742 100% = 0.912) 18.6 (SD =

5,933 100% 19.1 (SD = 1.17)

106

Table 3.5. Age distribution of victims, 2001 and 2006, (when victim and offender race known) 2001 N'= 5,742 N Percent 238 4.14% 2,744 47.8% 1,622 28.3% 2,845 49.6% 156 2.72% 29.4 (SD = 5.7) 2006 N = 5,933 N Percent 222 3.74% 3,014 50.8% 1,730 29.2% 2,834 47.8% 111 1.87% 28.1 (SD = 6)

Under 12 12 to 24 18 to 24 24 to 64 Over 64 Average age:

The individual crimes were aggregated to the census tract level (2000 boundaries) and categorized by the race/ethnicity of the victim and offender in order to give me the total number of crimes per neighborhood by type. Since I am focusing on Latinos and black residents only, there are four possible victim - offender dyads: (1) black offender and black victim, (2) Latino offender and Latino victim, (3) black offender perpetrated on a Latino victim, and (4) Latino offender on black victim. Table 3.6 presents the proportion of total crime in South Los Angeles for each type. In 2001, the majority of violent crimes were intra-group, but in 2006 there is a higher proportion of crimes that were black on Latino. This increase is due to the increasing number of black on Latino robberies between 2001 and 2006. Table 3.7 shows the number of violent crimes by type during this period; though most offenses were decreasing, the number of black robberies perpetrated on a Latino victim increased. This is also clearly shown in Figure 3.2.

107

Table 3.6. Percent of total crime by victim-offender racial/ethnic composition, 2001 and 2006 2001 2006 N= = 145 N = 143 S.D. S.D. Percent Percent Black on Black 27.54 27.49 23.10 32.55 30.57 Latino on Latino 32.59 32.99 29.55 20.59 34.50 21.00 Black on Latino 27.49 Latino on Black 7.38 13.99 5.03 8.10 Total 100% 100%

Table 3.7. Average number of homicides, robberies, and aggravated assaults by group type in South Bureau Los Angeles, 2001 and 2006, N = 147 (Standard deviation in parentheses) Black on black homicide Black on Latino homicide Latino on Latino homicide Latino on black homicide Black on black robbery Black on Latino robbery Latino on Latino robbery Latino on black robbery Black on black aggravated assault Black on Latino aggravated assault Latino on Latino aggravated assault Latino on black aggravated assault 2001 0.315 (0.96) 0.274 (0.26) 0.212(1.29) 0.041 (0.23) 6.610(8.52) 9.713 (13.82) 3.822(5.32) 0.678(1.13) ' 2.651(4.51)
v v

2006 0.297 (1.02) 0.552 (0.28) 0.248 (0.99) 0.041 (0.37) 7.283 (9.09) 14 138 (15.85) 4.683 (4.73) 0.662(1.13) ' 2.048(3.67) v ' ' 5 ' 1.000(2.12) v '
v

Change -0.018 0.278 0.036 0 0.673 4.425 0.861 -0.016 -2.602 -0.603 -0.908 -0.288

' 88(2.27) L2

108

Figure 3.2. Average number of aggravated assaults by victim-offender racial/ethnic composition, 2001 to 2006, N = 149 tracts

2001

2002

2003 -BL assault

2004 LL assault

2005

2006

--BB assault

LB assault

Where "BB" is Black offender on Black assault, "BL" is Black offender on Latino victim, "LL" is Latino victim and Latino offender, and "LB" is Latino offender, Black victim. Figure 3.3 shows the 2001 to 2006 trend for inter- and intra-group assaults; change in the number of homicides is not graphed because the trend is fairly flat.

109

Figure 3.3. Average number of robberies by victim-offender racial/ethnic composition, 2001 to 2006, N = 149 tracts

2001 IBB robbery

2002

2003

2004 ^ -BL robbery

2005

2006

LL robbery

L B robbery

Inter-and intra-group rates A novel contribution of this project is the ability account for the probability of interaction between residents of different racial and ethnic groups. Formulations of intergroup rates need to account for the size of each group and the likelihood of interaction based on physical closeness (propinquity); in neighborhoods with a greater racial and ethnic mixing, intergroup interaction is a more realistic possibility than in neighborhoods dominated by one race (Blau 1987). Even from Blau's original formulation of macrostructural theory of intergroup interaction, he

110

acknowledged the importance of opportunities for contact between members of different groups. Prior studies of inter and intra-group crime, however, have generally overlooked the likelihood of across group interaction and often rely on either the total population (D'Alessio, Stolzenberg, and Eitle, 2000) or the victim or offender's population (Sampson, 1984; Stolzenber, Eitle, and D'Alessio, 2006) as the denominator in computing crime rates. However, work I conducted with Hipp and Tita has shown that such denominators result in inconsistent rates because the rates are a function of the size of the two groups; in neighborhoods where the group distribution clusters at either extreme (such as in predominantly minority or predominantly white areas) the correlation between the group size and the denominator introduces bias in the estimation of intergroup rates and essentially creates built-in relationships with the racial/ethnic composition of the unit of analysis. Instead, we proposed using the conditional probability of interaction. We calculated "normalized" populations that controlled for the likelihood of interaction between members of two groups. We determined that this measure is consistent across different population compositions and accounts for group size and the possibility of interaction better than using total or group population as a denominator. I follow the same methodology in this study using population data from the 2000 Census and my 2006 adjusted population estimates. A more explicit discussion of our methodology can be found in Hipp, Tita, Boggess (2009).

Ill

To compute the probability that an interaction occurred between two black residents in a census tract, I used the following expression (as found in Hipp, Tita, Boggess, 2009): (3.1a) ibb = [(NB)(NB-l)]/[(N)(N-l)]

where ibb is the probability of interaction between two black residents, NB is the total number of black residents, and N is the tract's total population. Since the denominator captures the total number of possible interactions, this measure captures the proportion of interactions that should be between blacks. The equation to compute the probability of interaction between two Latinos is analogous: (3.1b) iB = [(NL)(NL-1)] / [(N)(N-1)]

where ill is the probability of interaction between two Latinos residents, NL is the size the total Latino population, and all other terms are as defined before. The possibility of inter-group interactions initiated by a black offender on a Latino victim ibl, is defined by the expression: (3.1c) ibl = [(NB)(NL)]/[(N)(N-l)]

where all terms are as previously defined. Since the probability that a Latino initiated inter-group interaction on a black victim is the same as a black initiating an interaction with a Latino, I only needed this one conditional probability interaction to handle both possible victim - offender dyads. I then multiplied the tract population by each of these conditional probabilities; this adjusted population was used as the denominator when computing inter-and intra-group rates.

112

Exogenous socio-demographiccontrolvariables As in Chapter 2,1 include neighborhood level socioeconomic and demographic variables often associated with community structure and crime from the Census. These include the average length of residential tenure or the proportion of residents who moved within the last five years (as indicators of stability), family structure (i.e., single female headed households, the number of youths, etc.), the percent of owner-occupied housing units (also as an indicator of stability, see Rohe and Stewart, 1996), poverty rates (including the percent of households receiving public assistance), unemployment rates, and median household income. Along with heterogeneity and instability, Shaw and McKay (1942) concluded that economic status was one of the strongest indicators of delinquency, and the income differential between Latino and Black households is one of the central indictors of many interracial/ethnic crime analyses. Furthermore, as discussed in the theory section, the role of income inequality plays a large role in the theories of intergroup crime. Therefore, I created a measure of between-group inequality that controls for the difference in Latino and Black income. This measure is computed as the ratio of Latino to Black median income. This will allow me to test if intergroup crime is a product of inequality between the two groups (as posited by the consolidated inequality theory), as a result of increasing equality (as posited by the group threat model), or is more along the lines of a defended neighborhood position (if the inequality indicator is not statistically significant). On average, the median income of Latino residents is 1.3 times as large as the median income for Black households.

113

Control variables were transformed into a rate based on the total tract residential population. Most neighborhood level studies control for these factors. See Chapter 2 for more explicit information. Table 3.9 has summary statistics for South Los Angeles in 2000.

Table 3.8. South Los Angeles Summary Characteristics, 2000, N = 149 Census Variable Total population Percent Latino Percent Black Percent non-Latino White Median household income Latino median household income Black median household income Non-Latino White median household income Percent population below poverty Percent owner-occupied housing units Median property value Value 4,440 51% 33% 9% $29,053 $29,438 $26,934 $31,720 30% 38% $161,132

Latent indicator of residential stability The definition of residential stability varies between studies. Most commonly, authors rely on Census measures of the average length of residency, the percent of home owners, or the proportion of new residents. More recently, empirical analysis has incorporated an index of residential stability consisting of at least two of the Census variables in order to more effectively measure the concept of residential stability. Therefore, I include a latent variable measure of stability in my model consisting of all three Census indicators (of the average length of residency, the percent of home owners, or the proportion of new residents). Since there are only three indicators, my latent variable is exactly identified.

114

The R values of the indicator variables are used to determine how well the indicator variables measure the latent term and are interpreted in a similar manner as R2 variables in traditional regression analysis. The obtained R2 values are all high, signifying they are acceptable predicators of residential stability: percent owneroccupied housing units, R2 = 0.911; average length of residency, R2 = 0.812; and the percent of residents in the same home for the past five years, R = 0.530).

RESEARCH METHOD

In order to investigate the relationship between Black and Latino crimes and change in the tract racial and ethnic composition 1 use a cross-lagged autoregressive model that can measure trends in inter/intra group crime while accounting for the reciprocal relationship between changes in the crime rate and black - Latino residential succession. Within cross-lagged panel models each year's observation is predicted by the values of the same variable in all the prior years, and the value of another variable in the year previous such that it controls for temporal ordering. Hipp, Tita, and Greenbaum (2008) employed a similar model when testing the relationship between crime and home sales. Likewise, cross-lagged autoregressive models have been used to study directionality between substance use and juvenile delinquency (D'Amico et al., 2008), and the direction of effect in the relationship between father involvement and adolescent well-being (Hawkins, Amato, and King, 2006). Previous studies, however, could not estimate all the models for the different victim - offender dyads simultaneously. 115

Unlike the model used in Chapter 2 which had simultaneous effects, I model one-year lags in this analysis, such that black to Latino succession in 2000 predicts crime in 2006, and crime in 2001 influences change in the Black and Latino population in 2006.1 will also control for neighborhood characteristics measured in 2000. Crime information for 2001 is used as a proxy for 2000 because of missing data. I use maximum likelihood estimation in AMOS to conduct the analysis. All models are identified because they are recursive. My equations are shown below.

(3.2a) (3.2b) (3.2c) (3.2d) (3.2e)

BB(06} = p,BBm

+ p,black(m + j32latinom + TX{00) + s + TX{00) + e + rX(00) + s + + p6latino(00)

BL{06) = p2BL{00) + p3black{00) + p4latinom LB(06) = p3LB(00) + p5blackm LL(06) = p7 LL(0Q) + p7black{00)

+ fislatino{00) + TXm

blackw = psblackm + P9BBm + fil0BLm + BnLBm + PuLLm + pulatinom + TXm + s (3.2f) latinom = p6latinom + PuBBi00) + Pl5BL(00) + PULB(Q0) + PLLm + PKblackm + rx(00) + s

Where BB is the rate of black on black crime, BL is the rate of black on Latino crime, LB is the rate of Latino on black crime, and LL is the rate of Latino on Latino crime for the year 2000 (00) or 2006 (06). The variable black is the proportion of Blacks for year, pi captures the size of the effect of black on black crime in 2001 on the rate of black on black crime in 2006; p2 captures the size of the effect of black on Latino crime in 2000 on the rate of black on Latino crime in 2006; p3 captures the size of the effect of Latino on black crime in 2000 on the rate of Latino on black crime in 2006; and p4 captures the size of the effect of Latino on Latino crime in 2000 on the rate of Latino on Latino crime in 2006. Py is the coefficient for the effect of ratio in the previous year on each y. 8 is the error term. X

116

is a matrix of the community characteristics in 2000, including income inequality, and r is a vector of the coefficients for the effect community characteristics on y. I run my analysis separately for aggravated assaults and robberies. I exclude homicide because the low base rate of intergroup homicides leads to unstable results. Future iterations of the analysis in this chapter will explore other methodologies that are better equipped to handle count data with values of zero in the dependent variable. Hipp, Tita, and Boggess (2009) have found different patterns of offending based on the type of offense. I exclude two tracts with extremely high Black on Black assault rates or extremely high Latino on Latino robbery rates, one with too low a population (less than 500), and one with an exceptionally high Black to Latino income ratio. The high Black on Black assault and high Latino on Latino robbery tracts are not the same. The final sample size is 144 census tracts.

FINDINGS

The mean values for the four victim-offender dyads are shown in Table 2.10. Despite the growing media attention to Black - brown violence in Los Angeles, the results show that the tendency is for violent crimes to be overwhelmingly intra group. Black offenders are much more likely to attack a Black victim than a Latino. The mean rate of Black on Black youth violence is approximately 91 per 1,000 adjusted or normalized population, whereas Black on Latino violence averages only 32 per 1,000 adjusted population. That is, on average, Black on Black crime is almost three times as large as Black on Latino youth violence. Likewise, Latino

117

offenders are ten times more likely to victimize another Latino than a Black youth. The mean Latino on Latino violence averages 57 per 1,000 adjusted population versus only 6 per 1,000 adjusted population for Latino on Black violent crimes. These results are the mean values even after accounting for propinquity effects and neighborhood compositional effects.

Table 3.9. Mean rates of inter- and intra-group youth violence Mean Black on Black violent crime rate (per 1,000) 90.68 Black on Latino violent crime rate (per 1,000) 31.80 Latino on Latino violent crime rate (per 1,000) 57.63 Latino on Black violent crime rate (per 1,000) 5.62

Aggravated Assault I first examined the relationship between aggravated assaults and change in neighborhood racial and ethnic composition. In this model I did not include an explicit measure of between-group inequality though I did control for the overall tract level poverty rate and the median household income. The estimates of model fit are shown below. This model fits the data reasonably well. The chi-square test of overall fit yielded x2 = 215.9, df = 52, and p < 0.001. In structural equation modeling, a non-significant chi-square indicates that the tested model perfectly predicts the data though this is difficult to achieve because of the inherent properties of the chi-square test. That is, in large enough samples, the chi-square is almost always significant. Likewise, the chi-square test is sensitive to correlations within the data and is more likely to find significance when there is correlated data, as in this model and almost all neighborhood level research.

118

Table 3.10. Fit statistics for Model 1, inter- and intra-group aggravated assault Value Chi-square 215.9 (df = 52)* CFI 0.943 IFI 0.946 TLI 0.721 *p< 0.001 Though the chi-square was significant, alternative summary fit indices suggest that the model actually fits the data well. I rely on three popular alternative fit tests. The comparative fit index (CFI) and incremental fit index (IFI) compare the covariance matrix generated by the model to a null model with a covariance matrix of zeros; the obtained fit value accounts for how much of the covariation in the data can be explained by the model as designed. Obtained CFI and IFI range from 0 to 1, and in general, values greater than 0.90 are considered a good fit. My obtained CFI = 0.943 and IFI = 0.946 then, are evidence of a decently fitting model. I also report the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) which similarly estimates a measure of fit by comparing the observed covariance matrix to a null model; TLI values close to 1 indicate a good fit, though negative values can be obtained if correlations between the parameters are low and there are few degrees of freedom. The TLI, however, penalizes more complex models. My slightly lower TLI score of 0.721 is likely the result of model complexity. Fan, Wang, and Thompson (1999) argue that the CFI is one of the least sensitive measures to sample size. Despite conflicting evidence on the quality of model fit, I ran the model and the results are shown in Table 3.11.

119

Table 3.11. Regression results estimating the relationship between inter- and intra-group aggravated assault and racial/ethnic composition (Standard error in parentheses), N = 144 BB assault 2006 0.035 (0.121) BL assault 2006 LL assault 2006 LB assault 2006 Percent Black 2006 0.025 (0.026) 0.206 (0.117)t -0.293 (0.097)** -0.024 (0.066) 0.708 (0.074)*** 0.048 (0.104) -0.111 (0.149) 0.747 (0.722) -0.056 (0.566) -0.621 (0.588) 0.011 (0.124) 0.137 (0.063)* -0.088 (0.89) 0.011 (0.136) Percent Latino 2006 -0.028 (0.030) -0.087 (0.136) 0.306 (0.113)** -0.036 (0.076) 0.058 (0.088) 0.510 (0.123)*** -0.201 (0.177) -0.653 (0.858) 0.170 (0.672) 0.071 (0.698) 0.194 (0.148) 0.362 (0.075)*** 0.543 (0.106)*** 0.193 (0.162)

BB assault 2001 BL assault 2001 LL assault 2001 LB assault 2001 Percent Black 2001 Percent Latino 2001 % femaleheaded households % Black male youths % Latino male youths Stability % foreign born residents Median household income % poverty % vacant housing

0.071 (0.88) 0.006 (0.050) 0.112 (0.257) 0.080 (0.141) 0.409 (0.172)* -0.146 (0.241) 0.582 (1.16) 0.286 (0.909) -1.27 (1.00) -0.311 (0.209) 0.472 (0.265)f -0.035 (0.187) -0.284 (0.222)

0.045 (0.408) 0.032 (0.496) -0.314 (0.704) -2.476 (3.377) 2.887 (2.631) 0.725 (2.952) -1.161 (0.602)* 0.133 (0.763) 1.041 (0.538)* -1.175 (0.643)t

-0.089 (0.091) 0.134 (0.111) 0.071 (0.156) 1.11 (0.752) -0.205 (0.592) -0.305 (0.651) -0.085 (0.136) 0.253 (0.172) 0.129 (0.121) -0.114 (0.144)

-0.047 (0.045) 0.022 (0.054) -0.102 (0.077) 0.751 (0.372)* 0.195 (0.289) -0.448 (0.319) -0.123 (0.066)f -0.033 (0.080) -0.79 (0.058) 0.121 (0.070)f

t p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; where BB is black offender on black victim, BL black offender on Latino victim, LL Latino victim and offender, and LB Latino offender on black victim. One of the primary goals of this chapter was to explicitly separate out the effect of neighborhood racial/ethnic change on crime from the impact of crime on residential change. Social disorganization and intergroup violence theories predict

120

that racial and ethnic transition will lead to increased between-group violence as the result of increased animosity or competition. My results reveal, however, that when defining racial/ethnic change as the different proportions Black and Latino residents between 2000 and 2006, there is little evidence that change in the racial and ethnic composition affects change in inter and intra-group assaults. The majority of regression models yield non-significant effects of racial/ethnic change on any type of intra or inter-group assaults. The exception being a significant and positive relationship between the size of the Latino population and the rate of Latino on Black assaults (b = 0.409, p < 0.05); as the tract becomes increasingly Latino, the number of Latino perpetrated assaults on Blacks increases controlling for the probability that members of each group will interact. Complementing my findings in the first chapter, I find that the effect of crime on racial and ethnic change is more robust; as the results in this chapter show, this relationship holds true even when crime is disaggregated to different victim-offender dyads. Aggravated assaults with black victims regardless of the race/ethnicity of the perpetrators, are not significantly related to change in population composition. The rate of Latino on Latino assaults in 2001, however, significantly and negatively affects the percent Black population in 2006 (b = -0.293, p <0.01), and significantly and positively affects the percent Latino residents in the tract in 2006 (b = 0.306, p < 0.01). That is, as the rate of Latino on Latino assaults increases, the proportion of black residents in the tract decreases, and at the same time, as the rate of Latino intragroup assaults increase, the proportion of Latinos in the tract grows. The influence of Black on Latino assaults is not significantly related to change in the size

121

of the Latino population, but the effect of Black on Latino assaults in 2001 on the percent Black population in 2006 approaches significance (b = 0.206, p = 0.079). This suggests that there is a unique effect of Latino victimizations on population change. Other interesting significant results include the percent of Black male youths significantly and positively predicting the rate of Latino on Latino assaults (b = 0.751, p < 0.05). Overall tract median household income is significantly related a larger Black population (b = 0.137, p < 0.05) and a larger Latino population (b = 0.361, p < 0.001) at alpha equal 0.05, and approaches a significant relationship with the rate of Latino on Black assault. Poverty is also associated with larger Latino populations (b = 0.543, p < 0.001) and larger Black populations (b = 1.041, p = 0.05), but is not a significant predictor of any type of crime except Black on Black assaults. Interestingly, the percent foreign born population in 2000 is significantly related to a decrease in the Black on Black assault rate (b = 1.161, p = 0.05). This likely reflects the relationship between the percent foreign born and the Latino population.

Aggravated Assaults - Accountingfor Economic Inequality Between group income inequality is central to certain theories of intergroup interaction. Therefore, I included a measure of the ratio of Latino median household income to Black income; larger values indicate a greater discrepancy between the two median incomes. Like the previous iteration, this model fits the data reasonably well. The chi-square test of overall fit yielded x2 = 226.93, df = 58, and p < .001. The

122

values of the alternative summary fit indices, however, indicate that the model is an acceptable fit: IFI = .946, CFI = .942 and TLI = .726. The results including the Black - Latino income ratio variable are shown in Table 3.12 (page 124). There are few differences between the model shown in Table 3.11 and these results in Table 3.12. One of the most noticeable findings, however, is that when controlling for the income differential between Latinos and Blacks, the formerly significant relationship between change in the size of the Latino population and the rate of Latino on Black assaults disappears. The effect of the rate of Latino on Latino assault in 2001 on the size of the Black population remains significant and negative (b = -0.273, p <0.01). Latino on Latino assaults in 2001 also continues to significantly affect the percent Latino residents in the tract in 2006 (b = 0.293, p < 0.01). The rate of Black on Latino assaults approaches significance (b = 0.193, p = 0.087). The Black - Latino income ratio is not significantly related to any victim offender dyad. The income ratio's effect on the Latino on Black assault rate, however, approaches significance (b = -5.103, p = 0.08). In which case, as the ratio of Black to Latino income increases, the rate of Latino on Black assaults decreases. Phrased another way, as Black residents make increasingly more than Latino residents, the rate of assaults where they are the victims of Latino offenders lessens. Other significant relationships worth mentioning include: the percent foreign born residents significantly and negatively affects the Latino on Black (b = - 0.419, p = 0.05) and Latino on Latino (b = - 0.124, p = 0.05) and Black on Black (b = 1.17, p = 0.05) assault rates in 2006; higher median household incomes are

123

Table 3.12. Regression results estimating the relationship between inter- and intra-group aggravated assault and racial/ethnic composition while accounting for Black - Latino income inequality, (Standard error in parentheses), N = 144 BB LL LB Percent Percent BL assault assault assault assault Black 06 Latino 06 06 06 06 06 BB assault 0.041 0.025 -0.028 (0.122) 2001 (0.025) (0.030) BL assault -0.074 0.077 0.193 2001 (0.133) (0.089) (0.113)f LL assault 0.009 -0.273 0.293 (0.050) 2001 (0.094)** (0.112)** LB assault 0.101 -0.016 -0.044 2001 (0.072) (0.064) (0.075) 0.684 Percent 0.051 -0.092 -0.050 0.075 0.077 Black 2001 (0.413) (0.092) (0.045) (0.141) (0.072)*** (0.088) Percent 0.040 0.027 0.474 0.080 0.151 0.485 (0.497) (0.115) (0.054) Latino 2001 (0.175) (0.101) (0.122)*** Income -5.103 -1.323 inequality (1.967) (2.91 l)t % female-0.116 -0.180 -0.223 -0.0123 -0.339 0.055 headed (0.079) (0.245) (0.148) (0.180) (0.718) (0.161) households % Black -2.421 0.785 0.706 1.009 1.158 -0.837 male youths (3.395) (0.756) (0.373)* (1.157) (0.703) (0.855) % Latino 2.888 0.174 0.162 -0.252 -0.389 -.429 male youths (2.669) (0.603) (0.293) (0.916) (0.556) (0.675) 0.583 -0.457 -1.267 -0.736 0.114 -0.319 Stability (2.934) (0.645) (0.317) (0.989) (0.567) (0.687) % foreign -0.124 -0.419 -0.002 0.202 -1.170 -0.112 born (0.065)f (0.215)* (0.120) (0.146) (0.601)* (0.141) residents Median -0.033 0.523 0.137 0.365 0.150 0.266 household (0.080) (0.262)* (0.061)* (0.073)*** (0.763) (0.173) income 0.134 -0.010 -0.084 -0.078 0.0537 1.037. % poverty (0.537)* (0.121) (0.184) (0.058) (0.086) (0.105)*** % vacant -1.157 0,186 -0.474 0.485 -0.139 -0.162 (0.958) housing (0.333L (0.196)* (0.218) (0.105)f (0.238)
t.p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; where BB is black offender on black victim, BL black offender on Latino victim, LL Latino victim and offender, and LB Latino offender on black victim.

124

associated with great Latino on Black assaults (b = 0.523, p < 0.05), greater percent of Black (b = 0.137, p < 0.05) and Latino (b = 0.365, p < 0.001) residents; higher poverty rates significantly predict larger Latino populations (b = 0.537, p < 0.001) and a higher percent Black (b = 1.037, p = 0.05).

Robbery I replicated the aggravated assault models using inter and intragroup robbery rates as the dependent variables. Robberies, though also violent crimes, can be considered more instrumental crimes (i.e., for financial gain), and previous studies have shown that intergroup robberies have different structural determinants that intergroup assaults (see, Hipp, Tita, Boggess, 2009). As in the aggravated assault models, this model fits the data reasonably well. The chi-square test of overall fit yielded x2 - 222.62, df = 52, and p < .001. The values of the alternative summary fit indices, however, indicate that the model is an acceptable fit: IFI = .945, CFI = .941 and TLI = .714. My first iteration of the robbery model excluded the income ratio variable; these results are shown in Table 3.13 (page 126). Immediately noticeable is the effect of Black perpetrated robberies on the tract racial and ethnic composition. Black on black robberies are significantly and positively associated with the percent Latino in 2006 (b = 0.098, p < 0.05), and the influence of Black on black robbery on the percent Black approaches significance. The Black on Latino robberies significantly and positively related to an increase in the tract percent Black in 2006 (b = 0.102, p < 0.01), and the Black on Latino robbery rate is close to significance at a 0.05 alpha 125

Table 3.13. Regression results estimating the relationship ietween inter- and intra-group robberies and racial/ethnic composition, N = ]144 BB robbery 2006 -0.040 (0.092) BL robbery 2006 LL robbery 2006 LB robbery 2006 Percent Black 2006 -0.063 (0.038)f 0.102 (0.038)** -0.003 (0.002) 0.109 (0.098) 0.759 (0.083)**
*

BB robbery 2001 BL robbery 2001 LL robbery 2001 LB robbery 2001 Percent Black 2001 Percent Latino 20 01 % femaleheaded households % Black male youths % Latino male youths Stability % foreign born residents Median household income % poverty % vacant housing

0.158 (0.061)** 0.001 (0.001) 0.066 (0.068) -0.206 (0.216) -0.839 (0.264)**
*

Percent Latino 2006 0.098 (0.044)** -0.085 (0.045)f 0.002 (0.002) -0.079 (0.115) 0.033 (0.098) 0.518 (0.126)*** -0.138 (0.179) -0.153 (0.902) 0.237 (0.677) 0.033 (0.713) 0.171 (0.153) 0.393 (0.072)*** 0.553 (0.106)*** -0.223 (0.234)

0.067 (0.175) 0.165 (0.210) 0.171 (0.292) -1.637 (1.425) -1.293 (1.11) 1.814 (1-18) 0.129 (0.253) -0.147 (0.318) 0.615 (0.228)** 1.119 (0.277)***

0.022 (0.048) 0.012 (0.057) -0.029 (0.078) -0.188 (0.400) -0.171 (0.299) 0.121 (0.316) -0.031 (0.068) -0.163 (0.083)* -0.047 (0.061) 0.099 (0.072)

0.061 (0.062) 0.144 (0.074) -0.056 (0.103) -0.381 (0.491) -0.590 (0.384) -0.336 (0.443) 0.001 (0.089) 0.003 (0.114) 0.019 (0.079) -0.010 (0.095)

0.047 (0.107) -0.201 (0.152) -0.290 (0.766) -0.019 (0.574) -0.756 (0.607) -0.004 (0.130) 0.109 (0.061)f -0.102 (0.090) 0.315 (0.200)

0.098 (0.359) 0.487 (1.75) 3.317 (1.37)* 1.03 (1.453) 0.247 (0.313) -0.601 (0.390) -0.070 (0.280) 0.961 (0.459)*

t p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; where BB is black offender on black victim, BL black offender on Latino victim, LL Latino victim and offender, and LB Latino offender on black victim.

126

level for the influence on the percent Black in the tract as well. The rate of Black on Latino robberies is associated with decreases in the size of the Black population (b = -0.085, p = 0.057). In the other direction, tract racial and ethnic change from 2000 is a significant predictor of only Black on Black robberies. That is, tract percent Latino in 2000 is negatively related to Black on Black robbery in 2006 (b = -0.839, p = 0.001). Again, we see that the evidence for the effect of violent crime on residential change is more consistent than the effect of residential demographic changes on violence.

Robberies - Accounting for Economic Inequality As in the aggravated assault analyses, the fit statistics indicate that this model fits the data reasonably well with the exception of the TLI score. The chi-square test of overall fit yielded x2 = 229.37, df = 58, and p < .001. The values of the alternative summary fit indices, however, indicate that the model is an acceptable fit: IFI = 0.947, CFI = 0.943 and TLI = 0.730. Curiously, income inequality is not a significant predictor of inter or intragroup robberies. This is contrary to theoretical expectations that argue the income differential is a primary source of between-group conflict. But by including the income inequality variable in the model, the tract percent Latino in 2000 is still a significant predictor of Black on Black robberies in 2006 (b = -0.885, p < 0.001). In fact, the size of the coefficient increases from the model without the income inequality variable. More specifically, as the proportion of Latinos in a tract increases, the rate of Black on Black robbery decreases.

127

Table 3.14. Regression results estimating the relationship between inter- and intra-group robbery and racial/ethnic composition while accounting for Black Latino income inequality, N = 144
BB robbery 2006 BB robbery 2001 BL robbery 2001 LL robbery 2001 LB robbery 2001 % Black 2001 % Latino 20 01 Income inequality % femaleheaded households % Black male youths % Latino male youths Stability % foreign born residents Median income % poverty % vacant housing -0.054 (0.093) 0.294 (0.076)*** 0.115 (0.061)f 0.046 (0.066) -0.239 (0.230) -0.885 (.263)*** 0.113 (0.178) 0.164 (0.434) -1.447 (3.412) 0.142 (0.287) -1.969 (1.456) -1.285 (1.105) 1.216 (1.219) 0.063 (0.260) -0.141 (0.310) 0.447 (0.231)* 1.305 (0.402)*** 0.045 (0.048) 0.033 (0.545) 0.038 (0.065) 0.142 (0.075)f -1.332 (0.288) -0.056 (0.104) -0.274 (0.513) -0.628 (0.392) -0.225 (0.464) -0.008 (0.094) 0.005 (0.114) 0.028 (0.080) -0.041 (0.142) BL robbery 2006 LL robbery 2006 LB robbery 2006 Percent Black 2006 -0.052 (0.038) 0.096 (0.043)* -0.080 (0.119) 0.103 (0.094) 0.742 (0.082)*** 0.078 (0.439) Percent Latino 2006 0.081 (0.044)f -0.101 (0.051)* 0.295 (0.142)* -0.094 (0.111) 0.050 (0.097) 0.519 (0.120)***

0.145 (0.363) 0.789 (1.855) 3.512 (1.41)* 1.040 (1.55) 0.319 (0.317) -0.339 (0.394) 0.070 (0.287) 0.810 (0.589)

0.002 (0.078) -0.353 (0.395) -0.262 (0.294) -0.069 (0.321) -0.030 (0.066) -0.150 (0.079)f -0.098 (0.061) 0.212 (0.104)*

-0.316 (0.153)* -0.555 (0.757) -0.275 (0.563) -1.028 (0.0628) -0.051 (0.127) -0.133 (0.061)* -0.089 (0.099) 0.754 (0.244)**

-0.056 (0.182) -0.720 (0.900) 0.288 (0.670) 0.470 (0.743) 0.232 (0.150) 0.343 (0.073)*** 0.0497 (0.118)*** -0.549 (0.289)f

t p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; where BB is black offender on black victim, BL black offender on Latino victim, LL Latino victim and offender, and LB Latino offender on black victim.

128

Several of the crime variables continue to be significant predictors of change in the racial/ethnic composition of the tract in 2006. Robberies committed by a Black offender on a Latino victim affect both the tract percent Black (b = 0.096, p < 0.05) and the percent Latino (b = -0.101, p < 0.05) in what could be considered the expected direction. That is, increases in Black on Latino robberies are significantly related to a decreasing Latino population. The rate of Black on Black robbery is significantly related to an increasing Latino population at an alpha level of 0.10. Similarly, the rate of Latino on Latino robbery is significantly related to a larger Latino population in 2006 (b = 0.295, p < 0.05).

DISCUSSION

This study addressed two important issues within criminology: inter- and intra-group violence among youth, and the reciprocal relationship between neighborhood racial and ethnic change and violence. By employing a unique measure of inter/intra-group crime, I was able to account for propinquity effects, or the likelihood that different group members come in contact with other groups. This solves for an inherent weakness in prior inter-group studies, which are unable to account for the likelihood of interaction and often use the total population or the victim or offenders' population as the denominator in determining intergroup rates. Additionally, I used a simultaneous equation model in order to account for the reciprocal relationship between neighborhood chance and changes in violent crime. Many prior studies have acknowledged that crime is both an outcome of residential 129

change, and an inciting factor, but few studies have actually accounted for crime as both a predictor of change and a consequence of it, and I can think of no study that examines the impact of specific types of crime on change in racial/ethnic composition. Importantly, this study also moves beyond the traditional Black-White dichotomy of intergroup violence. As our society changes and the Latino population (in particular) has an increasingly large presence, it is important to look at the relationships between Blacks and Latinos, as incoming Latino residents are more likely to relocate into already Black dominated communities. In Chapter 21 looked at how tract level residential racial and ethnic change affects crime in general; in this chapter I took a more specific look at how change, Black to Latino succession specifically, affects who is involved in crime. I find that when the crimes are broken down by victim - offender dyad and by aggravated assault versus robbery, racial and ethnic change does not play a large role in changing crime rates once the probability of between-group interaction and other structural variables are controlled. The effect of population change on violence was limited to two findings. One, I found a significant and negative effect of an increasing Latino presence on a decreasing rate of Black on Black robbery, and two, there exists a positive relationship between change in the percent Latino and increasing Latino on Black assault. This reveals that there is something about an increasing Latino population in particular that has (positive and negative) impacts on crime. Since I have controlled for the likelihood of interaction, this is more than simply a consequence opportunity. It is plausible that as the size of the Latino population becomes an ever-increasing threat in the formerly Black dominated

130

neighborhoods, Black residents are more likely to bond in a form of solidarity. In doing so, Black residents do not commit violent actions against the Latino population (as evidenced by the non-significant effect of percent Latino on Black on Latino assault and robbery), but show a united front by decreased violence perpetrated within their own group. Some research suggests that though Blacks feel that incoming Latino residents threaten their residential and employment opportunities (Johnson and Oliver, 1994), other research has shown that Blacks feel more positively towards Latinos than vice versa (Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodreguez, 2002). The effect of income inequality within the robbery models is non-significant (as are the majority of exogenous predictors), negating the applicability of consolidated inequality or group threat models. Because the increasing size of the Latino population does not result in increasing Black on Latino assaults, however, the defended neighborhood perspective is also not applicable. Turning now to the assault models, the overwhelming evidence suggests that population change does not affect intra or intergroup assaults. The only exception is that in models that do not control for income inequality, increases in the percent Latino are significantly associated with increased Latino on Black assaults. When I accounted for the income differential between the two groups, change in the size of the Black or Latino populations were not significant predictors of any type of aggravated assault. Since population size and probability of interaction between the groups is controlled for, the increased rate of Latino on Black assaults is not simply because there are more Latino perpetrators in the area. Under a defended

131

neighborhood perspective, one would expect an increase in Black on Latino assaults in response to the increased competition faced by the formerly dominant group on the newcomers; I find the opposite however, as the size of the group of incoming residents increases, there are more violent attacks on the former residents. More specifically, my results suggest that the true effect of residential change and change in violent crime rates may be primarily the effect of change in violent crime on racial/ethnic composition, a result that replicates the conclusion found in Chapter 1 and in my work with Hipp (under review) testing the directionality of residential instability and crime. We found robust evidence that changes in violent crime over time affects residential turnover, but that the residential change had no significant impact on the violent crime trajectory. I find that the rate of Latino on Latino assaults has the most noticeable impact on racial and ethnic change. As the rate of Latino on Latino assaults increases, the percent Black residents decreases and the percent Latino increases. Again, because I have controlled for the population probability of interaction, this is more than an artifact of Black residents moving out and Latinos moving in. It is likely that Black residents interpret the increasing Latino on Latino assaults as representing a general increase in violent crime, especially if Latinos are the most common residents in the tract. If Black residents conclude that violent crime in general is increasing, regardless of who the victim is, they may be more likely to relocate. Increases in the Black on Latino robbery rate, however, is associated with an increased Black population and a decreased Latino presence. Threat theory posits that the size of the group is strongly related to rate of intergroup hostility. In this case, as the Black

132

population is likely attempting to maintain their hegemonic position in the tract by victimizing Latinos at an increasing rate. This leads to an outmigration of Latino victims and increase in Black residents. This also suggests that there is something unique about Latinos as victims that impacts population shifts in South Los Angeles. Contrary to theoretical expectations, the role of income inequality was not a significant predictor of either intergroup robbery or assault. In South Los Angeles, therefore, group population size may be the most important determinant of intergroup hostility. Prior studies on income inequality have often focused on the income differential between blacks and whites, but in this study, I examine inequality between two minority groups. The difference in median income between Latino and Black residents may be small enough that is it not a noticeable factor in everyday in South Los Angeles; that both groups are essentially on equal ground. In an alternative model (not shown) I substituted a measure of the different proportion of households in poverty by race/ethnicity, and the results showed a similar nonsignificant finding. This means that the importance of income inequality may be limited to studies of majority - minority interaction and a less significant factor in minority - minority conflict. Despite the unexpected findings, this chapter includes some methodological advances that are necessary to consider when examining neighborhoods in general, and intergroup violence in particular. That is, following Hipp, Tita, and Boggess (2009) I utilized an adjusted population to account for the probability of intergroup interaction, and I used structural equation modeling to account for the reciprocal relationship between change in crime and neighborhood change. Importantly, I

133

analyze intergroup violence between two minority groups, which few previous studies have done. In the future, however, I will need to incorporate the influence of spatial effects; both other chapters in this dissertation have shown that what happens in neighboring communities significantly impacts the focal community. Additionally, I will have to expound on the definition of inequality; what form of inequality is important when examining minority group relations. Hipp (2007) determined that within group inequality is a better predictor of crime than overall income inequality but especially between group inequality. Alternative research strategies can also potentially assess the relationship between Black to Latino change and homicides, though the large number of zeros in the data prevented the analysis now.

134

REFERENCES
Allport, Gordon. 1954. The Nature of Prejudice. New York: Doubleday Anchor. Bingenheimer, Jeffrey B., Robert T. Brennan, and Felton J. Earls. .2005. Firearm violence exposure and serious violent behavior. Science, 308, 1323 - 1326. Bergesen, Albert and Max Herman. 1998. Immigration, Race, and Riot: The 1992 Los Angeles Uprising. American Sociological Review, 63, 39-54. Blau, Judith R. and Peter M. Blau. 1982. The Cost of Inequality: Metropolitan Structure and Violent Crime. American Sociological Review 47:114-129. Blau, Peter M. 1977. A Macrosociological Theory of Social Structure. American Journal of Sociology, 83, 26-54. . 1987. Inequality and Heterogeneity: A Primitive Theory of Social Structure. New York: Free Press. Blalock, Hubert M. 1965. Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations. New York: Capricorn Books. Blum, Terry C. 1985. Structural Constraints on Interpersonal Relations: A Test of Blau's Macrosociological Theory. American Journal of Sociology, 91,511 -521. Blumer, Herber. 1958. Race prejudice as a sense of group position. Pacific Sociological Review, 1 , 3 - 7 . Bonacich, Edna, and Ivan Light. 1991. Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Koreans in Los Angeles, 1965 -1982. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Clark, W.A. 1989. Revealed preferences and neighborhood transitions in a multiethnic setting. Urban Geography. 10, 434 - 448. D'Alessio, Stewart, Lisa Stolzenberg, and David J. Eitle. 2002. Racial threat and interracial violent crime. Social Science Research, 31, 392-408. D' Amico, Elizabeth, Maria Orlando Edelen, Jeremy N.V. Miles, and Andrew R. Morral. 2008. The longitudinal association between substance use and delinquency among high-risk youth. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 93, 8 5 - 9 2 . Dixon Jeffrey C. 2006. The Ties That Bind and Those That Don't: Toward Reconciling Group Threat and Contact Theories of Prejudice. Social Forces. 84, 2179-2204.

135

Dixon, Jeffrey, and Michael S. Rosenbaum. 2004. Nice to know you? Testing contact, cultural, and group threat theories of anti-Black and anti-Hispanic stereotypes. Social Science Quarterly. 85, pp. 257 - 285. Dixon, John A., Kevin Durrheim, and Colin Tredoux. 2005. Beyond the optimal strategy: A 'reality check' for the contact hypothesis. American Psychologist, 60, 697-711. Ellen, Ingrid Gould. 2000. Sharing America's Neighborhoods: The Prospects for Stable Racial Integration. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ellison, Christopher G., and Daniel A. Powers. 1994. The contact hypothesis and racial attitudes among Black Americans. Social Science Quarterly, 75, 385 - 400. Eitle, David, Stewart J. D'Alessio, and Lisa Stolzenberg. 2002. Racial threat and social control: A test of the political, economic, and threat of black crime hypotheses. Social Forces, 81, 557 - 576. Eitle, David and John Taylor. 2008. Are Hispanics the new 'Threat'? Minority Group Threat and Fear of Crime in Miami-Dade County. Social Science Research, 37,1102-1115. Fossett, Mark A., and Jill K. Kiecolt. 1989. The relative size of minority populations and white racial attitudes. Social Science Quarterly, 70, 820 - 835. Garcia, R. Maria, Ralph B. Taylor, and Brian A. Lawton. 2007. Impacts of violent crime and neighborhood structure on trusting your neighbors. Justice Quarterly, 24, 679-704. Glaser, James. 1994. Back to the Black Belt: Racial Environment and White Racial Hostility in the South. Journal of Politics, 56, 21 - 41. Golden, Reid M. and Steven F. Messner. 1987. Dimensions of Racial Inequality and Rates of Violent Crime. Criminology, 25, 525 - 541. Green, Donald P., Dara Z. Strolovitch, and Janelle S. Wong. 1998. Defended Neighborhoods, Integration, and Racially Motivated Crime. American Journal of Sociology, 104,372-403. Harer, Miles D. and Darrell Steffensmeier. 1992. The Differing Effects of Economic Inequality on Black and White Rates of Violence. Social Forces, 70,1035-1054. Hawkins, D. N., Amato, P. R., and V. King. 2006. Parent-adolescent involvement: The relative influence of parent gender and residence. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 68,125-136.

136

Haynie, D., Silver, E., and Teasdale, B. 2006. Neighborhood characteristics, peer networks, and adolescent violence. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 22,147169. Herek, Gregory M., and John P. Capitanio. 1996. "Some of my best friends": Intergroup contact, concealable stigma, and heterosexuals' attitudes toward gay men and lesbians. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22,412-424. Hernandez, Tanya 2007. Latino Anti-Black Violence in Los Angeles: Not "Made in the USA," Harvard Journal of African American Public Policy, 13. Accessed online http://www.law.ucla.edu/home/apps/crs/pdf/Harv.%20J.%20Afr%20Am%20 Pub%20Pol%20op%20ed.pdf on March 10,2008 Hipp, John R., George Tita, and Lyndsay Boggess. 2009. Inter- and Intra-Group Violence: Is Violent Crime an Expression of Group Conflict or Social Disorganization? Criminology, 47, 501 - 544. Hirschi, Travis, and Michael Gottfredson. 1983. Age and the explanation of crime. American Journal of Sociology, 89, 552-584 Jackman, M.R., and M. Crane. 1986. 'Some of my best friends are black...': Interracial friendship and whites' racial attitudes. Public Opinion Quarterly, 50, 459-486. Jacobs, David and Katherine Wood. 1999. Interracial Conflict and Interracial Homicide: Do Political and Economic Rivalries Explain White Killings of Blacks or Black Killings of Whites? American Journal of Sociology, 105, 157-190. Kennedy, Randall. 2003. Interracial Intimacies: Sex, Marriage, Identity and Adoption. New York: Pantheon Books. Kim, Claire Jean. 1999. The racial triangulation of Asian Americans. Politics and Society, 27, 105-138. Krivo, Lauren J., and Ruth D. Peterson. 1996. Extremely disadvantaged neighborhoods and urban crime. Social Forces, 75, 619 - 648. Lee, B.A., C.R. Farrell and B.G. Link. 2004. Revisiting the Contact Hypothesis: The Case of Public Exposure to Homelessness. American Sociological Review, 69,40-63. Loeber, R, Farrington, D., Southamer-Loeber, M, Moffit, T., and Caspi, A. 1998. The development of male offending: Key findings from the first decade of the Pittsburgh Youth Study. Studies in Crime and Crime Prevention, 7,141-172. Logan, John. 2001. Ethnic Diversity Grows, Neighborhood Integration Lags Behind. Albany, NY: Lewis Mumford Center, State University of New York.

137

Massey, Douglas S., and Brendan Mullan. 1984. Processes of Hispanic and Black spatial assimilation. American Journal of Sociology, 20, 397 - 420. McCall, Patricia L. and Karen F. Parker. 2005. A Dynamic Model of Racial Competition, Racial inequality, and Interracial Violence. Sociological Inquiry, 75, 273-293. McCarthy, J., and W. Yancey. 1971. Uncle Tom and Mr. Charlie: Metaphysical pathos in the study of racism and personal disorganization. American Journal of Sociology, 76, 648-672. McPherson, J. Miller, and James R. Ranger-Moore. 1991. Evolution on a Dancing Landscape: Organizations and Networks in Dynamic Blau Space. Social Force, 70, 19-42. Mears, Daniel P., and Avinash S. Bhati. 2006. No Community Is an Island: The Effects of Resource Deprivation on Urban Violence in Spatially and Socially Proximate Communities. Criminology, 44, 509-548. Messner, Steven F., and Robert M. Golden. 1992. Racial inequality and racially disaggregated homicide rates: As assessment of alternative theoretical explanations. Criminology, 30, 421 - 4 4 7 . Messner, Steven F. and Scott J. South. 1992. Interracial Homicide: A Macrostructural-Opportunity Perspective. Sociological Forum. 7, pp. 517-536. Mindiola, Tatcho, Jr., Yolanda Flores Niemann, and Nestor Rodriguez. 2002. Black - Brown Relations and Stereotypes. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. Moody, James. 2001. Race, School Integration, and Friendship Segregation in America. The American Journal of Sociology, 107, 679 -716. Oliver, J. Eric, and Tali Mendelberg. 2000. Reconsidering the Environmental Determinants of White Racial Attitudes. American Journal of Political Science, 44, 574-589. Oliver, J. Eric, and Janelle Wong. 2003. Intergroup Prejudice in Multiethnic Settings. American Journal'ofPolitical Science, 47, 567-582. O'Brien, Robert M. 1987. The Interracial Nature of Violent Crimes: A Reexamination. American Journal of Sociology, 92, 817-835. Parker, Karen F. and Patricia L. McCall. 1999. Structural Conditions and Racial Homicide Patterns: A Look at the Multiple Disadvantages in Urban Areas. Criminology, 37, 447-477. 138

Parker, Karen F., Brian J. Stults, and Stephen K. Rice. 2005. Racial Threat, Concentrated Disadvantage and Social Control: Considering the Macro-Level Sources of Variation in Arrests. Criminology, 43,1111 -1134. Pettigrew, Thomas. F. 1982. Prejudice. In Dimensions of Ethnicity: Prejudice. Stephan Thernstrom, Ann Orlov, and Oscar Handlin (Eds). Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Quillian, Lincoln. 1995. Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe. American Sociological Review, 60, 586-611. Quillian, Lincoln. 1996. Group threat and regional change in attitudes towards African Americans. American Journal of Sociology, 102, 816 - 860. Rohe, William and L. Stewart. 1996. Homeownership and Neighborhood Stability. Housing Policy Debate, 7, 37-76. Sampson, Robert J. 1984. Group size, heterogeneity and intergroup conflict: A test of Blau's inequality and heterogeneity. Social Forces, 62,618 - 639. Sigelman, Lee, Timothy Bledsoe, Susan Welch, and Michael Combs. 1996. Making contact? Black-White social interaction in an urban setting. American Journal of Sociology, 101,1306-1332. Sigelman, Lee, and Susan Welch. 1993. The contact hypothesis revisited: Black white interaction and positive racial attitudes. Social Forces, 71, 781 - 795. South, Scott. 1997. Escaping distressed neighborhoods: Individual, community, and metropolitaion areas. American Journal of Sociology, 103, 1040- 1084. . 1998. Leaving the 'hood: Residential mobility between Black, white, and integrated neighborhoods. American Sociological Review, 63,17 - 26. South, Scott, and Messner, Steven F. 1986. Structural determinants of intergroup association: Interracial marriage and crime. American Journal of Sociology, 91, 1409 -1430. Suttles, Gerald D. 1972. The Social Construction of Communities. Chicago: University of Chicago. Stein, Robert, Stephanie Post, and Allison Rinden. 2000. Reconciling Context and Contact Effects on Racial Attitudes. Political Research Quarterly, 53,285-303. Stolzenberg, Lisa, Stewart D'Alessio, and David J. Eitle. 2004. A Multilevel Test of

139

Racial Threat Theory. Criminology, 42, 673-698. Stolzenberg, Lisa, David Eitle, and Stewart J. D'Alessio. 2006. Race, economic inequality, and violent crime. Journal of Criminal Justice, 34, 303 - 316. Taylor, M.C. 1998. How white attitudes vary with the racial composition of local populations: numbers count. American Sociological Review, 63, 512-535. Velez, Maria B., Lauren J. Krivo, and Ruth D. Peterson. 2003. Structural Inequality and Homicide: An Assessment of the Black-White Gap in Killings. Criminology, 41, 645-672. Wadsworth, Tim and Charis E Kubrin. 2004. Structural Factors and Black Interracial Homicide: A New Examination of the Causal Process. Criminology, 42, 647-672. Warner, Barbara D. and Glenn L. Pierce. 1993. Reexamining Social Disorganization Theory Using Calls to the Police as a Measure of Crime. Criminology, 31, 493-517. Warner, Barbara D. and Pamela Wilcox Rountree. 1997. Local Social Ties in a Community and Crime Model: Questioning the Systemic Nature of Informal Social Control. Social Problems, 44, 520-536. Welch, S., and Lee Sigelman. 2000. Getting to know you? Latino-Anglo social contact. Social Science Quarterly, 81, 67-83. Welch, Susan, Lee Sigelman, Timothy Bledsoe, and Michael Combs. 2001. Race and Place: Race Relations in an American City. New York: Cambridge University Press. Wilbanks, William. 1985. Is violent crime intraracial? Crime & Delinquency, 31, 117-128. Yancey,George. 2003. A preliminary examination of differential sexual attitudes among individuals involved in interracial relationships: testing "Jungle Fever". The Social Science Journal, 40, 153 - 157. Zajonc, R. B. 1968. Attitudinal effects of mere exposure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 9, Monongraph supplement No. 2, Part 2. Zubrinsky-Charles, Camille. 2004. Won't You Be My Neighbor: Race, Class, and Residence in Los Angeles. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

140

CHAPTER 4

RACIAL AND ETHNIC CHANGE AND SERIOUS STUDENT OFFENDING IN LOS ANGELES MIDDLE AND HIGH SCHOOLS

ABSTRACT

In this section of my dissertation I assess the relationship between racial and ethnic change and change in crime in a different type of community - schools. Like neighborhoods, some schools are perpetually more dangerous than others despite turnover. This study investigates how change in the racial and ethnic composition of school enrollment plays a role in school level crime. Additionally, because schools are located within a community context, I incorporate information on crime and residential change in the surrounding neighborhood. Iperform a series of negative binomial regression models assessing the influence of changes in school specific and local community factors on serious school offending (assaults, batteries, robberies, and property offenses that occurred on campus) over time. I find that factors related to rates of school offending are different for middle schools and high schools, and that racial and ethnic change is a better predictor of crime in high schools. Furthermore, I determine that the relationship between school level racial and ethnic change is moderated by the community level, but that the relationship is specific to school type and operational definition of racial and ethnic change.

142

INTRODUCTION In chapters one and two I examined the relationship between racial and ethnic change and change in different types of crime in Los Angeles neighborhoods. In this chapter, I extend this relationship by using schools as my unit of analysis. Specifically, I am interested in determining if factors that motivate crime in neighborhoods are applicable to smaller institutions. Schools, like neighborhoods, vary in structure and resources, similar to how crime tends to cluster in only certain parts of a neighborhood, but even among schools within the same district, some schools are perpetually more dangerous than others despite turnover in the student population. School context has been linked to graduation rates (Swanson, 2004), self-reported student delinquency (Gottfredson, Gottfredson, Payne, and Gottfredson, 2005), academic achievement (Lee and Bryk, 1986; Rosenholtz, 1985), and to a lesser extent, illicit drug use (Eitle and Eitle, 2004). Criminal victimization is a very real threat to adolescent youths, especially on school property. A substantial proportion of youth violence takes place at school (U.S. Department of Education, 2007), and Snyder and Sickmund (1995) determined that 56% of all juvenile victimizations (violent and otherwise) occur on school grounds. In this chapter, I examine how change in school context affects levels of serious offending in schools over time. In particular, I am interested in how changes in the racial and ethnic composition of the student body influences crime on school grounds, and if school-specific factors such as increasing the proportion of qualified teachers, decreasing the student-to-teacher ratio, and raising test scores can account for the change in student offenses. 143

Schools, however, are not isolated entities but rather an extension of the local environment. Local crime and violence "intrudes into schools" leading some researchers to argue that the community in which the school is located is vital to understanding the school level of crime and violence (Menacker, Weldon, and Hurwitz, p. 68,1990). Indeed, problems of school crime vary by neighborhood type, with fewer reported cases of violence in middle or high-income neighborhoods than in low-income areas (George and Thomas, 2000; Gottfredson and Gottfredson, 1985), or schools in non-urban areas (Nofziger, 2008). Therefore, I examine the effect of change in the local community characteristics on crime within schools. I look specifically at how change in the racial/ethnic composition of the local community outside the school is related to racial and ethnic change within school, how it affects levels of offending inside the school, and examine whether the relationship between local community factors and school factors operates through school-level racial/ethnic change, or if in fact, the effect of school racial and ethnic change is conditional on the community setting. The purpose of this chapter then, is to analyze how shifts in the racial and ethnic make-up of enrolled students affects the change in the level of violent crime on school grounds between 2001 and 2007 while controlling for factors typically associated with communities and crime.

Why schools? School violence is often "headline" news. But when most people think of school violence, images of mass school shootings such as the Columbine tragedy in

144

1999 often come to mind. Or, recently, bullying and students who have been "bullied to death" have garnered national attention. The media focus on these two types of school violence, however, overlooks the day-to-day violence that students in some schools face. In Los Angeles in particular, student violence is a more routine affair that, in part, emanates from racial and ethnic tensions. This tension, often between Black and Latino students, has recently manifested as violence in some LA high schools. In 2005, months-long racially motivated fights at Jefferson High School, where the student body shifted from 31% Latino 25 years ago, to 92% Latino in 2005, made front page news (LA Times, 11/25/2007). The Jefferson High School principal considered the riots, in part, caused by racial tensions that "were coming out of the community and into the schools" (as quoted in the Pacific News Service, 4/27/2005). The following year, a campus-wide brawl at Locke High School involved an estimated 600 students, required police in riot gear to suppress, and resulted in the arrests of three students. According to students, this fight too, originated from conflict between Latino and Black students (gangs) (New York Times, 5/1//2008).13 The changing racial/ethnic composition of schools is not new. In 1991 racial tension and fear of violence motivated Phineas Banning High School, an ethnically diverse, yet largely Latino high school, to forfeit their football game against Susan

The media attention to bullying often focuses on the relationship between the student victim and his or her subsequent suicide; a relationship that has been coined "bullycide" by journalists Neil Marr and Tim Field (2001) in their book, Bullycide: Death at Playtime. 13 Both Jefferson High School and Locke High School have since converted to Green Dot charter schools. Green Dot acquired control of Jefferson High School in 2006 and Locke High School in 2008. Since both schools were operated by the LAUSD between 2000 and 2006 (the years of this study), both schools are included in this analysis.

12

145

Miller Dorsey High School, which had a predominantly black student enrollment (New York Times, 11/3/1991). Evidence suggests that despite a decline in crime in Los Angeles overall, the rate of offenses in and at schools is rising (Limbos and Casteel, 2008), supported in part by reports of nearly 60 break-ins at schools over a recent holiday break (LA Times, 1/3/2008). The media, and some former LA school employees, are quick to conclude that Los Angeles schools are "battled-scarred," and "violent and unpredictable."14 Disorder in schools disrupts the ability of school faculty and administrators to educate; teachers preoccupied with disruptive students and behavioral issues rather than instruction, leads to a lower quality of education and high dropout rates. As is, an estimate of the drop-out rates within the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) is nearly 37% (California Department of Education, 2009). Like the city itself, Los Angeles schools have undergone significant change in the racial and ethnic breakdown of enrolled students. In 1993, 66% of the LAUSD students were Latino, 14% African American, and 12% non-Latino white. By the 2006 to 2007 school year, Latinos comprised 73% of the students, African Americans 11%, and non-Latino whites were only 8% of the enrolled population. In some areas of the city (i.e., South Los Angeles) 75% of the students are Latino, 20.5% African American, and less than 5% everything else.

Based on a November 2007 commentary by Migdia Chinea, former substitute teacher in Los Angeles schools, "Battle-scarred 'sub' in L.A. barrios speaks out." Available online from WorldNetDaily.com at: http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=58713. accessed January 28,2008.

14

146

Contributions to the literature This chapter improves upon the current body of knowledge on racial and ethnic change and crime in several important ways. First, I use schools as my unit of analysis. Schools represent social environments where youth spend the majority of their time, and in the process of attending school, students create multi-dimensional communities based on the convergence of socio-demographics (also considered Blau space; see McPherson and Ranger-Moore, 1991). Within these social environments, students are more likely to interact with others who are not only physically closer, but those who are most aligned along a continuum of socio-demographic variables. That is, what occurs within schools may be a function of the combined social composition of its students, and as the composition of the social environment changes through racial and ethnic turnover of the enrolled student body, so too do school level factors such as crime. Second, I rely on official school crime data (from the Los Angeles School Police Department, LASPD). The majority of school-based studies - individual level or otherwise - utilize self-report data or assess misconduct and/or school disorder as suspensions or expulsions (e.g., Payne, Gottfredson, and Gottfredson, 2003; Stewart, 2003; Welsh, 2000). By using official crime data I reduce the known limitations of self-report data (particularly respondent underreporting because of fear or embarrassment or in reference to the student's own participation in illegal activities). LASPD crime data is also more equitable and comparable to the definitions of crime used in larger community-based crime analysis (such as the Part I crime data provided by the LAPD). In addition, the LASPD crime data records information per

147

known event. So while suspension or expulsion data provide information on the number of consequences for students who have been caught, the suspension or expulsion may actually be the result of the culmination of bad behaviors over time rather than a count of each violation and undercount the true prevalence of offenses. Third, I assess the effects of change over time. Too often studies within a social disorganization framework rely on cross-section analyses, even if they are multi-level. Neighborhood effects research, however, is rooted in social processes and community change (Shaw and McKay, 1942); the relationship between community structure and crime is best understood when considered as a social process developed over time (see Hipp, Tita, and Greenbaum,^br^co/wmg). Therefore, I employ a dynamic model and examine school and community changes over time and the impact on changes in school violent crime (between 2000 and 2006). Fourth, like a few other school-based analysis (primarily Welsh and colleagues), I account for local community effects in my analyses. Neighborhoods with schools have higher crime rates (Roncek and Lobosco, 1983). Menacker, Weldon and Hurwitz (1990) have shown that crimes on school grounds are similar to the crimes in the local vicinity. Limbos and Casteel (2008), however, found that though school crime is positively correlated with levels of dilapidation in the community, the local crime rate is not significantly associated with school rates. And fifth, I compare alternative operational definitions of racial and ethnic change. As in the previous two chapters, I utilize a change in heterogeneity score and a churning index to measure racial and ethnic change.

148

In this chapter of my dissertation, I use a series of negative binomial regression models to examine racial and ethnic change within public middle and senior high schools in the City of Los Angeles and the change in the rate of violent crime on school campuses. In the next section I elaborate on the theoretical premises guiding this research and discuss some of the extant literature. I then discuss the data used in this chapter and my research strategy, followed by an extensive summary of the results and discussion. I conclude with potential limitations of the current study and suggestions for future research.

THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS

Like the previous two chapters, the research questions in this chapter stems largely from social disorganization theory. In this section, however, I apply the theory to an alternative definition of community: the school campus. Though few prior studies have applied social disorganization theory directly to schools (for exceptions see Payne, Gottfredson, and Gottfredson, 2003; Welsh, Greene, arid Jenkins, 1999), it is a logical extension as many school campuses (particularly those located in urban areas) are characterized the same elements as socially disorganized communities. For example, many urban schools have large minority concentrations, transitional student bodies, and high rates of poverty. Just as social disorganization explains differences in crime rates between neighborhoods as a function of community characteristics, the rate of crime across schools can also vary with the degree to which the school is disorganized. In addition, social disorganization

149

perspectives have successfully been applied to explain crime in non-traditional definitions of communities including (victimization in) the workplace (Lynch, 1987) and student victimization in academic settings (Bradshaw^ Sawyer, O'Brennan, 2009). The majority of school-based delinquency or crime studies focus on the individual students. But as Graham and colleagues (2006) argue in their research on school victimization (primarily bullying), the larger context in which the abuse occurs is an important predictive factor. They find that students in schools with a more racially/ethnically diverse enrollment feel less vulnerable to bullying and are less likely to be victimized. I argue that in addition to the racial/ethnic context, other socio-structural characteristics of the school affect more serious juvenile (violent) crime through the impact on students' ability to form social networks and a cohesive environment just as social disorganization theory predicts that similar neighborhood characteristics influence crime in census tracts. As previously discussed in Chapter 2, certain community characteristics inhibit social connections among residents. For example, people in racially heterogeneous environments are less likely to interact with members of another racial/ethnic group (Duster, 1993); and in areas with high residential turnover, residents are not only unable to recognize who actually belongs in the neighborhood, but the constant change prevents them from developing social networks and friendship groups. Without these social networks, community members are unable to recognize common goals or work together to solve communal problems, include crime. Other factors shown to affect crime at the neighborhood

150

level include a large young male population (increases the availability of offenders) and a high percentage of single-parent households (reduces oversight). As in census tracts, disorganized characteristics within schools can foster delinquent activity and inhibit the pro-social student interaction necessary to form a communal environment. Indeed, the ability of students to form networks in school is largely based on physical proximity to and opportunities to interact with other classmates: students cannot form relationships if they do not have contact with others (see Felson, 2002). In schools with low attendance rates and a changing population through student transfers or suspensions, students will have infrequent contact with other students, be less likely to recognize their classmates, and unable to form meaningful social connections. School factors such as class size and the student to teacher ratio are associated with student offending (Hellman and Beaton, 1986; Welsh, Stokes, and Green 2000) and teacher assault (Casteel, Peek-Asa, and Limbos, 2007) through the impact on student interaction and the ability of teachers to monitor and control student behavior. Other characteristics of socially disorganized neighborhoods are prevalent within schools and are associated with crime and victimization within schools. Studies have shown that schools with a larger the proportion of minority students, more male students, and greater poverty rates have higher victimization rates (Gottfredson and Gottfredson, 1985; Payne et al., 2003). Likewise, a National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) 1993 phone survey of approximately 6,500 6th to 12 grade students and their parents found that students and teachers in schools with larger enrollments and greater than 41% of the students receiving lunch subsidies (an

151

indicator of poverty) were more likely to be victimized. Payne, Gottfredson, and Gottfredson (2003) assessed the relationship between communal school organization - which they equate to Sampson and colleague's collective efficacy - and teacher victimization, student victimization, and student delinquency. Though they relied on only faculty perceptions of "supportive and collaborative" environments with "common goals and norms" (as opposed to student opinions) they found that schools that are more communally organized have fewer incidents of student victimization and delinquency (Payne et al., pgs 757-758, 2003). The authors also determined that high schools in general have lower levels of delinquency than middle schools, and schools with more male students and African American teachers and students had higher levels of student delinquency. In contrast, Limbos and Casteel (2008) determined that high schools have higher levels of crime than middle schools in Los Angeles. As previously mentioned, racial and ethnic composition of the student body is also associated with crime and delinquency in schools; though the relationship is more difficult to ascertain. On the neighborhood level heterogeneous populations are associated with higher crime rates because the diversity interferes with residents' ability to communicate with other groups and develop social bonds. But some work suggests that heterogeneity within schools actually reduces victimization by evening the balance of power (Graham, 2006) or facilitating cross-group friendships (Astin, 1993; Chang, 1999). One of the premises of group threat theory is that as a formerly minority group increases in size relative to another group, the likelihood of between group violence increases. Turnover within the student body then not only decreases

152

social connections between students by reducing the frequency and duration of student contact, but racial and ethnic transition specifically can shift the balance of power if a school becomes more homogenous and one group is increasing in size relative to the others. Though few other studies have looked specifically at why some schools have continuously higher crime rates than others, the few that do often rely on elements of the broken windows perspective (Galloway, Martin, and Wilcox, 1985; Plank et al., 1999). That is, the physical condition of the school building, including literal broken windows, graffiti, litter, and dilapidated classrooms, encourages deviant behavior in the classroom by signaling to the students that no one cares. Plank, Bradshaw, and Young (2009) find a direct association between physical disorder and social disorder in schools, though Galloway, Martin, and Wilcox (1985) find no relationship between the condition of the school building and suspension rates. Furthermore, Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) argue that signs of physical decay do not directly cause crime, but that physical and social disorder are symptoms of the same underlying issues (i.e., lack of collective efficacy and community organization). Indeed, other research suggests that poor structural conditions of school buildings affect students' perceived fear (Mijanovich and Weitzman, 2003) which leads to decreased social interaction and decreased collective efficacy (Plank et al., 2009). Similar to social disorganization theory but applied specifically to schools, school climate theory argues that school culture, organizational structure, social milieu, and the physical condition of the school building all influence disorder on school campuses rather than the community outside the school. School culture and

153

the organizational structure define acceptable behavior within the school, and refer to indicators such as students' perceived threat or fear of danger, arbitrariness of rule enforcement, student and administrator knowledge of rules, student attendance rates, and school financial resources. School size, average student attendance, and high student-teacher ratios in particular are often linked to higher rates of school disobedience (Gottfredson and Gottfredson, 1985; Hellman and Beaton, 1986). In larger schools administrators and teachers have a reduced ability to monitor student behavior (Toby, 1983), and the anonymity increases the likelihood of victimization of socially isolated or new students (McDermott, 1980). School structural features that are predictive of higher levels of school disorder are large size, high student-toteacher ratios, and limited resources for educational supplies (Gottfredson and Gottfredson, 1985). Welsh (2000) concludes that school climate is a better predictor of student misconduct than more serious forms of student offending. The socio-demographic background of students and teachers, including information on the racial/ethnic composition, gender, income, and teachers' experience, are often considered measures of school social milieu and are significantly related to school disorder. For example, Casteel et al. (2007) found that schools with more male teachers, more male students, and higher proportions of students on the free-lunch program were associated with greater rates of reported teacher assault. And Nofziger (2008) showed that males, older students, and students enrolled in schools located in cities have higher victimization rates. The physical condition and layout of the school building also contributes to levels of school disorder, often by obstructing or reducing supervision in the hallways, lavatories,

154

near entrances and exits, and in stairwells (Crowe, 2000). School infrastructure, especially the use of temporary classrooms and inadequate custodial services is associated with decreased student attendance and increased drop-out rates (Branham, 2004). These different theoretical perspectives, social disorganization, opportunity theories, and the school climate theory are all strongly related, and essentially argue that school structural influences crime and victimization within schools. In addition, however, school environment often reflects the larger ecological conditions of the local neighborhood (Laub and Lauritsen, 1998). Several studies find a significant correlation between community crime rates and school offenses (Lawrence, 1998; Menacker, Weldon, Hurwitz, 1990). Schools located in communities with high crime rates are more likely to have higher rates of violence on school property than schools in safer neighborhoods (Gottfredson and Gottfredson, 1985). This may be due to direct contamination effects in which community attributes exert a negative influence the school environment, or an indirect importation effect where students bring characteristics of their community into the classroom (Vartanian and Gleason, 1999). For example, the community poverty level can directly contaminate school structure by limiting the financial resources available to the school, and negatively affecting the funding available for hiring quality teachers and implementing effective recreational and educational programs. Characteristics of socially disorganized communities can also indirectly affect crime and violence in schools when residents import behaviors/factors that were generated in the community into the school. That is, students are exposed to more crime or risk in these environments but also may

155

bring the norms of the streets into the schools. If boundaries of acceptable behavior are not clearly established in socially disorganized communities, the local may likewise be impaired accomplishing the same objective, in part because students coming from those areas may be less likely to obey rules or abide by established social norms. Plus, the tough neighborhood and potentially dangerous walk to and from school may encourage students to bring weapons to campus (Halliday-Boykins and Graham, 2001). Prior research has concluded that children who are exposed to violence at home or in their neighborhood have an increased likelihood to develop emotional problems (Martinez and Richters, 1993), including depression, suicidal thoughts, and post-traumatic stress disorder (Mazza and Reynolds, 1999), be truant from school or use drugs (Knapp, 1998), and an increased likelihood to use violence within their own lives (DuRant, Cadenhead, Pendergrast, Slavens, and Linder, 1994; Nofziger and Kurtz, 2005). Welsh and colleagues have completed a number of studies assessing the relationship between student, institutional, and community factors predicting school disorder. In one article they found that the social disorganization of both the local community immediately surrounding the school and the "imported communities" aggregated measures of the census characteristics of where students are from - exert a significant influence on the level of school disorder through the effect on school stability15 (Welsh, Stokes, and Greene, 2000). When individual level variables are included in the model, however, school and local and imported community factors exerted very little influence on school disorder (Welsh, Greene, and Jenkins, 1999).

Welsh et al. (2000) measured stability by average attendance rates and student turnover (the proportion of non-graduating seniors who do not reenroll).

15

156

Another study found that community characteristics predicted violence only in high schools (measured as suspension rates), but school specific factors were better predictors of misconduct in middle schools (Hellman and Beaton, 1986). It is worthwhile to note, however, that research has also found that community-level crime is not significantly related to school crime (Baker, Mednick, and Caruthers, 1989; Limbos and Casteel, 2008).

DATA

In the previous two chapters on communities and change I examined the effect of racial and ethnic transition on neighborhood levels of crime and inter-group violence. In this chapter I redefine community using a smaller unit of analysis schools - and test if change in the racial/ethnic composition of the student body is associated with change in the level of crime and violence within the school "community." Furthermore, I assess whether characteristics of the neighborhoods surrounding the school are related to racial change and crime within the school. I continue my analysis of the city of Los Angeles. Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) is the second largest school district in the United States and enrolls approximately 700,000 students a year with a 2008 operating budget of 19 billion dollars. There are over 700 schools operated by the district, the majority of which are elementary schools. In addition, crime data is readily available for Los Angeles schools since the LAUSD employs a separate school police department - the Los Angeles School Police Department (LASPD) - whose mission is to patrol the schools within the district. The LASPD is a specialized force that monitors 157

LAUSD's campuses and is a distinctly different entity than the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) that patrols the city. The LASPD is the largest school police force in the country, employing almost 500 police and safety officers. The LASPD does patrol charter schools, but that crime data is not available. The units of analysis are Los Angeles middle (or junior high) and senior high schools that have remained open between 2000 and 2006 to capture change over time in the racial/ethnic composition of enrollment. Schools that opened mid-way through the study period, closed for part of the study period, converted to a charter school within the study period, or are located outside of the Los Angeles city boundary but still operated by LAUSD (i.e., Gardena Senior High School) are excluded. I also exclude private schools, charter schools, continuation high schools, and alternative education schools (i.e., schools with special populations such as pregnant mothers, students with physical disabilities, or part-time students) because those schools have voluntary enrollment policies and may not be representative of the community at large. I include only middle and high schools in this analysis because they represent the age range of the population most likely to be involved in criminal activity. In addition, school crime data was not available for 18 of the schools and these were likewise excluded from the study. Of the schools missing crime data, the majority (15) are high schools and only 3 were middle schools. Therefore, the total number of schools included is 93; 55 middle schools and 38 high schools. I also examine the effects of the immediate ("local") community characteristics on racial and ethnic change and crime in schools. Using the 93 schools as centroids, I build communities from block group data (discussed in more

158

detail below). The average local community is comprised of 5 census block groups and has a population mean of just under 8,000 residents.

Defining "community" In order to build local communities I aggregate census block groups that are within a quarter mile of the school address. This lA mile community contains information from a non-circular boundary: any block group that intersects the % mile radius from the school is included. Welsh, Greene, and Jenkins (1999) also defined local communities as census tracts within a quarter mile of the school, and found that the nearby community characteristics exert more of an effect on school disorder than further neighborhoods. This method captures the characteristics of the area immediately around the school and potentially accounts for students bringing elements of their home community into the school. This method also accounts for changes to the boundary lines of the school catchment area that may have changed over the six years of the study.16 Additionally, neighborhoods built using a circle or radius avoid boundary effects of schools located on the edge of the Gity of Los Angeles since I am able to use census data for the block groups outside the city (or district) limits. A pictorial representation of the different neighborhood construction and the location of the schools is shown in Figure 4.1 (page 161).

The entire areafromwhich a school draws their enrollment, however, is presumed to be larger than the quarter mile boundaries used here. I limit this analysis to capture the effect of the neighborhoods most immediate to the school on school violence; in future studies I will compare the effects of larger, and potentially smaller, communities.

16

159

The data sets used in this chapter come from a variety of sources; listed below and then discussed in more detail. 2000 and 2006 crime data aggregated to census block group for the city of Los Angeles, provided by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) 2000 - 2001 school year and 2006 - 2007 school year, middle and senior high school crime data by school; publically available via the LASPD website 2005 Census demographic estimates by block group, purchased from GeoLytics Inc. 2000 and 2006 race/ethnicity of enrolled students in Los Angeles by schools, obtained through direct communication with the LAUSD 2000 to 2006 school characteristics data by school, available online via the California Department of Education (CDE) website

160

Figure 4.1. Location of middle and senior high schools in Los Angeles
Example of community around Berundo Middle School

9 O Los Angeles city tract High school

Middle school

Bezmidj) &SS conssmoiiy Los Angeles city txact

School data School crime data The Los Angeles School Police Department (LASPD) makes information on crimes that occur on school grounds publically available via their website (www.laspd.com). The LASPD provides counts of the number of property crimes and vandalism, drugs or drug paraphernalia violations, and violent offenses, including homicide, assault with a deadly weapon, weapon possession, battery, and robbery. Campus police are assigned to specific schools within the district, but most school campuses are also monitored by a non-uniformed non-police security force. Among other assignments, the security force is responsible for patrolling the hallways between classes, making sure that students behave during lunch, checking IDs at the entry, and otherwise monitoring the campus for suspicious behavior. In personal communication with faculty at a LAUSD high school, however, it seems that the school security team is actually responsible for much more: the "teachers do the work of the security guards, security act like cops, and the police only step in for the most serious incidents."17 The disciplinary infractions that are most often reported to the campus police, therefore, are the more serious events, and those involving stolen property. I was also informed by several school faculty that violent events on campus are typically gang related. Knowing these caveats, it is probably safe to assume that LASPD crime data underreports total offenses, that the crimes

17

In discussion with former LAUSD employee Heather Jonson on January 16,2009.

162

that are recorded are the most severe, and are primarily gang-related. No additional information on gang presence within the schools is available however. Though the LASPD collects information on numerous infractions, in this chapter I sum the total number of assaults, batteries, robberies, and property offenses to create an index of serious offenses, also referred to as total crime in this chapter (to equate to community total crime). As mentioned above, it is likely that many of the minor offenses that occur on school grounds are unaccounted for, therefore, I include those offenses most likely to be reported to the school police and those most easily compared to the LAPD Part I crimes in the surrounding community. LASPD defines assaults as fights involving weapons as opposed to batteries which are fights without a weapon present; robbery is taking something that belongs to someone else while using threat, force, and/or a weapon, and property offenses typically refer to thefts on campus. I exclude the number of homicides and the number of destructive device (bomb) offenses because they are both rare occurrences. I also exclude drug offenses because that information is potentially biased: some schools participate in random searches for drugs and weapons. This inflates the number of drug and weapons crimes recorded by LASPD in the schools that participate in the searches as opposed to schools that do not do random searches. Sexual offenses are not included because they are likely underreported (for the same reasons as information on rapes and sexual assaults is undercounted in the LAPD data). Prior research on school crime has shown that, in general, theft, vandalism, and property damage are the most prolific non-violent crimes (Elliot, Hamburg, and Williams^ 1998), and assaults

163

account for the majority of violent acts within schools (Kingery et al., 1995). Therefore, it is likely that my chosen dependent variable appropriately captures the majority of the range of crime occurring within schools. The dependent variable in the analysis is therefore the total number of serious violations in the 2006 to 2007 school year. To get a measure of the change between 2001 and 2006,1 control for the total offense rate of the 2001 to 2002 school year, where the rate is calculated as the number of offenses per 1,000 enrolled students. I use the rate in order test the pattern of crime over time while controlling for the number of students in the earlier school year (since it likely changed between the two academic years). On average, there are a total of 42.8 total offenses each year, and high schools average a greater number of offenses (64) than middle schools (28). The majority of crimes are property offenses (33) and batteries (6), followed by an average of fewer than four robberies and two assaults a year. In general, the number of crimes reported to campus police annually remains relatively stable between 2001 and 2006, with the exception of the number of robberies which increased in high schools. Additional mean crime counts are shown below in Table 4.1, and a graph depicting the change in school crime over the years of the study is shown in Figure 4.2.

164

Table 4.1. Average crime counts and rate per 1000 students by school type, 2001 - 2002 school year and 2006 - 2007 school year, N = 93
AH schools 2006 200118 Number of crimes Assault Battery Robbery Property Total serious offenses Crime rate per 1,000 Assault Battery Robbery Property Total serious offenses 2.02 6.49 1.89 33.35 43.76 0.87 2.97 0.80 14.27 18.91 1.65 6.44 3.66 31.05 42.80 0.72 3.18 1.55 14.03 19.49 Middle schools 2001 2006 1.62 6.04 1.09 25.45 34.20 0.82 3.21 0.59 13.25 17.88 1.05 5.27 1.36 20.45 28.15 0.59 3.19 0.81 11.86 16.46 High schools 2001 2006 2.61 7.16 3.05 44.79 57.61 0.93 2.63 1.10 15.74 20.40 2.50 8.13 6.97 46.39 64.00 0.91 3.17 2.62 17.18 23.87

Figure 4.2. Average number of serious school offenses by school type, 2001 2002 school year to 2006 - 2007 school year
70

60

50

40

30

20

10

2001

2002 All schools

2003

2004

2005 Middle schools

2006

High schools

For the remainder of the paper, in tables and otherwise, 2001 refers to the 2001 - 2002 school year, and 2006 refers to the 2006 - 2007 school year.

18

165

School demographic data Information on the schools was obtained from various sources. LAUSD provided enrollment counts by the registered race/ethnicity of the student. On average, there are 2,178 students in each school in the study, ranging from 733 at the low end to a high of 4,487. High schools in the study have a slightly larger enrollment (2,854) than middle schools (1,698). Students were classified in the following racial/ethnic categories: Hispanic, African American, Asian, Pacific Islander, Filipino, Native American, and Other white. In 2006 schools averaged 71% Latino, 13% Black, just under 10% non-Latino white, and approximately 4% Asian. About 2% of the student body are registered Filipino, and less than 1% each Native Americans and Pacific Islanders. The racial/ethnic breakdown is consistent between high schools and middle schools. I calculate the proportion of each group by dividing the total group count by the total school enrollment. Figure 4.3 displays the percent racial/ethnic change in all schools, middle schools, and high schools for Asian students, Black, Latino, White, and Other (total Filipino, Native American, and Pacific Islanders). Annual school characteristics are publically available from the California Department of Education (CDE)19 or its partner, Education Data Partnership (Ed9ft

Data) . Between those two data sources, school level information on average classroom size, the percent of English-as-a-second-language (ESL) learners, the proportion of students receiving a free lunch, and the gender composition of students and faculty is available. Additional information on high school graduates and
Data is publically available by school at http://www.cde.ca.gov. Data is publically available by school for 1998 to 2007 at http://www.eddata.kl2.ca.us/welcome.asp.
20 19

166

Figure 4.3. Percent change in school enrollment between 2000 and 2006 by racial/ethnic category, N = 93
20%

-25% I All schools D Middle Schools High Schools

dropouts by ethnicity, average test scores, average teacher salary, and per-pupil expenditures (for 2006 only) is also available. Data from CDE or Ed-Data is available for all years of the study for the included schools (though not all variables listed here were included in the final models). In 2006 the average class size is just under 30 students and per-pupil expenditures averaged $7,782. Schools average 103 teachers with about 71% fully credentialed and 53% white. Approximately 70% of the students are on a free or reduced meal program, and 28% are classified ESL students. I also control for the age of the school building in 2006 as a rudimentary indicator of structural quality (under the assumption that newer schools are in better

167

condition) and whether or not the school operates on a year-round basis. Schools with a year-round calendar may have more reported crimes because the extra months of instructional activity provide more opportunity for offenses to occur. Twentythree schools in the study are on a year-round calendar, 11 are middle schools and 12 high schools. Additional school data for the variables included in the analysis by high schools and middle schools is shown in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2. Average school characteristics for all schools, middle schools, and high schools, 2001 - 2002 school year and 2006 - 2007 school year High All Schools Middle Schools Schools N = 93 N = 55 N = 38 St. St. St.
Total serious offense rate 2001 Total serious offense rate 2006 Change in total serious offense rate Average class size 2001 Average class size 2006 Change in average class size Percent free lunch 2001 Percent free lunch 2006 Change in percent free lunch Percent credentialed teachers 2001 Percent credentialed teachers 2006 Change in percent credentialed teachers Percent non-Latino white 2001 Percent non-Latino white 2006 Change in percent non-Latino white Average building age in 2006 Mean 4.61 5.42 0.81 27.20 29.64 2.44 63.40 69.33 5.93 68.76 71.20 2.44 11.98 9.64 -2.04 66.16 dev 3.75 5.91 4.62 3.43 3.56 2.04 21.33 17.86 9.01 12.54 11.56 9.32 13.77 12.79 3.17 22.04 Mean 4.63 4.60 -0.03 27.74 30.43 2.69 68.02 73.55 5.53 65.79 71.23 5.44 12.22 9.87 -2.11 61.95 dev 3.74 6.42 5.17 1.78 1.58 1.79 19.65 16.97 8.27 10.41 9.28 9.31 14.31 13.40 3.44 19.65 Mean 4.61 6.59 1.98 26.44 28.51 2.07 56.88 63.38 6.50 72.95 71.16 -1.79 11.65 9.31 -1.95 72.26 dev 3.81 4.97 3.43 4.83 5.03 2.32 22.13 17.58 10.04 14.15 14.31 7.61 13.16 12.04 2.77 24.07

168

School racial and ethnic change data I analyze two different definitions of racial and ethnic change in this chapter: change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity and population churning. I measure racial/ethnic heterogeneity using a Herfindahl index (defined in Chapter 2), and the change in heterogeneity as the heterogeneity score in 2006 minus the score in 2000.1 use all seven LAUSD racial/ethnic categories to calculate the heterogeneity score. In 2006 schools averaged a heterogeneity score of 0.379, and a range from 0.017 to 0.732 (for both middle and senior high schools). Since values closer to 1 indicate more heterogeneity, the schools in the sample are fairly homogenous (predominantly Latino). In 84 schools (89%) the heterogeneity score between 2000 and 2006 decreased such that Los Angeles schools are becoming more homogenous over time. The average decrease in heterogeneity is 0.05. My second indicator of racial and ethnic change is population churning (also defined in Chapter 2). Churning is a more dynamic measure of racial/ethnic turnover than change in heterogeneity because it measures the difference that each group comprises in the total population between the two target years. As discussed in Chapter 1, population composition can change but the heterogeneity score remain stable. Population churning, on the other hand, will capture the population change. Again, I use all seven racial/ethnic categories to calculate school churning between 2000 and 2006. On average, school populations changed 7.5%, with a range from near zero to over 18%. Middle schools averaged a slightly higher rate of population churning (8.3%) compared to high schools (6.4%).

169

Community data Community crime data The crime data used in this chapter is the same LAPD data used in Chapter 2 but for the years 2000 and 200621. The crime points were mapped by census block group and then aggregated to obtain a total number of crimes by type per block group, regardless of age, gender, and race/ethnicity of the offender and victim. These block group values were then aggregated to the local community level surrounding the schools. As in the schools, I summed violent crimes into a total violent crime measure comprised of assaults, robberies and homicides . I converted the total crime counts into rates per 1,000 residents. In 2006, there averaged 7.2 violent crimes per 1,000 residents. These rates represent a decrease from crime rates in 2000.

Community demographic data I relied on 2000 census block group data and GeoLytics, Inc. for 2005 block group estimates of demographic and economic characteristics for communities. GeoLytics is a private company that provides intercensal year estimates of census

The crime data for communities is based on January through December counts, whereas the school crime data is based on the fiscal year calendar beginning July 1, 2006 and ending June 30,2007. Because I have the crime data by date, I was able to compute community crime values based on the fiscal calendar as well, but the correlation between the traditional calendar crime counts and the fiscal year calendar crime counts is X, and therefore I decided to use the traditional calendar crime because it is more intuitive to think of community crime as an annual rate rather than a fiscal year rate. 22 Since the school data does not include homicides, I also created a variation of this variable excluding homicide on the community level. The two versions of the variables are highly correlated and have no impact on the results when used alternatively in the analysis. I chose to use the version of the variable including homicide in order to capture a more complete picture of crime in the local community.

170

data23. Block group information was aggregated to the community level by summing the total counts for most variables and averaging the mean for income or household size variables. Racial/ethnic information for six major racial categories is included. I used the same categories as the school enrollment data with the exception of Filipino since the GeoLytics data does not estimate it. Therefore, I had racial/ethnic data on nonLatino whites, Native Americans, Pacific Islanders, Asians, African Americans, and Latinos. In 2005, communities averaged 47% Latino, 29% non-Latino white, 11% Black, 10% Asian, and 1% or less each Native Americans and Pacific Islanders. Compared to the school data, the local communities have fewer Latinos and larger non-Latino white and Asian populations. Figure 4.4 shows the percent change between 2000 and 2005 for Asian, Blacks, Latino, White, and Other (Native American and Pacific Islander) categories. Though communities averaged less than 1% Native Americans and Pacific Islanders, it was an increase of almost 200% since 2000.

23

Because the GeoLytics data was purchased in 2006, the dataset to which I have access includes estimates only up until 2005, therefore, I use 2005 block group estimates as a proxy for 2006.

171

Figure 4.4. Change in percent average community racial/ethnic composition for the four largest racial/ethnic groups between 2000 and 2005, N = 93
3%

2%

I
! 1 r
, , , , l,

1%

0%

*"* v !* *-!' ' ''l

Non Latino white

>.-...v .' -3

i
i i

Black

Asian

Latino

-1%
v'-'i ".,WJ

. . '

- f , . . *

"."'("-'JVI

-2%

F':- V-;.:.J

! r : '//?' 4

-3%

I also include explanatory variables that are often associated with community organization and crime. (These are similar variables as those described in Chapter 2.) Specifically, I include the percent female-headed households, and median household income. I calculated change over time in these variables by taking the difference between the 2005 estimated value and the 2000 value. Most neighborhood level studies control for these (or similar) factors. Table 4.3 shows the mean demographic information for communities.

172

Table 4.3. Average community characteristics, 2000 and 2005, N = 93 2000~ _ Mean St. dev 7878 3079 8.34 12.83 32.40% 10.42% 0.26% 8.79% 0.24% 44.93% 16596 9.02% 4.45% 0.4854 35.53 ~ 2005 Mean St. dev 8234 3362 7.12 5.16 25.58% 17.51% 0.55% 7.39% 0.25% 29.04% 23625 5.35 2.92% 0.1779 35.62

Total population Total crime rate per 1,000 Percent non-Latino white Percent Black Percent Native American Percent Asian Percent Pacific Islander Percent Latino Median household income Percent female-headed households Percent vacant housing Heterogeneity score Latino to Black ratio

27.68% 29.81% 17.10% 11.01% 0.34% 1.05% 6.88% 9.93% 0.41% 0.23% 28.38% 47.1.7% 13897 45799 9.00 5.09% 2.76% 4.60% 0.1601 0.4825 97.80 17.40

Change variables Change in total crime rate Change in median income Change in % female-headed households Change in % vacant housing Change in heterogeneity score Racial & Ethnic churning

-5.75 29204 -0.15% 0.14% -0.0028 4.94

5.61 17703 0.15% 0.56% 0.0528 1.87

Community racial and ethnic change data I calculate the same two measures of racial and ethnic change (change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity and population churning) on the community level as I do for schools. Change in heterogeneity is computed as the difference in heterogeneity score between 2006 and 2000; negative values indicate that heterogeneity is decreasing. I use all six racial/ethnic categories discussed above to calculate the heterogeneity score. There is little difference in the mean heterogeneity score for 2000 and 2005 (both average approximately 0.48). Community level heterogeneity decreased in 53 (56%) communities between 2000 and 2005, but the average value 173

of the change is less than 0.01. Population racial/ethnic churning on the community level averages 4.9%, ranging from 1.5% to 13%.

Linking school and community racial and ethnic change24 The enrollment in public school generally comes from the local neighborhoods surrounding the school; indeed, LAUSD school boundaries are based on the geographic location of the student's home in relation to the school. In this way, the racial and ethnic composition of the local area and the school is inextricably linked. Racial and ethnic change, therefore, is also likely related between schools and the local community. This is also evidenced by the significant correlations between school and community level variables (see Table 4.4 page 177). As previous research has suggested, the effect of community structure on school level outcomes may be mediated by school characteristics. For example, Welsh, Stokes, and Greene (1999) found that school stability mediates the effect of community variables on school disorder. That is, the observed effect of the independent variable (community poverty) on the dependent variable (school disorder) goes away or becomes non-significant when the effect of a mediator variable (student attendance) is taken into account. This is shown more generally in Figure 4.5 below.

I rely on Reuben Baron and David Kenny's discussion of mediating and moderating variables in relation to social psychological research for much of this section; see Baron and Kenny (1986) The Moderator - Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations in the Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology.

174

Figure 4.5. Example of a mediating relationship School change Z

^ / ^

^ ^ ^

Community change X

School offenses Y

A variable is considered a mediator variable if the following conditions are met. One, the independent variable (X) has a significant effect on the mediator variable (Z) (Path a); two, Z has a significant effect on the outcome variable (Y) (Path b); and three, the previously significant effect of X on Y (Path c) is attenuated (becomes non-significant) when Paths a and b are controlled. In this study, I test if the effect of community racial and ethnic change (X) on school violence (Y) is mediated by the school level change in racial composition (Z). Testing for a mediating relationship is relatively straightforward and no additional variables are required other than the ones already included in the models. Another possibility is that the effect of school racial and ethnic change on school violence may be moderated by, or conditional on, the community level of racial and ethnic change such school change cannot be assessed separately from community change. That is, the strength of the association between school racial and ethnic change may vary depending on the community level racial and ethnic change. For instance, schools with high turnover that are located in communities that also have racial and ethnic turnover are likely to have higher rates of serious school offending than similar schools located in stable communities. This is tested by

175

including interaction terms measuring the combined effect of school and community racial and ethnic change in the community level models, and is shown in Figure 4.6.

Figure 4.6. Example of a moderating relationship School change X

Community change M

School offenses Y

School X Community (X * M)

^^^-"""^ ^ ^ ^ ^

A moderating relationship is said to exist when the effect of the interaction term (X*M) on the dependent variable (Y) is significant. When interaction terms are included in the models, the individual, or main, effects of the two variables used to calculate the interaction term are more difficult to interpret since they cannot be separated from the interaction term, and, in general, the interaction variable becomes the variable of interest. In order to test for a moderating relationship, I created an interaction variable for each definition of racial and ethnic change by multiplying the school level variable by the community level value of the same variable. For the interaction of the change in heterogeneity variables, I collapsed the community change into a binary variable with a value of one equal to an increase in community

176

Table 4.4. Correlations between school and community characteristics (* p < 0.05)
% White students Median household income Community churning School heterogeneity Community heterogeneity Community violent crime rate % Free lunch School violent crime rate Average class size School churning % Credentialed teachers % Femaleheaded households %Vacant housing II 11

1
-0.0566 -0.4032* 0.1709 0.3511* 0.4305* -0.1023 0.2106* 0.1545 -0.1128 -0.3931* 0.6695* 0.1303 0.2769* 0.3320* -0.4483* -0.2279* -0.0861 -0.0286 -0.0737 -0.0769 -0.152 -0.0912 -0.193 -0.0329 -0.0228 -0.1457 0.1541 0.2897* 0.1383 0.098 -0.0724 0.1179 0.1066 -0.2759* -0.1398 -0.0873 0.2695* -0.0506 0.0688 -0.1662 0.0079 -0.1613 -0.0507 0.4455* 0,0711

Change in school heterogeneity Change in community heterogeneity

1 1 1 1 1 1
0.0402 -0.0952 -0.2474* 0.1313

School churning

Community churning

1
0.2434* -0.1146 0.1355

1
0.0757 -0.1181

Change in community violent crime rate Change in school Violent crime rate Change in % free lunch Change in average class size Change in % credentialed teachers Change in % white students

1
-0.1644

Change in median household income 0.0955 0.076 0.0197 0.0414 0.2153* -0.0921 -0.1017 0.0025 0.1061 -0.1335

1
0.101 -0.0306 0.0879 -0.0004 -0.2231* -0.0387 -0.057 -0.0679 0.0288 0.1162 -0.1119 0.0739

Change in % femaleheaded households

1
-0.1692

Change in % vacant housing

heterogeneity and zero equivalent to a decrease; there were no communities where heterogeneity did not change.

RESEARCH METHODS

In order to investigate these relationships, I use negative binomial regression models. Negative binomial models are extensions of Poisson models that are used with count dependent variables (as opposed to rates) where values are equal to or greater than zero. Negative binomial models have been employed in criminological research to examine cross-national homicides (Chamlin and Cochran, 2006), hate crimes in Chicago (Lyons, 2008), and the relationship between lynching and homicides in the South (Messner, Bailer, and Zevenberger, 2005). The dependent variable in this case is the number of serious offenses committed within schools (also referred to as total school crimes) reported to the campus police in the 2006 to 2007 school year. Poisson models assume that the mean and variance are equal, whereas negative binomial models are more appropriate for fitting data that is overdispersed (the variance is greater than the mean) since it includes a residual variance term to control for overdispersion (Gardner, Mulvey, and Shaw, 1995). The mean count of school level total crimes is 11.7 with a variance of 145, suggesting overdispersion; and, as seen in the histogram below (Figure 4.7), the distribution of the outcome variable is not normally distributed and is skewed to the right. If overdispersion is ignored, the standard errors will be underestimated, leading to increased Type I 178

errors (or statistical significance when in fact it is not). The regression output also provides a likelihood ratio statistic of the overdispersion parameter alpha (a) which tests if the negative binomial distribution is the appropriate model by comparing it to a Poisson distribution. Significant values of alpha indicate overdispersion and that negative binomial is the correct distribution. For all models in this analysis, a is significant at p < 0.05, reinforcing my selection of a negative binomial regression over a Poisson model. Figure 4.7. Frequency distribution of the number of serious offenses in schools, N = 93

25-

20-

15_

10-

5 -

o -

50

100

150

Total number of school serious offenses 2006 - 2007 Negative binomial regression captures the probability of observing discrete counts of the outcome based on the underlying mean number of events (Osgood, 2000). As such, the resultant coefficient can be interpreted as the difference between the log of expected counts. Taking the exponential of the coefficient gives the 179

incidence rate ratio, or the proportional change in the dependent variable given an increase of one in the explanatory variable. To reduce bias within models due to variation the size of population at risk, I include an exposure variable that transforms the outcome to a per capita rate. I use 2006 total student enrollment an exposure variable to account for between-school differences in student body size; the exposure option is equivalent to taking the natural log of the school total enrollment and including it in the models with a coefficient constrained to one. I run my analyses in Stata using maximum likelihood estimation. I perform a series of models testing the relationships between school change, community change, and change in school level violent crime. I first test if changes in school characteristics between the 2001-2002 school year and the 2006 - 2007 school year affect change in the prevalence of violent crime over that time same time period. My negative binomial regression equation for the school alone models is below.

(4.1)

ln(SOt) =0o + ln(enroll06i) + faSOOh + p2school_changei + p0St + fayearn + fchst + foaget + Cj

Where SO is the number of serious offenses for school / and In(enrolh) is the natural log of the total school enrollment in the 2006 - 2007 school year. By constraining the coefficient on the population at risk to one, I transform the analysis into a per capita rate. In order to measure the change in school serious offense index, I control for the rate of serious offenses in the 2001 - 2002 school year (SO01). School change represents one of the racial and ethnic change variables used in the analysis, which are alternatively 1) change in heterogeneity score between 2000 and

180

2006, and 2) racial and ethnic churning. The model is run separately for each school change variable. ASt is a vector of school characteristics measuring change in school factors across the study period (average class size, percent of students receiving free or reduced cost meals, percent non-Latino white students, and percent credentialed teachers); yearr is a binary variable indicating whether or not the school operates on a year-round calendar; hs is a binary variable controlling for a high school versus middle school; and age is an indicator the age of the school building in 2006. /?ois the intercept and/?/ is a coefficient that captures the impact of the school crime rate in 2001 on school crime in 2006. /^represents the effect of school racial and ethnic change on the outcome variable, and/?? is a vector of coefficients capturing the effect of school changes on change in the number of serious offenses, /^is a coefficient capturing the effect of year-round schools, fa is a coefficient measuring the effect of high schools, and /^represents the effect of structural age on the dependent variable. , is the random error. In Equation 2, below, I replicate Equation 1 but include variables accounting for the effect of change in community level characteristics on predicted values of school violent crime.

(4.2)

ln(SOt) =p0 + ln(enroll06j) + faSOOh + p2school_changet + y M $ + fayearri +fishsi+ forget + fiycommunityjchangei + fi&dcommunityCRi + j M C + s,

All school level variables remain the same as in the previous equation. Community_change represents the community level version of the same racial and ethnic change variable used on the school level {school change), and AcommunityCR is an indicator of the change in the community crime rate between 181

2000 and 2006. Ad is a vector of variables of change in community characteristics between 2000 and 2005; /?7 represents the effect of the community racial change variable on the dependent variable;figis a coefficient capturing the impact of the change in the community crime rate; and/?9 is a vector of coefficients capturing the effect of community changes on change in school crime. To test for mediation effects, I run bivariate analyses regressing school racial and ethnic change on community racial and ethnic change using ordinary least squares regression, and using bivariate negative binomial analysis I regress community change on change in school violence. To test for moderation effects I include school x community interaction terms into Equation 4.2. With the exception of the simple regressions of bivariate relationships, all models are also run separately for high schools and middle schools.

Spatial effects A recent concern in criminological research is the need to account for "spatial effects" when using geographic areas as the units of analysis (Pyle, 1974). That is, for data that corresponds to a location in physical space, one should consider the relationship between the focal area and geographically proximate areas. Research has shown that social behaviors can cluster or display patterns over geographical space (Deane, Beck, Tolnay, 1998), and researchers have explained the diffusion of social phenomenon such as church membership (Land, Deane, and Blau, 1992) and homicide (Cohen and Tita, 1999) across community boundaries in terms of spatial processes. Likewise, recent research suggests that not only can social phenomena

182

diffuse outward from places, but characteristics of nearby communities can affect outcomes in the focal area. For example, Hipp, Tita, and Boggess (2009) show that racial and ethnic churning in nearby tracts increases inter- and intra-group aggravated assaults in the focal tract. In this study, I implicitly account for the spatial effects of characteristics of nearby areas by creating local communities surrounding the schools and testing the impact of community factors on the school level outcome. I do not account for possible diffusion effects of school characteristics outward to the local community; there is no logical reason to believe that what occurs at one school affects another school, and it is not likely that what happens inside the school affects community behavior.

Sample size and statistical power Some prior research suggests that negative binomial estimates may be biased for small sample sizes (Agresti, 2003; Hilbe, 2007). The danger of performing analytic tests on datasets with a small n is that the statistical power necessary to reach valid conclusions is not achieved. In such cases, the resultant coefficients are often non-significant when in fact a relationship does exist (Type 2 error). Piegorsch (1990) showed that maximum likelihood derived negative binomial estimates are biased when n is less than 50, and a recently published article by Chamlin and Cochran (2006) successfully used negative binomial analysis to study homicide on a sample size of 33.1 feel confident that with a full sample size of 93 the likelihood of bias in my results is low, but that caution should perhaps be taken when inferring

183

conclusions based on the smaller split samples (n = 55 for middle schools and n = 38 for high schools). In the next section I report the results of the various analyses discussed above, beginning with bivariate analyses and the test for a mediating relationship. I then report my findings from Equations 4.1 (schools only) and 4.2 (schools and community) for the full model, and high schools and middle schools separately, before moving on to an in-depth presentation of the results of the interaction models.

FINDINGS

The central theme of this research is the relationship between change in racial and ethnic composition and change in school crime. I explore this relationship by looking both at what happens within schools alone, and also by examining the effect of changes in the local community characteristics on school offending. In doing so, I utilize two alternative definitions of racial and ethnic change - change in heterogeneity score and population churning - on both the school and local community levels. I focus on serious offenses (assaults, batteries, robberies, and property crimes), and in later analysis, I analyze high schools separate from middle schools. Before discussing the results of the more complicated models, I first run several straightforward simple regression models examining these relationships within schools and between school and community characteristics. This also allows me to determine if any effect of community change on crime is mediated by the effect of community racial/ethnic change on school level transition.

184

Bivariate analysis Cross-sectional In prior research Graham and colleagues have argued that schools with more racial and ethnic diversity have lower levels of students victimized by bullies. To test if this is also applicable to more serious offenses on campus, I ran a simple crosssectional negative binomial model of school crime in 2006 on school heterogeneity in 2006 (controlling for total student enrollment in 2006). In support of Graham's conclusions, I find that higher levels of school heterogeneity is significantly associated with fewer serious offenses in school (b = -0.9123, IRR = 0.4016, p < 0.01). The metric coefficient of-0.9123 translates into an incidence rate ratio of 0.402 by taking the antilog of the coefficient. This means that a one unit increase in the heterogeneity score in 2006 is associated with 60% fewer serious school offenses. However, since the heterogeneity score can only range from 0 to 1, this means that a completely heterogeneous institution would have 60% fewer crimes than a completely racially homogeneous school. A more meaningful translation would be that a difference of 0.10 in the heterogeneity score is associated with approximately a 9% reduction in the number of serious offenses (by taking the antilog of 0.10*-0.9123).

Because this analysis is supplemental to the primary research questions, tables for this series of analyses are not shown.

185

Testing for potential mediation effect In a cross-sectional simple-regression model, I showed that school heterogeneity is associated with lower school crime. In this study, however, I am more interested in the dynamic version of this relationship and the interplay with community level changes. I next ran several simple regression models assessing the bivariate relationships between change in the community racial and ethnic composition, school level racial and ethnic change, and change in the number of serious offenses in school. These baseline results allow me to determine if school level change mediates the relationship between community level change and school level outcomes (as depicted in Figure 4.2). Welsh, Stokes, and Greene (1999) conclude that much of the apparent effect of community characteristics on school disorder is mediated by the community's effect on school stability. I test for a similar mediating relationship, by examining 1) if community racial and ethnic change affects school crime directly (Path c in Figure 4.2); 2) if community racial and ethnic change directly affects school level racial and ethnic change (Path a); and 3) if significant effects of school racial and ethnic change on school offenses (Path b) attenuates the relationship between community racial and ethnic transition and school crime (Path c). I find that in simple regression models, community level change in heterogeneity is significantly and negatively related to school offenses (b = -2.556, p = 0.01). This is Path C in Figure 4.2. This replicates the negative association found in the cross-sectional model suggesting that racial and ethnic heterogeneity may

186

actually reduce crime. The other racial and ethnic change variable, neighborhood level racial and ethnic churning, is not a significant predictor of school offending. In order for a mediating relationship to exist, the direct effect of community change on school level change must also be significant (Path a in Figure 4.2). I test this by regressing the change in school heterogeneity on change in community heterogeneity using ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors. I find that change in the community level heterogeneity is not significantly related to change in school heterogeneity (b = -0.0528, p = 0.572). This suggests that school level racial and ethnic change does not mediate the relationship between neighborhood heterogeneity and serious school offending. In further support of this conclusion, there is no significant effect of either racial/ethnic change variable on the change in the number of serious school violations (Path b), though the direction of the coefficients are consistent with expectation.

School Models In this section I present the results of school-specific analyses without yet accounting for the potential effect of community characteristics. In each model, I used negative binomial regression analysis with school total enrollment in 2006 2007 as the exposure variable with the coefficient constrained to one. The included variables measure the change between 2000 and 2006 in school characteristics including the average class size, the percent of students receiving free or reduced

Cross-sectional models yield very similar results, suggesting little change between 2000 and 2006 values. I report change models here, however, to remain consistent with the racial and ethnic change variables which are at the heart of this dissertation.

26

187

lunches, the percent fully credentialed teachers, and the percent non-Latino white students27 enrolled. In addition, I control for structural age in 2006 as an estimator of the physical condition of the school building, whether the school operates on a yearround calendar, and school status (a binary control for high schools versus middle schools).281 run each analysis two times, substituting the different definitions of racial and ethnic change each time. The results for both racial change definitions are shown in Table 4.5. Table 4.5 compares the effects of school factors and racial and ethnic change to the change in the prevalence of serious offenses in schools between 2000 and 2006. It is immediately apparent that 1) neither of the racial and ethnic definitions are significant predictors of change in school crime at an alpha level of 0.05, and 2) the majority of school level characteristics are non-significant. Change in heterogeneity, however, is negative and significant at a = 0.10. This raises the possibility that there may be a meaningful relationship between heterogeneity and school offending that is not picked up due to a small sample size. The exponential of the beta coefficient gives the incidence rate ratio (or IRR in the table) for a one unit increase in the independent variable. Since one is the maximum heterogeneity score and unlikely to observed, I multiply the beta by 0.10 prior to exponentiating. This gives an IRR of 0.837, equivalent to a 16% reduction in serious school offenses for an increase of 0.10 in the heterogeneity score between 2000 and 2005.

Alternative models run that include a measure of percent "other" students comprised of Asian, Native American, Pacific Islander, Filipino, and non-Latino white instead ofjust the percent nonLatino white, yield similar results; for parsimony, percent non-Latino whites is used here. 28 Multicollinearity is not an issue with the chosen variables for any of the school or community models. Nasser, Wasserman, and Kutner (1990) suggest that VIF scores above 10 indicate multicollinearity, whereas all VIF scores in this analysis are approximately 2 or below. Additionally, there are no substantive differences in the results with the inclusion or exclusion of any variables.

27

188

Table 4.5. Negative binomial regression models of school serious offenses, comparing alternative definitions of racial and ethnic change, n = 93 (1)
Change in heterogeneity Pb IRR S.E. value Change in heterogeneity Racial/ethnic churning Serious offense rate 2001 - 2002 Change in average class size Change in percent free lunch Change in percent credentialed teachers Change in percent non-Latino white students School building age Year-round calendar High school Constant 1.772 0.170 1.055 0.093 0.007 1.007 0.011 0.505 (2) Racial and ethnic churning Pb IRR S.E. value

0.031 0.032 0.001 0.006

1.031 0.968 0.999 0.994

0.005 0.024 0.005 0.005

*** 0.174 0.880 0.260

0.031 -0.023 -0.002 -0.006

1.032 0.977 0.998 0.994

0.005 0.025 0.005 0.005

*** 0.350 0.681 0.267

0.013 0.002 0.008 0.220 4.760

1.013 1.002 1.008 1.246

0.019 0.002 0.117 0.098

0.200

0.510 0.439 0.944 ** ***

0.003 0.002 0.055 0.217 -4.811

1.003 1.002 1.057 1.242

0.019 0.002 0.117 0.101 0.218

0.894 0.366 0.636 **

***

***significant p < 0.001, ** significantp < 0.05; b is the negative binomial regression coefficient, S.E. is the standard error, and IRR is the incidence rate ratio (the exponetiated value ofb)

The other major finding worth highlighting in Table 4.5 is that the majority of school factors have no discernible impact on the change in the school serious offense rate. Limbos and Casteel's (2008) prior work on LA schools found that the proportion certified teachers and the student to staff ratio predict decreased in-school crime, whereas schools with tests scores below a basic performance level are predictive of higher crime rates in cross-sectional models. And Mansfield, Alexander, and Farris (1991) showed a positive correlation between the percent of students on free lunch programs and the percent of teacher victimizations. However, I find no evidence that changes in these (or similar factors) affect changes in school

189

crime. That is, schools on a year-round calendar are not significantly different than schools on a traditional schedule; and increasing the proportion of credentialed teachers or decreasing the average class size is not associated with a significant reduction in offending (as would be theoretically expected). The exceptions are the rate of serious offenses in the 2001 to 2002 school year, and high school status. High schools are associated with an additional 24% of serious events relative to middle schools.

High schools versus middle schools Though Limbos and Casteel (2008) determined that high schools and middle schools have significantly differently median values on a set of descriptive variables, the authors did not separate their analysis by school type. Given the significant difference between high schools and middle schools, I present the results for Models 1 and 2 below, splitting the sample by school type. In general, the results of Tables 4.6 and 4.7 specify the relationship between racial and ethnic turnover and change in serious offending for high schools only. The effect of school level heterogeneity change has a negative impact on school offenses; for each 0.10 increase in heterogeneity there is a 27% decrease in school serious offenses. This is consistent with prior research (Graham, 2006) and my previously discussed results that indicate heterogeneity has a beneficial impact in schools. Racial/ethnic churning, however, increases offending: a 1% increase in churning increases school offending by a factor of 1.04, or 4%. This is also consistent with theoretical expectations suggesting that the process of turnover disrupts social

190

Table 4.6. Negative binomial regression model of school serious offenses on

Middle Schools N = 55 b Change school heterogeneity Serious offense rate 2001-2002 Change in average class size Change in percent on free lunch Change in percent credentialed teachers Change in percent non-Latino white students School building age Year-round calendar Constant -1.212 0.036 0.009 0.000 -0.012 -0.001 0.005 -0.073 -5.121 IRR 0.298 1.036 1.009 1.000 0.988 0.999 1.005 0.930 S.E. 1.544 0.008 0.045 0.009 0.008 0.027 0.004 0.194 0.349 P value 0.432 *** 0.840 0.986 0.138 0.979 0.221 0.708 *** b -3.211 0.027 -0.065 -0.001 -0.003 0.017 0.000 0.038 -4.316 High:Schools N- = 38 IRR 0.040 1.027 0.937 0.999 0.997 1.017 1.000 1.039 S.E. 1.445 0.005 0.030 0.006 0.008 0.025 0.002 0.131 0.239 P value ** *** ** 0.927 0.707 0.511 0.973 0.771 ***

***significantp < 0.001, ** significantp < 0.05; b is the negative binomial regression coefficient, S.E. is the standard error, and IRR is the incidence rate ratio (the exponetiated value ofb)

Table 4.7. Negative binomial regression model of school serious offenses on school racial/ethnic churning by school type
Middle Schools N =55 b Racial/Ethnic churning Serious offense rate 2001-2002 Change in average class size Change in percent on free lunch Change in percent credentialed teachers Change in percent non-Latino white students School building age Year-round calendar Constant -0.001 0.037 0.009 -0.001 -0.013 -0.011 0.004 -0.021 -5.052 IRR 0.999 1.038 1.009 0.999 0.987 0.989 1.004 0.979 S.E. 0.015 0.008 0.049 0.009 0.008 0.026 0.004 0.185 0.378 P value 0.938 *** 0.851 0.928 0.121 0.678 0.303 0.908 *** b 0.043 0.026 -0.055 0.000 -0.003 0.037 0.002 0.148 -4.599 High Schools N--= 38 IRR 1.044 1.026 0.946 1.000 0.997 1.037 1.002 1.159 S.E 0.019 0.006 0.030 0.006 0.008 0.032 0.002 0.139 0.262 P value ** *** 0.065 0.992 0.664 0.247 0.461 0.286 ***

***significantp < 0.001, ** significantp < 0.05; b is the negative binomial regression coefficient, S.E. is the standard error, and IRR is the incidence rate ratio (the exponetiated value ofb)

191

networking to increase crime. Additionally, in the split models the effect of average class size on high school student offending is now apparent in Table 4.6 and approaching significance in Table 4.7, but in a direction contrary to expectation. For each additional student in the classroom, the rate of serious offenses is expected to decrease by 5% to 6%. In sum, school specific factors account for very little of the change in school crimes between 2000 and 2006. My analyses reveal that increased racial diversity of enrolled students will likely reduce the rate of serious offending on school grounds. When separating the analysis by school type, however, the relationship only holds true for high schools; some factor(s) specific to high schools make racial/ethnic diversity matter in relation to change in crime. Racial and ethnic churning also matters in high schools, but has the opposite effect: as enrollment transitions racially, the predicted number of serious offenses is expected to increase. But since the majority of school factors overall are not meaningful predictors of change in schoollevel crime, something besides school characteristics must be influencing crime. Some researchers have suggested that the influence of community factors plays out within the school environment (Limbos and Casteel, 2008), though other researchers argue that communities have little effect on school disorder (Welsh, Stokes, and Greene, 1999). Therefore, in the next section I replicate the analyses presented above but include community indicators and assess whether or not the local community influences the in-school prevalence of crime.

192

Community Models School specific analyses suggest the importance of separating the sample by school type - middle schools and high schools - but also reveal that few school specific characteristics predict school offending over time. In this section, I examine if these relationships hold up when controlling for relevant community factors in addition to changes in school characteristics. As in the school alone analyses, I include variables measuring the difference in community characteristics between 2000 and 2005 in order to capture the effect of community change on change in serious offenses in schools. Namely, I include the percent female-headed households, the proportion vacant properties, and the median household income (in thousands). I also account for the change in the community total crime rate for the same time period. Importantly, I include community versions of the same two definitions of racial and ethnic change, but to simplify interpretation I separated the change in community heterogeneity factor into a binary variable with values of one indicating community heterogeneity increased and zero if it decreased;29 the operational definition of racial/ethnic churning remains the same. I continue to use negative binomial regression models accounting for differences in school size by utilizing school total enrollment in 2006 as the exposure variable. Results for the change in the number of school crimes are presented in Table 4.8 (page 194). As revealed in Table 4.8, there is little evidence that community racial and ethnic change affects change in school levels of serious offending. Though the relationship between community heterogeneity change and reduced school crime
29

There were no communities where heterogeneity did not change between 2000 and 2005.

193

Table 4.8. Negative binomial regression models of school violent crime, comparing alternative definitions of racial and ethnic change, controlling for change in community characteristics n = 93
(1) Heterogeneity IRR S.E. p-value 0.198 0.081 0.010 0.040 1.010 0.999 1.029 0.992 0.997 0.991 0.011 0.026 0.005 0.024 0.005 0.005 0.366 0.127
***

b -1.310 -0.211 0.27 0.81 1.016 0.121

(2) Churning IRR S.E.

p-value

School change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity Increase in community heterogeneity School racial/ethnic churning Community racial/ethnic churning

0.741 0.568 0.089 0.722 0.614 0.944

**

1.007 1.001 1.008 1.248 1.041 1.046 0.973 0.992

0.018 0.002 0.111 0.096 0.006 0.029 0.078

0.848 0.116 0.727

** 0.003 *** 0.259 is the standard error, and IRR is the incidence rate

*** Serious offense rate 2001 - 2002 0.025 1.03 0.005 0.028 Change in average class size 0.98 0.023 0.451 -0.008 -0.018 0.000 1.00 Change in percent on free lunch 0.005 0.958 -0.003 -0.009 Change in percent credentialed teachers -0.008 0.99 0.005 0.118 Change in percent non-Latino white -0.002 1.00 0.019 0.918 0.007 students 0.002 School building age 0.000 1.00 0.838 0.001 Year-round calendar -0.061 0.94 0.112 0.008 0.587 ** High school 0.094 0.230 1.26 0.221 Change in community total crime rate -0.004 1.00 0.497 -0.001 0.005 Change in percent female-headed households 0.045 1.05 0.028 0.108 0.045 -0.027 Change in percent vacant housing units 0.018 1.02 0.075 0.815 Change in median household income (in 1000s) -0.004 -0.008 1.00 0.003 0.190 *** Constant -4.435 0.221 -4.705 ***significantp < 0.001, ** significant p < 0.05; b is the negative binomial regression coefficient, S.E. ratio (the exponetiated value ofb)

verges on significance (b = -0.211, IRR = 0.809, p = 0.081), community racial and ethnic churning has no appreciable effect on schools (b = 0.040, IRR = 1.041, p = 0.127). This suggests that schools situated in communities that are becoming more racially and ethnically diverse may have lower offense rates than schools surrounded by neighborhoods that are becoming more homogenous; a larger sample size may explicate the true relationship. In fact, all the community level changes are non-significant and contribute little to explain change in school serious offenses. Schools located in communities that exhibit signs of increasing racial and ethnic change, crime, social disorganization, or physical disorder do not have significantly different levels of serious offending than schools located in increasingly low crime or stable environments. An exception, however, is that when controlling for community racial/ethnic churning (Model 2) a thousand dollar increase in the community median income is associated with a decrease in school offenses by a magnitude of 1% (b - 0.008, IRR = 0.991, p < 0.01). As for school level factors, with the exception of school offending rates in 2001 and high schools, the relationships remains non-significant when the community variables are included. Change in school heterogeneity has no discernable effect on the rate of school serious offenses and is no longer significant within an a = 0.10 (as it was in Table 4.5).

195

High schools versus middle schools In order to investigate the differences between school type I reran models identical to those in Table 4.8 while separating middle schools from high schools. The results using change in heterogeneity to define racial and ethnic change are shown in Table 4.9 (page 197), and Table 4.10 (page 198) display the findings using racial/ethnic churning. As anticipated, once the models are specified by school level important distinctions between the two types of schools emerge. The pattern of findings remains essentially the same as in the full model in middle schools for both definitions of racial/ethnic change, but the nature of the relationship between racial and ethnic change and offending in high schools becomes more evident. A shown in Table 4.9, school change in heterogeneity approaches significance as it did in previous models (b = -2.664, IRR = 0.070,,p = 0.06), while the coefficient on community heterogeneity change is no longer significant at a = 0.10 (b = -0.216, IRR = 0.806, p = 0.181). So despite a smaller sample size (n = 38), the findings suggest that for an increase of 0.10 in the school heterogeneity level in high schools, the number of serious school offenses is predicted to decrease by a magnitude of 23%. Again, this replicates my previous results showing the potential beneficial effect of heterogeneous enrollments and the uniqueness of high schools. Turning now to Table 4.10 community churning has no appreciable effect on school crime (b = 0.042, IRR = 1.04, p = 0.221), but school level racial and ethnic churning is significantly associated with increases in serious offending in high schools (b - 0.041, IRR = 1.04, p < 0.05) (as it was in high schools in the school

196

Table 4.9. Negative binomial regression model of school serious offenses on school change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity by school type, controlling for change in community characteristics High Schools N=38 IRR S.E.
-2.664 -0.216 0.070 0.806 1.418 0.161

Middle Schools N=55 IRR S.E. p-value

0.817 0.185
***

p-value
0.060 0.181
***

School change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity Increase in community heterogeneity

-0.348 -0.245 0.706 0.783 1.503 0.185

1.030 0.996 0.997 0.986 0.979 1.002 0.825 0.995 1.052 1.073 0.993 0.930 0.712 0.060 0.410 0.669 0.296 0.546 0.231 0.503 0.105
***

1.021 0.951 0.999 0.997 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.998 1.059 1.073 1.003 0.008 0.043 0.009 0.008 0.026 0.004 0.184 0.009 0.042 0.105 0.004 0.393 0.020 -0.050 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.057 0.070 0.003 -4.297

0.108 0.906 0.715 0.991 0.915 0.998 0.743 0.159 0.603 0.477
***

Serious offense rate 2001 - 2002 Change in average class size Percent on free lunch Percent credentialed teachers Percent non-Latino white students School building age Year-round calendar Change in community total crime rate Change in percent female-headed households Change in percent vacant housing units Change in median household income (in 1000s) Constant
0.030 -0.004 -0.003 -0.014 -0.021 0.002 -0.192 -0.005 0.051 0.070 -0.007 -4.481

0.006 0.031 0.006 0.008 0.031 0.003 0.126 0.006 0.041 0.135 0.005 0.275

***significant p < 0.001, ** significantp < 0.05; b is the negative binomial regression coefficient, S.E. is the standard error, and IRR is the incidence rate ratio (the exponetiated value of b)

Table 4.10. Negative binomial regression model of school serious offenses on school racial/ethnic churning by school type, controlling for change in community characteristics

p-value
**

School racial/ethnic churning Community racial/ethnic churning

***

Middle Schools N= 55 b IRR S.E. p-value -0.001 0.999 0.016 0.972 0.044 0.195 0.057 1.058 b 0.041 0.042

High Schools N=38 IRR S.E. 1.042 0.020 1.043 0.034

0.221
***

1.031 1.0.10 0.999 0.989 0.985 1.002 0.845 0.995 1.047 1.011 0.988 0.836 0.936 0.175 0.525 0.673 0.337 0.559 0.290 0.927
** ***

1.025 0.961 1.000 0.992 1.047 1.001 1.151 1.002 1.049 0.983 0.998

0.201 0.942 0.276 0.137 0.580 0.301 0.802 0.247 0.895 0.648
***

Serious offense rate 2001 - 2002 Change in average class size Percent on free lunch Percent credentialed teachers Percent non-Latino white students School building age Year-round calendar Change in community total crime rate Change in percent female-headed households Change in percent vacant housing units Change in median household income (in 1000s) Constant 0.031 0.010 -0.001 -0.011 -0.015 0.002 -0.168 -0.005 0.046 0.011 -0.012 -4.757

0.008 0.047 0.010 0.008 0.024 0.004 0.176 0.009 0.043 0.117 0.004 0.415

0.024 -0.040 0.000 -0.008 0.046 0.001 0.141 0.002 0.048 -0.017 -0.002 -4.702

0.006 0.031 0.006 0.008 0.031 0.003 0.136 0.007 0.041 0.130 0.005 0.346

***significant p < 0.001, ** significant p < 0.05; b is the negative binomial regression coefficient, S.E. is the standard error, and IRR is the incidence rate ratio (the exponetiated value ofb)

alone models (Table 4.7)). The rate of school serious offending is predicted to increase by 4% for each 1% increase in school level racial and ethnic churning. This is consistent with theoretical knowledge and identical to the magnitude of the finding from analyses net of community controls. In the churning models, the previously significant relationship between increased median income and lower offense rates is specific to middle schools; no other community variables are even close to significance in any of the other permutations. Given that the relationships between community level racial and ethnic change, school racial and ethnic change, and school offenses fluctuates when the analysis is separated by school type, it is probable that the effects of school racial and ethnic change are conditional upon community racial and ethnic change and school type. Indeed, I have already shown that school and community racial change are correlated (see discussion of correlations, page 30) but not causal in a way that would indicate a mediating relationship. Therefore, next I include interaction terms in the regression analyses to investigate for this possibility.

Interaction effects Given the inconsistent results in the full model versus the split high school versus middle school models, and the logical likelihood that community change influences school change, I replicate the analyses above while controlling for the interaction between community and school change. The two interaction terms are the multiplicative value of the community racial change and same school racial change 199

racial change and same school racial change variables. This captures the combined effect of communities and schools. I report only the results for the analyses by school type since previous results indicate that the full models mask meaningful differences between high schools and middle schools.

Change in heterogeneity At the bivariate level I have shown that change in school heterogeneity between 2000 and 2006 is significantly related to decreases in serious offenses but that the relationship disappears once changes in school and community characteristics are included.When the sample is separated by school type, however, change in school heterogeneity is a significant predictor of a decreasing rate of offending in high schools only. It is likely that when schools and communities are changing similarly, the effect on school offending is compounded. In the full model adding the interaction variable has no significant impact (results not shown), thus I present the results for middle schools and high schools in Table 4.11. In the previous model (Table 4.8) none of the racial/ethnic predictors had any meaningful impact on serious school offenses, though school heterogeneity change approached significance (p = 0.060). When the interaction term is included, however, the relationship is specified in middle schools only; neither level of racial and ethnic change nor the school*community interaction are significant in high schools. This is

200

Table 4.11. Negative binomial regression models of school serious offenses by school type, controlling for change in heterogeneity and the interaction between
Heterogeneity Middle Schools N-= 55 b School change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity Community change in heterogeneity Community*school change in heterogeneity Serious offending rate 2001-2002 Change in average class size Change in percent on free lunch Change in percent credentialed teachers Change in percent white students School building age Year-round calendar Community change in total crime rate Community change in % female-headed households Community change in % vacant housing Community change in median income (in 1,000s) Constant -4.878 0.249 7.758 S.E. 2.069 0.241 2.665 IRR 0.008 1.283 2339 Pvalue ** 0.301 ** b -1.993 -0.287 -2.598 High Schools N-= 3S S.E. 1.594 0.178 2.854 IRR 0.136 0.751 0.074 Pvalue 0.211 0.107 0.363

0.030 0.024 -0.011 -0.017 -0.026 0.003 -0.288 -0.006

0.008 0.041 0.009 0.007 0.024 0.004 0.172 0.008

1.031 1.024 0.989 0.983 0.975 1.003 0.750 0.994

*** 0.560 0.226 ** 0.287 0.418 0.093 0.421

0.019 -0.041 -0.001 -0.004 0.015 0.000 -0.001 -0.001

0.006 0.032 0.006 0.008 0.035 0.003 0.125 0.006

1.019 0.960 0.999 0.996 1.016 1.000 0.999 0.999

** 0.202 0.924 0.595 0.658 0.922 0.995 0.819

0.069 0.078

0.040 0.097

1.071 1.081

0.082 0.423 ** ***

0.066 0.054

0.041 0.134

1.068 1.056

0.111 0.687

-0.011 -4.776

0.004 0.377

0.989

0.002 -4.167

0.005 0.307

1.002

0.753 ***

***significantp < 0.001, ** significantp < 0.05; b is the negative binomial regression coefficient, S.E. is the standard error, and IRR is the incidence rate ratio (the exponetiated value ofb)

contrary to thefindingsshown in Tables 4.6 and 4.9 which show that the effect of racial and ethnic heterogeneity on school offenses is specific to high schools. But the inclusion of the interaction term modifies the relationship such that the relationship is apparent only within the schools with younger students. That is, the effect of

201

change in school heterogeneity on the rate of serious offenses in middle schools is conditional on whether the community heterogeneity is increasing or decreasing. The interaction term is significant and positive (b = 7.758, IRR = 2339, p < 0.05), though the main effect of school change on serious offenses is negative (b = 4.878, IRR = 0.008, p < 0.05). The relationship between community and school heterogeneity change and offense rates is more easily understood when considering the effect of school racial change in communities where heterogeneity decreased since both the effects of community change and the interaction term are zero. Therefore, the effect of school change in heterogeneity is equal to the exponential of the sum of the coefficients (-4.878 + 7.758*0), or an incidence rate ratio of 0.008: an increase of one in school heterogeneity reduces serious offending by nearly 100%. For a more realistic increase of 0.10 in school heterogeneity, school serious offending would be reduced nearly 40% (IRR = 0.619) in communities where heterogeneity decreased. On the other hand, for schools located in communities where heterogeneity increased, the effect of school racial change is equal to an incidence rate ratio of 17.81 (the exponentiated value of (-4.878 + 7.758*1)). A 0.10 increase in school heterogeneity then, reduces school offending by a magnitude of-170%. This is displayed in Figure 4.8 below, where it is shown that schools in communities with increasing heterogeneity have a much greater reduction in serious offending than similar schools situated in more homogenous areas.

202

Figure 4.8. Predicted change in the percent of serious school offenses in middle schools based on change in school and community heterogeneity between 2000 and 2006
0% . Community change in racial/ethnic heterogeneity. Decreased Increased

-10%

i
i
'
<u c
ID

-20%

-30%

-40%

-50%

-60%

-70%

-80%

Decreased school heterogeneity

Increased school heterogeneity

Figure 4.8 shows how the percent change in middle school serious offenses (y-axis) varies for different combinations of community change in heterogeneity (xaxis) and school change in heterogeneity (lines). To simplify interpretation, school change in heterogeneity has also been divided into decreased heterogeneity (dashed line) and increased school heterogeneity (solid line).

Alternative graphs specifying school level change by the mean (0.0045), one standard deviation above the mean, and one standard deviation below the mean, appear virtually identical. For ease of understanding, the simplified increase/decrease graphs are shown.

30

203

From the graph it is clear that as long as either but not both the school or the community have an increase in heterogeneity, the expected change in serious offending is greater than in schools that have either 1) increased heterogeneity in increasingly heterogeneous communities, or 2) decreasing heterogeneity in decreasing heterogeneous communities. This suggests that community and school change do not work in agreement to compound their effect on the outcome, but rather have the most impact when school and the community heterogeneity change move in opposite directions. In sum, even when controlling for various community and school specific changes, increasing heterogeneity has a beneficial effect in middle schools. Three other middle school variables that significantly predict school offending are the rate of serious offenses in the 2001 to 2002 school year (b = 0.030, IRR = 1.031, p < 0.001), the change in the percent credentialed teachers (b = -0.017, IRR = 0.007, p < 0.05), and change in the community level median income (b = -0.011, IRR = 0.004, p < 0.001). All are consistent with theoretical expectation.

Racial and ethnic churning So far, evidence that racial and ethnic churning is related to school crime has been limited to a small positive effect in high schools. The effect of community churning on school offenses has so far been nil, but the relationship may be contingent upon the level of school churning. I assess this possibility in Table 4.12. The inclusion of a school* community churning variable in the full model does not significantly change the results of previous churning models: school racial

204

and ethnic churning, community racial and ethnic churning, and the interaction term are all non-significant (only the school total crime rate in 2001 - 2002, school type, community change in median income and the high school control predict change in the number of school offenses). Table 4.12. Negative binomial regression models of school serious offenses by school type, controlling for population churning and the interaction between community and school racial and ethnic churning
Racial/Ethnic Churning Middle Schools High Schools N= 55 N= 38 PS.E. IRR value S.K IRR 0.044 0.580 0.561 0.150 0.051 1.162 0.086 0.009 0.130 0.610 0.894 0.541 0.128 -0.021 0.049 0.009 1.137 0.980

value ** ** **

School racial/ethnic churning Community racial/ethnic churning Community*school racial/ethnic churning Violent crime rate 2001 2002 Change in average class size Change in percent on free lunch Change in percent credentialed teachers Change in percent white students School building age Year-round calendar Community change in violent crime rate Community change in % female-headed households Community change in % vacant housing Community change in median income (in 1,000s) Constant

-0.025 0.011 0.005

0.030 0.009 0.000 -0.011 -0.014 0.001 -0.154 -0.005

0.008 0.046 0.010 0.008 0.024 0.004 0.177 0.009

1.030 0.200 0.030 1.320 0.560 0.340 0.870 0.520

*** 0.838 0.972 0.187 0.577 0.737 0.383 0.602

0.023 -0.052 0.002 -0.012 0.023 0.000 0.166 0.003

0.006 0:030 0.006 0.007 0.031 0.003 0.128 0.006

1.023 0.949 1.002 0.988 1.023 1.000 1.181 1.003

*** 0.082 0.711 0.108 0.456 0.850 0.194 0.598

0.042 0.004 -0.012 -4.533

0.043 0.117 0.004 0.552

0.980 0.030 3.000

0.327 0.975 ** ***

0.021 0.006 -0.003 -5.032

0.041 0.123 0.004 0.356

1.021 1.006 0.997

0.614 0.960 0.456 ***

***'significantp < 0.001, ** significantp < 0.05; b is the negative binomial regression coefficient, S.E. is the standard error, and IRR is the incidence rate ratio (the exponetiated value ofb)

205

Previously, significant positive effects of school churning on change in crime is evident only in high schools (Tables 4.7 and 4.10). This finding is replicated for permutations including a community churning* school churning interaction variable. In the model shown in Table 4.12, both the main effects of school churning (b = 0.1450, IRR = 1.16, p < 0.01) and community churning (b = 0.1281, IRR = 1.14, p < 0.01) are significant and positive predictors of change in high school offending; community churning was non-significant in the previous model. The interaction term (b = -0.0206, IRR = 0.980, p < 0.05) is also significant. The combined effect of school and community churning, however, has a negative effect on change in school serious offenses. That is, schools with low racial and ethnic churning that are located in communities that also have low turnover, have a greater predicted decrease in school offending than the same schools located in communities with high turnover. This relationship is more noticeable (as the dotted line) in Figure 4.9, below. Figure 4.9 shows how the predicted percent change in the school crime rate (y-axis) varies for different combinations of community churning (x-axis) and school churning (lines). The values for both community and school churning are measured as deviations from the mean: low (one standard deviation below the mean), medium (or mean for schools) (mean), and high (one standard deviation above the mean). The graph reveals that when accounting for the combined effect of community and school churning, schools with high turnover that are located in stable neighborhoods actually have less of a decrease in offending than high churning schools in high churning neighborhoods (as indicated by the dashed line).

206

Figure 4.9. Predicted change in the rate of school serious offenses in high schools based on school and community racial and ethnic churning between 2000 and 2006

I
o o

0.03

0.03

0.02

!
!

0.02

0.01

0.01

0.00 Low Medium Community racial/ethnic churning Mean school churning - H i g h school churning Low school churning High

Though I will discuss this more in the Discussion section next, this seemingly contradictory relationship may be reflective of the protective effect of first or early generation immigrant populations. Indeed, in an alternative model that includes a change in the percent Latino population variable, an increasing Latino population is associated with decreases in the rate of school offending (results not shown). I point out again, that no other variables in the high school model are significantly associated with change in school offending.

207

Summary The inclusion of school and community racial change interaction variables provides more detailed information on the relationship between school and community change and the effects on change in school serious offending. At the same time, however, the pattern of findings produced is more complicated and somewhat perplexing. I highlight the results from the interaction section here, and then attempt to make sense of the complex - and sometimes contradictory - results in the Discussion section. In the models using change in the heterogeneity score as an indicator of racial change, I determine that, in the full model without separating by school type, racial and ethnic change is not a significant predictor of change in school crime. In middle schools, the effect of school racial and ethnic change is moderated by the community level heterogeneity change; schools where heterogeneity is decreasing that are located in communities that are also becoming less heterogeneous, have higher predicted school violent crime rates than similar schools located in areas becoming more heterogeneous. The interesting finding here is that the largest impact on school offending occurs when direction of change for schools is opposite that for the community. In high schools, changes in heterogeneity are no longer significantly related to school offenses rates, though the relationship previously existed without the interaction term in the model. In models using racial and ethnic churning as an indicator of racial change, there is no evidence that school churning, community churning, and the interaction between the two, are related to change in school crime in the full model and in the

208

middle school only analysis. In high schools, however, school churning and community churning are positive and significant, and the interaction term is negative. This means that effect of school churning on the change in the high school crime rate is moderated by the rate of community churning; if a school is surrounded by a lot of community turnover, the effect of school churning is less important. In addition, it is important to recognize that the majority of school and community change variables are not related to changes in school violence, and some significant relationships are at times in a direction contrary to theoretical expectation (i.e., the change in the rate of community total crime). In the final section I discuss these results and their implications for changing rates of school crime, the limitations of this analysis, and future studies.

DISCUSSION

Social disorganization theory argues that as racial and ethnic heterogeneity increases and residential population turns over, crime will increase because the population diversity and fluctuation prohibits the formation of social bonds that constrain delinquency. Some research within the education literature, however, suggests that heterogeneity may have a protective effect within schools by equalizing the balance of power among students. I find that, by and large, increased heterogeneity in schools is associated with a reduction in serious student offenses, but changes in the racial diversity outside of the school has no apparent direct impact on school level outcomes. This is in line with the balance of power argument, but

209

contrary to postulates of social disorganization theory. The impact of racial and ethnic churning is the only included variable that directly aligns with social disorganization theory. My results reveal that as school churning, and in some cases community churning, increases, the rate of serious schools offenses also increases. Indeed, other social disorganization controls at both the school and community levels were not predictive of change in serious student offending. Within schools, changes in the percent credentialed teachers, average class size, and the proportion of low-income students have no meaningful impact on the pattern of student offending over time. Likewise, the socio-demographic characteristics of areas outside the schools have no discernible effect on school crime. Schools located in communities that have higher levels of racial and ethnic change, an increasing percentage of vacant housings, and more female-headed households are not significantly different than schools located in more advantaged areas. Change in the community crime rate surrounding schools is also not predictive of changes in school level crime (in fact, the change in the two crime rates are not even correlated).31 It is probable that social disorganization affects that exist in census tracts are not picked up in smaller communities such as schools. That is, the average enrollment in LA schools in 2000 and 2006 is about 2,200 to 2,300 students, whereas the average census tract contains 4,000 plus residents. My operational definitions of social disorganization may not be appropriate for school environments. As did studies before me (Casteel et al., 2007; Mansfield, Alexander, and Farris, 1991; Plank et al., 2009), I relied on the proportion of students receiving free or reduced

31

Cross-sectional correlations of the school and community total crime rates are significantly correlated in 2001 (r = 0.2076), but not in 2006 (r = 0.1160).

210

cost meals as an indicator of student level poverty. The average school, however, had almost 70% (standard deviation of 18) of their students receiving free lunches (in 2006; this is much higher than the city as a whole, whose communities (census tracts) average 22.7% in poverty (standard deviation of 14.4). Furthermore, certain social disorganization relationships may not be applicable to the age range of the student population. In schools, enrolled students were generally 10 to 18 years old, but in communities the population has a much greater age variation. The differences in the expected and actual effects of heterogeneity then could be an artifact of the different age compositions in the different types of communities. An important finding in my study is that all these relationships are specified by school type, specifically within Los Angeles high schools (in models excluding the school by community interactions). Many prior studies focused on middle schools or the equivalent (Reis, Trockal, Mulhall, 2007; Payne et al., 2003; Plank et al., 2009; Welsh, Greene, and Jenkins, 1999), combined high schools with middle schools (Limbos and Casteel, 2008), and rarely just high schools (Macquire and Pastore, 1996). Few studies have specifically compared high schools to middle schools, despite evidence that being enrolled in a junior high increases the likelihood of violent victimization (Ringwalt et al., 1992). My results indicate that some factor or factors specific to high schools influence the association between changes in racial and ethnic composition and school offending. The most obvious possibility is the older ages of high school students; older students may have increased access to weapons or have a greater amount of time spent away from parental or adult supervision; though there are mixed reports on whether younger students (U.S.

211

Department of Education, 2007) or older students (Nofziger, 2008) are more likely to be victimized. Another possibility is older students are official gang members whereas their younger counterparts are still considered "taggers" (graffiti artists) and do not participate in the more serious forms of gang activity that may be driving the association in high schools (personal communication with LAUSD Assistant Dean M. Solorzano on January 16, 2009). There is no support for the notion that community level racial and ethnic change on school level outcomes is mediated by (or attenuated if controlling for) school level racial and ethnic change. This is fairly obvious as the results continuously fail to show a direct relationship between community change and serious school offenses. There is evidence of a moderating relationship between school and community effects: the impact of school level heterogeneity change on school offenses rates is conditional on community level change (and school type). Perplexingly, an association between racial and ethnic change and in school crime only shows up in middle schools in the model controlling for the interaction between school and community changes in racial heterogeneity (Table 4.11). In this situation, the combined effect is not what one would logically expect. Based on my previous findings, I would expect that schools with increased heterogeneity located in communities also with increased heterogeneity would have the greatest reduction in school offenses. Rather, though the main effect of school change in heterogeneity is negatively associated with school crime (as expected based on previous results), the interaction term is positive and large. This suggests that the beneficial effect of

212

changing heterogeneity is not compounded when controlling for the relationship with community change, but rather only effectively reduces crime in middle schools that are located in communities where the heterogeneity is decreasing. The magnitude of the decrease in student offending in these schools is considerably greater than in any other community - school combinations. The relationship between school level racial and ethnic churning and changes in school offense rates is also moderated by the community level churning, but (as anticipated) only in high schools. A significant and positive effect of school churning has been apparent in all the high school specific analyses regardless of community change; the approximate magnitude of the relationship is a 4% increase in rates of student offending for each 1% increase in racial and ethnic churning. In the interaction model, however, both the main effects of school and community churning predict increasing school crime while the interaction between the two has a negative coefficient. This may be evidence of a protective (or equalizing) effect of high churning neighborhoods. According to Graph 4.5, regardless of the level of school churning, schools in communities with a lot of racial and ethnic turnover have approximately the same expected decrease in school crime rates. As previously mentioned, this could be evidence of the protective effect of immigrant families, which are typically associated with lower crime rates (Lee, Martinez, and Rosenfeld, 2001; Sutherland, 1934). The population in these high churning communities can be fluctuating, but if the incoming residents are immigrants this can possibly explain the lower rate of school offenses.

213

Both definitions of community change yielded interesting results that would have been masked had I simply relied on the traditional heterogeneity score. Though the 2000 to 2006 change in heterogeneity for most schools is small, my use of this definition gave rise to the somewhat unexpected finding between increased school diversity and reduced student offenses that would have been missed with just the churning variable. Additionally, the measures are somewhat different in the sense that population churning may be a more dynamic indicator and a better estimate of turnover, whereas the heterogeneity score and the change in heterogeneity approximate racial and ethnic diversity. For these reasons, I do not make a claim that one definition is a better measure racial and ethnic change and that both are useful tools depending on the research question. This study is not without limitations however. The first is that the sample size is small, especially when the study is separated by school type. Small samples used in analysis with numerous predictor and control variables can run into a power issue where the model consumes too many degrees of freedom to accurately detect statistically significant relationships. But prior negative binomial analyses have been published using a small samples and statistically significant relationships still show up in my high school models (with the smallest n, of 38 schools). Additionally, models run net of any school or community controls (to increase statistical power) still showed the same patterns of significance and null findings (results not shown). Second, in order to determine change in community attributes between 2000 and 2005,1 relied on population projections and estimates of 2005 block group demographics purchased from a private company (GeoLytics, Inc.). The

214

methodology for computing these estimates is proprietary and therefore unknown. This introduces some possibility of error. However, I found that GeoLytics total (tract level) population estimates and Los Angeles Planning Department (tract level) estimates (used in Chapter 3) are highly correlated. A third limitation is the underreporting of LASPD crimes, missing school crime data, and inability to examine more minor offenses such as drugs or vandalism. Many future projects can originate from this study. Modifications to the existing research include the use of a community disadvantage factor or school climate index that will simultaneously reduce the drain on statistical power and degrees of freedom usage while increasing the number of explanatory variables I can incorporate into the project. Alternatively, I can rerun the analysis using the three year smoothed averages for the offense rates, specify school year crimes versus calendar year offenses (though there was little difference between the two in some preliminary exploration), or adjust enrollment counts for attendance rates. In order to investigate how schools and communities are changing compositionally, I can use changes in specific races instead of heterogeneity or churning and/or limit the community age structure to match only those potential offenders and victims who are of high school or middle age. The crime data included in this study is unique and invaluable and will hopefully be able to be utilized for numerous investigations on school crime in the future.

215

REFERENCES

Agresti, Alan. 2003. Categorical Data Analysis. Hoboken, NJrJohn Wiley & Sons, Inc. Baker, R.L., B. R. Mednick, and L. Carothers, 1989. Association of age, gender, and ethnicity with juvenile victimization in and out of school. Youth and Society, 20, 320-341. Baron, R. M , and D. A. Kenny. 1986. The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51,1173-1182. Bradshaw Catherine P, Anne L. Sawyer Anne L, and Lindsey O'Brennan. 2009. A social disorganization perspective on bullying-related attitudes and behaviors: the influence of school context. American Journal of Community Psychology, 43,204220. Branham, David. 2004. The Wise Man Builds His House Upon the Rock: The Effects of Inadequate School Building Infrastructure on Student Attendance. Social Science Quarterly, 85,1112 - 1128. Bellmore, A.D., Melissa R. Witkow, Sandra Graham, and Jaana Juvonen. 2004. Beyond the individual: The impact of ethnic context and classroom behavioral norms on victims' adjustment. Developmental Psychology, 40, 1159 - 1172. California Department of Education. 2009. Drop Outs by ethnic designation by grade 2007 - 2008. Accessed online at http://dq.cde.ca.gov/dataquest on May 15, 2009. Casteel, Carri, Corinne Peek-Asa, and Mary Ann Limbos. 2007. Predictors of Nonfatal Assault Injury to Public School Teachers in Los Angeles City. American Journal of Industrial Medicine, 50, 932 - 939. Chamlin, Mitchell, and John Cochran. 2006. Economic inequality, legitimacy, and cross-national homicide rates. Homicide Studies, 10,231,252. Cohen, Jacqueline, and George Tita. 1999. Spatial Diffusion in Homicide: Exploring a General Method of Detecting Spatial Diffusion Processes. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 15,451-493. Crowe T.D. 2000. Crime prevention through environmental design: Applications of architectural design and space management concepts 2nd edition. Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann.

216

DuRant R.H., C. Cadenhead, R.A. Pendergrast, G. Slavens and C.W. Under . 1994. Factors associated with the use of violence among urban black adolescents. American Journal of Public Health. 84, pp. 612-617. Duster, Troy. 1993. An Emerging Reformulation of'Competence' in an Increasingly Multicultural World. In Becky Thompson and Sengeeta Tyagi (Eds.), A Dream Deferred (pp. 231 - 255). University of Minnesota Press. Eitle, David J. and Tamela McNulty Eitle. 2003. Segregation and school violence. Social Forces, 82, 589-615. Elliot, Delbert, Beatrix Hamburg, and Kirk Williams. 1998 Violence in American Schools. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press. Elliott, Delbert, William J. Wilson, David Huizinga, Robert J. Sampson, Amanda Elliott, and Bruce Rankin. 1996. The effects of neighborhood disadvantage on adolescent development. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 33, 389 426. Galloway, David, R. Martin, and B. Wilcox. 1985. Persistent absence and exclusion from school: The predictive power of school and community variables. British Educational Research Journal, 11,51-61. Gardner, W., E. P. Mulvey. and E. C Shaw. 1995. Regression Analyses of Counts and Rates: Poisson, Overdispersed Poisson, and Negative Binomial Models. Psychological Bulletin, 118, 392^04. Gottfredson, Denise. 2001. Schools and delinquency. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Gottfredson, Gary, and Denise Gottfredson. 1985. Victimization in schools. New York: Plenum. Gottfredson, Gary, Denise Gottfredson, Allison Payne, and Nisha Gottfredson, 2005. School climate predictors of school disorder: Results form a national study of delinquency prevention in schools. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 42,412-444. Gottfredson, Michael, and Travis Hirschi. 1990. A general theory of crime. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. George, R., and G. Thomas. 2000. Victimization among middle and high school students: A multilevel analysis. The High School Journal, 84, 48-57. Graham, Sandra. 2006. Peer victimization in school: Exploring the ethnic context. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 15, 317-321.

217

Hanke, Penelope. 1996. Putting school crime into perspective: Self-reported school victimizations of high school seniors. Journal of Criminal Justice, 24, 207-226. Haynie, D., Silver, E., and Teasdale, B. 2006. Neighborhood characteristics, peer networks, and adolescent violence. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 22,147169. Hellman, Daryl, and Susan Beaton. 1986. The Pattern of Violence in Urban Public School: The Influence of School and Community. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 23,102-127. Hilbe, Joseph. 2007. Negative Binomial Regression. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hipp, John R., George Tita, and Lyndsay Boggess. 2009. Inter- and Intra-Group Violence: Is Violent Crime an Expression of Group Conflict or Social Disorganization? Criminology, 47, 501 - 544. Juvonen, Jaana, A. Nishina, and Sandra Graham. 2006. Ethnic diversity and perceptions of safety in urban middle schools. Psychological Science, 17, 393-400. Kingery, Paul M., Mark Goggeshall, and Aaron Alford. 1995. Violence at School: Recent Evidence from Four National Surveys. Accessed online [May 20,2009] at www.violenceprevention.net/vita/vita/attach/60.pdf Knapp, J. F. 1998. The impact on children witnessing violence. Pediatric Clinics of North America, 45,355-363. Kubrin, Charis and Ronald Weitzer. 2003. New Directions in Social Disorganization Theory. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 40, 374-402 Land, Kenneth C , Glenn Deane, and Judith R. Blau. 1992. Religious Pluralism and Church Membership: A Spatial Diffusion Model. American Sociological Review, 56,237-49. Laub, John, Janet Lauritsen. 1998. The interdependence of school violence with neighborhood and family conditions. In Elliott D.S., B.A. Hamburg, K.R. Williams (Eds.), Violence in American schools. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lee, Valerie, and Anthony Bryk. 1989. A Multilevel Model of the Social Distribution of High School Achievement. Sociology of Education, 62,172 - 192. Lee, Valerie E., Todd K. Chow-Hoy, David K. Burkam, Douglas Geverdt, and Becky A. Smerdon. 1998. Sector Differences in High School Course Taking: A Private or Catholic School Effect? Sociology of Education, 71, 314-35.

218

Limbos, M.A., and C. Casteel. 2008. Schools and neighborhoods: Organizational and environmental factors associated with crime in secondary schools. Journal of School Health, 78, 539 - 5 4 4 . Loeber, Rolf, and David Farrington (Eds.). 1998. Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders: Risk Factors and Successful Interventions. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Lynch, James. 1987. Routine activity and victimization at work. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 3,283 - 300. Lyons, Christopher. 2008. Defending Turf: Racial Demographics and Hate Crime Against Blacks and Whites. Social Forces, 87, 357 - 385. Martinez, Pedro, and John Richters. 1993. The NIMH community violence project: II. Children's distress symptoms associated with violence exposure. Psychiatry, 2235. Mazza, James J. and William Reynolds. 1999. Exposure to violence in young innercity adolescents: relationships with suicidal ideation, depression, and PTSD symptomatology. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 27, 203-213. McDermott, J. 1980. High Anxiety: Fear of Crime in Secondary Schools. Contemporary Education, 5 2 , 1 8 - 23. McPherson, Miller, and James Ranger-Moore. 1991. Evolution on a dancing landscape: Organizations and networks in dynamic Blau space. Social Forces, 70,19 -42. Menacker, Julius, Ward Weldon, and Emanuel Hurwitz. 1990. Community Influences on School Crime and Violence. Urban Education, 25, 68-80. Messner, Steven, Robert D. Bailer, and Matthew Zevenbergen. The legacy of lynching and Southern homicide. American Sociological Review, 70, 633 - 655. Mijanovich, Tod, and Beth Weitzman. 2003. Which broken windows matter? School, neighborhood and family characteristics association with youths' feelings of unsafely. Journal of Urban Health, 80,400-415. Moody, James. 2001. Race, School Integration, and Friendship Segregation in America. The American Journal of Sociology, 107, 679 -716. National Center for Education Statistics. 2003. Violence in U.S. public schools: 2000 school survey on crime and safety. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education.

219

National Center for Education Statistics. 2004. Crime and safety in America's public schools: Selectedfindings from the school survey on crime and safety. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education. National Center for Education Statistics. 2007. Indicators of school crime and safety: 2007. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education. National Institute of Education. 1978. Violent schools-safe schools: The safe school study report to the Congress. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, National Institute of Education. Neter, J., Kutner, M. H., Nachtsheim, C. J. and W. Wasserman. 1996. Applied Linear Statistical Models, Fourth Edition. Boston: McGraw-Hill. Nofziger, Stacey. 2008. Deviant lifestyles and violent victimization at school. Journal of Interpersonal Violence. Accessed online at http://iiv.sagepub.com/cgi/rapidpdf/0886260508323667vl. Nofziger, Stacey, and Don Kurtz. 2005. Violent lives: A lifestyle model linking exposure to violence to juvenile violent offending. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 42, 3-26. Nye, Barbara, Larry Hedges, and Spyros Konstantopoulos. 2000. Do Disadvantaged Students Benefit More from Small Classes? Evidence from the Tennessee Class Size Experiment. American Journal of Education. 109, pp. 1 -27. Osgood, D. Wayne. 2000. Poisson-Based Regression Analysis of Aggregate Crime Rates. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 16, 21-43. Patchen, Martin. 1982. Black-White Contact in Schools: Its Social and Academic Effects. Purdue, IN:Purdue University Press. Payne, Alison A., Denise C. Gottfredson, and Gary D. Gottfredson. 2003. Schools As Communities: The Relationships among Communal School Organization, Student Bonding, and School Disorder. Criminology, 41, 749-778. Piegorsch, Walter W. 1990. Maximum likelihood estimation for the negative binomial dispersion parameter. Biometrics, 46, 863-867. Plank, Stephen, Catherine Bradshaw, and Hollie Young. 2009. An Application of "Broken-Windows" and Related Theories to the Study of Disorder, Fear, and Collective Efficacy in Schools. American Journal of Education, 115, 227 - 248. Pyle, Gerald F. 1974. The Spatial Dynamics of Crime, vol. 159. Chicago :University of Chicago Press.

220

Reis, Janet, Mickey Trockel, and Peter Mulhall. 2007. Individual and school predictors of middle school aggression. Youth & Society, 38, 322 - 347. Roncek, D. W., and A. Lobosco. 1983. The effect of high schools on crime in their neighborhoods. Social Science Quarterly, 64, 598 - 613. Rosenholtz, S. 1985. Effective schools: Interpreting the evidence. American Journal of Education, 93, 352 - 388. Sampson, Robert J. 1985. Neighborhood and Crime: The Structural Determinants of Personal Victimization. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 22, 7-40. Sampson, Robert J. and W. Bryon Groves. 1989. Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social-Disorganization Theory. American Journal of Sociology, 94, 774-802. Sampson, Robert J. and Stephen W. Raudenbush. 1999. Systematic social observation of public spaces: a new look at disorder in urban neighborhoods. American Journal of Sociology, 105, 603 - 651. Schofield, Janet W. 1978. School Desegregation and Intergroup Relations. In Daniel Bar-Tal and Leonard Saxe (Eds.), Social Psychology of Education: Theory and Research (pp. 329-363). Washington, DC: Halsted Press. . 1986. Black-White Contact in Desegregated Schools. In Miles Hewstone and Rupert Brown (Eds.), Contact and Conflict in Intergroup Encounters (pp. 79-92). Oxford:Basil Blackwell. . 1991. School Desegregation and Intergroup Relations: A Review of the Literature. In G. Grant (Ed.) Review of Research in Education (pp. 335-409). Washington, DC:American Educational Research Association. Shaw, Clifford, and Henry D. McKay. 1942. Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Snyder, Howard and Melissa Sickmund. 1995. Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A National Report. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice. Stewart, Eric A. 2003. School social bonds, school climate, and school misbehavior: A multilevel analysis. Justice Quarterly, 20, 575 601. Sutherland, Edwin. 1934. Principles of Criminology. Chicago, IL: J. B. Lippincott. Swanson, Christopher. 2004. Who graduates, who doesn't? A statistical portrait of public high school graduation, class of 2001. The Urban Institute. Accessed online at: http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410934 WhoGraduates.pdf fMav 23.2009)

221

Toby, Jackson. 1983. Violence in School. In M. Tonry and N. Morris (Eds.), Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research, Volume 4. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Tolnay, Stewart E., Glenn Deane, and E. M. Beck. 1996. Vicarious Violence: Spatial Effects on Southern Lynchings, 1890-1919. American Journal of Sociology, 102, 788-815. Vartanian, Thomas, and Philip Gleason. 1999. Do neighborhood conditions affect high school dropout and college graduation rates? Journal ofSocio-Economics. 28, 21-41 Velez, Maria, Lauren Krivo, and Ruth Peterson. 2003. Structural inequality and homicide: An assessment of the gap in Black-White killings. Criminology, 41,645 672. Welsh, Wayne. 2000. The effects of school climate on school disorder. The Annuals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 567, 88 - 107. Welsh, Wayne, Jack Greene, and Patricia Jenkins. 1999. School disorder: The influence of individual, institutional, and community factors. Criminology, 37, 601 643. Welsh, Wayne, Robert Stokes, and Jack Greene. 2000. A Macro-Level Model of School Disorder. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 37, 243 - 283.

222

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION

223

CONCLUSION

Discussion of Chapter Findings Chapter 2 One of the most unexpected findings is how little of an apparent effect that racial and ethnic change has on changes in crime in Los Angeles neighborhoods. Social disorganization theory broadly states that residential instability - of any type should increase the crime rate, but contrary to theoretical expectation and much empirical research, I find no evidence that population turnover leads to higher crime rates. Prior work on Los Angeles by Boggess and Hipp (in progress) has reached a similar conclusion. This raises the question of whether there is something unique about Los Angeles that mediates the potential impact of neighborhood change on increasing crime. Social disorganization theory grew out of research on Chicago in the 1920s and has been supported primarily by "rust belt" cities that are geographically and structurally similar (such as Philadelphia and Baltimore). Los Angeles, however, is a newer city characterized by a distinctly different culture and the dynamics of change may be different than in Chicago. For starters, social disorganization theory is premised on the social interactions primarily between European immigrants, but Los Angeles and many other "sun belt" cities are cities of Latino and Asian migrants. It is possible that this distinction in ethnic composition makes a difference in the applicability of social disorganization theory. For example, at the time the Chicago School developed, there were historically tense relations between Europeans of 224

differing descent even outside of the United States. Hostilities between the Irish and British, or Germans and Jews, or opposing sides of the World Wars may have been transported to the U.S. during migration and manifested as violence among the different immigrant groups. Though relations between Latinos of different origins may not always be amicable, the conflict is not as historically deep-rooted or widespread as it was among the European immigrant population. Related to this, Latino migrants have strong social networks among those residing in the U.S., but also extending to family and friends still in Mexico. The strength of these connections bond the immigrants together in a way that may not have been the case among European immigrants in the early twentieth century. At the same time, shared experiences among all community members are likely to strengthen ties, not only among the immigrants but also with the native residents. That is, community changes are not necessarily seen as caused by one group but are seen by all groups as the result of a macro-level change in society or policy. An extreme example of this is the Black and Latino experience in the 1992 Los Angeles. Though commonly seen as a consequence of the acquittal of Rodney King and the influx of Latino migrants into formerly predominantly Black South Central, research shows that the riots were, in part, actually manifestations of pent up animosity and hostility towards the LAPD, Korean business owners, and prejudices of non-Latino whites (Baldassare, 1994; Bergesen and Herman, 1998). In this situation, Latinos and Blacks were on the same side. Riots are an extreme case, but it suggests that it is plausible that different groups can react together in the face of other (minor) community changes for the overall community well-being.

225

It is likely too, that in a modern multi-ethnic cities racial/ethnic category is not as salient a factor in predicting crime as other indicators, such as social class or simply opportunity. That is, LA residents could have adjusted to a lifestyle that involves interaction with other groups and/or constant changes in residential composition in general and are more tolerant of racial diversity (research shows this is particularly true on college campuses (Antonio, et al., 2004)). In such a diverse society then, other criminogenic factors like poverty or income inequality or even residential instability in general (i.e., not race-specific) may be more relevant to predict changes in crime besides race or ethnicity; these should be explored in future studies. Lastly, the results that Shaw and McKay obtained could also have been driven primarily by other community structural factors, such as poverty (or class) or general residential instability, rather than specific changes in the racial/ethnic composition. This is particularly likely in light of research that repeatedly finds no association between increased immigrant populations and increased crime. As expected, however, I do, find an effect of changes in crime on community stability. That is, when controlling for reciprocal effects and the influence of change in the surrounding communities, my results reveal a robust effect of change in crime on changes in racial and ethnic composition. More specifically, within Chapter 2 I find that as violent crime increases, communities become more diverse (i.e., heterogeneity increases), and that as property crimes increase, racial and ethnic churning also increases. The relationship between increases in crime and racial/ethnic change is unsurprising, and replicates work by Cullen and Levitt (1997) and by Morenoff and Sampson (1997), which determined that as cities or

226

communities become more dangerous or as the perceived risk of victimization increases, households move, and that this out-migration is related to race/ethnicity and class (see also Hipp, Tita, and Greenbaum, forthcoming). Within Chapter 2,1 also predicted that the relationships would differ depending on the definition of racial and ethnic change I employ. Indeed, I find that change in crime has differential effects on racial and ethnic composition when neighborhood change is alternatively defined as heterogeneity or churning. (Racial and ethnic change is not significantly associated with changes in crime regardless of operational definition.) Though I expected the difference in definition to matter more in the opposite direction, it is interesting that there are differences when racial/ethnic change is the outcome. Lastly, I expected the relationships to differ depending on whether the outcome in question was violent versus property crime. I argued that social disorganization theory predicts changes in crime regardless of type, but my results reveal that crime as an outcome of neighborhood transition is irrelevant. Rather, the type of crime has differential effects on racial and ethnic change, as discussed above.

Chapter 3 In Chapter 3 I examined how a specific type of racial and ethnic change Black to Latino transition - affects violent personal crimes between these two groups. First, I predicted that this specific type of residential change would lead to greater between-group incidents of violence. My results reveal, however, that Black

227

to Latino change does not play a large role in changing violent crime rates once the probability of between-group interaction and other structural variables are controlled. There is minimal evidence that as the Latino population increases, the rate of Latino on Black assaults increases, but once the income differential between Latino and Black households is controlled for, the significant relationship disappears. Interestingly, an unexpected finding is the negative association between Latino population growth and reduced Black on Black robbery (which remains significant even when accounting for between-group income inequality). This potentially represents an increase in solidarity among Black residents; who, in response to an increasing Latino population, bond together and victimize their own group less often. Under such an assumption, however, one would also expect a corresponding increase in Black on Latino crimes, but this is not supported in my Chapter 3 results. Based on findings in Chapter 2,1 also hypothesized that change in the local crime rate would affect population change even when the crimes are broken down by victim - offender dyad, particularly changes in intergroup violence. I find evidence of this in two relationships: (1) when the rate of aggravated assaults with Latino victims increases, the Latino population increases; and (2) when the rate of robberies with Latino victims increases, the Latino population decreases. This suggests that not only is there something unique about Latinos as victims that impacts population shifts in South Los Angeles, but that the true direction of impact is from change in violent crime on racial and ethnic compositional change.

228

Chapter 4 In my final empirical chapter, I predicted that an analysis of social disorganization theory within schools would yield similar results as within neighborhoods. Indeed, my results are consistent with theory: change in the racial and ethnic composition of the student body is significantly associated with changes in serious student offending. Racial/ethnic turnover within schools affects serious offending, though the direction of impact is contingent upon definition of racial/ethnic change and whether the school is a middle or high school. Interestingly, heterogeneity in middle schools is actually related to lower crime rates on school grounds. Schools, however, are distinctly different types of communities than are the neighborhoods defined by social scientists that are typically constructed from census tracts or block groups. First, the population is limited to a specific age range, approximately 10 through 18 year old students. Not only are these ages more likely to commit crime, but they are also more likely to be sensitive to peer and social pressure. Second, schools are structurally contained. This concentrates students for a significant portion of their day and week and limits with whom they interact. Within this environment, there are also more prevalent (and possibly more effective) means of formal social control. Extensive oversight by teachers, staff, security guards, and campus police whose job includes monitoring student actions increases the likelihood of being observed misbehaving in school compared to the probability of being caught by police in the communities.

229

Third, though a couple high schools in LA have enrollments surpassing 5,000, the majority of schools have an average enrollment of 2,178 (in 2006), which may mean that racial and ethnic change is more obvious than in the larger communities (that have an average population size of 8,233 per community surrounding the school campus, or 4,600 per census tract), or that schools have a lower "tipping point" - the point at which students react because the level of racial and ethnic change has surpassed that which they can tolerate - than neighborhoods (Schelling, 1972,1978; Quercia and Galster, 2000). Within the smaller populations it is also more likely that students will have physical contact with other groups, though prior research shows that smaller institutions actually have less crime (see Felson, 2002). In smaller schools, teachers are better equipped to recognize and control students, and students are more likely to be involved in extra-curricular activities (Barker and Gump, 1964), though it could be within these extra-curricular activities that intergroup conflict originates. It is important to remember that factors which predict negative between-group interactions often also predict interracial/ethnic friendships. The increased opportunities for students to associate with students of other races/ethnicities may actually lead more positive relationships between the groups if it helps dispel stereotypes. Fourth, the lack of other significant school-specific factors as predictors of crime suggests that a large part of different crime rates between schools lies not with school or community level distinctions, but rather with the differential characteristics of students. Importantly, in Chapter 4,1 find little support for the notion that school specific or community factors drive crime in schools. This conclusion replicates the

230

findings of Welsh and colleagues and suggests that there might be some factors associated with the students enrolled in each school rather than school itself that influence changes in serious offending rates. That is, studies of school violence need to account for individual behavior and demographic background of individual students, in part because those more likely to be from abusive backgrounds or associate with deviant peers are more likely to be offenders, and victims (HallidayBoykins and Graham, 2001; Sampson and Lauritsen, 1990).

Linking the chapters Though each chapter has a specific set of conclusions, there are unifying themes present throughout the dissertation. An illuminating finding is the significant relationship in the direction opposite theoretical expectation: crime affecting neighborhood change. This finding is not necessarily surprising given previous research (Boggess and Hipp, in progress; Cullen and Levitt, 1997; Hipp, Tita, and Greenbaum, 2009; Morenoff and Sampson, 1997), but it is a robust effect that has implications for future neighborhood level analyses. Increases in crime, even specific types of crime (Latino on Latino assault and Black on Latino robbery), influence residential turnover. The logical conclusion of this is that households are more inclined to relocate as the level of dangerousness, possibility of victimization, or perceived fear of victimization, increase; and according to Chapter 2, this holds true for increases in violent crimes as well as property offenses. This relationship was not addressed or accounted for in early social disorganization studies, which focused on the causes of crime and not its simultaneous effects; this is an inherent weakness in

231

neighborhood theories. By only looking at one side of the equation, these theories are inadequate to explain the full pattern of change in communities. In addition, recent neighborhood effects literature is moving towards analysis of the causal mechanisms linking neighborhood structural conditions and crime. More specifically, Sampson and colleagues' research on collective efficacy attempts to measure residents' cohesion and shared expectations for action. They investigate these processes by asking residents about their willingness to intervene on another person's behalf and the level of trust in their neighbors, but the ultimate goal is to gauge the quality and strength of residents' connections and if these translate into behaviors that help the community. Other studies have begun to follow suit (Browning, Feinberg, and Dietz, 2004; Warner and Rountree, 1997). These processes within neighborhoods cannot be captured by the Census and likely influence both changes in residential racial and ethnic composition and changes in crime. Moreover, an interesting distinction is the difference between racial and ethnic change when operationalized as change in heterogeneity as opposed to racial and ethnic churning. Both Chapters 2 and 4 examined these two definitions, but I had hypothesized that racial/ethnic churning would result in larger increases in crime because this measure is a more dynamic indicator of racial/ethnic transition. I find, however, that there are differences not in the magnitude of the effect, but between different types of crime and in the direction of the effect. In Chapter 2, as expected, racial/ethnic change increases as crime increases, but the relationships are specified by crime type: an increase in the rate of violent crimes is associated with greater heterogeneity, and increases in property offenses heightens the rate of racial/ethnic

232

churning. This can be summarized as essentially, increased violence increases neighborhood diversity whereas increased property crime increases residential turnover. I believe these differences arise because of the different aspects of change that each calculation actually captures. Violent crime affects diversity by influencing residential out-migration by households with the economic means. If in South Los Angeles increasing violence spurred the relocation of middle-class Blacks to suburban LA County, their absence and the racial/ethnic composition of their replacements in the community, would cause changes in the amount of diversity of their former neighborhoods. This captures what has happened near the end of the change process. The effect of increased property crime on turnover, however, captures the relationship more dynamically as it is occurring. Prior studies have shown that increased violence leads to out-migration, but these results suggest that increases in property crime (and fear of victimization of burglary likely) also motivate population change. Change in heterogeneity and churning also show differential relationships with crime in Chapter 4. Here 1 showed that increased heterogeneity has a beneficial effect in middle schools by reducing crime, but racial/ethnic churning increases offending in high schools. The effects found within Chapter 4 are more in line with theoretical expectation. That is, according to Graham (2006), racial and ethnic heterogeneity in schools increases the balance of power so that no one group dominates the campus; this then, leads decreased victimization because of fear of retaliation by an equally strong/large group. And the turnover (churning) leads to more serious offenses by disrupting social networks among students and reducing

233

mechanisms of social control in line with social disorganization theory. Hipp, Tita, and Boggess (2009) showed a strong effect of racial and ethnic churning on increases in both inter- and intragroup violence in neighborhoods, and these effects were strongest when the racial/ethnic change occurred in spatially proximate tracts. Finally, the significant role of geographic space is evident throughout this dissertation. Social factors are clustered throughout Los Angeles, and evidence shows that this distribution is not random (Chapter 2). The effects of change in neighboring tracts continuously show a positive effect on or positive correlation with the focal tract. In Chapter 2, racial and ethnic change in the nearby tracts increases racial/ethnic change in the local community; and increased total, violent, or property crime in the spatially lagged tracts also exhibits a significant and positive effect on the local tract. In fact, this finding is the most consistent and robust conclusion of the chapter. This likely represents not only the clustering of like values, but the diffusion of residents into surrounding areas as they move. In Chapter 3 increased racial and ethnic change in the surrounding areas affects crime in the focal tract (results not shown in the dissertation). This replicates Wilson and Taub (2006) who found that racial and ethnic changes in nearby tracts influenced resident behavior in the focal community. They attributed the reactions of residents resulting from competition for geographically situated resources and fear of encroachment into their own community. Likely this fear of encroachment motivates increased intergroup violence, and further replications of my analysis in Chapter 3 will have to expound on this. In Chapter 41 modeled the influence of space by comparing the change in census block groups surrounding the school to change within the school. Though I

234

hypothesized that changes in the community would diffuse into the school, this was not the case as much of the community racial/ethnic change variables were non^ significant in the models. The interaction between community and school racial/ethnic change, however, suggests that the two levels of change cannot be separated.

Strengths, weaknesses, and extensions Overall, this dissertation contributes to the existing neighborhood effects research in a multitude of ways that have been discussed more thoroughly throughout the chapters. Most importantly, I look at racial and ethnic change as a specific type of instability and the consequences of racial/ethnic change on neighborhood crime over time. Racial and ethnic transition as a specific form of residential instability is more problematic than the effect of general residential turnover on crime. As discussed more thoroughly throughout Chapter 3, racial/ethnic succession is theorized to be correlated with increased between-group conflict because of heightened prejudices and competition for resources which compounds the effect of disruption caused by population turnover in general. I look at racial and ethnic transition using two different definitions of change - heterogeneity and churning - that yield different results depending on the type of crime, suggesting that how change is defined can have important impacts on the outcome. Past research has shown that racial and ethnic change has caused problems for Blacks and Whites, but Ialso include information on the largest four racial/ethnic groups in Los Angeles in order to gain a better understanding of the racial complexities in LA. Therefore, in 235

contrast to prior studies that have focused specifically on Black to White or White to Black change, I also include information on the change in the proportion of Asian and Latino residents (in most chapters). Additionally, by looking at census tracts instead of overall citywide change, I can get a better idea of the effect of change in diverse small scale urban areas. Communities throughout Los Angeles vary on socioeconomic status and racial/ethnic diversity, and it is likely that the effect of residential change on crime in one area differs from the effect in another compositionally different neighborhood. Prior studies that have examined racial and ethnic transition at the city level miss these important by neighborhood distinctions. Throughout the dissertation I focus on dynamic models of change rather than rely on more conventional cross-sectional tests of neighborhood effects. Numerous studies have found an association between heterogeneity and crime at any one time point (e.g., Bellair, 1997; Sampson and Groves, 1989; and Warner and Rountree, 1997). The idea of neighborhood change specifically as a basis for community models goes back to the original formulation of social disorganization theory (i.e., Shaw and McKay, 1942) which discussed the ecological model of community growth and transition/succession over time. In using change models, I investigate the long term consequences of change and to some degree examine if it is the change itself or the process of change that affects the outcome. Additionally each chapter has particular strengths. In Chapter 2 I am able to study census tracts throughout the city and examine the reciprocal causality, but I use strong and unique instrumental variables for the change in heterogeneity variable.

236

That is, I rely on the change in the percent crowded households and change in the percent of married households with children, to instrument tract level heterogeneity change. Both of these instrumental variables are correlated with increased household size and negatively associated with heterogeneity; since households and marriages are more likely to be within-group this would lead to greater homogeneity in the neighborhood. Indeed, I performed various tests of instrument validity and strength, and crowded households and married families with children perform exceptionally well. Chapter 3 advances work on intergroup crime by using a novel denominator that accounts for propinquity effects, or the likelihood of interaction, and I focus on minority - minority interaction. I also limit my analysis to focus on youth in order to capture those persons who are most likely involved in criminal activity. In Chapter 4 I applied the social disorganization framework to schools as smaller communities while including information about the neighborhoods surrounding the school in order to account for spatial processes that affect changes within schools. While prior studies have performed similar analyses (e.g., Welsh, Greene, and Jenkins, 1999; Welsh, Stokes, and Greene, 2000), their definition of local community still relied on the census tract which may not be an appropriate definition if it is too large or if the school is located in a corner of the tract such that it is closer to other tracts than areas of its own tract. Despite these strengths, each chapter in this dissertation can be improved upon and extended. In Chapter 2 my empirical outcomes relied strongly on my choice of instrumental variables. As discussed in the chapter conclusion, there is

237

evidence that my instrumental variables for the change in crime variable can be improved upon. Also, within the framework of that chapter, I examined the effect of my models including change in the size of specific racial and ethnic groups instead of the heterogeneity or churning variable. Though I did not show these results (or discuss them to any extent), I determined that the race-specific models do not significantly add to our understanding of the interplay between race/ethnicity, communities, and crime. That is, these models yielded entirely non-significant findings in both directions of the non-recursive model. The next challenge will be to determine what is it about heterogeneity and churning that interacts with crime that does not pertain to specific racial and ethnic group change. I have already extended the analysis in Chapter 3 by incorporating the influence of surrounding communities and included spatially lagged versions of the dependent variables. These preliminary spatial models showed that space matters: the racial and ethnic transition in neighboring tracts is a significant and positive predictor of increased intragroup violence and Black on Latino robbery/Importantly, I find that when I include a spatially lagged measure of income inequality, as Black median household income increases relative to Latino income in spatially adjacent tracts, the number of Latino on black robberies in the focal tract rises. These findings raise a number of issues. First, by incorporating spatial effects, there is some evidence that Black to Latino transition in neighboring communities influences crime. This is consistent with the social disorganization model and these intergroup specific models. Second, the role of income inequality in relation to increased crime needs to be further explored. Third, because my models are reciprocal, the inclusion

238

of spatially weighted versions of my dependent variables introduces an additional dimension of endogeneity. I need to re-estimate the spatially lagged variables using the Land-Deane/Anselin or Anselin Alternative two-stage least squares method discussed in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 I also found that between-group income inequality is a poor predictor of between-group conflict. This may be because my operational definition of income inequality - the ratio of Black median household income to Latino median household income - may not be adequately capturing inequality. For example, Hipp (2007) showed that alternative definitions of income inequality, such as within-group inequality, are more strongly associated with crime. Additionally, there are alternative aspects of inequality that an income measure cannot capture (such as access to resources), or the income differential may not be as relevant a factor when examining minority - minority violence. Though I did run additional models which included the percent of households below poverty by racial/ethnic group as an alternative indicator of inequality, those models too yield no relationship (and therefore are also not shown and discussed within the chapter). Future extensions of this project need to take a closer look at the operational definition of inequality, particularly in reference to two minority groups. While Chapter 4 is unique and takes an interesting spin on applying social disorganization factors to schools, there are serious analytical limitations because of the small sample size (namely the increased likelihood of type 2 errors). Future analysis can potentially utilize latent trajectory models (or another analytic strategy) to overcome the small sample size. Likewise, I compare serious offending within

239

schools committed mostly likely by youths ages 10 to 18 to crimes committed by all residents in the surrounding community. In the future, I can limit the offenses outside of school to a similar age range, and examine trends comparing on and off school offending rates. Within the dissertation overall, and like many neighborhood studies before now, this project is constrained by data availability. Even with my change models I am limited to 10 year changes in Chapter 1 because of a reliance on census data. Furthermore, the analyses in Chapters 3 and 4 also require using Los Angeles City Planning population estimates or GeoLytics estimates, both of which are not necessarily the true populations. In the future, it will be interesting to explore the relevance of using neighborhood-level change as an indicator of crime in crime. That is, what level of change motivates crime rates? Is it that Los Angeles as a whole is becoming more diverse that leads to more crime, or is it because the local neighborhood specifically is more heterogeneous? Lastly, this dissertation, and much social science research investigating race/ethnicity, is unable to distinguish between Latinos (or Blacks or Asians for that matter) of different origins.

"Take-home" message Perhaps the most important lessons to be learned from this dissertation are that changes in crime, both in general and specifically by the racial/ethnic composition of victim - offender dyad, affect residential turnover and racial and ethnic turnover in Los Angeles neighborhoods; and that schools are distinctly different types communities whose unique structural factors may explain why the 240

relationship between racial/ethnic change and crime within them are different than communities at large. I have also learned that ecological studies of communities are complex and require careful consideration of 1) the influence of endogenous relationships, 2) the consequences of change in crime on neighborhoods, and 3) the influence of surrounding neighborhoods. Indeed, as has been discussed throughout the conclusions, there are numerous projects that will emanate from this research which will take these factors into account, and I look forward to undertaking them in my future work.

241

REFERENCES Antonio, Anthony, Mitchell Chang, Kenji Hakuta, David A. Kenny, Shana Levin, and Jeffrey Milem. 2004. Effects of racial diversity on complex thinking in college students. Psychological Science, 15, 507 - 510. Baldasarre, Mark (Ed.). 1994. The Los Angeles Riots: Lessons for the Urban Future. Boulder, CO: Westview. Barker, R., and P.V. Gump (Eds.). 1964. Big school, small school. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Bergesen, Albert and Max Herman. 1998. Immigration, Race, and Riot: The 1992 Los Angeles Uprising. American Sociological Review, 63, 39-54. Bobo, Lawrence, Melvin L. Oliver, James H. Johnson, and Abel Valenzuela Jr. 2000. Prismatic Metropolis: Inequality in Los Angeles. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Boggess, Lyndsay, and John Hipp. Examining the directionality of the violent crime and residential instability relationship in Latino and African American neighborhoods. Unpublished manuscript Browning, Christopher R., Seth Feinberg, and Robert Dietz. 2004. The paradox of social organization: Networks, collective efficacy, and violent crime in urban neighborhoods. Social Forces, 83, 503 - 534. Cullen, Julie Berry and Steven D Levitt,. 1999. Crime, urban flight, and the consequences for cities. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 81,159-169. Felson, Marcus. 2002. Crime and Everyday Life. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Halliday-Boykins, C. A., Sandra Graham. 2001. At both ends of the gun: Testing the relationship between community violence exposure and youth violent behavior. Journal oj Abnormal Child Psychology, 29, 383-402. Hipp, John R. 2007. Income inequality, race, and place: Does the distribution of race and class within neighborhoods affect crime rates? Criminology, 45, 665 - 697. Hipp, John R., George Tita, and Lyndsay Boggess. 2009. Inter- and Intra-Group Violence: Is Violent Crime an Expression of Group Conflict or Social Disorganization? Criminology, 47, 501 - 544.

242

Hipp, John R., George Tita, and Robert Greenbaum, forthcoming. Drive-bys and Trade-ups: Examining the Directionality of the Crime and Residential Instability Relationship. Social Forces. Morenoff, Jeffrey D. and Robert J. Sampson. 1997. Violent crime and the spatial dynamics of neighborhood transition: Chicago, 1970- 1990. Social Forces, 76, 31 64. Quercia, Roberto G., and George C. Galster. 2000. Threshold effects and neighborhood change. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 20,146 - 162. Sampson, Robert J., and Janet Lauritsen. 1990. Deviant lifestyles, proximity to crime, and the offender-victim link in personal violence. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 27,110-139. Sampson, Robert J. and W. Bryon Groves. 1989. Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social-Disorganization Theory. American Journal of Sociology, 94, 774-802. Schelling, Thomas. 1972. The process of residential segregation: Neighborhoods tipping. In Anthony Pascal (Ed), Racial discrimination in economic life (pp. 157184). Lexington, MA: D.C. Health. . 1978. Micromotives and macrobehavior. New York: Norton. Warner, Barbara D. and Pamela Wilcox Rountree. 1997. Local Social Ties in a Community and Crime Model: Questioning the Systemic Nature of Informal Social Control. Social Problems, 44, 520-536. Welsh, Wayne, Jack Greene, and Patricia Jenkins. 1999. School disorder: The influence of individual, institutional, and community factors. Criminology, 37, 601 643. Welsh, Wayne, Robert Stokes, and Jack Greene. 2000. A Macro-Level Model of School Disorder. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 37, 243 - 283. Wilson, William J., and Richard P. Taub. 2006. There Goes the Neighborhood: Racial, Ethnic, and Class Tensions in Four Chicago Neighborhoods and their Meaningfor America. Alfred A. Knopf.

243