Continuing Trespass

An unlawful intrusion that interferes with one's person or property. Tort Law originated in England with the action of trespass. Initially trespass was any wrongful conduct directly causing injury or loss; in modern law trespass is an unauthorized entry upon land. A trespass gives the aggrieved party the right to bring a civil lawsuit and collect damages as compensation for the interference and for any harm suffered. Trespass is an intentional tort and, in some circumstances, can be punished as a crime.

Common-Law Form of Action

Trespass is one of the ancient Forms of Action that arose under the Common Law of England as early as the thirteenth century. It was considered a breach of the king's peace for which the wrongdoer might be summoned before the king's court to respond in a civil proceeding for the harm caused. Because the king's courts were primarily interested in land ownership disputes, the more personal action of trespass developed slowly at first. Around the middle of the fourteenth century, the clerks of the king's courts began routinely giving out writs that permitted a plaintiff to begin a trespass action. Before that time criminal remedies for trespass were more common. The courts were primarily concerned with punishing the trespasser rather than compensating the landowner. From the beginning a defendant convicted of trespass was fined; a defendant who could not pay the fine was imprisoned. The fine in this criminal proceeding developed into an award of damages to the plaintiff. This change marked the beginning of tort action under the common law. As trespass developed into a means of compelling the defendant to compensate the plaintiff for injury to his property interests, it took two forms: an action for trespass on real property and an action for injury to Personal Property. In an action for trespass on land, the plaintiff could recover damages for the defendant's forcible interference with the plaintiff's possession of his land. Even the slightest entry onto the land without the plaintiff's permission gave the plaintiff the right to damages in a nominal sum. An action for trespass to chattels was available to seek damages from anyone who had intentionally or forcibly injured personal property. The injury could include carrying off the plaintiff's property or harming it, destroying it, or keeping the plaintiff from holding or using it as she had a right to do. Later, an additional Cause of Action was recognized for injuries that were not forcible or direct. This action was called trespass on the case oraction on the case because its purpose was to protect the plaintiff's legal rights, rather than her person or land, from intentional force. Over the years the courts recognized other forms of actions that permitted recovery for injuries that did not exactly fit the forms of trespass or trespass on the case. Eventually, writs were also issued for these various types of actions. For example, a continuing trespass was a permanent invasion of someone's rights, as when a building overhung a neighbor's land. A trespass for mesne profits was a form of action against a tenant who wrongfully took profits, such as a crop, from the property while he occupied it. A trespass to try title was a form of action to recover possession of real property from someone who was not entitled to it. This action "tried title" so that the court could order possession for the person who turned out to be the rightful owner.

These common-law forms of action had serious shortcomings. A plaintiff who could not fit her complaint exactly into one of the forms could not proceed in court, even if she obviously had been wronged. Modern law has remedied this situation by enacting rules of Civil Procedure that replace the common-law forms with more flexible ways of wording a civil complaint. The various trespass actions are still important, however, because modern property laws are largely based on them. The rights protected remain in force, and frequently even the old names are still used.

Trespass to Land
In modern law the word trespass is used most commonly to describe the intentional and wrongful invasion of another's real property. An action for trespass can be maintained by the owner or anyone else who has a lawful right to occupy the real property, such as the owner of an apartment building, a tenant, or a member of the tenant's family. The action can be maintained against anyone who interferes with the right of ownership or possession, whether the invasion is by a person or by something that a person has set in motion. For example, a hunter who enters fields where hunting is forbidden is a trespasser, and so is a company that throws rocks onto neighboring land when it is blasting. Every unlawful entry onto another's property is trespass, even if no harm is done to the property. A person who has a right to come onto the land may become a trespasser by committing wrongful acts after entry. For example, a mail carrier has a privilege to walk up the sidewalk at a private home but is not entitled to go through the front door. A person who enters property with permission but stays after he has been told to leave also commits a trespass. Moreover, an intruder cannot defend himself in a trespass action by showing that the plaintiff did not have a completely valid legal right to the property. The reason for all of these rules is that the action of trespass exists to prevent breaches of the peace by protecting the quiet possession of real property. In a trespass action, the plaintiff does not have to show that the defendant intended to trespass but only that she intended to do whatever caused the trespass. It is no excuse that the trespasser mistakenly believed that she was not doing wrong or that she did not understand the wrong. A child can be a trespasser, as can a person who thought that she was on her own land. Injury to the property is not necessary for the defendant to be guilty of trespass, although the amount of damages awarded will generally reflect the extent of the harm done to the property. For example, a person could sue birdwatchers who intruded onto his land but would probably receive only nominal damages. A farmer who discovers several persons cutting down valuable hardwood trees for firewood could recover a more substantial amount in damages. Trespassers are responsible for nearly all the consequences of their unlawful entry, including those that could not have been anticipated or are the result of nothing more wrongful than the trespass itself. For example, if a trespasser carefully lights a fire in the stove of a lake cabin and a fault in the stove causes the cabin to burn down, the trespasser can be held liable for the fire damage. Courts have had to consider how far above and below the ground the right to possession of land extends. In United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 90 L. Ed. 1206 (1946), the U.S. Supreme Court held the federal government liable for harm caused to a poultry business by low-altitude military flights. The Court concluded that because the airspace above land is like a public highway, ordinary airplane flights cannot commit trespass. In this case, however, the planes were flying below levels approved by federal law and regulations, so the government was held responsible. Its activity was a "taking" of private property, for which the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires just compensation. It may be a trespass to tunnel or mine under another person's property, to force water or soil under the property, or to build a foundation that crosses under the boundary line. Underground encroachments are usually an exception to the rule that no harm needs to be shown in order to prove a trespass. Generally,

trespass actions are permitted only where there is some damage to the surface or some interference with the owner's rights to use her property.

Trespass by One Entitled to Possession

In nearly all states, a person who forcibly enters onto land is guilty of a crime, even if that person is entitled to possession of the land. For example, a landlord who personally tries to eject a tenant creates a potentially explosive situation. To discourage such "self help," the states provide legal procedures for the rightful owner to use to recover his land. Many states do not let the illegal occupant sue the rightful owner in trespass for his forcible entry, but the occupant can sue for Assault and Battery or damage to her personal property.

Continuing Trespass
A trespass is continuing when the offending object remains on the property of the person entitled to possession. A building or fence that encroaches on a neighbor's property creates a continuing trespass, as does a tree that has fallen across a boundary line. Some courts have allowed a series of lawsuits where there is a continuing trespass, but the prevailing view is that the dispute should be settled in its entirety in one action. The remedies can be tailored to the particular kind of harm done. A defendant might have to pay damages to repair the plaintiff's property or compensate the plaintiff for the diminished value of her property. Where a structure or object is on the plaintiff's property, the defendant may be ordered to remove it.

Defenses
In some cases a defendant is not liable for trespass even though she has intruded onto another's property. Public officials, for example, do not have any special right to trespass, but a housing inspector with a Search Warrant can enter someone's building whether the owner consents or not. A police officer can pursue a criminal across private property without liability for trespass. The police officer's defense to a claim of trespass is her lawful authority to enter. A hotel employee who enters a guest's room to perform housekeeping services is not a trespasser because it is customary to assume that guests want such services. If charged with trespass by the guest, the hotel would claim the guest consented to the employee's entry. A landlord does not have the right to enter a tenant's apartment whenever the landlord wants. However, the landlord usually has the right to enter to make repairs. The landlord must arrange a reasonable time for the repairs, but the tenant's consent to this arrangement is either contained in the lease or is implied from the landlord's assumption of responsibility for making repairs inside the apartment. A person is not guilty of trespass if he goes onto another's land to protect life or property during an emergency. For example, a passerby who sees someone pointing a gun at another person may cross onto the property and subdue the person with the gun. Someone at the scene of a traffic accident may go onto private property to pull a victim from one of the vehicles. Permission to enter someone else's property can be given either by consent or by license. Consent simply means giving permission or allowing another onto the land. For example, a person who lets neighborhood children play in her yard has given consent. Consent may be implied from all the circumstances. A homeowner who calls a house painter and asks for an estimate cannot later complain that the painter trespassed by coming into her yard.

Sometimes consent to enter another's land is called a license, or legal permission. This license is not necessarily a certificate and may be in the form of a written agreement. For example, an electric company might have a license to enter private property to maintain electrical lines or to read the electric meter. The employees cannot act unreasonably when they make repairs, and they and the company are liable for any damage they cause to the property.

Duty to Trespassers
A homeowner is limited in what he can do to protect his family and property from trespassers. The homeowner cannot shoot children who keep cutting across the lawn or set traps or deadly springoperated guns to kill anyone who trespasses on the property. Deadly Force in any manner is generally not justifiable except in Self-Defense while preventing a violent felony. Mere trespass is not a felony. The owner or person in possession of real property can be held liable if guests are injured on the property because of the owner's Negligence. A property owner generally does not have the same duty to make the premises safe for a trespasser, however. A trespasser assumes the risk of being injured by an unguarded excavation, a fence accidentally electrified by a falling wire, or a broken stair. The occupant of real property has a duty only to refrain from intentionally injuring a trespasser on the premises. These general rules have several exceptions, however. A property owner who knows that people frequently trespass at a particular place on his land must act affirmatively to keep them out or exercise care to prevent their injury. If the trespasser is a child, most states require an occupant of land to be more careful because a child cannot always be expected to understand and appreciate dangers. Therefore, if the property owner has a swimming pool, the law would classify this as an attractive nuisance that could be expected to cause harm to a child. The property owner must take reasonable precautions to prevent a trespassing child from harm. In this case the erection of a fence around the swimming pool would likely shield the property owner from liability if a child trespassed and drowned in the pool.

Criminal Trespass
At common law a trespass was not criminal unless it was accomplished by violence or breached the peace. Some modern statutes make any unlawful entry onto another's property a crime. When the trespass involves violence or injury to a person or property, it is always considered criminal, and penalties may be increased for more serious or malicious acts. Criminal intent may have to be proved to convict under some statutes, but in some states trespass is a criminal offense regardless of the defendant's intent. Some statutes consider a trespass criminal only if the defendant has an unlawful purpose in entering or remaining in the place where he has no right to be. The unlawful purpose may be an attempt to disrupt a government office, theft, or Arson. Statutes in some states specify that a trespass is not criminal until after a warning, either spoken or by posted signs, has been given to the trespasser. Criminal trespass is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.

[G.R. No. 152021. May 17, 2005]

HEIRS OF ERNESTO V. CONAHAP, namely, NERRE CONAHAP, FARRAH MAY GANCINO CONAHAP, GANCINO CONAHAP, petitioners, vs. PROSPERADOR REGAA, namely, MILAGROS CARLA JOY REGAA, respondents.
*

D. GANCINOand MELANIE HEIRS OF REGAA and

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Sometime in August 1983, the spouses Prosperador and Milagros Regaa, who had first returned to the Philippines from Nigeria, agreed to purchase a parcel of land in Davao City. The property, Lot No. 33, was located at Sapphire Street, Block No. 8 (Phase 4), Ecoland Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, and had an area of 331 square meters. It was owned by Ecoland Properties Development Corporation (Ecoland), and the agreed price was P56,270.00, with a down payment of P3,000.00 upon the execution of the contract to sell,[1] the balance payable on or before September 30, 1983. Project Engineer Romel Bernardino accompanied Prosperador Regaa to the property which was then unoccupied. Bernardino also showed a sketch plan[2]indicating its location; Bernardinos house was around 100 meters away from the lot; [3] adjacent thereto was the house owned by Delfin Yap,[4] and behind it, a commercial road. On August 22, 1983, Ecoland and Prosperador Regaa executed a Contract To Sell over the property. The purchase price was paid, and the Register of Deeds thereafter issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-101822 under Prosperadors name. The Regaa spouses then left the Philippines and returned to Nigeria where they were employed. Upon their return to the Philippines in 1984, the couple visited the property and found it unoccupied. They placed a temporary fence around its perimeter, as well as a No Trespassing sign.[5]They then left for Surigao where Milagros was then working. Upon their return to Matina, Davao City in March 1988, they were dumbfounded to see that a house already stood on their property that of Ernesto Conahap who, together with his family, was already residing therein.[6] Prosperador then filed a complaint for ejectment against Ernesto with the Office of the Barangay Captain, Bucana, Davao City. The parties failed to arrive at a settlement. Prosperador Regaa then filed a complaint for recovery of possession of the said property with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, praying that after due hearing, judgment be rendered in his favor, viz.:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered:

1.

Ordering defendant, his privies, agents, and representatives to vacate the land in question, demolish his structure, and turn possession thereof to the plaintiff; Ordering defendant to pay rentals on the premises at the rate of five hundred (P500.00) pesos a month counted from January 1988 until possession thereof is restored to the plaintiff; Ordering defendant to pay exemplary damages in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) pesos; Ordering defendant to pay attorneys fees in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) Pesos plus appearance fees and other litigation expenses;

2.

3. 4.

5.

Ordering defendant to pay to (sic) [the] costs.

PLAINTIFF further prays for such other reliefs as the Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the premises.
[7]

In his answer to the complaint, Ernesto alleged that Prosperador had no cause of action against him. He claimed that the subject property was part of a 188,299-squaremeter lot owned by Saya V.A. Lim and covered by TCT No. 2341; it was later sold to Ecoland on June 14, 1974 via a deed of absolute sale,[8] and, thereafter, to the Regaa spouses. Ernesto further alleged that the property occupied by him was a portion of the property subject of Ponciano Sabrosos existing application for a free patent with the Bureau of Lands. He presented Feliciano Sabroso, Poncianos brother, who declared that Ponciano had allowed Ernesto to construct his house over the property. During the pre-trial, Ernesto admitted that the spouses Regaa had purchased the property from Ecoland, and that it was titled in their names. For his part, Prosperador admitted that the property was covered by Poncianos homestead patent application which was filed with the Bureau of Lands in 1982. Feliciano testified further that there was no No Trespassing sign installed on the property, nor any fence constructed around its perimeter. Ernesto adduced evidence that Poncianos free patent application covered a 5 hectare lot, located in Kabacan, Matina, Davao City, and that such application was filed with the Bureau of Lands on August 25, 1982. Ernesto alleged in his application that he had occupied the property since 1966 and planted coconut trees, fruit trees and vegetables.[9] Upon Poncianos death on October 11, 1986, his brother Feliciano secured an authority from the Bureau of Lands for the survey of the property on October 26, 1988.[10] The property was surveyed on October 28, 1988 and February 3, 1989 by Geodetic Engineer Meliton Panes who prepared a plan [11] covering the said lot. It appeared in the said plan that the property[12] claimed by the Regaa spouses was

owned by Ponciano. Per the Memorandum[13] of the Regional Technical Director of the Land Management Services, dated July 31, 1991, a committee was created to oversee the relocation survey of the exact boundaries of the Ecoland property. Ernesto further alleged that although the Bureau of Lands had not approved Poncianos free patent application, the property occupied by him was not a part of Ecolands property, as evidenced by the resurvey[14] of the property titled to the latter. Ernesto also adduced evidence that Ponciano had filed a complaint for forcible entry against Ecoland, and that Ecoland filed a similar complaint against him on August 15, 1984; after a joint trial, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Davao City dismissed the cases in a Decision,[15] dated June 19, 1989. The court ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint of Ecoland, and that Ponciano failed to prove his possession of the lot. Ponciano appealed the decision to the RTC.[16] On September 1, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Prosperador. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered against the defendant in favor of plaintiff: 1. Ordering the defendant, his privies, agents and representatives to vacate the land in question, to demolish his structure and turn over possession thereof to the plaintiff; Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff rentals of the land at the rate of P300.00 per month counted from Jan. 1988 until possession thereof is restored to the plaintiff; Ordering defendant to pay attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000.00; and To pay the cost.
[17]

2.

3. 4.

Ernesto appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the decision on December 26, 2000. A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise filed, and was similarly denied. The appellate court ruled that Ernesto failed to prove that the property occupied by him and his family was a portion of the property subject of Poncianos free patent application. In the meantime, Ernesto died and was survived by his heirs, Nerre D. GancinoConahap, Farrah May Gancino Conahap and Melanie Gancino Conahap, who now assail the appellate courts decision and resolution through the instant petition for review on certiorari. It is the contention of the petitioners that the decision of the CA does not comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. They further assert that under Article 434 of the New Civil Code, Prosperador, as the plaintiff in the trial court, was burdened to prove the identity of the property claimed by him, and that such property was covered

by TCT No. T-101822. Citing the ruling of this Court in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Franco,[18] and relying on their documentary evidence, the petitioners aver that Ponciano had acquired title over the property by acquisitive prescription by virtue of his adverse possession even as against the owner, despite his erroneous belief that the property was public land. In their comment to the petition, the respondents maintained that the decision of the CA was correct. Subsequently, respondent Prosperador Regaa died and was survived by his heirs, respondents Milagros and Carla Joy Regaa. The petition is denied due course. The issues raised in this case are factual. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in this Court. The raison detre of this rule is that this Court is not a trier of facts. Unless for exceptional reasons, it is not to review the evidence on record and assess the probative weight thereof. Even in cases where the Court exercises its power to review, the findings of fact of the CA are still to be considered conclusive and binding, unless in conflict with those of the trial court or contrary to the evidence on record. The Court agrees with the contention of the petitioners that the RTC and the CA erred in ruling that the respondents failed to prove that the property subject of Poncianos homestead application in the Bureau of Lands includes the lot subject of the complaint. Nonetheless, the fact is that, as gleaned from the pre-trial order of the trial court, Prosperador, as the plaintiff (the respondents p redecessor), admitted the following:

1) that the land is covered by the Application of Ponciano Sabroso but with the counter-manifestation that said Application was not approved by the Bureau of Lands and it was filed nine (9) years ago and no action was taken thereon; 2) that there is a survey but with counter-manifestation that said survey was not approved, Exhibit 1.
[19]

On the other hand, Ernesto, the defendant therein and the predecessor of the petitioners, admitted during the pre-trial that the property subject of the complaint was purchased by Prosperador from Ecoland and was covered by TCT No. T-101822 under the name of Prosperador:

1) the land is titled in the name of the plaintiff, Exhibit A; 2) the land was purchased from the Ecoland Development Corporation; 3) the matter of the area occupied by the defendant was reported by the plaintiff to the Office of the plaintiffs counsel for settlement and arbitration, Exhibit C Certificate to File Action;

4) the lot is now fully developed with concrete roads and underground drainage.
[20]

The admissions of the parties during the pre-trial as embodied in the pre-trial order of the court are binding and conclusive on them,[21] unless there is a clear showing that the admission was entered through palpable mistake.[22] Such admissions cannot be contradicted by the parties. The petitioners are thus estopped from claiming that the property occupied by them is not the property titled to the respondents, and that the latter failed to prove the identity of the claimed property. Since the property is titled to the respondents, they are entitled to possess the same.[23] It bears stressing that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.[24] The ruling of this Court in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Franco[25] does not apply in this case, since neither Ponciano nor his brother Feliciano was a party in the RTC. In that case, the Director of Lands, in behalf of the government, filed a petition in the cadastral court to settle and adjudicate the title to two parcels of land. Juan Franco claimed ownership over the property and adduced proof during the trial that it was part of a forest concession granted to Petronilo Sangued, but that he cultivated the property and built his house thereon. Franco adduced proof that he complied with all the legal formalities for a homestead patent application. The Court awarded the property to Franco who took possession of the property on the erroneous belief that it was public land, with the intention of holding and claiming it under the homestead law; he acquired title over the property by actual possession as against the owner. In this case, however, when Ponciano filed his application for a homestead patent over the property in 1982, the property was already private land. Moreover, his application was not acted upon, much less approved by the Bureau of Lands; hence, Ponciano never acquired any rights over the property. By the time the complaint of the respondents was filed in the RTC, Ponciano had already died. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED.