INTHECENTRALCRIMINALCOURT THEQUEEN v JOHNANTHONYDOWNEY JUDGMENT:ABUSEOFPROCESS Introduction 1. Forobviousreasons,Imakeanorderunders.4(2)oftheContemptofCourt Act1981prohibitingthereportingofthisjudgmentuntilfurtherorder.1 2. Thedefendant,whoisnowaged62(andordinarilyresidentintheRepublicof Ireland)haspleadednotguiltytofivechargesfourofmurderandoneof doinganactwithintenttocauseanexplosion.Theallegedoffencesariseout ofthenotoriousbombingcarriedoutbytheIrishRepublicanArmy(IRA)in HydePark,LondononthemorningofTuesday20July1982.

July1982.ARemote ControlImprovisedExplosiveDevicewhichcontainedabout2025poundsof commercialhighexplosivewithwirenailsasshrapnelandwashiddeninthe bootofablueMorrisMarinacar,registrationLMD657P,whichwasparkedin SouthCarriageDrive,wasdetonatedastheGuard(consistingofsixteen membersofTheBlues&RoyalsRegimentoftheHouseholdCavalryandtheir horses,accompaniedbytwomountedpoliceofficers)waspassingenroute fromKnightsbridgeBarrackstoHorseGuardsfortheChangingoftheGuard. FouroftheGuardweremurderedLieutenantAnthonyDaly,whowasaged 23,andTrooperSimonTipper,whowasaged19,diedatthescene(Counts1 &2);LanceCorporalJeffreyYoung,whowasaged19,diedthefollowingday (Count3);andSquadronQuartermasterCorporalRoyBright,whowasaged 36,diedtwodaysafterthat(Count4).Atotalof31otherpeoplewere injured(anumberofthemseriously)and7horsesweredestroyed.
FollowingtheCrowninformingtheCourton25February2014ofitsdecisionnottoseek toappealthisjudgmentMrJusticeSweeneyhasliftedallreportingrestrictionsinrelation tothiscasesaveforanorderprohibitingreportingofthedefendantsaddressbeyondthat itisDonegalandprohibitingthereportingofsuretiesaddresses.
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OnthedefendantsbehalfitissubmittedthatIshouldstaytheprosecution asbeinganabuseofprocess.Thesubmissionisadvancedonfourgrounds, namely(inbroadoutline)that: (1) Afairtrialisnolongerpossiblegiventhepassageofmorethanthirty yearssincetheevent,thefactthatanumberofsignificantwitnesses arenowdead,thefactthatkeyexhibitsareirretrievablylost,andthe existenceoffurthertrialprejudice. (2) Itwouldbeunfairforthedefendanttobetriedinthelightofthe expectationcreatedbygovernmentalstatementsthatprosecutions wouldnotbepursuedinrespectofthosewhowouldotherwise qualifyforearlyrelease(as,itiscommonground,thedefendantdid anddoes)undertheschemeprovided(inaccordancewiththeGood FridayAgreement)bytheNorthernIreland(Sentences)Act1998(the 1998Act). (3) Itwouldbeunfairforthedefendanttobetriedbecauseon20July 2007[25yearstothedayafterthebombingandunderan administrativeschemeinrelationtosocalledontheruns(OTRs) whichwasintendedtoadvancethepeaceprocessinNorthern Ireland]hewasgivenaclearwrittenassuranceonbehalfofthe SecretaryofStateforNorthernIrelandandtheAttorneyGeneralthat therewasnooutstandingdirectionforprosecutioninNorthern Irelandinrelationtohim,thattherewerenowarrantsinexistence, thathewasnotwantedinNorthernIrelandforarrest,questioning andchargebythepolice,andthatthePoliceServiceofNorthern Ireland(PSNI)werenotawareofanyinterestinhimbyanyother policeforceintheUnitedKingdom whereasinrealitythePSNIwere aware,atthetimethattheletterwasgiventohim,thathewas wantedbytheMetropolitanPoliceinrelationtotheHydePark bombing(andhadbeenalmostcontinuallysinceMay1983),andthe PSNIhadalsoappreciated,aftertheletterhadbeengiventohim,that itwasmisleadinginthatregard,butdidnothingtocorrectthe situation;andbecausethereafter,inrelianceupontheletterandto hiseventualdetriment,thedefendant(whoisaprovenstrong supporterofthepeaceprocess)travelledonanumberofoccasionsto NorthernIrelandandthemainland includingthefinalsuchoccasion when,on19May2013,hewasarrestedatGatwickAirportenroute toGreeceandwasthereafterchargedwiththeinstantoffences. (4) Eveniftheabovementionedgroundsdonotinthemselvesjustifya stay,theircumulativeeffect(particularlygiventheenormousand unjustifiabledelayandtheexistenceofthesortofsenseofsecurity fromprosecutionwhichwouldactasabartoextradition)requires thattheprosecutionbestayed. Onbehalfoftheprosecutionitissubmitted,insummary,that: (1) Despitethelongdelaythedefendantcanreceiveafairtrial,andthe trialprocesscanaccommodatetheissuesraisedonhisbehalfsuchas toensureafairtrial.Inparticular,whilstthefailuretoextraditethe

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defendantfromtheRepublicofIrelandinthepastexplainssomeof thedelay,itdoesnotimpactontheabilityofthedefendanttoreceive afairtrialnow. Thepoliticalprocessandpastgovernmentalcommitmentnotto pursueprosecutions,underlyingtheadministrativeOTRscheme underwhichthe20July2007letterwastransmittedtothedefendant, shouldnotimpactuponanindependentprosecutorialdecisionto prosecute. Inanyevent,the20July2007letterwastheproductoferrorduring thePSNIsOperationRapidasopposedtoanyactofbadfaith;itdid notconstituteanunequivocalassurancethatthedefendantwould not,orwouldneverbe,prosecutedonthemainlandforanyterrorist offencescommittedbeforetheGoodFridayAgreement;thetermsof theletterdonot,andwereneverintendedto,amounttoanamnesty fortherecipient;andthedefendanthasnotactedonanysuch assurancetohisdetriment. Thereisnobasisinlawforrulingthatthedelaycoupledwiththe letterof20July2007hasengenderedafalsesenseofsecurityinthe defendantsuchthatthecourtshouldholditanabuseofprocessto allowtheprosecutiontoproceed.

Thepapersandhearings 5. Theprosecutionprovidedthecourtwith,amongotherthings: (1) AnUpdatedCaseSummarydated29November2013(66pages). (2) ASummarysettingouttheessenceoftheprosecutioncaseforthe purposesoftheabusehearing(4pages). (3) ASkeletonArgumentonabuseofprocess(55pages). (4) AProsecutionBundlefortheabusehearingthecontentofwhich includestwowitnessstatementsbyKevinMcGinty(whoseroleinthe periodfromDecember1997untilMay2010wastoadvisethe AttorneyGeneralonNorthernIrelandmatters),andanumberof authorities. (5) TwoNotesonDisclosure(dated19January2014and30January 2014)byMrLittle,counselinstructedtoconductthedisclosure exerciseonbehalfoftheprosecution. (6) Afileofdisclosedmaterialsinrelationtotheconsideration,inthe periodfrom1983to1993,oftheextraditionofthedefendantfrom theIrishRepublic(312pages). (7) Twofilesofdisclosedmaterialsinrelationtotherelevant negotiationsintheNorthernIrelandpeaceprocess,thecircumstances inwhichthedefendantwasprovidedwiththeletterdated20July 2007,andwhatwasrealisedaftertheletterhadbeenprovided(802 pages).

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Twofilescontainingthewitnessstatementsandexhibitstoberelied uponifthecasegoestotrial,togetherwithVictimPersonal Statements. Witnessstatementsandasmallquantityofothermaterialsthatwere disclosedduringthecourseoftheabusehearings. FurtherSubmissionsonLimb2onabuseofprocess(7pages).

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Thedefenceprovidedthecourtwith,amongotherthings: (1) ASkeletonArgumentonabuseofprocess(60pages). (2) ADefencebundlefortheabusehearingthecontentofwhich includeswitnessstatementsfromJonathanPowell(theChiefofStaff tothethenPrimeMinister,TonyBlairandtheBritishGovernments chiefnegotiatorinthepeaceprocess)andGerardKellyMLA(a memberofSinnFeinsnegotiatingteaminthepeaceprocessandthe initialrecipientoftheletteraddressedtothedefendantdated20July 2007),togetherwithwitnessstatementsbythedefendantswifeand peopleinvolvedwiththedefendantinthewiderpeaceprocess. (3) Anoutlinechronologywhichwasamendedbytheprosecutionand crossreferencedtothepapers. (4) 2filescontainingatotalof56authorities. (5) AwitnessstatementbytheRt.Hon.PeterHainMP(whowasthe SecretaryofStateforNorthernIrelandfrom6May2005until27June 2007). (6) ASummaryofsubmissionsonbreachofpromise(8pages). Ihavereadallofthesepapers. Theabuseofprocessargumentwasinitiallyduetobeginon14January2014 but,attherequestoftheprosecution,wasputbackuntil17January2014in ordertoenabletheAttorneyGeneraltoconsiderandapprovethe prosecutionsSkeletonArgumentbeforeitwasserved. Ithadbeenrecognisedfromanearlystageintheoverallproceedingsthatin consequenceoftheprovisionsofs.29(1C)oftheCriminalProcedureand InvestigationsAct1996apreparatoryhearinghadtobeheld.Attheoutsetof thehearingon17January2014thepartiesindicatedthattheywereagreed thatnowitnesseswouldbecalledbyeithersideandthatIshoulddecideany disputedfactualissues(ofwhichtherewererelativelyfew)onthepapers. Itbecameapparentatanearlystageintheabusehearingsthattherehad beennoinvestigation,assuch,institutedbytheprosecutionintotheprecise circumstancesinwhichtheletterdated20July2007hadcomeintobeing, andintowhyithadnotbeencorrectedthereafter.Rather,intheperiod betweenSeptember2013andNovember2013,MrLittlehadcarriedouta conventionaldisclosureexerciseattheCrownProsecutionService,the AttorneyGeneralsOffice,theNorthernIrelandOffice(NIO),thePSNI,the PublicProsecutionServiceinNorthernIreland(PPS),theMinistryof DefenceandtheCabinetOffice.

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Overtheweekendof1819January2014,atthecourtsrequest,MrLittlere reviewedthematerialsattheAttorneyGeneralsOfficeanddiscoveredthata relevantletterdated27JunefromtheDeputyDirectorofthePPStoMr McGintyattheAttorneyGeneralsOfficehadbeenomittedinerrorfromthe filesofdiscloseddocumentation. Thehearingscontinuedon20,22and24January2014duringthecourseof whichthedefendantwasarraigned. Initially,theprosecutionsoughttoarguethatwhilstitwasclearfromPSNI documentationthatinApril/May2007thePSNIhadbeenawarethatthe defendantwaswantedbytheMetropolitanPoliceinrelationtotheHyde Parkbombing,theremusthavebeenafailurebythePSNI,intherunupto thepreparationofavitalletterdated6June2007fromACCSheridantothe DirectorofPublicProsecutions(NorthernIreland)(DPP(NI))(whichwasthe triggerfortheeventualletterfromtheNIOtothedefendantdated20July 2007)tocheckthePNC,oritsownrecords,or(inthealternative)thatifany suchcheckshadbeenmadetheymusthavebeenconductednegligentlysuch thatthefactthatthedefendantwassowantedwasmissed. Inthemeanwhile,followingcommentsbythecourt,DetectiveInspector CorriganofthePSNIhadbeentaskedbytheprosecutiontoinvestigatea chainofemails(primarilybetweentwoPSNIofficers)in2008which appearedtoindicatethatthePSNIhadbeenawareofthefactthatthe defendantwaswantedbytheMetropolitanPoliceandofthefactthatthis hadnotbeenmentionedinACCSheridanslettertotheDPP(NI)inJune2007, butwhichdidnotindicatewhetheranyactionhadbeentakenin consequence. Inawitnessstatementdated21January2014DICorriganreportedthathe hadspokentoanumberofthoseinvolvedatthetime,thathehad establishedasequenceofeventsin2007,thathehadreviewedtherelevant PolicyDecisionLogBookswhichdemonstratedthatitwasknownbythe PSNI,atthetimethattherelevantdecisionsweremadein2007,thatthe defendantwaswantedbytheMetropolitanPoliceinrelationtotheHyde Parkbombing,andthatnoadditionalactionhadbeentakenin2008.Ina furtherwitnessstatementdated24January2014DICorriganproduceda copyoftherelevantpolicydecisionwhichhadbeenrecordedbyActingDCI GrahaminaPolicyDecisionLogBookon2May2007.Itwasthatdecision thatbegantheprocessthatledtoACCSheridansletterandtherecord referredintermstothefactthatthedefendantwaswantedbythe MetropolitanPolice(inconnectionwiththeHydeParkbombing). ThePolicyDecisionLogBookshadnotbeenmadeavailabletoMrLittlewhen hehadconductedhisdisclosureexerciseatthePSNI.Inconsequenceof concernsexpressedbythedefenceandthecourt,MrLittlereturnedto

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Belfaston29January2014andcarriedoutafurtherdisclosureexercisethe resultsofwhicharesetoutinhisFurtherNoteonDisclosuredated30 January2014.Intheresult,furtherdocumentsweredisclosedincludinga signedcopyoftheTermsofReferenceofOperationRapid(albeitthatother versionshadalreadybeendisclosed),additionalemailsrelatingtoeventsin June2007,andanumberofJuly2008emailswhichwerefoundinthe relevantPolicyDecisionLogBookofActingDCIGrahamadjacenttothepage dealingwiththedefendantandtheHydeParkBombing(albeitthattheyhad alreadybeendisclosedaspartofalongerchainofemailsrecovered elsewhere). 17. Inconsequenceafurtherhearingwasheldon31January2014duringthe courseofwhichMrLittle(towhomthecourtisgrateful)gaveaverbalreport, andansweredanumberofquestionsaskedbythecourt.Finaloral submissionswerethencompletedduringwhichitwasreconfirmedthat neithersideintendedtocallanyliveevidence.On2February2014,following anearlierrequest,thepartiesprovidedthecourtwithfurthersubmissionsin relationtotheallegedbreachofpromisearisingfromtheletterdated20July 2007.

Overviewofthebackground 18. TheMarina,registrationLMD657P,whichwasusedtocarryoutthebombing hadbeenboughtaweekbefore,onTuesday13July1982,atacarauctionin Enfield.ThepurchaserwasamanwithanIrishaccentwhohadgivenfalse personaldetails. 19. Theprosecutioncaseisthattheinvolvementofthedefendantinthe bombingisproved,inparticular,bythecombinationof: (1) Hisconviction(aged22)inDublinon21May1974formembershipof theIRAon28February1974. (2) Thefactthathisappearancein1982isconsistentwithphotofits and/orartistsimpressionspreparedwiththeassistanceof(orinone caserecognisedby)threewitnessesasvariouslybeingoneoftwo menapparentlycarryingoutreconnaissancefromacarparkedin SouthCarriageDriveastheGuardwaspassingon30Juneand1July 1982(MarkChrusciel);oneoftwopeopleseatedintherearofan orangeFordCortinatowhichtwoothermenwalkedfromaMarina registration..65..PwhichwasthenparkedinHertfordRoadin NorthLondonon14,or15or16July1982(RobertDay);thedriverof bluecarregistrationLM..Pwhichwasseen(andthedriverspoken tobythewitness)inEdgwareRoadonthemorningofFriday16July 1982(PhyllisMcGowan). (3) Thefindingofthreeofhisfingerprintsontheticketthatwas dispensedwhentheMarinawasdrivenintotheNCPcarparkin PortmanSquareat2.14pmonSaturday17July1982andparkedthere,

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andwhichwassurrenderedwhentheMarinawasdrivenoutofthat carparkat6.14pmonSunday18July1982. Thefindingoftwoofhisfingerprintsontheticketthatwasdispensed whentheMarinawasdrivenintotheNCPcarparkattheRoyal GardenHotelinKensingtonat6.39pmonSunday18July1982and parkedthere,andwhichwassurrenderedwhentheMarinawas drivenoutofthatcarparkat6.51amonTuesday20July1982(just underfourhoursbeforethebombing).

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Itappearsthatthedefendantsinvolvementwasfirstsuspectedin consequenceofamatchthatwasmadeon13August1982betweena fingerprintfoundontheRoyalGardenHotelNCPticketandasetofthe defendantsfingerprintsthathadbeentakenbytheGardaintheRepublicof Irelandon7July1980andwhichhadthereafterbeeninformallysupplied (underanoperationalarrangement)totheRoyalUlsterConstabularyandthe MetropolitanPolice.LikewiseaGardaphotographofthedefendantwas obtainedfromadelicatesourceandwasbelievedtomatchthewitness MarkChruscielsphotofit/artistsimpression.Giventhatanyformaluseof thephotographwasbelievedtoriskcompromisingthesourcewhohad providedit,anartistsimpressionwasmadeofthedefendanton28August 1982. Theeventsoverthefollowingsevenyearsincluded: (1) ThecirculationbytheMetropolitanPolicetothepress,inSeptember 1982,ofwhatwassaidtobeanartistsimpressionofasuspectseen bywitnesses(butwas,infact,theartistsimpressionofthedefendant referredtoimmediatelyabove). (2) TheidentificationbythewitnessDay(above)ofthatartists impressionasbeingofthemanthathehadseen. (3) Theidentification,byaGardaofficeronavisittoNewScotlandYard on30January1983,ofthedefendantasbeingthepersondepictedin thesameartistsimpression. (4) TheprovisionofinformationtothepressbytheMetropolitanPolice inMay1983thatthedefendantwaswantedforthebombing,and providingthepress(again)withtheartistsimpression(nowona wantedposter). (5) ThecirculationonthePoliceNationalComputer(PNC)on29May 1983ofthefactthatthedefendantwaswantedbytheMetropolitan Policeforconspiracytomurderon20July1982. (6) ThepublicationintheSundayTimeson21October1984ofa photographofthedefendantandallegationsincludingthefactthat hewaswantedforthebombing;thathewasatthetopofScotland YardsMostWantedlist;thatScotlandYardbelievedthat,aftertwo yearsofinvestigation,ithadamassedenoughevidencetoextradite him;thatattemptstodosowouldsoonbegin;thatheboreaclose resemblancetooneofthewitnesssphotofits;andthathehad claimednevertohavelefttheIrishRepublic.

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ThepublicationoffurtherarticlesintheSundayTimesinJune1985, March1986andOctober1987 eachofwhichassertedthatthe defendantwasstillwantedforthebombing. Theconsideration,bytheauthoritiesinthiscountry,onanumberof occasions,ofthechancesofasuccessfulextraditionrequestbeing madetotheRepublicofIreland,orofasuccessfulrequestbeing madetotheIrishLegalAuthoritiesforproceedingstobecommenced againstthedefendantthereundertheCriminalLaw(Jurisdiction)Act 1976. Theresolutionofconcerns(causedbytheabsenceofevidencefrom twoNCPemployees)astotheadmissibilityoftherelevantNCP tickets,andconcernsastotheadmissibilityofthefingerprintmatches (causedbytheabsenceofformalproofofthedefendants fingerprints).

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On21November1989thethenAttorneyGeneral(SirPatrickMayhewQC MP)heldameetinginrelationtothedefendantscase.Themeetingwas attendedby(amongothers)thethenSolicitorGeneral,counsel,theCPSand theMetropolitanPolice.Itwasrecognisedthat(underthethencurrent legislationinrelationtobusinessrecords)theparkingticketswerelikelytobe admissible;thatthefingerprintevidenceexisted,butthattoaskajuryto infercriminalinvolvement(ratherthansimplyhavingmovedthecartwodays beforeitwasusedasacarbomb)mightbetotaketoogreataleapoffaith inthepostGuildfordandWoolwichclimate;andthatthelapseoftime(then over7years)neednotbefataltoanapplicationforthedefendantsreturn fromtheRepublicofIreland,butnonethelesswasquitelikelytobeso. UltimatelytheAttorneyGeneralconcluded,andeveryoneelseatthemeeting agreed,thatthecasewasnotoneinwhichitwouldbeappropriatetoseek extradition.Giventhelimitedinferencesthatitwasbelievedcouldfairlybe drawnfromthefingerprintevidence,theLawOfficersagreedthatamarker shouldbeputdowntoensurethatthecasewasproperlyreviewedbefore anydecisionwastakentoprosecuteDowneyifheshouldenterthe jurisdictionvoluntarily. InJune1991thedefendantscasewasreviewedbytheMetropolitanPolice, andtheconclusionreachedthatarequestforextraditionwouldnotmeet withapprovalatthisparticulartimeandthatthecasewouldbeputaway untilfurtherevidenceisforthcomingandamoresuitablepoliticalclimatefor extraditionrequestsprevail.InSeptember1993itwasrecordedbythe MetropolitanPolicethatthesubjectisnotextraditablebutisobviously arrestableshouldhebedetainedwithintheUKjurisdictionthereare enormousdifficultieswiththeNCPexhibitsandcontinuityinthiscaseand theidentificationevidenceoftheGardaofficermustbequestionable.I stronglysuspectthattheCPSwouldbelessthanenthusiastictopursuethis toprosecutionbutIbelievethecirculationshouldremain.

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ThefactthatthedefendantwaswantedbytheMetropolitanPolicefor conspiracytomurderon20July1982remainedonthePNCuntil29August 1994,whenitwasremovedinerror.Theerrorwas,however,realisedand on31October1994thedefendantwasrecirculatedonthePNCasbeing wantedbytheMetropolitanPoliceforconspiracytomurderon20July1982. ItwasthatrecirculationwhichwasstillonthePNCwhenthedefendant arrivedatGatwickAirporton19May2013,andwhichresultedinhisarrest. Inthemeanwhile,however,momentouseventshadbeentakingplacein NorthernIreland.Theyresulted,on10April1998,inthesigningoftheGood FridayAgreementwhichinvolvedamultipartyagreementbythemajority ofNorthernIrelandspoliticalpartiesandaninternationalagreement betweentheBritishandIrishGovernments.ThatwasfollowedbyReferenda inbothNorthernIrelandandtheRepublicofIrelandthatapprovedtheGood FridayAgreement;thecomingintoforceon28July1998ofthe1998Act;and thecomingintoforceoftheGoodFridayAgreementitselfon2December 1999. The1998Actwasnotanamnesty(giventhattheGovernmentwasmindfulof thebrutalnatureofterroristcrime),butprovidedaframework,in accordancewiththeGoodFridayAgreement,fortheearlyreleaseofserving prisoners.Itwasdesignedtoensure(subjecttocertainsafeguardsforthe protectionofthepublic)thatanyqualifyingprisonerswhoremainedin custodytwoyearsafterthecommencementoftheschemewouldbe releasedatthatpoint.InRvSSHD[1999]NIQB68GirvanJ(ashethenwas) concludedthatthe1998Actappliedtoallproceedingsandsentences imposedthroughouttheUK.BytheendofJuly2000(twoyearsafterthe 1998Actcameintoforce)noqualifyingprisonersaffiliatedtotheIRA,whose chargesweretheresultofIRAactionspriortotheGoodFridayAgreement, remainedinprisoninNorthernIreland,EnglandortheRepublicofIreland (whereequivalentarrangementshadbeenputinplace). TheGoodFridayAgreementdidnot,however,dealwiththosewhowere suspectedof(butnotchargedwith)relevantoffencespriortotheGood FridayAgreement,orwhohadbeenchargedwithsuchoffencesbuthad thereafterescaped,orwhohadbeenconvictedofsuchoffencesand thereafterescaped.Anumberwerethesubjectofextraditionproceedings. Theybecameknowncollectivelyasontherunsor(asindicatedabove) OTRs. AsecondphaseofnegotiationsbeganinJuly1998.Itwasduringthose negotiationsthatthepositionoftheOTRswasaddressed.SinnFeinargued, interalia,thatgiventhefactthatmanyofthecaseswereveryold,andgiven theintroductionoftheearlyreleaseschemebythe1998Act,thepositionof theOTRswasanomalous.Themoreso,itwassaid,asanumberoftheOTRs werestrongsupportersoftheGoodFridayAgreement,whosepresencein NorthernIreland,freefromtheriskofarrest,wouldfurtherthepeace

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process.ThusSinnFeinwantedtheGovernmenttofindawaytoenableOTRs toreturnto,ortogoto,NorthernIrelandfreefromtheriskofarrest/ prosecution(including,wherenecessary,thedroppingofoutstanding extraditionrequests),andfreefromanyadverseconsequenceflowingfrom arrest.SinnFeinmadeclearthatitregardedasuccessfuloutcomeinrelation toOTRsasbeingofcriticalimportancetotheeventualsuccessoftheGood FridayAgreement.SinnFeinspositionwasbroadlysupportedbytheIrish Government. 29. Whilst,fromapoliticalperspective,theGovernmentwasbroadly sympathetictoSinnFeinsargumentsinrelationtoOTRs,itwasrecognised thattherewereconsiderableproblemsinachievingasolution.Legislation (whetherbywayofamnestyorotherwise)wasgenerallyrecognisedtobe thebestwayahead,butalsotoinvolvesignificantpoliticalproblemsmaking enactmentverydifficult.Othersolutions,forexampleareviewofeach individualscasetocheckwhetherhe/shewas(still)wanted,ifsowhether theevidentialtestforprosecutionwasmetand,ifso,whetherthepublic interesttestwasalsomet,werealsorecognisedtogiverisetopotentially difficultpolitical,legalandlogisticalproblems. InApril1999,intheearlystagesofdiscussionsabouttheissue,SinnFein raisedthequestionwiththeGovernmentofwhetheraparticularindividual whohadsuccessfullyresistedextradition,butwhoheldanimportantrole withinSinnFeinandwasactiveinpressingforwardthepeaceprocess,could beallowedtoreturntoBelfast.Thiswasreferredtoinaletterdated5 November1999fromthePrimeMinister,TonyBlairtothePresidentofSinn Fein,GerryAdams.ThePrimeMinisterunderlinedthatthequestionof whethertopursueprosecutionswasamatterfortheDPP(NI)andthe AttorneyGeneralwho,constitutionally,actedindependentlyofgovernment, butthattheAttorneyGeneral(bythenLordWilliamsQC)hadindicatedthat hewishedtousethediscretionthathehadtoreview,withoutcommitment, whetherthepublicintereststillrequiredaprosecutioninsuchcases. IntheperiodbetweenFebruaryandMay2000theNorthernIreland Assemblywassuspended.On18April2000and2May2000,therewere meetingsamongGovernmentofficialsinrelationtotheOTRissue.Atthat stagetheRoyalUlsterConstabulary(RUC)believedthattherewereabout 200OTRs.TheMinutesofthesecondmeetingrecordedthat:Themeeting agreedthatthefollowingwayforwardshouldbegivenfurtherconsideration. Thatthereshouldbeapublicstatementmade,possiblybywrittenPQ,that theGovernmentwaspreparedtotakeasystematicandbroadlysympathetic viewapproachtoindividualswhohadcause,orfelttheyhadcause,tofear arrestonreturntoNorthernIreland.Wherenecessary,casescouldbe consideredagainbytheAttorneyGeneral/DPP(NI)inthelightofevidential sufficiencyand,ifnecessary,onpublicinterestgrounds.Suchaprocess,even ifnotresultinginanygreatnumberofcasesbeingdroppedwouldhavethe benefitofallowingindividualstodeterminewheretheystoodinrelationto

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theprosecutingauthorities.TheMinuteswentontorecordthatithadto beclearlyunderstoodthatthiswasalegalprocessandthatcasescouldnot simplybedroppedaspartofawiderpoliticalprocess. 32. Alsoon2May2000thereweremeetingsattheIrishEmbassyinLondon betweenofficialsfrombothgovernmentsandSinnFein.TheMinutesof thosemeetingsrecordthatJonathanPowell(theGovernmentsChief Negotiator)indicatedthattheGovernmentwaspreparedtooperateasimilar systeminrelationtoOTRstotheonethenbeingoperatedbytheIrish Government.HeindicatedthatiftheGovernmentwasgivenalistofnames, itwouldclarifywiththepoliceandtheprosecutingauthoritiesthepositionof thoseindividualsand,whereappropriate,wouldreviewwhetheritremained inthepublicinteresttopursueaprosecution.Hefurtherindicatedthatit wasthoughtthattheGovernmentcoulddealwith,say,12namesinamonth butnoguaranteecouldbegivenontheoutcomeofanyreview,because thatwasanindependentdecisionfortheprosecutingauthoritiesunderthe AttorneyGeneral. Itwasagainstthatbackgroundthaton5May2000,followingnegotiationsat HillsboroughCastlewhichresultedinagreementastoaprocessfor disarmament(andduringwhichprivateassuranceswereagaingiventoSinn Feinthat,onewayoranother,theOTRissuewouldbesortedout),andinthe continuingabsenceofalegislativesolution,thePrimeMinisterwrotetoMr Adams,asfollows:Icanconfirmthat,ifyoucanprovidedetailsofanumber ofcasesinvolvingpeopleontherunwewillarrangeforthemtobe consideredbytheAttorneyGeneral,consultingtheDirectorofPublic ProsecutionsandthePolice,asappropriatewithaviewtogivingaresponse withinamonthifatallpossible.Youhavealsoquestionedwhetheritwould beinthepublicinteresttomountanyprosecutionsafter28Julyforoffences allegedtohavebeencommittedbeforetheGoodFridayAgreement,sinceby thenallremainingeligibleprisonerswillhavebeenreleased,andhaveraised otherrelatedissuesaroundthe28Julydate.Iwouldbewillingtohavethese mattersconsideredrapidly,withtheaimofdecidingthewayforwardbefore 28July.Prosecutiondecisionsare,ofcourse,amatterfortheDirectorof PublicProsecutionsandtheAttorneyGeneral... On19May2000SinnFeinprovidedapreliminarylistofOTRs,which contained36names,toMrPowell,whopassedthelistontotheAttorney General. On24May2000theAttorneyGeneralwrotetoMrPowellandindicated, amongstotherthings,thathehadforwardedthelisttotheDPP(NI)andhad askedhimtotrytolocatefilesforeachofthepersonsnamed,andthatonce fileshadbeenlocatedthetaskofreviewingtheevidencewouldbegin (involving,inmostcases,ifnotall,tracingwitnessesandconsultingthe police).TheDPPforEngland&Waleswouldbeforwardedanynamesof relevancetohim.TheAttorneyGeneralunderlinedthatnodecisionastothe

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sufficiencyoftheevidencecouldbereachedunlessacarefulexaminationof theevidencewasconducted,andcontinuedthat:Insofarasitiscompatible withtheproprietiesofmypositionIwilldowhatIcantoassist.Butthe integrityofthecriminaljusticesystemisafragilethingandinreachingany decisionastoprosecution,actingoutsideGovernmentasIdo,Imustnotact forreasonsofpoliticalconveniencehoweverdesirableanyimmediate effectmaybe.Mydecisionhastobejustifiableintermsofthetestfor prosecutionthatappliestoeverycase,whateveritsnature,consideredfor prosecution.Eachdecisionthatisreachedinanycaseissusceptibleto judicialreviewsothatIcanonlyagreetoadecisionifIamsatisfiedthat thatdecisioncanbejustifiedbeforethecourts.Iftheexpectationisthatthe thirty sixpersonssofarnamed(andthattotalmayrise)shouldbefreeto returntotheUnitedKingdomregardlessoftheindividualcircumstancesof theircasethatcanonlybeachievedbylegislativeamnesty.Itisnot appropriateformetoconsiderthethirtysixcasesonpublicinterestgrounds atthisstage..Iwillconsiderthecurrentevidentialsufficiencyofeachof thecasesandwilldosoinaccordancewiththeTestforProsecution.Iwill ensurethattheprocessiscarriedoutpromptlybutIamsureyouwill understandthatasAttorneyGeneralmyfirstresponsibilityistoensurethe integrityofthecriminaljusticesystemandtheproprietyofdecisionstaken. TheAttorneyGeneraldid,however,statethathewouldconsiderthepublic interesttestinrelationtotheparticularindividualmentionedinparagraph 30above. 36. On2June2000theAttorneyGeneralwrotetothethenSecretaryofStatefor NorthernIreland(SSNI),PeterMandelsonstating:..Iamseriously concernedthattheexercisethatisbeingundertakenhasthecapacityof severelyunderminingconfidenceinthecriminaljusticesysteminNorthern Irelandatthismostsensitiveoftimes.Individualprosecutiondecisionshave tobejustifiablewithintheframeworkinwhichallprosecutiondecisionsare reachedandIamnotpersuadedthatsomeunquantifiablebenefittothe peaceprocesscanbeaproperbasisforadecisionbasedonthepublic interest Thatwasfollowedbyfurthercorrespondenceandmeetings(whether betweenMinistersorofficials)duringthecourseofwhichtheneedto proceedbythebookwasaccepted.ItwasstressedthattheDPP(NI)was theheadofanindependentprosecutingauthority,subjecttothe superintendenceoftheAttorneyGeneralwho,whenconsideringprosecution matters,actednotasaministerbutoutsidegovernmentandindependentof it. Intheend,theDPP(NI)decided,andtheAttorneyGeneralagreed,thatthe evidentialtestwasmetinrelationtotheparticularindividualmentionedin paragraph30above,andthatthepublicinterestrequiredthattherebea prosecutionofthatindividual.

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On15June2000MrPowellwrotetoMrKellyenclosingletterssignedbyhim representingdecisionsbytheAttorneyGeneralandtheDirectorofPublic ProsecutionsforEngland&Wales.Theletterswereinthefollowingterms: FollowingareviewofyourcasebytheDirectorofPublicProsecutionsfor EnglandandWales,hehasconcludedthatontheevidencebeforehimthere isinsufficienttoaffordarealisticprospectofconvictingyouforanyoffence arisingoutofYouwouldnot,thereforefaceprosecutionforanysuch offenceshouldyoureturntotheUnitedKingdom.Thatdecisionisbasedon theevidencecurrentlyavailable.Shouldfreshevidenceariseandany statementmadebyyouimplicatingyourselfinmayamounttosuch evidencethemattermayhavetobereconsidered.TheCrownProsecution Serviceisnto[sic]awareofanypoliceinterestininterviewingyouinrelation toanyotheroffencenorofanyinterestfromanotehr[sic]countryseeking extradition.Ifthereweretobeotheroutstandingoffencesorrequestsfor extraditionthesewouldhavetobedealtwithintheusualway. ThisdecisionwouldnormallybeconveyedtoyoubythePoliceortoyour SolicitorbutasthisisnotpossibletheAttorneyGeneralhasaskedthatIwrite toyou. Inthemeanwhileworkcontinuedbywayofevidentialreviewsofthecasesof theremainderonthepreliminarylistplusahandfulofotherswhose nameshadalsocometolight.Itwasslowanddifficultwork.SinnFein regularlycomplainedabouthowlongitwasalltakingseee.g.aletterfrom MrAdamsdated14July2000. Abroadersolutionwashoweverfoundinrelationtothosewhohadescaped fromcustodyaftersentenceandwho,inviewoftheprovisionsofthe1998 Act,wouldbereleasedwithinashorttimeafteranyreturntoNorthern Ireland.On29September2000theSSNIannouncedthat,followingthe releaseon28July2000ofallremainingqualifyingprisonerswhohadserved atleasttwoyearsoftheirsentence,hehadconcludedthatitwasnolonger proportionateorinthepublicinteresttoseektheextraditionofthosewho,if successfullyextradited,wouldbereleasedimmediatelyunderthe1998Actor wouldonlyhaveminimalperiodslefttoserveinprison.Suchpersons,ifthey returnedtoNorthernIrelandweretobebroughtwithintheearlyrelease scheme.ArrangementsweremadewithSinnFeintominimisetheprocedure involvedwiththerelevantindividualbeingtechnicallyarrestedatanhotel neartheborder,butnottakenintocustody(insteadtheywouldbeissued withtemporaryreleaseformspendingtheirreleaseonlicenceunderthe 1998Act).However,whethersuchpersonswouldbeprosecutedforany offenceinrelationtotheirescape,orforanyotheroutstandingoffence, remainedthesubjectofindividualreview.Likewise,theSSNImadeclearthat anycasesinvolvingtheextraditionofindividualswantedfor,orchargedwith (asopposedtoconvictedof)terroristrelatedoffenceswouldcontinuetobe consideredonacasebycasebasis.

40.

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42.

Bywayofexample,on8November2000theAttorneyGeneralwrotetothe SSNIconcerningdecisionsbytheDPP(NI)inrelationtofourofthoseonthe preliminarylist,indicatinginrelationtoallfourthattherewasno outstandingdirectionforprosecutioninNorthernIreland;that,apartfrom theunexpiredportionoftheirsentences,theywerenotwantedinNorthern Irelandforarrest,questioningorchargebythepoliceinrespectofanyother matter;andthattheRUCwasnotawareofanyinterestfromanyotherpolice forceintheUnitedKingdominrelationtothem. Inthemeanwhileconsiderationwasbeinggiventootherpotentialsolutions. Forexample,inJanuary2001,followingearlierworkinNovember2000,Sir QuentinThomasproducedareportfortheGovernmentsettingoutthe availableoptionsinrelationtotheremainingOTRs,including continuingthe normalprocessesofthelaw;decidingasamatterofpolicyinthepublic interestnottopursueextraditioninrespectofsomeorallofthose suspected;providinganautomaticamnestyinrespectofallrelevant offences;providingaselectiveamnestywherebyonlydeservingapplicants wouldbenefit;providingaconditionalinhibitiononprosecutionssothat prosecutioninrespectofrelevantoffenceswouldnotbepossibleunlessthe offenderwasengagedinterrorismorwasasupporterofaspecified organisation;usingtheRoyalPrerogativebywayofpreconvictionpardons; orlegislatingtorefinetheconsiderationswhichinformtheassessmentmade bytheprosecutingauthoritiesofthepublicinterestinmountinga prosecution(althoughthiswasnotassessedtoprovideaviableoption).Sir Quentinconcludedthatwhilstaconditionalprohibitiononprosecutions offeredthebestcombinationofpoliticaldefensibility,acceptabilityto Republicansandadministrativeconvenience,anautomaticamnestywould bemorestraightforwardandwouldminimisethecontaminationofthe systemofjustice. However,giventhedifficultiesinvolvedinthosesolutions,onlythereviewof individualcasesbytheDPP(NI)underthesuperintendenceoftheAttorney General,andwithanynecessaryinvestigationbeingcarriedoutbytheRUC, providedawaytomakesomeprogress.Theprocessthuscontinued.It becameknownastheadministrativeschemeorprocessfordealingwith OTRs,andincludedregularoverviewsofprogress.Overtime,theRUC becamethePSNIandtheOfficeoftheDPP(NI)becamethePPS. On19January2001thePrimeMinistergaveSinnFeinawrittenassurance that:TheGovernmentrecognisesthedifficultyinrespectofthosepeople againstwhomthereareoutstandingprosecutionsforoffencescommitted before10April1998.Atpresent,theyfacethepossibilityofextraditionor prosecutioneventhoughtheoffencesifprovenwerecommittedbeforethe keydatefortheearlyreleaseschemeundertheGFA.TheGovernmentis committedtodealingwiththedifficultyassoonaspossible,sothatthose who,iftheywereconvictedwouldbeeligibleundertheearlyreleasescheme arenolongerpursued.

43.

44.

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 46.

Inaletterdated23January2001theAttorneyGeneralexpressedconcern aboutthemakingofanystatementthatimpliedthatGovernment,rather thanParliament,wouldseektoinfluenceorevenpreventtheprosecutionof individuals pointingoutthatnotonlywouldthatbeconstitutionallywrong, butthatitwouldnotbepossibleeithergiventhatneitherhenorthe DPP(NI)couldbeinfluencedbyanysuchstatementofGovernmentintent.He alsoexpressedconcernastothepossibleuseofanysuchstatementinany abuseofprocessargumentsthatmightariseatanytrialofanyindividual coveredbythestatement. On29January2001theAttorneyGeneralwrotetotheSSNIstatingthat informationhadcometohisattentionthatoneofthefourindividuals mentionedinhisletterof8November2000(seepara.41above)wasnow liabletoquestioningbythepoliceaboutinvolvementinacriminaloffence, andhad(itappears)beeninformedoftheposition.TheAttorneyGeneral underlinedthattheremarksintheletterof8November2000hadfolloweda standardpatternandreferredtothepositionofeachindividualasitwas knownatthetimethattheletterwaswritten;thatwhilstthecheckshad beenthoroughtheydidnotamounttoanamnesty,andthatifotheroffences werediscovered,ornewevidencewasfoundthatlinkedindividualswith offences,orfreshoffenceswerecommitted,thentheindividualconcerned wouldfacearrestorquestioningintheusualway. On8March2001,duringcrisistalksatHillsboroughCastle,itwaspublicly acceptedforthefirsttimebyallparties,includingthePrimeMinisterandthe Taoiseach,thatthepositionoftheOTRswasananomalyandthatitwouldbe addressed.BothGovernmentsacceptedthat:Inthecontextofthe agreementofMay2000beingimplemented,itwouldbeanatural developmentofthe[earlyrelease]schemeforsuchprosecutionsnottobe pursuedandwouldintendassoonaspossiblethereaftertotakesuchsteps asarenecessaryintheirjurisdictionstoresolvethisdifficulty,sothatthose concernedarenolongerpursued...TheAttorneyGeneralmadeclear withinGovernmentthatlegislationwasrequired. Atameetingon12March2001MrKelly,onbehalfofSinnFein,produceda furtherlistof30OTRsforconsideration,pointedoutthatnewnameswere continuallyemerging,andsaidthatwhatwasrequiredwasasystemwhich woulddealwithsuchcasesinaproactivemannerandpushthemthroughto completion.HepointedoutthatthePrimeMinisterhadgivenacommitment tosorttheissueoutandthatiflegislationwasnecessaryitneededtobegot onwith. InmidMarch2001theAttorneyGeneralsuggestedtotheNIOthataletterto aparticularOTRshouldincludethefollowingparagraph:Onthebasisof informationcurrentlyavailable,thereisnooutstandingdirectionfor prosecutioninNorthernIreland,therearenowarrantsinexistence,norare

47.

48.

49.

50.

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youwantedinNorthernIrelandforarrest,questioningorchargebythe police.TheRUCarenotawareofanyinterestinyoufromanyotherpolice forceintheUnitedKingdom.Ifanyotheroutstandingoffenceoroffences cametolight,orifanyrequestforextraditionweretobereceived,these wouldhavetobedealtwithintheusualway.TheAttorneygeneralstressed thatitwasessentialthatthattheNIOcheckedtheaccuracyoftheparagraph, andthatitalsoseemedsensiblefortheRUCtobekeptinformedofanyletter thatwasissuedsothattheopportunityforconfusiontoariseastostatuswas lessened. 51. InlateMarch2001aninternalpapersetouttheproceduresinvolvedinthe conductoftheadministrativeschemeandthedifficultieswhichbythenwere besettingthepolice,theDPP(NI)andtheCrownSolicitors(whodealtwith extraditionrequests)inrelationtoit.Thedifficultiesincludedbeingprovided withonlysketchydetailsoftheindividuals;thescaleandcomplexityofthe tasksinvolvedincarryingoutintelligencechecksoneachindividual;thescale andcomplexityofthetasksinvolvedinthepolice,theDPP(NI)andtheCrown Solicitorsidentifyingallfilesheldbyeachinrespectofeachindividual;inthe policecarryingoutafullevidentialreviewofeachlivefileinrelationtoeach individualincludingestablishingwhetheroriginaldocumentationstill existed(includingdocumentationheldbyothers),whetherwitnesses (includingmilitarywitnesseswhohadsinceleftthearmyandreturnedtolive onthemainland)werestillavailableandwillingtogiveevidence;inthe DPP(NI)carryingoutanevidentialreviewonfootofanyfilessubmittedby thepolicewithsomeindividualOTRshavingalargenumberofsuchfiles; andincarryingoutchecksastowhetherindividualswerewantedbyany otherpoliceforceintheUK,orbyanyothercountrywhichinvolved researchofthePoliceNationalDatabaseandcontactwithInterpol. AtameetingwiththeSSNIinMay2001MrAdamsexpressedtheviewthat, intermsofRepublicanconfidence,itwouldbebetteriftherewasaninvisible processfordealingwithOTRs,butacceptedthattheGovernmenthadno alternativebuttolegislateontheissuealbeitthatsuchlegislationwouldbe extremelydifficulttotakethroughParliament. Inmid2001sixdaysoffurthercrisistalkswereheldatWestonPark, Staffordshire.Itwasagainacknowledgedbyallparties,includingthePrime MinisterandtheTaoiseach,thatthepositionoftheOTRsconstitutedan anomalythatwouldbeaddressed.Paragraph20oftheresultantWeston ParkTreatyprovidedthat: BothGovernmentsalsorecognisethatthereisanissuetobeaddressed, withthecompletionoftheearlyreleasescheme,aboutsupportersof organisationsnowonceasefireagainstwhomthereareoutstanding prosecutions,andinsomecasesextraditionproceedings,foroffences committedbefore10April1998.Suchpeoplewould,ifconvicted,standto benefitfromtheearlyreleasescheme.TheGovernmentsacceptthatit wouldbeanaturaldevelopmentoftheschemeforsuchprosecutionsnotto

52.

53.

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bepursuedandwillassoonaspossible,andinanyeventbeforetheendof theyear,takesuchstepsasarenecessaryintheirjurisdictionstoresolvethis difficultysothatthoseconcernedarenolongerpursued. 54. ByOctober2001,LordGoldsmithQChadbecomeAttorneyGeneral,andhad madeclearwithintheGovernment,amongotherthings,thathewouldhave verygreatdifficultyinseeingthatthepublicinterestwouldbeotherthanto proceedwithprosecutionsincaseswheretherewassufficientevidenceof involvementinseriouscrime;that,inanyevent,hewasonlypreparedto considerthepublicinterestonanindividualcasebycasebasis,giventhata blanketbasiswouldbeimproperandthatitwasforParliamenttodecide whetherthereshouldbeanamnesty;andthat(intermsofmaintaining publicconfidenceintheDPP(NI)andintheadministrationofjusticeinthe longerterm)itwasoffundamentalimportancetomaintainanimpartial prosecutionprocesswhichwasnotinfluencedbypoliticalconsiderations.He doubted,however,thatanycourtwouldseriouslyentertainanabuseof processargumentbasedonanexpectationsaidtoarisefromastatement madebythePrimeMinister. ByOctober2001atotalofjustover100nameshadbeenputforwardbySinn Feinundertheadministrativescheme,whichcontinued.InearlyNovember 2001afurther19nameswereprovidedbySinnFein.Bytheendof November2001thecasesof41individualshadbeenresolved(onewayor theother)with8moreexpectedtoberesolvedshortly.TheRoyal Prerogativewasusedinasmallnumberofcases.Inmeetings,MrAdamsand MrKelly(onbehalfofSinnFein)expressedfrustrationastothelengthof timethattheadministrativeschemewastaking.Inthemeanwhile,itwas recognisedwithinGovernmentthatitwouldbeextremelydifficulttoensure thepassageofanylegislation. FurthernameswereputforwardbySinnFeintotheNIOincluding,inJanuary 2002,alistof55nameswhichincludedthenameofthedefendant.Isetout indetailbelow(startingatparagraph83)whathappenedthereafterin relationtothedefendant.ThelistwasforwardedbytheSSNItotheAttorney General.IntheaccompanyinglettertheSSNIsaid:.Iwouldalsobe gratefulifyoucouldaskthenecessarypeopletolookurgentlyintothesenew casestoestablishtheirstatusintermsofwhethertheyarefreetoreturnto theUKjurisdictionwithoutfacingprosecution. AtameetingwithofficialsandofficersfromthePSNIon18February2002the DPP(NI)explainedthedifficulties,giventhenumbersnowinvolved,incoping withthedemandsoftheadministrativescheme.Heindicatedthathewas goingtotakepersonalcontroloftheprocess,andthathewasgoingtocarry outtheAttorneyGeneralsrequestthatthenamesbecheckedtoascertain theirstatus.TheNoteofthemeetingrecordedthattheDPP(NI) understandablyfeltthatitwasimportantthat,beforeanyonewasgiventhe greenlighttoreturntoNorthernIreland,hewaspersonallysatisfiedthatall

55.

56.

57.

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avenuesofenquiryhadbeenexhausted,andanegativereturnfiled.Itwas underlinedthattheretrospectivereviewofcasesandfileswasaverytime consumingexercise. 58. On26February2002theSSNIwrotetothePrimeMinisterindicatingthat, whilstdraftlegislationwasreadyitwouldbeamistaketointroduceit,orto invitetheQueentoexercisetheRoyalPrerogativeofMercyinasmall numberofcases,andthattheyshouldasktheAttorneyGeneralandtheDPP tocontinuetoworkthroughtheSinnFeinlists. InMarch2002internalproposalswereputforwardwithintheNIOtospeed uptheadministrativescheme,andwerelaterraisedwiththeAttorney General.Itwas,however,recognisedwithintheNIOthattherewere considerable,possiblyinsuperable,difficultieswitheachideaandthatthe worstoutcomewouldbetoletpeoplebackwhosubsequentlycametopolice attention,andwerethenarrestedforoldcrimesforwhichtheDPPdecided thattherewasstillsufficientevidencetojustifyaprosecution.Theproposals includedasummaryofhowtheadministrativeschemewasthenworking, andanindicationofthestandardofresearchrequired,andwhatwas expectedofthereviewingPSNIofficer.Inshort,thenamesprovidedbySinn FeintotheNIOwereforwardedtotheAttorneyGeneral,whoforwarded themtotheDPP(NI),whothenpassedonthenamestoadedicatedteamin thePSNI.Thatteamthencarriedoutchecksontheircomputeriseddatabase (ICIS)andwithcollatorsandSpecialBranchaswellasconsultingthePNC andInterpoltoseeifanOTRwaswantedintherestoftheUKor internationally,andwiththeCrownSolicitorsinrelationtoextraditionissues. Whereexistingevidenceincludedwitnesses,theywouldbetrackeddown andtheirwillingnesstogiveevidencechecked.Theywouldalsocheckthe continuingexistenceorotherwiseofexhibitsandforensicevidence(including decidingwhetherfurthertestswerenowavailableandrequired).Where therewasintelligence,aSuperintendentwouldtakethedecisionasto whetherthereremainedarequirementtointerviewanindividual,andwould completeaproformaaccordingly.Attheendofallthatafullreportwould beputbeforetheDPP(NI).Inmanycaseshewouldaskforfurtherevidence tobeobtainedbeforemakingafinaldecision.Thefinaldecisionwouldbe providedtotheAttorneyGeneraland(throughhim)totheNIO,whowould thenpassitontoSinnFeinforonwarddeliverytotherelevantindividual. On22March2002,inabriefingnotetothePrimeMinisterinpreparationfor ameetingwithMrAdams,itwasrecordedthatSinnFeinhadnowprovideda totalof161names35ofthemsincetheNewYear.Ofthese,47hadsofar beencleared(ofwhom22whohadescapedwhilstservingasentencehad beenbroughtwithintheearlyreleasescheme).In12casestheDPP(NI)had saidthatthereremainedarequirementtoprosecute,andinafurther10the policehadsufficientevidencetowarrantarrestforquestioning.The remaining102casesalmostallinvolvedpeoplewhohadgoneontherun beforetheycouldbeprosecuted.Itwassaidthatofficialshadbeenarguing

59.

60.

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foramoreroughandready,andthereforemorehighrisk,approach,butso farwithoutsuccess. 61. Atthesubsequentmeeting,MrAdamssoughtassurancethatthe30orso problemcaseswouldbesortedoutoveraperiodofeighteenmonthsorso. Apossiblelegislativesolutionwasalsodiscussed. AspartoftheongoingconsiderationbyMinistersandofficialsastowhether theadministrativeschemecouldbespeededup,anofficialintheLegal SecretariattotheLawOfficerswrotetotheDPP(NI)attheendofMarch 2002canvassingthepossibility(whichhadbeenraisedbytheNIO)of removingconsiderationofwhethertherewasanyoutstandingrequirement toprosecutetheindividual,andconfiningtheadministrativeschemeto answeringthequestionswhetheranindividualwaswantedbythepolicein NorthernIrelandandGreatBritain,orwasthesubjectofongoingextradition proceedingswithSinnFeinbeinginformedcorrespondingly.Itwas acknowledgedthatthiswouldincreasethedangerofanindividualbeingtold thattheycouldreturnandthenhaveproceedingsbroughtagainstthem,and thatitwouldbenecessarytoincludeintheNIOscomfortlettera qualificationastothelevelofcomfortgiven.Asuggesteddraftwasprovided, bytheNIO(whichhaddecidedthatthereshouldbenoreferencetothe DPP(NI)astheresultantdifficultyindraftingwouldmaketheletterso technicalastobeunclearorsovagueastounderminethereassurancesuch aletterisdesignedtoprovide).Thedraftwasinthefollowingterms: TheSecretaryofStatehasbeeninformedbytheChiefConstableofthePSNI thatonthebasisoftheinformationcurrentlyavailable,therearenowarrants inexistencenorareyouwantedinNorthernIrelandforarrest,questioningor chargebythepolice.ThePSNIarenotawareofanyinterestinyoufromany otherpoliceforceintheUnitedKingdom.Ifanyotheroutstandingoffenceor offencescametolight,orifanyrequestforextraditionweretobereceived thesewouldhavetobedealtwithintheusualway. On4April2002theDPP(NI)repliedpointingoutthatnotmuchlesswork wouldberequiredunderthenewproposal,andthatitwasdifficulttosee howchangingthequestionwouldprovideareliableresponse.Itwas, neverthelessopentotheChiefConstabletoprovideanswersonthebasisof morelimitedandlessreliableresearch.Thepossibilityoftheproposed changewasthenraisedwith,andrejectedby,thePSNI.Thusthe administrativeschemecontinuedasbefore,andwithanyletterofcomfort/ reassurancecontinuingtobeinthetermssetoutinparagraph49above. InJune2002theAttorneyGeneralwrotetotheSSNIpointingoutthat althoughtheadministrativeprocesscontinued,itwouldnotprovidethe meansbywhichtheGovernmentscommitmentinrelationtoOTRswouldbe met.Heunderlinedthattheprosecutionprocesscouldnotprovidean amnesty,andthatheandtheDPP(NI)hadbeencarefultoensurethateach casewasconsideredonitsownmeritsandwassubjectedtothesameTest

62.

63.

64.

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forProsecutionasappliedinallcasesonlybythatroutecouldtheintegrity oftheprosecutionprocessbeassured. 65. AninternalNIObriefingnotedated3September2002setoutthehistoryin relationtoOTRs,andnotedthatthegrandtotalofnamesprovidedbySinn Feinwasnow162(ofwhom61hadbeentoldtheycouldreturn),witha further10raisedbythePrisonServiceandafurther2bytheIrish Government.Thenoterecordedthatithadbeenknownallalongthatthere wouldbeahardcoreofunconvictedcases,likelytoruntoafewdozen,which couldnotberesolvedwithinthepresentlaw. InMay2003,followingnegotiationsatLeedsCastle,theBritishandIrish GovernmentsissuedaJointDeclarationinwhichprovisionwasmade:To discussappropriateissueswiththepartiesincludingthroughthe implementationgroup..ProposalsinrelationtotheOTRswerepublished inparallel. However,aslaterrecordedbytheAttorneyGeneralinaletterdated27 February2006totheSSNI,workontheadministrativeschemecametoahalt in2004albeit,aswillbecomeclear,someworkwasdoneinrelationtothe defendantuptoSeptember2004. On28July2005theleadershipoftheIRAannouncedthatithadorderedan endtoitsarmedcampaign.InresponsethethenSecretaryofStatefor NorthernIreland,PeterHain,indicatedthattheGovernmentwouldnow implementtheareasoftheJointDeclarationofMay2003thatwere dependentontheIRAsdecision. AttheendofSeptember2005theIndependentInternationalCommissionon DecommissioningreportedthattheIRAhadplaceditsarmscompletelyand verifiablybeyonduse.On13October2005MrHainmadeawideranging statementtotheHouseofCommonsinresponse,duringthecourseofwhich heremindedtheHousethatthegovernmenthadundertakentolegislatein relationtotheOTRs,andthattheproposalshadbeenpublishedalongside theJointDeclarationinMay2003.Hecontinued:Thisisnotanamnesty. Neverthelesstheimplementationofthoseproposalswillbepainfulformany people.Ifullyunderstandthis.ButtheGovernmentbelievesthatitisa necessarypartoftheprocessofclosingthedooronviolenceforever. TheNorthernIreland(Offences)Billwasintroducedon29November2005 to:Makespecialprovisionaboutcertainoffencescommitted,orallegedto havebeencommitted,before10April1998.Itattemptedtoaddressthe positionofallpersonswhowouldbeliabletoprosecution,including membersofthepoliceandarmedforces,andprovided(amongstother things)forthegrantingofcertificatesofeligibilitybyaCommissioner, exemptionfromarrestforthoseholdingsuchacertificate,trialbyaSpecial Tribunalandentitlementtoalicenceenablingtherelevantindividualnotto

66.

67.

68.

69.

70.

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serveanypart,oranyfurtherpart,ofanysentenceimposedbytheSpecial Tribunalincustody. 71. EveryNorthernIrelandpartyvigorouslyopposedtheBill,barSinnFein.Now SinnFeinopposesit,becauseitrefusedtoacceptthatthelegislationshould applytomembersofthesecurityforceschargedwithterrorismrelated offences.ToexcludefromprovisionsoftheBillanymembersofthesecurity forceswhomighthavebeeninvolvedinsuchoffenceswouldhavebeennot onlyillogicalbutindefensible,andwewouldnotdoit.Closureonthepast cannotbeonesided.Thatwas,andis,nonnegotiable. Theprocesswouldhavemadepeopleaccountablefortheirpastactions throughthespecialtribunalbeforebeingreleasedonlicence.SinnFeinhas nowsaidthatanyrepublicanpotentiallycoveredbythelegislationshould havenothingtodowithit.Butifnoonewentthroughtheprocess,victims whowouldhavesufferedthepainofhavingtocometotermswiththe legislationwouldhavedonesofornothing.Thatisunacceptable,andIam thereforewithdrawingtheBill. 72. Itappears,seeagaintheAttorneyGeneralsletterdated27February2006, thatitwastheintroductionof,and/orthefailureof,thelegislationwhich promptedtherestartoftheadministrativescheme. InOctober2006,followingallpartynegotiationsatStAndrews,the GovernmentpublishedtheStAndrewsAgreement. On28December2006,inaconfidentialletter,thePrimeMinisterassured GerryAdamsthattheGovernment,havingalreadyannouncedthatitwould nolongerpursuetheextraditionofindividualsconvictedofpre1998 offenceswhohadescapedfromprisonandwhowould,iftheyreturnedto NorthernIrelandandsuccessfullyappliedfortheearlyreleasescheme,have littleifanyoftheirtimelefttoserve,wasnowworkingwitharenewedfocus onputtinginplacemechanismstoresolveallotherOTRcasesincluding expeditingtheexistingadministrativeproceduresandstatingthatIhave alwaysbelievedthatthepositionoftheseOTRsisananomalywhichneedsto beaddressed.BeforeIleaveofficeIamcommittedtofindingaschemewhich willresolvealltheremainingcases. InFebruary2007thePSNIcommencedOperationRapid,whichwasthe operationalnameforareviewofpersonscirculatedaswantedbythePSNI inconnectionwithterroristrelatedoffencesupto10April1998.The purposeofitwastoexaminewhatbasis,ifany,thePSNIhadtoseekthe arrestofthoseindividualsidentifiedbySinnFeintotheGovernmentand passedtotheChiefConstable.TheTermsofReferencerecorded,among otherthings,thatresponsibilityfortheexpeditiouscompletionofthereview However,theBillwaswithdrawnon11January2006when,inastatementto theHouseofCommons,MrHainsaid:

73. 74.

75.

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restedwiththeHeadofBranchC2ofthePSNI(whowouldensurethata properdetailedrecordauditingthereviewanddecisionmakingprocess wouldbemadeandretained);thattherewouldbeasmallteamof investigators(aDetectiveChiefInspector,2DetectiveSergeantsand3 assistantcivilianinvestigators);thatthereviewwouldbeconductedon termsofconditionalreportinginordertopreventamisinterpretationofits purpose;thattheAssistantChiefConstable,CrimeOperationswouldsupplya listofthoseindividualsidentifiedtothePSNIashavingrequested informationastotheirstatuswiththePSNIasawantedperson;thateach offencewouldbereviewedonanindividualbasis;andthatrecommendations wouldbemadeinaccordancewithparticularformsofwordssetoutinthe Terms(althoughtheformsofwordsinrelationtoapersonwantedforarrest didnotincludeoneforsomeonewhowaswantedbyanotherpoliceforcein theUK). 76. ItisclearthatOperationRapidmarkedthebeginningofdirectengagement betweenSinnFeinandthePSNIinordertotrytoexpeditetheremaining cases.ThefirstOperationRapidmeetingtookplaceon7February2007.It waschairedbytheHeadofBranchC2,DCSBaxterandattendedbyamong othersADCIGraham(whowasappointedSIO).Anoteofthemeetingwas disclosedduringthehearings.Itrecordedthat:TheHoBprovidedabrief backgroundastowhyareviewwouldbetakingplaceintothosepersons termedasbeingOntheRun.HestatedthatMrMcGrory,Solicitor,whoacts onbehalfoftheOTRs,hadrequestedinformationaboutthecurrentlegal statusofhisclients.UnderArticle3oftheECHRandHumanRightsActall personshavealegalrightuponrequesttobeinformedifpolicerequirethem forquestioning.Hestatedthatpolicewerethereforeobligedtoreviewall thosecasesanddeterminethecurrentstatusofthesepersonsitwas agreedthatthetermsofreferencefortheenquiryshouldbetwofold.Firstly, toestablishthelegitimatebasiswhyapersonOntheRunwaswanted. Secondly,toestablishthestatusandtheintegrityoftheevidence.Formal termsofreferencewouldbedraftedbyACCCrimeOperationsandforwarded toD/C/InspGrahamforguidance.Whereitwasestablishedthatnocurrent legitimatebasisexistedtohaveapersonarrested,thisinformationwouldbe passedtoACCCrimeforonwardtransmissiontotheirSolicitor.Alternatively, ifreasonablegroundsstillexistedtosuspectapersonofcommittinga specificterroristoffencewhenbalancedagainstHumanRights considerations,afirmrecommendationwouldbemadetohavethese personstoremaincirculatedaswantedforinterviewandrecordsupdated appropriately.ItwasagreedthatallOTRdecisionsshouldbebasedonpurely policingconsiderationsandthattheenquiryshouldremainneutral, proportionateandethicalatalltimes.Uponpublicityreachingthepress regardingthereviewofOTRcases,itwasagreedthatthefollowingpress statementwouldbereleased.Asaresultofinformationmadeavailableto thePoliceServiceofNorthernIreland,officersfromCrimeOperations Departmentareconductingareviewofindividualswantedforserious terroristcrimedatingbackanumberofyears.Inquiriesareatanearlystage

22

butpoliceareworkingtodeterminewhetherthereremainsalawfulbasisfor arrest,havingregardtocurrenthumanrightslegislation.Whereevidence exists,andmeetsrequiredstandards,itremainstheroleofpolicetobring thoseresponsibleforcrimebeforeacourt,regardlessoftheircurrent whereabouts. 77. 78. On8May2007theNorthernIrelandExecutivewasswornin. Itisofinteresttonotethat,inhislettertothePSNIdated27February2006 (towhichreferenceismadeabove)LordGoldsmithQCstatedthat:Asyou areaware,yourpredecessorsinofficeaskedthatconsiderationbegivento whetherornotcertainindividualswerefreetoreturntotheUnitedKingdom withoutfearofarrest Astothewitnesseswhotookpartinthenegotiationsinrelationto,and/or theimplementationof,theadministrativescheme,MrPowellstates,among otherthings,that: Aswewerenotabletofindanacrosstheboardsolutionthatworkedwe hadtodealwiththeOnTheRunsasindividualcasesthroughan administrativeschemethathadbegunasaninterimmeasurerequiring individualrequestsforconsiderationtobesubmittedtotheNorthernIreland OfficethroughSinnFein,andthereafteraseriesofreviewsanddecisionsto betakenbyalloftherelevantministriesoragencies,includingthePolice ServiceofNorthernIreland(whointurnwouldobtaininformationfrom otherforcesoragenciesorviaInterpol),theAttorneyGeneral,theDPPin NorthernIrelandand/orinEnglandandtheSecretaryofStateforNorthern Ireland.Thefirstletterscontainingassurancesthattheindividualsconcerned werenotwantedforarrest,questioningorchargeweresentfrom10 DowningStreettothePresidentofSinnFein,GerryAdams,tobegiventothe addressees.Iwasthesignatoryoftheinitialletters.Latersignatoriesto similarletterswereseniorofficialsintheNorthernIrelandOffice.Whateach letterwasintendedtoreflect,wasthatonthebasisofinformationthen availabletotheauthoritiesandcarefullyconsideredineachcaseindividually, anassurancewasbeinggiventhattheindividualwouldnotbesubjectto arrestandsubsequentprosecutionifheorshereturnedtotheUnited Kingdom.Althoughthishadnotbeenthesolutionfirstenvisagedbythe Britishgovernmentinitswishtodealwiththisparticularaspectofthepast, neverthelessitwasintendedtoprovideasolutionthatworkedinpractice evenifmoreslowlyandinamorecumbersomeandlessuniversalwaythan hadbeenwishedbythosenegotiatingonbehalfofSinnFein. TheissueoftheOTRswasatnotimeasingle,isolatedissue,butwasdealt withaspartoftheoverallnegotiation.Allaspectsweresimultaneouslyin play;agreementtooneissuebyonepartywascriticaltoobtainingthe agreementofanotherpartytoanotherissue.Isetoutmyrecollectionsofthe decadelongnegotiationsinabookentitled,GreatHatred,LittleRoom: MakingPeaceinNorthernIrelandpublishedin2008forwhichIwas

79.

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80.

permittedbytheCabinetOfficetohaveaccesstotheNo10papersrelating tomytimeinDowningStreet. InthebookImakeclearmyviewthatthemostchallengingpartofthepeace processinNorthernIreland,asinmostotherpeaceprocesses,isits implementation.Agreementsarenecessarypreciselybecausethetwosides donottrusteachotherandagreementsbythemselvesdonotestablishtrust. Itisonlywhenthetwosidesactuallyimplementwhattheyhavepromisedto dothatthetrustbeginstobecreatedaspartofaprocessofpeacebuilding.If eithersiderenegesonitsundertakingsorfailstoimplementwhatithas promisedtodo,trustcanbefatallyundermined. TheintentionbehindtheBritishGovernmentgivingwrittenassurancesto individualOTRswastotrytoresolvetheissuegiventhefailuretofinda workablegeneralapproachandtoprovideindividuallettersthatSinnFein couldusetoreassuretheindividualsconcernedthattheycouldreturntothe UKwithoutfearofarrest.(Myemphasis) MrKelly(whoincludesinhisstatementabreakdownofthenumberof personswhowereinformedeachyearfrom2001to2012thattheywerenot wanted)states,amongotherthings,that: SinnFeinforwhomIspeakinthisstatementemphasisesthatitisimpossible tooverstatetheimportanceoftheassurancesgiventothe187recipients, whichincludedJohnDowney,beingmaintained.Thesewereessentialinthe achievementoftheseriesofagreementsthatbeganwiththeGoodFriday Agreementin1998,andwereconsolidatedinthecommencementofthe NorthernIrelandAssemblyin2007.TheCourtwillbeawarefromthe presenceofSinnFeinMPsatthehearingstodateinthiscase,aswellasthe presenceoftheIrishGovernment,oftheimportancethatisattachedtothe firmnessofeachofthebuildingblocksofthepeaceprocessintheNorthof Irelandandtherelianceupontheassurancesgiven,byallpartiestothose agreements,tothoseassurancesbeinghonouredbythosewhogavethem. Thepeaceprocessremainsaprocess;therehastobeconstantvigilanceand effort.TheeffectofJohnDowneysarrestandprosecutionhascaused enormousconcernbothastotheobviousquestionmarksnowraisedin relationtoidenticalassurancesgiveninidenticalcircumstancestomany othersandastothewiderimplicationsofafirmassuranceonakeyissue emanatingfromalengthyprocessthatisnolongerbeingadheredto. Therehadbeenthroughouttheadministrativeprocess,areliancethatthose responsibleforpreparingandpresentinganassurance(orarefusal)wereina positiontoprovideanunequivocalstatement.ItwasonthatbasisthatSinn Feinfeltabletoadvisethosewhohadsoughtitshelpinaskingforsuch assurances,thattheymeantwhattheysaidandonthisbasis,thatthe recipientsthereafterbelievedtheywereabletoorganisetheirlives accordingly.(Myemphasis) MrHainstates,amongotherthings,that: TheproposedlegislationwasinduecourselaidbeforetheHouse,butitwas notpassed.Idonotsetoutherethedifferentobjectionsthatledtoits

81.

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abandonment.Itwasinthiscontextthatthealreadyongoingadministrative scheme,althoughbegunasatemporarymeasure,becamethemechanismby whichalloftheOntheRunapplicantswereenabledtohavetheirposition clarified. TheschemeaddressedthepositionofindividualswhothroughSinnFeinput theirnamesforward.Toqualifyforconsiderationtheoffencesforwhicheach individualwhobelievedheorshemightbesuspected,orwanted(insome casesalreadyconvictedandhavingescapedfromprison),shouldhavebeen committedbeforethesigningoftheGoodFridayAgreementin1998and havebeenconnectedwiththeconflictinNorthernIreland.Thegroupto whichtheindividualconcernedwasaffiliated(ietheIRA)mustadheretothe commitmenttocessationofarmedconflict.Whilstthefirstcasespressedby SinnFeinconcernedthosewholivedandhadfamilyintheNorthofIreland, theschemeextendedtoapplicantsintheRepublicofIrelandwhohadno suchrelationshipsandtopersonswhoseextraditionhadbeenactivelysought fromwithinotherjurisdictions.Theschemewasnotlimitedtooffences committedintheNorthofIreland. AsSecretaryofState,Iwasconversantnotjustwiththeimplicationsbutwith therunningofthescheme,whichwasaschemeendorsedbyeverybranchof theGovernmentincludingthosetaskedwithconsideringprosecutions.The procedurewasinanumberofwayswhollyunprecedented.Theindividuals concernedweretold,intermsandinwriting,bytheNorthernIrelandOfficein responsetoSinnFeininrespectofeachapplicant,eitherthattheywereliable toarrestiftheyenteredthejurisdictionor,viaapersonalletterwhosekey phraseologywasinessencecommontoall,thatonthebasisofcurrent informationthattheywerenotwantedandwouldnotbearrested.Iwas involvedintheextensivediscussionsthatsurroundedattemptstobring legislationand/ortoconsideralternativemechanisms.Whenthesecouldnot beachieved,itwastheadministrativeschemethatpersisted. Therewereanumberofexceptionalfeaturestothescheme.Thefirst,of course,involvedSinnFeinbeingformallyputonnotice;individualswho otherwisemightnotknowwithanycertaintythattheycouldbesubjectto arrestwerealerted.Thesecondwasthattheschemeprogressedinanon publicmanner.Confidentialitywasmaintainedfortheindividualswho submittedtheirnamestothescheme;neitherthenamesoftheapplicants northeoutcomeoftheapplicationsweresubjectedtopublicity.Therewasin consequenceanenhancedrelianceuponinternalchecksbeingcorrectlydone andcorrectlynotifiedastherecipientwasdependentuponandtrustinginthe soleevidenceofanassurance,namelytheletterhe/she(oronhis/herbehalf SinnFein)receivedfromtheNorthernIrelandOffice.Iaminformedthatthe Courthasbeenprovidedwithinternaldocumentsthatshowthatata numberofjuncturesdiscussiontookplacewithaviewtoreducingtoburden ofverificationthatresteduponthedepartmentsconcerned,butthiswas rejectedonthebasisthatcornerscouldnotbecut.Itwasintendedthatthe assurancebejustthat,reliableassurancesastothepositionoftheapplicants andimplicitinthat,thattheprocessbywhichtheassuranceshadcometobe

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given,hadbeencompetentandrobust.Throughoutmyperiodoftimein office,Iwasconfidentthatwaspreciselytheposition.(Myemphasis) 82. InhisfirstwitnessstatementMrMcGintystates,amongotherthings,that: intheabsenceofanystatutoryscheme,SinnFeinthroughtheNorthern IrelandOffice,begantoprovidetheprosecutingauthoritieswithnamesof individualswhowereoutsidethejurisdictionandhadgroundforbelieving theymightbesubjecttoarrestorprosecutioniftheyreturnedtothe jurisdiction.Ibelieveitwasunderstoodbyallthatatbestthisadministrative schemewouldidentifythosecaseswhereindividualswerenotinfactwanted orwheretheevidentialtestcouldnolongereverbemet.Theprosecuting authoritiesacceptedtheadministrativeschemewithsomereluctance.Inpart thiswasbecausetheactualandperceivedimpartialityoftheprosecution authoritywasofcrucialimportancetothemaintenanceofpublicconfidence andtheadministrativeschemewouldonlybenefitonesideofadivided community.Thesecondreasonwasthatitwasnotusualforanassessment oftheevidencetobemadeintheabsenceoftheindividualconcerned.The thirdreasonwasthatwhereanindividualwasstillwanted,toinformthem thattheywouldbearrestediftheyreturnedtothejurisdictioncouldamount totippingoff.Thislastconcernwasmitigatedtosomeextentbythefact thatgiventhatanindividualsnamehadbeenputforwardinitselfsuggested thatthatindividualhadcausetobelievetheywereinfactwantedforarrest. Theseconcernshadtwoconsequences.Thefirstwasthatinassessingthe evidentialsufficiencyforprosecution,theusualtest,namelywhetherthere wassufficientevidencetoaffordareasonableprospectforconviction,was amendedslightlytoatestofwhethertherewasnow,orcouldeverbe, sufficientevidencetomeetthetestforprosecution.Thereasonforthiswas thatifanindividualreturnedandwasarrested,theevidentialpositionmay change.Theremaybeforensicteststhatcouldbecarriedout,fingerprints wouldbecomeavailableandadmissionsmaybemadeininterview. Thesecondconsequencefollowedonfromthefirst,andwasreflectedinthe wordingoftheletterssenttothosewhoweretoldtheycouldreturn.The lettersmadeclearthattheassessmentwasbasedontheevidencethen available.Thatpositioncouldchange.Itwastotheforefrontofthemindsof theprosecutorsthatifanindividualwhohadreceivedsuchaletterreturned tothejurisdictionandstartedcommentingpubliclythroughtheauthorshipof books,articlesorappearanceontelevisionthattheyhadinfactbeeninvolved interroristactivity(whichwasnotasfarfetchedasitmayseem)public confidenceinthecriminaljusticesystemwouldrequiretheauthoritiestobe abletoact.Itfollowedthatthelettersentcouldneveramounttoanamnesty ofabsoluteandfinalpromisenottoprosecute. Ibelievethelimitationsoftheschemewereunderstoodbyall.Ibelieveit wasunderstoodbytheIrishgovernmentbecauseatonestagetheyaskedthe AttorneyGeneraltoconsiderwhetherthepromisemadebygovernment couldbemetbytheuseofpreconvictionpardons.Ibelieveitwasalso understoodbySinnFeinasitwaspatentlyobviousthattheschemeonly soughttoidentifythoseindividualswhowereabletoreturnwithoutfearof

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arrestandprovidednoremedyforthosewhoremainedwanted.(My emphasis) Thedefendant&theadministrativescheme 83. AsIhavealreadyindicatedabove,thedefendantsnamewasfirstput forwardbySinnFeininJanuary2002(seeGeneralMattersVol2p.514).In duecourseafolderwascreatedinrelationtohim. 84. On26March2002itwasrecordedthatthedefendantwasstilloneofthose beingconsideredorpositivelyidentified(p.579580). 85. On30April2002thedefendantsPNCrecordwasprintedout(p.688694).It recordedthathewaswantedformurderon20July1982inthejurisdictionof theCentralCriminalCourt,andthathehadbeenreportedassuchon29May 1983.Itincludedthewords:ConspiracytomurderIRAterroristdonot interrogatecontactCommanderSO13(i.e.theAntiTerroristBranchofthe MetropolitanPolice). 86. InJuneandJuly2002itwasrecordedthatenquiriesintothedefendantwere ongoing(pp.635and642). 87. On17September2002theDepartmentoftheDPP(NI)wrotetothePSNIto indicatethatasearchhadrevealedafileinthedefendantsnamewhichwas concernedwiththemurderoftwomembersoftheUDRandcausingan explosionatEnniskillenon28August1972.Adirectionfornoprosecution hadbeenissuedon28May1985withtheprovisothat:Shouldanyfurther evidencecometolightinthefuturetoconnectDowneywith(the)explosion, thefileshouldberesubmitted.ThePSNIwereaskedtoconfirmthatno furtherevidencehadcometolight. 88. On7November2002thePSNIwrotetotheDPP(NI)toindicatethatit appearedthatnofurtherevidencehadcometolightinrelationtothe Enniskillenbombing,butthattheOTRteamwasreviewingthedefendants suspectedinvolvementinanumberofcrimes,includingtheEnniskillen bombing,andhopedtobeinapositiontoadvisetheDPP(NI)shortly(p.663). Towardstheendofthatmonth(p.668/9)itwasrecordedthatenquiries wereongoing. 89. On28March2003itwasindicatedthatenquirieswereongoing,andthatthe CrownSolicitorwastocarryoutafilecheck(p.671/2). 90. On9April2003itwasrecordedthatthepolicewerehopingtosubmita reportshortly,thatthedefendantwaswanted,butthattheCrownSolicitor hadnointerest(p.676/7).

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91. 92.

On27Augustand9October2003itwasrecordedthataletterfromthe policewastoissueshortly(pp.679/680and696/7). On9December2003therewasnoreferencetoaletterfromthepolice(p. 699/700).HoweveritisclearthatthePSNIinvestigatedthedefendantin relationtofiveincidentsinNorthernIrelandandthattheyalsomadesome enquiriesoftheMetropolitanPoliceinrelationtotheHydeParkBombing. Eachofthesixincidentswasthesubjectofatemplate.TheHydePark Bombingwasthesubjectofthesixthtemplate.AtsomepointanAssessment Forminrelationtothattemplatewascompleted(p.681/2),andrecorded thatthedefendantwascirculatedasbeingwantedforconspiracytomurder inrelationtotheHydeParkexplosioninLondonon20July1982andthat therewasfingerprintevidenceinthecase.Thematerialsinrelationtothe sixthtemplatealsoincludedaSpecialBranchreport(p.684)whichalso recordedthatthedefendantwasrequiredforquestioninginrelationtothe HydeParkBombingbytheMetropolitanPolice.TherewasalsoanICIS summaryinrelationtothedefendant(p.686/7)andhisPNCrecord(already referredtoabove,p.688694). On22July2004aninternalPSNIdocument(p.701)recordedthatthearrest andinterviewofthedefendanthadbeenapprovedinrespectofanumberof NorthernIrishincidents,includingtheEnniskillenbombing.Itwasalso recordedthatthedefendanthadbeenidentifiedonfingerprintsinrelationto theHydeParkExplosionon20July1982,andthattheAntiTerroristBranch hadconfirmedthatnoextraditionhadbeenattempted,butthatitwastheir intentiontoarrestthedefendantshouldhecomewithinthejurisdiction. On14September2004thePSNIwrote(p.702)totheDPP(NI)pointingout thatthedefendanthadneverbeeninterviewedinrelationtotheincidentat Enniskillen,andthatitmaybethatfurtherevidencewouldcometolight duringsuchaninterview.Theletteralsoindicatedthat,inaddition,the defendantwaswantedbythePSNIforarrestandinterviewinrelationtoa numberofseriousterroristoffences. On27January2006theNIOwrote,followingameeting,tothePSNIasking whetheritwasnowconfirmedthatthedefendantwaswanted(p.722724). On31January2006thePSNIwrotetotheNIOunderliningtheimportanceof theNIO,PPS,PSNIandAttorneyGeneralsofficebeinginagreementasto whatexactlythepositioninrelationtoallpersonsnamedonallSinnFeinlists was,andsuggestingaroundtablemeetingofalltheabovementionedparties (p.727732). On27February2006(seeabove)theAttorneyGeneralwrotetotheSSNI(by then,MrHain)andinformedhimthatthedefendantwaswantedforarrest andquestioninginrespectofseriousterroristoffences.Therewasno mention,assuch,oftheHydeParkBombing(p.733/4).

93.

94.

95. 96.

97.

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 98.

99.

InMarch2006theNIOwrotetoMrKellystatingthatinrelationtofour individualstherewasnooutstandingdirectiontoprosecuteinNorthern Ireland,thattherewerenowarrantsinexistence,andnorwerethe individualswantedinNorthernIrelandforarrest,questioningorchargeby thepolice.Letterstothefourindividualswereincludedeachintheterms setoutinparagraph49above.However,thelettertoMrKellywentonto indicatethatthreeotherindividuals,oneofwhomwasthedefendant,would inthecurrentcircumstancesoftheircasesfacearrestandquestioningifthey returnedtoNorthernIreland(p.735/6). InJune2006(p.741/2)thedefendantappearedonalistofpersonswho wereconfirmedasbeingwantedbytheNIOandwantedforquestioningby thePSNI.

100. InJanuary2007aPSNIschedule(p.745)recordedthatthedefendantwas currentlywantedbythePSNI,andthatenquiriesconfirmedthathewas soughtforarrestandinterviewinrelationtoanumberofseriousterrorist offences,andthattheNIOhadinformedSinnFeinaccordinglyinMarch 2006. 101. ItwillberecalledthatitwasaroundFebruary2007thatOperationRapid commenced.IhavealreadysummariseditsTermsofReferenceinparagraph 74above.Itwillberecalledthatitwasareviewofpersonscirculatedas wantedbythePSNIinconnectionwithterroristrelatedoffencesupto10 April1998anditspurposewastoexaminewhatbasis,ifany,thePSNIhadto seekthearrestofthoseindividualsidentifiedbySinnFeintotheGovernment andpassedtotheChiefConstable. 102. On13April2007emailmessageswithinthePSNIshowthat,attherequestof OperationRapid,acheckwasmadeonthePNCtoseewhetherthe defendantwasstillwantedfortheHydeParkBombingandthatitwas confirmedthathewas(p.758). 103. OnthesamedayanOperationRapidupdateinrelationtothedefendant (p.760),whichincludedacrossreferencetotheSpecialBranchreport(p.684 seeabove),madereferencetothesixthtemplateinhiscase.Itwas recordedthatthattemplaterelatedtotheHydeParkBombingon20July 1982;thatnocasepaperswereavailableinNorthernIrelandbutthat: DowneyisalertedonPNCaswantedformurderifarrestedinformSO13 evidenceisbywayoffingerprints.Thealertiscurrentandwaslast updated/confirmedbythisteamon13/4/07.Thereisnofurtherinformation toaddtothistemplate.ShouldDowneybearrestedinNorthernIrelandfor offencesherewewouldbedutyboundtoinformSO13NewScotlandYard. 104. On7May2007ActingDetectiveChiefInspectorGrahamofOperationRapid carriedoutareviewofthedefendantscase.Itissaidthathehadavailableto himthe2003OTRdocumentationrelatingtoHydePark(p.681/694)andthe

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13April2007update(p.760/1)bothofwhichreferredtotheHydePark Bombing.TherecordofADCIGrahamsreviewinrelationtotheHydePark Bombing(thesixthtemplate)didnotemergeuntilenquirieswere commencedduringthehearing(seeparagraphs1516above).ADCIGraham recordedhisdecisioninaPolicyDecisionLogBookasbeing:Thatsubjectis notwantedbyPSNI,howeverthereisinformationtosuggestthatheis wantedbyMetropolitanPolice,Iwillrequestanuptodatereportfrom MetropolitanPoliceoncurrentstatusoftheircirculation.Theofficer recordedhisreasonsasbeing: 1.Conspiracytomurderallegationsrelatetoincidentsthatoccurredin London1982.Itisnotknownwheretheconspiracywascarriedout. 2.Thereisnoevidenceonfilethatwouldgivemegroundstoconsider circulationbyoronbehalfofPSNIforanyoffencewithinthejurisdiction. 3.Theevidencei.e.fingerprintdoesnotspecifythatthefingerprintbelongs tosubject.HeishowevercirculatedonthePNCasbeingwantedbythe MetropolitanPolice. 4.Iconsiderthatthepresentcirculationby/onbehalfofMetPoliceshould remainsubjecttofurtherclarificationfromtheEnglishauthorities.

105. InareportlaterthatdaytoDetectiveChiefSuperintendentBaxter,ADCI Grahamindicatedthathehadcompletedareviewinrespectofthe defendant,withdueconsiderationbeinggiventotheagreedTermsof Reference;thatallthetemplatesinrelationtothedefendantwerebasedon intelligence,includingthetemplaterelatingtothebombatHydePark,and thathehadreviewedthepapersandcouldfindnoevidencethatthe defendantwaswantedbythePSNIforthatoffence,butthatthedefendant wasstillwantedbytheMetropolitanPoliceinrelationtoitsubjecttoany furtherevidence.Heindicatedthat,inrespectoftheothertemplates,there wasnoevidenceormaterialthatcouldprovidesufficientgroundstohavethe defendantcirculatedatthattime.Hethereforerecommendedthatthe defendantbelistedasnotwantedbythePSNIatthattime,andthat clarificationshouldbesoughtfromtheMetropolitanPoliceastothecurrent positionwiththeircirculationofthedefendant.Todate,norecordofany requestforclarificationhasbeenfound. 106. On10May2007DCSBaxterwho,itissaid,would(unlessheaskedforfurther documentation)onlyhaveconsideredADCIGrahamsreportof7May, reportedtoAssistantChiefConstableSheridaninrelationtoanumberof individuals.Astothedefendant,hesaidthat:Theabovepersonisanative oftheRepublicofIrelandandisacitizenoftheIrishRepublic.Hehasnot residedinNorthernIrelandandremainsresidentinhisnativedistrict.Heis notcurrentlyontherunfromhishome.Ihavereviewedhiscaseandthere isnobasisinmyprofessionalopiniontoseekhisarrestcurrentlyforany offencepriortothesigningoftheGoodFridayAgreement.Theaboveperson shouldbeinformedthatheisnotcurrentlywantedbythePSNIforoffences priortotheGoodFridayAgreement1998,butitshouldbeborneinmindthat shouldnewproperlyassessedandreliableintelligence,ornewevidence

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whichhasbeenjudgedtoretainitsintegrity,emergewhichcreates reasonablegroundstosuspecthisinvolvementinoffencesthenhewillbe liabletoarrestforanysuchoffencewhichmayhavebeencommittedduring thisperiod.(p.765). 107. ThusitisclearthatalthoughDCSBaxterknewfromADCIGrahamsreport aboutthefactthatthedefendantwaswantedinrelationtotheHydePark Bombing,hemadenoreferencetoitortothedefendantbeingwantedin relationtoit.WhenaskedbyDICorrigan(seeparagraphs14and15above) duringthecourseofthehearingshesaidthathereportedtoACCSheridan viaastrictapplicationoftheOperationRapidcriteriaandagreedparameters. HesaidthatthedefendantwasnotwantedbythePSNIandwasnot consideredtobeontherunashewasnotaresidentofNorthernIreland,and thattherewasnostatutoryrequirementtosupplyanyfurtherinformationas peragreedparameters. 108. On6June2007ACCSheridanwrote(p.766)totheDPP(NI)referringtothe ongoingreviewandstatinginrelationtothedefendantthat:theabove personisnotaresidentofNorthernIrelandandisacitizenoftheRepublicof Ireland.HehasnotresidedinNorthernIrelandandremainsaresidentinthe Republic.HeisnotthereforecurrentlyOntheRunfromhishome. EnquiriesindicatethatJohnDowneyisnotcurrentlywantedbythePSNI. 109. On7June2007theOperationRapidteammadeanentryinPSNIrecords indicatingthatthedefendantwasnotcurrentlywantedbyPSNIunlessa newappropriatealertiscreatedbyanInvestigatingofficer. 110. On12June2007(p.767)theActingDPP(NI)providedamemberofhisstaff with,amongotherthings,ACCSheridansletterinrelationtothedefendant, andrequestedthatchecksbemadeagainstthefilesandinformationheldby theDPP(NI)inaccordancewithpreviousinstructionsforthetask(whichdo notappeartohavebeendisclosed),andthereaftertopreparelettersforthe AttorneyGeneralsOfficeandACCSheridan. 111. AroundmidJune2007theNIOrequestedconfirmationinwritingfrom OperationRapidthatallcheckswithoutsideforceshadbeencarriedoutin relationtosubjectsunderreview.Anumberofemailsinrelationtothat requestweredisclosedduringthehearing.Inparticular,on13June2007ACC SheridansD/StaffOfficeremailedDCSBaxterandADCIGrahamseeking confirmationinwritingthatsuchcheckshadbeencarriedout. 112. On14June2007MrMcGowan(amemberoftheOperationRapidteam) emailedADCIGrahamasfollows:theoriginalversionofthereviewtemplate didnotspecificallyaskforanindividualsPoliceNationalComputer(PNC) and/orInterpolnumbers,orifsuchhadbeenchecked.Subsequentletters, however,fromHeadofBranchC2madereferencetoenquiriesindicatingif thepersonwaswantedbyotherUKforcesorbyanyothercountryby

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Interpol.ThelettersstipulatedthatnoenquireshadbeenmadewithAn GardaSiochana.Itseemsthatitwaspracticeforthereviewteamtocheckfor PNCentriesandtocheckviaInterpolliaisonforinternationalalertsbutthere appearstohavebeennoformalmeansofrecording,orapprisingtheHeadof Branchof,theresultsofsuchenquiries(althoughinsomeoftheolderfiles thereisachecklistwhichincludesGazette/PNC/Interpol).Thecurrentreview teamhasexaminedwhetherindividualsarewantedbythePSNIin connectionwithterroristrelatedoffencesupto10April1998(asperterms ofreference).Ithasbeenpractice,however,forthecurrentteamtoexamine ICISforindicationsofPNCentriesbyexaminingthePNCIDfieldwiththe nominalsviewpersonscreen.Thisisthescreenthatopenswhenan individualissearchedforbymeansofanICISuniquereferencenumber (URN).PNCitselfisonlyaccessedduringsearcheswhentheindividualis soughtbymeansofanameanddateofbirthorage.Thevastmajorityofthis teamssearchesaredonebymeansofanICISURNrelyingthereforeonthe accuracyofthePNCIDfields.Samplecheckscarriedouttodayhaverevealed thatICIScannotberelieduponinthisrespect.Tenpeopleonourlistofthose recentlyreviewedhavebeenscrutinised.Noneofthetenhaveentriesinthe PNCIDfieldbutfivearerecordedwhenPNCitselfischecked.Threeofthe individualsarealertedaswantedinNorthernIrelandandtwosimplyhave PNCnominalentries.Noneofthetenwererecordedaswantedbyanyother agency.(Asdiscussedwedidrecentlycheckoneindividualwhowasrecorded onPNCaswantedinEnglandandcarriedoutfurtherenquirieswiththeMet). ItisnowclearthatwecannotrelyontheICISviewpersonscreenandmust carryoutspecificPNCchecksoneveryindividual.Inresponsetotherequest belowthisofficecannotstatethatallcheckswithoutsideforceshavebeen carriedout,asInterpolhasnotbeenconsultedandearlierrelianceonPNC IDfieldsisclearlyflawed.ThereviewteamcannowrecheckPNCitselfvia ICISinrespectofthosenominalsalreadyreviewedandcansubmitthose namestoInterpolliaisonwhichhasnotbeenthepracticeofthisteam.It appearsthatrequeststoInterpolwillrequireprovisiontothemofsignificant information,includingreasonorjustificationforthecheckanddetailsofany offencesofwhichsuspected.Theoriginalreviewtemplatewasamendedto answerquestionsofcontinuity/intelligenceoriginsetceteraandwillnowbe amendedtostatethatPNC/Interpolcheckshavebeendone.Allindividuals willbespecificallysearchedonICISforPNCentriesandInterpolliaisonat PSNICriminalJusticeDepartmentwillbeaskedtoconductenquiriesat Interpol.(Subjecttoyourconfirmationthatthismustbedone).Acopyofthe SOCAformforusewithInterpolisattachedforyourinformation. 113. ThatwaspassedontoDCSBaxterwholateron14June2007emailedADCI Grahamasfollows:Theissueisprobablyresolved.AsIunderstanditifa personwithadomicileaddressinNorthernIrelandiswantedbypoliceon mainlandUKthenthePSNIareformallynotifiedandanentryismadeagainst theirnominalonICIS.Similarly,ifanindividualiswantedoutsidetheUKe.g. aEuropeancountrythenacurrentEuropeanArrestWarrantistheformal andlegalmeansofnotifyingthePSNI.Onceagainsuchanarrestwarrantis

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loggedagainstthenominalofanindividualonICIS.IfICISchecksarenot flagginganindividualaswantedbyaGBpoliceforceorunderaEuropean ArrestWarrantthenitiscorrecttoreportthatthatindividualisnotwanted bythePSNIonbehalfofeitheraGBforceoraEuropeancountry.Itwouldbe impossibletocheck100percentastowhetherornotanindividualis suspectedofoffenceswhichhavenotreachedalevelofevidencetoformally seekarrestandtodosothroughoutEurope.Ihopethisguidanceishelpful. WhatweneedtoestablishisthefollowingIsXwantedforarrestbythe PoliceServiceofNorthernIrelandforanoffences(sic)pretheGoodFriday Agreementorcirculatedaswantedforarrestbyanexternalforceandthe existenceofreasonablegrounds(withintheUK)oraEuropeanArrest Warrant.ThiscanbeestablishedbyanICIScheckandIdonotbelievethat investigationsbeyondthisarenecessaryasthetenexaminedhasshown. 114. ThatwasforwardedbyADCIGrahamtoMrMcGowansaying:pleaseseethe viewsfromHOBC2whichareforwardedforinformation.Wewillsticktoour agreedprinciplesandprogressasnecessary 115. On20June2007therewasemailcorrespondence(againdisclosedduringthe hearing)betweenMrMcGowan,ADCIGraham,DCSBaxterandACC SheridansD/StaffOfficerinwhichitwasmadeclearthatInterpolchecksas suchwerenotbeingundertaken. 116. On27June2007theActingDPP(NI)wrotetoMrMcGintyintheLegal SecretariattotheLawOfficers(p.769AD)inrelationto8individuals includingthedefendant.HequotedfromACCSheridansletterof6June 2007includingtheassertionthatenquirieshadindicatedthatthedefendant wasnotcurrentlywantedbythePSNIandaddedthattheonefileheldbyhis service(inrelationtotheEnniskillenbombing)wasclosed. 117. OnthesamedateACCSheridanwrote(p.769)totheDirectorPoliticalatthe NIOstating,inanswertoherearlierquery,thathecouldconfirmthat:our reviewsetouttoestablishifXiswantedforarrestbyPSNIforanyoffences pretheGoodFridayAgreementorcirculatedaswantedforarrestbyan externalforceandtheexistenceofreasonablegrounds(withintheUK)ora EuropeanArrestWarrant.ThiscanbeestablishedbyanICIScheck(PSNIs computersystem),checkswithAnGardaSiochanaandthePoliceNational Computer(PNC).Thesecheckshaveallbeencarriedoutinrelationtothe lettersforwardedtotheDirectorofPublicProsecutionsfromthePSNIand theyarethesamecheckswhichhavebeencarriedoutduringprevious reviews. 118. On11July2007MrMcGintywrote(p.785)totheNIOinrelationto10 individualsincludingthedefendantinrelationtowhomhequotedthe ActingDPP(NI)letterof27Juneinfull.

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119. InhissecondwitnessstatementMrMcGintystates,amongotherthings, that: BythetimetheDowneyletterwassent,theprocesswasfamiliarandhad beenrunningforsomeyears.InolongerinformedtheAttorneyGeneralof individualdecisionsandthelettertotheNorthernIrelandOfficewouldbe sentbymetoanofficialthereIconfirmthatinrespectofMrDowney,his namewasoneofanumberinaletterfromtheDeputyDPPidentifiedasnot beingwanted.Ididnotseeanyothermaterialinrelationtohimuntilhis arrest.IdidnotrecognisehisnameanddidnotconnecthimwiththeHyde Parkbombing.Theconsiderationofhisextraditionhappenedbeforemy arrivalhereandnoneofthosewhodealtwithitatthetimewereinthe AttorneyGeneralsofficewhentheDowneyletterwassentInsummary,in relationtothevastmajorityofnamesconsidered,includingthatofMr Downey,theroleofthisofficewassimplytoforwardinformationtotheNIO thatwasbeingprovidedtousbythePPS.ThenameDowneymeantnothing tome.IwasnotawareofanyotherinformationabouthimandtheLaw Officersandthisofficetooknopartintheconsiderationgiventohisposition bythePSNIorthePPS.(Myemphasis) 120. On20July2007,followinganearlierattempton18July,MrMarkSweeneyof theNIOemailedtheD/StaffOfficertoACCSheridan(p.770/1)seeking confirmationofanearlierconversationduringwhichtheStaffOfficerhad saidthatthePSNIhadcheckedwhetheranyoftheindividualsnamedinMr McGintysletterof11July(whoincludedMrDowney)werewantedbyan externalforceasfarasthePSNIcouldascertain,andhadestablishedthat theywerenot.Theemailfurtherrecordedthatduringtheearlier conversationithadbeenagreedthatMrSweeneywouldemailtheD/Staff OfficerandthatshewouldcheckthatMrSweeneysunderstandingwas correctorwouldputhimright. 121. WithinminutestheD/StaffOfficerreplied(p.770):TheletterfromACC Sheridandated27Juneconfirmsthatpriortoforwardingalldetailstothe DirectorofPublicProsecutionsourreviewteamconductallsearchesthrough ourowncomputersystemICIS,thePoliceNationalComputer(PNC)and checkswithAnGardaSiochana.Thisistheprocessconductedforall individualsreviewedpriortoanylettersbeingsentfromthisofficeandthis willcontinuetobethecase.Toconfirm,thesecheckshavebeencarriedout onthetennamesinthe11Julyletter.Itwasclearlyimplicitintheemail thatnotonlyhadthechecksbeendone,butthattheywerenegative. 122. Laterthatsameday(20July2007)MrSweeneywrotetoMrKellyofSinnFein (p.773/4)statingthat:Youhavepreviouslybeenincorrespondencewiththe NorthernIrelandOfficeaboutanumberofindividualswhoarecurrentlyon therunbutwanttoreturntoNorthernIrelandandwishtobeinformedof theirstatusiftheyweretodoso.Followinginvestigationsmadebythe relevantauthoritiesinNorthernIrelandIcannowconfirmthatthenecessary checkshavebeencompletedon10moreindividuals.Onthebasisofthe

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informationcurrentlyheldinrespectofthe10individuals,thereisno outstandingdirectionforprosecutioninNorthernIreland,thereareno warrantsinexistencenoraretheywantedinNorthernIrelandforarrest, questioningorchargebythepolice 123. Letterstoeachindividualwereenclosed.Thebodyofthelettertothe defendant(p.780),incommonwiththeotherletterswas(aspreviouslyset outabove)inthefollowingtermsTheSecretaryofStateforNorthern IrelandhasbeeninformedbytheAttorneyGeneralthatonthebasisofthe informationcurrentlyavailable,thereisnooutstandingdirectionfor prosecutioninNorthernIreland,therearenowarrantsinexistencenorare youwantedinNorthernIrelandforarrest,questioning,orchargebythe police.ThePoliceServiceofNorthernIrelandarenotawareofanyinterest inyoufromanyotherpoliceforceintheUnitedKingdom.Ifanyother outstandingoffenceoroffencescametolight,orifanyrequestfor extraditionweretobereceived,thesewouldhavetobedealtwithinthe usualway.(Myemphasis) 124. Anotheroftherecipientswasoneoftheothertwopeoplewhohadbeen informedatthesametimeasthedefendantinMarch2006thathewas wanted.ThestatusofthethirdpersontobewarnedinMarch2006wasnot changed.(Inhiswitnessstatement,MrKellygivestheexampleofanother personwhowasinformedin2001,2002and2010thathewaswanted,but wasthereafterinformedinDecember2012thathewasnotwanted). 125. On7May2008(p.790)anotherenquiryteaminthePSNIwhowere investigatingadoublemurderinSeptember1972madeenquiriesofthe OperationRapidsteaminrelationtothe7June2007entryinPSNIrecords, seekingconfirmationoftheirpresumptionthatitmeantwhenanyother evidencebecameavailable.Thatwasconfirmedinareplywhichstatedthat: thedecisionbyHeadC2thatDowneyisnotcurrentlywantedisbased oninformationavailableatthetimeoftheassessment.Iffurtherevidence comestolightthematterwouldthenbereviewedbyanappropriateSIO. 126. On23July2008(p.794)MrMcGowanemailedADCIGrahamandACC SheridansD/StaffOfficerinrelationtothedefendantssuspected involvementintheEnniskillenbombing,asfollows:InJune2007,following OperationRapidreview,aletterwasissuedstatingthatDowneywasnot consideredtobeOnTheRunbyvirtueofhisnothavinglivedinNorthern Ireland.TheletteraddedthathewasnotcurrentlywantedbyPSNI.There wasnocaveattotheeffectthathecouldbecomeliabletoarrestiffurther evidencecametolight.IhavejustspokenwithHETinrelationtothismatter. HETexpressedsomeconcernthatDowneywasnotconsideredaswanted. Theyinformedmethattheyhavelocatedacrucialpieceofevidencein relationtoadoublemurderforwhichwesubmittedareviewtemplate.Itis probablethattheywillhaveanSIOcreateanewwantedalertinrespectof themurdersconcerned.Thissituationreflectsthecircumstancescateredfor

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bytheadditionofacaveatinOpRapidICISentriesandtherelevantletters.In thiscasehowever,presumablybecauseDowneywasnotconsideredtobe OTR,therewasnocaveatintheletterissuedtothePPS.GiventhatDowney didnothaveaNorthernIrelandaddressitisunlikelythathewillnowseekto liveinthisjurisdiction.Itisofcoursepossiblethathemightvisithereand,ifa newalertiscreated,besubjecttoarrest. 127. On25July2008(p.794)theD/StaffOfficerrepliedstatingthat:sincethe letterinrelationtothisindividualwentoutsometimeagostatinghewasnot tobedeemedaswantedIwillneedareportdetailingwhatactionshould/can betakennowtopresenttoACCSheridanassoonaspossible. 128. On28July2008(p.793)MrMcGowanemailedADCIGrahamsettingoutthe backgroundinrelationtotheinvestigationofthedefendantinconnection withtheEnniskillenbombingandcontinued:Ithasalwaysbeenthecase thatnewevidencecouldpotentiallybeuncoveredbyHETorothers investigatingcasespreviouslyreviewed(underspecificcriteria)byOpRapid. Itismyunderstandingthatithasbeenmadeknowntoconcernedparties thattheassessmentofapersonasnotcurrentlywantedwasalways subjecttotheconditionthatnewevidencecouldresultinthatperson becomingliabletoarrestiflocatedinthisjurisdiction.Althoughtheletter relatingtoDowneydidnotspecificallycarrythiscaveatallinterestedparties areapparentlyawarethatthisconditionapplies.HEThaveindicatedthat theywillnowseektohaveanewalertcreatedinrespectofJohnAnthony Downey.Consequentlyheislikelytobedescribedaswantedformurder uponcreationbytheHETofanappropriatealert.Thisofficehasnot examinedthemurderinvestigationconductedbyHETandhasnoremittodo so.TherecouldhoweverbevalueinaSeniorInvestigatingOfficerappointed byD/C/SuptBaxterliaisingwithHETonthismatterinordertoclarifythe groundstooverturnthedecisionoftheOpRapidreview.Despitethe understandingthatnewevidencewouldoverturnanOpRapidassessment thereispotentialthatPSNIcouldbeaccusedofabuseofprocessoractingin badfaith,particularlysincetheletterspecifictoDowneydidnotcontainthe appropriatecaveat. 129. On29July2008(p.792/3)ADCIGrahamupdatedDCSBaxterand recommendedthat,beforecirculationwasconsidered,anSIOshouldbe appointedtoreviewtherelevantmaterialandliaisewiththePPSas appropriate. 130. Anhourlateron29July2008(p.794A)MrMcGowan(whohadbeencopied inontheearlieremail)emailedADCIGraham(copyinginACCSheridans D/StaffOfficer)statingthat:IhaveadvisedHEToftheexistenceoftheDPP directiondatedMay1985.IwillalsoconfirmthattheyareawareoftheMets interest.IhavecheckedPNCandtheMetwantedalertformurderisstillon thesystem(itdoesnotspecifytheHydeParkBomb).Thereportfromthen

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HeadC2toACCCrimeOpsandthesubsequentlettertotheDPPdonotstate thatDowneyiswantedbytheMet.(Myemphasis) 131. Afewminuteslater(p.794A)ADCIGrahamreplied(copyinginDCSBaxter): Noted.Thankyou. 132. Theseriesofemailsdated2329July2008(excludingtheonedealingwith theHydeParkBombing)wereprintedoutbyADCIGrahamon29July2008 andwerefoundbyMrLittleduringthedisclosureexerciseinsideADCI Grahamsrelevant2007PoliceDecisionLogbookinfrontofthepagedealing withthesixthtemplate(whichrelatedtotheHydeParkBombing).Therewas norelevantentryinADCIGrahams2008PolicyDecisionLogbooks. 133. ThePSNIdidnotalerttheDPP(NI),oranyoneelse,tothefactthatthe defendanthadbeenwantedbytheMetropolitanPoliceinrelationtothe HydeParkBombingatthetimeofthecriticalcorrespondenceinJune/July 2007,ortothefactthatthedefendantwasstillwantedbytheMetropolitan PoliceinJuly2008. 134. ADCIGrahamtoldDICorriganthathedidnotrecallthe2008emails,asdid DCSBaxter(nowretired).AsIhavealreadyindicated,MrBaxteralsostated thattherewasnorequirementtoprovidefurtherinformationasperagreed parameters. 135. TherewasfurtheremailcorrespondenceinrelationtotheEnniskillen bombingon4August2008(p.792). 136. On21October2009aninternalPSNIreport(p.796)recordedthatthe defendantwasoneofanumberofindividualswhosenamewaschecked againstlistsheldbyOperationRapidwiththeresult:StatusreviewedbyOp RapidandassessedasnotcurrentlywantedbyPSNI.Heis,however,alerted onPNCaswantedformurder20/07/82(HydeParkBombing).(My emphasis) 137. Again,nothingwasdonetoalerttheDPP(NI),oranyoneelse,inrelationto thedefendantbeingwantedbytheMetropolitanPoliceinconnectionwith theHydeParkBombing. 138. Astofailuretowarnthedefendant,intheletterof20July2007and thereafter,thathewasstillwantedbytheMetropolitanPolice,MrMcGinty saysinhissecondstatement:Assetoutinmyearlierstatement,Iworked closelywiththePPSinrespectofthisschemeandothermatters.Iam confidentthatifanyinformationcametotheattentionofthePPS,NIOor thisofficethattherewassomespecificdoubtaboutMrDowneyoranyother individualonthelist,thematterwouldhavebeenlookedatagain.Therewas nointentionbyofficialstomisleadanyindividualintobelievingitwassafeto returntothejurisdictionandthenarrestingthemwhentheydid.The

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consequencesofthathappeningwouldhavebeenseriousandcastdoubton thewholeprocess.Itwouldcallintoquestionthestatusofallotherswhohad beennotifiedtheyweresafetoreturn.Inpreparingfordisclosureinthe currentcase,counselwasgivenfullaccesstoallrelevantfilesheldbyAGO, NIO,PPSandPSNIandotherdepartments.Ihavebeenaskedtocommenton whethertherewasanyfurthercommunicationbetweenPSNIandAGO regardingMrDowneyafter2008.Therewasnot.Iamequallyconfidentthat hadinformationbeenpassedtothePPSorNIOIwouldhavebeentold.This wasadifficult,timeconsumingand,insomeways,controversialprocess.Had itcometoourattentionthatMrDowney,oranyotherindividualhadwrongly beentoldtheycouldreturntothejurisdictionwithoutfearofarrest,we wouldhavehadamajorproblem.Iwouldhaveimmediatelyinformedthe AttorneyGeneralandDPP(NI)and,inthecircumstances,theCPS.Icannot speculateonwhatwemayhavedoneafterthis.Itwouldhavebeenamajor incidentandwouldhavebeenreflectedassuchonourfilesandthoseofthe PPSandNIO.(Myemphasis) 139. MrHain,whohasbeenshowntheunderlyingdocumentationandMr McGintysstatement,states:IhavebeenmadeawarethatJohnDowney,an OnTheRunapplicantinJuly2007receivedaletterinthesametermsas otherpersonsatthesametime.Ihaveseentheletter,whichinphraseology repeatedinletterstomanyapplicantspreviously,providesanassurancethat hewasnotliabletoarrestifheenteredthejurisdiction.Onitsfaceit informedhimthathewasnotwantedinthenorthofIreland.Norwasthere anyinterestfromanyotherpoliceforceintheUnitedKingdom(onthebasis ofinformationfromthePSNI).Iconfirmthatwastheassurancethatwas intendedbytheGovernmenttobeunderstoodbytherecipientofsuch lettersInotetheinternalcommunicationsinwhichrequestsforadditional confirmationaremadebyofficialsattheNorthernIrelandOfficeastothe exactpositioninrelationtotenapplicantsofwhomMrDowneywasone.In responsetheNorthernIrelandOfficeisinformedbythePSNIthatallthe nameshavebeencheckedthroughtheICIS,thePNCandtheAnGarda Siochanacomputersystems.Inotethatthesuccessiverequeststoensure accuracymadebytheNorthernIrelandOfficereceivedconfirmationofits understandingofMrSheridansletter,providedbyaDetectiveSergeant,a StaffOfficertotheAssistantChiefConstable.ThecarewithwhichtheNIO soughttoconfirmitsunderstandingisconsistentwithmyexperienceofthe wayinwhichtheschemewasandwasrequiredtobeconductedandupon whichtheGovernmentinitsdealingswithSinnFeinonthisissuedepended. Thesewereimportantassurancestobeprocessedresponsiblyandcarefully, issuedinthenameoftheGovernment,intendedbytheGovernmenttobe reliableandanticipatedasbeingrelieduponIhavebeenaskedtocomment fromtheviewpointoftheSecretaryofStatehaditbeenbroughttomy attentionatanystagethataletterhadbeensentoutbytheNorthernIreland OfficetoSinnFeinandtoanindividualwhichcontainedsoseriousanerror.I amentirelysurethatitwouldhavebeenconsideredrightandappropriate immediatelytoinformSinnFeinthataletterhadbeenprovidedthatwas

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providedinerror.Idonotspeculateastowhatstepstheprosecuting authoritieswouldhavetaken,butasMrMcGintyrightlysays,andasIcan confirm,theBritishgovernmentdidnotintendindividualstobemisledinto believingtheyweresafetoreturntothejurisdictionandthenbearrested.The oppositewasthecase;itwasintendedatalltimesthattheyshouldknow withaccuracytheirposition;hencetheexceptionalsteptakenfromthattime oftheWestonParktalksandthereafter,ofpositivelynotifyingSinnFeinthat particularindividualswhohadputtheirnamesforwardwereliabletoarrest, anindicationthatnodoubtallowedeachtodecidewhetherornottheymight enterthejurisdictioninfullknowledgeoftherisksiftheydidso.Ifdespite whathadbeensaidinalettertothecontrary,SinnFeinwasthereafter informedthattheindividualconcernedwasstillwantedheorshewould havenodoubtimmediatelybeentold;atransparentprecautionarystep wouldhaveintheseexceptionalcircumstancesbeenappropriatelytakenthat wouldhaveallowedfortheindividualaswellasthewellbeingoftheprocess asawholetobeprotectedfromunintendedrisk,consistentlywithboththe letterandspiritinwhichthisuniqueschemehadbeenconstructed.No mistakeofsuchimportancecouldorshouldhavebeenpermittedtohave goneuncorrected.Iamawareofhowcriticallyimportantitwasthroughout thatmostdifficultofperiodsthatpromisesmadebyandinthenameof Governmentmustbeabletobetakenatfacevalueandadheredto.The underlyingdifficultyallhadtoovercomewasthefearthatanypartiestothe process,includingthegovernmentsconcerned,mightmakefalsepromisesor mightnotbetruetotheirword.Theentirerecordofthemorethantenyears ofextraordinaryandoftenalmostimpossibleobstaclestoprogressreflects preciselythis.Thepeaceprocessisnotonethatwasfixedatanymomentof time,whateverthemajormilestonesachieved.Itwasandisonethathas requiredconstantadherenceonallsidestotheirundertakings.Icontinueto maintainacloseinterestintheprogressionofthepoliticalprocessin NorthernIrelandandmaintainclosecontactwithmanyofthosecurrently involvedinGovernment.Iamawareofthelevelofseriousconcernand uncertaintythatthissituationhasengendered;Iprovidethisstatementin thehopethattheCourtmightbeassistedbymyassessmentofwhateach letterwasintendedbytheGovernmenttoprovide.(Myemphasis) 140. MrDowneyrelieduponthelettersenttohimbytheNIOinJuly2007to traveloutsidetheRepublicofIreland.Inparticular; (1) Inthesummerof2008,beforetravellingtoCanadawithhiswifeto visithissonandgrandchild,thedefendant(guidedbytheexperience ofhisfriendDannyMorrison)contactedtheCanadianauthoritiesto seekatemporaryresidencepermitstating:Thereasonfortheabove applicationisthatIservedatermofimprisonmentinPortlaoise prisonintheIrishRepublicin1974.[Pleaseseeenclosedpolicecert]I wasnamedinsomeBritishnewspapersasbeingresponsibleforthe HydePark&RegentsParkbombingsin1982,whichIstrenuously deny.NowarrantwaseverissuedbytheBritishauthoritiestohave meextraditedandIunderstandfromcontactswhichhavetakenplace

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(2)

(3)

(4) (5)

betweentheBritishandSinnFeinthatthey,theBritish,haveno furtherinterestinme.Ihavestronglysupportedthepeaceprocess fromtheverybeginningofthetalksandIbelievethattheonlyway forwardforallpeopleontheislandofIrelandnorthandsouthisin peacefulcooperationandmutualrespectandunderstandingforeach otherTheapplicationwasgrantedandthedefendantduly travelledtoCanada. Aspartofplayingacentralandsignificantroleinthedevelopment ofgreaterunderstandingbetweenRepublicanExprisonersand LoyalistexprisonershevisitedLondonderryon4April2009and Belfaston7November2009. HetravelledtoandstayedonthemainlandoftheUnitedKingdomin February,MarchandApril2010,April2011,November2011,July 2012andJanuary2013allwithoutincident. In2012heattendedtheNationalCommemorationoftheHunger StrikeswhichtookplaceinNorthernIreland. Asacontinuationofbeinganactivepersuaderforapeacestrategyhe ledaRepublicanGrouptotworesidentialworkshopswithmembers oftheIrishBorderSecurityPersonnelattheCorrymeelaPeaceCentre inNorthernIrelandinNovember2012andMarch2013.

141. Asalreadytouchedonabove,thedefendantwasarrestedatGatwickAirport on19May2013whilstintransitonroutetoGreece.Theprosecutionassert thathetoldthepoliceIamsurprisedthatthishadcomeupasIhave travelledinandoutoftheUKonanumberofoccasionstoseefamilyandI havetravelledtoCanadafromDublin.WhenIwenttoCanadaIcontactedthe UKgovernmenttocheckitwouldbeOKasIdidntwantanyproblems.They saiditwouldbefine. Thedefendantsmedicalcondition 142. Thereisnodoubtthatthedefendantsuffersfromanumberofmedical conditionsthesearesetoutinthestatementofhiswifedated2January 2014,inareportfromhisGPandinthemedicalrecordswhichhavebeen placedbeforethecourt.Theconditionsinclude,inparticular,veryhighblood pressureandrecurrentunpredictedcollapse.Itisnotnecessarytogointo anyfurtherdetail. Therelevantlaw 143. Therewasrelativelylittledisputebetweenthepartiesastotherelevantlaw. 144. AdoptingtheformulationofLordDysoninRvMaxwell[2011]1WLR1837at para13:

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itiswellestablishedthattheCourthasthepowertostayproceedingsin twocategoriesofcase,namely(i)whereitwillbeimpossibletogivethe accusedafairtrialand(ii)whereitoffendsthecourtssenseofjusticeand proprietytobeaskedtotrytheaccusedintheparticularcircumstancesof thecase.Inthefirstcategoryofcase,ifthecourtconcludesthatanaccused cannotreceiveafairtrial,itwillstaytheproceedingswithoutmore.No questionofthebalancingofcompetinginterestsarises

145. AstothefirstcategoryIwasreferred,inparticular,toAttorneyGenerals Reference(No1of1990)[1992]QB630,AttorneyGeneralsReference(No2 of2001)[2004]2AC72,RvS(SP)[2006]2CrAppR23andRvF(S)[2012] QB703.Ibearinmind,inparticular,theprinciplesidentifiedatpara21ofthe judgmentinRvS(SP),namelythat: (1) Evenwheredelayisunjustifiable,apermanentstayshouldbethe exceptionratherthantherule; (2) wherethereisnofaultonthepartofthecomplainantorthe prosecution,itwillbeveryrareforastaytobegranted; (3) nostayshouldbegrantedintheabsenceofseriousprejudicetothe defencesothatnofairtrialcanbeheld; (4) whenassessingpossibleseriousprejudice,thejudgeshouldbearin mindhisorherpowertoregulatetheadmissibilityofevidenceand thatthetrialprocessitselfshouldensurethatallrelevantfactual issuesarisingfromdelaywillbeplacedbeforethejuryfortheir considerationinaccordancewithappropriatedirectionfromthe judge; (5) if,havingconsideredallthesefactors,ajudgesassessmentisthata fairtrialwillbepossible,astayshouldnotbegranted. 146. Astothesecondcategory,thejudgmentofLloydJonesLJinSSHDvCCand CF[2013]1WLR2171providesahelpfulsummaryofthegeneralprinciplesto beapplied,asfollows: 91.Inthepresentcaseitiscommongroundthatweareconcernedonly withthesecondcategoryofabuse.Thatlimbisnotrelatedinanywayto resultingunfairnessintheensuingproceedings.(SeeWarrenperLordDyson atparagraph35.)Itspurposeisthemoregeneraloneofprotectingthe integrityofthelegalsystemandtherebymaintainingtheruleoflaw. 92. Thethresholdforthesecondcategoryofabuseisveryhigh.Thequestion forthecourtwillbewhetherthecourt'ssenseofjusticeandproprietyor publicconfidenceinthejusticesystemwouldbeoffendedifthe proceedingswerenotstayed.IdonotunderstandLordDysoninWarren toqualifythisveryhighthresholdinanyway.Onthecontraryhisspeech reaffirmsit. 93. Toestablishanabuseofprocessunderthesecondcategoryinvolves morethanthesatisfyingofathresholdcondition.Itrequiresan evaluationofwhathasoccurredinthelightofcompetingpublic interests.InLatifLordSteynexplainedasfollows:

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"Thelawissettled.Weighingcountervailingconsiderationsofpolicyand justice,itisforthejudgeintheexerciseofhisdiscretiontodecide whethertherehasbeenanabuseofprocess,whichamountstoan affronttothepublicconscienceandrequiresthecriminalproceedingsto bestayed;RvHorseferryRoadMagistrates'Court,exparteBennett [1994]1AC42.ExpBennettwasacasewhereastaywasappropriate becauseadefendanthadbeenforciblyabductedandbroughttothis countrytofacetrialindisregardofextraditionlaws.ThespeechesinExp Bennettconclusivelyestablishedthatproceedingsmaybestayedinthe exerciseofthejudge'sdiscretionnotonlywhereafairtrialisimpossible butalsowhereitwouldbecontrarytothepublicinterestintheintegrity ofthecriminaljusticesystemthatatrialshouldtakeplace.Aninfinite varietyofcasescouldarise.Thegeneralguidanceastohowthe discretionshouldbeexercisedinparticularcircumstanceswouldnotbe useful.Butitispossibletosaythatinacasesuchasthepresentthe judgemustweighinthebalancethepublicinterestinensuringthat thosethatarechargedwithgravecrimeshouldbetriedandthe competingpublicinterestinnotconveyingtheimpressionthatthecourt willadopttheapproachthattheendjustifiesanymeans". 94. Theabusejurisdictionisnotofadisciplinarycharacter.ThusinBennett LordLowryobserved(atp.47H): "Discretiontostayisnotadisciplinaryjurisdictionandoughtnottobe exercisedinordertoexpressthecourt'sdisapprovalofofficialconduct. Accordingly,iftheprosecutingauthoritieshavebeenguiltyofculpable delaybuttheprospectofafairtrialhasnotbeenprejudiced,thecourt oughtnottostaytheproceedingsmerely"pourencouragerlesautres". ThesamethemeistakenupbyLordDysoninhisspeechinMaxwellat paragraph24wherehereferstoLordLowry'sspeechinBennett. SimilarlyinWarrentheBoardimplicitlyendorsedtheobservationofLord LowryinBennettwhileadding,withreferencetothedecisionofthe CourtofAppealinRvGrant[2006]QB60torefusetoorderaretrial,a decisionwhichitconsideredincorrect: "[I]tmaynotalwaysbeeasytodistinguishbetween(impermissibly) grantingastayinordertoexpressthecourt'sdisapprovalofofficial conduct"pourencouragerlesautres"and(permissibly)grantingastay becauseitoffendsthecourt'ssenseofjusticeandpropriety.Butitis difficulttoavoidtheconclusionthatinGranttheproceedingswere stayedinordertoexpressthecourt'sdisapprovalofthepolice misconductandtodisciplinethepolice".(atpara.37). 95. Itispossibletoidentifyfactorswhichareoftentakenintoaccountbythe courtsinperformingthisbalancingexercise.However,LordSteyn's wordsofcautionagainstgeneralguidanceastohowthediscretion shouldbeexercisedremainofcriticalimportance.AsLordDyson observedinWarren(atparagraph36),theexerciseofthediscretion 42

dependsontheparticularcircumstancesofeachcaseandrigid classificationsareundesirable.Inthecontextofcriminalproceedingsthe balancemustalwaysbestruckbetweenthepublicinterestinensuring thatthosethatareaccusedofseriouscrimeshouldbetriedandthe competingpublicinterestinensuringthatexecutiveconductdoesnot underminepublicconfidenceinthecriminaljusticesystemandbringit intodisrepute.Withthosewarningsfirmlyinmind,itisappropriateto considerwhatfactorshavebeenconsideredintheauthoritiestobe indicationsofabuseofprocess. 96. Theconnectionbetweentheabuseofexecutivepowerandthe proceedingswhicharesaidtobeanabuseofprocessislikelytobea highlyrelevantconsideration.Thusitwilloftenbethecasethatbutfor thewrongfulconductthedefendantwouldnotbebeforethecourtatall. However,theexistenceofsuchacausativelinkisneitheraprecondition noraconclusivedemonstrationofabuse.Itissimplyarelevant consideration.ThusinMaxwellthemajorityconsideredthatthefactthat theconfessionsonwhicharetrialwouldbebasedwouldnothavebeen madebutforthemisconductwasnotdeterminativeofwhetherthere shouldbearetrial.SimilarlyinWarrenLordDysonobserved: "TheBoarddoesnotconsiderthatthe"butfor"testwillalwaysoreven inmostcasesnecessarilydeterminewhetherastayshouldbegrantedon thegroundsofabuseofprocess.Thefactsofthepresentcase demonstratethedangersofattemptingaclassificationofcasesinthis areaofthelawanddisregardingthesalutarywordsofLordSteyn.For reasonswhichwillappear,itistheBoard'sviewthattheCommissioner reachedtherightconclusioninthiscase,oratleastaconclusionthathe wasentitledtoreach.Andyetitwasacceptedatalltimesbythe prosecutionthatbutfortheunlawfulandmisleadingmisconductofthe JerseyPoliceinrelationtotheinstallationanduseoftheaudiodevice, theprosecutioninthiscasecouldnothavesucceededandtherewould benotrialunlessthepolicewereabletoobtainthenecessaryevidence byother(lawful)means."(atparagraph30). 97. Clearlythegravityofthemisconductandthedegreeofculpabilityonthe partofthewrongdoerswillbehighlyrelevantindeterminingwhether thethresholdtesthasbeensatisfiedandinwhichdirectionthebalancing exerciseshouldberesolved.InthisregardtheSecretaryofStatesubmits thatasamatterofprincipleandauthorityactualknowledgeofillegality isnecessary.Itissubmittedthatmisconductcannotbesograveasto amounttoanaffronttothepublicconscienceunlessitisdeliberate. Furthermoreitissubmittedthatthereportedcaseshavebeen concernednotwithconductthatwasmerelynegligentorevenreckless butratherwithinstancesofdeliberateandflagrantdisregardoflegal requirements.Inadditionitissubmittedthatthereisnocaseinwhich therequiredlevelofmisconducthasbeenestablishedafterargumentsas totheprecisenatureandeffectofforeignlocallawandattemptsto

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suggestthatmoreenquiriesshouldhavebeenmadebytheauthoritiesto establishitsprecisenatureandeffect. 98. Iacceptthatactualknowledgehasoftenbeenakeyelementin establishinganabuseofprocess.Forexample,inRvMullen[2000]QB 520theCourtofAppealrecordedwithapprovalthedefendant's concessionthatproofofactualknowledgeofillegalitywasrequired. "MrMackayacceptedthattheburdenofprovingabuseofprocessison thedefendantandthatknowledgeonthepartoftheEnglishauthorities thatlocalorinternationallawwasbrokenmustbeshown"(atp.529D). SimilarlyinBennettLordGriffithsstatedtheprincipleasfollows: "InmyviewyourLordshipsshouldnowdeclarethatwhereprocessof lawisavailabletoreturnanaccusedtothiscountrythroughextradition proceduresourcourtswillrefusetotryhimifhehasbeenforcibly broughtwithinourjurisdictionindisregardoftheseproceduresbya processtowhichourownpolice,prosecutingorotherexecutive authoritieshavebeenaknowingparty".(atp.62G.) 99. However,itdoesseemtomethatMrO'Connor'sapproachinthisregard isoverprescriptive.Acaseinvolvingactualknowledgeofillegalitywill necessarilyberegardedasaparticularlyseriousmatter.However,the objectiveofmaintainingtheintegrityofthelegalsystemcanbeachieved onlybyaconsiderationoftheentiretyoftheconductinquestionand untrammelledbyanyrigidrules.Moreover,asMrO'Connorhimself submits,therearemanygradationsofstatesofmindincludingactual knowledge,wilfulblindness,constructiveknowledgeandrecklessness. Thecourtshouldbefreetoreflectthesemattersinitsexaminationof eachcaseintheround.Theremaybesituationsinwhichrecklessor possiblyevennegligentconductcouldjustifyastayongroundsofabuse ofprocess.Everythingwilldependonananalysisoftheparticular featuresofeachcaseinitsentirety. 100. OnbehalfoftheSecretaryofStateMrO'Connorfurthersubmitsthat inacaseofanalleged"disguisedextradition"thepartyseekingto establishtheabuseisrequiredtoprovenotonlyaflagrantandknowing disregardofthelawbutalsothattheauthoritiescolludedinorprocured thedeportationforsomeulteriororwrongfulpurpose.Iacceptthatit willusuallybenecessarytoshowthattheUKauthoritiesactedsoasto procuretheindividual'sremovaltotheUnitedKingdom.(RvStaines Magistrates'CourtexparteWestfallen[1998]1WLR652.)However,I considerthathereonceagainMrO'Connor'ssuggestedapproachis undulyprescriptive.Clearly,theexistenceofawrongfululteriormotive willbeahighlyrelevantconsideration.Howeverthecourtmustbefree toconsidertheconductinitsentirety.

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101. InWarrentheBoardrecognisedthatinabductionandentrapment casesthecourtwillgenerallyconcludethatthebalancefavoursastay. However,itwasatpreciselythispointinhisspeech(paragraph26)that LordDysonwarnedagainsttheundesirabilityofrigidclassificationsand emphasisedtheneedtobalancecompetinginterests.Clearlyitis insufficienttolabelacaseasfallingwithinaparticularcategory.A challengeongroundsofabuseofprocesscallsforamorerefinedanalysis ofthefactsandthebalancingofthecompetinginterests.Itis,however, instructivetoobservetheapproachofthecourtstoabductioncases giventheRespondents'contentionthatitisinsubstancewhathas happenedtotheminthiscase. 147. Itwascommongroundthatalthoughcomingundertheumbrellaofthe secondcategorythereisadistinctbodyofcaselawinrelationtoalleged breachofpromisecases.InthisregardIwasreferred,inparticular,toChu PiuWingvTheQueen[1984]HKLR411,RvCroydonjustices,exparteDean [1993]QB769,Bloomfield[1997]1CrAppR27,Townsend[1997]2CrAppR 540,Hyatt/Wyatt[1997]3ArchboldNews2,RvD[2000]1ArchboldNews1, Edgar(200)164JP471,Taylor(2004)EWHC1554(Admin),AbuHamza [2007]QB659,GuestvDPP[2009]2CrAppR26,Gripton(2010)EWCACrim 2260,Killick[2012]1CrAppR10andtheNorthernIrishcaseofMcGeough [2010]NICC33[2012]NIQB11[2012]NICA28. 148. InAbuHamzaLordPhillipsCJreviewedtheauthoritiestodate,andatpara54 ofthejudgmentsaid:Theseauthoritiessuggestthatitisnotlikelyto constituteanabuseofprocesstoproceedwiththeprosecutionunless(i) therehasbeenanunequivocalrepresentationbythosewiththeconductof theinvestigationorprosecutionofacasethatthedefendantwillnotbe prosecutedand(ii)thatthedefendanthasactedonthatrepresentationtohis detriment.Eventhen,iffactscometolightwhichwerenotknownwhenthe representationwasmade,thesemayjustifyproceedingwiththeprosecution despitetherepresentation. 149. ItmusthoweverbenotedthatinGripton,atpara27ofthejudgement,the courtobserved:Thirdly,sofarastheapproachespropoundedinBloomfield andAbuHamzaareconcerned,wenotethatneitherwasintendedbythe courtadoptingittobeacomprehensivebindingrule.InBloomfieldStaughton LJexpresslystatedthatthecourtwasnotseekingtoestablishanyprecedent oranygeneralprincipleinregardtoabuseofprocess.SimilarlyinAbuHamza LordPhillipsCJemphasisedthedifficultiesofpropoundingatestofabuseof process,andtheformulationadoptedinthatcaseisexpressedintermsthat conductwouldbeunlikelytoconstituteanabuseofprocessunlesscertain criteriaweresatisfied.Hewascertainlynotlayingdownrequirementswhich wouldbeindispensableinanycase.Thereasonforthisisclear:thecourtsare hereconcernedwithconsiderationsoffairnessandtheymustbefreeto respondtothecircumstancesofeachcase.

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150. MrBlaxlandQChelpfullysummarisedtheCommonwealthauthoritiesin relationtobreachofpromiseatparas136137ofthedefenceSkeleton Argument. FirstgroundSubmissions 151. Whilstconcedingthatthiswashisweakestground,MrBlaxlandarguedthatit isnotpossibleforthedefendanttoreceiveafairtrial.Herelied,amongst otherthings,onthefollowing: (1)Thattheallegedoffencestookplacemorethanthirtyyearsago. (2)Thatasignificantpartofthatdelaywascausedbythedecisionnottoseek extradition. (3)Noidentificationparadesorotherformofindependenttestingofthe identificationevidencewereundertakenatthematerialtime(despitehaving beendiscussedwiththeGardaasearlyas1983);thewitnessMarkChrusciel isnowdead;DCKemp(theofficerwhoobtainedtheartistsimpressionofthe defendant)cannolongerremembertheprecisecircumstancesofdoingso; theartistWorsley(whocreatedthatimpression)isnowdead;the identificationpicturereferredtobythewitnessPhyllisMcGowancannotbe found;theartistWallerwhocreatedanartistsimpressionwithMcGowan (uponwhichthereisadescriptionthatbearslittlerelationshiptoMcGowans statement)isalsonowdead;andtherearevarioustroublingaspectsofthe originalpoliceinvestigation(forexampledeliberateleakstothepressnaming thedefendantandanothermancalledSeanOCallaghan,whowasinfacta policeinformantbeinggivencoverbythedisclosure),thatcannotbeproperly exploredabsenttheleadinvestigatorDetectiveSuperintendentLamperwho isnowalsodead. (4)Thedefendantsillhealth. 152. Aspartofthissubmission,andwhilstacceptingthataviolationofthe defendantsArticle6ECHRrightswouldnotleadinexorablytoatermination oftheproceedings,MrBlaxlandarguedonfootofAttorneyGenerals Reference(No.2of2001)(above)thatthedefendantwassubstantially affectedwithinthemeaningofArticle6whenhewasdeliberatelyblownto thepressinthe1980s,atwhichpointhewasofficiallyalertedtothe likelihoodofcriminalproceedingsagainsthim. 153. Inreply,MrAltmanQCargued,inshort,thatthedefendantwasnot officiallyalertedinthe1980sandthatallthematterscomplainedofcould befairlydealtwithwithinthetrialprocesswhetherbywayoftheexclusion ofevidence,orbyappropriatedirectionstothejury,orbysittinghourswhich accommodatedthedefendantshealthproblems. 154. WhenIsuggestedthepossibilityofsubmissionsunders78ofthePoliceand CriminalEvidenceAct1984inrelationtotheidentificationevidencetotest

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thepropositionthatthetrialprocesscouldfairlydealwiththeissues,both sidesagreedthatthatwasnotnecessary. FirstgroundConclusion 155. NotwithstandingthepointsmadeonthedefendantsbehalfIhavenodoubt thatitispossibletogivethedefendantafairtrial.Thetrialprocesswill ensureit.Althoughnotcritical,andforwhatitisworth,Ialsoinclinetothe viewthatthedefendantwasnotofficiallyalertedinthe1980s. Secondground Submissions 156. TheessenceofMrBlaxlandssubmissioninrelationtothisgroundwasthat, evenifthedefendanthadreceivednowrittenassurancein2007he(andthe othercasesnotsolvablebytheadministrativescheme)weresubjecttoan ongoingcommitmentmadebytheUKGovernmentsince2001totakesteps nottopursueprosecutionsincasestowhichtheprovisionsoftheearly releaseschemeapplied,suchthatitamountedtoanaffronttojusticeto prosecutethedefendantforqualifyingoffences. 157. InthisregardMrBlaxlandinvitedattention,amongstotherthings,to; (1)TheGovernmentssympatheticattitudetowardsOTRsthroughoutthe postGoodFridayAgreementnegotiations. (2)Theprivatecommitmentsgivenseee.g.May2000(paras32and33 above),January2001(para45above),andDecember2006(para74above). (3)Thepublicassurancesgivenseee.g.March2001(para48above),mid 2001(para53),andMay2003(para66above). 158. MrBlaxlandsubmittedthatsuchstatementsgaverisetoanexpectationthat prosecutionswouldnotbepursuedinrespectofthosewhom(likethe defendant)wouldotherwisequalifyundertheearlyreleaseschemeandthus servenomorethantwoyearsofanysentenceofimprisonmentimposed. 159. MrBlaxlandacceptedthattheresolutionofthisgroundrequiredabalancing exercisebetweenthepublicinterestinrequiringthatthosewhoareaccused ofseriouscrimesshouldbetriedandthecompetingpublicinterestin ensuringthatexecutiveconductdoesnotunderminepublicconfidenceinthe criminaljusticesystemandbringitintodisrepute. 160. MrAltmansubmitted,inshort,thattheGovernmentssympatheticattitude towardsOTRsandthegeneralcommitmentsandassurancesgivenboth privatelyandpubliclycamenowherenearmakingthisprosecutionanaffront tojustice.Hepointsoutthatthereality(clearlyunderstoodonbothsidesand eventuallypublicly)wasthatOTRsremainedsubjecttoprosecutionifthere wassufficientevidenceagainstthem.

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SecondgroundConclusion 161. IagreewithMrAltmanssubmissions.WhilstIinferthatthedefendantwas toldabouttheprivatecommitments,neithertheynorthepublicassurances amountedtoanysortofindicationsuchas,inthemselves,tomakethis prosecutiononewhich,uponthatlimitedground,offendsthecourtssense ofjustice.Thebalancingexerciseinrelationtothissubmissioncomesdown infavourofthecontinuationoftheprosecution.Thatisnot,however,tosay thatthecommitmentsandassurancesarenotrelevantinrelationtothethird submissiontheyplainlyare. ThirdgroundSubmissions 162. Thisgroundinvolvesabalancingexercisebetweenthepublicinterestin ensuringthatthosewhoareaccusedofseriouscrimeshouldbetriedandthe competingpublicinterestsinensuringthatexecutiveconductdoesnot underminepublicconfidenceinthecriminaljusticesystemandbringitinto disrepute,andinholdingofficialsofthestatetopromisestheyhavemadein fullunderstandingofwhatisinvolvedinthebargain. 163. Thepartiesargumentsinrelationtothissubmissionaresetoutindetailin theirrespectivewrittensubmissionssuppliedon2February2014. 164. MrBlaxlandsubmitted,amongstotherthings,that; (1) Theonlyreasonableinterpretationofthe20July2007letterwasthat itprovidedanunequivocalpromisetothedefendantthathewould notbeprosecutedfortheHydeParkBombinggiventhate.g.itwas insignificantcontrasttowhathadpubliclybeenstatedin19831987 andtheMarch2006letter;itexpresslyinformedhimthathewasnot, totheknowledgeofthePSNI,ofanyinteresttoanyotherpoliceforce intheUnitedKingdomandthatcouldonlymeantohimthathehad beengivenspecificreconsideration(asothershadbeenorlater were);suchreconsiderationwastheessenceoftheadministrative scheme;therewasexpressreferencetothePSNIandtotheAttorney General;hewasanactiveproponentofthepeaceprocess;thetiming wouldhaveappearednoncoincidentalwiththeswearinginofthe NorthernIrelandAssemblyinMay2007;theoverallcircumstancesin whichtheletterwasprovidedwereintendedtoengenderconfidence inthecontextofsuchletters;anditwouldbewrongtoconstruethe defendantslettertotheCanadianauthoritiesasdemonstratingalack ofconfidenceintheassuranceletterratherthanthereverse. (2) Theonlylimitationintheassuranceintendedtobeconveyedbythe letterwastheemergenceoffreshevidenceorfurtheroffences neitherofwhichariseinthiscase.Inthisregardtheadministrative schemewasnotintendedtoprovidelimitedcomfort,andtheinternal proposalthatitcouldbeamendedtodosowasrejectedasbeing

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(3)

(4) (5)

(6) (7)

(8)

incompatiblewiththepurposeandintentofthescheme.Inanyevent thefourprincipalwitnessesPowell,Kelly,HainandMcGintyall agreeabouttheintendedeffectoftheletters: Powell:toreassuretheindividualsconcernedthattheycouldreturn totheUKwithoutfearofarrest.Kelly:anunequivocalstatement thattheymeantwhattheysaidthattherecipientsthereafter believedthattheywereabletoorganisetheirlivesaccordingly. McGinty:theschemeonlysoughttoidentifythoseindividualswho wereabletoreturnwithoutfearofarrest.Hain:TheBritish governmentdidnotintendindividualstobemisledintobelievingthey weresafetoreturntothejurisdictionandthenarrested. Thenatureandconsequenceofthedetrimentsufferedbythe defendantwasrelevanttothebalancingexerciseparticularlygiven thathewasaproponentofthepeaceprocess. Astheprosecutionacceptedinoralargument,thedefendantwas positivelymisled. Whilstthelikelihoodwasthattheletterwastheproductoferror,that conclusionremainedopentodoubtgiventhatthePSNIwasawarein 2007thatthedefendantwasstillwantedforthebombing;thatasa resulttheyneededtocheckwiththeMetropolitanPolicewhatthe currentpositionwasbeforedecidingwhethertoissueapositive letter;andtheassertionintheD/StaffOfficersemailof20Julytothe NIOthatsuchcheckshadbeencarriedout(withtheobvious implicationthattheyhavebeennegative).Thefailurebythe prosecutiontoconductafullinvestigationintothecircumstancesin whichtheletterwasissuedmeantthatthereremainedgapsandif,in consequence,thecourtwasleftinlingeringdoubtastowhetherall relevantmaterialhadbeenobtained,thentheindictmentshouldbe stayedforthatreasonalone. Ifitwasanerror,itwastheresponsibilityoftheStateseee.g. Blackledge[1996]1CrimAppR326. TheStatesculpabilitywasveryhightheprosecutionhadpresented itasacatastrophicsystemfailure.ItinvolvedboththePSNIandthe AttorneyGeneralsoffice.Theformerbecauseitwasawarethatthe defendantwaswanted,andwasawareoftheneedtoconductPNC checksandtoreporttheirresultaccurately.Thelatterbecause,by July2007,therewasnorealconsiderationoroversightbythe AttorneyGeneralsOfficeandthustheletterwasmisleading. Theseriousnessoftheoriginalcatastrophicfailurewas compoundedbythefurtherfailure,stillunexplained,toputmatters rightin2008and2009astowhichMrHainhadcommented;No mistakeofsuchimportancecouldorshouldhavebeenpermittedto havegoneuncorrected;andMrMcGintyhadstated:Haditcometo ourattentionthatMrDowney;oranyotherindividual,hadwrongly beentoldthattheycouldreturntothejurisdictionwithoutfearof arrest,wewouldhavehadamajorproblemIcannotspeculateon

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whatwemayhavedonethereafterbutthiswouldhavebeenamajor incident. (9) Thebreachofpromiseinthiscasewasparticularlyseriousbecauseit wasgivenaspartofawiderprocessinvolvingmultiplerecipients andaconsequenteffectonthewiderpoliticalprocess. (10) Theseriousnessoftheoffencehadtobeviewedinthelightofthe GoodFridayAgreementandthe1998Actandtheinferencethat Parliamenthadassessedthatthecontinuedpublicinterestinthe prosecutionandpunishmentofallpreGoodFridayAgreement terrorismoffences,howeverindividuallyserious,yieldedtothe greaterpublicinterestinmaintainingthepeaceprocess. (11) ThecasefellfairlyandsquarelywithintheAbuHamzacriteria. 165. OnbehalfoftheprosecutionMrAltmansubmitted,amongstotherthings that: (1) Thechargesthatthedefendantfaceswereoftheutmostgravity whichwasapowerfulpublicinterestinfavouroftheprosecution. (2) Thelettertothedefendantwasequivocalandqualified. (3) Thatsaid,theassurancethatthePSNIwasnotawareofanyinterest inhimfromanyotherpoliceforceintheUKwaswrongandtheresult offundamentalfailureinthatthePSNIhadbeenawaresince2003, andwasawareatthematerialtimein2007,thathewaswantedby theMetropolitanPoliceinrelationtotheHydeParkbombing. (4) Thedefendantmusthaveknownorbelievedthattheletterwas wronggivenhisknowledgeofthemediareportsin19831987,the March2006letter,andhisfailuretoproducetheJuly2007letterto theCanadianauthoritiesin2008. (5) TheJuly2007letterservedmerelytoconfirmthedefendantsstatus asbesttheauthoritieswereabletoestablishit,andthefactthatthe informationwaswrongdemonstratedthefrailtyofthesystem. (6) Thelettergavenounequivocalrepresentationthatthedefendant wouldnotbeprosecuted,andmadenoexpressreferenceeitherto theinvolvementoftheAttorneyGeneralortheSSNIinthedecision makingprocess,andanycriticismsoftheabsenceofevidentialor publicinterestassessmentbythePPSortheLawOfficersoverlooked thesimplicityofwhatthePSNIshouldhavedonetoavoiderror. (7) Theclaimtolingeringdoubtinrelationtothedisclosureexercise wasentirelymisplaced,giventhatanydecisionnottoprosecute wouldnothavebeenthatofthePSNI,andiftherehadbeensucha decisionthedefendantwouldnothaveremainedcirculatedwith randomborderchecks(perthestatementofDCSHanley)beingthe likelycauseofthefailuretoarrestthedefendantsooner. (8) Giventheburdenofproofonanabuseapplicationthedefence concessionofthelikelihoodoferrorbeingthecausesufficedtomake itimpossibletofindanycauseotherthanunexplainedsystemicor individualerror.

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Thepoliticalprocesswasnotrelevanttothefactstobeweighedin thebalancingexercisegiventhattheGovernmentspublic commitmentsweremadetothepublicatlargeandnotdirectedto thesituationofindividualOTRs;thosecommitmentscouldonlybe deliveredbyalegislativeamnesty,whichnevermaterialised;they werenotcapableofbeingdelivered,andwerenotdeliveredbythe administrativeschemeandtheassuranceletters,despitethe intentionsofthepoliticians;theadministrativeschemeprovidedno completeamnesty,aswasunderstoodbyall;atnotimedidany memberoftheGovernmentorpoliceorofanyprosecutionservice makeanyprivatepromisetothedefendantpersonallyabouthis status;thedefendantwasnotpartytotheprivatenegotiations betweentheGovernmentandSinnFeinortotheprivate correspondencebetweenMinisters,ortheirstaff,settingouttheir privateviewsabouttheOTRadministrativeschemeanditsintentions; andtherewasnostatementfromthedefendant,andnoevidential support,forthecontentionthattheestablishmentofthenew executiveinMay2007ledthedefendanttoproceedonthebasisthat thatwasthetriggerfortheletterwhichhereceivedinJuly. (10) Ifthecourtfoundthattheletterdidamounttoanassurancenotto prosecutethedefendant,makinghimselfamenabletothejurisdiction wasaverydifferentmattertotheletterinducinghimtodoso;at notimedidanyoneinauthoritydeliberatelymisleadhiminto believinghewassafetoreturn;itwasnotbroughttotheattentionof anyoneoutsidethePSNIthattherehadbeeneitherafailuretocheck thePNCorthatsuchacheckhadproducedapositiveresult;rather, onthedaytheletterwassentthePSNIassuredtheNIOthatthe relevantcheckhadbeencarriedout. (11) Theallegedwiderdetrimenttothepeaceprocesswasnota legitimateareaofenquiryforthecourtontheissuewhetherthere hadbeenanabuseofprocess thatwasamatterforthepoliticiansor Parliamenttoaddress.Inanyeventtherewasnoevidencethatupto andincludingJuly2007thedefendantwascloseorsoclosetothe furtherdevelopmentofthepeaceprocessastomakehispresencein NorthernIrelandofsuchsignificanceastomakeanimportantpublic interestfactoragainstprosecution. (12) Ontheexceptionalfactsofthiscasethebalancingexercisefellin favouroftheprosecutionthepeaceprocesshadnotextinguished prosecutionforoutstandingterroristcrimes,ithadsimplysoughtto resolvethestatusofOTRsandputthemonanequalfootingtothose benefitingundertheGoodFridayAgreementwherechecksshowedit wasappropriatetodoso.Whenstrikingthebalance,thenon deliberatemisleadingofthedefendantsinceJuly2007shouldyieldto thegreaterinterestintheprosecutionofthoseaccusedofthegravest crimes.

(9)

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ThirdgroundConclusion 166. WhilstIhavenecessarilyhadtoconsider,andtosetoutatlength,aspectsof thepeaceprocessinNorthernIrelanditisnopartofmyfunctiontoexpressa viewabouttherightsorwrongsofthem,savetotheextentrequiredin decidingwhetheritoffendsthecourtssenseofjusticeandproprietytobe askedtotrythedefendantintheparticularcircumstancesofthiscase. 167. Inconductingthenecessarybalancingexercise(inwhichthereisanobvious overlapbetweenthepublicinterestinensuringthatexecutiveconductdoes notunderminepublicconfidenceinthecriminaljusticesystemandbringit intodisrepute,andthepublicinterestinholdingofficialsofthestateto promisestheyhavemadeinfullunderstandingofwhatisinvolvedinthe bargain)Irecognisethatthethresholdforastayisaveryhighone,andthatit involvesanevaluationofwhathasoccurredinthelightofthecompeting publicinterestsinvolved.Itisnotadisciplinaryjurisdiction,isuntrammelled byrigidrules,andalldependsontheparticularfactsofthecaseviewedinits entirety. 168. IacceptMrAltmanssubmissionthatIshouldnottakeintoaccountany effectthatmyrulingmighthaveonthecontinuingpeaceprocessthatisa matterforpoliticiansandParliament.ButthatdoesnotmeanthatIpropose toignorethefactthattheeventswithwhichIamconcernedoccurredduring aninternationalpeaceprocessinwhichthebuildingofconfidenceandthe abilitytorelyuponassurancesgivenwerecriticalelements. 169. IalsotakeMrAltmanspointthatneitherthedefendantnortheSinnFein negotiators(savetotheextentthatsuchmatterswerethereafterrevealedto them)wouldhavebeenawareofinternalcommunicationswithin Government,theDPP(NI)/PPSandthePSNI.But,notwithstandingthe absenceofastatementfromthedefendanthimself,andthefactthat(inhis statement)MrKellydoesnotdealwithwhatpassedbetweenhimselfandthe defendantinrelationtotheletter,thereisanobviousinference(whichI draw)thatthedefendantwastoldabouttheassurancesthathadbeengiven toSinnFein,and(againstthatbackground)wasalsotoldaboutthe confidencewithwhichhecouldrelyupontheassurancesgiventohiminthe letterof20July2007. 170. Thevastmajorityofthematerialsnowbeforethecourtwereoriginallyinthe possessionofthevariousDepartmentsandServiceswhichwerethesubject ofthedisclosureexercise.Hence,untildisclosure,thedefencewerelargely unabletoinvestigatewhathadhappened.Therewasnoinvestigationas suchonbehalfoftheprosecutionuntilthehearingscommenced,andthen onlyaninformalone.Therewasfurtherdisclosure,someofitsignificant, duringthehearings.Thereremaingapsinthedocumentationandalackof sensibleexplanationastowhatactuallyhappenedwithinOperationRapidin relationtothedefendant.Giventhatitwasonlyviablefortheprosecutionto

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gettothebottomofwhatactuallyhappened,andalbeitthatthereisa burdenonthedefenceonabalanceofprobabilities,thegapsandlackof sensibleexplanationcannotberelieduponbytheprosecutionintheirown favour.Ontheotherhand,Iamnotpersuadedthat,giventhegapsandlack ofsensibleexplanation,Ishouldgrantthestaysoughtonthatbasisalone. 171. Applyingtheburdenofproofonthedefenceonabalanceofprobabilities,I havenohesitationinacceptingthepowerfulevidenceofMrPowell,MrKelly andMrHain.Iseenosignificantconflictbetweentheirevidenceandthatof MrMcGinty,whichIalsoaccept. 172. Inbroadterms,andotherthanasindicatedimmediatelyabove,Iacceptthe argumentsadvancedbyMrBlaxlandandrejectthoseadvancedbyMr Altman. 173. ApplyingtheburdenandstandardofproofthatIhaveindicated,and whetherasaresultofdirectevidenceorreasonableinference,Ifindthe followingcorefacts: (1) AtallmaterialtimesthedefendantwasacitizenoftheRepublicof Ireland,andwasdomiciledthere. (2) Atallmaterialtimesfrom29May1983,saveforashortperiodin 1994,itwasrecordedonthePNCthatthedefendantwaswantedby theMetropolitanPoliceforconspiracytomurderon20July1982. (3) FromatleastOctober1984onwards,thedefendantwasawarethat hewaswantedbytheMetropolitanPoliceinrelationtotheHyde ParkBombing. (4) InNovember1989afinaldecisionwastakennottoseektoextradite thedefendantfromtheRepublicofIreland. (5) Fromatleastthespringof2000inprivate,andfromMarch2001in public,theGovernmentassuredSinnFeinthatitwassympatheticto theargumentthatthepositionoftheOTRswasananomalyandthat theissuewouldbeaddressed. (6) Thebeginningsofwhatbecametheadministrativeschemeinrelation toOTRs,whichwastheproductofsuggestionsmadebythe Government,canbeseeninevents,inparticular,inApril/May2000. (7) Thebeginningsofwhatbecamethebroadlystandardlettersentto thosewhowerenotwantedcanbefoundinlettersfromtheAttorney GeneraltotheSSNIandtheNIOinNovember2000andmidMarch 2001. (8) Thestandardletterdidnotamounttoanamnestyassuch.However, itsterms(andinparticularthereferencestotheSSNIandthe AttorneyGeneral)wereintendedtoanddidmakeclearthatitwas issuedinthenameoftheGovernmentandthattheassuranceswithin itcouldberelieduponwithconfidenceasmeaningwhattheysaid, namelyanunequivocalstatementthattherecipientwasnotwanted withtheobviousimplicationfromtheremainderthatthusthe

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(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

recipientwouldnotbearrestedorprosecutedunlessnewevidence cametolightortherewasanewapplicationforextradition. AsMrPowellsaysinhiswitnessstatement:Whateachletterwas intendedtoreflect,wasthatonthebasisofinformationthen availabletotheauthoritiesandcarefullyconsideredineachcase individually,anassurancewasbeinggiventhattheindividualwould notbesubjecttoarrestandsubsequentprosecutionifheorshe returnedtotheUnitedKingdom..TheintentionbehindtheBritish GovernmentgivingwrittenassurancestoindividualOTRswastotryto resolvetheissuegiventhefailuretofindaworkablegeneralapproach andtoprovideindividuallettersthatSinnFeincouldusetoreassure theindividualsconcernedthattheycouldreturntotheUKwithout fearofarrest. AsMrHainsaysinhiswitnessstatement:Itwasintendedthatthe assurancebejustthat,reliableassurancesastothepositionofthe applicantsandimplicitinthat,thattheprocessbywhichthe assuranceshadcometobegiven,hadbeencompetentandrobust. Theassurancesgivenintheletterwerenotonlygiveninthenameof theGovernmentinthecourseofaninternationalpeaceprocess,but wereintimatelyconnectedwiththecriminaljusticesysteminrespect ofveryseriousoffences. Accordingly,atleastuntil2007,itwasclearlyappreciatedbythose involvedintheconductoftheadministrativeschemethatitwas vitallyimportantthattherelevantcheckswereexhaustivelyand accuratelydone,andthattheresultswerecorrectlynotifiedtoeach recipient.Hencetheamountoftimeandcarethatwastakeninthe conductoftheschemeupto2007. AsMrKellysaysinhiswitnessstatement:Therehadbeen throughouttheadministrativeprocessareliancethatthose responsibleforpreparingandpresentinganassurance(orarefusal) wereinapositiontoprovideanunequivocalstatement.Itwason thatbasisthatSinnFeinfeltabletoadvisethosewhohadsoughtits helpinaskingforsuchassurances,thattheymeantwhattheysaid andonthisbasis,thattherecipientsthereafterbelievedtheywere abletoorganisetheirlivesaccordingly. ItwasequallyappreciatedbytheGovernmentthatanerrorintelling someonethattheywerenotwanted,wheninfacttheywere,would beanextremelyseriousmatter(theworstoutcome)bothpolitically andlegallywiththelikelihoodofanabuseofprocessapplication baseduponabreachoftherelevantassuranceintheletter. Itwassuchconcernsthatled,amongstotherthings,to: (a) Correctingtheerrorinrelationtotheindividualreferredtoin theAttorneyGeneralsletterof29January2001. (b) TherejectionbytheDPP(NI)andthePSNIinMarch/April2002 ofthemoreroughandready(andthereforemorehighrisk) approachthenbeingmooted.

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(16) InMarch2006thedefendantwastoldthathewaswantedalbeit thattherelevantletterwasnotclearastowhetherthatwasin relationtooffencesinNorthernIreland,totheHydeParkBombing,or toboth. (17) OperationRapidcommencedinaroundFebruary2007. (18) CheckingthePNCwasastraightforwardprocess. (19) AtthetimeofOperationRapidsreviewofthedefendantscase,it wasawarethatthedefendantwaswantedbytheMetropolitanPolice inrelationtotheHydeParkbombing,butfailedtopassthatontothe DPP(NI). (20) Thatwas,astheprosecutionconceded,acatastrophicfailure. (21) Itwascompoundedbythefactthat: (a) OperationRapidwasawareoftheneedtocheckwhetheran individualwaswantedbyanotherUKpoliceforce. (b) WhenspecificallyaskedbytheNIO(beforetheissueofthe lettertothedefendant)whethersuchaPNCcheckhadbeen doneinrelationtothedefendant(andothers)Operation RapidinformedtheNIOthatsuchcheckshadbeendone,but failedtomentionthatthecheckinrelationtothedefendant hadshownthathewaswantedbytheMetropolitanPolicein relationtotheHydeParkbombing. (22) Whenthedefendantreceivedhisletterhewasentitledtoanddid believethatitwastheproductofcarefulandcompetentfurther work,andthattherehadbeenagenuineandcorrectchangeofmind abouthimparticularlygiventhathewasasupporterofthepeace process.Healsobelieved,asaresultofassurances(whetherdirector indirect)fromindividualsinSinnFeinwhohadbeeninvolvedinthe negotiationswiththeGovernmentthathecouldrelyuponthe assurancesgivenintheletter. (23) HencehereliedupontheassurancegivenbytheGovernmentthat; ThePoliceServiceofNorthernIrelandarenotawareofanyinterest inyoufromanypoliceforceintheUnitedKingdomwhichherightly believedtobeanassurancethatifhewenttotheUKmainlandhe wouldnotbeatriskofarrestorprosecutionunless(astheletterwent ontosay)anyotheroutstandingoffencecametolight,orifany requestforextraditionweretobereceivedneitherofwhichapply inhiscase. (24) Howeverthatassurancewaswhollywronghewaswantedbythe MetropolitanPoliceinrelationtotheHydeParkBombing,which involvedthecausingofanexplosionandfourmurders.Thus,asthe prosecutionconceded,thedefendantwaswhollymisled (25) Thedefendantwasnotawarethatin2007theAttorneyGeneralwas nolongerascloselyinvolvedintheadministrativeschemeashehad beenthecaseinthepast. (26) ThecatastrophicfailuresofOperationRapidin2007werefurther compoundedin2008,whenitwasappreciatedbyOperationRapid thattheDPP(NI)hadnotbeeninformedin2007thatthedefendant

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(27)

(28)

(29) (30)

(31) (32)

waswantedfortheHydeParkbombing,butnostepwastakentoput mattersright. TheOperationRapidfailureswerefurthercompoundedin2009, whenitwasagainappreciatedthatthedefendantwaswantedforthe HydeParkbombing,butnothingwasdonetoputmattersright. AsMrHainsaidinhiswitnessstatement:Nomistakeofsuch importancecouldorshouldhavebeenpermittedtohavegone uncorrected. Asyet,therehasbeennosensibleexplanationforthevarious OperationRapidfailures. Relyingontheletter,thedefendanttravelledtoCanada,andona numberofoccasionstoNorthernIreland(includingvisitsin furtheranceofthepeaceprocess)andtotheUKmainland. Thedefendantwasagainactinginrelianceontheletterwhenhe soughttotransitGatwickAirportonroutetoGreeceon19May2013. Astheprosecutionconcededinargumentthedefendantsuffered detrimentasaresult bywayofarrest,thelossofhisfreedomfora time,theimpositionofstrictbailconditions,andbeingputatriskof convictionforveryseriousoffences(albeitthatthelatteristempered, tosomeextent,bythefactthatevenifconvictedofalltheoffences hewould,inconsequenceofthe1998Act,servenomorethantwo yearsinprison).

174. IrejecttheprosecutionargumentsbasedonthecaseofMcGeough(above)in whichthefactswereverydifferent. 175. GiventhecorefactsasIhavefoundthemtobe,andthewiderundisputed facts,Ihaveconductedthenecessaryevaluationofwhathasoccurredinthe lightofthecompetingpublicinterestsinvolved.Clearly,andnotwithstanding adegreeoftemperinginthiscasebytheoperationofthe1998Act,the publicinterestinensuringthatthosewhoareaccusedofseriouscrime shouldbetriedisaverystrongone(withtheplightofthevictimsandtheir familiesfirmlyinmind).However,intheveryparticularcircumstancesofthis caseitseemstomethatitisverysignificantlyoutweighedinthebalancing exercisebytheoverlappingpublicinterestsinensuringthatexecutive misconductdoesnotunderminepublicconfidenceinthecriminaljustice systemandbringitintodisrepute,andthepublicinterestinholdingofficials ofthestatetopromisestheyhavemadeinfullunderstandingofwhatis involvedinthebargain.HenceIhaveconcludedthatthisisoneofthoserare casesinwhich,intheparticularcircumstances,itoffendsthecourtssenseof justiceandproprietytobeaskedtotrythedefendant. 176. Ithereforeupholdthisgroundandproposetoorderthattheindictmentbe stayed.

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FourthGroundSubmissions 177. Itwillberecalledthatthisgroundispremisedonthefailureofallthe precedinggrounds.Therefore,inviewofmyconclusioninrelationtothe thirdground,Icandealwiththisgroundshortly. 178. Inessence,MrBlaxlandarguedthatextraditioncases,suchasKakisvThe GovernmentoftheRepublicofCyprus[1978]1WLR779,demonstratedthat itwasrareforcasesinvolvingbothsubstantialdelayandanybreachofa senseofsecurityfromprosecutiontoresultinextradition.Thereforeitwas submittedthatbecausebothexistinthiscase,andgiventhecumulative effectoftheothergrounds,thereshouldbeastay. 179. MrAltmanarguedthattherewasnomeritinthisground,pointingoutthat relianceonKakiswasdisapprovedofinAbuHamza(above). FourthgroundConclusion 180. Irejectthisground. OverallConclusion 181. Forthereasonssetoutabove,Irejectthefirst,secondandfourthgrounds forastayadvancedonbehalfofthedefendant.However,againforthe reasonssetoutabove,Iupholdthethirdgroundandorderthatthe indictmentinthiscasebestayed. SweeneyJ 21February2014

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