On or about 17 Oct 1988, Santiago the then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) approved the

application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of EO 324 which prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Garchitorena, presiding Justice of Sandiganbayan, issued the arrest of Santiago. Santiago petitioned for a provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. After a long series of appeals and court battles between Santiago and Sandiganbayan, in 1995 the latter moved for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then, from office. Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate president (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days. ___________________ People v. Godoy Doctrine: The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character humiliates their entire families. Facts: Godoy was charged with rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention. His defense was that they were lovers, as evidenced by the letters wrote by the complainant to the accused. Issue: Can Godoy be convicted of rape? Held: No. They were in fact lovers. It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactor was to deprive the offended party of her liberty. In the present charge for that crime, such intent has not at all been established by the prosecution. Prescinding from the fact that the Taha spouses desisted from pursuing this charge which they themselves instituted, several grave and irreconcilable inconsistencies bedevil the prosecution's evidence thereon and cast serious doubts on the guilt of appellant. The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character humiliates their entire families.80 It could precisely be that complainant's mother wanted to save face in the community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter's indiscretion and escape the wagging tongues of their small rural community, she had to weave the scenario of this rape drama. ____________ Nolasco vs Enrile Facts: Special Military Commission No. 1, petitioner Mila Aguilar (hereinafter referred to as AGUILAR), who is listed as No. 74, charged with Rebellion The charge alleged that the rebellion was committed "in or about the month of August, 1973-feb 1974. During the alleged period (August, 1973 to March 18, 1977), Rebellion was not a capital offense Presidential Decree No. 942, effective on June 10, 1976, increased the penalty to reclusion temporal 1981, and through Presidential Decree No. 1834, that Rebellion became a capital offense 1978, AGUILAR and nine others were charged before Military Commission No with Subversion 3 in Criminal Case No. MC-25-113 AGUILAR was at large until August 6, 1984 when she was arrested -In the meantime: (a) In the Rebellion Case, arraignment was held on October 28, 1978, without the presence of AGUILAR. > other defendants in custody refused to plead, and pleas of 'not guilty" were entered for them including one for AGUILAR. In June, 1982, trial commenced and towards the latter part of that year the prosecution rested its case. In July, 1984. Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus were filed against SMC in G.R. Nos. 67850 and 6M51 a) As previously stated, AGUILAR was arrested on August 6, 1984 in Quezon City together with one, Cynthia Nolasco. 1984, a Presidential Detention Action(PDA) was issued agains AGUILAR,NOLASCO and TOLENTINO.

Information was filed against AGUILAR, NOLASCO and TOLENTINO for illegal possession of Subversive Documents in Criminal Case of MTC - That Court ordered the release of the three defendants on the same day,August 13, 1984, on a P600.00 bail for each, "subject to the existence of any other order from any other court or competent authority 1984, in the Subversion Case, MC 25 also directed AGUILAR's confinement during the pendency of the trail. custodial authorities had refuse to release them because of the PDA, the three defendants filed the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 68437 . The resolution of GR 68437- ordered the released of NOLASCO and TOLENTINO, but served action in regards to AGUILAR. And become sole petitioner if the case. The Gr 68437-interpose his release on the ground of inter alia that she belongs to the highest education of communist party. G.R. No. 69482, respondent MC 25 upholds its jurisdiction over AGUILAR -on the ground thather case was already filed and pending trial before it as of January 12, 1981 when General Order No. 69 (infra) was issued. -1984, in the Subversion Case, AGUILAR was brought before MC 25 to appear and be involved in the ongoing trial of the case, GUILAR's counsel questioned the jurisdiction of the Commission over her, but the Commission upheld its jurisdiction issue to be resolved is whether or not MC 25 can still exercise jurisdiction over AGUILAR in the Subversion Case what has first to be determined is the validity of the plea of'not guilty' entered by the Commission on her behalf in that case. Ruling: We hold that AGUILAR had not been legally arraigned when a plea of "not guilty" had been entered for her together with the other defendants who had refused to plead. There can be no arraignment or plea in absentia. Under both the 1964 Rules of Court 6 and the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, 7 a defendant must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea. Even under Section 62 of the Manual of Courts Martial, it is provided that "during arraignment, the accused and personnel will stand Respondent MC 25, in its Answer submitted in G.R. No. 69482, invoked Section 5(c) of Presidential Decree No. 39 8 to justify a plea in absentia, stating that she was informed of the date set for trial and apprised of the content of the charge sheet through the prescribed service. The cited provision, allowing trial in absentia, and which presupposes arraignment inabsentia (through publication), was promulgated in 1972. It should give way to the 1973 Constitution, effective January 17, 1973, which provides that "after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. 9 In the Constitutional provision, "arraignment" cannot be construed as inclusive of "arraignment in absentia." As a matter of fact, in the codification made in Presidential Decree No. 1835, Section 5 provides: SEC. 5. After the arraignment of an accused who is charged with subversion, the trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused, provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. Judgment may be promulgated in absentia and the penalty of confiscation of his properties in the Philippines may be immediately executed. In other issue, The Subversion Case, therefore, should be transferred to the civil Court. for further proceedings. Wherefore: If the Information filed before a civil Court does not charge petitioner, Mila Aguilar, with acapital offense, and the civil Court shall order her release cm ball, she shag ako be releasedin relation to Criminal Case No. 223466 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, o the strength of the bail she has already filed, but also without prejudice to her detention during the continued pendency of the Rebellion Casein her regard. _______________ Garcia vs. Domingo Facts: For the convenience of the parties the trial was held in the air conditioned chamber of the respondent judge Garcia. The complaint was under the premise that such act is in violation of the right to hold a public trial.

Issue: Whether or not such proceeding of holding trial in the chamber of the judge in violation to the principle of right to a public trial. Held: It is not in violation of the right to a public trial since the trial was still open to public and there is no showing that the public was deprived to witness the trial proceeding. _________ Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 (1988) FACTS: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaintfiled with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only onJune 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused. RULING: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had afalling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. ____ Same case: Tatad due process; speedy disposition of cases Long delay in termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case found to e violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process; Undue delay in the conduct of preliminary investigation can not be corrected ___________ People vs. Jardin Petition for certiorari on decision of CFI Quezondismissing the criminal cases against accusedDemetrio Jardin because his constitutional right tospeedy trial was allegedly violated.

FACTS - The criminal prosecutions originated from a lettercomplaint of the Provincial Auditor of Quezonrequesting the Provincial Fiscal to file the necessarycriminal action under Article 217 of the Revised PenalCode against Demetrio Jardin for malversation of public funds thru falsification of public documents onsix counts. (1967) - {This case is full of delaying tactics}PI 1 : accused moved to postpone 4 times, andfailed to appear everytime.- PI was nevertheless conducted. And the six criminalinformations were filed in CFI.AR 1 : accused moved to postpone 4 time, neverappeared; counsel asked for reinvestigation on theground that the accused was not given theopportunity to present his defense during thepreliminary investigation. Court granted motion.PI 2 : accused moved to postpone many times, failed still to appear. When he finally appeared withhis counsel, they asked for 15 days to filememorandum. The memorandum was never filed, sothe investigating fiscal filed a manifestation beforethe court that the records of these cases be returnedand the trial on the merits of the same be set.- The court transferred the case to new branch of CFIQuezon without acting on manifestation.Arraignment date was set.AR 2 : more postponements at instance of accused; moved for reinvestigation again. Court granted.PI 3 : reset because no show. Counsel then askedfor 5 days to file written sworn statement of accusedas defense. No statement was submitted so therecords of the case were returned to court. A datewas set for arraignment.AR 3 : accused asked for postponement. Arraignment finally happened on Sept 8,1970 . Accused pleaded NOT GUILTY and asked fortrial to be postponed. On postponed date, accusedasked for another postponement.- Oct 1970, accused and counsel were at trial; but noone appeared for prosecution, except for a statewitness. Counsel moved (orally) for dismissal,invoking accused right to a speedy trial. Courtgranted motion and dismissed the cases. ISSUES 1. WON accused can invoke right to speedy trial

HELD 1. NO- The respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the cases and in basing thedismissal on the constitutional right of the accused tospeedy trial.- The right to a speedy trial means that the accusedis free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent personmay be free from anxiety andexpense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortestpossible time compatible with the presentation andconsideration of whatever legitimate defense he mayinterpose.- The delays in the prosecution of the offenses wereall caused by the accused so he cannot invokeconstitutional right to speedy trial. By his owndeliberate acts, he is deemed to have waived orabandoned his right to a speedy trial. ____________ People vs. Tee Facts The case involves an automatic review of judgment made against Tee who was convicted for illegal possession of marijuana and sentenced to death. The defense assailed the decision of the court for taking admissible as evidence the marijuana seized from the accused by virtue of allegedly general search warrant. They further contend that the accused was deprived of his right to speedy trial by failure of the prosecution

to produce their witness who failed to appear during the 20 hearing dates thereby slowing down the trial procedure.

Issue Whether or not the substantive right of the accused for a speedy trial prejudiced during the hearing of the case.

Held The court ruled that the substantive right of the accused for a fair and speedy trial was not violated. It held that the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 provides that the trial period for the criminal cases should be in general 180 days. However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: (1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or (2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or (3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. It was shown by the records that the prosecution exerted efforts in obtaining a warrant to compel the witness to testify. The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative where several factors are weighed such as the length of time of delay, the reason of such delay, and conduct of prosecution and the accused and the prejudice and damaged caused to the accused of such delay. The court did not find the 20 days of delayed hearing unreasonable length of time as to constitute deprivation of the constitutional rights of the accused for a speedy trial in addition to the fact that court trial may be always subjected to postponement for reasonable cause of delay. In the absence of showing that the reason for delay was capricious or oppressive, the State must not be deprived of reasonable opportunity in prosecuting the accused. ____________

Facts: Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, the petitioner invoked the void-for-vagueness rule in questioning the Plunder Law which he claimed denied him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him because of its ambiguity in failing to define with precision certain words and phrase in many of its provisions. Issue: R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional : II. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO KNOW THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM Held: The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. _______ Facts: Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu. However, he was not arraigned. That not withstanding, respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The case was appealed to the Court o First Instance

in Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. It was alleged that the failure to arraign him is a violation of his constitutional rights. It was also alleged that without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered The Solicitor General commented that the decision should be annulled because there was no arraignment. Issue: Whether or Not petitioners constitutional right was violated when he was not arraigned.

Held: Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. It is also not just due processthat requires an arraignment. It is required in the Rules that an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. Being arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. Also, respondent Judge Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of an arraignment. With the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel being thus manifest, it is correct that the Solicitor General agreed with petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should be set aside for being null. The absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of the requirements of due processto ensure a fair and impartial trial. Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining dated December 28, 1973, finding the accused guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries, is nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated November 16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is nullified and set aside. The case is remanded to the City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries, with due respect and observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with the arraignment of petitioner. _______ People vs Alcalde G.R. Nos. 139225-28 ; May 29, 2002 Facts: ARNEL convicted of two counts of parricide committed against his wife and his 11-month-old son and two counts of frustrated parricide committed against his two daughters. Upon his arraignment, ARNEL, who was assisted by a counsel de parte, acted strangely in a manner as if he [was] out of touch with the world and would not utter any word. The trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty in each of the cases. On the same occasion, the defense waived pre-trial. The cases were then consolidated and jointly tried. After the prosecution finally rested its case, Defense counsel for ARNEL, Atty. Vasquez Sr., informed the trial court of his inability to communicate wi th ARNEL because of ARNELs out of touch of the world behavior. Atty. Vasquez manifested that the defense was constrained to submit the case for decision. In these cases neither accused nor his counsel de parte asked for the suspension of the arraignment on the ground of mental incapacity. The OSG maintains that such failure was tantamount to an admission that ARNEL was not suffering from any mental disorder or to a waiver of the right to move for suspension of arraignment. ISSUE: Whether or not ARNELs arraignment was valid (as he was in a questionable mental state). Held: Invalid. It must be recalled that ARNELs arraignment was on 22 October 1997. At the time, what was applicable was Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Nowhere in that Section was it required that a motion by the accused be filed for the suspension of arraignment. Hence, the absence of such motion could not be considered a waiver of the right to a suspension of arraignment. Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was invoked by the OSG, requires a motion by the proper party. This new requirement of motion by the proper party could not be applied to these cases because the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which prescribes such requirement, took effect only on 1 December 2000. Besides, a waiver must be knowingly and intelligently made by the person possessing such right.

Unfortunately, ARNEL was apparently deprived of such mental faculties. Thus, no waiver, impliedly or expressly, could have been made by ARNEL at the time of his arraignment by reason of his mental condition. The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him under the Bill of Rights carries with it the correlative obligation to effectively convey to the accused the information to enable him to effectively prepare for his defense. At the bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency on the part of the accused is sufficient to justify suspension of the proceedings, the trial court must be fully satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance the law secures or gives Even if Atty. Vasquezs zeal for ARNELs cause fell short of that required of h im, that is, for him to have asked the court to suspend the arraignment of ARNEL on the ground of the latters unsound mental health, the greater demand of due process overwhelms such inadequate zeal. ______________ People vs. Crisologo a deaf-mute was accused of robbery with homicide, but arraignment was deferred for six years because there was no sign language expert to assist him. Finally waiving the reading of the information, he was tried, still without he assistance of a sign language expert, and was eventually convicted. Issue: Whether or not the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation was violated. Held: The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and any other means, whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against him denied the accused his fundamental right to due process of law. The accuracy and fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was determined was not safeguard. The accused could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be head by himself and counsel, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake.

______________ People v. Liwanag, 73 SCRA 473 (1976) Facts: The prosecution moved that the testimony of the witnesses presented during the preliminary investigation of this case be adopted as part of the evidence in chief of the prosecution. The trial court granted the motion subject to the condition that the witnesses be further cross-examined by counsel for the accused. At the trial, the witnesses for the prosecution who testified at the preliminary investigation were recalled and were again cross-examined by counsel for the appellant. Held: The testimony sought to be made part of the evidence in chief are not ex-parte affidavits, but testimony of witnesses taken down by question and answerduring the preliminary investigation in the presence of the accused and his counsel who subjected the said witnesses to a rigid and close crossexamination. The inclusion of said testimony was made subject to the right of the defendant to further cross-examine the witnesses whose testimony are sought to be reproduced and, pursuant to said order, the witnesses were recalled to the stand during the trial and again examined in the presence of the appellant. Upon the facts, there was no curtailment of the constitutional right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face. People vs. Dichoso Redentor Dichoso y Dagdag , the accused, appealed from June 11, 1991 of the RTC of San PabloCity where he has been convicted of the crime violating Sec. 15, Art. II and Sec. 4, Art. II of theDangerous Drugs Act of 1972 sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all itsaccessory penalties,

to pay fine of P20, 000 and the cost of suit. Likewise, Jaime Pagtakhan, was alsocharged with illegal possession of regulated drug violating Sec.16 , Art. III of the Dangerous Drug Act .However, Sonia Dichoso y Vinerable could not be arrested because as for the words of the trial court she cannot be located. The three cases were consolidated for a joint trial. In Branch 30 of the RTC SanPablo City.According to the accused-appellant Redentor Dichoso, the said accusation of illegal possessionof dangerous has been framed up or planted evidence. Frame-Up: This Court rejects the appellant's claim that he was framed. This defense requires strong and convincing evidence because of the presumption that the law enforcement agents acted in the regular performance of their official duties. 18 Appellant failed to rebut this presumption. He did not even attempt to prove that the NARCOM agents who obtained the search warrant, conducted the search and recovered the prohibited drugs had motives other than to enforce the law and stem the menace of drug addiction and trafficking which has already reached an alarming level and has spawned a network of incorrigible, cunning and dangerous operations. 19 It may be stressed here that the defense of frame-up can be easily fabricated and the accused in drugs cases almost always take refuge in such a defense.20