UNIVERSITY GR FACTS:

OF THE No.

EAST, petitioner, 132344.

VS. ROMEO February

A.

JADER, 17,

respondent 2000.

Romeo Jader, a law student of the University of the East, failed to take his regular examination in Practice Court I in his first semester of his last school year. However, he was able to remove the incomplete mark when the Dean of his college approved his application to take a removal examination. In the 2nd semester, his name appeared in the tentative list of candidates for graduation for the Decree of Bachelor of Laws and in the invitation for the 35th Investiture and Commencement Ceremonies, the plaintiffs name appeared. Thus, he attended the investiture ceremonies and graduated. On April to September 1998, he took a leave of absence from his work and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. To his dismay upon knowing that he incurred a deficiency, he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examinations. He then filed a suit against UE praying for moral and exemplary damages arising from the latters negligence. The trial court ruled in his favor and was granted for actual damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision with modification. The CA awarded moral damages. On account of suffering moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights and ultimately for not having to take the bar exam. ISSUE: Whether RULING: In view of the foregoing issue, the Supreme Court emphatically enunciated that moral damages cannot be awarded to Romeo Jader. It cannot believe that he suffered shock, trauma, and pain. Along this vein, the Supreme Court held Jader negligent. It opined that as a student, he should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, especially those appertaining to his academics, are in order. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements. While the Court held the University of the East negligent and therefore liable for actual damages in favor of Jader, the latter was also held liable for negligence thereby no moral damages can be awarded in his favor. The decision was affirmed with modification. or not Romeo Jader can validly claim for moral damages.

ERMELINDA C. MANALOTO, petitioners vs ISMAEL VELOSO III, respondent. G.R. No. 171365 October 6, 2010 Facts: This case is an off-shoot of an unlawful detainer case filed by [herein petitioners] Ermelinda C. Manaloto, Aurora J. Cifra, Flordeliza J. Arcilla, Lourdes J. Catalan, Ethelinda J. Holt, Bienvenido R. Jongco, Artemio R. Jongco, Jr. and Joel Jongco against [herein respondent]. In said complaint for unlawful detainer, it was alleged that they are the lessors of a residential house located at No. 42 Big Horseshoe Drive, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City which was leased to respondent at a monthly rental of P17,000.00. The action was instituted on the ground of respondent's failure to pay rentals from May 23, 1997 to December 22, 1998 despite repeated demands. Respondent denied the non-payment of rentals and alleged that he made an advance payment of P825,000.00 when he paid for the repairs done on the leased property. Whilst respondent's appeal of the MeTC judgment in the unlawful detainer case was pending before the RTC-Branch 88, respondent filed before the RTC-Branch 227 on November 26, 2002 a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against the petitioners. The said complaint alleged two causes of action. The first cause of action was for damages because the respondent supposedly suffered embarrassment and humiliation when petitioners distributed copies of the above-mentioned MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case to the homeowners of Horseshoe Village while respondent's appeal was still pending before the RTC-Branch 88. The second cause of action was for breach of contract since petitioners, as lessors, failed to make continuing repairs on the subject property to preserve and keep it tenantable. The decision of the RTC is affirmed with modification that the case is dismissed only as to the second cause of action. As to the first cause of action, petitioners were ordered to pay respondent moral damages of P30,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00. Hence, the instant Petition for Review. Issue: Whether respondent is entitled to the award of moral and exemplary damages. Ruling: While said Decision was still pending appeal with the RTC, the petitioner, already distributed copies of said Decision to some of the homeowners of Horseshoe Village, who personally know the respondent. This act is a direct assault or character assassination on the part of the respondent because as stated in the said decision, respondent has been staying in the premises but did not or refused to pay his monthly rentals for a long period of time when in truth and in fact was untrue. That from the time the said decision was distributed to said members homeowners, the respondent became the subject of conversation or talk of the town and by virtue of which respondent's good name within the community or society where he belongs was greatly damaged; his reputation was besmirched; respondent suffered sleepless night and serious anxiety. Respondent, who is the grandson of the late Senator Jose Veloso and Congressman Ismael Veloso, was deprived of political career and to start with was to run as candidate for Barangay Chairman within their area which was being offered to him by the homeowners but this offer has started to fade and ultimately totally vanished after the distribution of said Decision. Damages to his good names and reputations and other damages which he suffered as a consequence thereof, may be reasonably compensated for at least P1,500,000.00 as moral and consequential damages. In order to deter petitioners and others from doing as abovementioned, petitioners should likewise be assessed exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00.

A cause of action (for damages) exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. We find that all three elements exist in the case at bar. Respondent may not have specifically identified each element, but it may be sufficiently determined from the allegations in his complaint. First, respondent filed the complaint to protect his good character, name, and reputation. Every man has a right to build, keep, and be favored with a good name. This right is protected by law with the recognition of slander and libel as actionable wrongs, whether as criminal offenses or tortuous conduct. Second, petitioners are obliged to respect respondent's good name even though they are opposing parties in the unlawful detainer case. As Article 19 of the Civil Code requires, "[e]very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." A violation of such principle constitutes an abuse of rights, a tortuous conduct. The principle of abuse of rights stated in the above article, departs from the classical theory that "he who uses a right injures no one." The modern tendency is to depart from the classical and traditional theory, and to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is an abuse of rights, even when the act is not illicit. Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. If mere fault or negligence in one's acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. The absence of good faith is essential to abuse of right. Good faith is an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through the forms or technicalities of the law, together with an absence of all information or belief of fact which would render the transaction unconscientious. In business relations, it means good faith as understood by men of affairs. While Article 19 may have been intended as a mere declaration of principle, the "cardinal law on human conduct" expressed in said article has given rise to certain rules, e.g. that where a person exercises his rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty and good faith, he opens himself to liability. The elements of an abuse of rights under Article 19 are: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.25 Petitioners are also expected to respect respondent's "dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind" under Article 26 of the Civil Code, which provides: ART. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: (1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence; (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another; (3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends; (4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition. Thus, Article 2219(10) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages for acts and actions referred to in Article 26, among other provisions, of the Civil Code.

ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING and RAMAS UYPITCHING SONS, INC., petitioners, vs. ERNESTO QUIAMCO, respondent. G.R. No. 146322 December 6, 2006 Facts:

In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by Juan Davalan,2 Josefino Gabutero and Raul Generoso to amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery3 filed by Quiamco against them. They surrendered to him a red Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration. Respondent asked for the original certificate of registration but the three accused never came to see him again. Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside respondents business establishment, Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, where it was visible and accessible to the public. Which it turns out that the motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation managed by petitioner Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. To secure its payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner corporation. When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan assumed the obligation and continued the payment. However, Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments and told petitioner corporations collector, that the motorcycle had allegedly been "taken by respondents men." Petitioner Uypitching went to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the motorcycle. Petitioner paced back and forth inside the establishment uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle," while the policemen accompanying the petitioner were asking for the clerk in charge for the respondent. Unable to find the respondent, Uypitching took pictures of the motorcycle and took the motorcycle over the clerks objection. On February 18, 1991, petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law against respondent in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City. Respondent moved for dismissal because the complaint did not charge an offense as he had neither stolen nor bought the motorcycle. The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint and denied petitioner Uypitchings subsequent motion for reconsideration. Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners in the RTC of Dumaguete City, sought to hold the petitioners liable for the following: (1) unlawful taking of the motorcycle; (2) utterance of a defamatory remark (that respondent was a thief) and (3) precipitate filing of a baseless and malicious complaint. These acts humiliated and embarrassed the respondent and injured his reputation and integrity. RTC rendered a decision finding that petitioner Uypitching was motivated with malice and ill will when he called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a baseless complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioners acts were found to be contrary to Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court held petitioners liable to respondent for P500,000 moral damages, P200,000 exemplary damages and P50,000 attorneys fees plus costs. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed the trial courts decision with modification, reducing the award of moral and exemplary damages. Issue:

Whether the filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the AntiFencing Law in the Office of the City Prosecutor warranted the award of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs in favor of respondent. Ruling: Supreme court ruled that malice and ill will attended not only the public imputation of a crime to respondent but also the taking of the motorcycle, petitioners were deemed to have accepted the correctness of such findings. This alone was sufficient to hold petitioners liable for damages to respondent. Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on respondents establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous statement. The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code, provides: Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. It seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach. In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners instance was not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which the right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners actions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused damage to respondent. Hence, they should indemnify him.

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant vs.VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees. G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965

Facts: Vicenta Escao, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register. Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in love. They planned to get married and then elope. Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however, materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escao were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke. The following morning, the Escao spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escao was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948, while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame. Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition. The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing. In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor. On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage. On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958. But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages. The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the

counterclaim of Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly Supreme Court. Issue: Whether defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doa Mena Escao liable for damages; and, the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant parents on their counterclaims. Ruling: Plaintiff was admitted to the Escao house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous one was canonically defective. There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved. Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen. In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicente Escao, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees. With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao, opined by the SC that the same are excessive. Defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. Supreme Court reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased,plaintiffs-appellants, vs. REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees. G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977 Facts: Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." The CFI dismissed the case, hence, this aapeal. Issues: Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed? Ruling: The corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides: ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasidelict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery." SC hold, that Article 2176, refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, thatculpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4 It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC., and ADMER PAJARILLO, petitioners, vs. LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO, VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN LAURO TANGCO, VON LARRIE TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO and VIVIEN LAURIZ TANGCO, respondent. G.R. No. 165732 December 14, 2006 Facts:

Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death. Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed with the RTC of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, respondents reserved their right to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide. Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the plaintiffs, the heirs of Evangeline, and against defendants Pajarillo and Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. ordering said defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally actual, exemplary, moral, death indemnity, attorneys fees and costs of suit. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.'s civil liability in this case is only subsidiary under Art. 103 of the RPC Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in a Resolution dated October 20, 2004.Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari Issues: (1) whether Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline; and (2) Safeguard should be held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to respondents. Ruling: The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary. The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, to wit: SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in fact filed the same on January 14, 1998. An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes. Thus, a reading of respondents' complaint shows that the latter are invoking their right to recover damages against Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Pajarillo's act of shooting and killing Evangeline under Article 2176, Civil Code which provides: ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo in the criminal case but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from crime. The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not an act or omission punishable by law. Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. xxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. xxxx The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasidelict committed by the former. Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by operation of law. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee. Turning now to the award of damages, SC find award actual, moral, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

SEBASTIAN SIGA-AN, Petitioner vs. ALICIA VILLANUEVA, Respondent. G.R. No. 173227 January 20, 2009 Facts: On 30 March 1998, respondent Alicia Villanueva filed a complaint for sum of money against petitioner Sebastian Siga-an before the Las Pinas City Regional Trial Court (RTC). Respondent alleged that she was a businesswoman engaged in supplying office materials and equipments to the Philippine Navy Office (PNO) located at Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, while petitioner was a military officer and comptroller of the PNO from 1991 to 1996. Respondent claimed that sometime in 1992, petitioner approached her inside the PNO and offered to loan her the amount of P540,000.00. Since she needed capital for her business transactions with the PNO, she accepted petitioners proposal. The loan agreement was not reduced in writing. Also, there was no stipulation as to the payment of interest for the loan. According to her computation, the total amount she paid to petitioner for the loan and interest accumulated toP1,200,000.00. Her lawyer told her that petitioner could not validly collect interest on the loan because there was no agreement between her and petitioner regarding payment of interest. Upon being advised by her lawyer that she made overpayment to petitioner, she sent a demand letter to petitioner asking for the return of the excess amount of P660,000.00. Petitioner, despite receipt of the demand letter, ignored her claim for reimbursement. Respondent prayed that the RTC render judgment ordering petitioner to pay respondent. Respondent also issued to him six postdated checks amounting to P1,240,000.00 as guarantee of compliance with her obligation. Subsequently, he presented the six checks for encashment but only one check was honored. He demanded that respondent settle her obligation, but the latter failed to do so. Hence, he filed criminal cases for Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22) against respondent. The cases were assigned to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65 (MeTC). Petitioner insisted that there was no overpayment because respondent admitted in the latters promissory note that her monetary obligation as of 12 September 1994 amounted to P1,240,000.00 inclusive of interests even issued six postdated checks as guarantee but only one was honored. but to no avail his demand to settle her obligation failed hence he filed for BP 22 at MeTC Makati. The RTC rendered a Decision on 26 January 2001 holding that respondent made an overpayment of her loan obligation to petitioner and that the latter should refund the excess amount to the former. It ratiocinated that respondents obligation was only to pay the loaned amount of P540,000.00, and that the alleged interests due should not be included in the computation of respondents total monetary debt because there was no agreement between them regarding payment of interest. It concluded that since respondent made an excess payment to petitioner in the amount of P660,000.00 through mistake, petitioner should return the said amount to respondent pursuant to the principle of solutio indebiti. The RTC also ruled that petitioner should pay moral damages for the sleepless nights and wounded feelings experienced by respondent. Further, petitioner should pay exemplary damages by way of example or correction for the public good, plus attorneys fees and costs of suit. Petitioner appealed to the CA. The appellate court promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC Decision. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision but this was denied. Hence, petitioner lodged the instant petition.

Issue: Whether the CA erre in applying the principle of solution indebiti. Compensatory interest is not chargeable in the instant case because it was not duly proven that respondent defaulted in paying the loan. Also, as earlier found, no interest was due on the loan because there was no written agreement as regards payment of interest. Under Article 1960 of the Civil Code, if the borrower of loan pays interest when there has been no stipulation therefor, the provisions of the Civil Code concerning solutio indebiti shall be applied. Article 2154 of the Civil Code explains the principle of solutio indebiti. Said provision provides that if something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises. In such a case, a creditor-debtor relationship is created under a quasi-contract whereby the payor becomes the creditor who then has the right to demand the return of payment made by mistake, and the person who has no right to receive such payment becomes obligated to return the same. The quasi-contract of solutio indebiti harks back to the ancient principle that no one shall enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another.31 The principle of solutio indebiti applies where (1) a payment is made when there exists no binding relation between the payor, who has no duty to pay, and the person who received the payment; and (2) the payment is made through mistake, and not through liberality or some other cause. Supreme Court held that the principle of solutio indebiti applies in case of erroneous payment of undue interest. Article 2232 of the Civil Code states that in a quasi-contract, such as solutio indebiti, exemplary damages may be imposed if the defendant acted in an oppressive manner. Petitioner acted oppressively when he pestered respondent to pay interest and threatened to block her transactions with the PNO if she would not pay interest. This forced respondent to pay interest despite lack of agreement thereto. Thus, the award of exemplary damages is appropriate. The amount of P50,000.00 imposed as exemplary damages by the RTC and the Court is fitting so as to deter petitioner and other lenders from committing similar and other serious wrongdoings. In the present case, petitioners obligation arose from a quasi -contract of solutio indebiti and not from a loan or forbearance of money. Thus, an interest of 6% per annum should be imposed on the amount to be refunded. The decision of CA was affirmed by the SC with some modifications.

PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL, petitioners, vs. IAC, DAVID UY and TERESITA UY, respondents. G.R. No. 74431 November 6, 1989 Facts: On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated 1 wounds on the forehead" and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint. Issues: 1) Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property. 2) The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of the dog that bit Theness there was no clear showing that she died as a result thereof.

Rulings: Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be held responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is one of Miranda's heirs. However, that is hardly the point. What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house. Article 2183 reads as follows: The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from causing injury to any one, including himself. While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the 13 property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. Moreover, there is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, according to at least one witness, and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the 15 house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog. The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It
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is also noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although Purita said she knew them only casually. On the contrary, the death certificate declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia, which had nothing to do with the dog bites for which she had been previously hospitalized. The Court need not involve itself in an extended scientific discussion of the causal connection between the dog bites and the certified cause of death except to note that, first, Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a complication of rabies. That Theness became afraid of water after she was bitten by the dog is established by the testimony of Dr. Tautjo. On the strength of the testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has beep satisfactorily established. We also reiterate our ruling in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada,
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that the death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of

death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated a different cause of death. The petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of thte Civil Code holds possessor liable even if the animal should escape or be lost and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal. According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that hewho posseses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal cause. SC sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary awards except only as to the medical and hospitalization expenses, which are reduced to P2,026.69, as prayed for in the complaint. While there is no recompense that can bring back to the private respondents the child they have lost, their pain should at least be assuaged by the civil damages to which they are entitled.