Cutting to the Chase: Carl Schmitt and Hans Blumenberg on Political Theology and Secularization

Pini Ifergan
The term political theology conceptualizes an attempt to rediscover and expose the theological dimension entwined within the fabric of politics. Political theology must be understood against the backdrop of the common perception of the political in the modern era, at least since the publication of Thomas Hobbess Leviathan in 1651. On this view, among the distinctive features of the political are its complete independence from any and all lofty theological notions and, conversely, its preoccupation with the here and now. This effort to reexpose the relations of dependence between the theological and political does not entail moving theology or religion back to the center of human existencea position that these beliefs lost after the profound changes in the modern Wests understanding of the world and humanity. Needless to say, religion has not disappeared in the modern epoch, and its place on the pedestal has indeed been subsequently restored. Be that as it may, the motivation for clarifying the relations of dependence between the theological and the political is not religious, but emerged from within modern political and legal thought itself, as it endeavored to answer the following question: to what extent is modern political theory based on or independent of the theological realm? The philosopher most closely identified with elucidating the modern attributes of the political is Carl Schmitt (18881985). In Political Theology
New German Critique 111, Vol. 37, No. 3, Fall 2010 DOI 10.1215/0094033X-2010-018 2010 by New German Critique, Inc.

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(1922), Schmitt formulated political theologys principal argument: All the quintessential concepts of the theory of the modern state are secularized theological concepts.1 From a normative standpoint, this statement can be interpreted as a neutral observation. In other words, rather than make a principled judgment, Schmitt merely points to a conceptual analogy or resemblance between the underlying theoretical principles of the modern state and those of Christian theology. That said, this succinct sentence can just as easily be read as a normative observation on the question of modernitys liberation from the legacy of theological thought. In fact, this statementand political theology in generalhas drawn criticism from both adherents of theological worldviews and those committed to the tenets of modernity. The former lash out at the attempts to eviscerate political thought of what they believe to be its rudimentary theological content, whereas the standard-bearers of modernity bemoan the absence of a political theory that is radical enough to completely extricate itself from the grips of the religious worldview. Schmitt is chiefly responsible for the ambiguity over political theologys fundamental position, as he persistently refrained from spelling out his motives. In consequence, the normative ramifications of his position remain an open question. This veil of uncertainty does not emanate solely from Schmitts position, however, as his oeuvre clearly points to his theological leanings. The ambiguity also stems from a broader and more principled issue, which is well reflected in Schmitts position: the view of modern consciousness as a self-contained and self-derived system of well-defined norms that strive for self-justification. Only through this unique form of justification will modern self-consciousness be able to reaffirm that it is an all-inclusive system of norms and absolutely distinct from the Christian theological framework, which the founders of modernity saw themselves as breaking away from. This fundamental objective, which has yet to be attained, has accompanied the Wests intellectual history since long before the appearance of Schmitts theologicalpolitical thesis. However, the latter molded this entire issue into a particular form that sets it apart from its previous manifestations. Schmitts approach is unique for two reasons. To begin with, when Political Theology first came out, the trenchant Nietzschean critique of the origins of modern consciousness and, above all, Max Webers sociological-historical characterization of the modern eras social and political institutions were already in the background. More specifically, Friedrich Nietzsche and Weber had substantially deflated the self-confident attitude of modernitys defenders
1. Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 57.

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who were certain that modern consciousness was a historical phase in which humanity had cast off the shackles of the Christian theological worldview. The second reason is much more local. Schmitt wrote his seminal works (Political Theology included) during the nascent stages of the Weimar Republic. The founding of the new political order on the ruins of the imperial government in the immediate aftermath of Germanys defeat in World War I triggered an extensive discussion on the fledgling regimes stability and strength, or lack thereof. Schmitt adopted a critical line toward the new government. Focusing on the concept of sovereignty, he claimed that it had lost some of its validity because of the inherent ambiguity over who holds the decisionmaking power in the Weimar Republic. It was in this highly tangible context that political theologys underlying principlethat secularized theological concepts undergird the theory of the modern statecame into being. This position allowed Schmitt to launch a lucid discussion on sovereignty, which he iden tified with the age-old theological belief in a divine ruler. The concept of sovereigntys legitimacy, in Schmitts view, can be rehabilitated only if we assume that there is a succession between the terminology of Christian theology and that of the modern state. Put differently, his secularization argument must be understood primarily as a way to shore up the sovereignty of governments (most notably the Weimar Republic) in the modern political sphere, so that they may overcome their inherent instability. However, the specific political context of Schmitts argument eventually took a backseat to the discussion on secularization, especially in all that concerned modernitys demand to view itself as a new historical epoch, which derives its legitimacy from itself, alone. While the history-of-ideas movement, which jettisons central ideas in favor of the marginal, partly contributed to this shift to a much wider context, it was primarily the result of the deep rupture that beset the modern West because of, among other events, the Weimar Republics collapse and its replacement with a totalitarian government. These events rendered the discussion on sovereignty, certainly in all that concerns Schmitts local points of emphasis, irrelevant and even illegitimate (Schmitt was personally involved with the Nazi regime). Instead, the desire to explain the deep rupture caused by the horrors of World War II spurred on the need to analyze the ideological origins as well as question the legitimacy of modern consciousness. This imperative was manifest in works as varied as Dialectic of Enlightenment, by Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno (1944), and Meaning of History, by Karl Lwith (1949). As part of this same discourse, Hans Blumenberg (192096) proposed The Legitimacy of the Modern Age in 1966. Blumenbergs vantage point is unique in that it seems completely detached from the discussion in which the

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consciousness of the crisis plays a major role and also in his innovative focus on demonstrating that secularization was not a factor in the advent of modern consciousness. Blumenberg clearly distinguishes his own work from the criticism on modernity. In so doing, he situates himself in a unique position. Blumenbergs emphasis on the dynamics that spawned the change, while emphatically ignoring its ramifications, led him to focus his criticism on those schools of thought that held that secularization is the key to understanding the workings of the historical dynamic. According to Blumenberg, this explanation is inappropriate for modernity and is based on a misunderstanding of its very nature. But Blumenbergs overt effort to distance himself from the critical-normative discussion on modernity means not that his position lacks a normative dimension but that it merely disguises it. In Blumenberg ian thought, the modern eras normative obligation may be ascertained from the account of the dynamics of historical change, which assumes a patently modern picture of humanity and the motives behind human actions in the world. These motives are not openly declared but gradually revealed to be the components of this same account. Blumenbergs unique strategy bears a certain resemblance to the one that Schmitt adopted in his critique of modernity. Neither directly confronts the problem of modernity itself, as their views on the topic rise to the surface within the framework of the theological-political debate. The similarity between the two philosophers mode of argumentation heightens our interest in their exchange of letters. Not only does their correspondence enable us to further understand their positions, but above all it points to an unusual way to contend with the problem of modernity. By refusing to place themselves in the seat of either the theologian (Schmitt) or the advocate of the Enlightenment (Blumenberg), both philosophers deviate from the standard framework wherein the contours of the debate between the supporters and detractors of modernity are clear-cut. Instead, the two correspondents reevaluate these positions and alter their meaning while nevertheless remaining within the boundaries of the important discussion on modern consciousness. Blumenberg initiated the correspondence with Schmitt, which ran between 1971 and 1978 and was published in 2007.2 In the first letter, from March 1971, Blumenberg ascribed his decision to solicit his colleague to a
2. Alexander Schmitz and Marcel Lepper, eds., Hans Blumenberg Carl Schmitt Briefwechsel, 19711978, und weitere Materialien (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2007). The letters appear on 10358. All references to the correspondence between Schmitt and Blumenberg are to this book and are cited as Briefwechsel. References to the further materials included in this volume are cited as Materialien.

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strong urge aroused by Schmitts criticism of The Legitimacy of the Modern Age.3 Schmitts comments appeared in the appendix to his own work Politische Theologie II, published in 1970, four years after the first edition of Blumenbergs book.4 What transformed Blumenbergs strong urge into action was the encouragement of Rainer Specht, a close associate of both scholars; Specht assured Blumenberg that the elder philosopher was amenable to such an overture.5 As the letter reveals, Spechts nudge was necessary not only because of Blumenbergs understandable fear lest his gesture be ignored or deemed inappropriate by Schmitt, whom he held in the highest regard, but also because of the singular potency of the critique. Blumenberg informed Schmitt that he normally considered it improper for the criticized to respond in kind to the critic, but he felt the need to make an exception this time around because Schmitts words had particularly innervated (innerviet) him. While heeding the pitfalls of overanalysis, it would appear as though Blumenbergs use of a physiological term to describe the impact of Schmitts critique was intended to set it apart from the other responses to his book, as there was indeed something in Schmitts words that aroused Blumenberg to the point where he could not resist the temptation of formulating a response. To discern the unique elements of Schmitts criticism and understand exactly why it elicited such strong feelings in its recipient, I open with a summary of Blumenbergs original stance and then describe Schmitts criticism. In 1966, some thirty years after the publication of Schmitts pamphlet Political Theology,6 Blumenbergs thick tome The Legitimacy of the Modern Age made its debut in Germany. In the books first part Blumenberg explored the varied use of secularization as a theoretical category. In so doing, he explained the deep changes in the way that human beings have come to understand themselves and their surroundings since the rise of the modern era, one of whose most prominent attributes is secularization. From the very title of the books opening partSecularization: Critique of a Category of Historical Wrong7it is clear that Blumenberg set out not only to outline the usages of
3. Hans Blumenberg, Die Legitimitt der Neuezeit (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1966); The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985). All citations refer to the English version, a rendering of the second German edition. 4. Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie II: Die Legende von der Erledigung jeder politischen Theologie (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1970). Subsequent quotations are my translations. 5. Schmitz and Lepper, the editors, expatiate on the chain of events that led to the correspondence between the two in the epilogue to the exchange of letters; see Briefwechsel, 250300, esp. 252. 6. Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie (Munich: Duncker und Humblot, 1934); see also Political Theology. 7. Blumenberg, Legitimacy, 3.

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the secularization category in various contexts of religious knowledge but to shed light on the categorys normative elements, which transcend its ostensibly neutral role. Although Blumenberg joined others in exposing the exploitation of the secularization category, his work is unique in that it does not accuse those philosophers who availed themselves of this category of consciously attempting to undermine the justification of the new historical age. According to Blumenberg, their efforts should not be attributed to a preconceived normative motive. Instead, they should be understood as the result of a neutral theoretical consideration that pertains to the nature of the historical period, especially in all that concerns the changes that it has reputedly ushered in. Deeming the historical-conceptual category of secularization one of the causes behind the genesis of the modern age essentially delegitimizes the notion that it is indeed a new epoch, for it lends credence to what Blumenberg referred to as a quasicultural debt of the new historical age to its predecessor. In Blumenbergs estimation, this claim can be refuted only if secularization is perceived as a reoccupation of the position held by the religious-theological outlook, whereby completely new ideas supplanted the old context, as opposed to a process of copying extant religious-theological notions into a new format that preserves the original content. Thus Blumenberg contended that the historical transition to the modern era consisted of the evisceration of the old content and then the appropriation of the vacated framework on the part of new elements, thereby giving rise to what is deemed a new epoch. In contrast to the use of the secularization category by the critics of modernity, which Blumenberg considered a travesty, the legitimacy that he demanded for the new age was presented as the minimal criteria for inaugurating something new, even if that same phenomenon is notand can never besomething created ex nihilo. This extremely brief summary of The Legitimacy of the Modern Age focuses on the projects complex and nebulous normative standing. Blumenberg launched his attempts to dispense with the normative vagueness, or at least explain it, in the second (1974) edition, as part of his effort to respond to the various critiques of the first edition. As noted, one critic who forced Blumenberg to amend his first version was undoubtedly Schmitt, whose philosophy focuses on the modern states legal system. The nature and magnitude of Schmitts criticism are somewhat surprising, given that Blumenberg hitherto referred to his work only in passing; to wit, in the first edition Schmitt is but one in a long line of philosophers for whom secularization is a fundamental category in their analysis of the modern era. Nonetheless, Blumenberg probably viewed Schmitt from the outset as one of the more prominent thinkers to embrace the secularization category unequivocally. For example, in Political

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Theology Schmitt asserted that all the significant concepts of the modern doctrine of the state are secularized theological concepts.8 In the epilogue to Politische Theologie II, however, Schmitt contended that Blumenbergs failure to distinguish between his own unique use of this category and that of the other cited scholars had led Blumenberg to misunderstand his theologicalpolitical thesis and the role that secularization fills therein. More specifically, Blumenberg failed to distinguish Schmitts position from those motivated by ambiguous metaphysics and thus depicted his view superficially. Schmitt also surveyed some of the positions espoused by the other philosophers targeted by Blumenberg, such as the correlation between the notion of modern progress and the messianic-eschatological impulse in monotheistic theology, or the view that Western rationalism in its modern form incarnates the religious praxis of asceticism. In characterizing these views as metaphysical, Schmitt partly accepted Blumenbergs criticism of the secularization category, whereby the latter homed in on the metaphysical premise that underpins the enduring historical substance that the secularization category undertakes to explain, including certain modifications it underwent. Nevertheless, Schmitt endeavored to show why Blumenbergs inclusion of his work in this category was misguided. As far as Schmitt was concerned, his own use of the category is predicated on a highly specialized tradition of the theory of state and law according to which the transition between its first and second phases, which are based on the Catholic Churchs interpretation of this theory and Ius Publicum Europeum (the international European law or order), respectively, entail the secularization of one stage in the terms of the other. Schmitt assumed that this shift pertains to the rewriting of the international rules of war and constituted the primary historical venue in which the coming of the new era played itself out. In other words, the transition to modernity released humanity from the theological context in which these laws were previously understood. In both Politische Theologie II and his personal letter to Blumenberg, Schmitt directed his readers attention to Alber ico Gentili, the renowned international law scholar (15521608). According to Schmitt, Gentilis exhortation that theologians should keep quiet about a matter outside your fieldthat is, the field of historymarked the threshold of the new era. At this early juncture in the debate, Schmitt already proved an extremely ironic critic who, at least to some extent, was inclined to assume a self-induced navet. For example, Schmitt made use of Blumenbergs own terms to describe
8. Schmitt, Political Theology, 36.

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the dawn of the new age, which the former considered a process of reoccupying the position of the erstwhile rules of war with those practiced in the modern era. The evocation of Gentilis command also contained a bit of nuanced irony, as immediately after the citation Schmitt alluded to the fact that Gentili was a contemporary of Giordano Bruno, who was also persecuted by the Inquisition. What is more, Bruno was cast as a leading protagonist in Blumenbergs account of the rise of the modern era. In resorting to irony, Schmitt apparently sought to point to the propinquity between his and Blumenbergs positions by distancing his theory from the other objects of his correspondents criticism and by taking the trouble to hint at the structural resemblance between his own line of thought and the Blumenbergian alternative. In other words, Schmitt adopted this approach to blunt the sting of his critics assault and to cloak himself in a shroud of navet as if something had been imputed to him that he neither intended nor had the power to do. Schmitt thus presented himself as having been falsely pegged as a member of the camp that aspires to undermine the efforts to distinguish modernity from the previous epoch. This critical irony and self-induced navet that he brought to bear on his polemic with Blumenberg can hardly be considered chance strategies of a master rhetorician of Schmitts caliber; they were calculated to serve a highly specific purposeto safeguard and justify Schmitts theological-political categorywhich constitutes a mainstay of his entire philosophy. In fact, Schmitt expressly noted that his decision to lock horns with the Blumenbergian enterprise stemmed from the fact that he considered it the most updated and nontheological attempt to render his theological-political category superfluous:
This book positions the nonabsolute as an absolute and undertakes to scientifically negate every political theology. The negation is understood to be scientific only from the standpoint of a scientific term that is free of all remnants of continued influence, or reoccupation, on the part of the redemption gospel, which, for its part, is valid only within a religion that positions itself as absolute. That same reoccupation, which preserved a link to that same theology, is perceived by him [Blumenberg] as merely a tragic debt to eras past. The tireless efforts to cancel that same debt are attributed to the worldliness of the new age, which was eviscerated theologically, and it remains the ongoing critical mission of modernity.9

Accordingly, Schmitt devised two approaches for contending with Blumenbergs project. The first, ostensibly neutral, points to the methodological
9. Schmitt, Politische Theologie II, 85.

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resemblance between their stances, whereas the second considers Blumenbergs work a frontal attack on the conceptual standing of his political theology. These two strategies indicate the ambiguity that informs Schmitts own position: the dual commitment to a supposedly neutral scientific objective versus his largely normative and theological outlook. Schmitt and Blumenbergs dialectics inevitably lead us to ask whether political theology is indeed a neutral category that explains the changes the theory of law and state underwent during the transition to the modern era through, among other things, an analogy between political theology itself, or the Christian theory of law and state, and modernity. Alternatively, perhaps any understanding of the modern era must preserve a Christian-theological dimension, for any explanationand perhaps justificationof the modern era that lacks this element is bound to be wanting, if not defective. The polemic between the two philosophers provides us with an opportunity to dissipate the cloud of ambiguity surrounding the theological-political category. Schmitt projected the general debate over this issue onto the Blumenbergian enterprise by exposing the fact that behind his correspondents so-called neutral explanation for the genesis of the new era, which Blumenberg refrained from couching in terms of the secularization category, stands an unequivocally antitheological motive. In so doing, Schmitt affirmedboth de jure and de factothe existence of a strong theological impetus behind the theological-political category, even if it was broached solely as an analogous explanation for the rise of the new historical era. In addition, Schmitt contrived to trap Blumenberg in his own problematics and compelled him to take part in the theological debate over the enduring presence of Christianity in the political-public sphere. For the most part, Schmitt conducted this polemic with theologians who assumed that the political-theology category should be removed from the public discourse on account of the distinction they drew between the divine and temporal city, as well as the theological realms inherent incompatibility with politics. Conversely, the dialectic with Blumenberg over secularization was waged on an entirely different front. Blumenberg mainly pitted himself against critics of modernity who contended that the new era is still in thrall to the conceptual frameworks of Christian theology. After being dragged into the fray by Schmitt, Blumenbergwho joined others in contending that modernity has been remarkably successful in detaching itself from its Christian rootsfound himself lumped together with those same theologians whom his interlocutor accused of undermining the validity of the theological-political category. In so doing, Schmitt basically positioned himself, once more, among

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those who believed that modernity has failed to extricate itself from its theological origins. In fact, he apparently found confirmation for his view in Blumenbergs assumption that an intentional effort was being, or had been, waged to oust religion from the public sphere. For his part, Blumenberg deemed Schmitt and his ilk his sworn ideological enemies, so that it was incumbent on him to dispel their persistent theologically motivated attempts to undermine the legitimacy of the modern age. In sum, Schmitt sought to lure Blumenberg into the debate, while Blumenberg entered the fray of his own volition. Thereafter the two philosophers began to gather evidence for the ongoing struggle between the proponents of monotheistic theology and the proponents of the modernist worldview (including the conceptual framework that the latter is predicated on), even though members of both sides claimed that the struggle had already been decided or had never actually taken place. Blumenbergs willingness to participate in the debate within the confines of Schmitts ambiguous framework is evident from his very first letter. Blumenberg unreservedly accepted Schmitts contention that he had compartmentalized the latters usage of the secularization category together with that of other philosophers and had failed to discern its uniqueness. Notwithstanding his acceptance of Schmitts criticism, Blumenberg did not, at least in this particular letter, explain how he understood his addressees use of the category to be different from the rest. Instead, he undertook, in this of all contexts, to disclose the dynamics that led him to the concept of legitimation. It turns out that what made Blumenberg reassess the historical change in terms of reoccupying or reconquering the position was the desire not to defend the new epoch but to uncover the element of illegitimacy that was latent in its various detractors use of the secularization category. Only by dint of this new understanding could he consider the possibility of tying secularization to legitimation. In his first letter to Schmitt, Blumenberg described the meteoric rise of this concept within the context of attempting to convey the utter contingency of the legitimation argument as strange and almost paradoxical.10 More specifically, it did not derive from an established conceptual system, according to Blumenberg, but is among the arbitrary results of the dynamics of historical change. The objective behind this brief genealogy of the Blumenbergian concept of legitimation was to muster a riposte against Schmitts contention that Blumenbergs use of the term legitimacy was misleading and the suggestion that his true intention was to argue on behalf of the new ages legality. Schmitt showed that the terms usage contains a bona fide historical dimension in which the
10. Briefwechsel, 105.

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present is considered a legitimate successor of the past if it fulfills certain conditions of succession that render the transition legitimate or justified. However, this sort of justification model is obviously predicated on an interpretation that preserves the idea of a succession between past and present. Schmitt argued that this was not the justification that Blumenberg was referring to. According to Schmitt, Blumenberg essentially advocated a rational justification model whereby the modern eras legitimacy derives from a system of unbending and historically self-contained laws, so that the epochs adherence to the law is the sole criterion for its standing. In crafting this argument, Schmitt endeavored to lure Blumenberg into becoming another representative of modernity who sought to justify the epoch by trumpeting it as the Age of Enlightenmentan era that, from a historical standpoint, embodies reasons perennial and mandatory system of laws. Although Schmitt indeed pushed in this direction to position himself as a champion of the Enlightenment and enemy of religion, his primary objective was to thwart Blumenbergs criticism concerning the use of the secularization category. By claiming that Blumenbergs concept of legitimation essentially refers to legalization, Schmitt could argue that the legalization of the modern age is merely a secularized reincarnation of the theological idea of the law. Blumenberg was well aware of Schmitts tactics and knew that the short genealogy was meant to be the first step toward a possible answer. His comprehensive response would have to wait, however, until the expanded second edition of The Legitimacy of the Modern Age appeared in 1974: The objection that under the title of legitimacy, what I was concerned about was only legality, puts in question the status of the books problematic and its thesis as historical. As a criticism this could hardly be stronger.11 Blumenberg insisted that his proffered conception of legitimation should be considered a historical category or, more accurately, a category that arises from an understanding of historical dynamics rather than a logical or temporary antecedent to the actual historical event. His firm stance should be viewed as a conscious attempt to distinguish his theory from those aimed at justifying the Enlightenment and from those premised on the fact that the only substitute for this line of thinking is to return to the theological apologetics of yesteryear, namely, the position that was the object of criticism of the Enlightenments supporters. In claiming that Blumenbergs concept of legitimation refers exclusively to legalization, Schmitt
11. Blumenbergs criticism of Politische Theologie II appears in the second edition of Legitimitt, published in 1974. It is concentrated in the chapter Political Theology I and II. See Legitimacy, 96.

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sought to trap the former in a pincer movement, which would force him either to adopt the outlook of the Enlightenment, so that he could accuse Blumenberg of essentially being interested in the self-empowerment of man,12 which testifies to the fact that human reason is the only source of justification, or to acknowledge the huge debt that the modern era owes to the same theological forms of justification that Blumenberg sought to extricate himself from, lest he be accused of what Schmitt described as a form of justification whose immanent characteristic is that of autism. However, Schmitt turned a blind eye to a third option whereby that same self-empowermentor what Blumenberg referred to as self-assertion and self-determinationis an inherently historical reaction, which assumed the form of an enduring (atemporal and ahistorical) set of laws and is to be conceived as a replacement for the earlier explanatory framework. Insofar as Blumenberg was concerned, the emphasis need not be on the self-depiction of that same system but on the specific historic function that it fulfilleda function that can be defined in terms of self-assertion and self-determination.13 In his own detailed account of the genesis of the new age (a topic beyond the purview of the present article), Blumenberg explained why this rational system, which derives from the individual himself or herself, is essentially a historical reaction to the implosion of the theological system. The reason behind Schmitts misunderstanding of the unique alternative that Blumenberg introduced is twofold. He ignored its existence and overemphasized the self-characterization of that rational systema description putatively unconnected to the historical conditions that paved the way for that system. Blumenberg portrays Schmitts oversight thus:
Self-assertion determines the radicalness of reason, not its logic. An extreme pressure toward self-assertion gave rise to the idea of the epoch as a selffoundation . . . that emerges from nothing. It must seem paradoxical to Carl Schmitt that the legitimacy of an epoch is supposed to consist in its discontinuity in relation to its pre-history, and this paradox prevents him from thinking that anything else could be at issue but mere legality vis--vis a hypostatized reason that decrees positive law.14

Schmitts misunderstanding of Blumenbergs conceptual alternative also prevented him from appreciating the difficulties that pertain to secularization,
12. Schmitt, Materialien, 39. 13. Blumenberg, Legitimacy, 97. 14. Ibid.

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for he basically viewed it as a means for legitimation. As a result, Schmitt approached the historical past as a source for reorienting and thereby stabilizing contemporary reality, which seems on the brink of collapsing into a rudderless state of serendipity, by maintaining its connection with that same past. According to Schmitt, the secularization category fosters legitimacy for the new historical state of affairs by deeming it an indivisible part of the ongoing construction of a historical identity whose attendant transitions are similarly characterized and justified by secularization. Assuming that this sort of historical identity renders secularization into a particularly attractive category insofar as legitimation is concerned, as it engenders the requisite succession for contemplating a historical identity that negates the possibility of a radical new. In fact, it is this very negation that exposed the stratum of illegitimacy in the category of secularization. Schmitt was careful not to disclose the defining attributes of his version of historical identity. Instead, he preferred to undermine the claim for a new age by pointing to the inherent absurdity of attempting to create anything ex nihilo. From Schmitts vantage point, it was clear that there exists a something whose multifarious reincarnations or phases can be tied to a single identity, which will constitute the source for explaining the change. In addition, that same something will impart meaning to the exceptional or aberrant. This is of utmost importance to Schmitts hypothesis because in the absence of that identity, the aberrant is bound to constitute a lingering threat to the systems stability. At this juncture, it is worth asking whether Schmitts concept of identity is akin to god, a metaphysical substance, existence itself, or whoever embodies the principle that the sovereign is who decided on the exception at any given moment.15 Or perhaps it is a dichotomous pair, such as friendfoe or sealand, whose constituent parts express that same identity in concert. To anyone who reads Schmitts writings, he clearly oscillated between these possibilities. Be that as it may, the present article is not the venue to decide which option is best suited to Schmitts stance or best conveys the relationship of these antitheses. Yet Schmitts deep commitment to this sort of concept of identity, which in his estimation stands at the heart of historical events, is what essentially sets his position apart from that of Blumenberg. Blumenberg, who is considerably more skeptical as to whether there is such an identity, replaces it with a functional constraint that recognizes the need for a system which confers order and significance. But Blumenbergs system is not intrinsically tied to any claim of identity. The quest to validate the modern era does not entail the need to justify the attempt to reveal the essence
15. Schmitt, Political Theology, 5.

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of human rationality, the system of order, or the ultimate meaning of existence. Moreover, it does not express the zenith of the historical or theological process but merely contends that the new historical epoch is a legitimate and unique framework for coping with the ineluctable demand for order and meaning. It was Schmitt, of all people, who concisely phrased Blumenbergs intentions in the concluding paragraph of his 1942 book Land and Sea: Human trepidation of the new is frequently as great as the trepidation from the void, even when the new is . . . [aimed at] overcoming . . . the void. Therefore, many see but an incomprehensible lack of order upon hearing the ring of the new understood.16 In fact, Blumenberg advocated this very definition on chronicling how the new era came into being and humanitys efforts to cope with the disappearance of a meaningful order by instituting a new one that derives from the individual. As such, this solution endows the new order with a legitimation not dependent on the previous one. According to Schmitt, this transition to a new framework proceeds through an apparent void and is constantly reined in by erstwhile phases, which infiltrate the present system and provide the framework for crafting a new meaning and order. Notwithstanding its novelty, the modern age is not incommensurate with either the past or its forms. In light of the above, must we assume the existence of an enduring identity to contend that this sort of transition from old to new indeed transpired? Does every change basically consist of reappareling an existing identity? The fact that the debate between Schmitt and Blumenberg ultimately came down to this fundamental metaphysical issue can be gleaned from two subsequent stages of their correspondence, wherein Blumenberg assumed the lead in trying to pinpoint the differences between them. In the same epilogue to Politische Theologie II, containing Schmitts original critique of Blumenberg, the former put forward an interpretation to the epigraph of the fourth part of Goethes autobiography, Poetry and Truth. The epigraph states that nemo contra deum nisi deus ipse (no one can stand against a god unless he is a god himself).17 Although Goethes aphorism reflects on a notion of a unity, it leaves more than enough room for the possibility of an embedded dualism. For Schmitt, this passage must be understood in a theological-political context. In other words, it contains a kernel of instability or friction that is liable to alter
16. Carl Schmitt, Land und Meer: Eine weltgeschichtliche Betrachtung, 3rd ed. (Cologne: Hohenheim, 1981), 107; my translation. 17. See Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, From My Life: Poetry and Truth, in The Collected Works, ed. Thomas P. Saint and Jeffery L. Sammons, trans. Robert R. Heitner, vol. 5 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).

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the sense of that same unity. (Schmitt used the Latin transcription of the Greek word stasis to describe a state of political unrest, disobedience, or civil war. However, he noted that in Greek dictionaries this meaning is but a secondary definition to the first: an inherent state of harmony or stability.) According to Schmitt, Goethes statement harbors the expression theology that turned into stasisology.18 Put differently, even though the statement was penned by a consummately modern thinker, it constitutes yet another manifestation of the deep bond between the theological and political. Schmitt attributed his interest in tracking down the mysterious origins of this epigraph not only to philological curiosity but to a discussion he participated in on the concept of the enemy in the political thought of Carl von Clausewitz, against the backdrop of the military theorists struggle against Napolon. In attempting to distinguish Clausewitzs concept of enemy from that of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Schmitt analyzed Goethes aphorism from a theological-political standpoint. Moreover, Schmitt took the trouble to underscore the political relevance of the discussion on Goethes epigraph by noting that in many private conversations during the [Second World War], many people well versed in Goethe quoted and interpreted this aphorism.19 Needless to say, this context explains why Schmitt was interested in tracing the epigraphs lineage to a theological source, as he was eager to attribute another theological-political statement to a venerated figure who is widely considered not to have taken sides in the debate over political theology. While the epigraphs political context revolves around Napolon and his conquests of the cities of Germany, Schmitt posited that its theological element derives from a fragment of Jakob Michael Reinhold Lenzs unfinished play, Catherine of Sienna.20 Schmitt cites a few lines from the play as evidence that it is indeed the epigraphs theological source:
My Father looked at me threateningly, Like a loving, aggrieved God. But if he had reached out both his handsGod against God! [She draws a small crucifix from her bosom and kisses it, promising herself to the other God.] Save me, rescue me, my Jesus, whom I follow, from his arms!21
18. Schmitt, Materialien, 47. 19. Schmitt, Politische Theologie II, 94. 20. For some time Lenz was among the frequent guests in Goethes home. 21. See Jakob Michael Reinhold Lenz, Werke und Schriften, ed. Britta Titel and Hellmut Haug, vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Goverts, 1966), 435. For an English translation, see Hans Blumenberg, Work on Myth, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), 534.

164 Schmitt and Blumenberg on Political Theology

To Schmitt, the connection is so obvious that he did not even bother to elaborate on why this passage should be viewed as an expression, much less the origin, of Goethes epigraph. This omission obviously warrants criticism, but it is peripheral to the debate with Blumenberg. The crux of Schmitts argument lies in the need for a theological key to unlock the mystery surrounding the position of Goethe, who can hardly be suspected of religious fanaticism. If Goethe indeed espoused this view, it would bolster the argument that the theological dimension cannot be dislodged and can even be found in decidedly political contexts. The presence of a theological matter at the heart of a historicopolitical situation reinforces the argument that an underlying theological basis is requiredbe it consciously or notto understand the political, and the theological may very well serve as the basis of its meaning. Schmitt subsequently quotes from a conversation between Goethe and Chancellor Friedrich von Mueller on October 10, 1823, which Goethe documented in his diary: His doctrine with respect to the divinity of Jesus, Goethe wrote, is in need of a despotism, perhaps even more than despotism needs it.22 Although Schmitt cited this passage to soften the impression that Goethe was ambivalent toward Christian theology, it apparently encapsulated his own theological-political position. As noted, Blumenbergs concerted effort to plumb the differences between himself and Schmitt commenced in his very first letter to his critic. Blumenberg mentioned how surprised he was to find that they both independently sought to interpret and track down the source of Goethes cryptic epigraph. But in contrast to Schmitts Christological exegesis, Blumenberg offered a polytheistic reading that revolves around the image of the rebellious god Prometheus. Blumenberg took the trouble (perhaps for the sake of showing his correspondent that they shared a similar point of departure and his interest in Goethes epigraph served no ulterior motive) to inform Schmitt that he had first tackled Goethes aphorism a year before the publication of Schmitts book (in a conversation with Gershom Scholem and Hans Georg Gadamer). The premise behind Blumenbergs interpretation is rather straightforward and is connected to the fact that toward the end of the third part (the installment before the epigraph), Goethe discussed a scandal that was prompted by his Ode to Prometheus and that subsequently gave rise to the so-called pantheism polemics (whose main protagonists were Gotthold Ephraim Lessing and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi). In Goethes words, the ode was the tinder for an explosion which revealed and brought to discussion the most
22. See the citation that Schmitt quotes in Politische Theologie II, 96.

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secret concerns of worthy men, concerns which, unknown even to them, slumbered in an otherwise very enlightened society.23 Controversy aside, within the narrow scope of Schmitt and Blumenbergs relationship, I am more concerned with how the latter used the polytheistic context to undermine Schmitts theological-political interpretation that is dependent on a strong principle of identity. Blumenberg appears to argue that the riddle of Goethes aphorism yields to a polytheist reading that allows for the rise of a new order that, unlike Schmitts position, is not limited to modifying a single, strong identity that appears in different guises. Instead, the era is forged either by a struggle between separate forces or by the petering out of one force and the emergence of another from the ruins of the former. Even in the absence of a detailed explanation or justification for his interpretation, Blumenbergs mobilization behind a polytheistic reading of that epigraph constitutes, among other effects, an assault on the underlying premise of Schmitts political theology and its monotheistic Christian context. As such, Blumenberg assumesand Schmitt was in no rush to deny itthat the sense of succession from a past epoch is manifest only under the assumptions of monotheistic theology, whereas the shift to a polytheistic mind-set pulls the ground out from beneath the theologicalpolitical category and its instrument of implementationthe category of secularization. As opposed to Schmitt and his Christological rendering, Blumenberg apparently adopts the explanation that Goethe himself gave for his excitement over what the latter referred to as the poetic figure of Prometheus, which he contrasted with Satan, the poetic figure of the monotheistic theological tradition:24
The Titans are the foil to polytheism, just as the devil can be viewed as the foil to monotheism. But neither the latter nor the One God to whom he stands in contrast is a poetic figure. Miltons Satan . . . remains in a disadvantageously subaltern position as he attempts to destroy the splendid creation of a superior Being. Prometheus, on the other hand, has the advantage of being able to create and form in defiance of higher beings. Also, it is a beautiful thought, one appropriate for poetry, to have human beings created, not by the supreme ruler of the world, but by a lesser figure who, however, is sufficiently worthy and important to do this because he is a scion of the oldest dynasty.25
23. Goethe, Poetry and Truth, 469. 24. Blumenberg eventually turned this issue into the main topic of his book on myths, which also refers, albeit briefly, to the polemic with Schmitt. See Hans Blumenberg, Arbeit am Mythos (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979). For an English translation, see Work on Myth. 25. Goethe, Poetry and Truth, 46970.

166 Schmitt and Blumenberg on Political Theology

The second occasion on which Blumenberg sought to underscore the differences between himself and Schmitt took place after a three-year silence between the two in the aftermath of their initial exchange. In a relatively long letter, Blumenberg responded to an article penned by Schmitt, The Three Phases of Providing Historical Understanding, which the latter attached to one of his letters.26 Like the correspondence on Goethes epigraph, the two philosophers availed themselves of this opportunity to demarcate more sharply their positions. What is more, the article introduced Lwith to the mix. Lwiths work, especially his book Meaning in History, played a central role in Blumenbergs decision to embark on a treatise on modernity in the first place.27 It also had a significant impact on the theological-political theory of Schmitt, who praised and made direct reference to Meaning in History in the abovenoted article. The books well-known theory, which has long become a mainstay in the theoretical discourse of the history of ideas, posits that the modern phenomenon of the philosophy of history should be understood as a later, secularized incarnation of the Judeo-Christian eschatological outlook. Of course, this theory further enhanced Schmitts theological-political position, as his contribution to the theory of the modern state seems in keeping with Lwiths contribution to the historical-ideological sphere, which undergirds the discourse of modern consciousness. However, this substantive resemblance between Lwiths and Schmitts thought does not extend to their motivations. Although Lwiths theory debunks the modern camps pretension for autonomy and liberation from its theological origins, Lwith did not espouse this view in the name of either theology or secularized modernity. Instead, he wielded this theory against both schools of thought on the premise that modern consciousness can be explained only from a theological standpoint; that is, it is deeply indebted to the eschatological idea. In contrast, Schmitts case against modernity appears to focus on its adherents inherently false pretenses of detaching themselves from their theological roots, which Lwith revealed in his book. Schmitt averred that this can be remedied if modernity recognized its debt to its theological past. By dint of Lwiths fundamental historical distinction between circular (Greek-pagan) and linear (Judeo-Christian) time, Schmitt put forward his own characterization of historical consciousness, which informed his own day and age. More specifically, Schmitt asseverated
26. Carl Schmitt, Drei Stufen historischer Sinngebung, Universitas: Zeitschrift fr Wissenschaft und Literatur 8 (1950): 92530. 27. The book was originally written in English and published in the United States; see Karl Lwith, Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949).

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that time is neither circular nor eschatological but is entirely limited to the individual who presents and determines the meaning of historical time and constantly transforms it into a framework of meaning for himself or herself and other human beings. As such, history is no longer understood as a manifestation of either cosmic time or a divine plan; it is merely a way to bestow meaning on oneself and then apply it to or force it on others. Though Lw ith shared Schmitts view according to which historical consciousness is a later incarnation of the perception of eschatological time, the latter eschewed Lwiths conclusion that humankind must reembrace some version of circular time to avert the problematic outcome of eschatological time. To wit: Schmitt insisted that it is possible to dovetail eschatological faith to historical consciousness. It seems rather odd, however, to ascribe this view to Lwith, given that he viewed historical consciousness as a reincarnation of and dependent on eschatological faith. It is precisely at this point where the disparate motivations driving Lwith and Schmitt come to light and, for my purposes, array the former and Blumenberg against Schmitt. Lwith linked his criticism of modern historical consciousness to eschatological belief to show that at the very moment the West unfettered itself from the promise of the redemption, which heretofore had kept it in check, humankind turned into a destructive force. So long as eschatological faith was emphasized and undisputed, it had the wherewithal to prevent the advent of a historical consciousness that would distort the accepted meaning of the historicalthat is, a longing for the end of time or redemption. Schmitt, who endeavored to demonstrate that eschatological faith continues to exist within the framework of the new form of historical consciousness, insisted that a way could be found to bridge the two. With this in mind, he turned to the theological idea of the katkhon, the restrainer, which appears in Pauls Second Epistle to the Thessalonians (2:7). The bridge rests, according to Schmitt, on the image of the power that delays the apocalyptic ending and defeats evil.28 In other words, modern consciousness fills the role of the restrainer. As such, it merely delays the coming of the end; it does not go so far as to eradicate eschatological faith. Since it is the individual who imparts meaning onto history, the theological system is flexible enough to encompass this delay and even shield humankind from the collapse that Lwith warned against. In his letter to Schmitt, Blumenberg wondered if I have already managed to point out the crux of the difference between us.29 Nevertheless, he
28. Schmitt, Drei Stufen historischer Sinngebung, 929. 29. Briefwechsel, 131.

168 Schmitt and Blumenberg on Political Theology

took another stab at it by responding to Schmitts above-noted article. Unlike Schmitt, Blumenberg espoused a view somewhat reminiscent of Lwiths, whereby historical consciousness and eschatological belief are beyond reconciliation. Once again, Blumenberg undertook to justify the newmodern historical consciousnessby offering a divergent interpretation of the said katkhon. Blumenberg asked whether the postponement of the end of time and the enervation of eschatological faith remain within the same eschatological purview, or perhaps signify the abandonment of the entire outlook. He answered, in his patented style, that the modern perspective advocates not the simultaneity of history and eschatology but the inversion of their meaning. Consequently, the prospects of the redemption still retain the form of an eschatological promise, but now it entails suspending the eschatological denouement. Blumenberg offered a comprehensive interpretation of this inversion whereby the hopes for redemption were dashed time and again. In the process, the signs that were supposed to herald the beginning of the end were metamor phosed into something so atrocious that humankind was left with no choice but to stop it from coming to pass. According to Blumenberg, the katkhon is but an expression of the radicalization of the eschatological craving at this moment in history. As such, Blumenberg left the interpretation of the katkhon within the theological framework, thereby upholding his refusal to view it as the conceptual basis of historical consciousness. This notion of the radicalization of a religious concept that triggers the evisceration or disappearance of that concept, and the emergence of another one in its place, constitutes the linchpin of Blumenbergs depiction of the rise of modern consciousness. Nevertheless, his account revolves around the concept of God as an absolute power, rather than the notion of eschatological redemption. What sets this particular instance of radicalization apart from the similar process that Blumenberg believed to have transpired in the theological nominalism of the late Middle Ages is that in the latter the theological framework managed to contend with the resurgent yearnings, whereas in the Enlightenment the radicalization led to the collapse of that framework and the construction of another. Consequently, Blumenberg wrote to Schmitt that, from a conceptual standpoint, the rise of the modern consciousness must have been preceded by a marked waxing or waning of the force of eschatological paraly sis. However, its emergence could have transpired only against the backdrop of an absolute negation of the eschatological forceas opposed to a mere transformation or modificationfor otherwise it would have been capable of restraining the eschatological element. In light of the above, Blumenberg realized that Schmitt was committed to a strong concept of identity, which serves,

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among other purposes, to connect eschatological belief and historical consciousness. On the other hand, Blumenberg endorsed a much weaker, functional concept of identity that enables us to keep track of the entire process the evisceration of a framework of meaning that induced a reaction whose implications can no longer be explained in terms of that framework.30 Blumenberg elaborated on the weak identity that he advocated in the fourth part of The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, where he contended that reoccupation is the key concept for comprehending the new historical era: The concept of reoccupation designates, by implication, the minimum of identity that it must be possible to discover, or at least presuppose and to search for, in even the most agitated movement of history.31 Blumenbergs efforts notwithstanding, Schmitt was under no obligation to accept his correspondents depiction of his own position. If Schmitt indeed rejected Blumenbergs reading, we would then be forced to formulate another explanation for Schmitts insistence on finding alternative bridging or transitional categories for preserving the succession not of the historical as such but of the historical as an entity predicated on the theological. As Blumenberg argued, Schmitts notion of an unceasing effort to bridge the conceptual gap between the theological and what seeks to detach itself from the theological can be understood as a practice that assumes, and is dedicated to, a strong metaphysical notion of identity, which embodies its debt to the Christian theological worldview. However, Schmitt could have eschewed this metaphysical assumption by asserting that this commitment is merely ethicotheological and not metaphysical; in other words, it is a perspective motivated by a normative worldview in which the historicophilosophical discourse is only a means for justifying this stance. The exposure of this discussions metaphysical strata apparently stemmed, at least partly, from Schmitts inclination to keep a safe distance from the normative or theological sphere while taking advantage of conceptual analogies that fall between the theological and other areas of human endeavor. This tendency was put to the test during the correspondence with Blumenberg, who agreed to participate in the conceptual exchange according to the rules that Schmitt laid down in his initial critique. Blumenberg then proceeded to expose Schmitts underlying metaphysical point of departure by compelling Schmitt, who sought to avoid the metaphysical realm, to articulate a normative-theological commitment in its stead, which undergirds his position. The fact that this disclosure transpired during the dialogue
30. See Blumenberg to Schmitt, August 7, 1975, in Briefwechsel, 13036. 31. Blumenberg, Legitimacy, 466.

170 Schmitt and Blumenberg on Political Theology

with Blumenberg is no accident. For Blumenberg, the point of departure, which disclosed Schmitts above-noted leanings, is a conceptually neutral discourse. That said, disclosure was neither Blumenbergs express purpose nor even his intention. The normative strata naturally surfaced during the debates clarification process, at the very moment the conceptual description was jettisoned. Indeed, the correspondence shed light on Blumenbergs loyalties in equal measure. Schmitt described Blumenberg as the most cogent representative of the opposing viewpoint and was cognizant of the role his younger colleague played in elucidating his own position. Blumenberg was unwittingly cast by Schmitt in the role of the most eloquent voice of a worldview that he was not interested in championing. Schmitt, of all people, provided a succinct survey of this outlook in his initial critique of Blumenberg (i.e., the appendix to Politische Theologie II, which was the last work that Schmitt was to publish in his lifetime). Schmitt offered a lucid yet satirical look at this same worldview as early as 1918, through a fictional character named Buribunken:
I write therefore I am; I am, therefore I write. What do I write? I write myself. Who writes me? I myself. . . . What is the content of my writing? I write that I write myself. What is the principal driving force that saves me from the self-serving cycle of the I? History! If so, Im a letter in the typewriter of history; Im a letter that writes itself. Yet if we are to be precise, it is not I who writes me, but merely the letters that are me which write. However, it is through me that the global spirit perceiveswritesitself, so when I perceive my own self the global spirit is perceived. . . . In other words: I am not only the reader of world history, but . . . the one who writes it.32

It may very well be that that same innervation that Schmitts critical response aroused in his colleague was connected to Blumenbergs desire to wash his hands clean of this sort of figure, which ostensibly represented the impetus behind his attempt to bestow legitimacy on the new age. Blumenberg withstood the temptation of affiliating himself with this figure or directly renouncing it. Instead, he dug himself in behind a neutral discourse that revolves around the possibility of historical change, which at times appears to be his only commitment to modernity. In other words, the notion that this worldview possesses a clear normative dimension derives solely from his unwavering commitment to a conceptual analysis that shuns basic metaphysical assumptions, be they hidden or revealed. Nevertheless, his inability to remain completely ambivalent to the normative dimension that Schmitt had thrust on
32. Carl Schmitt, Die Buribunken, Summa: Eine Vierteljahrensschrift, 1918, 89106, esp. 103.

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his shoulders points, at the very least, to the fact that he recognized the possibility of a normative dimension, even if he sought to distance himself from it and preferred to view it as no more than the product of, rather than the reason behind, a conceptual decision. Likewise, it may be said that Blumenbergs insistence on critiquing Schmitt by emphasizing his theorys underlying metaphysical premise, instead of its conspicuous theological dimension, indicates that same desire to refrain, as much as possible, from routing the polemic onto a normative track. However, here too, Blumenbergs adamancy ultimately engendered his own commitment to the normative sphere, which may perhaps be defined as modern. This is manifest in Blumenbergs critical aversion to the notion of a strong, substantive identity that he found looming over whatever Schmitt had to say. Against this backdrop, Blumenberg refused to accept the image that Schmitt tried to foist on him of an individual creating himself and his world. In so doing, however, it soon became evident that Blumenberg cast doubt on the existence of anything that may be characterized as absolute. His refusal to recognize the existence of an absolutebe it God, humanity, existence, or the self-constitutive subject itselfis the only motive that would appear to express, albeit in an admittedly circuitous fashion, a normative commitment to modernity that may be ascribed to Blumenberg. Blumenbergs inclination to extricate and distance himself from the absolute stands in stark contradistinction to Schmitts unremitting desire to locate and reinforce the presence of that same absolute. Hence it appears that Blumenberg and Schmitt needed one another to activate the normative dimension that both were inclined to obfuscateeach in his own wayas part of a conscious effort to assume the role of the singular outsider within the framework of a discussion they were expected to take part in. Just as Schmitt accomplished this objective through the discussion on theology, Blumenberg did so in the philosophical discourse on modernity. In my estimation, the correspondence between Schmitt and Blumenberg indeed repositioned each participant in the coveted role of outsider or, at least, a unique thinker.

Cutting to the Chase: Carl Schmitt and Hans Blumenberg on Political Theology and Secularization Pini Ifergan

Is modernity a distinct historical epoch that can be radically distinguished from the one that preceded it? What are the implicit philosophical assumptions regarding our understanding of historical time that determine the sort of answer that we are inclined to give to this question? The debate between Carl Schmitt and Hans Blumenberg concerning the conceptual status of secularization as an explanatory category for the emergence of modernity provides us with a paradigmatic case that sheds light on those questions. With the recent publication of the correspondence between Schmitt and Blumenberg, I suggest in my article a reading of the debate that exposes how they use each others argument to sharpen their distinctive evaluation of modernity and its relation to Christian theology. These two arguments and their unique dynamic transcend the common ways of either defending or criticizing modernitys claim to be a distinct and legitimate historical epoch. The suggested conceptual reconstructions of the Schmitt-Blumenberg debate point to a revaluation of the terms of the quarrel over modernity, Christian theology, and the relations between them.

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