UWI OPEN CAMPUS

EDMA 2213 (ED22M)

Children Learning Mathematics

(READINGS)

B. Ed. Secondary (Online)

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Contents
Learning to Teach Mathematics in the Secondary School Sue Johnston-Wilder, et al.................................................................................................... 1 Aims of Teaching Mathematics Paul Ernst. ..........................................................................................................................13 Relational Understanding and Instrumental Understanding Richard R. Skemp...............................................................................................................15 Understanding Michelle Selinger................................................................................................................29 What does it mean to understand something and how do we know when it has happened? Anne Watson. .....................................................................................................................37 The Formation of Mathematical Concepts Richard Skemp...................................................................................................................51 What Cognitive Demands are Made in Learning Mathematics? Anthony Orton...................................................................................................................59 An Introduction to Theories about Learning in Mathematics Alan Bloomeld et al. .........................................................................................................73 Contextual Teaching: Challenges and Possibilities for the Jamaican Classroom Camille Bell-Hutchinson. ....................................................................................................89 Making Sense when Learning Mathematics Andy Begg........................................................................................................................101 Accommodating Students Differences Glenda Lappan................................................................................................................107 Questioning Questioning Jim Smith.........................................................................................................................109 Communicating Mathematics J. Backhouse, et al............................................................................................................111 Mathematics? I Speak it Fluently David Pimm.....................................................................................................................125 Language Bell, Costello & Kucheman...............................................................................................137

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The Language of Mathematics do you speak it? Camille Bell-Hutchinson. ..................................................................................................153 Communicating with symbols Camille Bell-Hutchinson. ..................................................................................................155 Mathematics Through Problem Solving Margaret Taplin...............................................................................................................157 Caribbean Examinations Council Regional Workshop Mathematics Camille Bell-Hutchinson. ..................................................................................................165

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Learning to Teach Mathematics in the Secondary School

Sue Johnston-Wilder, et al.
Task 1.2 Your personal vision for mathematics education It is important to be clear about your opinions about mathematics and mathematics education, because they will influence your practice. In order to articulate your views clearly, it can be helpful to try writing them down in a concise form. Write a statement outlining your personal vision for mathematics education. This could be kept in your reflective journal and referred to at different times during your course For instance, you might consider reviewing it prior to any job interview and also at the end of your course. Limit yourself to a maximum of 250 words. Include answers to the following questions: Why is mathematics education important? What is mathematics? How is mathematics best taught and learnt? Having finished your statement, you might like to ask other students on your course how it compares with their own views. How will the differences among you have an impact on the pupils you teach?

MATHEMATICS AND EDUCATION

While you are learning to teach mathematics you may feel that you have more important priorities than considering the somewhat abstract issues of the nature of mathematics and the purpose of education. You may quite reasonably wish to focus instead on surviving in a classroom full of pupils. However, it is important to understand at this early stage the way in which these philosophical issues do impinge significantly on classroom practice. Is the nature of mathematics a controversial issue? Surely everyone has a fairly clear idea of what the subject is and consequently what should be taught in schools? If you have had a chance to talk to other students about the issues raised in either Task 1.1 or 1.2, you may already have encountered varying perspectives, if not conflicting views on what is important about mathematics. The two quotations that follow, written by professional mathematicians and published in the same year, illustrate that mathematics can mean different things to different people.

Reprinted from: Sue Johnston-Wilder, Peter Johnston-Wilder, David Pimm and John Westwell, Eds. Learning to Teach Mathematics in the Secondary School. pp. 819.

It is security. Certainty. Truth. Beauty. Insight. Structure. Architecture. I see mathematics the part of human knowledge that I call mathematics, as one thing one great glorious thing. (Halmos, quoted in Albers, 1986, p. 127)

Mathematics does have subject matter, and its statements are meaningful. The meaning, however, is to be found in the shared understanding of human beings not in an eternal non-human reality. In this respect, mathematics is similar to an ideology, a religion, or an art form it deals with human meaning and is intelligible only within the context of culture. In other words, mathematics is a humanistic study. It is one of the humanities. (Davis and Hersh 1986, p. 410)

You might conclude that although the responses of these people are different, they are nonetheless still talking about the same thing. However, there is significant difference between these two views, and it is rooted in different understandings of human knowledge. For Paul Halmos, mathematics seems a fixed, objective body of true ideas, independent of culture. Developing your standpoint on the nature of mathematics is important because it will influence the values about mathematics that you convey to your pupils.

The Aims of Education

Aims express intentions of individuals or groups; they are not just abstract ideas. It is important then, in order to understand educational aims fully, to ask whose aims are being expressed. As with the nature of mathematics, there is no universal agreement or happy consensus. This is because different groups can and do have different sets of values which are in turn rooted in their different world views or belief systems. There are, however, some broad categories that help to illuminate the area of educational aims. These are indicated in Table 1.1, which presents a simplified categorisation of the possible purposes for education. Each of these areas of development has, at some time within the history of mathematics education, been the focus of concern for different groups. Considering your aims for education is a further important part of clarifying the values that will inform your mathematics teaching.

Table 1 The aims for education different types of development

Academic development Education should help pupils to develop a thorough knowledge and understanding of the subject. At the same time, pupils are encouraged to form appropriate attitudes towards the subject. The desired outcome is sufficient people inducted into the academic community, including an adequate supply of good teachers at all levels This is in order that the subjects place within our cultural heritage and its future development are guaranteed. Vocational development Education should provide pupils with the relevant knowledge and skills that they need in the world of work. The desired outcome is a suitably equipped work force ready to adapt to the needs of a growing economy. Personal development Education should provide opportunity for the all-round development of the individual. The desired outcome is fulfilled and autonomous people who have a well-developed self-awareness and who continue to grow and mature in adult life. Social development Education should provide the forum within which pupils can develop socially and find their roles within society. The desired outcome is individuals who will be confident in their interpersonal relationships and in their role as critical citizens.

Further Issues
Your perspectives on the nature of mathematics and on the aims of education come together to form your aims for mathematics education. However, having established the purpose of mathematics education a sense of why? there remain the further questions, what? and how? The way in which you answer these questions will be strongly connected to your aims. Table 2 lists questions that follow on from the more philosophical ones you have been considering. You will explore many of these areas in more detail in later chapters of this book. However, you might immediately begin to see how different aims might lead you to answer these questions differently. You are faced with the challenge of developing your own considered responses to these questions, consistent with your aims.

Table 2 Fundamental questions

Area of interest Philosophy Curriculum Questions raised Why should pupils learn mathematics? What mathematics should be included in the school curriculum? Which pupils should learn which aspects of the subject? How do pupils learn mathematics? What teaching methodologies will best support your aims? What resources are most appropriate to the tasks and the learners? How should/could/might pupils development in mathematics be measured? What accounts for the diversity of pupil response to mathematics? How should/could/might you respond to this diversity?

Learning Teaching Resources

Assessment

Differentiation

Task 1.3 The aims of the mathematics department During your school experience, you will find out much about how your mathematics department works. It is also useful to find out what aims or vision the department has for mathematics education and how this comes through in its policies. Ask to read the department handbook and in particular consider what views about the nature of mathematics and education underpin any statement of aims, how well policies and procedures relate to the departments aims the extent to which the official aims are shared by all members of the department whether classroom practice supports the achievement of the departments aims

COMPETING INFLUENCES ON THE MATHS CURRICULUM

This section includes various aims for education and some discussion of the implications these could have on your work as a maths teacher in the classroom. Below are descriptions of the mathematical perspectives of four different social groups: the Mathematical Purists, the Industrial Pragmatists, the Progressive Educators and the Social Reformers. These groups are not real, organised associations of people, but instead represent a categorisation offering a framework for exploring the competing influences within mathematics education. No claim is made that all individuals fit neatly into any particular group; indeed, as you read the descriptions,
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you may find you have certain sympathies with some or even all of the groups. However, the origins of much current practice in maths education have their roots within the opinions attributed to one of these four groups. Many of the ideas expressed here are due to the work of Paul Ernest (for example, Ernest, 1991).

Mathematical Purists
This group is primarily concerned with the academic and some aspects of personal development of pupils. Its members strongly reject any utilitarian emphasis on work or the applications of mathematics for its justification as a school subject. They also assume that it is obvious that mathematics education has no role in the social development of young people. Members of this group have a long tradition within mathematics which can be traced back to Greek philosophy, where mathematics was seen to be educationally valuable in the development of thought rather than for learning about any applications.
Now that we have mentioned the study of arithmetic, it occurs to me what a subtle and widely used instrument it is for our purpose, if one studies it for the sake of knowledge and not for commercial ends it draws the mind upwards. (Plato, trans. Lee, 1987, p 332)

The tradition of emphasising the importance of mathematics as a subject for the mind continues to be maintained by some today. The Mathematical Purists consider mathematics to be an objective form of knowledge, a complex hierarchical structure of ideas linked together through proof and rational thought. They celebrate its significant contributions to our cultural heritage, identify it more as an art than a science and believe it to have aesthetic qualities. The Cambridge mathematician G. H. Hardy wrote:
The mathematicians patterns, like the painters or the poets must be beautiful; the ideas, like the colours or the words, must fit together in a harmonious way. Beauty is the first test: there is no permanent place in the world for ugly mathematics. (Hardy, 1940, p. 25)

They see, the role of the teacher as enabling the effective transmission of this body of knowledge and encouraging particular qualities in the pupils, such as concern for rigour, elegance and precision. This tends to involve a lecturing and explaining style that makes use of standard texts and traditional mathematical equipment but makes little use of other resources. Teachers will have an enthusiasm for the subject that will be conveyed to the pupils. This group supports major competitions for pupils such as Mathemtical Olympiads, partly because these help identify the next generations or mathematicians. Assessment on the whole is not a major concern. However, it is important that qualitfications such as A-level mathematics preserve their high standards, and so members of the
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group express concern if they think this is becoming less demanding. On the whole, there is little consideration given to what form of mathematics education is appropriate for pupils who will not be part of the new mathematical lite, and it is just to be accepted that some people are born with a talent for the subject.

Industrial Pragmatists
This group is primarily concerned with the vocational development of pupils through mathematics. There is some recognition of the need for social development, but only in as far as it prepares young people for the world of work. Academic development is acknowledged to be relevant for a few but the dominant focus of maths education must be on the great mass of ordinary people. Everybody needs an adequate mathematical education so that they can contribute to the development of a successful economy. Members of this group are most likely to be found amongst employers in industry or leaders of technical and scientific professions. There is a tradition of this group trying to influence maths education from the last century. At that time, their argument was mainly with the Mathematical Purists. One strong advocate of this groups views was Professor John Perry, an engineer and former science teacher. At the 1901 meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, he said:
The study of Mathematics began because it was useful, continues because it is useful and is valuable to the world because of the usefulness of its results, while the mathematicians, who determine what the teacher shall do, hold that subject should be studied for its own sake. (cited in Griffiths and Howson, 1974, p. 17)

This group has grown considerably in numbers and strength throughout the twentieth century and is arguably the most influential at the end of the century. The Industrial Pragmatists see mathematics as an established collection of very useful techniques and skills that can be applied to a large range of technical and scientific contexts. They recognise that there is a body of knowledge to be learnt, but consider that it is only to be learnt in order to be applied. There is, however, sometimes a tension within this group as to which areas of mathematics are most important. Some advocate a strong emphasis on arithmetic and basic numeracy, whilst others require pupils to learn the mathematics most helpful for them to function in a rapidly changing technological society and so welcome an increased emphasis on the use of calculators and, especially, computers. They see the role of the teacher as being to instruct the pupil in skills and to motivate them by the use of real work contexts. Learning requires thorough practice and possibly experimental work. At a higher level, pupils should learn the skills required for applied problem solving and modelling.

Assessment has a dual function for the Industrial pragmatists. On one level, it acts as a simple aid to selection what has been termed a critical filter: for instance, unless pupils have a Grade C at GCSE level, they will not be considered for a particular job. However, there is also an emphasis on assessment ensuring that core skills have been developed and verified. Concern is expressed by this group if standards of numeracy are falling and so the new vocational qualifications, which all include an element of the application of number, are welcomed.

Progressive Educators
This group is primarily concerned with the personal development of pupils, with the individual child as focus of attention. It rejects the adult-orientated nature of vocational development, and supports social and academic development only to the extent that these are supportive of personal development. Members of this group have, like the Industrial Pragmatists, grown in prominence during the twentieth century, but there is a tradition rooted as far back as the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the eighteenth century. His advice to potential teachers included:
Your first duty is to be humane. Love childhood. Look with friendly eyes on its games, its pleasures, its amiable dispositions. Which of you does not sometimes look back regretfully on the age when laughter was ever on the lips and the heart free of care? Why steal from the little innocents the enjoyment of a time that passes all too quickly? (cited in Boyd, 1973, p. 33)

Here we find a concern to put the child, not the future adult, at the centre of the educational project. Whilst accepting that mathematics is a body of knowledge, this group is not very concerned about the particular mathematics to be learnt. Instead, it is much more interested in the process of learning and rejects any attempt to impose mathematics on the pupils. It believes that pupils should be supported in exploring and discovering the subject for themselves. There is a concern for the child to remain motivated and to have positive feelings and attitudes towards the subject. Learning mathematics should build up childrens self-esteem and help them to become confident and autonomous. They are encouraged to pursue their own open-ended investigations to engage in projects related to personal interests, and to find their own ways of expressing and communicating their own mathematics. They see the role of the teacher as coming alongside the pupil and acting as a guide in the pupils journey of discovery. This means that it is the responsibility of the teacher to create an appropriate learning environment, both in terms of stimulating resources and supportive social dynamics. Mathematical educators within this group have been influential in developing specialist maths equipment,
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such as Cuisenaire rods and Dienes structural apparatus. Computers and calculators are considered important for offering new environments within which mathematical exploration can happen. There is also an emphasis on developing caring, supportive relationships in the classroom, with children being shielded from significant social conflict. Children are to be treated as individuals and allowed to learn at different rates. It is important to recognise and celebrate their success, so records of achievement and criteria-based assessment are to be welcomed. External examinations are not considered helpful, as they have the potential for bringing discouragement and disappointment to the child. They are also seen as skewing the curriculum towards short-term goals.

Social Reformers
This group is primarily concerned with the social development of pupils in the sense that education should empower the individual to participate fully and critically in a democratic society. Conseqently aspects of personal development are considered important. Encouraging vocational and academic development is appropriate only through negotiation with the pupil.

Members of this group have only relatively recently begun to influence mathematics education, but the origins of this group within education (also called Public Educators) can be traced back to the nineteenth century. Then, the concern was for education for all. In more recent times Social Reformers have had more influence in the emerging education structures of developing countries. For example, president Julius Nyerere expressed the aims of a Tanzaman education programme as being:
to prepare people for their responsibilities as free workers and citizens in a free and democratic society, albeit a largely rural society. They have to be able to think for themselves, to make judgements on all the issues affecting them; they have to be able to interpret the decisions made through the democratic institutions of our society (Ernest, 1991, p. 202)

The other stimulus to the work of the group of Social Reformers has been the need to work towards equality of opportunity for all within education. Within mathematics education, significant work has been done in the field of gender issues, multicultural and anti-racist mathematics. The view of mathematics held by some in this group is also relatively new. Mathematics is seen to be a social construction: tentative growing by means of human creation and decision-making and connected with other realms of knowledge, culture and social life (Ernest, 1991, pp. 207208). This offers a much wider definition of mathematics than is the norm and challenges the Mathematical Purists exclusive ownership of real mathematics. Pupils should experience mathematics as relevant to their own lives; as important in addressing wider social
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issues; as a vehicle for social emancipation, and as enabling a critical stance towards society. They see the role of the teacher as faciliatiing pupils in both posing and solving their own problems. This requires the teacher to set conditions in which pupils can participate in decisions about their learning and in which they feel able to question their mathematics course and its associated teaching methods. Resources need to be socially relevant and include authentic materials such as newspapers and sources of real data. Discussion is central to the learning process and conflicting ideas are welcome in promoting greater understanding. Any form of assessment must be seen to be fair to all pupils and should not disadvantage any social grouping. This requires a greater variety of modes of assessment, and so project work and the on-going assessment of coursework is highly valued. The GCSE qualification initially had scope for a large percentage of assessment by coursework and so was welcomed by the Social Reformers. Because of the status that certain mathematical qualifications have within UK society, helping pupils to pass external exams remains crucial, so teachers have to work within the existing assessment system.

AGENCIES FOR CHANGE

Given that there is a range of views about the aims of mathematics education, you may wonder how these competing influences actually bring about change in the school curriculum and teaching approaches. In this final section, you will see how the social groups discussed above have acted through different agencies to bring about the reforms that they seek. You will also consider the influence of people who express their expectations at ground level within your school context.

Mathematics Teaching Associations

The influence of different groups can be seen in the history of the two main maths teaching organisations. The Mathematical Association (MA) was established in 1871 as The Association for the Improvement of Geometrical Teaching with an overt agenda for change. The initial focus was on reforming the teaching of Euclidean geometry. The Association of Teachers of Mathematics (ATM), which was set up in 1953 as The Association for Teaching Aids in Mathematics, was a splinter group from the MA. Articles in the early issues of the journal of the newer association (Mathematics Teaching) show clearly the dominance of the Progressive Educator group (Cooper, 1985, pp. 6990). These two organisations are discussed further in Chapter 12.

Curriculum Development Projects

Mathematics education has had its fair share of curriculum projects. Some succeed and have a large impact in schools across the country; others do not extend much beyond the initial project schools and are soon forgotten. In either case, projects will
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normally have the strong support of one of the four social groups listed above, which recognise that courses and materials are a significant way of influencing the way in which teachers work. The School Mathematics Project (SMP), established in 1961, was perhaps particularly successful in establishing itself because it was the product of an alliance between members of both the Mathematical Purists and the Industrial Pragmatists (Cooper, 1985 pp. 235266).

Official Reports
Every so often the climate within education reaches such level of concern that an official inquiry is commissioned. The reports then produced can become key points against which all futue proposals are tested. Consequently, many groups wish to influence the findings of these inquiries. Dr. W. H. Cockcroft chaired the most influential inquiry into mathematics teaching in recent times. Its report was entitled Mathematics Counts (DES, 1982). Its terms of reference included considering the needs of employment, but perhaps its most famous paragraph (para. 243 see Chapter 4) is about the need for a broad range of teaching methods. It can be interpreted as being supportive of the view of both Industrial Pragmatists and Progessive Educators (Ernest, 1991 pp. 220222).

Curriculum and Assessment Policy

All four groups described above have long recognised that qualifications and their associated exams have a significant impact on teaching and learning. Some of their particular views on assessment were outlined above. In comparison, the most farreaching government policy in the area, the National Curriculum (NC) for England and Wales, and the corresponding for Scotland and Northern Ireland (see Chapter 2), is still relatively new. Plainly, the NC will remain a crucial battleground for competing groups and indeed the present NC can be seen to embody ideological aspects of some of the groups. Certain of the key debates surrounding the various national mathematics curricula are explored in the next chapter.

Local Expectations
Finally, it is important to recognise the influence of much more localised groups on your teaching. Parents, colleagues in the mathematics department, and the schools senior management will all have expectations of you as a maths teacher. These expectations may coincide with your own views or may be in conflict with them. You will need to learn to negotiate with different individuals and groups, if you are to remain in contact with your own values while working to meet the legitimate demands of others. In particular, pupils will certainly let you know their own expectations; this theme is addressed in Task 1.4.

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Task 1.4 What do the pupils want from their mathematics education? Pupils are arguably the group that will most regularly express to you their views about maths education and much else besides. It can be valuable for you to understand what they are wanting from their mathematics education. There is scope for exploring this in every maths lesson, but there is not normally the time to consider the issue in depth with individuals. Design an interview sheet that you could use with pupils to explore their views. The prompts in Mathematical memories (Task 1 1) offer possible questions, but you may also want to add some of your own. If you ask questions about teachers, make sure the pupils understand that you do not want to know names; you just want to know what teaching styles work well for them. If it is possible within your school, ask to interview three Year 7 pupils, three Year 10 pupils and three A-level pupils, and arrange with your head of department to speak with them for about fifteen to twenty minutes. Also check with your head of department that your interview questions are acceptable to the staff. Record the results of your interview and write some notes in your journal, indicating the extent to which you believe you could accommodate the pupils perspectives within your teaching.

SUMMARY
The role of mathematics education in our society is complex. There is no simple consensus as to which mathematics is important or how it should be taught. Indeed, there is controversy about the nature of mathematics itself. Different social groups have influenced and will continue to influence the shape of mathematics education. Maths teachers experience the influence of such groups through their teaching, associations, curriculum projects, recommendations of official reports and government policy on curriculum and assessment. The chapter title posed the question Mathematics education who decides? Now you must prepare to decide where you stand on the issues raised within it.

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FURTHER READING
Cooper, B. (1994) Secondary mathematics education in England: recent changes and their historical context in Selinger, M. (ed.), Teaching Mathematics London: Routledge 526. This introductory chapter from an Open University reader for mathematics students offers a helpful historical overview of the forces for change within Engligh mathematics education. It also provides in extensive section of reference. DES (1982) Mathematics Counts, London: HMSO. This volume, often referred to as the Cockcroft Report, remains a key text for mathematics education in Britain. It is much referred to, although often quite selectively, and so it is worth being familiar with its contents. Ernest, P. (1991) The Philosophy of Mathematics Eduation, Basingstoke: Falmer Press. This book is an ambitious work that seeks both to offer new philosophy of mathematics and to examine its impact on mathematics education. The influence of different ldeologies on mathematics education is explored in some detail. MA (195a) Why, What How? Some Questions for Teaching Mathematics, Leicester: The Mathematical Association. This booklet provides a good example of an outcome from the recent attempt by one of the mathematics teaching associations to produce a coherent rationale for mathematics teaching. As well as offering answers to why, what and how in relation to mathematics teaching, it also includes a small number of classroom examples.

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Aims of Teaching Mathematics

Paul Ernst

The aims of teaching mathematics fall into groups with a common theme. The first group concerns the giving of skills which will be useful to the student as a member of society and help social development in general. 1. Utilitarian Aims (a) To create numerate citizens. Students need mathematics for everyday life. They need to know about number and number operations, social arithmetic, measurement, approximation and estimation, basic geometry and graphs and relations. They will also need mental mathematical skills, and to be able to apply all of this to practical situations. (b) To give basic work skills. To be prepared for the modern world of work students may need more than (a) above. They may also need some algebra, trigonometry and ideas of computing and statistics. Mathematics teaching should prepare them for employment. (c) To help students who wish to study further beyond the end of secondary schooling.They may need some mathematics as a basis for their studies. For example, computer engineers, electricians and geographers all use network theory. (d) To help students who will continue to study mathematics. They may become teachers, actuaries or even mathematicians. These students will need a basis for further study of mathematics. (e) To foster physical skills such as using compasses or measuring instruments. 2. Cognitive aims (a) To foster logical reasoning and critical thought. Students should be able to support their assertions and conclusions and be able to critically evaluate the arguments of others. (b) To encourage a way of looking at the world. Students should acquire a range of spatial and other concepts with which they can order their experiences and classify objects and events around them. (c) To provide a concise language. Students should acquire a language with which to express concisely and communicate precisely relationships between events, or ideas. They should be able to describe patterns and should gain improved powers of abstract thought. (d) The ability to formulate and solve problems. Students should acquire the ability to express problems in mathematics. They should have a range of techniques for solving problems. They should be able to reapply their solutions to the real world.

Source: UWIDITE materials.

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In addition to the growth in their knowledge and skills, we would like students to grow and develop into whole, well-rounded people. The aim in this third group includes growth in personal areas like attitudes and mathematical self-concept. These areas are often grouped together under the title of the affective domain. 3. Affective Aims (a) To give all our students experiences of pleasure, success and creativity in mathematics. (b) To foster positive attitudes. Students should have their interest aroused and challenged. They should have their open-mindedness, spirit of enquiry, selfreliance, persistence and feelings of worth encouraged. (c) To foster social skills. Students should learn to cooperate, to listen, to discuss, to help, to value others suggestions and to put aside competition in favour of teamwork. The final set of aims concerns the appreciation of mathematics in our culture. 4. Cultural Aims (a) To appreciate the role of mathematics throughout our society. (b) To appreciate the role of mathematics in providing a foundation for other disciplines and subjects. (c) To appreciate the role of mathematics throughout history and its importance in the development of human thought. (d) To appreciate the aesthetic side of mathematics: its beauty and its contribution to music and art.

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Relational Understanding and Instrumental Understanding

Richard R. Skemp*

Faux Amis
Faux amis is a term used by the French to describe words which are the same, or very alike, in two languages, but whose meanings are different. For example: French word histoire libraire chef agrement docteur mdecin parent Meaning in English story not history bookshop, not library head of any organization, not only chief cook pleasure or amusement, not agreement doctor (higher degree) not medical practitioner medical practitioner, not medicine relations in general, including parents

One gets faux amis between English as spoken in different parts of the world. An Englishman asking in America for a biscuit would be given what we call a stone. To get what we call a biscuit, he would have to ask for a cookie. And between English as used in mathematics and in everyday life there are such words as field, group, ring, ideal. A person who is unaware that the word he is using is a faux amis can make inconvenient mistakes. We expect history to be true, but not a story. We take books without paying from a library, but not from a bookshop; and so on. But in the foregoing examples there are cues which might put one on guard: difference of language, or of country, or of context. If, however, the same word is used in the same language, country and context, with two meanings whose difference is non-trivial but as basic as the difference between the meaning of (say) histoire and story, which is a difference between fact and fiction, one may expect serious confusion. Two such words can be identified in the context of mathematics, and it is the alternative meanings attached to these words, each by a large following, which in my belief are at the root of many of the difficulties in mathematics education to-day.

*Richard Skemp is Professor of Education at the University of Warwick, Coventry, England. Reprinted from: Mathematics Teaching, December 1976, 99. 915.

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One of these is understanding. It was brought to my attention some years ago by Stieg Mellin-Olsen, of Bergen University, that there are in current use two meanings of this word. These he distinguishes by calling them relational understanding and instrumental understanding. By the former is meant what I have always meant by understanding, and probably most readers of this article: knowing both what to do and why. Instrumental understanding I would until recently not have regarded as understanding at all. It is what I have in the past described as rules without reasons without realizing that for many pupils and their teachers the possession of such a rule, and ability to use it, was what they meant by understanding. Suppose that a teacher reminds a class that the area of a rectangle is given by A = L x B. A pupil who has been away says he does not understand, so the teacher gives him an explanation along these lines. The formula tells that to get the area of a rectangle, you multiply the length by the breadth. Oh, I see, says the child, and gets on with the exercise. If we were now to say to him (in effect) You may think you understand, but you dont really, he would not agree. Of course I do. Look: Ive got all these answers right. Nor would he be pleased at our de-valuing of his achievement. And with his meaning of the word, he does understand. We can all think of examples of this kind: borrowing in subtractions, turn it upside down and multiply for division by a fraction, take it over to the other side and change the sign, are obvious ones; but once the concept has been formed, other examples of instrumental explanations can be identified in abundance in many widely used texts. Here are two from a text used by a former direct-grant grammar school, now independent, with a high academic standard.
Multiplication of fractions. To multiply a fraction by a fraction, multiply the two numerators together to make the numerator of the product, and the two denominators to make its denominator.
2 3

e.g.

of

4 5

2 4 3 5

8 15

3 5

10 =
13

30 65

6 13

The multiplication sign x is generally used instead of the word of. Circles. The circumference of a circle (that is its perimeter, or the length of its boundary) is found by measurement to be a little more than three times the length of its diameter. In any circle the circumference is approximately 3.1416 times the diameter which is roughly 3
1 2

times the diameter. Neither of these figures is exact, as the exact

number cannot be expressed either as a fraction o a decimal. The number is represented by the Greek letter (pi). Circumference = d or 2r Area = r2

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The reader is urged to try for himself this exercise of looking for and identifying examples of instrumental explanations, both in texts and in the classroom. This will have three benefits. (i) For persons like the writer, and most readers of this article, it may be hard to realize how widespread is the instrumental approach. (ii) It will help, by repeated examples, to consolidate the two contrasting concepts. (iii) It is a good preparation for trying to formulate the difference in general terms. Result (i) is necessary for what follows in the rest of the present section, while (ii) and (iii) will be useful for the others. If it is accepted that these two categories are both well-filled, by those pupils and teachers whose goals are respectively relational and instrumental understanding (by the pupil), two questions arise. First, does this matter? And second, is one kind better than the other? For years I have taken for granted the answers to both these questions: briefly, Yes: relational. But the existence of a large body of experienced teachers and of a large number of texts belonging to the opposite camp has forced me to think more about why I hold this view. In the process of changing the judgement from an intuitive to a reflective one, I think I have learnt something useful. The two questions are not entirely separate, but in the present section I shall concentrate as far as possible on the first: does it matter? The problem here is that of a mismatch, which arises automatically in any faux amis situation and does not depend on whether A or Bs meaning is the right one. Let us imagine, if we can, that school A send a team to play school B at a game called football, but that neither team knows that there are two kinds (called association and rugby). School A plays soccer and has never heard of rugger, and vice versa for B. Each team will rapidly decide that the others are crazy, or a lot of foul players. Team A in particular will think that B uses a mis-shapen ball, and commit one foul after another. Unless the two sides stop and talk about what game they think they are playing at, long enough to gain some mutual understanding, the game will break up in disorder and the two teams will never want to meet again. Though it may be hard to imagine such a situation arising on the football field, this is not a far-fetched analogy for what goes on in many mathematics lessons, even now. There is this important difference, that one side at least cannot refuse to play. The encounter is compulsory, on five days a week, for about 36 weeks a year, over 10 years or more of a childs life. Leaving aside for the moment whether one kind is better than the other, there are two kinds of mathematical mis-matches which can occur. 1. Pupils whose goal is to understand instrumentally, taught by a teacher who want them to understand relationally. 2. The other way about.

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The first of these will cause fewer problems short-term to the pupils, thought it will be frustrating to the teacher. The pupils just wont want to know all the careful ground-work he gives in preparation for whatever is to be learnt next, nor his careful explanations. All they want is some kind of rule for getting the answer. As soon as this reached, they latch on to it and ignore the rest. If the teacher asks a question that does not quite fit the rule, of course they will get it wrong. For the following example I have to thank Mr. Peter Burney, at that time a student at Coventry College of Education on teaching practice. While teaching area he became suspicious that the children did not really understand what they were doing. So he asked them: What is the area of a field 20cms by 15 yards? The reply was 300 square centimeters. He asked: Why not 300 square yards? Answer: Because area is always in square centimetres. To prevent errors like the above the pupils need another rule (or, of course relational understanding), that both dimensions must be in the same unit. This anticipates one of the arguments which I shall use against instrumental understanding, that it usually involves a multiplicity of rules rather than fewer principles of more general application. There is of course always the chance that a few of the pupils will catch on to what the researcher is trying to do. If only for the sake of these, I think he should go on trying. By many, probably a majority, his attempts to convince them that being able to use the rule is not enough will not be well received. Well is the enemy of better, and if pupils can get the right answers by the kind of thinking they are used to, they will not take kindly to suggestions that they should try for something beyond this. The other mis-match in which pupils are trying to understand relationally but the teaching makes this impossible, can be a more damaging one. An instance which stays in my memory is that of a neighbours child, then seven years old. He was a very bright little boy, with and I.Q. of 140. At the age of five he could read The Times, but at seven he regularly cried over his mathematics homework. His misfortune was that he was trying to understand relationally teaching which could not be understood in this way. My evidence for this belief is that when I taught him relationally myself, with the help of Unifix, he caught on quickly and with real pleasure. A less obvious mis-match is that which may occur between teacher and text. Suppose that we have a teacher whose conception of understanding is instrumental, who for one reason or other is using a text which aim is relational understanding by the pupil. It will take more than this to change his teaching style. I was in a school which was using my own text1, and noticed (they were at Chapter 1 of Book 1) that some of the pupils were writing answers like the set of {flowers}. When I mentioned this to the teacher (he was head of mathematics) he asked the class to pay attention to him and said: Some of you are not writing your answers
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properly. Look at the example in the book, at the beginning of the exercise, and be sure you write your answers exactly like that. Much of what is being taught under the description of modern mathematics is being taught and learnt just as instrumentally as were the syllabuses which have been replaced. This is predictable from the difficulty of accommodating (restructuring) our existing schemas.2 To the extent that this is so, the innovations have probably done more harm than good, by introducing a mis-match between the teacher and the aims implicit in the new content. For the purpose of introducing ideas such as sets, mappings and variables is the help which, rightly used, they can give to relational understanding. If pupils are still being taught instrumentally then a traditional syllabus will probably benefit them more. They will at least acquire proficiency in a number of mathematical techniques which will be of use to them in other subjects, and whose lack has recently been the subject of complaints by teachers of science, employers and others. Near the beginning I said that two faux amis could be identified in the context of mathematics. The second one is even more serious; it is the word mathematics itself. For we are not talking about better and worse teaching of the same kind of mathematics. It is easy to think this, just as our imaginary soccer players who did not know that their opponents were playing a different game might think that the other side picked up the ball and ran with it because they could not kick properly especially with such a mis-shapen ball. In which case they might kindly offer them a better ball and some lessons on dribbling. It has taken me some time to realize that this is not the case. I used to think that maths teachers were all teaching the same subject, some doing it better than others. I now believe that there are two effectively different subjects being taught under the same name, mathematics. If this is true, then this difference matters beyond any of the differences in syllabi which are so widely debated. So I would like to try to emphasise the point with the help of another analogy. Imagine that two groups of children are taught music as a pencil-and-paper subject. They are all shown the five-line stave, with the curly treble sign at the beginning, and taught that marks on the lines are called E, G, B, D, F. Marks between the lines are called F, A, C, E. They learn that a line with an open oval is called a minim, and is worth two with blacked-in ovals which are called crotchets, or four with blackedin ovals and a tail which are called quavers, and so on musical multiplication tables if you like. For one group of children, all their learning is of this kind and nothing beyond. If they have a music lesson a day, five days a week in school terms, and are told that it is important, these children could in time probably learn to write out the marks for similar melodies such as God Save the Queen and Auld Lanng Syne, and to solve simple problems such as What time is this in? and What key?, and even Transpose this melody from C major to A major. They would find it boring, and the rules to be memorized would be so numerous that problems like Write a simple accompaniment for this melody would be too

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difficult for most. They would give up the subject as soon as possible, and remember it with dislike. The other group is taught to associate certain sounds with these marks on paper. For the first few years these are audible sounds, which they make themselves on simple instruments. After a time they can still imagine the sound whenever they see or write the marks on paper. Associated with every sequence of marks is a melody, and with every vertical set a harmony. The keys C major and A major have an audible relationship and a similar relationship can be found between certain other pairs of keys. And so on. Much less memory work in involved, and what has to be remembered is largely in the form of related wholes (such as melodies) which their minds easily retain. Exercises such as were mentioned earlier (Write a simple accompaniment) would be within the ability of most. These children would also find their learning intrinsically pleasurable, and many would continue it voluntarily, even after O-level or C.S.E. For the present purpose I have invented two non-existent kinds of music lesson, both pencil-and-paper exercises (in the second case, after the first year or two). But the differences between these imaginary activities is no greater than between two activities which actually go on under the name of mathematics. (We can make the analogy closer, if we imagine that the first group of children were initially taught sounds for the notes in a rather half-hearted way, but that the associations were too ill-formed and un-organized to last.) The above analogy is, clearly, heavily biased in favour of relational mathematics. This reflects my own viewpoint. To call it a viewpoint, however, implies that I no longer regard it as a self-evident truth which requires no justification: which it can hardly be if many experienced teachers continue to teach instrumental mathematics. The next step is to try to argue the merits of both points of view as clearly and fairly as possible: and especially of the point of view opposite to ones own. This is why the next section is called Devils Advocate. In one way this only describes that part which puts the case for instrumental understanding. But it also justifies the other part, since an imaginary opponent who thinks differently from oneself is a good device for making clearer to oneself why one does think that way.

Devils Advocate
Given that so many teachers teach instrumental mathematics, might this be because it does have certain advantages? I have been able to think of three advantages (as distinct from situational reasons for teaching this which will be discussed). 1. Within its own context, instrumental mathematics is usually easier to understand: sometimes much easier. Some topics, such as multiplying two negative numbers together, or dividing by a fractional number are difficult to understand relationally. Minus times minus equals plus and to divide by a fraction you turn it upside down and multiply are easily remembered rules. If what is wanted

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is a page of right answers instrumental mathematics can provide this more quickly. 2. So the rewards are more immediate, and more apparent. It is nice to get a page of right answers, and we must not underrate the importance of the feeling of success which pupils get from this. Recently I visited a school where some of the children describe themselves as thickos. Their teachers use the term too. These children need success to restore their self-confidence, and it can be argued that they can achieve this more quickly and easily in instrumental mathematics than in relational. 3. Just because less knowledge is involved, one can often get the right answer more quickly and reliably by instrumental thinking than relational. This difference is so marked that even relational mathematicians often use instrumental thinking. This is a point of much theoretical interest, which I hope to discuss more fully on a future occasion. The above may well not do full justice to instrumental mathematics. I shall be glad to know of any further advantages which it may have. There are four advantages (at least) in relational mathematics. 1. It is more adaptable to new tasks. Recently I was trying to help a boy who had learnt to multiply two decimal fractions together by dropping the decimal point, multiplying as for whole numbers, and re-inserting the decimal point to give the same total number of digits after the decimal point as there were before. This is a handy method if you know why it works. Through no fault of his own, this child did not; and not unreasonably, applied it also to division of decimals. By this method 4.8 0.6 came to 0.08. The same pupil had also learnt that if you know two angles of a triangle, you can find the third by adding the two given angles together and subtracting from 180. He got ten questions right this way (his teacher believed in plenty of practice), and went on to use the same method for finding the exterior angles. So he got the next five answers wrong. I do not think he was being stupid in either of these cases. He was simply extrapolating from what he already knew. But relational understanding, by knowing not only what method worked but why, would have enabled him to relate the method to the problem, and possibly to adapt the method to new problems. Instrumental understanding necessitates memorising which problems a method works for and which not, and also learning a different method for each new class of problems. So the first advantage of relational mathematics leads to: 2. It is easier to remember. There is a seeming paradox here, in that it is certainly harder to learn. It is certainly easier for pupils to learn that area of a triangle = 1/2 base x height than to learn why this is so. But they then have to learn separate rules for triangles, rectangles, parallelograms, trapeziums; whereas relational understanding consists partly in seeing all of these in relation to the

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area of a rectangle. It is still desirable to know the separate rules; one does not want to have to derive them afresh everytime. But knowing also how they are inter-related enables one to remember them as parts of a connected whole, which is easier. There is more to learn the connections as well as the separate rules but the result, once learnt, is more lasting. So there is less re-learning to do, and long term the time taken may well be less altogether. Teaching for relational understanding may also involve more actual content. Earlier, an instrumental explanation was quoted leading to the statement Circumference = d. For relational understanding of this, the idea of a proportion would have to be taught first (among others), and this would make it a much longer job than simply teaching the rules as given. But proportionality has such a wide range of other applications that it is worth teaching on these grounds also. In relational mathematics this happens rather often. Ideas required for understanding a particular topic turn out to be basic for understanding many other topics too. Sets, mapping and equivalence are such ideas. Unfortunately the benefits which might come from teaching them are often lost by teaching them as separate topics, rather than as fundamental concepts by which whole areas of mathematics can be inter-related. 3. Relational knowledge can be effective as a goal in itself. This is an empiric fact, based on evidence from controlled experiments using non-mathematical material. The need for external rewards and punishments is greatly reduced, making what is often called the motivational side of a teachers job much easier. This is related to: 4. Relational schemas are organic in quality. This is the best way I have been able to formulate a quality by which they seem to act as an agent of their own growth. The connection with 3 is that if people get satisfaction from relational understanding, they may not only try to understand relationally new material which is put before them, but also actively seek out new material and explore new areas, very much like a tree extending its roots or an animal exploring a new territory in search of nourishment. To develop this idea beyond the level of an analogy is beyond the scope of the present paper, but it is too important to leave out. If the above is anything like a fair presentation of the cases for the two sides, it would appear that while a case might exist for instrumental mathematics short-term and within a limited context, long-term and within a limited context and in the context of a childs whole education it does not. So why are so many children taught only instrumental mathematics throughout their school careers? Unless we can answer this, there is little hope of improving the situation. An individual teacher might make a reasoned choice to teach for instrumental understanding on one or more of the following grounds. 1. That relational understanding would take too long to achieve, and to be able to use a particular technique is all that these pupils are likely to need.

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2. That relational understanding of a particular topic is too difficult, but the pupils still need it for examination reasons. 3. That a skill is needed for use in another subject (e.g., science) before it can be understood relationally with the schemas presently available to the pupils. 4. That he is a junior teacher in a school where all the other mathematics teaching is instrumental. All of those imply, as does the phrase makes a reasoned choice, that he is able to consider the alternative goals of instrumental and relational understanding on their merits and in relation to a particular situation. To make an informed choice of this kind implies awareness of the distinction, and relational understanding of the mathematics itself. So nothing else but relational understanding can ever be adequate for a teacher. One has to face the fact that this is absent in many who each mathematics; perhaps even a majority. Situational factors which contribute to the difficulty include: 1. The backwash effect of examinations. In view of the importance of examinations for future employment, one can hardly blame pupils if success in these is one of their major aims. The way pupils work cannot but be influenced by the goal for which they are working, which is to answer correctly a sufficient number of questions. 2. Over-burdened syllabi. Part of the trouble here is the high concentration of the information content of mathematics. A mathematical statement may condense into a single line as much as in another subject might take over one or two paragraphs. By mathematicians accustomed to handling such concentrated ideas, this is often overlooked (which may be why most mathematics lecturers go too fast). Non-mathemticans do not realize it at all. Whatever the reason, almost all syllabi would be much better if much reduced in amount so that there would be time to teach them better. 3. Difficulty of assessment of whether a person understands relationally or instrumentally. From the marks he makes on the paper, it is very hard to make a valid reference about the mental processed by which a pupil has been led to make them; hence the difficulty of sound examining in mathematics. In a teaching situation, talking with the pupil is almost certainly the best way to find out; but in a class of over 30, it may be difficult to find the time. 4. The great psychological difficulty for teachers of accommodating (restructuring) their existing and longstanding schemas, even for the minority who know they need to, want to do so, and have time for study. From a recent article3 discussing the practical, intellectual and cultural value of mathematics education (and I have no doubt that he means relational mathematics!)

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by Sir Hermann Bondi, I take these three paragraphs. (In the original, they are not consecutive.)
So far my glowing tribute to mathematics has left out a vital point: the rejection of mathematics by so many, a rejection that in not a few cases turns to abject fright. The negative attitude to mathematics, unhappily so common, even among otherwise highly-educated people, is surely the greatest measure of our failure and a real danger to our society. This is perhaps the clearest indication that something is wrong and indeed very wrong with the situation. It is not hard to blame education for at least a share of the responsibility; it is harder to pinpoint the blame, and even more difficult to suggest new remedies.

If for blame we may substitute cause, there can be small doubt that the widespread failure to teach relational mathematics a failure to be found in primary, secondary and further education, and in modern as well as traditional courses can be identified as a major cause. To suggest new remedies is indeed difficult, but it may be hoped that diagnosis is one good step towards a cure. Another step will be offered in the next section.

A Theoretical Formulation
There is nothing so powerful for directing ones actions in a complex situation, and for co-ordinating ones own efforts with those of others, as a good theory. All good teachers build up their own stores of empirical knowledge, and have abstracted from these some general principles on which they rely for guidance. But while their knowledge remains in this form it is largely still at the intuitive level within individuals, and cannot be communicated, both for this reason and because there is no shared conceptual structure (schema) in terms of which it can be formulated. Were this possible, individual efforts could be integrated into a unified body of knowledge which would be available for use by new-comers to the profession. At present most teachers have to learn from their own mistakes. For some time my own comprehension of the difference between the two kinds of learning which lead respectively to relational and instrumental mathematics remained at the intuitive level, though I was personally convinced the difference was one of great importance, and this view was shared by most of those with whom I discussed it. Awareness of the need for an explicit formulation was forced on me in the course of two parallel research projects; and insight came, quite suddenly, during a recent conference. Once seen it appears quite simple, and one wonders why I did not think of it before. But there are two kinds of simplicity; that of naivety, and that which, by penetrating beyond superficial differences, brings simplicity by unifying. It is the second kind which a good theory has to offer, and this is harder to achieve. A concrete example is necessary to begin with. When I went to stay in a certain town for the first time, I quickly learnt several particular routes. I learnt to get
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between where I was staying and the office of the colleague with whom I was working; between where I was staying and the university refectory where I ate; between my friends office and the refectory; and two or three others. In brief, I learnt a limited number of fixed plans by which I could get from particular starting locations to particular goal locations. As soon as I had some free time, I began to explore the town. Now I was not wanting to get anywhere specific, but to learn my way around, and in the process to see what I might come upon that was of interest. At this stage my goal was a different one, to construct in my mind a cognitive map of the town. These two activities are quite different. Nevertheless they are, to an outside observer, difficult to distinguish. Anyone seeing me walk from A to B would have great difficulty in know (without asking me) which of the two I was engaged in. But the most important thing about an activity is its goal. In one case my goal was to get to B, which is a physical location. In the other it was to enlarge or consolidate my mental map of the two, which is a state of knowledge. A person with a set of fixed plans can find his way from a certain set of starting points to a certain set of goals. The characteristic of a plan is that it tells him what to do at each choice point: turn right out of the door, go straight on past the church, and so on. But if at any stage he makes a mistake, he will be lost; and he will stay lost if he is not able to retrace his steps and get back on the right path. In contract, a person with a mental map of the town has something from which he can produce, when needed, an almost infinite number of plans by which he can guide his steps from any starting point to any finishing point, provided only that both can be imagined on his mental map. And if he does take a wrong turn, he will still know where he is, and thereby be able to correct his mistake without getting lost, even perhaps to learn from it. The analogy between the foregoing and the learning of mathematics is close. The kind of learning which leads to instrumental mathematics consists of the learning of an increasing number of fixed plans, by which pupils can find their way from particular starting points (the data) to required finishing points (the answers to the questions). The plan tells them what to do at each choice point. And as in the concrete example, what has to be done next is determined purely by the local situation. (When you see the post office, turn left. When you have cleared brackets, collect like terms.) There is no awareness of the overall relationship between successive stages, and the final goal. And in both cases the learner is dependent on outside guidance for learning each new way to get there. In contrast, learning relational mathematics consists of building up a conceptual structure (schema) from which its possessor can (in principle) produce an unlimited number of plans for getting from any starting point within his schema to any finishing point. (I say in principle because of course some of these paths will be much harder to construct than others.)
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This kind of learning is different in several ways from instrumental learning. 1. The means become independent of particular ends to be reached thereby. 2. Building up a schema within a given area of knowledge becomes an intrinsically satisfying goal in itself. 3. The more complete a pupils schema, the greater his feeling of confidence in his own ability to find new ways of getting there without outside help. 4. But schema is never complete. As our schema enlarge so our awareness of possibilities is thereby enlarged. Thus the process often becomes self-continuing, and (by virtue of 3) self-rewarding. Taking again for a moment the role of devils advocate, it is fair to ask whether we are indeed talking about two subjects, relational mathematics and instrumental mathematics or just two ways of thinking about the same subject matter. Using the concrete analogy, the two processes described might be regarded as two different ways of knowing about the same town; in which case the distinction made between relational and instrumental understanding would be valid, but not that between instrumental and relational mathematics. But what constitutes mathematics is not the subject matter, but a particular kind of knowledge about it. The subject mater of relational and instrumental mathematics may be the same: cars travelling at uniform speeds between two towns, towers whose heights are to be found, bodies falling freely under gravity, etc. etc. But the two kinds of knowledge are so different that I think that there is a strong case for regarding them as different kinds of mathematics. If this distinction is accepted, then the word mathematics is for many children indeed a false friend, as they find to their cost.

The State of Play

This is already a long article, yet it leaves many points awaiting further development. The applications of the theoretical formulation in the last section to the educational problems described in the first who have not been spelt out. One of these is the relationship between the goals of the teacher and those of the pupil. Another is the implications for a mathematics curriculum. In the course of discussion of these ideas with teachers and lecturers in mathematical education, a number of other interesting points have been raised which also cannot be explored further here. One of these is whether the term mathematics ought not to be used for relational mathematics only. I have much sympathy with this view, but the issue is not as simple as it may appear. There is also research in progress. A pilot study aimed at developing a method (or methods) for evaluating the quality of childrens mathematical thinking has been

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finished, and has led to a more substantial study in collaboration with the N.F.E.R. as part of the TAMS continuation project. A higher degree thesis at Warwick University is nearly finished; and a research group of the Department of Mathematics at the University of Quebec in Montreal is investigating the problem with first and fourth grade children. All this will I hope to be reported in due course. The aims of the present paper are twofold. First, to make explicit the problem at an empiric level of thinking and thereby to bring to the forefront of attention what some of us have known for a long time at the back of our minds. Second, to formulate this in such a way that it can be related to existing theoretical knowledge about the mathematical learning process, and further investigated at this level with the power and generality which theory alone can provide.

References
1. R.R. Skemp: Understanding Meathmatics (U.L.P.) 2. For further discussion see R.R. Skemp: The Psychology of Learning Mathematics (Penguin 1972) pp. 4346. 3. H. Bondi: The Dangers of Rejecting Mathematics (Times Higher Education Supplement, 26. 3.76)

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28

Understanding
Michelle Selinger

Many teachers report that they suddenly have the feeling that they are the only person in the classroom who cares whether the pupils can do mathematics or not. In front of them there is a sea of faces waiting for the next instruction. The pupils seem to be saying: You are in charge. Give me something to do and I will do it. When Ive finished this, you can give me something else to do. These teachers are unsure whether it arises because their pupils do not see any point in the mathematical topic or whether it is because they have no interest in mathematics at all. The teachers also believe that this cannot be a productive way to learn mathematics, nor a way to discover the power of the subject. They want their pupils to find out that working on mathematics can be challenging and exciting; that the connections and similarities between different aspects of mathematics can be a constant source of amazement and new insights. Before reading on, the reader is invited to construct a map of how pupils learn mathematics. This chapter describes some ways teachers have tried to encourage pupils to want to learn and to start asking questions about the mathematics they were doing. Their methods are often indirect, relying more on stimulating pupils to reflect on their work than on setting challenging mathematical problems.

TWO FORMS OF UNDERSTANDING

An article by Richard Skemp (1976) outlined two types of understanding, instrumental and relational. Instrumental understanding he described as rules without reasons; A = L X B, a2 + b2 = c2, borrowing in subtraction, change the side, change the sign. On the other hand, pupils who had relational understanding would be able to reconstruct forgotten facts and techniques: for example, they would be able to demonstrate, perhaps by means of a diagram of a right-angled triangle on which squares have been constructed on each side, the relationship between the areas of the squares of the three sides. Being able to quote rules like Pythgoras in parrot fashion does not constitute full understanding and a story of Skemps highlights this strongly. He tells of a young child returning home from school and reporting that he now knew his four times table. Well done, said his mother, so tell me, if there are seven children at a party and they are each given

Reprinted from: Michelle Selinger, Teaching Mathematics. Open University, UK: Routledge, 1994.

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four balloons, how many balloons will there be? The child looked confused and his face fell as he said to his mother But we havent done balloons yet! Skemp outlines three advantages for teaching instrumental understanding:
1. Within its own context, instrumental mathematics is usually easier to understand; sometimes much easier. Some topics, such as multiplying two negative numbers together or dividing by a fractional number, are difficult to understand relationally. Minus times minus equals plus and to divide by a fraction you turn it upside down and multiply are easily remembered rules. If what is wanted is a page of right answers, instrumental mathematics can provide this more quickly and easily. 2. So the rewards are more immediate and more apparent. It is nice to get a page of right answers, and we must not under-rate the importance of the feelings of success which pupils get from this . . . 3. Just because less knowledge is involved, one can often get the right answer more quickly and reliably by instrumental thinking than relational. This difference is so marked that even relational mathematicians often use instrumental thinking. (Skemp 1976: 23)

However, he argues that relational understanding can be

more adaptable to new tasks. Recently I was trying to help a boy who had learnt to multiply two decimal fractions together by dropping the decimal point, multiplying as for whole numbers, and reinserting the decimal point to give the same total number of digits after the decimal point as there were before. This is a handy method if you know why it works. Through no fault of his own, the child did not, and not unreasonably, applied this method to division of decimals. By this method 4.8 0.6 came to 0.08 . . . He was simply extrapolating from what he already knew. But relational understanding, by knowing not only what method worked but why, would have enabled him to relate the method to the new problem, and possibly adapt the method to new problems. Instrumental understanding necessitates memorising which problems a method works for and which not, and also learning a new method for each new class of problems. So the first advantage of relational mathematics leads to: 2. It is easier to remember. There is a seeming paradox here, in that it is certainly harder to learn. It is certainly easier for pupils to learn that area of a triangle = 1/2 base x height than to learn why this is so. But they then have to learn rules for triangles, rectangles, parallellograms, trapeziums; whereas relational understanding consists partly in seeing all of these in relation to the area of a rectangle. It is still desirable to know the separate rules, one does not want to have to derive them afresh everytime. But knowing also how they are inter-related enables one to remember them as parts of a connected whole, which is easier. (Skemp 1976: 23)

It might be thought that pupils would be attracted to relational understanding because it minimises their memory load and so might provide the key to a way forward in motivating pupils to learn more effectively. But encouraging pupils to learn more relationally can be problematic for both teachers and their pupils; the

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investment required to make connections is greater than in instrumental learning and the content of the curriculum needs to be considered so that connections can be easily and readily established. The way a teacher works may affect the way their pupils want to learn. A test can be set in such a way that instrumental understanding will not be useful for all of the questions and relational understanding is required in order to make sense of the questions.

MAKING CONNECTIONS
There are several ways in which relational understanding can be developed to help pupils make connections and which can be used to help understand concepts. Pupils can be set a range of tasks; some which will help them increase their understanding of concepts within a topic and some which will encourage them to stand back from their work, view it as a whole and examine the way in which they make sense of new concepts. It is such tasks which include the use of concept maps, matching statements, marking fictitious homework or using metaphors to describe learning which form the focus of this chapter. I have tried several of these and find that although some tasks appear different from normal classroom practice they can be successfully integrated.

Concept Maps
Concept maps present a method of visualising concepts and the relationships between them. Because concept maps are explicit, overt representations of the concepts and relationships we hold, they allow teachers and pupils to exchange views on why a particular relationship is valid, and to recognise missing linkages that suggest a need for further experience. Because they contain externalised expressions of relationships, they are effective tools for highlighting misconceptions. Concept maps are more than a mere overview, they can be used as tools for negotiating meanings. They offer a method by which the relationships between concepts can be shared, discussed and negotiated. One of the most important single factors influencing learning is what the learner already knows; consequently, many, teachers recognise that it is useful to have some idea of what their pupils already know (or misunderstand) before beginning a new topic. By using concept maps with a class, I can be provided with some of the necessary information which will help me decide on a starting point that will involve all my pupils in building on from what they know. One approach I used with concept maps was to select a key idea from a new topic and to then invite pupils to construct a map showing all the concepts and relationships they can link to this key concept (Figure 18. 1). At other times, in order to assess the kind and extent of previous learning, I selected ten to fifteen concepts from a new topic of study and asked pupils to construct a concept map

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using some or all of these concepts, and to add other concepts they think might be relevant. As a further extension, I sometimes ask pupils to construct three or four sentences linking two, three or more of the concepts. Heather Scott (1991) introduced her pupils to concept maps through the term mathematical maps.
A mathematical map would consist of towns and various connecting routes. The towns could represent a variety of items . . . concepts knowledge, skills or processes. The routes too may be symbolic of many things a connection, a need, or a particular method. (Scott 1991: 5)

Scott found that pupils maps highlighted understandings and misunderstandings as well as vital gaps in areas of mathematics which would need to be closed for progress to be made. Pupils were able to add towns and routes as they learnt and made new connections or understood a concept more fully and the teachers role became that of provider of tickets to travel to more towns and upon different routes on the map. Once the notion of constructing concept maps has been established with pupils, concept maps can become a tool for them to use when they are faced with a concept they appear to have forgotten. They can be encouraged to try and recreate their understanding by referring back to a concept map constructed earlier or to try to reconstruct their understanding through a new mental concept map. Pupils can delete towns or change their meaning as a result of new learning.

Matching statements
In the task of matching statements, I present pupils with a list of mathematical statements or number names and ask them to sort these in any way they like but to justify the way they have been sorted. For example, this might be a list of fraction names written as numbers and words, decimal names, ratios and percentages. In initial sorts many groups of pupils put the statements into separate sets of fractions, decimals, ratios etc., so I then invite them to sort them in another way. This time some pupils start to group the equivalent fraction with its decimal, percentage and ratio, e.g. three-quarters, 3/4, 0.75, 75% and 3:4 can be grouped together. I then invite pupils to share their groupings with others and to search for similarities and differences and to point out where they think a grouping may be incorrect. A consensus as to what the correct groupings ought to be must then be reached. As a result of these groupings and regroupings, pupils who had always seen concepts such as decimals, percentages and fractions as unconnected ways of representing types of numbers can now start to gain insights into the connections that will help them recognise percentages as another way of writing fractions or fractions as another way of writing decimals. In other words their relational understanding will be enhanced.

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Marking homework
Another way in which I help pupils to make connections or to see where a misconception has occurred is to give groups a fictitious homework to mark. This might have been compiled from errors made by a class in a previous homework that I have collated and rewritten to ensure anonymity of the authors (and to avoid embarrassment). As a result, I hope that cognitive conflict might occur in which the pupils become aware of their own difficulties through the discussion and arguments that are generated. They see errors they might also have made themselves and they are caused to rethink their understanding in order to make sense of the errors and also to work on the correct solutions. Having to justify and explain will help pupils to make use of and enhance both their relational and their instrumental understanding.

AWARENESS OF LEARNING
Asking pupils to consider how they learn or to think about one new thing they learnt in a lesson can also help them consider the learning process. Below is a transcript of part of an interview I had with two 12-year-old girls about their learning. MS: LISA: MS: KATYA: When you are doing a problem, do you ask yourself whether you are on the right lines? You do, dont you? Because when youre in the middle of something and youre not sure, you do say, Am I doing this right? Do you ask yourself if you understand? Yes, I suppose so, cos if you dont, you go and ask the teacher and shell tell you. If you dont think about it, if you dont ask yourself if you understand you wouldnt go and tell the teacher, would you? Do you learn with a partner or a group of three or four? Yes, I learn with a partner. Yes, that might be it, I dont learn when Im with a group of three or four because everyone starts talking, so you dont get much done. I think I learn best when I work with a partner because you have to discuss. Its easier to discuss with two people because you dont have as much argument. I think I like working with a partner best, I dont like working on my own at all. What do you like best about working with a partner? Say, comparing answers? Yes. Does that help you learn?

MS: LISA: KATYA: LISA:

KATYA: MS: LISA: MS:

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KATYA:

Yes because you go Ive got 94 and shes got 93 and then you go OK well see whos right and do it again, and it helps you get things right and helps you learn. Do you learn when you listen to others? Yes, because If they got it right and theyre explaining to you then youre learning. Is it better than a teacher explaining it to you? Yes, because theyre the same age as you and they use the words that you know. Basically they know all that you know . . . . So when they explain it to you . . . itll be easier to understand. Does it help if you are shown how to do something? Yes, then, because if they talk to you, you might not get it in your head, but if they show it to you, by writing it down or whatever (if youre allowed to do that in your maths book) then you understand it more clearly like dividing a chocolate bar into thirds. Does repetition help you learn? No, that doesnt help you learn, cos when youre doing your maths book and youve got a whole page of timesing it doesnt help you learn cos you think this is boring, you get about two done in a day. It does help with your spellings though, doesnt it? If you do spelling over and over again you learn how to do it eventually. Does discussion help you learn? Yes, I think so, because you listen to other peoples thoughts about it and then you put them together and you decide I think shes right and you sort of mix them up and see what you get until you think each others right. If you are not understanding, does it help trying to work out for yourself? Yes, because If youve not understood something and then you can do it, you feel youve really achieved something and you remember it. You think its the first time Ive achieved that, Ive really stuck my teeth into that and you I think, Ill remember that one. Does trying several ways to do a difficult problem help? I suppose it does in a way. It means youve learnt the first way, because you think about the first thing youve done and you . . . If youve worked out all the ways to do it then youve got more chance of remembering what you had than if you had just learnt one way, youd have more things in your brain toremember.

MS: KATYA: MS: LISA:

MS: LISA:

MS: KATYA:

LISA: MS: KATYA:

MS: LISA:

MS: LISA: KATYA: LISA:

Finding out how pupils view mathematical learning can often open the door to their fears and concerns as well as revealing what it is about mathematics that motivates them. Another way of exposing their views is to ask pupils to consider metaphors for learning mathematics. For example, learning mathematics is like. . .

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 wondering (sic) through a maze doing a jigsaw climbing a mountain a flower blooming filling a bucket I recall a lesson in which I tried to find out about a new set of Year 10 pupils views of mathematics by introducing the idea of metaphors to describe their learning. Rather than give the pupils the bald statement, I had some cartoons illustrating three or four of these metaphors mounted on card. I gave each group two of the cartoons and asked them to consider the following questions for each one and write a response. 1 2 3 In what ways do you agree with this statement? In what ways do you disagree with this statement? Try to think of a time when you felt like this about learning mathematics. Describe the topic you were doing and what you were learning when you felt like this.

The pupils were reluctant to start but once they started talking about each cartoon, the discussion seemed to be very valuable. One girl started to laugh and said, my buckets got a great big hole in it. The completed sheets certainly showed depth of thought I had not anticipated and highlighted some of the difficulties they were experiencing particularly in the areas of algebra and loci. Here are some of the responses the pupils gave. Learning mathematics is like . . . building a wall:
You add a new brick every lesson, as a brick represents knowledge and cement represents understanding . . . Sometimes we have a lot of bricks but no cement to stick them together. By the time you reach the top of the wall some of the knowledge is forgotten, and where we didnt understand, there may be bricks missing.

. . .being a sponge:
learning maths is not really like this because when reading a book about maths it goes in one ear and out of the other, but when working something out practically, you thoroughly understand it. I feel like this when revising for a test.

We all shared the comments and then I invited the class to invent their own metaphors and explain why the metaphor was appropriate. The following are examples of some of the responses. Learning mathematics is like:

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a gold ring . . . because you never think you will get it, but when you do, you can be very proud of it; a rock . . . flipping hard; a tree . . . one minute you are upright and fine, and the next minute when the wind blows, you are confused and sad; a foggy day . . . sometimes it is clear, sometimes it is not making a cake . . . when you mix the right things together, the result is perfect. This lesson had allowed the pupils to find a way to articulate their feelings about learning mathematics, to express their difficulties and anxieties as well as their enjoyment. I think it helped them to become more comfortable in mathematics lessons because they were more aware of how others felt about mathematics and realised they were not alone. The metaphors had also provided the means by which they could describe their learning in the future. As a teacher I was more aware of how individuals viewed mathematics; I gained some insight as to whether they viewed mathematics as a collection of facts and skills to be learned and practiced (instrumental understanding) or whether they saw it as a collection of inter-related concepts which could be drawn on when a new concept was introduced to help make sense of it and to incorporate it into their understanding (relational understanding). I was able to adapt my teaching style to help individual pupils overcome anxieties which had been highlighted as a result of the exercise and to work on the idea of learning mathematics more relationally. It also helped me to discuss and describe individual ways of learning when the class was working on mathematical activities. I could say to one pupil, you are in a maze today, how do you think you could get out of it?, or to another, Youre trying to soak up too much in one go, think about how you could wring out your sponge without losing what you have learnt so far. By using metaphors which both the pupils and I understood, we could talk about their learning. Alternatively pupils could describe their difficulties to me with a metaphor so that we immediately had some shared understanding of these difficulties. It offered me an insight into each pupils thinking and enabled me to help them find a suitable strategy to resolve the problem.

SUMMARY
Instead of summarising how I believe these strategies have offered pupils an opportunity to learn and understand mathematics relationally, I invite the reader to reflect on how their own concept map of pupil learning could be reformulated by reading this chapter.

NOTE
Much of the work described in this chapter is based on research undertaken at the Shell Centre for Mathematics Education for the ESRC funded project Pupils Awareness of Learning.

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What does it mean to understand something and how do we know when it has happened?
Anne Watson

Words which appear to describe cognition, such as understanding and knowing are used throughout educational literature, and in teachers shared discourse, with flexibility and fluency. When we try to use them precisely they become problematic, as they can take slightly different meanings, but we communicate effectively about them by elaborating what we mean. However, once they enter the statutory language through official documents which describe what education should be achieving they can no longer be used casually. Teachers are accountable for the ways in which they fulfill the statutory requirements, and need to have a worked-out and justifiable view of what understanding means. Phrases such as knowledge and understanding and mathematical understanding are used in the Initial Teacher Training National Curriculum (ITTNC) (TTA, 1999), and the Mathematics National Curriculum (NC) (QCA, 1999) refers frequently to pupils ability to use and understand concepts and to assessing such ability. These requirements suggest that there is a state called understanding and we can know when it exists and when it does not exist.

Understanding as a State
In this chapter I am going to argue that the idea that pupil progress in mathematics can be seen by assessing recognizable states of understanding is an oversimplification of how learning happens. It is very common for new teachers to find themselves thinking, I never really understood addition of fractions (or calculus, or graph-plotting etc.) until I had to teach it! In other words, the thinking involved in planning to teach (such as working out how to explain or exemplify and predicting what pupils will find difficult) has enabled the teacher to re-examine existing knowledge and look at in a new way that is recognized as being deeper, more connected and more secure than previous experience. Possibly the teacher has easily remembered how to add fractions, but thinking about how to teach has led to considering why it is done that way and brought new insights into the importance of equivalence, or has raised an awareness of the numerical value of the fractions. And yet the teacher has been able to add fractions, pass examinations involving this skill and be thought of as

Reprinted from: Linda Haggarty (ed.), Teaching Mathematics in Secondary Schools, A Reader. Routledge Falmer, 2002, pp. 161175.

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understanding adding fractions. What is being recognized here is that, even when one is extremely competent in a mathematical technique, there are still ways in which understanding can grow in a new situation, when one looks at the topic differently. Understanding is not static. Marton and Salj (1997) classify learning as surface (learning procedures and descriptions) or deep (learning about connections and relationships with previous knowledge). This kind of distinction can be useful when planning how to teach, but fails to take account of the fact that mathematical procedures consist of strings of simpler procedures which could be described as previous knowledge. To continue the example of adding fractions, one has to multiply and to add, to identify multiples and factors, to find common multiples and common factors . . . all dependent on previously acquired knowledge and skills. In this sense, learning mathematical procedures inevitably involves connecting and employing previouslylearnt procedures. What is missing from this observation, but is implied in Marton and Saljs distinction, is a sense of underlying meaning allowing us to explain why we add fractions this way and justify the answers we get. Nevertheless, most mathematicians do not explain their actions when adding fractions. It is usually enough to know how to do it and to understand that the method works, but being able to reconstruct explanations, if needed, can contribute to future learning. So here we have two meanings for understanding: I understand that in situation X I need to do Y and I understand why I need to do Y in situation X. Ryle (1949), in describing types of knowledge, referred to these as knowing-that (factual, definitional) and knowing-why. He also describes a third type, knowing-how, which is the knowledge required to carry out the chosen action. Examples of knowing-that can be found in the NC, for example Understand that percentage means number of parts per 100 (p. 59). In this case understanding appears to mean knowing a definition of a word where the definition gives us some clues (but very few) about what we can do with it mathematically. Some students may be able to construct everything they need to do with percentages from this fact, others may need much more help, but all can be tested on whether they can repeat definitions and correctly use procedures in particular circumstances. There is widespread agreement that what is being tested is not understanding, which relates to more complex forms of knowledge, but whether pupils can act in a certain way in the very precise circumstances of the test a very localized knowing-that. A state of understanding would include knowing facts and procedures, but might also include a sense of underlying meaning, some connection to previous knowledge and, possibly, the ability to explain. However, as shown above in the description of previous knowledge links in adding fractions, making connections is not dependent on a sense of meaning or knowing-why. It is possible to progress in mathematics to some extent by performing increasingly complex procedures and hence displaying a kind of behavioural, fluent, automatised understanding of how to enact mathematical algorithms.

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Understanding as Meaning and Connection

Skemp (1976) points out that knowing what is appropriate to do, and when to do it, involves a different kind of understanding than knowing how to do it. He reports that Mellin-Olsen described two kinds of understanding: instrumental as the application of rules without reasons and relational as knowing what to do and why. His enthusiastic embrace of the importance of relations has influenced mathematics education hugely, but a cautious reader might well ask, Relate to what? and notice that possible reasons in mathematics can range from the purely pragmatic, It works in these circumstances, I can check by other means to the purely logical, Given these axioms and these rules of logic, this will always work. Repetition of a definition does not imply that the pupil attaches any meaning to what is being said. Understanding requires more than rote-learning or following procedures correctly, although these could form the basis for future work to develop understanding. A poem learnt by heart can be brought back to mind and reconsidered many times. But the development of meaning is a personal process, dependent on what the pupil makes of successive experiences of a word or concept.
Understanding is a personal thing. The prize is the greater meaning that can flow from the union of isolated thoughts. All it takes is a connection but making it may not be easy. Understanding is not something that can be passed or transmitted from one person to another. No one can make the connection for someone else. Where there are connections to be made the mental effort has to be supplied by the learner. (Newton, 2000, p. 2)

The meanings pupils develop about a concept, the relationships and reasons they attach to it, are inevitably obscure to others. Even in the education profession the nature of understanding is unclear and requires elaboration. For example, the NC contains the requirement that pupils should understand equivalent fractions (p. 59). Clearly this would not be a matter of simply knowing they exist, nor is there anything to explain in this statement; it seems to be more an instruction to knowabout. But what should be known? A teacher preparing to teach about them might know that they give alternative ways to represent the same numerical value, or proportion or ratio; that, plotted as ordered pairs on a coordinate grid, they lie on a straight line; that the traditional rule what you do to the top, you do to the bottom can be easily misunderstood and used to justify adding something to both the numerator and denominator, rather than only scaling. The teacher would know how to generate them, how they relate to each other and how this knowledge would contribute to later work. Given all these possible components of understanding, some of which are fortuitous, some pedagogic and some procedural, how can one assess whether a pupil understands equivalent fractions or not?

Growth of Understanding
The above example suggests that understanding can change and develop, becoming more complex. Locke (1690), in his classic essay about understanding, proposed that

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ultimately everything is connected to everything else, hence growth of understanding relates to an increase in the number of links one makes. This [is] a useful metaphor in mathematics because ultimately the links themselves can be named as mathematical objects (such as are expressed through abstract algebra, morphisms, networks, etc.,). Since we do not know how much there is to know, there is no end to the growth of understanding. Pirie and Kieren (1994) have developed a theory of the growth of mathematical understanding as a whole, dynamic, levelled but non-linear, transcendentally recursive process (p. 62). This hierarchical model has been used to relate different levels of understanding to what can be observed in pupils behaviour, i.e., descriptions of observable actions of mathematical understanding that express background processes. It provides a structure for considering questions such as What can be said about the understanding of a pupil who chooses to use symbolic forms, or manipulates familiar formats to adapt them to a new situation, or derives a new fact from some previous knowledge? They describe stages of primitive knowing, image-making and -having, propertynoticing, formalizing, observing, structuring and inventising. Primitive knowing is what is known so far, making distinctions in existing knowledge and using it in new ways leads to formation of new images. Images can be manipulated and compared and lead to new properties being noticed by the learner who then abstracts something to be said about them, thus moving to a level of formalizing. Reflecting on, and expressing, such formal thinking is called observing, and developing these observations as theory is called structuring. After this the learner can create new questions and new lines of enquiry, which they call inventising. These processes, although increasingly complex, do not necessarily follow each other. In practice there is a lot of toing and froing between levels. In secondary school mathematics it is rare for teachers to have the opportunity to observe pupils closely enough to be precise about their understanding. The simpler models of Bruner (1960), who sees learning as a process of developing iconic and then symbolic representations of enacted experiences, with the help of interaction with others or Floyd et al. (1981) who see learning mathematics as a process of manipulating, getting-a-sense-of and articulating, might be easier to use in the classroom. Once learners can articulate or symbolise a mathematical idea, they are ready to manipulate it further to gain more understanding, or to treat it as the raw material for abstraction or more complex manipulations.

Understanding in Context
Some teachers may interpret relational understanding to be entirely about appropriateness in a context, which could be mathematical or real world, while others may look for genaralised arguments or descriptions of underlying structure. To interpret understand as able to use in a real context implies that all mathematics can be useful outside classrooms, which is dubious, and that pupils can apply what is learnt in one place to another, dissimilar situation. The implication is

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that relational understanding enables instrumental use of mathematics. But formal mathematics is rarely used outside classrooms (Nunes, 1993; Watson, 1998b), so the requirement to use it might be artificial and unrealistic. Further, Mason and Spence (1999) point out that none of the components of relational understanding (knowing that, how and why) necessarily lead to doing the most appropriate, sophisticated or efficient action in a particular situation. For a variety of ad hoc reasons the features of the situation just may not trigger a particular pupil to use the hoped-for mathematics. Cooper (in Chapter 13 of this volume), Christoforou (1999) and Watson (1999), among others, show that students responses may be as much due to their social backgrounds and the way the mathematical question is structured as they are to understanding. Understanding appears to depend on the situation, different understandings being contingent on circumstances.

Understanding as Overcoming Obstacles

Sierpinska (1994), speaking of advanced mathematics, describes understanding as the overcoming of particular obstacles in mathematics. Such obstacles include common difficulties in learning mathematics, inherent difficulties in the subject, errors, misunderstanding, overextending ideas that only work in a restricted domain, and unhelpful ways of thinking, such as generalising with too little data or failing to discriminated between opinion and fact. She sees these obstacles as arising from unconconscious, culturally acquired schemes of thought and unquestioned beliefs about the nature of mathematics (p. xi). In other words, some obstacles are to be expected and taken into account when teaching. It is sensible to include overcoming identifiable obstacles as a component of understanding; the ITTNC pays significant attention to this aspect but on its own this approach may do little for the development of deeper knowledge.

The Example of Multiplication

To illustrate that understanding is dynamic, contingent and local I shall now look at typical meanings of understanding multiplication. It is possible to write 5 x 6 = 30 from a variety of viewpoints, each one adequate for some purpose: A learnt statement with no underlying number sense, from note-learning; A representation of grouped counting of objects, either five lots of six or six lots of five; An example to show a general grasp of commutativity; An example of number patterns in the five-times table; A learnt statement, with underlying number sense; An example of number patterns in the six-times-table; An example of multiplying two positive numbers; Multiplication as repeated addition;

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A way to work out the answer to a problem; Multiplication as scaling; Multiplication by numbers greater than I causes increase; A representative of a binary operation.

In this list are hidden several potential obstacles, for example the need to understand cardinal numbers, to use numbers as objects in their own right, to have an image of what happens when one multiplies and to shift from specific examples to general properties. The list also presages future obstacles: the inadequacy of seeing multiplication as repeated addition, or grouped objects, when multiplying by negative numbers or by numbers less than 1; the successive levels of abstraction which remove the learner further and further from images of addition or scaling; multiplying vectors or matrices require a more abstract notion. For each viewpoint above apart from possibly the first, one can imagine a teacher legitimately saying the pupil understands multiplication. And yet the image of grouped objects is significantly unhelpful if one is trying to multiply matrices. Understanding, therefore, depends not only on the mathematical context but also the pedagogic situation; there is a sense in which one can understand enough for the moment.

What Teachers Mean by Understanding

If we cannot be specific about understanding, then we are unlikely to pinpoint particular moments when pupils achieve it as an attainable, definitive, stable state. When teachers say they are teaching for understanding they rarely mean that they want their students to know about formal logical systems. More often they are talking about pupils having a sense of the form and purpose of the mathematics, and the places where it is likely to be useful. They may want students to be able to generate or reconstruct an appropriate response in new situations, not just mechanically repeat back what they have learnt by heart. Some typical statements from teachers are: I know they understand when: They can say it to me in their own words; They can tell me how they did it; They can use it in context without being told; They use it without prompting; They can answer a question which comes at it in a slightly different direction.

All of these indicate that teachers want pupils to have enough of an overview of techniques and procedures to be able to shift into another representation, generalization or transformation which allows use in unfamiliar ways, explanations, general descriptions and applications (Dreyfus, 1991). Teachers, therefore, are recognising the abilities to generalize, represent and transform as components of
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understanding mathematics. Even given the temporary and local nature of understanding, it might be possible to say something about whether a pupil has generalized, represented or transformed some mathematical concept in given circumstances. But these are mental actions, so how can a teacher collect evidence of pupils understanding?

How do we know what a pupil understands?

In order to recognize such generalizations, which are crucial in all mathematics, teachers have to rely on what they can see, hear and read. Hence there is not room for intuitive understandings in the above statements (Fischbein, 1987; Claxton, 1997), except those intuitions that might enable pupils to apply mathematics in new places. Instead there is much importance placed on verbal expressions of methods, although an essential aspect of mathematics is that structures can be expressed and manipulated in non-verbal ways. Another emphasis, which teachers might make, is that successful performance of mathematics in given contexts might indicate certain kinds of understanding. But observing pupils actions in the classroom is difficult to manage systematically, and in the end one might only have the outcomes of written work to see. The ITTNC says that new teachers should know:
... how to use formative, diagnostic and summative methods of assessing pupils progress in mathematics, including (ii) undertaking day-to-day and more formal assessment activities so that specific assessment of mathematical understanding can be carried out ... (and) (iii) preparing oral and written questions and setting up activities and tests which check for misconceptions and errors in mathematical knowledge and understanding ... and understanding of mathematical ideas and the connections between different mathematical ideas.

(TTA, 1999, p.14, 9aii and iii) In order to achieve this a teacher must have a very clear idea of what kind of understanding is being assessed: instrumental, contextual, procedural, relational within mathematics, transformable, generalized, logical or abstract with obstacles successfully overcome. Also required is an awareness of how such understanding can be assessed. Is it possible, for instance, to find out if a pupils understanding is relational or instrumental? Or, if one believes all understanding to be relational, even if it is related to a fragmentary rule-performance view of mathematics, can a teacher find out what is it related? There are problems with observations of students. Although such observations tell us something, they do not give us access to understandings that have not been expressed in accessible forms (Watson, 1997). In addition, all observations have to be interpreted by the teacher and one may know how such expressions were achieved. For example, a correct proof can be given because it has been learnt by heart; this may or may not mean that the student has an understanding of how the proof works. The understanding could be relational, or could be an instrumental response to a request to prove. Neither does it indicate
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that the student has learnt anything about that type of proof in general, even if the student has grasped the reasoning in the learnt proof. The teacher needs to be cautious not to impute levels of understanding without evidence, and needs to probe further if more references have to be made. Oral evidence, though highly valued by all the teachers, is time-consuming to organize. Language difficulties, diffidence or fear might prevent some pupils from speaking. It is rare to overhear useful remarks in a busy classroom, although such remarks often give insight into a pupils thinking before they are able to record what they think on paper. In addition, oral evidence does not give hard evidence to support a teachers judgements, so that over-reliance on oral evidence may leave the teacher vulnerable to criticism when being inspected by others. Reliance on role work ought also to be seen in the light of Bersteins work (e.g. 1971) on how middleclass pupils are at an advantage in school because the elaborated codes of language are what they might be used to at home, where working-class pupils are expected to communicate at school in a way unlike the codes used at home. This theory relies on a very stereotyped view of language use outside school, but it does prompt a closer look at language forms in mathematics classrooms. The request to explain how you did something, a common requirement in teacher-pupil discourse, is a rare form of speech outside school in any social grouping. Hence reliance on pupils ability to demonstrate their understanding orally for assessment purposes is expecting a keen awareness of different discourses as well as mathematical ability. Many teachers comment that written work on its own is not enough to convince them that pupils understand; they want oral evidence, or written workings and explanations as well. However, there is also wide recognition that many pupils have considerable difficulty in recording in writing what they could do mentally or practically. Assessment of written work, particularly where it involves explanations or extended exploration, has to be seen in the light of research into assessing coursework. Several writers have shown that pupils can be very selective in what they write down, so that written work represents a highly-edited view of their mathematical thinking (MacNamara and Roper, 1992). Sometimes this is an attempt to produce curtailed, terse, classical mathematics, but it can also be due to a failure to appreciate what is important or an inability to find ways to represent abstract or intuitive thought on paper. Observation in a busy classroom is difficult to organize but can reveal that the pupil is using particular methods, such as counting instead of using number bonds. Observation of actions depends in part on the teachers notions of how mathematical activity might be observable. Sometimes this is clear, such as when one sees a pupil use a ruler and read off a measurement correctly. At other times it has to be interpreted, such as when a pupil is trying to make a cube from six squares and may appear to us to be doing it in an obscure way, but nevertheless succeeds. Other times, there is little to interpreted; the pupil who is gazing motionless at a problem may or may not be thinking about it, and the thought may or may not be productive. On the other hand, avid writing may not indicate anything useful is being done. How the teacher interprets the actions can be influenced by many factors. In the examples above, interpretation depends on what the teacher expects
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to see relevant to the mathematics, what the teacher expects from the particular pupil and what the teacher expects from pupils in general. It also depends on what is noted by the teacher that can be affected by previous impressions of the pupils abilities. In order to avoid the possible unfairness that can creep into assessment, given the warnings above, it is possible to: Be prepared to be surprised avoid forming firm views of pupils capabilities and achievements; Use a variety of forms of assessment so that you accumulate a broad view of what a pupil can do; Relate the way you assess, and what you record, to the purpose of the assessment; Discuss your views and interpretations with colleagues; Look for evidence which contradicts, as well as that which corroborates, your views; Do not base irrevocable decisions solely on your own interpretations of what a pupil can do.

Purposes of Assessment Diagnostic assessment

This purpose of assessment assumes that you can find out something about the pupils current state of knowledge in order to decide what and how to teach. As I have argued above, it is not possible to establish current understandings with any certainty because of the complex, dynamic and situated nature of mathematical understanding. There are commercially produced tests to help in the diagnostic process, but it is important to realize the results tell you about a pupils response to a particular question on a particular day. Responses may indicate that common misunderstandings exist, or that the pupil was able to get the right answer using a specific method, and this is useful information when planning to teach, but general judgments about individuals made on the basis of such tests could be flawed. A more immediate way to assess the knowledge pupils bring to a mathematics lesson would be to set up an interactive situation in which pupils are somehow encouraged to reveal how they see a topic, perhaps by making up their own questions, or describing methods on the chalkboard, or telling each other what they already know. The more we can find out about how they already think about the topic, and what they know which is related to it, the more appropriately teaching can be planned and focused.

As Hawkins (1967) said, active and talkative lessons allow pupils to show us what they know, and what images they attach to concepts. When:
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Children are rather passively sitting in neat rows and columns and manipulating you into believing that theyre being attentive because theyre not making any trouble, then you wont get much information from them. Not getting much information about them, you wont be a very good diagnostician of what they need. Not being a good diagnostician, you will be a poor teacher...When we fail in this diagnostic role we begin to worry about assessment. (p. 23)

Since the purpose on diagnostic assessment is to find out what is not known, what is misunderstood, and to inform future teaching it is debatable whether keeping records permanently for individual pupils is of any use except to provide a base from which to assess their later progress.

Formative Assessment
Teachers make judgments all the time about how pupils are responding to teaching, and what progress they are making. For progress to be observed, hierarchical criteria need to be used, such as level descriptors of the NC, or progress tests in a published scheme of work. Pupils can be made aware of such criteria and possibly be involved in assessing their mathematics against them. In this way, the teacher and the pupil are both informed about how they are responding to teaching, and what topics, concepts or teaching styles are causing problems. Progress is often seen to be a oneway process, but the Pirie-Kieren model expects pupils to return to lower levels of knowing from time-to-time, and if pupils have not worked in a particular area of mathematics for some time they may need to revisit earlier ideas. Often, formative assessment is accompanied by target-setting in which pupils are given, or may suggest for themselves, some learning goals for the near future. This can be effective in helping to motivate pupils, but can work against the development of deep understandings, encouraging instead the desire to acquire more and more skills at the expense of higher levels of understanding and reflective approaches to consolidating learning. It is clear from this description that formative assessment relates to what has been taught and what will be taught to those pupils, rather than to some overarching curriculum plan. Although the information may be of value to individual learners, it is also very important for teachers to use in order to monitor their teaching. Again, it is debatable how valid permanent record-keeping about individuals would be, and judgments made about pupils on the basis of formative assessment need to be temporary. Formative assessment does not necessarily provide useful baselines for describing progress, as it usually relates to current teaching and learning.

Summative Assessment
At the end of a course, or at fixed points during the school career, pupils may be tested in a variety of ways to see how much they have learnt and identify their overall progress. These assessments are done by comparing pupil work to an overarching plan, such as a national curriculum or some course objectives, and

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summing up what has been achieved. This purpose of assessment is usually to categorise and grade pupils individually, thus influencing future educational choices, and to get data about a group or cohort for other purposes such as within-school or between school comparisons.

Methods of Assessment
Although there are published tests for all three purposes described above, and national statutory tests for summative purposes, there are many other assessment activities which are an integral part of classroom life. In addition, teachers judgments of what pupils have achieved are included in statutory assessments. A systematic study of methods used by teachers to find out what their pupils know (Watson, 1998a) found that, although teachers knew that their assessment findings were dependent on circumstances, they nevertheless believed that there was some ultimate state of understanding about which they could say something, if only they could get enough information about pupils. More usefully for our purposes here, they described a variety of ways of finding out as much as they could about pupils understanding because it was of central importance for their decisions about what and how to teach, who needed special support, who needed further challenges, and so on. There are dense links between choice of assessment method and choice of teaching (see Watson, 2001) or tasks, questions and interactive strategies (see Mason, 2001) so I shall not comment fully on the pedagogy associated with every method below. Instead, I shall highlight how each method contributes to the meanings of understanding given at the start of this chapter, and also how it relates to the three main purposes set out above. 1. Looking for how mathematics is used in the context of practical or investigational work, or more complex mathematics. Is a concept used where appropriate? Has it been adapted for use? If the concept is used, this can demonstrate that the pupil has internalised it and generalised it enough to recognize where it may be useful, and to transform it for use. However, failure to use it does not mean it is not understood; it may only mean that it was not seen as appropriate, or was deemed too complicated for the context, or just failed to come to mind. How it is used can give formative information; successful use can contribute to summative assessment; a practical situation can give diagnostic information about a skill if it is specifically requested. 2. Explaining to the teacher; explaining to another student Verbal explanation can be evidence of generalization, or of noticing and formalisng properties of a procedure or concept. Some pupils may be uncomfortable about verbalizing; those operating at a highly abstract level may not see how words can express the mathematics. Others can transform their understanding into words and learn more by doing so. This method can give useful diagnostic and formative information.
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3. Response to teacher-led questioning or open prompts e.g. Tell me about ... While closed questions may give information about understanding, they may also encourage instrumental, or learnt-by-heart responses. Additionally, some pupils are adept at guessing answers from the teachers cues, while others may choose not to take part. Open prompts may reveal much more about a pupils personallyconstructed understanding, but may fail to provide enough structure to trigger the most sophisticated response possible. One prompt that appears to be effective is Make up the hardest example you can. Such questions can generate useful information for formative assessment, and may incidentally allow the teacher to diagnose difficulties, but may not reveal the full extent of a pupils knowledge and can only give summative information insofar as they reveal ways of working with mathematics. 4. Pupil expressing insight while working on an intended area of mathematics; or while working on another area of mathematics; communication pupil-to-teacher or pupil-topupil This is the kind of incident which is very revealing when it is spotted, but cannot be planned and hence may not be systematically incorporated into assessment practices. What is demonstrated might be intuition, or a recognition of some mathematics that has been met previously in some other form. It is more likely to take its place in the mental picture that the teacher develops for each pupil. In that sense it is formative, in that it informs the teacher that this pupil may be able to cope with particular kinds of challenge in future. 5. Response to similar, simpler, slightly different or harder examples, or examples where questions are asked in other ways. If a teacher is trying to find the extent or depth of a pupils understanding, slight alterations of a standard question-type are very useful, and can be systematically incorporated into worksheets, homework tasks and tests. These can be used to identify common misunderstandings, and show how far the pupil is able to adapt, manipulate and transform the concepts taught. Careful developments of questions can be used, therefore, to diagnose what needs to be taught, and to summarise what can be done in certain situations. The more open approach of asking pupils to make up their own hard questions, as in 3 above, can also be used. 6. Self assessment A formative assessment method that also motivates and informs pupils is to ask them to assess their own progress. There are several ways of doing this, but to be effective pupils must have some understanding of what it is they are supposed to achieve, otherwise the exercise can degenerate into meaninglessness. Writing journals, in which they describe what they have leant by giving instructions or examples and recording difficulties (Waywood, 1992), is one way. Such exercises can show teachers what pupils see as the important aspects of a topic, and their sense of underlying structure.
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7. Tests: teacher-written tests, impromptu questions, use of a bank of test items, test as part of published scheme, test as written by students for their class Answering test questions is an obvious way to assess understanding, but the circumstances of the test need to be taken into account when deciding how to use the results. Timed tests consisting of closed questions assess algorithmic competence, speed, accuracy, recall, the ability to identify what is needed to answer a question and the ability to adapt what is known to fit a situation. It matters, therefore, whether the test is covering what has actually been taught. It matters also how it has been taught, because the difference between the questions on the test and the kinds of situation the pupil is used to working with is crucial to how the pupil can engage with the questions. For this reason, teachers wishing for the best possible test results may try to teach to the test, in order to give their pupils the advantage of not having to adapt their understandings too much. Sometimes teachers are criticized for doing this, particularly when it leads to an instrumental approach in which pupils responses are triggered by certain language forms in test questions. One way to teach to the test, but also to pay attention to the development of deep knowledge, would be to regard test questions as problems to be solved and develop a critical, questioning approach to the task. Tests are commonly used for all three assessment purposes, but there are many problems with their use as summative tools. The style of question can attract some students and alienate others, questions can be ambiguous, small details of language can lead to misinterpretation of what is required (think of the difference between subtract and subtract from), the pressures of the test situation can lead to underachievement and so on. 8. Analysis or discussion of errors For formative and diagnostic purposes pupils can be asked to explain how they did some mathematics, thus showing what sort of reasoning led to incorrect answers. This is also helpful when answers are correct! This method requires close one-to-one attention and is hence difficult to manage. However, a teacher can use similar methods with a whole class in order to become better informed about a range of misunderstandings that they might have. In addition, working on common errors can aid understanding. This is an example (as are several of the methods above) of good assessment practice merging with good teaching. Masons article on questioning (Mason, 2001) gives further examples of this. 9. Activities which use knowledge or processes, or both, and are expressed through paper, observation, verbal, investigative or practical work Many teachers in my research said that they would know for sure that pupils understood if they could apply their mathematics, unprompted, in a new situation. The situation might be a new mathematical context, or a practical situation such as on the sports field, or in technology lessons. Transfer of mathematics from the classroom to other situations that have their own habits, ways of seeing things and ad hoc methods is complex and sophisticated, as has already been said. But
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application to later work in the mathematics classroom would indeed inform the teacher about how pupils see the meaning, uses and scope of a topic. As in all types of assessment, this is most effective if pupils are familiar with what is required of them. If a class commonly approaches new mathematics with the questions What do I know which is like this? or How does this fit with what I already know? then connecting and using new topics will become a working habit. Not only will the teacher be able to see who understands the mathematics that has to be used, but how it is understood. In addition, the ground can be prepared for helping pupils see mathematics in a connected way, relating one algorithm to another, and hence constructing a network of knowledge.

Knowing about Understanding

Although commonly used in education, the word understanding is complex and open to a variety of interpretations, particularly in mathematics with its multiple layers of generalization, abstraction and use. Understanding depends on mathematical context and on what is expected of the pupil. It can also depend on how mathematics is taught. To find out what a pupil understands is dependent on what it means to understand in a context, and how the teacher identifies, collects and interprets evidence. Teaching for understanding (Watson, 2001) and assessment can be intimately related.

References
Berstein, B. (1971) Class, Codes and Control, vol. 1, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Bruner, J.S. (1960) The Process of Education, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Christoforou, A. (1999) National Curriculum aural tests, social class and equity, unpublished Msc. Dissertation, University of Oxford. Claxton, G. (1997) Hare Brain, Tortoise Mind: why intelligence increases when you think less, London: Fourth Estate. Dreyfus. T. (1991) Advanced mathematical thinking processes, in D. Tall (ed) Advanced Mathematical Thinking, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer. Fischbein, E. (1987) Intuition in Science and Mathematics: an educational approach. Dordrecht, The Natherlands: Reidel.

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The Formation of Mathematical Concepts

Richard Skemp

ABSTRACTING AND CLASSIFYING

Though the term concept is widely used, it is not easy to define. Nor, for reasons which will appear later, is a direct definition the best way to convey its meaning. So I shall approach it from several directions, and with a variety of examples. Since mathematical concepts are among the most abstract, we shall reach these last. First, two pre-verbal examples. An infant aged twelve months having finished sucking his bottle, crawled the floor of the living room to where two empty wine bottles were standing, and stood his own empty feeding bottle neatly alongside them. A two-year-old, seeing a baby on the floor, reacted to it as he usually did to dogs, patting it on the head and stroking its back. (He had seen plenty of dogs, but had never before seen another baby crawling.) In both these cases the behaviour of the children concerned implies: one, some kind of classification of their previous experience; two, the fitting of their present experience into one of these classes. We all do these all the time; it is thus that we bring to bear our past experience on the present situation. The activity is so continuous and automatic that it requires some slightly unexpected outcome thereof, such as the above, to call it to our attention. At a lower level, we classify every time we recognise an object as one which we have seen before. On no two occasions are the incoming sense data likely to be exactly the same since we see objects at different distances and angles, and also in varying lights. From these varying inputs we abstract certain invariant properties, and these properties persist in memory longer than the memory of any particular presentation of the object. In the diagram at the top of the following page, C1, C2 . . . . represent successive past experiences of the same object; say, a particular chair. From these we abstract certain common properties, represented in the diagram by C. Once this abstraction is formed any further experience Cn evokes C, and the chair is recognised: that is, the new experience is classified with C1, C2, etc. Cn and C are now experienced together, and from their combination, we experience both the similarity (C) of Cn to our

Reprinted from: Ann Floyd (ed). Developing Mathematical Thinking. UK. The Open University, 1981.

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C1

C2

C3

Cn

previous experiences of seeing this chair, and also the particular distance, angle, etc., on this occasion (Cn). Awareness of the differences between Cn and Cl, C2, C3 is (according to this diagram) a more indirect process; and this accords with experimental data children find it easier to give similarities between, say, an orange and an apple, than differences. We progress rapidly to further abstractions. From particular chairs C, C, C, we abstract further invariant properties, by which we recognise Ch (a new object seen for the first time, say in a shop window) as a member of this class. It is the secondorder abstraction (from the set of abstractions C, C, . . .) to which we give the name chair. The invariant properties which characterise it are already becoming more functional and less perceptual that is, less attached to the physical properties of a chair. One I saw recently was of basket-work, egg-shaped, and hung from a single rope. It bore little or no physical resemblance to any chair which I had ever seen but I recognised it at once as a chair, and a most desirable one too! [] Ch

A concept therefore requires for its formation a number of experiences which have something in common. Once the concept is formed, we may (retrospectively) talk about examples of the concept. Everyday concepts come from everyday experience, and the examples which lead to their formation occur randomly, spaced in time. The more frequently encountered objects are, in general, conceptualised more rapidly: but many other factors are at work, which makes this statement an over simplification. One of these is contrast. In the diagram below, the single X stands out perceptually from the five variously shaped Os.

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Objects which thus stand out from their surroundings are more likely to be remembered, and their similarities more likely to be abstracted across intervals of space and time. The diagram also illustrates the function of non-examples in determining a class. The X, by its difference from all the other shapes, makes the similarity between them more noticeable. The essential characteristics of a chair are clarified by pointing to (say) a stool, a settee, a bed, and a garden seat, and saying These are not chairs. This is specially useful in fixing the border-line of a class we use objects which might be examples, but arent. []

The communication of concepts

We can see that language can be used to speed up the formation of a concept by helping to collect and separate contributory examples and non-examples. Can it be used to short-circuit the process altogether, by simply defining a concept verbally? Particularly in mathematics, this is often attempted; so let us examine the idea of a definition, as usual with the help of examples. To begin with, let us choose a sample and well-known concept, say red, and imagine that we are asked the meaning of this word by someone blind from birth, who has been given sight by a corneal graft. The meaning of the word is the concept associated with that word; so our task is now to enable the person to form the concept red (which he does not have when we begin) and associate it with the word red. There are two ways in which we might do this. Being scientifically inclined, and perhaps interested in colour photography, we could give a definition. Red is the colour we experience from light of wavelength in the region of 0.6 microns. Would he now have the concept red? Of course not. Such a definition would be useless to him, though not necessarily for other purposes. Intuitively, in such a case, we would point to various objects and say This is a red diary; this is a red tie; this is a red juniper . . . In this way we would arrange for him to have, close together in time, a collection of experiences from which we hope that he will abstract the common property, red. Naming is here used as an auxiliary, in the way already described. The same process of abstraction could take place in silence, but probably more slowly: and the name red would not become attached. If he now asks a different question, What does colour mean?, we can no longer collect together examples for him by pointing; for the examples we want are red, blue, green, yellow, . . . and these are themselves concepts. If (and only if) he already has these concepts in his own mind their presence in our mind is not enough then by collecting together the words for them, we can arrange for him to collect together the concepts themselves; and thus make possible, though not guarantee, the process of abstraction. Naming (or some other symbolization) now becomes an essential factor of the process of abstraction, and not just a useful help. We now need to distinguish between two kinds of concept. Those which are derived from our sensory and motor experiences of the outside world, such as red, motor car,
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heavy, hot, sweet, will be called primary concepts; and those which are abstracted from other concepts we shall call secondary concepts. If concept A is an example of concept B, then we shall say that B is of a higher order than A. Clearly, if A is an example of B and B of C, then C is also of higher order than both B and A. Of higher order than means abstracted from (directly or indirectly). So more abstract means more removed from experience of the outside. world, which fits in with the everyday meaning of the word abstract. This comparison can only be made between concepts in the same hierarchy. Although we might consider that sonata form is a more abstract (higher order) concept than colour we cannot properly compare the two. These related ideas, of order between concepts and a conceptual hierarchy, enable us to see more clearly why, for the person we are thinking of, the definition of red was an inadequate mode of communication; for it pre-supposed concepts such as colour, light, which could only be formed if concepts such as red, blue, green. . . . had already been formed. In general, concepts of a higher order than those which a person already has cannot be communicated to him by a definition, but only by collecting together, for him to experience, suitable examples. Of what use, if any, then, is a definition? Two uses can be seen at once. If it were necessary (e.g. for a photographic colour filter), to specify exactly within what limits we would still call a colour red, then the above definition would enable us to say where red starts and finishes. And having gone further in the process of abstraction, i.e. in the formation of larger classes based on similarities, a definition enables us to retrace our steps. By stating all those (and only those) classes to which our particular concept belongs, we are left with just one possible concept the one we are defining. In the process we have shown how it relates to other concepts in its hierarchy. Definitions can thus be seen as a way of adding precision to the boundaries of a concept, once formed; and of stating explicitly its relation to other concepts. New concepts, of a lower order, can also be communicated for the first time by this means. For example, if our formerly blind subject asked What colour is magenta? and we could not find a sufficiency of magenta objects to show him, we could say it is a colour, between red and blue, rather more blue than red. Provided that he already had the concepts of blue and red, he could then form at least a beginning of the concept of magenta without ever having seen this colour. Since most of the new concepts we need in everyday life are of fairly low order, we usually have available suitable higher-order concepts for the new concepts to be easily communicable by definition; often followed by an example or two, which then serve a different purpose that of illustration. What is a stool? Its a seat for one person, without a back, is quite a good definition, but even so a few examples will define the concept in such a way as to exclude hassocks, pouffes, and garden swings far more successfully than further elaboration of the definition.

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In mathematics, however, not only are the concepts far more abstract than those of everyday life, but the direction of learning is for the most part in direction of still greater abstraction. The communication of mathematical concepts is therefore much more difficult, on the part of both communicator and receiver. This problem will be taken up again shortly, after certain other general topics have been explored. One other consequence of this principle, that concepts of a higher order in a hierarchy than those which a person already has cannot be communicated by definition, can now be deduced. This is, that concept itself cannot be defined for any particular concept must be an example of this concept which is therefore of higher order than any other concept. We can however describe some of the characteristics of concepts, discuss how they function and build up a general understanding of the idea by relating it to other ideas. This is adequate for our purpose, as indeed it has to be. Similarly, I believe that mathematics cannot be precisely defined, but only exemplified. []

The learning of mathematical concepts

Much of our everyday knowledge is learnt directly from our environment, and the concepts involved are not very abstract. The particular problem (but also the power) of mathematics lies in its great abstractness and generality, achieved by successive generations of particularly intelligent individuals each of whom has been abstracting from, or generalising concepts of earlier generations. The present-day learner has to process, not raw data, but the data-processing systems of existing mathematics. This is not only an immeasurable advantage, in that an able student can acquire in years ideas which took centuries of past effort to develop: it also exposes the learner to a particular hazard. Mathematics cannot be learnt directly from the everyday environment but only indirectly from other mathematicians. At best, this makes him largely dependent on his teachers (including all who write mathematics text books), and, at worst, it exposes him to the possibility of acquiring a lifelong fear and dislike of mathematics. Though the first principles of the learning of mathematics are straightforward it is the communicator of mathematical ideas, and not the recipient, who most needs to know them. And though they are simple enough in themselves, their mathematical applications involve much hard thinking. The first of these principles was stated earlier in the chapter: 1 Concepts of a higher order than those which a person already has cannot be communicated to him by a definition, but only by arranging for him to encounter a suitable collection of examples.

The second follows directly from it: 2 Since in mathematics these examples are almost invariably other concepts, it must first be ensured that these are already formed in the mind of the learner

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The first of these principles is broken by the vast majority of textbooks, past and present. Nearly everywhere we see new topics introduced, not by examples, but by definitions: of the most admirable brevity and exactitude for the teacher (who already has the concepts to which they refer), but unintelligible to the student. For reasons which will be apparent, examples cannot be quoted here: but the reader is invited to verify this statement for himself. It is also a useful exercise to look at some definitions of ideas new to oneself, in books about mathematics beyond the stage which one has reached. This enables one to experience at first hand the bafflement of the younger learner. Good teachers intuitively help out a definition with examples. To choose a suitable collection is, however, harder than it sounds. The examples must have in common the properties which form the concept, but no others. To put it differently, they must be alike in the ways which are to be abstracted, and otherwise different enough for the properties irrelevant to this particular concept to cancel out, or, more accurately, fail to summate. Remembering that these irrelevant properties may be regarded as noise, we may say that some noise is necessary to concept formation. In the earlier stages, low noise clear embodiment of the concept, with little distracting detail is desirable; but as the concept becomes more strongly established, increasing noise teaches the recipient to abstract the conceptual properties from more difficult examples, and so reduces his dependence on the teacher. Composing a suitable collection thus requires both inventiveness and a very clear awareness of the concept to be communicated. Now it is possible to have, and use, a concept at an intuitive level without being consciously aware of it. This applies particularly to some of the most basic and frequently used ideas; partly because the more automatic any activity, the less we think about it; partly because the most fundamental ideas of mathematics are acquired at an early age when we have not the ability to analyse them; and partly because some of these fundamental ideas are also among the most subtle. But it is easy to slip up even when these factors do not apply. Some African children were learning the theorem of Pythagoras. They had copied a right-angled triangle from the blackboard, and were told to make a square on each side. This they did easily enough for the two shorter sides; but they were nearly all in difficulty when they tried to draw the square on the hypotenuse. Many of them drew something like figure C. From this, I inferred that the squares from which they had formed their concepts had all been square to the paper, and had included no obliquely placed examples. All too easily done!

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The second of the two principles, that the necessary lower-order concept must be present before the next stage of abstraction is possible, seems even more straightforward. To put this into effect, however, means that before we try to communicate a new concept, we have to find out what are its contributory concepts; and for each of these, we have to find out its contributory concepts; and so on, until we reach either primary concepts, or experience which we may assume as given. When this has been done, a suitable plan can then be made which will present to the learner a possible, and not an impossible, task. This conceptual analysis involves much more work than just giving a definition. If done, it leads to some surprising results. Ideas which until recently were first taught in university courses are now seen to be so fundamental that they are being introduced in the primary school; for example, sets, one-to-one correspondence. Other topics still regarded as elementary are found, on analysis, to involve ideas which even those teaching the topic have for the most part never heard of. In this category I include the manipulation of fractional numbers. There are two other consequences of the second principle. The first is that in the building up of the structure of successive abstractions, if a particular level is imperfectly understood, everything from then on is in peril. This dependency is probably greater in mathematics than in any other subject. One can understand the geography of Africa even if one has missed that of Europe; one can understand the history of the nineteenth century even if one has missed that of the eighteenth; in physics one can understand heat and light even if one has missed sound. But to understand algebra without ever having really understood arithmetic is an impossibility, for much of the algebra we learn at school is generalised arithmetic. Since many pupils learn to do the manipulations of arithmetic with a very imperfect understanding of the underlying principles, it is small wonder that mathematics remains a closed book to them. Even those who get off to a good start may through absence, inattention, failure to keep up with the pace of the class, or other reason, fail to form the concepts of some particular stage. In that case, all subsequent concepts dependent on these may never be understood, and the pupil becomes steadily more out of his depth. In the latter case, however, the situation may not be so irremediable, if the learning situation is one which makes back-tracking possible;
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e.g. if the text in use provides a genuine explanation, and is not just a collection of exercises. Success will then depend partly on the confidence of the learner in his own powers of comprehension. The other consequence (of the second principle) is that the contributory concepts needed for each new stage of abstraction must be available. It is not sufficient for them to have been learnt at some time in the past: they must be accessible when needed. This is partly a matter, again, of having facilities available for back tracking. Appropriate revision, planned by a teacher, will be specially useful for beginners; but more advanced students should be taking a more active part in the direction of their own studies, and, for these, returning to take another look at earlier work will be more effective if it is directed by a felt need rather than by an outside instruction. To put it differently, an answer has more meaning to someone who has first asked a question.

Learning and teaching

In learning mathematics, although we have to create all the concepts anew in our own minds, we are only able to do this by using the concepts arrived at by past mathematicians. There is too much for even a genius to do in a lifetime. This makes the learning of mathematics, especially in its early stages, and for the average student, very dependent on good teaching. Now, to know mathematics is one thing, and to be able to teach it to communicate it to those at a lower conceptual level is quite another; and I believe that it is the latter which is most lacking at tile moment. As a result, many people acquire at school a lifelong dislike, even fear, of mathematics. It is good to report that widespread efforts are being made to remedy this, for example by the introduction of new syllabuses, more attractive presentation, television series, and other means. These efforts will all however be of greater value if they are combined with greater awareness of the mental processes involved in the learning of mathematics. This will reduce the danger of new topics being chosen largely according to the current fashion, and taught almost as badly as those they replace. []

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What Cognitive Demands are Made in Learning Mathematics?

Anthony Orton

THE PROBLEM OF CLASSIFICATION

There has been a variety of attempts to classify the mental activities involved in learning. Gagn (1970, 1977) listed and described eight types of learning. Bloom et al. (1956) analysed the objectives of education in the cognitive domain. Skemp (1971) discussed the processes which need to be adopted in doing mathematics Polya (1945) attempted to analyse the process of solving mathematical problems, a theme subsequently taken up by Wickelgren (1974). Brown (1978) suggested that there were four types of mathematical learning, namely simple recan, algorithmic learning, conceptual learning and problem-solving. Her Majestys Inspectorate (1985) listed five main categories of objectives for mathematics learning, and these were facts, skins conceptual structures, general strategies and personal qualities. The four cognitive categories, bear a close resemblance to those of Brown, and basicany provide a suitable structure for further discussion, though in reality all four are inextricably linked in the learning process. In particular, the whole of cognition may be said to be a study of memory. (Claxton, 1984).

RETENTION AND RECALL

Children are expected to be able to recan from memory a variety of different qualities in mathematics, for example: words (e.g. length, metre, triangle) symbols (e.g. +, , x, , /) numerical facts (e.g. number bonds, tables) formulas (e.g. A = lb, A = r2).

Memory has been the focus for considerable research effort by psychologists over many years. At one time it was believed that our powers of memory could be improved by exercising them, in other words by being made to learn anything relevant and useful or otherwise. Such an extreme view is not acceptable though the value of exercise might not be completely discredited. The modern view of memory is that it is a feature of overall intellectual capacity, and that different people might even have differing capacities as regards what kinds of knowledge or understanding can most readily be remembered. As with the processing powers of the brain, human capabilities in terms of memory have been studied from physiological perspectives. There is no doubt that the chemistry and physics of the brain might provide the
Reprinted from: Anthony Orton. Learning Mathematics: Issues, Theory and Classroom Practice, London: Cassell, 1992.

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ultimate answers to problems studied in educational psychology but we do not have many answers yet. Such physiological studies are therefore not considered to be within the scope of this book. It should be pointed out that psychologists have expressed the view that we possess both short-term and long-term memory. More recently the concept of working memory has been introduced, and this might be important in mathematical learning. What we certainly wish to achieve is long-term storage together with ready-recan. The problem is how to achieve this. Retention of knowledge has often been associated in the past with rote learning. Drin (repetitive practice) was thought to be the answer to the problem of fixing knowledge in the memory, though subsequent difficulties of recan suggest that drin does not often achieve its objective. The recent history of curriculum development in mathematics, however, reveals a clear, new view from innovators that the emphasis should be taken off memory work so, for example, formula books were provided for candidates in certain examinations. There is considerable doubt whether this movement carried along with it the majority of mathematics teachers. There is an obvious efficiency factor in having knowledge readily to hand but there may be even more in favour of memorizing relevant mathematics. The view from psychology is that committing knowledge to memory is important in terms of efficient processing but at the same time rote learning without meaning is relatively unhelpful. Cockcroft (1982) included practice of skins and routines in the list of features of good mathematics teaching but there were also other features. Rehearsal is necessary but it is unlikely to be sufficient as the kind of learning machine that we are is one that thrives on meaning (Claxton, 1984). In other words, retention and recan are easier if what is learned is meaningful in terms of the network of knowledge already held in the mind of the learner. One difficulty in putting this view into practice immediately emerges. What do we do for learners at the very beginnings of mathematics when there is virtually no network of mathematical knowledge in the mind of the learner? How, for example, is the child to learn the symbols 0 to 9 and the corresponding words? There is clearly meaning to be learned in the ideas of oneness and twoness and so on, but the symbols and words are in a sense arbitrary and therefore have to be learned by rote. Even as a child progresses through mathematics some element of rote learning must remain, in particular in relation to certain words and symbols. Some words may be remembered more easily because they are used in everyday life, for example, length. Other words like metre and centimetre are rarely used in everyday speech and need to be practised. Meaning is involved in the relationship between the lengths which the two words represent and the connection with the prefix centi. The word triangle would seem to be very meaningful in its bringing together of two ideas, but there must be considerable doubt as to whether this is helpful when the teacher first talks about triangles because the idea of angle is likely stin to be relatively unformed. Symbols must frequently involve rote learning. Some require very careful discrimination, for example + and x, and also and . In learning mathematics, and particularly in the early years, it seems inevitable that learning by rote or by simple association win be involved.

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There are a number of other ways in which retention can be fostered. Simple devices such as variations in layout in text and exercise books, different type style, different colours, the placing of certain key elements in boxes and summary notes are all helpful. Repetition, or rehearsal, has a part to play, both spoken rehearsal and written rehearsal. Constant repetition of multiplication tables was once commonplace in mathematics lessons. Such learning techniques cannot be considered bad if they achieve their objective, but of course they often did not, and in any case there are relationships and properties within tables which give a conceptual component to them which suggests that repetition alone is not likely to be the only way of promoting learning of tables. Rehearsal, however, must not be rejected out of hand as a way of assisting in the fostering of retention of facts. Periodic revision, likewise, is also important. Retention can also be promoted by using deliberate contrivances such as mnemomics. The use of a variety of mnemonics in learning the basic three trigonometrical ratios has been common, for example oranges have segments (sectors), apples have cores, for opposite sine = hypotenuse and adjacent cosine = hypotenuse or the more lengthy statement, some officers have curly auburn hair to offer attraction, which includes cues for the tangent ratio as well. It is interesting that mnemonics have not been used widely outside trignometry. It may be that opportunities for using other mnemonics in the rest of mathematics are very limited. But they do work, and we must acknowledge that and use them as appropriate. Even if retention is achieved we cannot test it without recan, and recan can be a serious problem. Sitting and thinking, hoping the elements win come back, racking ones brains, is frustrating and tiring. Often, however, the presentation to the learner of an appropriate cue jogs the memory, but it is how to arrange for the cue which is the difficulty. Memory is, to some extent, context specific, which is why our memory is sometimes jogged by reconstructing the situation in which the original experience occurred. Teachers are wining to provide children with appropriate cues, but there comes a time when pupils might have to manage without external help. In the case of mnemonics, the rhyme provides the cue. In other cases a concept map fixed in the mind might help the child to follow the network to the required element, or might release a complete structure of elements once a few key ideas are remembered. Structure built into the retention greatly assists recan. Learning which has been achieved simply by rote and without a link into a network does not facilitate recall.

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Recently, considerable attention has been given to the idea of concept maps. A concept map is simply a linked network of related elements of learning material. It can be used in a variety of ways. It can be used by teachers in course planning, It can be given to pupils as a model for revision, it can be used by a learner in a deliberate way in the learning process. An example is given in Figure 1 which is a map of mathematics associated with triangles and triangularity.

Figure 1

This map, as with most such maps, is not exhaustive. It may be too difficult for most children to appreciate that there are so many related mathematical ideas, but more limited maps might be very useful to assist in remembering, for example the diagram in Figure 2, which was produced by a middle school pupil.

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Figure 2

In connection with using concept maps there are a number of provisos which need to be mentioned. First, in the preceding maps there is much more to be learned than can be memorized without understanding, so that in introducing concept maps within this section we have certainly gone beyond the basic ideas of retention and recan. Secondly, and unfortunately, the effect of concept maps in helping to foster retention is also likely to be limited. The basic problem here is that, when learning, we each put our own structure on the material that is to be learned. Modern constructivist views suggest that learners do not remember material exactly as it was taught, that they construct their own meanings, that retention involves an active process of reconstruction. There is, therefore, the suggestion that many of the learning difficulties recorded in the previous chapter are not caused by failure to absorb all that was taught but rather that they are created in the reconstruction of knowledge. Retention and recan are clearly not simple processes.

USING ALGORITHMS
Learning mathematics is too much concerned with learning algorithms, it might be argued. The following are some examples: long multiplication long division adding and subtracting fractions multiplying fractions dividing fractions multiplying matrices

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Clearly, memory is involved in using algorithms but here the children have to remember a step-by-step procedure. A worrying feature about algorithms in mathematics is that many which we expect children to remember and use with confidence are meaningless to the pupils, in terms of worthwhile knowledge, and are sometimes completely irrelevant. The distinction between instrumental understanding and relational understanding (Skemp 1976) is helpful in appreciating this point, and this is inustrated below. One of the less obvious algorithms to be found in some schools involves the conversion of denary numbers to binary. Assume that 13 is our denary number, then divide it by 2 and record the quotient (6) and the remainder (1). Next we divide 6 by 2 and record the quotient (3) and the remainder (0). We continue until the quotient is0.

Then the required binary number is 1101, formed from the remainders. It is for pupils to learn this as a procedure for conversion, but it is doubtful if many would appreciate why it works. Thus, they understand what to do to get the answer so they have achieved instrumental understanding, but they have not necessarily achieved relational understanding. There is something of a parallel between this distinction and the distinction between memorizing by rote and memorizing through establishing connections. There are many more well-known algorithms. Long division has traditionally, and probably wrongly, been taught in primary schools, and this was discussed in Chapter 2. Pupils in general would not be able to achieve relational understanding of long division and nowadays we would presumably use a calculator if we ever needed to obtain a quotient in a complicated division. The method for adding two fractions may be treated algorithmicany:
a c + b d

ad +bc bd
2 1 + 3 4

However, this algorithm is sensible for

but not sensible for

1 1 + 2 4

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or

1 2 + 6 9

Furthermore, there is a subtle difference in what one would sensibly do in the latter two examples which can only be appreciated through relational understanding, incorporating the idea of lowest common multiple. Recently, this algorithm has been linked with the idea of equivalent fractions. Since the equivalence of fractions depends on the equality of ratios it is open to question whether such use of equivalence has led to any greater understanding. In any case, why should we wish young children to be using a routine process to add fractions? The worst horror story of all concerning fractions involves division, for example

3 7 5 10 To find the answer, instrumentally, one inverts the second fraction and replaces the by x. This has inevitably led to confused recollections, in particular which fraction to invert or whether it is both. Relationally, of course, we wish to know
how many
3 7 there are in , so equivalence is involved. Is the algorithm necessary? 5 10

If it is necessary, at what age is it appropriate to aim for relational understanding? Such real understanding does not appear to be achievable by most pupils within the compulsory years of schooling. A major problem with algorithms is that we often appear to introduce them before the pupils see a need for them. For example, we teach pupils how to solve linear equations by applying an algorithm to equations which can and win, be solved by inspection, or trial and error. At the time of introduction to the procedure the equation 2 x + 3 = 11 win not be winingly solved by the method 2 x + 3 3 = 11 3 2x = 8

2x 8 = 2 2 x=4

when anyone can see almost at a glance that x = 4! Hart (1981) stated:
We appear to teach algorithms too soon, inustrate their use with simple examples (which the child knows he can do another way) and assume once taught they are remembered. We have ample proof that they are not remembered or [are] sometimes remembered in a form that was never taught e.g. to add two fractions, add the tops and add the bottoms.

One of the difficulties which faces us, however, is that we cannot be sure that relational understanding must precede the use of an algorithm. There is some

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evidence that relational understanding can be developed by thoughtful use of an algorithm, that instrumental understanding might help to promote relational understanding. Learning is so complex, and it seems like another chicken and egg situation. Which comes first? Nevertheless, there seems to be no doubt that too much instrumental learning is accepted in mathematics with pupils for whom relational understanding winnever come, and that too much dependence on instrumental understanding in learning mathematics is rather like building a tower on insecure foundations. Such a tower win eventually crumble from somewhere near the bottom. As with so many aspects of learning, it is not easy to find the right compromise. This compromise might, after all, be different for different sorts of pupils! If we decide that a particular algorithm has some value is it justifiable to teach it, even knowing that relational understanding is impossible to achieve? Are there any essential algorithms anyway?

LEARNING CONCEPTS
There are problems in remembering facts in mathematics and there are difficulties in learning algorithms meaningfully, but it is the conceptual structure or basis of mathematics which is perhaps the hardest aspect of all. Mathematics learning consists very largely of building understanding of new concepts onto previously understood concepts. Examples of concepts are so widespread that it is almost unnecessary to quote any but for comparison with simple recan and algorithmic learning here are a few: triangularity percentage relation similarity limit Strangely, however, it is not easy to explain what a concept is. A dictionary might tell us that a concept is an abstract idea. The definition by Novak (1977) is helpful namely: Concepts describe some regularity or relationship within a group of facts and are designated by some sign or symbol. However it is probably easier to understand such a definition retrospectively, as it were, after thinking about particular concepts and what is involved in using them. Skemp (1971) discussed exactly this point in a very helpful inustration of how we learn concepts. Considering the hypothetical situation of an adult born blind but given sight by an operation Skemp suggested that there is no way we can help the adult understand the concept of redness by means of definition. It is only by pointing to a variety of objects which are red that the adult could himself abstract the idea, the property which is common to all of the objects. Clearly, one would also assume that the counter-examples the objects which were not red, would also help to clarify what was meant by redness. Skemp was claiming that the learning of mathematical concepts is comparable. We must not expect children to learn through definitions. We need to use examples and counter-examples. Thus, in exactly the

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same way, we can run into difficulty in trying to define what we mean by a concept in mathematics unless we have many examples in mind. The clear implication is that we learn about triangularity through examples of triangles and the contrast with other shapes. The concept of triangle is probably relatively easy to grasp in this way, but we must not take it for granted. After all, children are sometimes very reluctant to admit that the shape in Figure 3 is a square, Figure 3

and often wish to can it a diamond and insist that it is not a square. It would seem likely that our examples of squares, from which abstraction of the concept takes place, have not included a sufficient number for which one side is not parallel to the bottom of the page or blackboard. This is a point made by Dienes (1960) in connection with his theory of mathematics-learning. Other concepts, such as relation and function, are certainly much more difficult to learn (see Orton, 1971). Usually, family relations or family trees are used as a way in, and they certainly help. However, a mathematical relation is, strictly, a set of ordered pairs. Relations in the family sense are the people (members or elements) to whom a particular member is related. The idea of function in modern mathematics is very difficult to introduce, and probably irrelevant to most children anyway. Using functions without trying to define the idea abstractly may be the best starting point, and a more abstract definition of function can then be given much later only to those for whom it is appropriate. We need to be very careful when trying to introduce abstract mathematical ideas. Some ideas may be more abstract and therefore more difficult than we imagine. Skemp (1964), in drawing attention to the surprises we may get through concept analysis, cited fractions as being very much harder than we had previously thought and sets as being very much easier. The precise mathematical definition of a concept, based on many years of handling examples, is something the mathematics teacher needs to have, but even that might cause problems. We all know exactly what a triangle is, but do we know what a natural number is? To many professional mathematicians the natural numbers are 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

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but to others they are 1,2, 3,4, 5 The definition of prime numbers at one time included the number one, and may do so for some people, but nowadays most definitions of prime numbers exclude the number one. Some books might define rectangular numbers to include the square numbers, and others might not. Some books might define both rectangular and oblong numbers in order that rectangular numbers should include square numbers with oblong numbers being those rectangular numbers which are not square but other books might not admit to oblong as being a useful idea. Yet it is possible to learn mathematics without having a completely tight definition of certain concepts. Certainly, our concepts grow and develop over the years. We introduce children to numbers meaning only a very limited kind of number with which we count. Over the years, other kinds of numbers are introduced, namely fractions (rational numbers) integers, irrational numbers and real numbers. Our original numbers have had to be redefined as natural numbers. Despite apparent complexities of concept redefinition which are implied, learning can stin take place. There are other problems too. Skemp (1964) expressed the view that sets were relatively simple to understand but should we introduce the notion of the empty set? The emptiness of particular intersections of set or of particular defined sets is a easy idea but not so the uniqueness of the empty set, nor the fact that the empty set is a subset of every set. Yet Skemp was correct. Learning about sets can take place successfully despite certain difficulties. Boundary disputes might be less likely in mathematics than in other areas of knowledge, but they do exist, for example whether a square is a rectangle. Distinguishing between blue and green around the boundary between two colours might lead to disagreement, but is unlikely to hold up learning. We do not fully know what are the boundary problems for children in learning mathematics and how much they interfere with learning. The definition of concept by Child (1986) acknowledges the boundary problem:
With most concepts there are wide margins of attribute acceptability. . .In some cases the boundaries which distinguish concepts are hazy and in-defined. But generally speaking, there is a large measure of agreement in the definition of most class concepts within a given culture.

The suggestion by Skemp that we do not learn concepts from definitions is not only major strand of recommendation. In Nuffield (1976a) we find the simple proverb: I hear, and I forget; I see, and I remember; I do, and I understand Here is a strong activity message, also found in the Schools Council Report (1965) and in many other documents including Cockcroft (1982). In Cockcroft we find:
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For my children practical work provides the most effective means by which understanding mathematics can develop. The assumption in all of these references is that children particularly young children, learn best by proceeding from the concrete to abstract. Perhaps, to a large extent, we all learn in that way though thinking purely in abstractions does become more possible, though not certain, in adulthood. Cockcroft in many paragraphs, emphasized this kind of message, and suggested that it is important that we do not assume that practical approaches should be limited only to young children, or children whose attainment is low. Cockcroft also stressed the slowness of the progression from concrete materials to abstract thinking. The Schools Council Report (1965) stressed the same in: Children learn mathematical concepts more slowly than we realised. They learn by their own activities. Such views as those recorded above, and many other related views, are common to most publications which set out to make recommendations to teachers about how to help children to learn mathematics. The theories of learning which are discussed in some subsequent chapters of this book all face up to the crucial issue of how to promote concept learning. In fact, many of the above references show clear evidence of close association with such theories of learning anyway. It is interesting to note that one theorist, Gagn (1970, 1977), was at pains to suggest that some concepts can be defined. He suggested that there are concrete concepts and defined concepts and, whilst admitting that many concepts require a concrete approach, since they are fundamentally classes of objects, events and qualities (for example angle, triangle, and regularity he pointed to other concepts such as pivot, uncle and sell which cannot be learned from examples. This issue will be raised in the next chapter. Suffice to say at this stage that Gagns view is open to debate and, if a distinction exists between concrete and defined concepts it is not a clear distinction, at least in terms of learning mathematics. What neither Gagn nor any other major theorist has denied is that, in the case of young children learning mathematics, attempts to define concepts are unlikely to be successful. Concrete approaches are often very necessary, though nothing win ever ensure that relational understanding is achieved. Skemp and others have drawn attention to the implications for concept learning of what is perhaps best described as the hierarchical nature of mathematics. In some subject disciplines there might be considerable freedom as regards the order in which topics are taught. In mathematics it is usually much more important that we find the right sequence for the learner. Often the very examples which we use to promote concept learning are themselves other concepts, and we must be sure that these other concepts have already been adequately understood. A mature understanding of what we mean by number as a generalization depends on an understanding of natural numbers, rational numbers, irrational numbers, integers and real numbers, together with, perhaps, an appreciation that this might not be a completely exhaustive list of different number sets. Various authors have tried to elaborate the hierarchy of concepts, or topics, through which learners must pass. Two such attempts are in Nuffield (1970) and Skemp (1971). It does not seem likely, however, that such hierarchies can ever completely solve our problems in the

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sequencing of learning in mathematics, though they should help. One other feature of learning is that we continue to refine and extend our understanding of concepts throughout life. A thorough and complete understanding of a concept is sometimes not only unnecessary to enable a learner to move on to the next concept, it might even be unattainable. It might be that it is the study of parallel or even more advanced concepts which leads to enhancement of the understanding of more elementary concepts. Another feature of learning mathematics is that some flexibility within the hierarchy of topics is possible, even though we have to be more careful with our sequence than in some other knowledge areas. Learners are not identical in their needs, after all, and do not all achieve identical levels of understanding of particular topics in a hierarchy. Hence the good sense of the well known statement by Ausubel (1968):
If I had to reduce all of educational psychology to just one principle, I would say this: The most important single factor influencing learning is what the learner already knows. Ascertain this and teach him accordingly.

PROBLEM SOLVING
Considerable attention has been accorded in recent years to the place of problemsolving in mathematics and to how to help children to become better problemsolvers. It is first necessary to declare exactly what is meant by problem-solving in this context. In fact, it is perhaps better first to say what we do not mean. At the end of a section of mathematics textbook there is often a set of routine exercises, which may even be referred to in the text as problems but these are unlikely to involve problem-solving in the current accepted sense. The routine practice provided by such exercises is probably very important, and can be thought of in terms of rehearsal as a way of fostering retention in the memory. Some such exercises might require the learners to apply their mathematics to situations which arise in the real world and, as such could be termed applications. Some such applications win involve problem-solving. Problem-solving is now normally intended to imply a process by which the learner combines previously learned elements of knowledge, rules, techniques, skins and concepts to provide a solution to a novel situation. It is now generally accepted that mathematics is both product and process: both an organized body of knowledge and a creative activity in which the learner participates. It might, in fact, be claimed that the real purpose of learning rules, techniques and content generally is to enable the learner to do mathematics, indeed to solve problems, though Ausubel (1963) would disagree. Thus problem-solving can be considered to be the real essence of mathematics Gagn (1970, 1977) has expressed the view that problem-solving is the highest form of learning. Having solved a problem, one has learned. One might only have learned to solve that problem, but it is more likely that one has, learned to solve a variety of similar problems and perhaps even a variety of problems possessing some similar characteristics. Descartes expressed it as follows: Each problem that I solved became a rule which served afterwards to solve other problems. It might therefore be asked, What is the difference between problem-solving and discovery? Both require thinking, leading to the creation of something which the learner did not have
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before. Another term which is currently in frequent use is investigation. An investigation might be closed, in the sense that the intention is to lead to an established mathematical result, or it might be open, in the sense that the result is not known in advance or there might not even be a clear result which can be stated simply. Investigations should clearly lead to problem-solving. Investigations also, hopefully, lead to discovery. In short, whatever we mean by the separate terms discovery, investigation and problem-solving there are clear relationships between the processes involved.

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An Introduction to Theories about Learning in Mathematics

INTRODUCTION
In recent years there have been radical changes within most sectors of education. Initial teacher education has been no exception. Government circulars (9/92 and 14/ 93) shifted the responsibility for the planning of courses, the teaching and assessment of trainees by encouraging partnership between schools and higher education. The latest DfEE circular has now laid down standards for the award of Qualified Teacher Status (QTS) in effect a National Curriculum for Teacher Training. In the past teacher training programmes were in danger of being seen to involve two distinct components; theory undertaken in college and practice undertaken in schools. The trainee teacher often had difficulty making sense of these two domains when the links between them were few and often tenuous. There was a danger in seeing theory and practice as unrelated instead of seeing practice as the application of theory, and theory as a way of reflecting on and making sense of practice. This could lead to a rejection of theory which was based on a belief that professional practice depended on the development of automaticity, not on a reflective response to teaching involving consideration of theory in order to make sense of experience. The change over the last few years to partnership models of training has afforded the opportunity to help trainees to bring theory and practice together, to make meaning from the two overlapping domains. Ideally teachers and trainees have become involved in conjecture making and testing theory in personal practice. Sinkinson (1996) has commented on the need for mentors to touch on the theoretical aspects of teaching and learning. This ensures that the links between theory and practice become increasingly important. During their education courses, trainees need to bring together theory and practice learning to see practice modelled and theory developed from practice. Teacher education invites the trainee to undertake tasks which help to combine the two domains. Within the classroom the need for quick decisions means that the expert teacher often needs to be able to reflect in action (Schon 1983, 1987). However learning to become such an expert will require deliberate reflection out of action (Eraut 1995). The use of enquiry or teacher as researcher strategies enables the student to understand and generate knowledge, in order to empower them as human beings and as professionals (Poetter 1997). Theory and practice become the joint responsibility of all participants. This book aims to help the student to weave together theoretical and practical ideas about education and to understand how one informs the other. In order to aid this
Reprinted from: Alan Bloomfield and Tony Harris, (eds.) Teaching, Learning and Mathematics: Challenging Beliefs. ATM, Derby, UK. 73

process, this first chapter is concerned with exploring some of the main theories of learning.

DRILL AND PRACTICE THEORIES

The Stimulus-Response theory, developed by Thorndike and Skinner, was that learning was about developing connections; these connections were a means whereby behaviour could be modified. Thorndikes work suggested two educational principles.
Put together what should go together and keep apart what should not go together. Reward desirable connections and make undesirable connections produce discomfort. (Macdonald, 1964 p. 8)

Much of his theory was developed from experiments which were similar to those carried out by Pavlov in Russia. From the experiments Thorndike developed his Law of Effect which stated that ... behaviour which is followed by reward or success will tend to be repeated whereas behaviour which is not rewarded will tend to die away. (Macdonald 1964). It was this law which Thorndike applied to the teaching of mathematics (in particular arithmetic), developing the principle of drill and practice. The object being that, when pupils were presented with the stimulus 2+2, they would come up with the response 4. His belief was that arithmetic consisted of a countless set of bonds or connections and that it was the role of the teacher to enable pupils to know these bonds. These principles had impilcations for the teaching of Mathematics the learning of mathematics was imposed from outside the learner, someone else decided the connections and their related rewards and discomforts, and the connections were perceived to be the same for all learners. This naturally led to the idea of individualised programmed learning as the key to progress, on the grounds that whilst the connections necessary to facilitate learning were the same the rate at which the connections may be assimilated would be different for different learners. There are difficulties with these theories. Thorndike appears to take little or no account of the process which may be considered to be the mediator between the stimulus and the response, and of course the mediator can vary greatly between pupils. Also he makes no distinction between doing and understanding. His view of Mathematics was a clinical one and took no account of who the learner was and why they might wish to learn the correct response to countless stimuli. Two important schools of psychological thought developed at about the same time as Thorndike but took very different views of learning Dewey and Gestalt. The views of Dewey are significant in that they question a number of the Thorndike principles. Firstly, he questioned the view that stimuli needed to be externally produced. He suggested that the stimlus was directly related to the learner, his/her experience, and his/her environment, and that the response to the stimulus resulted in new stimuli. Thus the notion of a linear sytem of discrete stimulus response 74

situations organised externally was replaced by a stimulus = response circuit in which the learner was an active participant. Secondly, Dewey was also concerned about the interest and motivation of the learner, believing that this was an important factor in ensuring that learning was a positive experience. Thirdly, he believed that there must be an aim in learning, which must be personal, and not just imposed from outside. Thus, the implication is that a clear aim combined with interest and motivation produces intelligent action. McDonald (1964) summarises Deweys view on learning as:
problem-solving or intelligent action in which the person continually evaluates his/ her exprience in the light of its foreseen and experienced consequenceslearning in this sense is not simply an aquisition or achievement but a moment of experience out of which emerges redefined purposes, new evaluations, and new actions in the service of continued growth. (p. 13)

Thus for Dewey learning was not a clinical exercise but something which was deeply rooted in personal development. It was something in which the learner was an active participator. The Gestalt psychologists added two important points to Deweys thoughts. Firstly, they reacted very strongly against the idea that learning was something which was broken down into its constituent parts and then the learner learnt each of these constituent parts without having a view of wholeness. They believed that the significance of a situation or pattern of stimuli is in the total pattern and not in the separate elements (Stone 1966). This links closely with Deweys ideas about learning and problem solving, as solving a problem is not about working blindly on the constituent parts of the problem solving, and that insight was directly related to having a whole view of a problem. These schools of thought led to a quite different view about how learning might best be facilitated in school. Whereas Thorndike took the view that all the small bits of learning would eventually constitute a whole when the myriad connections were understood, both Dewey and the Gestalt psychologists sought to put learning in a context. This allowed the learner to have a view of the whole problem first and then to see the bits as a way of making sense of the whole.

Theories of Development Piaget

Piaget rejected Thorndikes theory of learning which was based on the idea of stimulus-response. He maintained that rather than think of stimulus-response as a linear process of external stimulus invoking personal response, it should be thought of as a feed-back loop in that response can affect stimulus and thus it is not a one way schema.

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Piaget placed active involvement in personally meaningful problem solving at the centre of learning and development with three basic principles being central to his theory. Firstly, there is assimilation. At any stage of development the individual has a mental conceptual structure. When he/she receives new information or has a new experience, that experience has to fit into these existing structures. Secondly, there is accommodation which is understood as the restructuring of existing mental structures in order to accommodate a new experience. For example the child who has developed an understanding of 5 has to expand that understanding in order to make sense of 54. Sometimes the accommodation will involve minor adjustments to mental structures whereas at other times adjustments can be quite dramatic. Thirdly, there is equilibration, which is the process whereby conflicting ideas are harmonised. For example, the notion that the symbol 5 has a unique meaning is upset by the numbers 54, 564 0.5. The mental conflict has to be harmonised by some concept of place-value, and an internalisation of the idea that the symbol 5 has context-related meaning. These principles underlie the development of Piagets Stages of Development. He postulated that learning was subordinate to development and that there were four stages or periods of development through which all children passed. The first stage he termed the Sensory-Motor stage (birth-eighteen months). This is the stage of actions both reflex and learned and sensations associated with the actions. During this stage the child develops habits that produce pleasing sensations. He/she develops a sense of permanence that is objects exist even when they cannot be seen. He/she starts to set simple objectives and develop a plan for achieving the objective. Also he/she starts to develop the concept of physical reversability, or inverse operations eg dropping and picking up, putting a spoon in a bowl and taking it out. The second stage he termed the Pre-operation stage (eighteen months to four years). During this stage the child starts to develop the power of representation. Words are used to represent objects, blocks are used to represent various objects from cars to towers, and he or she starts to draw representational pictures. For most of this stage Piaget argues that a child is only able to centre on one aspect of an experience, and in his standard conservation experiments illustrated below, the child would say that in the first situation the number of flowers and the number of vases are the same, whilst in the second the number of flowers and the number of vases are different. The contention is that the child focuses on the length occupied by the vases and the flowers (a visual/physical experience) rather than on the abstract notion of number. Piaget also claims that at this stage a child has not developed the mental notion of reversibility and so once the flowers have been spread out he/she cannot imagine them back in the first position.

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Resnick (1984 p. 167)

The third stage he termed concrete operational (seven years to twelve years). This is the stage during which the child develops what Piaget calls logico-mathematical thought and starts to think operationally with the help of physical manipulation objects. He/she continues to develop an understanding of reversibility, in that now he/she may be able to argue that since 2+7=9 then 9-2=7. Ideas about conservation and invariance become firmly rooted, so that children can now centre on more than one aspect of an experience and so understand for themselves that in the flower and vase experiment the number of flowers and the number of vases are the same. Also Piaget believed that it is at this stage that children start to develop such logical principles as transitivity so that they can argue that if A>B and B>C then A>C. The fourth stage he termed formal operations (twelve years onwards). In this stage Piaget would claim children develop the ability to make hypotheses, generalise an argument and make logical deductions. There are a number of points that need to be made about Piagets theories. Firstly, it must be emphasized that the theory is about development and not about learning. As Davis (1991 p. 22) says, Piaget had little to say about the educational implications of his work, and where he did comment it was not necessarily in a way that shed a very positive light on the teaching profession Development is seen as gradual changes reflected in stages; learning is more specific and determined by the stages themselves. Thus he makes no comment on the way in which learning may influence development. Secondly, (and this is closely related to the first point) he rejects the idea that development can be accelerated. He calls it an American obsession and he suggests that whilst it may be possible to accelerate learning the best time will depend on each individual and the areas being studied. Thirdly, and possible most importanly, he pays little attention to the role of language in development. He held that language was a reflector of cognitive achievement rather than a controller of it. This lack of attention to language has led researchers to question the validity of two of Piagets important experiments the conservation experiment mentioned earlier and the class-inclusion one discussed below. McGarrigle (Hughes 1987) suggested that, in the conservation experiment, as the adult deliberately rearranged the flowers in order to make them appear different and then asked the same question that this inferred a change had taken place. The children responded appropriately. So McGarrigle introduced the idea of the naughty teddy who messed up the arrangement. A comparative study between this problem and Piagets showed that significantly more children conserved number in 77

McGarrigles experiment than in Piagets. Thus the implication is that context and language had an influence on response received. In explaining these results Donaldson (1981) has claimed that Piaget was requiring the child to use disembodied thinking a process whereby the language used needed to be considered independently from its context. Clearly the work of Piaget has been very influential in the development of ideas about the learning of Mathematics. In particular a study based at Kings College in London CSMS study which included work on the development of algebra was based on these theories. The view taken was that there was a kind of hierarchical progression of understanding through arithmetic and algebra. This started with small numbers which could be understood in a concrete sense, to large numbers which were outside this realm of concrete understanding, to algebraic elements which would be understood as representing specific numbers, and later as generalised numbers and variables. With this strongly Piagetian view of hierarchy the CSMS team developed six categories of letter understanding. This hierarchical view is in evidence in the Mathematics schemes used in schools. Further the work of Piaget has encouraged the development of the idea of readiness for learning particular concepts. This is then used as a reason for pupils not being able to learn something since Piagets theories suggest that certain learning can only take place when the appropriate development stage has been reached. An alternative explanation could be that the contextual situation in which they are pursuing the learning is not appropriate. There can be no question about the influence of Piagets work but as indicated his work would appear to be more concerned with developmental structure than learning. His concern with stages of development did not include work on the process whereby the learner progressed from one stage to another. This is why language and social interaction played little part in Piagets work. In considering theories of learning the work of Bruner and Vygotsky are considered in some detail.

Developing Theories of Learning Bruner

The main concern of Bruner was to do with learning processes particularly those associated with creative problem solving. Thus he was deeply concerned with the way in which language, communication, and instruction affected the development of knowledge and understanding (Wood 1988). One of his claims was that:
Any idea or body of knowledge can be presented in a form simple enough so that any particular learner can understand it. (Bruner 1966 p. 44))

This was a claim which was seriously questioned by Piaget who described it as astounding, and whilst he did accept that in some circumstances it may be possible to accelerate learning he did not believe that Bruners suggestion was ever desirable. Bruner (1966) postulated that a theory of instruction has four main features. Firstly a theory of instruction should specify the experiences which most effectively implant 78

in the individual a predisposition to learning. This fits closely with Deweys ideas on the importance of motivation in learning. However, Bruner takes the idea beyond that of motivation and suggests that learning and problem solving depend upon the three aspects of exploration of alternatives. These are activation which simply means that tasks need to be sufficiently open as to arouse curiosity, but not so open as to arouse confusion, maintenance which means that the pursuit of alternatives is considered useful and worthwhile, and direction which means keeping in mind a view of the whole problem (a Gestaltian principle) and alternative means of achieving a solution to the problem. Secondly, a theory of instruction must specify ways in which a body of knowledge should be structured so that it can be grasped readily by the learner. Again there were three aspects to this principle. The most important is the mode of presentation, and the three modes of presentation which he suggests could be said to be compatible with Piagets levels of development. The enactive mode concerns the representation of a concept by means of actions. For example, a young child can experience the principle of balancing by playing games on a see-saw. The iconic mode concerns the representation of concepts through pictures, graphics, or images. So that in this mode the child could experience balancing by working with a model of a balance beam. The symbolic mode is where the concept is represented in some abstract symbolic form. This would correspond to experiencing the principles of balancing through a written description or mathematical formula. The other aspects of this feature were economy which simply means that the learner should receive the optimum amount of information to be processed (too little will frustrate, and too much will confuse), and power which means that the learner must be empowered by what they learn to move ever onwards. Thirdly, a theory of instruction should specify the most effective sequences in which to present the materials to be learned. Whilst Bruner does not advocate one prescribed sequence for all children he does suggest that the sequencing should take into account the three modes of presentation. He accepts that if a child has a highly developed sense of symbolism, then the enactive and iconic modes could be bypassed. However, these modes should be available as a fall-back in cases where the symbolic representation has not brought about the desired level of understanding. He also suggests that sequencing is not a linear process but more a spiral one where concepts are visited many times but with increased linguistic precision each time. Lastly a theory of instruction should specify the nature and pacing of rewards and punishments in the process of learning. Children need to have a clear goal so that they always know where their work is leading them. They need to be empowered to know what they are able to do with their new knowledge. This is a means of achieving personal satisfaction. If learning is proceeding in a particular mode then any corrective work needs to be delivered in the same mode. All this is aimed at making the learner self-sufficient. Two of the important points that Bruner makes are:

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The theory of instruction seeks to take account of the fact that the curriculum reflects not only the nature of knowledge, but also the nature of the knower and the knowledgegetting process. (Bruner 1964 p. 334)

So as with Piaget he emphasises the importance of the individual in considering the learning process.
To instruct someone in these disciplines (Bodies of knowledge) is not to get him to commit to mind. Rather it is to teach him to participate in the process that makes possible the establishment of knowledge. We teach a subject not to produce living libraries on the subject but rather to get a student to think mathematically for himself, to consider matters as a historian does, to embody the process of knowledge-getting. Knowing is a process not a product. (Bruner 1964 p. 335)

These ideas have been developed further by Wood (1988), where he discussed the development of contingent teaching which helps pupils to develop local expertise (p. 80). The process involves starting with a task and then helps the pupils to break it down into a sequence of smaller and manageable tasks. In order to facilitate this the amount of help given is carefully managed so that a lack of understanding will result in more help whereas understanding will result in the teacher taking a more withdrawn role. He suggests that in this way the learner is never left alone when he is in difficulty nor is he held back by teaching that is too directive and intrusive (p. 81). He terms this system of help for the learner scaffolding and suggests that used correctly it allows the learner to achieve heights that they cannot scale alone (p. 80). In describing these ideas he suggests that scaffolding:
... breaks down the task into a sequence of smaller tasks which children can manage to perform, and orchestrates the sequence so that they eventually manage to construct the completed assembly ... Built well, such scaffolds help children to scale heights that they cannot scale alone. (Wood 1988 p. 80)

The important feature of scaffolding is not just that it is an attractive metaphor giving images of breadth and depth, and alternative routes to the same location, but that it does not lose sight of the whole task. The sequence of smaller tasks is always seen as part of the whole. The purpose of this structure is to help children to make sense of and gain some understanding of the world in which they live, and to help them to understand the way of thinking in different disciplines. As Wood (1988) writes:
Unless the child practices the role of being a mathematician, historian or geographer, learns the issues that excite people, the problems that interest them and the tools that help them to resolve and solve these, then the child may only learn empty tricks or procedures and will not inherit the discipline itself. (Wood 1988 p. 84)

Two levels of learning Vygotsky

Although chronologically Vygotskys work precedes that of Bruner it seems appropriate to consider his work at this point. Vygotsky (1978) placed instruction at the

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8heart of human learning and development. He starts with the child and his/her own active involvement in learning for development. He strongly believed that communication and social interaction were prerequisites for learning.
... children confronted with a problem that is slightly too complicated for them exhibit a complex variety of responses including direct attempts at attaining the goal, the use of tools, speech directed toward the person conducting the experiment or speech that simply accompanies the action ... (p. 30) .. From the very first days of the childs development his activities acquire a meaning of their own in a system of social behaviour and, being directed towards a definitive purpose, are refracted through the prism of the childs environment. The path from object to child and from child to object passes through another person. This complex human structure is the product of a developmental process deeply rooted in the links between individual and social history. (p. 30)

This illustrates one of the fundamental differences between Piaget and Vygotsky. While Piaget saw development almost entirely in terms of biology, Vygotsky saw it as the result of a link between biology and environmental interaction. In fact he believed in a dual stage process of internalisation.
Every function in the childs cultural development appears twice: first on the social level, and later, on the individual level; first, between people (interpsychological), and then inside the child (intrapsychological), This applies equally to voluntary attention, to logical memory and to the formation of concepts. All the higher functions originate as actual relations between human individuals. (Vygotsky 1978 p. 57)

This view bears some similarity with Piagets thoughts on equilibrium. In both cases they are concerned with the way in which children internalise knowledge the process whereby mental structures are adapted in order that sense is made of new knowledge/information. But whereas Piaget believed that the process was a personal and individual one Vygotsky interpreted the process in a wider sense and reccgnised the role of external and social forces in this process. Vygotsky considered two levels of performance. These were unassisted performance (which is what Piaget worked on), and assisted performance which is investigating what the child does with assistance. Thus he distinguishes between a childs learning level and his/her developmental level. He justifiably postulates that the learning level is higher than the developmental level, and the gap between the two levels he terms the Zone of Proximal Development:
It is the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers ... the Zone of Proximal Development defines those functions that have not yet matured ... These functions could be termed the buds or flowers of development rather than the fruits of development. (Vygotsky 1978 p. 86)

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Thus Vygotsky maintains that for any domain of skill a zone of proximal development can be created, which will vary for individuals and within cultures, and from his thinking he defines good teaching as that which awakens and arouses to life those functions which are in a stage of maturing (p. 90) Learning takes place when assistance is offered at points in the Zone of Proximal Development at which performance requires assistance. Learning is dependent on the right kind of social interaction.

A CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE
Introduction
The struggle over the last half century seems to have been to gain an understanding of cognitive development, teaching and learning, and the relation if any between them. In analysing the schools of thought it would seem that as Vygotsky (1978) suggests there are three alternatives. The Thorndike School seems to equate learning with development. Piaget and the exponents of his theories would seem to belong to a school which sees learning and development as separate development happens anyway. Learning may take place at each stage of development but does not influence the developmental level. The third school is the one to which Bruner and Vygotsky would belong a school which tries to bring learning and development into a whole theory. Learning is an element of environmental stimulus which pushes forward maturation, which in turn stimulates more learning and results in development. Theories are then developed on ways of maximising learning. These theories develop the notion of zone of proximal development and scaffolding. Both are powerful notions for recognising the role of external influences in helping children to construct their own understanding of Mathematics. The next stage in this review of the development of research on the way children learn is to investigate how theories of learning fit in with what is currently called constructivism There are similarities as illustrated by von Glasserfelds two principles (1995):
Knowledge is not passively received but built up by the cognising subject. The function of cognition is adaptive and serves the organisation of the experimental world not the discovery of ontological reality. (p. 18)

The first produces no real problems as action underpins the work of Piaget, Bruner and Vygotsky. However the second needs some expansion, as it would seem that whilst Bruner and Vygotsky would both agree that instruction is a means whereby one is helped to organise knowledge in order to help one make sense of the world, it would also appear that it is a means whereby the learner is challenged to make sense of the not known and to bring it into the mind of the learner. From Piaget onwards two key words stand out problem-solving, and action. It is these that need to be the foundation, so that the child becomes a genuine participator not a spectator, so that a scaffold is constructed by the teacher which ensures that the childs 82

ineptitudes can be rescued by appropriate intervention, and so that the scaffold can be removed part by part as the reciprocal structure is able to stand by itself. (Bruner 1983 in Light 1991 p. 109)

Constructivism and Mathematics Education

Modern ideas about constructivism need to be considered in two parts radical constructivism which emanates from the ideas of Piaget and social constructivism which emanates from the work of Vygotsky. The principles which underpin the various aspects of constructivism are outlined by Ollerenshaw and Ritchie (1993) as:
what is already in the learners mind matters individuals construct their own meaning the construction of meaning is a continuous and active process learning may involve conceptual change the construction of meaning does not always lead to belief learners have final responsibility for their learning some constructed meaning are shared.

Clearly it is what is in the learners mind that matters if false assumptions are made about prior knowledge then misunderstandings can easily arise. In the end an individual must construct their own meaning, but the teaching and learning process that they go through can hinder or aid that process. The third point recognises that meaning is not fixed but is often domain-specific and that as the domain within which the learner works changes then meaning may also be transformed leading to conceptual changes. The idea about meaning not always leading to belief is also an important one since it is a meaningful belief which provides the firm foundation on which learning can be built. The final point emphasises the fact that part of the process of constructing meaning involves the learner in sharing meaning and communicating their beliefs. In summary learning is an activity pursued by the learner and therefore from a psychological point of view he/she can do none other than become actively involved in giving meaning to his/her own learning whatever style of leaching the learner is exposed to.

The Essence of Constructivism

In considering the nature of constructivism Cobb et al (1992) consider it to be an alternative to a representational view of mind in mathematics education. This sees learning as a process in which students work on their internal representations so that they mirror the external representations to which they are exposed. The difficulty is that the teacher already has an internal representation to which he or she relates the external representation. The student only has the external representation through which meaning is to be developed. Constructivists suggest that this is an extremely difficult thing to achieve and that we must seek ways of helping the learner to construct meaning through their own individual effort. The learning of the student needs to be more openly active rather than hidden behind the illusory facade of the passive recipient. 83

Cobb et al suggests that the difficulties with the representational approach (advocated by Putnam 1988 and quoted in the article) are that it depends to a large extent on the expert interpretation of the teacher and not on the constructing power of the student. The representational view locates the source of meaning outside the student whereas the constructivist approach locates the meaning withing the student and his/her environment. The representational view appears to set up a dualistic conflict within the student between in head or internal representations and external ones which are located in the environment whereas the constructivist approach would seek to start with the internal representations and seek ways in which they can be externalised and then modified. Further there is the assumption that specific mathematical meaning is actually present in the external representation. This is true for the presenter but not necessarily for the receiver. Finally Cobb suggests that a representational view of the learning of mathematics encourages the learner to separate school mathematics from mathematics in other settings. These concerns lead Cobb to suggest that:
we should attempt to develop instructional situations in which the teacher can draw on students prior experiences to guide the negotiation of initial conventions of interpretation (p. 13)

and that this leads to the view that:

the learning teaching process commences from the students initial mathematizations of hypothetical situations described in instructional activities. (p. 13)

This gives a clear starting point for mathematical activity with pupils but it is also necessary to have a clear view as to what the learner is aiming for. These principles were put into practice in a project in which Cobb was involved (Cobb et al 1995 p. 232) and which is discussed later.

Radical Constructivism
This theory, developed by von Glaserfeld (1987) and others, builds upon the two principles of constructivism stated above. He suggests that his theory is radical because it breaks with convention and develops a theory of knowledge that does not reflect an objective ontological reality, but exclusively an ordering and organising of a world constituted by our experience. (p. 216) In essence his starting principle is that concepts are individual mental structures that cannot be passed from one mind to another. He recognises the importance of social interaction and how other minds can influence the construction but in the end the knowledge is subjective. As he says:
for the radical constructivist the crucial aspect of the negotiating procedure is that its results the accommodated knowledge is still a subjective construction, no matter how mutually compatible the knowledge of the negotiators may have become in the process (p. 221)

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The difficulty with this view is that identifying what real knowledge is becomes a problem. If it is different for each individual does it even cease to be a useful concept with which to explore ideas about learning? Jaworski (1994) suggests that radical constuctivism does not deny the existence of an objective reality but suggests that we can never say what reality is. This again is a difficulty as how is it possible to give meaning to something that we are unable to identify. We are then left with the idea that we are trying to develop an understanding of learning using an idea that we are unable to define in an acceptable way.

Social Constructivism
This purely subjective view of knowledge and its subsequent implications for teaching were considered by Ernest (1991) in which he developed the philosophy of social constructivism. His view is that there cannot be just subjective knowledge that there has to be objective knowledge also and that this type of knowledge is determined by its social acceptability. In elaborating on the distinction between subjective and objective knowledge he uses Poppers (1979) idea of the knowledge associated with three distinct worlds. These are the physical world, the world of our conscious experiences and the world of the logical content of books etc. The second world is considered to be subjective knowledge and the third is objective knowledge. To this Ernest adds all intersubjective and social knowledge. This seems a helpful development of the constructivist principle. For, whilst it has to be true that in the end each individual will give their own meaning to knowledge that they constuct, it needs to be acknowledged that the knowledge is constructed in an environment which includes social interaction with others. As Jaworski (1994) says:
effective construal begins with fragments that can be agreed between people and weaves these into stories that can be discussed, negotiated and acknowledged as appropriate to a particular perspective. (p. 25)

As individuals construct their knowledge within their social environment(s), there will be the opportunity to discuss and share individual perceptions. This sharing leads to an apparent common meaning which can be construed as shared knowledge. Ernest (1994) suggests that there are two possible forms of social constructivism an add-on form which takes the radical constructivist view and adds to it a classroombased social dimension. The second form emanates from the work of Vygotsky and recognises that there are two complementary frameworks operating Ernest calls them the intra-individual and the inter-personal. The view taken is that pupils are rational thinkers who develop meaning within a situation in accordance with an accepted set of beliefs. These beliefs will be the pre-existing ideas which could be in the form of accepted statements. These statements will constitute the mathematical objects with which the pupil will initially interpret or give meaning to a new situation. In working in the situation the learner will either find the statements sufficient, will adapt the statements or will need to create new statements. In

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mathematical terms it will also be important to consider the efficiency of the statements in giving meaning to a situation. It will then be necessary to evaluate the knowledge constructed by reflecting on how such knowledge relates to the original ideas of the learner.

Some Implications for teaching

In using these ideas on constructivism there are a number of implications for teaching. The process with which there is engagement is that of teaching not training. This implies that the thinking processes of the pupils are more relevant than specific overt responses, and linguistic communication becomes a process for guiding a students learning not a process for transferring knowledge. When the learner appears to deviate from the teachers expectations it provides an opportunity for exploring the basis on which the learner is making the perceived rational decisions. There is a tendency particularly with low attaining pupils to follow an error analysis route (Rees 1992, van Lehn 1993), in other words to assume a correct position and to seek to ensure that the pupils reach this position. However it could be equally important to consider the starting statements of the pupils. Since these statements will have determined the direction in which the pupils are thinking, the role of the teacher will be either to broaden the statement base or to adapt the base being used. The links with the work of Vygotsky are now evident. It would seem reasonable to conjecture that knowledge is constructed intersubjectively that it is socially constructed between groups who share meanings and social perspectives of a common world. Knowledge may differ but it will be brought closer through communication. If this is true then there is a need to move from a purely individual view of knowledge to one in which the social and cultural processes of discussion and negotiation have an important role to play. The individual will construct knowledge within a social environment. Jaworski suggests that within this environment issues are raised which challenge individual construction and force changes to perceptions and thinking. In this way individual perceptions come closer together and the result is the appearance of common knowledge. These ideas were the basis of a research project conducted by Cobb et al. (1995) in which they worked with second grade students. In this project with second grade pupils in America arithmetical computation was taught through problem solving. The activities used were of two general types: teacher-directed whole class activities and small group activities. Each session would end with a sharing of the ideas that had been pursued and an attempt towards developing a common understanding of what had happened in the session. Their conclusions were that a sincere atmosphere of trust was developed in the classroom and that this resulted in the pupils being enthusiastic, and persistent in solving problems, and a distinct lack of frustration on the part of the pupils in the class. The role of the teacher was crucial in initiating the construction of a set of obligations and expectations. In so doing she was able to facilitate the taking of risks by the pupils in their solutions of mathematical problems. The claim is that the fact that the teacher was a constructivist teacher one who sees his/her role as facilitating a personal construction of knowledge by the pupils, as opposed to one who sees his/her role as transferring teacher knowledge to the pupils was an important

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factor. Whether the use of the term constructivist teacher is helpful or not is at least open to question, but what is important is that the teacher reflects on the situations that he/she creates in the classroom and ensures that it is a secure environment in which the pupils can fulfil their potential.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bierhoff H. (1996) Laying the Foundations for Numeracy ESRC, London Boaler J (1993) The Role of Contexts in the Mathematics Classroom in For the Learning of Mathematics Vol. 13 No. 2 pp. 1217. Brown A L & Ferrara F A (1985) Diagnosing Zones of Proximal Development in Culture, Communication and Cognition Vygotskian Perspectives ed Wertsch, CUP, Cambridge. Bruner J S (1964) Some Theorems on Instruction illustrated with reference to Mathematics in Theories of learning and instruction NSSE yearbook, NSSE, Chicago, Bruner J S (1970) Some Theorems on Instruction in Readings in Educational Psychology ed. Stones E., Methuen. London. Cockcroft W. (1982) Mathematics Counts HMSO, London DfE (1993) Initial Teacher Training (Primary Phase). Cicular 14/93. London, HMSO DfE (1993) Initial Teacher Training (Secondary Phase). Cicular 9/92. London, HMSO DfEE (1997) Circular 10/97 Teaching High Status, High Standards Requirements for Courses of Initial Teacher Training DfEE, London Durkin K. & Shire B. (eds) (1991) Language in Mathematical Education. Open University Press Keynes. Eraut M. (1995) Schon Shock: a case for reframing reflection in action? Teachers and Teaching: theory and practice Vol I No. 1 pp 922 Ernest P. (1994) What is Social Constructivism in the Proceedings of the 18th. International Conference on the Psychology of Mathematics Education. Portugal Etkin H (1993) Fear and Underachievement in How and Why Children Fail ed Varma V. Jessica Kngsley Publishers, London Evans P. (1993) Some Implications of Vygotskys Work for Special Education in Charting the Agenda ed. Daniels H. Routledge, London. Gardner H. (1985) Frames of Mind Paladin, London

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Glaserfeld E von (1987) Learning as a Constructive Activity in Problems of Representation in the Teaching and Learning of Mathematics (ed) Janvier C. LEA publishers, Hillsdale Glaserfeld E von(1995) Radical Constructivism. Falmer, London Gray E & Tall D (1993) Duality, Ambiguity and Flexibility: A Proceptual View of Simple Arithmetic, in Journal for Research in Mathematics Education. Vol. 25 No. 2 pp. 116140. Harries A.M. (1994) Pupils Numerical Strategies in Proceedings of the British Society for Research and Learning in Mathematics, December 1994 pp. 2938. Haylock, O. (1991) Teaching Mathematics to Low Attainers, 811. Paul Chapman Pub. Ltd., London. Hewitt, D. (1996) Mathematical Fluency: the Nature of Practice and the Role of Subordination in For the Learning of Mathematics Vol. 16 No. 2 pp. 2836 Howe M J A (1976) Good Learners and Poor Learners in Bulletin of British Psychological Society Vol 29. pp. 1619. Howe M J A (1992) The Origins of Exceptional Ability. Basil Blackwell, Oxford Hughes M (1991) What is Difficult About Learning Arithmetic in Learning to Think (ed) Light P, Sheldon S, Woodhead M., Routledge and OUP, Oxford. Jaworski B. (1994) Investigating Mathematics Teaching Falmer Press, London. Joseph GG (1992) The Crest of the Peacock Non European Roots of Mathematics Penguin Kaput J (1991) Notations and Representations as Mediators of Constructive Processes in Radical Constructivism in Mathematics Education (ed) E von Glaserfeld. Kluwer Academic Publishers, The Netherlands. Krutetski V A (1976) The Psychology of Mathematical Abilities in School Children. University of Chicago Press Lee L & Wheeler D. (1989) The Arithmetic Connection in Educational Studies in Mathematics, Vol. 20 pp. 41-54. Lerman S. (1993) Can we talk about Constructivism? in Proceedings of BSRLM conference, December 1993.

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Contextual Teaching: Challenges and Possibilities for the Jamaican classroom

Camille Bell-Hutchinson

INTRODUCTION
Jean Laves Theory of Situated Learning explores the situated nature of human understanding and communication. Lave (1991) argues that learning is an integral and inseparable aspect of social practice, and arises as a function of the activity, context and culture in which it occurs. Implicit in her work is the notion that learning is a way of being in the social world, not a way of coming to know about it (Hanks, 1991). From the situated perspective learning is not a one-person act. Rather it is a process that takes place in a participation framework (Hanks, 1991). As such, knowledge, is not considered to be just in the head, but develops in the course of activity as a person interacts with other people and situations. The activity in which this knowledge is developed and deployed is therefore considered to be inseparable from learning and cognition (Brown, Allen and Duguid, 1989). This belief that knowledge is not static and cannot be simply given to an individual underpins the notion of distributed cognition which is essential to situated learning theory. According to this idea, cognition, as an activity, is essentially distributed or stretched over (Lave 1988) all impacting forces within an activity other persons, the setting, the individual. Knowledge is seen as dynamically constructed as we conceive of what is happening to us. That is, our action is situated in our role as a member of a community (Clancey, 1995). In support of this, Soltis (1981), reasons that what we take as knowledge and how we think and express ideas are the products of interactions of groups of people over time. It is these interactions which become the major determinants of both what is learned and how learning takes place, (Borko and Putnam, 1998). Miller and Gildeas (1987) work on vocabulary teaching (cited by Brown et al, 1989) demonstrates the importance of recognizing that situations do structure cognition. Their work describes the use of vocabulary by children who are taught words from dictionary definitions and a few exemplary sentences, with the way vocabulary is normally learned outside of school in the context of ordinary communication. The following examples illustrate how the students in school used the vocabulary taught.

Source: Paper presented at the International Conference on Problems and Prospects of Education in Developing Countries, University of the West Indies School of Education, Cave Hill Campus, Barbados, Accra Beach Hotel Barbados, March 2527, 2002.

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Me and my parents correlate, because without them I wouldnt be here. I was meticulous about falling off the cliff. Mrs. Morrow stimulated the soup.1

Given the method of teaching used, Brown et al. argues that such mistakes are unavoidable since teaching from dictionaries assumes that definitions are selfcontained pieces of knowledge. They maintain that teaching practices that ignore the situated nature of learning inevitably limit the effectiveness of such practices and propose that the way to provide useable, robust knowledge is to use teaching approaches which embed learning in activity, and which deliberately use the social and physical context. Though much of Laves work did not take place in the classroom, situated learning theory challenges educators to consider the role of contextual learning as a critical if not necessary tool in preparing students for effectively functioning in nonschool environments. Indeed, in many developing countries, including Jamaica, students generally have much difficulty in making connections between what they learn in school and how this knowledge can be used in the real world. As educators in the Caribbean struggle to bridge this gap between learning and use a number of questions emerge. How can we create learning environments which go beyond the teaching of facts, rules and procedures? How can we provide classroom experiences which will empower our students to be problem-solvers throughout their lives? How can we make learning experiences sense-making experiences? In an attempt to address these questions, this paper explores the use of authentic instruction and cognitive apprenticeship teaching approaches emerging from the situated learning paradigm and raises issues concerning the feasibility of their use in the Jamaican classroom with examples being used relating to the teaching and learning of mathematics.

Authentic instruction
Authentic instruction is characterized by the presence of authentic activity in the classroom. Brown et al consider that learning methods that are embedded in authentic situations are essential to the learner and that learners who do not engage in such activities will be unable to use the conceptual tools needed in authentic practice. This authentic activity is defined by Brown as the ordinary practices of a culture and he opines that such activity is important for learners because this is what shapes or hones their tools (p. 36). Brown and his colleagues are careful to ____________
Brown et al points out that the dictionary meanings that the students were using were: Correlate be related one to the other; meticulous very careful; stimulate stir up. They were given these definitions with little or no contextual help.
1

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distinguish authentic activity from school activity which they contend lacks the contextual features that allow for authentic activity.
Many of the activities students undertake are simply not the activities of practitioners and would not make sense or be endorsed by the cultures to which they are attributed. (p. 34)

Many mathematics word problems, for example, only mimic real situations. Take for example the following problem: A concrete base for a workshop measuring 4m by 2m is to be 14 cm deep. Concrete is made from a mixture of stones, sand and cement in the ratio of 4:2:1. How much of each material will be needed? This question is clearly attempting to have students apply their knowledge of volume and ratios in a real situation. However, persons who work in construction would intuitively recognize that the mathematical solution does not work in practice. In fact, because of the nature of the materials being used sand and stones one would be surprised to see that there is yet much more material needed to completely fill the base! So, in spite of being contextual in nature, the, task actually gives a misconception of the process in the real-world. One cannot deny the significance of the claim made by Brown that such an activity may do more harm than good to students, causing them to develop false notions about real-life situations. However, we do need to accord equal significance to classroom activities which provide opportunities for developing thinking and problem-solving skills. The use of carefully constructed word problems, is largely accepted as one route through which this can occur. But according to Browns definition this activity, it seems, would not be considered authentic. However, Ann Brown et al (1993) have put forward another definition of authentic activity. They argue that an authentic activity is any activity that fosters the kinds of thinking and problem-solving skills needed for lifelong participation in out-ofschool domains, even if they do not mirror what practitioners do. (My emphasis.) This definition presents authentic activity in a more realistic and accessible form for translation into the classroom. So while itis worthwhile to strive to provide activities that mirror what practitioners do, those which do not fall in this category, but which facilitate the development of the skills mentioned above can also be classified as authentic.

Cognitive apprenticeship
Cognitive apprenticeship is a model of learning which is heavily dependent on the notion of authentic activity in the classroom. The model was developed by Allan

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Collins, John Seely Brown and Susan Newman and relates directly to the work of Jean Lave. The main objective of cognitive apprenticeship is to initiate the novice into a community of expert practice. In the classroom this means that students are enculturated into authentic practices through activity and social interaction in a way that is similar to that evident in craft apprenticeship. (Brown et al, 1989). This is in keeping with the view that learning is as much enculturation as it is a result of explicit instruction in specific concepts, skills and procedures. (Driver et al, 1994; Resnick, 1988; Schoenfeld, 1992). Apprenticeship as used in the concept, emphasizes the centrality of activity in learning and knowledge while cognitive is used to emphasize the fact that apprenticeship techniques go beyond physical skills and includes the kinds of cognitive skills more normally associated with conventional schooling (Brown et al. 1989). Using a cognitive apprenticeship approach, individuals learn from more knowledgeable members of a community by participating with them in activities of the community. While this is happening these individuals (apprentices) are not only able to appropriate new understandings for themselves but are also able to influence the understandings and practices of the community. Cognitive apprenticeship implies that children acquire cognitive and metacognitive processes through assisted instruction with a sensitive and knowledgeable adult (Collins et al. 1989). Rogoff (1990) further characterizes this approach as a model of shared problem-solving between an active learner and a more skilled partner, this taking place in a learning environment which promotes collaborative and cooperative learning experiences. How can this model be operationalized in the classroom? Borko and Putnam (1998) explain that as in other forms of apprenticeship, teachers assume the role of masters who model expert performance and guide students participation through coaching and scaffolding techniques. (p. 41) (One cannot help but highlight here the inherent danger in any form of apprenticeship learning the possibility of dominance by the teacher (the master craftsperson). In the ensuing discussions therefore an underlying assumption is that models of good practice are being considered.)

Key components of cognitive apprenticeship

Collins et al. (1989) identifies six key components of the cognitive apprenticeship teaching model. Modeling (teacher demonstrates a task or the ways of thinking representative of the culture Coaching (guided participation of the teacher; supporting; offering hints, feedback)

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Scaffolding (providing just enough assistance to help learner to move through his/her zone of proximal development (Vygotsky, 1978) Articulating (assisting learner to articulate their knowledge during a task) Reflecting (facilitating learners analysis and reflection on progress) Exploring (encouraging creativity, further development of learners own ideas)

In an attempt to examine the efficacy of the cognitive apprenticeship model Berryman argues that the ideas are unusually well-grounded and build on and incorporate the ideas and findings of a community of well-respected thinkers and researchers going back to John Dewey. Examples of the effectiveness of the use of the approach in the classroom are demonstrated in a number of cases. (See for example, Schoenfeld, 1985; Lampert, 1986, Dorn, French and Jones 1998.) The questions that become relevant to us in the Caribbean are: Can our classrooms facilitate the cognitive apprenticeship model of teaching? Does the curricular structure provide the kind of support needed for such a model to work? What challenges are inherent in the adoption of such a model and what are the possibilities for the Jamaican classroom? Although the discussion focuses primarily on the Jamaican educational system, it is my belief that sufficient commonalities exist among the islands of the Caribbean to make the issues relevant to the region as a whole.

The Jamaican School System

The Jamaican school system is exam-driven. From elementary school to the end of secondary school emphases in teaching are influenced by examinations of varying types: The Grade Six Achievement Test (GSAT) used for placement of 11 year-olds into secondary school; The Grade 9 Achievement Test based on the Reform of Secondary Education (ROSE) Grades 79 National Curriculum; The Caribbean Secondary Examination Certificate (CSEC) Examinations offered by the Caribbean Examinations Council (CXC) and sat by the majority of Grade 11 school leavers in Jamaica. (Alternatively students may choose to sit the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) offered by Cambridge University Syndicate in the UK.); The Caribbean Advanced Proficiency Examination (CAPE) and the General Certificate in Education (GCE) Advanced Level examinations (sat by the majority of students in Grades 12 and 13).

A major consequence of this exam-driven context is that teaching is focused on getting students to pass examinations. Because of the very high unemployment rate in Jamaica, and the competition for University placement, parents often place pressure on principals who in turn pressure teachers.
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Within this environment everything works against teaching for sense-making and models of teaching which support authentic activity are resisted because they are seen to be taking up too much time. In addition to being exam-driven, secondary schools, though under the control of the Ministry of Education in principle, are largely left to determine the nature of the curriculum they offer and in many cases act autonomously in the delivery of such curriculum. So while the school may determine the content of the teaching curriculum, how that content is delivered is left to a large extent to the discretion of individual teachers. In the mathematics classroom in particular, the CSEC syllabus has become the mathematics curriculum for most secondary schools, and learning mathematics both in elementary and secondary school has become associated with remembering rules, procedures, algorithms and formulae. In this scenario, problem-solving is typically taken to mean solving word problems and where cooperative learning is practiced it is often being used not so much for its power, but moreso for its convenience. So, for example, even though the Grades 79 curriculum strongly recommends that collaborative learning principles be adopted in the teaching of the curriculum, and problem-solving skills be nurtured, it is left to the whim of individual teachers to implement this. Furthermore, because assessment of the curriculum does not support its methodology, little emphasis is placed on the latter.2 What prospect then is there for the Jamaican child to develop useable, robust mathematical knowledge? How can Jamaican children gain the opportunity to be immersed in authentic activity and experience mathematics as a continuous, lifelong process? What can be done to ensure that classroom activity supports the making of connections with knowledge and the use of such knowledge? Two major issues seem to surface as we consider these questions. 1. 2. School Curriculum Teacher Training

School Curriculum
We have already established that the delivery of school curricula in Jamaica is largely dictated by the requirements of various examinations. Evans (2001) points out some inherent features of a curriculum of this nature. These include (a) teaching styles which are geared towards transfer teaching, and (b) student learning which is in parallel and not in a joint or collaborative manner.

___________
2

This curriculum expounds in its rationale the need to develop problem-solving skills and emphasizes collaborative work. However, it is tested by means of a multiple-choice examination at the end of Grade 9.

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This is in total contradiction to the cognitive apprenticeship model. Surely, if such a model is to be adopted then we need to have in place the kind of curricula that will support its tenets teaching through authentic activity and collaborative working. This is particularly necessary for mathematics a subject which students normally consider to be highly abstract and which, in their view, has little meaning to their everyday life. Bearing in mind the foregoing discussion therefore, if such models are to be effected in the classroom then, two possibilities seem to exist. Either existing local mathematics curricula will have to be redesigned, or new syllabuses, which emphasize the use of authentic classroom activity, will need to be developed by the Caribbean Examinations Council. With respect to mathematics, it seems foolhardy to consider that the latter will occur in the short term, since the Council has just released a new mathematics syllabus to be examined for the first time in June 2003 and which is normally valid for at least 10 years. This syllabus, though incorporating for the first time the use of investigations, reflects to a large extent a traditional approach to mathematics learning. In fact, CXC would have had an ideal opportunity to influence the curriculum positively, if it had introduced school-based assessment in mathematics, as it has done with the majority of its subjects. Since this examination syllabus largely determines the secondary school curriculum, any built-in system of authentic activity would have guaranteed its implementation in the classroom. If, then, examination syllabuses remain the same, change must inevitably emerge from within the education system. In other words, local curricula would have to change. How would the curriculum facilitate the cognitive apprenticeship model? A model characterized by collaboration cooperative learning, much discourse and which is highly student-centred? As many teachers would ask: How can this fit in with a system controlled by examinations? Can students experience learning in this way and yet perform well in traditional examinations? The experience of Jo Boaler (Boaler, 1997), provides a useful and instructive example of how mathematics can be taught through the use of informal discourse communities within a problem-based environment signified by authentic activity, and still do well in traditional examinations very much of the format of the CSEC examinations. In an interesting piece of research Boaler studied two groups of students being taught mathematics. In one school students were exposed to a problem-based environment and worked predominantly on open-ended projects. The teacher acted as guide, and only taught mathematical content when it was needed. In the other school, students were taught using the traditional whole-class, textbook method. Boaler reports that students in the textbook school were rarely able to use their knowledge in anything other than textbook and test situations. In applied assessments, many were unable to perceive the relevance of the mathematics they
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had learned and found it difficult to adapt the procedures they had learned to other situations. On the other hand, in the school where textbooks were not used and standard rules and procedures were not introduced until a few weeks before the examinations, students attained higher grades on a range of different problems. Additionally students at the textbook school soon forgot what they had learned while the other students seemed to hold on to their knowledge, certainly for longer periods of time. So it does work. Admittedly developing countries are faced with significant hurdles not found in the more developed nations. Issues of class size, resources and demotivated teachers, for example are but a few of the many factors that do impact on the delivery and subsequent products of teaching. In spite of this truth however, there is yet much scope in the Caribbean and indeed in Jamaica, for more openended, problem-based teaching in a manner which models the real world. What then prevents its happening and what would be the difficulties inherent in the implementation of these specific models? If we use mathematics as an example, the first point to recognize is that the lack of a commonly agreed upon set of standards for mathematics education in Jamaica is a significant deterrent to the achievement of meaningful learning goals. While written curricula articulate impressive rationales these rationales do not become translated into classroom practice in any consistent and nationally agreed manner. Secondly, the fact that the CSEC examination syllabuses support neither open-ended teaching nor authentic activity, means that any attempt at curriculum reform in mathematics which supports these, would be unsuccessful. As was alluded to earlier, whatever emphasis the assessment reflects is where the emphasis will be placed in the classroom. So, for example, even though impressive rationales are articulated in both the Grades 79 and the CSEC syllabuses, these will only be taken seriously when assessment lines up with them. Are we therefore caught between a rock and a hard place? Not necessarily. Because it may be that the solution lies in the establishment of our own national examinations based on a revised curriculum and inderpinned by a set of standards that promote authentic activity in the classroom.

Teacher Training
As we ponder on the need for curriculum reform important implications of such reform for the training of teachers arise. For surely, if curriculum emphasis changes then those who are responsible for the implementation of this new emphasis must themselves be prepared for the innovation. Both pre-service and in-service teacher training programmes will need to respond. A shift from traditional roles of teaching to the models discussed in this paper is a radical one and would no doubt be a difficult one for teachers to make. It is for this very
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reason that teacher training becomes critical. In fact such programmes become even more significant because the cognitive apprenticeship model brings with it particular assumptions which teachers must imbibe in order to be effective. This is substantiated by Brown et al. 1993, who declares that if the teacher is to take on the role of the master craftsperson of learning whom [students] must emulate, (Brown et al. 1993, p. 207), then they themselves must experience this approach to learning. Lampert and Ball, cited by Borko and Putnam, also indicate that for teachers to teach in these ways, they must know in and about teaching. This means that in addition to knowing theories, teachers must also know in the context of practice. As we consider the vast numbers of teachers already in the system, it becomes obvious that the task of in-service training could seem daunting. Implications for financing and the availability of resources will pose significant challenges. However, there seems to be adequate justification for serious dialogue among the stakeholders of the system with a view to developing strategies to meet the challenges which arise.

CONCLUSION
Jamaican classrooms need to be transformed and students need to ascribe meaning to the knowledge they gain in school. Authentic instruction and cognitive apprenticeship seem to be feasible models of teaching which would provide the type of learning experiences necessary for the development of useable knowledge. As in several other developing nations, however, the Jamaican educational system is wrought with inefficiencies, insufficient human physical and financial resources, and in some instances a lack of will But that doesnt obviate this need. Nor does it make it any less urgent. Strategies need to be developed to overcome the hurdles present in the system if we truly want to empower our students. Curriculum developers in Jamaica, and indeed the Caribbean, must embrace the view that an integral (if not essential component of teaching) is the ability to equip students with the tools they need, not only to pass examinations, but perhaps, more importantly, to function effectively in the real world. In other words, a new perspective on education is critical. School activity should allow students to see mathematics, for example, as a way of learning that will continue for the rest of their lives. Classrooms must become the domain of meaningful activity and learning must be underpinned by a curriculum which places emphasis on socially shared cognitive activities, individual competence and cooperation and collaboration. (Borko and Putnam, 1998). This is what we need if we truly wish to empower students. Yes, there are challenges. But there are also many possibilities. Can we afford to ignore the possibilities? Are we willing to face the challenges?

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REFERENCES
Berryman, Sue. Designing Effective Learning Environments: Cognitive Apprenticeship Models. http://www.ilt.Columbia.edu/k12/livetext/docs/berry.html> Boaler, Jo (1997). Experiencing School Mathematics. Teaching styles, sex and setting. Open University Press. Buckingham, UK. Borko, H., and Putnam, R. T. (1998). Learning to teach. In D. C. Berliner and R. Calfee (Eds.). Handbook of Educational Psychology. Macmillan. New York. Borko, H., and Putnam, R.T. (1998). The Role of Context in Teacher Learning and Teacher Education. http://www.contextual.org/docs/4-BORKl.pdf Brown, J.S., Collins, A., and Duguid, P. (1989). Situated Cognition and the Culture of Learning. Educational Researcher, 18(l), 3242. Clancey, W. J. ( 1995), A tutorial on situated learning. Proceedings of the International Conference on Computers and Education (Taiwan) Self, J. (Ed.). Charlottesville, VA:AACE. 4970. 1995 <http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/03/23/ cog00000323-00/139.htm> Collins, A., Brown, J.S., & Newman, S.E. (1989). Cognitive apprenticeship. Teaching the craft of reading, writing and mathematics. In L.B. Resnick (ed) Knowing, learning, and instruction. Essays in honor of Robert Glaser. Hillsdale. NJ: Erlbaum. Dorn, L J., French, C., and Jones, T. (1998). Apprenticeship in Literacy: Transitions Across Reading and Writing. Stenhouse. Driver, R., Asoko, H., Leach, J. Mortimer. E., and Scott, P. (1994). Constructing scientific knowledge in the classroom. Educational Researcher, 2 3(7), 512. Evans, Hyacinth (2001). Inside Jamaican Schools. University of the West Indies Press, Mona. Jamaica. Hanks (1991) Foreward in Lave, J. and Wenger, E. (1991). Situated learning. Legitimate peripheral participation. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK. Janvier, Claude (1990). Contextualization and Mathematics for All. In Teaching and Learning Mathematics in the 1990s. 1990 Yearbook. National Council of Teachers of Mathematics. Reston, Va. Lampert, M. (1986). Knowing, doing, and teaching multiplication. Cognition and Instruction, 3, 305342. Lave, J. and Wenger, E. (1991). Situated learning. Legitimate peripheral participation. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK.

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Lave, Jean. (1983). Cognition in Practice. Mind, mathematics and culture in everyday life. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK. Resnick, L. B. (1988). Treating mathematics as an ill-structured discipline. In R. I. Charles and E. A. Silver (Eds). Research agenda for mathematics education: Vol 3. The teaching and assessing of mathematical problem solving. (pp 3260). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Hillsdale, NJ. Rogoff (1990) cited in <http://www.stenhouse.com/0088ch02.pdf> Schoenfeld, A. H. (1992). Learning to think mathematically: Problem solving, metacognition, and sense making in mathematics. In D. Grouws (Ed), Handbook of Research on Mathematics Teaching and Learning. (pp 334370). New York: Macmillan. Schoenfield, A. H. (1985). Mathematical problem solving. Academic Press. Orlando, Fl. Soltis, J. F. (1981) Education and the concept of knowledge. In J. F. Soltis (Ed). Philosophy and education. 9 pp 951.13): National Society for the Study of Education. Vygotsky, L. (1978). Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes (M. Cole, V. Jolin-Steiner, S. Scribner, and E. Souberman, Eds. and Trans.). Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Ma.

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Making Sense when Learning Mathematics

Andy Begg

Discussion Questions
Reecting on your own experiences: How did you learn at school? How do you learn now? How did your most effective teachers help you learn? Recall times when: (i) You rejected old ideas because they did not t with your new ideas; (ii) You rejected new ideas because you did not feel comfortable with them; (iii) You battled to reconcile your pre-conceived ideas with new information. Can you think of an example where you know something to be true, but you conveniently use some other idea as good enough even when it is not true? What are the practical difculties associated with: (i) Accommodating students prior ideas; (ii) Allowing students to investigate their own questions; (iii) Assessment, when students are investigating topics in their own way?

Introduction
Most mathematics teachers in schools, and mathematics education lecturers in colleges of education and universities, met some of the following buzz words when they learnt about education: drill and practice, behavioural objectives, discovery learning, Piagets ages and stages, investigations and projects, individualised programmes, and mastery learning. These words were based on the theories and research ndings about learning that were current at the time. The new buzz word is constructivism. Constructivism is a way of describing how people come to know what they know; that is, how they learn, and how they make sense of their world. This buzz word is more than a fad. It is based on research and its key concepts are useful for explaining how our students learn, and for analysing our approaches to teaching.

Reprinted from: J. Neyland (ed). Mathematics Education: A Handbook for Teachers, Vol. 2, 7076. Wellington College of Education: New Zealand, 1995.

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Constructivism
Constructivism is a theory of knowing and learning, rather than a theory of teaching. Ernst von Glasersfeld (1989) is one of its principal proponents and he traces its formulation to Giambattista Vico in 1710. Von Glasersfeld (1989) asserts that constructivism is based on two key principles. Paraphrased these are (i) knowledge is not passively received, but actively built up, by a thinking learner; and (ii) thinking is an adaptive process that helps the learner to organize his or her experiential world, rather than to know absolute reality.

Passive Reception or Active Construction?

The rst of these principles states something which most teachers know from experience students do not learn by merely attending class. Learners need to actively think about and process the ideas they meet. This thinking and processing is more likely to occur if they are involved in experimenting, forming and investigating hypotheses, and validating their ideas through learning activities, than if they are just sitting and listening. This is not a new idea. It is similar to the well established Socratic method and to the educational approaches promoted by the philosopher-educator John Dewey. The learning activity referred to includes, not only critical thinking, but social interaction between teacher and learners, and between learners. Through these social transactions learners develop their ideas by modifying them in the light of the conicting views of others, and by justifying and explaining their thinking to others. Theories of learning and knowing which acknowledge the importance of social transaction and negotiation are sometimes referred to as social constructivist theories. Thus, for these constructivist and social constructivist theories language is an important tool for aiding the students construction of knowledge through social interaction, but it cannot substitute for the students own thinking activity. And knowledge cannot simply be transferred from the teacher to the student by linguistic communication.

Adaptive Process
The second key principle refers to an adaptive process. This occurs when students take on new ideas and link them with their prior beliefs, experiences and understandings. The prior ideas inuence learning by providing the lens through which new ideas are viewed. Adaption may occur in a number of ways. If the new ideas do not conict with the prior ideas, then they may be integrated with them. If the new ideas conict with prior knowledge, then they may be accepted, with the earlier ideas taking either an inferior or a superior status. If the status of the new ideas is too low then they may be rejected.

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The form of adaption used is likely to depend on whether the learner is dissatised with his or her existing ideas, and whether the new ideas seem intelligible, plausible and fruitful (Posner, Strike, Hewson and Gertzog, 1982). When integration does not occur, the learner may compartmentalize the conicting ideas. For example, if a learner has a system for multiplying numbers using repeated addition, and the teacher is introducing long multiplication, one system may be seen by the student as real knowledge while the other may be compartmentalized as unreal or school knowledge. Thus, one is given inferior status. Because the students prior ideas (alternative ideas, naive views, errors or misconceptions) are so inuential in the adaptation process, it is important for the teacher to be aware of them and work to make any conicts between them and newer ideas explicit. Thus, teachers need to focus on what seems to be going on inside students heads, rather than on their overt responses as this is likely to give them a better insight into how the new ideas are being adapted. In particular, teachers need to be interested in students errors and in any deviations from the intended path, because these throw light on how they, at this point in their development, are organizing their ideas.

Organising Experience or Knowing Reality?

Does knowing mean having an absolute understanding, or is it having a view that ts with experiences and makes sense of them? I would suggest that it is the latter of these two. Imagine a work of art and the different views the artist, geometer, historian, art dealer, and investor have. Are all these perspectives essential for knowledge? Can any one person say they have the right view? This is an example of people organising their experiences in different ways. They each know about the work of art, but their knowledge in not absolute. Each persons knowledge is a construction which ts with their experiences. Mathematics, too, is a human construction, an invention of people. It does not exist in its own right but provides ways of organising and making sense of the world. Languages are also human constructions. Often words in one language have shades of meaning with no equivalent in other languages, and thus ones knowledge is dependent on ones prior language experiences. This view of knowledge as being a good t, to make sense of ones world, rather than absolute truth, does not mean that there is not sometimes a right and a wrong view. It means that right and wrong are relative terms. When we say that students have the right idea we mean they have the socially accepted view that the teachers had intended. Some critics of constructivism, often people with a belief in the infallibility of truth and the knowers ability to know absolute reality, suggest that constructivists believe that no absolute reality exists, and that for the constructivist all constructions are equally valid. This is a misconception that was not intended by constructivists. Constructivists do not claim that no reality exists, they only claim that one cannot directly know this reality.

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Teaching
We observed earlier that constructivism is about learning, not teaching. However, a number of educators have contributed to the development of teaching models in line with constructivist principles. These include Osborne and Wittrocks (1983) Generative model, Biddulph and Osbornes (1984) Interactive model, and Wheatleys (1991) Problem-solving model. Now it must be acknowledged that if one accepts constructivism as a theory of learning then one assumes that students construct their knowledge according to these principles whenever they learn, regardless of how they are taught. However a skilled teacher can make the process more effective and these models are designed to help teachers develop these skills.

Interactive Teaching Model

The Interactive teaching model was developed in New Zealand by Biddulph and Osborne (1984). It is used by many primary teachers, some science teachers, and a smaller number of mathematics teachers. In interactive teaching the teacher endeavours when teaching a topic to take into account each students prior thinking about the topic

to become more sensitive to the childrens ideas and questions and to provide exploratory experiences from which they can raise useful questions and suggest sensible explanations;

to introduce activities that focus on the questions and ideas that many of the children had; to act as a team research leader with the students to help them plan and carry out investigations into their questions and to help them draw sensible and useful conclusions from their ndings. This requires the teacher to develop the skill of interacting with the children to challenge, modify and extend their ideas, instead of leaving it to the children to make of their experiences what they will, or dogmatically imposing on them answers to their questions. The Interactive teaching model implies a role shift for teachers which makes more demands on them than traditional chalk-and-talk approaches. It involves a shift from a focus on well-dened objectives which can easily be assessed, to the provision of rich learning activities centred on the students interests. The expectation is that students grow from where they are, that they construct or modify their own ideas, that they will be empowered to seek their own solutions rather than follow a path totally determined by the teacher, and that the learning outcome may be different for each student. The interactive teaching approach also suggests the students should have a role in negotiating their curriculurn.

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Assessment
Teachers who view learning from a constructivist perspective need to consider what assessment feedback they and their students need (Begg, 1991). Assessment arises in three situations and answers questions such as: (i) before teaching a topic what are the childrens interests in this topic? what are their current ideas, their conceptions and misconceptions? what questions are they likely to have about this topic? what learning activities are suitable for focusing on these questions? (ii) during learning what are the childrens actual questions? are the learning activities focusing on these questions? are the meanings that the children are constructing similar to the intended ones? how are the children putting together their ideas, what are they thinking? (iii) after the topic is covered what are the childrens ideas when the topic is completed? are these ideas different from their earlier views? what needs to be reported or recorded for student documentation?

Assessment may be done informally by questioning and observing while the students are planning their explorations and investigating their questions. The teachers role would be one of challenger, supporter, and encourager using what if and what if not questions, and other questions that respected the learners and their views but helped them construct alternative ideas and consider different conclusions. Teachers might use other assessment techniques too, such as, interviews, surveys, concept maps, and postbox techniques these are described in detail by Bell (1993). The after learning or summative assessment will be difcult. The obvious problem is, how do we measure conceptual change? That is, how do we compare earlier with later conceptions? This will be more difcult when the curriculum has been freely negotiated and when the activities and problems vary for each group of learners.

Curriculum
Those who believe that a national curriculum, or school scheme, should outline specic achievement objectives for all students of each particular age, nd behaviourist learning theories appealing. By contrast, a constructivist curriculum or scheme needs to be more open-ended, respect the autonomy of the students, and rely on the professionalism of teachers. Unfortunately new curriculums are often designed using student-centred and constructivist views about learning, but, because of national assessment policies, have assessment tasks linked to them that t with the contrasting behaviourist views.

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Conclusion
Constructivism is useful because it explains what happens in classrooms better than older theories. It is gaining international acceptance among mathematics educators. Constructivism raises important questions about learning, teaching, assessment and course design, and offers no simple solutions to these questions. The challenge for teachers is to nd an approach to teaching, learning, assessment, and course design that makes sense of their own professional experiences, observations and reections. This is an ongoing process.

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Accommodating Students Differences

Glenda Lappan

Builders often sink building supports into bedrock, the solid rock that underlies the earths surface, to provide the stability on which towering structures can be built. In many ways, we as mathematics teachers need to do the same thing ensure that our mathematics programs are built on the rock solid commitment to excellence and to providing support for students to learn. Does this mean that every student will learn the same things from each experience we provide? No. The complex job of a teacher is to ensure that every student learns the core ideas and proceeds as far as possible. But with diverse students who have different interests and ways of learning, the question becomes how? Here are some ideas. Connect to students interests. One of our long-term challenges is that many students see no way in which mathematics is relevant to their lives. They have little experience with problems that are genuinely interesting to them and that give rise to substantive mathematics. We can change that. Perhaps not every day, but often enough that students come to see mathematics as useful and relevant. Develop both the logical and the experimental aspects of mathematics. For far too long we have over-emphasized the routines of mathematics without allowing students to experience the joy of trying out new situations and developing their own wonderful ideas. Does this mean that understanding the language and structure of mathematics is unimportant? Absolutely not. It means that we need a healthy blending of students own ideas and experiments with a teachers careful guidance in making the mathematics more explicithelping students abstract, generalize, prove, and apply the mathematics embedded in situations. Create a tool-rich environment for learning mathematics. Tools for making sense of and doing mathematics include cubes, tiles, grid paper, measuring devices, shape sets, and so forth tools that allow students to explore and to represent their own ideas in mathematics. Tools also include computer and graphing technologies. Our responsibility as teachers is to instill in our students the mental skills and decision-making capabilities that allow them to use tools of all kinds with insight and understanding. Understand how student are making sense of mathematics. Teachers can make a real difference in students learning by paying attention to how well students understand the mathematics being studied. Rather than only use tests to assign a grade, we need to see tests and everyday work as information we can use to strengthen our teaching as well as feedback through which students can monitor their own learning. Looked at in this way, tests are an important part of learning.

Reprinted from: NCTM News Bulletin

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To help bring these ideas to life, consider the following problem recently tackled by students of a Kentucky middle school teacher: Take a standard-sized sheet of paper and tape the short edges together to form the lateral surface of a cylinder. Take a second sheet of the same-sized paper and cut it in half with a cut parallel to the longer edges. Tape the short ends of both pieces together to form the lateral surface of a new cylinder whose height is half the original cylinders height and whose circumference is twice as long. Continue by cutting a same-sized sheet in fourths parallel to its long edges, then tape the four long pieces together to form the lateral surface of a new cylinder whose height is half that of the previous one and whose circumference is double. Continue to make cylinders in this way, each time cutting the height in half and making the circumference twice as long. Set the cylindrical surfaces on a table. How do the volumes of these cylinders compare? (See art below, not drawn to scale)

The students became immediately intrigued with cutting and building the cylinders. Then the teacher helped them to nest the cylinders on a table, tallest in the center. After guessing that they would all hold the same amount because the changes in the heights and circumferences countered each other, they filled the center cylinder with popcorn kernels. The teacher carefully removed the center cylinder and let the kernels spread out into the next-size cylinder and then the next. The students were completely captivated and amazed. Instead of holding the same amount, it looked as if in each succeeding cylinder the kernels reached only half as high. This means that the second cylinder held twice as much as the first, the third cylinder held four times as much as the first cylinder, the fourth cylinder held eight times as much as the first, and so on. Now the search for why became a goal of the students, not an assignment of the teacher. Each student learned something about cylinders, volume, formulas, and exponential growth in the context of a problem they found exciting. They used a variety of methods and tools in their search for patterns. Activities such as these pursue substantive mathematical goals by making the problem real for all and engaging to students, who naturally hold a variety of interests and perspectives. They also help us establish in the students the firm bedrock for building of mathematics knowledge for years to come. Its well worth our efforts to find ways of accommodating every student. Their future depends on it.

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Questioning Questioning
Jim Smith
There is a story of a man who is walking down the street when a stranger approaches and asks the way to the town hall. If I were you, replies the man, I wouldnt start from here. Are the students in our mathematics classes faced with a situation similar to that of the stranger in this story? Without wishing to pursue the analogy too far, I believe that as soon as we begin to tell pupils about (other peoples) mathematics, we move unwittingly into the area of I wouldnt start from here and even into the realm of turn left where the butchers used to be. The fact is that we must start from where the pupils are, and we must help them to develop their own mathematics. In order to do this we need to question pupils constantly and tell them nothing. To say tell them nothing is to advocate what might be seen as rather an extreme view. After all, Cockcroft (243) asserts that mathematics at all levels should include, among other approaches, opportunities for exposition by the teacher. This is clearly supported by HMI in Mathematics from 5 to 16. However, in Cockcroft (245) and HMI p38, it is made clear that exposition is meant to be a dialogue of questions and answers, not a broadcast explanation. Questions and answers should contain some challenge and meaning, not mere statement and test of the type exemplified by This is called an equilateral triangle what is it called? To keep the record straight it must be recorded that neither Cockcroft nor HMI documents, regretfully in my opinion, record the view that we should tell students nothing. However, I ask you to consider some of the benefits of this extreme approach. Even as a temporary measure teaching-without-telling forces you to improve your questioning techniques. You have to draw ideas out from situations that are significant to students, where they can see for themselves the attraction of the next step, and the power that the next step brings them. Concentration on questioning is simultaneously a concentration on the social interactions between teacher and students. It builds better relationships respecting students opinons and constantly demanding that a good relationship exists, which is then reinforced by each transaction. Although this can be very demanding in the short term, the longer term effects are simply more cooperative lessons. Teaching-without-telling forces the need for a variety of presentations and practical situations, which are otherwise often neglected. These provide the stimulus and context for discussion.

Reprinted from: Mathematics Teaching 115.

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There are clear benefits in asking students to recall, rather than merely recognise, revision work. Questioning automatically builds revision on a recall basis; false progress is impossible if you have made a commitment not to tell students anything. Students gain in confidence because they perceive that it is their own ability to contribute that is valued and crucial to the subject development. They begin to ask questions of themselves, to simplify difficult questions and build back later. They know the teacher will help by asking more questions, and therefore that the answers lie in themselves. The exclusive use of questioning shifts the role of the teacher away from being a purveyor of knowledge, standing between student and subjectmatter. The shift is towards a role of becoming increasingly concerned with students learning (rather than teacher teaching) and enabling students to have direct access to their own subject.

Of course, some topics and types of knowledge are easier than others to teachwithout-telling. Straightfoward facts, such as the names of concepts are more difficult. Before discussing these problems though, we need to think of the variety of questions that can be used and the kind of responses that can be generated. What kind of responses would we expect from questions such as How many sides has a triangle? What is 23 x 56? or by contrast questions such as What is a good name for this shape? How many different ways can you find of doing the sum 23 x 56? Both open and closed questions have a part to play, but the open question with its multiplicity of possible correct responses tends to be under-used. This is probably because it is more difficult to manage in the classroom context. Yet the benefits of opening up discussion and of maximising the chance of individuals being able to contribute are often greater with the more open question. The type of response generated by questioning can be influenced strongly by the phrasing, tone of voice, whether or not the question is directed at an individual, etc. Responses can be monosyllabic, if speed is required or much more lengthy. Other students can be invited to add to the answer, or to clarify it, or express it in another way. The possibilities, in short are endless. Where problems seem to exist in teaching certain items without telling, this is often a test of faith both in the approach of not telling and in the construction of mathematics itself. If it is a logical subject then we should not, in theory, need to tell anything. It can all be deduced, given the right questions.

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Communicating Mathematics
J. Backhouse, et al

In the United Kingdom generally, mathematics is being increasingly used in communications, and the Cockcroft Committee took the view that foremost among the reasons for teaching mathematics is that it can be used as a powerful means of communication to represent, to explain and to predict (Cockcroft, 1982, p. 3). This chapter contains two sections. In the first we consider some aspects of the special nature of mathematics which bear on communication, and in the second we turn to consider communicating mathematics in the classroom.

WORDS AND SYMBOLS

A teacher asks, What is the difference between 7 and 10? The response comes, 7s got one figure in it and 10 has two. This is an example of one of the themes of this section: that words have different meanings and that this fact sometimes leads to a breakdown in communication between teacher and learner. Symbols also give rise to problems. Here are several ways in which the symbol 3 is used; do give a moments thought as to how to interpret the symbol in each context. 33, 3/4, 3!, .3 Much of the time when people are learning mathematics they are listening to words. Also, much time is spent reading: reading words and symbols. (We use the term symbol only for mathematical symbols.) Failure to understand the meanings of words or symbols inevitably impairs communication. First we take a brief look at the problem of vocabulary.

Vocabulary
Otterburn and Nicholson (1976) used a questionnaire to ask some CSE pupils to show that they understood three dozen words which had been used in previous examination papers. They were allowed to show their understanding in any of three ways: by a verbal description, diagram or symbolic representation. No attention was paid to computation, spelling or grammar. Correct answers were given by less than half the sample for more than half of the words, including reflection, square root, parallelogram, factor and ratio. Furthermore, correct answers were given by less than a quarter of the sample for more than a quarter of the words, including gradient, symmetry, product, multiple, similar, index, integer and trapezium. We suspect that a similar survey would produce similar results now.

Reprinted from: J. Backhouse, et al. Improving the Learning of Mathematics. Cassell: England, 1992, pp. 110128. Permission requested.

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It is not just technical vocabulary that teachers need to be careful about. Words which a teacher regards as familiar may cause difficulty to learners. Recently one of us made the following note from observation.
A pupil worked all the way through a booklet on equations which was based throughout on balances. He completed the entire booklet correctly and the teacher thought he had understood it all but afterwards it was discovered that he did not know what balance meant.

The research on vocabulary just mentioned paints a gloomy picture but, in teaching and learning mathematics, the situation is more complicated than that. Consider the following diagram:

words

learners concepts

teachers concepts

symbols

A learners mathematical concepts are intimately associated with the words through which the concepts are learned, and with any mathematical symbols used in connection with these concepts. The same can be said of the teachers mathematical concepts. Note, however, that there is no line joining the learners concepts on the left of the diagram with the teachers concepts on the right because there is no direct link between them. Yet much of teaching mathematics is concerned with teachers making opportunities for learners to develop mathematical concepts. This potential lack of common understanding of the meanings of words and the uses of symbols, means that there is great scope for failure in communication from learner to teacher, and from teacher to learner. So we need to look further into words and symbols.

Meanings of Words
That isnt a rectangle its a square.

Such a statement must be familiar to teachers. It illustrates very sharply the way in which teacher and learner may have different ideas about the meanings of words. We have evidence from in-service courses for primary teachers that many of them think that squares are not rectangles. When a learner enters secondary school, it then comes as a shock to have to restructure the concept of rectangle to include a square as a special case.

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English, in common with other languages, suffers from ambiguities and we have to infer meanings from the context of a word, as for example, the sum of five and six, or the sum I couldnt understand. Mathematicians attempt to remove ambiguities from the mathematics they write down and use words in technical ways to ensure this. It is therefore important for teachers to use these technical words correctly so that learners can acquire the meanings they have in mathematics. For example, the faces of a cube should not be called sides, the vertices need not be called corners and we dislike the way that the word vertical is increasingly used to refer to an axis in a book which is commonly laid flat on a table. New words which only have technical meanings do not pose much of a problem if they are used frequently through a course. Words which have different meanings in ordinary English can, however, cause more trouble: perpendicular: interpreted as straight up and down; half: when something is cut into two not necessarily equal parts similar: used in the sense of much the same; diagonal: the sense of slanting.

The special meanings in mathematics need to be pointed out at the first opportunity, and reminders will probably be needed from time to time. Such mismatches between ordinary English and the technical vocabulary used in mathematics are not difficult to cope with, once they are known. Misconceptions However a more serious situation can arise when a teacher thinks a learner is familiar with a concept but in fact the learner lacks understanding of certain aspects of it. One example is that shown by the quotation above, That isnt a rectangle its a square. The concept of fraction provides another example. Learners may be using fractions and obtaining the correct answers but nevertheless not be aware that fractions are numbers. Kerslake (1986) has pointed this out in her SESM study. The belief that fractions are not numbers came out both in interviews and in responses to items such as: 1.
, 1 1 , 9 on this number line: Mark and name the numbers 4, 3 5 5 5

2.

Underline the numbers in this set:

{4

some

3 4

5.7

ten

lots

21

13 5

17

19 23

7 } 3

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A third example is the confusion that many students have between mass and weight. It would distract from our argument to discuss straight away how to help learners to unlearn misconceptions but we return to it in section 6.3. We now turn to the other subject of this section: mathematical symbols.

Symbols
It is symbols (by which we mean mathematical symbols) that make mathematics both possible and powerful. With poor notation for their arithmetic, the ancient Greeks made little progress with arithmetic and algebra although their study of geometry flourished. The power of mathematics comes from symbols because they are abstract, allowing mathematics to be applied in many situations. Of course, to be able to tap into the power of mathematics, the learner needs to be able to manipulate symbols. If this can be done more or less automatically, the mind is then freed to think about the problem that is being tackled, without having to spend much time and energy on manipulation. Modern technology has already provided handheld calculators which relieve us from having to carry out complicated calculations with pen and paper. Some learners may need to be encouraged to use calculators when the calculations are incidental, and not the purpose of the exercise. There are also computer programs that allow the user to carry out manipulations in algebra and calculus; how soon these will reach schools, in the form of algebraic calculators for universal use, remains to be seen. Position There is a particularly important feature of our mathematical conventions which may not always be made explicit, and this is that the position of a numeral or letter within a term often determines its function in an expression. Consider the 3 in: 32 3a a3 In these: 3 is the number of tens to be added to 2; 3 is multiplied by a; 3 is the number of as to be multiplied together; 3 is the number of parts into which a unit is divided; 3 is the number of parts of a unit which are to be counted; 3 is the number of hundredths; 3 is a negative number of units. and somehow the learner is expected to grasp these conventions. Unfortunately 3a is often muddled with a3. The difference between 3a and a3 may be clear when learners first meet it. However, the matter may be left for some time before they next meet it and it is not surprising
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2 3 3 4

4.03 3

that many of them will have forgotten their meaning. Recall can be assisted if the learners form links with other schemas. The term 3a can be compared with bc (and contrasted with 32) and initially the multiplication can be made explicit as 3 x a. The terms a2 and a3 can be linked with the area of a square and the volume of a cube to explain the phrases a squared and a cubed but, more importantly, with powers of whole numbers, particularly powers of 10. Perhaps mistakes are more common when learners arrive at a rule and are trying to express it as a formula, as for example a x a v 2a. Then it is advisable to discuss their understanding of the rule they have found and, if necessary, remind them of the conventions. Ambiguities Often, as we said earlier, symbols are intimately associated with concepts. Because there is no direct method for teachers and learners concepts to be compared with each other, there is a danger that learners and teachers may associate different concepts with the same symbol. Here are some examples:

1. The symbol has two words and concepts associated with it: negative and minus. The sign in 23 acts as a verb (2 take away 3) while the sign in 7+4 acts as an adjective (negative 7). When we are first employing directed numbers, therefore, there is much to be said for raising the sign of the minus and plus signs, as in 7+(+4), to distinguish them from subtraction and addition signs. The distinction can be dropped later. 2. The = sign may have the meaning of is equal for a certain value of x to as in 2x + 3 = 13, or is equal for all values of x to, as in sin2x + cos2x = 1. It may even mean can be exchanged for in 1 = Fr 10.55. Learners sometimes carry out a calculation, using = to string together a number of steps; for instance subtraction may be done by adding on and written down as 72 53 = 53 + 20 = 72 1 = 19 whereas a space could be left between the steps, or perhaps an arrow placed there: 72 53 53 + 20 73 1 19 The = sign is also sometimes used incorrectly in work on equations by learners who placethe symbol at the bMginning of some of their lines of working. They can be encouraged to use the implication symbol instead. Teachers certainly need to be aware of a learners misuse of =, and the lack of understanding such misuse may indicate. Mathematicians are not bothered by the ambiguities of and = because they can tell their meaning from the context: learners need to acquire this ability, and may need help. 3. The use of a letter to stand for a number has two main uses in school as: (a) a place holder, where a letter stands for a number which would make an equation true if substituted for that letter, e.g. x is a place holder for the number 5 in the equation 2x + 17 = 5x + 2

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(b)

a variable, where a letter stands for any number in a given set, as does x in the equation of a straight line 3x 2y = 5. A learner who has only met x as a place holder can easily be at a loss when it is first used as a variable. Sometimes practice is given in working out values of formulae with a = 1, b = 2 and c = 3, so that learners can easily remember which value is to be substituted for each of these three letters. Then some learners remember it all too well and they therefore assume that a, b and c always take these values.

If teachers are aware of the possibilities described in the last two examples, careful teaching should help them to avoid these traps for the unwary. Care also needs to be taken when teaching conventions about operations on numbers represented by symbols. These conventions are quite frequently not clear to learners. Operations with symbols If communication using symbols is to take place efficiently, there need to be some conventions. Perhaps the best way to make this point with a group of learners is to provide them with a situation in which they need to invent their own conventions. The Frogs investigation can be used to provide such a situation. Ask a group of learners to record, each in his or her own way, the successive moves made. When they have done so, ask each to show the others how the recording was carried out (see Pirie, 1987) and what they were recording. Another opportunity sometimes arises when calculators give different answers. If you are working with a calculator, it is important to know the logic it obeys. Learners are often unsure about what are the priorities to be obeyed when evaluating an expression. There is an old-established mnemonic BODMAS which indicates the order, but needs some explanation. The mnemonic comes from the initial letters of Brackets Of Divide Multiply Add Subtract

Of can be found in questions on fractions and percentages, e.g. What is two-thirds of three-quarters? and What is 10% of 30? Addition and subtraction are carried out from left to right but addition does not take precedence over subtraction. Neither does multiplication take precedence over division; for instance
2a may be evaluated as (2a)/3, (2/3)a, or 2(a/3) 3

This is something which may need to be pointed out to learners. However, the rule BODMAS needs extending to include functions and powers. Consider the four groups which follow:

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1. 2. 3. 4.

brackets and functions, also fraction bars acting as brackets; powers; multiplication and division; addition and subtraction.

Operations in any group take precedence over operations in a lower group. So these rules cover BODMAS and extend it: in (q + p)3, q + p is evaluated before cubing; in sin2x, the sine is evaluated before squaring; in 5x4, x is raised to the fourth power before multiplying by 5. It is also important to remember that a fraction bar acts like a pair of brackets when two or more terms are involved in numerator or denominator, e.g.

in

2x + 5 , we have to evaluate 2x + 5 before dividing by 2. 2

This explains why the 2s cannot be cancelled. The rule for removing brackets, a(b + c) = ab + ac, also comes from the convention that brackets are evaluated before multiplication. The rule can be induced from a few numerical examples. The conventions above are used by professional mathematicians in their publications and it is advisable to check whether any calculator you use obeys these conventions. Learners will need to be reminded of the rules from time to time and we consider it important that they realize that these are conventions, and that using these conventions helps people to communicate with each other unambiguously (see Chapter 4 on conventions). To conclude this section, we suggest that teachers should: keep alert to the ambiguities of words and symbols; determine whether a difficulty is due to unfamiliarity with conventions, or is conceptual and take appropriate action; help learners to improve their technical mathematical vocabulary; help learners to acquire confidence in using symbols.

USING LANGUAGE IN CLASS

When learners are asked what they expect of a good teacher, one of the suggestions that is often made is that a good teacher should be able to explain mathematics clearly. Certainly this is one part of what we have in mind for this section, but we want to make it clear at the outset that we are concerned with a much broader concept of communication, involving interactions between those people, both teacher and learners, making up a class. These interactions may be intended to communicate some mathematics, or they may be about learning mathematics. Sometimes we shall restrict discussion to the teacher, and at other times to learners,
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but we hope that most of what we have to say will be applicable to both. Five aspects of communication are discussed below: 1. the social context which, with the next aspect, is concerned with setting up a situation which favours good communication; 2. the motivation for the receiver (whether learner or teacher) to give full attention; 3. the purpose of communication; 4. the communication; 5. feedback to the communicator and the need for flexibility

Social Context
From the beginning of this book we have been stressing the importance of good personal relations. We return to it here because the attention that a person can give to someone trying to communicate will depend to a considerable extent on the relations between them. If learners are tense in a teachers presence their attention to the communication will probably be distracted by worries. If a teacher is irritated by certain pupils, or worried about how they are going to behave, concentration on the learner who is speaking will be reduced. Many young teachers have experienced this and, because their ability to communicate has suffered, they have found it difficult to increase their control over a class and to improve personal relations in it. We believe that the ideal to aim at is a social situation in which both teacher and learners feel secure in class, where there is also a certain tension which encourages everyone to work towards the goal of learning mathematics.

Motivation
In the last paragraph it was implicit that attention by the receivers is a prerequisite to effective communication. We see this as essential but, for effective communication, we do not see it as sufficient: the receivers must want to receive, and understand, the communication. When the receivers are learners, they need to be well motivated to listen to what is being communicated by the teacher or another learner; we have discussed this in sections 1.3, 1.4 and 3.4 where we stressed the importance of motivation intrinsic to the subject. It is also important that teachers are well motivated to really listen to what learners try to communicate.

Purpose
Learners can find it difficult if a teacher starts talking without giving any clue about what they should be learning or doing. We do not wish to suggest that lessons should start, Today we are going to do simultaneous equations, or whatever the subject is; this can have a depressing effect on motivation. However, we do wish learners to know what they should be getting out of the communication, it might be:

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how to overcome a difficulty; what has to be homework; the start of a new investigation; a problem to tackle; a useful process; clarification of something said in the last lesson.

Such a communication might be directed to an individual, group or the whole class. Teachers, in the position of receiver, need to realize that some learners find it difficult to make the purpose of their communication clear; for instance, a teacher may not see whether the difficulty in tackling the problem lies in understanding what the problem is, or in not knowing what mathematics is needed to solve it; indeed the learner may not know. A combination of listening with some probing questions will usually pinpoint the difficulty or difficulties.

Clarity of Communication
In this section we discuss a number of factors which help to as make communication effective that is to say, a communication from a sender reaches the receiver with as little distortion as possible. The first requirement is that a communication should actually reach the receiver; a second requirement is that it should be understood by the receiver. As communication in teaching needs to be a two-way process, much of what we say applies both to teacher and learner. However, we have found it convenient to move from the teacher to learners as the section proceeds. Reaching the receiver Recently, Delroy was talking about his maths teacher:

Mr B is a great bloke but he talks too fast. I cant take it in the first time he says something, and the second time he tells us he still talks too fast.

When people are dealing with unfamiliar ideas, it takes them longer to process language in their minds. Once they are thoroughly familiar with the ideas they can manage with a faster speed. It is all too easy to be so familiar with ideas ourselves that we forget other people may not find them so familiar. Is your voice loud enough, but not overloud? Is your pronunciation clear? Can those learners whose first language is not English understand? Is the board, or overhead projector acetate; clean? Can handwriting on the board (or on an overhead projector) be read easily? Are symbols such as l and 1, b and 6, 2 and z, x and X, readily distinguished? Is there a shine on the board which makes the writing on it difficult to read?

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 Are worksheets written clearly and attractively? Are there learners who need questions to be read to them? (See section 2.6.) There are also differences in learners ways of thinking (see Chapter 2). If a teacher is emphasizing a point, setting tasks or recapitulating at the end of a lesson, there may be a temptation to do this orally. However, learners who take information in better by eye than by ear will be at a disadvantage or even not manage to retain what the teacher is saying. Anything important needs to be presented both orally and visually for best impact. In some lessons a teacher may spend a good many minutes talking to the class. When this is the case, learners need guidance as to what needs to be remembered from the hundreds or thousands of words spoken by the teacher. First, attention needs to be secured, perhaps by an activity switching word such as Right!; or a change in voice can be made (speaking slowly or quietly), and eye contact can be sought with learners. Then whatever has to be remembered can be emphasized in a number of ways; for instance, important pieces of boardwork can be enclosed in coloured boxes, or learners can be asked to make or copy down notes. Finally, the need for people to hear what is being said justifies the ground rule that there should be no talking while a teacher or learner addresses the class as a whole; if there is, the talker and listeners will be distracted from what is being said. Here are three further points about effective communication. It should be: 1. Unambiguous. We have already argued against the rule, two minuses make a plus. This arises in the context of multiplication of directed numbers but learners sometimes apply it to expressions such as 23. A slightly longer formulation of the rule would help. (But we provide no guarantee that it will completely overcome this difficulty!) 2. Correct. This criterion implies that the teacher should have mastered what is being taught, and be able to cope with possible questions. We have heard of incorrect teaching from pupils and from students on teacher education courses. We have also observed such students make incorrect statements, so we are sure that this is not a trivial observation. 3. Readable. We are not worried about slips of the tongue and sentences that are not grammatical. We are more concerned with formal presentation of mathmatics. Written mathematics should make sense when read aloud. The more coursework assessment is used in schools, the more important is it that learners should be provided with a good example by their teachers. Phrased in appropriate language We mentioned in section 1 that many of the pupils taking part in one research project did not appear to understand several words used in examination papers. There is some division among teachers as to how far is it advisable to use technical words whose meanings may not be understood. We take

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the view that it is a teachers duty to teach learners the technical words they are likely to meet, so that they do not find them a barrier to communication later on. While teachers may not insist that learners always use technical words (especially when they are struggling to express themselves), they themselves can give a parenthetical explanation to remind learners of the meanings of words, e.g.: The vertex (corner) of the triangle Experience tells us that learners are unlikely to ask for explanations of words. This may be because they manage to get the general gist of what others are saying even if they do not understand every word. Yet in mathematics the general gist is not enough for understanding; learners need to follow each step. Also, if learners have been discouraged from asking by a teacher who made them feel small for doing so, they may not try again. Textbooks, booklets and worksheets all need to be checked for their vocabulary. This does not mean that unfamiliar words should be eliminated teachers should be glad to have the opportunity to increase their learners vocabularies. Learners are quite often stretched simultaneously both by the mathematics they are doing and by the need to find the language to express themselves. Under such circumstances it is unreasonable to insist on accurate use of language. However we see it as one of a teachers responsibilities to encourage learners to express themselves clearly, using the appropriate technical terms. If the meanings of these technical terms cannot be freely recalled, learning is likely to be impeded later on. In brief, we believe that teachers should ensure that: what they say is unambiguous correct, and, if written makes sense when read aloud; their communications actually reach learners; the language they use is phrased in ways appropriate to the learners; learners develop a familiarity with the technical vocabulary of mathematics. Written communications to learners Worksheets and work cards written by teachers for their own classes have the special merit that the learners realize that they have been written for them. The suggestions which follow are based on writings by Giles 1975 and Rothery et al. (1980). Use short sentences. Use simple words. Remove unnecessary expository material. Use the present tense and avoid the conditional mood. Avoid sentence structure which involves the reader having to remember initial clauses. Stimulate discussion between pupils. Dont create stress.

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 Try using handwriting and keep language informal. Set work which can be done at different levels.

Communication by Learners
It takes time to learn to communicate easily and clearly through the medium of mathematics, and many learners will not progress very far in this respect. Nevertheless, their mathematical education will have failed unless they are able to communicate to other people, using mathematics, in their everyday life after they leave school. It will also have failed if they are unable to understand the arithmetic used at work, in shops, and in the media. This latter statement implies that it may be necessary to give opportunities in school for some learners to work with lifelike examples of that sort. Conventions Every mathematics teacher must be familiar with learners who, in trying to communicate a good idea, break the usual conventions for writing mathematics, for example writing ab + c instead of a(b + c). It is easy to assume that the learner has meant what has been written and to respond on this assumption. Of course this is liable to lead to a further failure in communication, this time from teacher to learner. A safer approach is to say something like, How did you get that? If a class is returning to algebra after an interval it may be worth while to put up a poster to remind them of algebraic conventions. If learners are given opportunities to communicate their own results in investigations to other members of their class, it is quite likely that they may invent their own notation to do so (see section 1). This can be an opportunity to help the class to realize that: It can help when communicating with other people to agree on some conventions. If someone does want to use their own conventions, it is important to make it clear how the various symbols need to be interpreted. Communication with other learners We think the idea of getting one learner to communicate, using mathematics, to others is an important one. Referring back to the last paragraph, a learner who has to tell others about something discovered in an investigation will need to prepare what to say so as to present it in an understandable manner. This will mean that the ideas should be clear in his or her own mind. Discussion in small groups, for instance when solving problems, can help those participating to achieve more than they could single-handed. Ideas need to be clarified as they are developed. As well as being useful for clarifying ideas, communication by learners to others can help to give them confidence that they will be able to do this later on, perhaps at work.

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Good oral work We believe that learners should be encouraged to develop their oral skills through mathematical conversations. Suggestions as to how to encourage such conversations occur throughout this book. Similarly, in an attempt to value oral work, the Mathematics Criteria for GCSE Mathematics (SEAC, 1990) require that a Groups scheme of assessment should
include a variety of techniques which enable the candidate to respond orally and in writing to questions about mathematics, discuss mathematical ideas,...

However, at the time of writing, it is not known how this will be done. The requirement in the current GCSE criteria (DES, 1985a) is noticeable by the absence of its observance. Therefore it is not clear whether, and if so how, oral communication is expected to play a part in the assessment scheme. Good written work Mathematical writing has become much more important in schools with the introduction of GCSE coursework assessment. We need not expand or the advice given by Examining Groups but would emphasize the need to work on the presentation of mathematics from the earliest days in secondary school. It is worth stressing that, from a practical point of view, learners can benefit from setting out their work well because this can help to reduce mistakes in working. But at the same time, we would want to encourage learners to use rough paper for jotting down ideas. The important things to remember are that the thinking demonstrated in the rough working should not be lost if a write-up is made and that the task of producing written work of a high standard does not become so time-consuming that mathematical activity is replaced by mindless copying. Learners mathematical writing, as well as their teachers, should make sense when read aloud. An example of bad practice is provided by the frequency with which learners put an = sign when would be correct. 5x + 3 = 2 x 15 = 5x = 2 x 18 The = sign at the beginning of the last line is clearly wrong because 5x is 3 less than 5x + 3. It may be an uphill struggle before learners see that mathematics is written in a way which is recognizably in English (or some other language), but on occasion it may be a good idea to read back to a learner one or two nonsensical pieces. An extended effort needs to be made if we are serious about mathematics as a means of communication. We recommend that teachers should: encourage learners to communicate orally about their mathematical work with others; encourage learners to write mathematics so that it makes sense when read aloud; provide opportunities for learners to talk about what they have learned, particularly in investigative work;

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 help learners to become aware of the conventions used when communicating in mathematics; help learners to see that the conventions are conventions; allow learners to use their own conventions in work they do themselves but insist that they make any conventions clear when they are communicating with you or other people.

Flexibility
In our experience, much of the interest in teaching derives from the observation that every class is different and every learner is different. Learners differ in their knowledge of mathematics, their motivation, the speed at which they acquire new mathematical knowledge, their interests, as well as in the ways described. So it is clear that teachers need to be flexible in their communications. A further difficulty in establishing communication with learners, was pointed out with a diagram early in section 1: there is no direct path of communication between a learners concepts and a teachers. Indeed, this applies not only to concepts; a teacher has even greater difficulty in obtaining insight into the schemas in which a learner holds knowledge of mathematics. One learner wrote of his teacher: If I dont understand Mrs ... Its no use asking her to explain. She just says it over again. This illustrates one of the dangers of explanations. If they are clear to a teacher, there is no guarantee that they will be clear to a learner. There was no point in the learner above persisting with saying he did not understand, because his teacher was not flexible enough to try to see the problem from his point of view. While explanation has its place in a teachers repertoire, we are concerned with flexibility in all oral communication with learners. At the beginning of Chapter 1 we quoted the phrase that learning must start from the pupil and we see this as pointing the way towards flexibility when teachers are communicating with learners. To become flexible in your communication: look for signals from learners that they do not understand; use probing questions to try to find out what has caused the blockage; use a different approach when one fails; allow for differences in the way in which learners learn.

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Mathematics? I Speak it Fluently

David Pimm

INTRODUCTION
As teachers, our primary concern should be encouraging and improving the communication of mathematical meanings, both between teacher and pupil, but also among pupils themselves. Such communication about a situation or an idea can be verbal, pictorial or in mathematical symbols, where I assume the latter two to be written. Mathematical ideas are often conveyed using a specialised, highly condensed symbol system which attempts to reflect relationships among the ideas by means of relationships among the symbols. In so doing, the symbol system acts as a kind of filter, dispensing with all but the essential elements involved, as by no means all the relationships among the ideas can be simultaneously represented. The pupils must therefore come to understand this filtering process and become confident users of it. Thus we can see the dual nature of mathematics, at once medium and message. Any mathematics classroom will provide many examples of the medium influencing, and sometimes distorting, the intended message. As a consequence, one role for any maths teacher is the encouragement of fluency, both oral and written, in the language of mathematics. But that the emphasis must always remain on meaningful communication of experiences and ideas is the main point of this introduction. I want to take the commonly heard statement that mathematics is a language as a starting point for this essay and explore in part what arises if this claim is taken seriously. It could be taken to mean that mathematical language is a part of English (or French, German, etc.). Another interpretation could be that it is a universal shorthand, while a third might be that maths is a language in its own right. However you interpret it, I think the main point for the teaching of mathematics is the importance of meaning to mathematical activity, rather than the mere manipulation of symbols to which it so often degenerates. Therefore the aim of mathematical language should be to help construct, express and communicate these mathematical meanings. I hope this point will become clearer through the examples as the chapter unfolds. My approach throughout is to look to natural language itself for certain key ideas which we can then try to identify within mathematics itself. As a brief overview of what is to come, the second section focuses on the basic notions of vocabulary and grammar and possible differences in these regards between what I shall contrast as ordinary English and mathematical English. Moving away from surface features, I shall look at metaphor, a common yet powerful phenomenon in ordinary English. Does it arise in mathematics, and

Reprinted from: David Pimm, Mathematics? I Speak it fluently. In Developing Mathematical Thinking. p. 139149.

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if so what are some of the consequences? In the last section, I deal with the question of the readability of mathematical prose. Many childrens difficulties with mathematics may be due more to the complexity of wording of written material than to the express mathematical task being posed or explained. In this introduction, I have tried to provide some idea of what this chapter contains as well as a sense of some more general questions which can be posed concerning the role of language in mathematics. This discussion is by no means exhaustive. I have, for example, made no reference to the increasingly vexed and important question of children for whom English is a second language. Any reader who wishes to pursue further one of these areas may care to consult the article by Austin and Howson listed in the references which reviews much of the literature on the topic of language and mathematics.

Mathematical English and ordinary English

What does it mean to say that mathematics is a language and how does it differ from English? If it is a shorthand, a shorthand is learned as a language, and not just translation, for you cant translate shorthand without learning the language. Does it make sense to refer to mathematics as a language in its own right? ls it not merely English with the addition of a few specialised terms, such as any professional group might employ? Most mathematical classes actually take place in a mixture of ordinary English and a mathematical English in which ordinary words are used with a specialised meaning (Kane, 1968). It is important to distinguish these as failure to do so can result in incongruous errors. For example, in response to What is the difference between 30 and 7? answers often include 30 is a big number and 7 is a small number or 30 is even while 7 is odd. Halving, indicating a process of division into two (not necessarily equal) pieces allows us to speak of (and ask for!) the larger half. Many confusions can occur as a result of differing linguistic usage with the teacher, most often, speaking mathematical English, while the student interprets it as ordinary English. Mathematics is notorious for attaching specialised meanings to everyday words, words which already have meanings. Thus one set of problems arise from two people using the same words but understanding different things by it. Mathematics, when written, often employs its own symbols (e.g. 2 + 3 = 5) yet, when spoken, comes out in English sentences. There are conventions developed over the centuries governing the construction of symbolic mathematical sentences. In what ways do they differ from the structure of English? Are there many examples of conflict? For instance, we write 8 4 but sometimes say four from eight where the written left-to-right order is the opposite of the spoken order. (Another example of this is seventeen for 17, where the seven comes first, compared with twenty-seven for 27). This can cause particular problems when tens and units are reached, for example 38 14 The direction of the operation must be indicated (top to bottom or conversely, rather than left to right) for if you mix both expressions (eight take away four and four from eight)

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you will only encourage the childrens natural tendency to take the smaller from the larger. This problem becomes acute with 34 18 With corresponding addition problems the choice is irrelevant due to commutativity of addition which only encourages the problem. A second difficulty thus arises from the lack of synonyms in mathematical language. Many different processes and operations in the real world come under the one heading subtraction, for example, as a result of the filtering process I mentioned in the first section. Many different English words and phrases have a single mathematical expression, as all the differences reflected in the English have been filtered out. As further instances of how the richness (and structure) of English is not necessarily a useful guide to its mathematical equivalent, consider some of the ways we speak about basic arithmetic operations in English. (I shall not concern myself here with words like more, extra, altogether, which seem to indicate particular operations). 1 Addition: 3 + 2 This can be rendered in English as: the sum of three and two, add three and two, add two to three, two added to three, three plus two. Only the last version is a straightforward, term for term transliteration preserving the order of the mathematical symbols. 2 Subtraction: 3 2 The difference between three and two (but not subtract two and three), take two from three, three take away two, two from three, three minus two. 3 Multiplication: 3 x 2 Three times two (two is the operator, three the operand), multiply three by two (the reverse), the product of three and two, take two three times. 4 Division: 2 3, 32, 2 3

Three into two, divide two into three (i.e. three pieces), divide two by three, two over three. Notice that we have three different ways of symbolising the same operation, yet with entirely different orders. We have broken with the left to right order for our notation when we use 2/3. (Something more involved has happened since from a verb phrase, we now see a noun, a number. What sense can be made of 23, 2/3?) In each case, the English has at least two forms where the order of the numbers is reversed. Unfortunately only two of the operations, addition and multiplication, are commutative, that is, the order of operation is unimportant with regard to the result. For many children, however, the other two operations, subtraction and division also only have one permissible order: subtract smaller from larger, divide smaller into larger.

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As a final instance of ways in which mathematical English and ordinary English differ, consider the grammatical function of number words themselves. Cardinal numbers in everyday usage seem to function more as adjectives in that they describe one property of a set. But in mathematical English, numbers function as nouns, entities with properties of their own for instance, odd, square, prime. This confusion can be seen in multiplication tables where both arise together. One four is four, two fours are eight and so on. We have an entity, a four, of which we can have any number. Notice this is usually called the four times table, whereas the four times table might more logically run four ones are four, four twos are eight and so on. The third main point will comprise the remainder of this section and concerns the differences in various conventions employed in mathematical symbolism, differences within the supposedly consistent language of mathematics itself. My focus is on the symbols themselves , but also on the uses to which they are put as well as the conventions governing that use. Mathematical symbols occur predominantly on paper and hence are twodimensional, spatial entities which have different meanings dependent on their position in relation to other symbols. Thus the 2 in 23 differs in meaning from the 2 in 32, as does the 3 in 3/4 from the 3 in 4/3. Possible relationships among symbols include above/below, to the left/right of and not many more. Orientation in the plane is also important in the interpretation of symbols, (at the most basic level, that of distinguishing between 6 and 9 or 2 and 5). I was once in a classroom talking with a 6 year old. He had just drawn a 7 on his paper and commented that to him it looked like a seven, but to the girl opposite it looked like a nose! Yet children see numbers in all directions and angles, 1 1 for example 8 on a bus, 8 on a gatepost (see Higginson, 1980). 7 7 Consider powers such as 23 . A common misinterpretation of 23 is 2 x 3, fairly reasonably as the operation does involve multiplication (in fact, 2 x 3 is three times two as opposed to 23, multiply two by itself three times). With powers, in most books, there is a size relationship between the numerals (the exponent is smaller). Thus relative size is another possible relationship among symbols. Compare the requests, draw a larger 2 and which is larger, 2 or 5?. At some level, a distinction between the symbol and the concept needs to be drawn, yet it is difficult to indicate a desirable level of awareness at all clearly. Symbols can only be confidently interpreted within a given context. Sometimes the same spatial relationship reflects a different meaning according to that context. In algebra, for example, juxtaposition of certain symbols denotes multiplication, whereas in arithmetic it denotes place value. What is 3pq if p = 4 and q = 2? In arithmetical terms the answer would be 342, but in algebra a different convention provides with the interpretation 3 x 4 x 2 which is 24. We know multiplication is commutative, so ab = ba, yet 23 32. Our conventions have changed regarding the interpretation of symbols yet you often hear comments to the effect that, algebra is just like arithmetic only you are operating with letters rather than numbers. We need to ensure that the original convention is made very explicit and secondly that we

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are changing it (and are free to do so) in algebra. Although 23y does not mean 2 x 3 x y. Another example comes from juxtaposition and the often subtle gap relationship involved. Consider the sequence 891011. Why is 11 seen as a number and not One one or even two ones (see Higginson again for a lovely exploration of this point). Initially, number meant digit. Yet in algebra when we refer to an entry in a matrix, for example, a, we revert to a one one and not a eleven. A further cause for concern comes from reading decimals aloud. 2.57 is often referred to as two point fifty seven. One not unreasonable conclusion from this is that two point fifty seven is bigger than two point seven since fifty seven is bigger than seven. As a final example of symbol interpretation, look at the complexity of place-value notation. The meaning we attach to each digit depends precisely on its location within a string of digits. Yet even within the context of arithmetic itself we write 32 to imply the invisible power of ten and addition, 32 = 3 x 10 + 2, whereas we also write 2 5/8 , where we just imply addition. So far, I have been dealing primarily with the vocabulary of mathematics, both its place within spoken English and its written, symbolic form. Any mathematical expression can be written out as a sentence of English and this is one way to gain an appreciation of exactly how compact is our contemporary notation. But, just as knowing French is much more than knowing the contents of a French dictionary, knowledge of mathematical language is far more than an awareness of individual symbols and their meanings. One of the essential characteristics of doing mathematics is not only forming grammatical mathematical sentences which describe something, but also transforming them to gain further knowledge of the situation. Mathematics is action, it is operating on the given to produce new things. The most commonly asked question in a maths class is, I suspect, how do I do this one?. Listening to a child performing (!) a long multiplication, one hears, I do this ... then I go like this. . . Any algorithm in arithmetic consists of an ordered sequence of such actions. But maths, as a transformational activity, comes into its own with algebra. So often, sadly, learning algebra consists solely of learning the appropriate moves to apply in particular situations, and how to discriminate among different situations. Even with a verbal arithmetic problem, the question often asked is is it an add or a times? What happens is that there are a few basic sequences of operations to apply and all that is required is a cue to clue pupils in to which one. Because meaning, in the sense of an understanding of the situation which gave rise to the problem, is so often absent for pupils in mathematics, it cannot guide them (as it does in English) to correct sentence construction. They have to fall back on trying to learn the rules directly. In learning to speak English, they have acquired the rules governing formation of a question, a negative, the passive construction and so on without having to be taught them. Algebraic transformations are analogous to some degree, but are taught consciously. Because the manipulations are necessarily transacted at the symbolic level, most of the guidance tends to be phrased in terms of how to obtain the desired surface features. For example: 1 2 3 Take it over to the other side and change the sign. Cross multiply. Move it one space to the left. This implies an absolute spacing on paper so we know how far one space is.
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4 5 6

To multiply by ten, add a nought. But adding a nought doesnt change anything? Put down a zero, carry the one down (over). You must always do to the top what you do to the bottom. One instance would be xc = x , yet yc However y x+x y +y = x+c y+c x y x y

(where we broke the injunction), while xx x yy y 7 8 Turn it upside down and multiply. Collect all the xs on one side of the equation. Yet see Brown (1976) for an exploration of a situation where he deliberately ignores this maxim.

Im sure you can come up with other examples. These are all instructions (actions, note) on how to move symbols around on a piece of paper, guides of greater or lesser efficacy, with no indication as to why they work. Nor is there any feeling for what the effect is of these transformations at the level of meaning, which is after all what should be guiding these manipulations. In other words, we are unconscious of changing the underlying reality which these symbols represent as well. What are the transformations linking 7 be: 1 add to each side, = 4 to 4 + = 7? One possible sequence could

2 recombine via distributive law for addition, 3 if a = b, then b = a. Difficulties arise with 1 as pupils say but we dont know what is. How can we add it to each side? and 3 as pupils are so used to seeing derivations which end up . . ., so x = 2, when confronted with . . . , so 2 = x, they declare but youve solved for 2, not x. Reading left to right and word order mattering for meaning (e.g. Mary hit John v. John hit Mary) may be powerful reasons underlying difficulty in grasping this sort of order invariance of meaning. In conclusion, in this section I have outlined three possible sources of difficulty from the interaction of ordinary English with mathematical English, at the level of individual words and conflicting meanings, at the level of grammar and conflicts within the mathematical symbolism itself. There are undoubtedly many more instances of these phenomena and I would be most interested to hear of them.
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Metaphor
Moving away from the question of grammatical structure, what are some constructions, figures of speech which make natural language so expressive? Metaphor comes to mind as a technique for creating new meanings, often by transfer of meaning by means of an analogy. Ones initial inclination is to view mathematical language as clear and precise, while metaphors seem fuzzy, and, at best, suggestive. One could be forgiven for thinking them unsuited to mathematical work. I think, however, there are important cases of metaphor to be found in arithmetic and algebra and that metaphor is as central to the expression of mathematical meaning as it is to the expression of meaning in ordinary language (see Lakoff, 1980). Before trying to identify instances of metaphor in mathematics, let us look at a straightforward everyday example: George is a lion. There are a number of senses in which this could be meant. For instance he may be brave, he may have a tremendous head of hair (a mane), he may roar a lot, or some combination of these. What is important to realise is that not everything which is the case about lions will be transferable. The context of use will usually determine which features are intended to be carried over and which are not. We will also understand or make sense of the statement George is a lion very differently according to the situation. Often the force of a metaphoric statement comes from the strength of the claim, that is George is a lion, compared with George is like a lion (simile). So if we are looking for metaphor in mathematics, we need statements of equality where the two things being equated are not the same. Then we can look at which features are being transferred and which are not. My first example comes from arithmetic. Contrast the statement 3 2 = 1 with 2 3 = 1. The latter involves an unexamined metaphor which leads us to presume that the meanings of certain symbols, for instance, 2, , =, are the same as had been used previously. There are however conflicts which often arise as they are not the same. The metaphor involved identifies 2 with the directed number + 2 (just as George was identified with the lion) and so on, very soon after the introduction of directed numbers. The same notation is used for subtraction of directed numbers as for subtraction of counting (unsigned) numbers. But the results disagree, for whereas 2 3 is impossible within the counting numbers, (+2) (+3) = 1 within the system of directed numbers. The problem of taking a metaphor literally, which I shall examine for this example in the next couple of paragraphs, is increased by its existence being concealed through using the same symbols. Discussions of metaphor often hinge on the distinction between literal and metaphorical meaning. Let us look at the basic situation with the counting numbers and the operations on them. From where does the meaning arise? One approach, rich in meaning, is that counting numbers arise as possible answers to the question how many, addition from conflating two sets of distinct elements, subtraction from take away, multiplication from repeated addition and division from equal sharing. Yet 1 makes no sense as an answer to how many, any more than + 2 does. 1 is often referred to as minus one, a verb without a subject. Yet previously, in all earlier work, the verb had always been flanked on both sides by a number. We have switched systems while keeping the language the same, yet not all of the properties of the old system are carried over by the metaphor 2 = + 2, etc. particularly not the specific meanings involved. The central issue is that although the symbolic statements
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equated by the metaphor may behave in analogous ways, their meanings are not compatible. Consider the case of multiplication of directed numbers (integers). I can find no corresponding real-world situation to which we can refer. One force of making + 2 into 2 is that it permits the literal meaning of multiplication of counting numbers to be used metaphorically (transferring an old meaning to construct a new meaning) with integers thus + 2 x + 3 takes on the meaning 2 x + 3 or + 3 + + 3. Having made sense of + in terms of movement to the right on a number line (a fairly surface meaning) we obtain + 6. + 2 x 3 is acceptable also without too much stretching, (assuming our view of addition works on all the integers). 3 x + 2 we can approach by means of commutativity, though justification of this is flimsy due to the absence of any situational meaning guiding our actions. What can we do with 2 x 3? Our metaphor cannot help us here and this is, I believe, one of the causes of problems of multiplying negative numbers together. Turning to the algebra of indices produces further instances of precisely this extension of meaning, in one direction to negative numbers and in the other to fractional numbers. a2, a3 , . . . can be seen as a shorthand notation for repeated multiplication (just as multiplication itself started out life as repeated addition) where the index is the number (in the sense of how many) of times it is to be repeated. What can be made of a1 in this light? What sort of statement is a1 = 1/a? The metaphor 2 = + 2 gives us a2 = a+2 and then, presuming we wish to preserve the law of exponents for counting numbers, namely that am. an = am+n, we can give a meaning to a0, a1 , . . . . But just as with falling back on commutativity of the extended operation of multiplication, the question why should we accept this as justification is a difficult one to answer. In the same way a1/2 = a can extend the range of indices to fractions and then in a double move, produce fractional numbers as indices). Why is this a problem? If the metaphoric quality of certain conceptual extensions in mathematics is not made clear to children, then specific meanings and observations (whether intuitive or consciously formulated) about the original setting will be carried over to the new setting where they are often inappropriate. The identification, which is at the basis of the metaphor, guarantees only that certain structural properties are preserved in the extended system, not the meaning. Consider the observation that subtraction produces something less than either of the two starting numbers. Then think about 4 (2) = 6. Or, for example, that multiplying two whole numbers together results in a number larger than each of the original pair. This is a correct concommitant of viewing multiplication as repeated addition. This no longer holds with fractions. Why do we call

1 2

1 = and so on that is, allowing directed

2 4 multiplication 2 5

anyway? What is the root meaning of this operation? The extension of concepts in this fashion can result in the destruction of meaning, presuming no distinction is made between the literal and metaphorical use, because the confusion arising from seeing such (often unanalysed) truths fails contaminates not only the extended system but also the one from which it grew. The old concept resists expansion precisely because it is the literal, and hence, the most basic meaning, There is no trace in the symbolism to indicate that a

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metaphor is in use, the same symbols and words are used throughout. A metaphor skims over a lot and a polished notation permits this riding on the surface. If students are not used to mathematics making sense, then having tried and failed to make literal sense of a statement they are likely to give up. But this experience also undermines their faith in situations where the original meaning is the most sensible one. [For an extended version of this section, see Metaphor and Analogy in Mathematics, Journal For the Learning of Mathematics, vol. 1, no. 3, March 1981]

Other work on language and mathematics

Consideration of mathematics as language has almost always focused on the obvious interaction of English with mathematics, namely text books in general and verbal problems in particular. An example of the latter would be, John has seven sweets, Sally has nineteen. How many more does Sally have than John? The unquestionable difficulty pupils often encounter reading mathematical prose in texts in general (at all age levels), and in contending with such problems in particular has often been remarked upon and, as a result, verbal problems have been singled out as an item of research interest as if it formed a coherent topic. (Though, in fact, they cohere only in the uncommon form, namely prose, of problem presentation). This provides another instance of the problem due to the filtering from many forms of expression in English to one in mathematics. The adopted approach to both problems has been to explain why certain passages in texts or certain problems are difficult to read or interpret in terms of the construct of text readability. As this area forms the overlap of reading and mathematics, and readability measures abound for ordinary prose, the first step was an attempt to modify the ubiquitous cloze procedure in an attempt to measure the reading difficulty level. I suspect this process will be familiar to you but there is a difficulty in applying it to mathematics, as the redundancy patterns are very different and what constitutes a unit of mathematical prose is a very difficult question. There is also a reasonable, general assumption that a poor reader is going to have problems reading mathematics although the extent to which the converse is true remains unclear. Certainly the intervention strategies in this area have focused on improving specific reading skills. An approach to difficulty in work problems themselves (particularly arithmetic ones) has involved an attempt to find a number of contributory factors (both linguistic and nonlinguistic) which would allow the difficulty level of a problem to be predicted. Among examples of the sorts of things the researchers thought might be relevant can be listed the length of the problem, the number of words and sentences, the average sentence length, and some grammatical measures for instance, the presence of relative clauses, uncommon question forms, unusual vocabulary. In some cases up to seventy different contributory factors were examined at one time! It is, however, assumed that the variation in a problems difficulty is within the problem itself and that an objective level of difficulty can be assigned to any given problem. No discussion or importance is assigned to the strategies the students actually use! The concern is merely whether or not they correctly solve the problem so as to enable average success rates to be calculated for a group of problems.
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One general belief is that a straightforward translation technique from English into arithmetic equations is the method to follow. As a result of this there has been a lot of teaching based on verbal cues to be used as clues. Once again we see surface features being used as a guide for action. If the word more appears, then the problem is a take away. How can this be reconciled with Charles earns four times more than Steve? Pearla Nesher and her co-workers have investigated the topic thoroughly (1975, 1976, 1977), and come to the conclusion that it is impossible to make a one-to-one translation from ordinary language to arithematical language solely on a linguistic level. Thus it is inappropriate to teach by means of the presence or absence of certain key words. Once again we see a move away from the surface level to a focusing on the meaning inherent in the situation behind the problem. This is essential to a successful mathematical formulation of the problem, one which depends on knowledge of the real world and how to represent it mathematically as well as how to mirror the relevant relationships through the choice of an appropriate mathematical model. If you wish to follow up the brief discussion of the work on text readability, I suggest you write for a copy of Rothery et al., Children Reading Maths, 1980.

Summary and conclusions

In this article I have tried to outline some of the many fascinating interactions that there are between mathematics and ordinary language, as well as what sense might be made of the claim that mathematics is a language. There are many different levels on which one can operate. One is to focus on the particular English words which crop up in mathematics classes (and the uncommon meanings they have there). Another involves the different symbols we employ as part of the representation system of mathematics and the conventions implicit in our use of them both in understanding them as they stand (such as place-value notation) and the transformations of mathematical phrases and sentences in arithmetical computation and algebra. A third is to focus not on the words (or symbols), nor on the grammar of mathematics at all, but on the meanings that we are trying to convey through our language and how that meaning changes and expands even though we may use the same words and symbols (the examples of subtraction and multiplication were discussed). Metaphors deny distinctions between things; problems often arise from taking metaphors too literally. Because unexamined metaphors lead us to assume the identity of non-identical things, conflicts can arise which can only be explained by understanding the metaphor which requires its recognition as such. Teachers will often cease to use the term consciously in a metaphorical way when their concept is an expanded one. This will not mirror the situation in most of their pupils minds. The unexplained extension of concepts can too often result in the destruction rather than an expansion of meaning. It is important to tell children when we are using words with either an expanded or restricted meaning and we understimate childrens ability to understand that words can have different meanings in different contexts. Lastily I discussed the question of reading mathematical prose and the particular problems involved with mathematical (especially arithmetical) problems posed in ordinary language. Many childrens difficulties with mathematics may be due more to the complexity of wording of written material, rather than the mathematical task being requested. This is

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something which has attracted a good deal of attention of people professing an interest in the area of language and mathematics. In fact, the two are often equated, though I hope that this is a limited view and there are other possibilities of importance and interest. Lastly, may I make a plea for you, as teachers of mathematics, to listen with an open ear for what your children are trying to say. It is surprising how often there is a comprehensible basis for mistakes and misunderstandings and one which has a linguistic origin.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Austin, J. L. and Howson, A. G., Language and Mathematical Education Educational Studies in Mathematics, vol. 10, pp. 161197, 1979.

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136

Language
Bell, Costello and Kucheman

1. Introduction 2. Survey Paper Austin and Howson 3. Language and the Formation of Mathematical Concepts 4. Oral Language in the Mathematics Classroom. 5. Language in Mathematical Texts 6. Language in Exercises and Examinations 7. Mathematical Terminology, Symbolism and Linguistic Structure 8. Learning Mathematics

1. Introduction
In the following discussion of language and mathematics education, various aspects of their relationship are identified. Firstly, the extent to which mathematical concept formation is related to and dependent upon language development is considered: this includes the question of whether the development of adequate terminology is a pre-requisite for cognitive growth. In a short second section the teachers use of language in mathematics teaching is discussed, and particularly how and why this varies from one class to another. Next, the use of language in mathematical texts is studied, followed by some comments on language in set exercises, particularly in examinations. The way in which mathematics is expressed and written in particular, precise linguistic forms is then considered. Finally, some results about the learning of mathematics through different languages are quoted: consideration is given to the teaching of mathematics to immigrant children in their second language, to bilingual children and to groups of mixed language.

2. Survey Paper Austin and Howson

A survey paper in the field of language and mathematical education by Austin and Howson, was published in Educational Studies in Mathematics (1979) : the paper began as an attempt to compile an annotated bibliography, which the authors then decided to preface by an essay. This essay is not exactly a critical review of research in the field, because it was felt that this would not adequately reflect the way in which language and mathematical education interact: rather, Austin and Howsons
Reprinted from: Bell, Costello, and Kucheman. A Review of Research in Mathematical Education, NFER-Nelson Publishing Company Ltd, Windsor, Berkshire, 1983.

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work indicates possible areas for investigation and draws attention to areas where research activities already exist. The article is both thorough and extremely useful, and the subtantial bibliography is a good indication of the wide variety of published material relevant to this topic. The present chapter relies considerably on Austin and Howsons paper as source of references, and is an attempt at a brief review of the present state of knowledge in the field as revealed in written articles. This may mean the proliferation of issues which seem peripheral and restricted: but this in itself may reflect a general lack of awareness of what the central issues are.

3. Language and the Formation of Mathematical Concepts

Piagets earliest study of intellectual development (1926) is entitled The Language and Thought of the Child: he distinguishes between ego-centric and socialized talk. In ego-centric talk, the child does not bother to whom he is speaking nor whether he is being listened to. It is suggested that speech of this kind begins to disappear at about the age of seven. In a later study (1954), Piaget gives a more general view of the relationship between language and thinking, stating that
... language and thought are linked in a genetic circle where each necesarily leans on the other in independent formation and continuous reciprocal action. In the last analysis, both depend on intelligence itself, which antedates language and is independent of it.

Sinclair (1971) gives a useful summary of Piagets position on this matter. Vygotsky (1962) sees ego-centric speech as a transitional stage from vocal to inner speech, which is also called speech for oneself, the ability to think in verbal terms. Austin and Howson note the sub-vocal movements of the tongue and lips sometimes observed when difficult material is to be read and understood, and comment on the tendency of mathematicians to want to talk to a colleague in an apparently egocentric manner in order to analyse a difficulty. This use of language is clearly often helpful: some consider it essential. Sapir (1963) writes:
The feeling entertained by many that they can think, or even reason, without language, is an illusion ... no sooner do we try to put an image into conscious relation with another than we find ourselves slipping into a silent flow of words.

There is, however, a lot of evidence of disagreement with Sapir for example, statements by Einstein and many others (see Sheppard, 1978). Skemp (1971) quotes a number of illustrations which, it is claimed, show the formation and use of low order concepts without the use of language. Nevertheless, language seems to play an essential role in the development of higher order concepts. Both Piaget and Vygotsky provide some evidence that the development of linguistic structure in some cases precedes the appreciation of the corresponding logical relationship. Piagets experiments suggest, for example, that

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children use subordinate clauses with because, unless, etc., long before they grasp the logical relationship corresponding to these forms: the statement grammar precedes logic appears in both Piaget and Vygotsky. Vygotsky, in an experimental study of concept formation, has probed more deeply into the dependence of the understanding of concepts on the language which describes them. It is fairly obvious that children themselves do not make the separation between linguistic form and meaning: the identification of the linguistic forms as non-arbitrary attributes of the objects they describe is seen by Vygotsky. His simple experiments show that pre-school children explain the names of objects by their attributes. Thus when asked whether one could interchange the names of objects, for instance call a cow ink and ink cow, children answer no, because ink is used for writing, and the cow gives milk. Language and thought are so inseparable that names take the characteristic features with them in the exchange. In one experiment, the children were told that in a game a dog would be called cow: this is a sample of the ensuing discussion: Does a cow have horns? Yes. But dont you remember that the cow is really a dog? Come, now, does a dog have horns? Sure, it is a cow, if its called cow, it has horns. That kind of dog has got to have little horns? Vygotskys conclusion is not simply that concept and language are inextricably linked, but that concept formation depends on linguistic development:
The birth of a new concept is invariably foreshadowed by a more or less strained or extended use of old linguistic materials; the concept does not attain to the individual and independent life until it has found a distinctive linguistic embodiment.

The notion that concept formation arises through verbal discussion appears to have a fairly general acceptance. In his review of self-paced mathematics instruction, Schoen (1976) deprecates the use of individualized learning schemes, stating that the educational quality of pupil-teacher interaction in the self-paced classroom is very poor, consisting mainly of procedural matters. His explanation of the low effectiveness of such schemes is their failure to provide a quality of dialogue. Stephens (1977), writing in similar vein, emphasizes the need for a varied pattern of communication. The learning of mathematics requires the negotiating of mathematical meaning for (and by) each student; the use of prepared programmes places the teacher in too inactive a role for him to exercise this negotiation; and tends to isolate children from one another. Stephens expresses the view that the medium of instruction needs to be evaluated at least in part by its ability to develop relationships within which mathematical dialogue can be fostered.

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An article by Hanley (1978) also discusses this area: his starting-point is some research on the process of thinking summarized by Wright and Taylor (1970). The role of language is seen as supplying verbal symbols which can represent concepts and be used as stimuli for the internalized manipulation of these concepts. There is some experimental evidence (Bourne, Ekstrand and Dominowsky, 1971, Ch.13) which indicates that problem solving is made easier by the provision of words to represent objects or ideas involved in the problem situation. Hanleys discussion has two main themes: firstly it is plea that the oral verbalization of mathematical ideas should not be neglected, and secondly it provides some guidance about the choice of words for concepts, suggesting that these concept words should be applied carefully and not used loosely or ambiguously. An example especially likely to prove confusing appears to be the use of the words vertical and horizontal to develop the corresponding ideas. Hanleys analysis of this treatment in three different primary texts provides ample evidence of these words used in different ways and with meanings which change as the discussion proceeds. While Hanley is critical of much use of language in texts to develop concepts (the printed word has a permanence that demands accuracy), he nevertheless allows (and expects) the teacher to introduce ideas using words in an inexact way, which can be progressively refined until precision of thought is developed. He concludes that the best learning situations exist where language can be used freely as the interactive medium and the best resource for this is the teacher. Much of this leads to the question of whether adequdate terminology is a prerequisite for cognitive growth. Studies of attempts to teach mathematics without an adequate language structure appear to support this suggestion (cf. Philp in New Guinea, 1973, and Greenfeild in Senegal, 1966). The problem of coping with deficiencies in vocabulary is an old one: Austin and Howson give several illustrations, and Easton, (1966) describes Recordes attempts in 1551 to encourage the use of lozenge and threelike instead of rhombus and equilateral: it does after all seem reasonable to choose a word with familiar concrete connotations if no adequate description of a concept already exists. Thus, according to Mmari (1975) there is no word used in Tanzania for centre: the Kiswahili word kitovu, meaning navel, has come to be used for the centre of a circle. A particular conclusion here is that the development of terminology appears to be important for concept formation. A more general description of the place of lanuage in the development of mathematical concepts is more difficult to provide, but the notion that language, and particularly oral dialogue, is an essential part of this process appears to be fairly well established.

4. Oral Language in The Mathematics Classroom

Austin and Howson (p.174) give a separate section to the way in which teachers use language: one aspect of this has already been considered in the discussion of the place of dialogue in concept formation, and particularly of the deterioration of classroom language when individualized schemes are used. There is clearly some kind of connection between the way a teacher talks in class and the relationship
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between teacher and pupils: this may not be specific to mathematics, but it is perhaps worth a brief mention. American research, using interaction analysis methods (Fletcher, 1960, 1970) provides some evidence that mathematics teachers talk more than social studies teachers, for example; they ask more convergent questions, make more directing statements, and elicit and reject fewer pupil responses. Various other differences between subjects can be identified: it is not clear whether these differences are inherent in mathematics or part of the background and tradition of teachers. In Britain, attention has been focused more directly on the relation between language and teacher/pupil interaction. Henry (1971) describes a dialectic choice between mobilising childrens attitudes to a pitch of excitement and attempting to control them. The distinction made by Arnold (1973) is that in a teacher-directed class, children will learn to use (however uncomprehendingly) the teachers language; whereas in a child-centred class, unorthodox language presents the teacher with additional problems and new opportunities.

5. Language in Mathematical Texts

A number of studies exist of the readability of mathematics textbooks: generally the tests used were devised for analysing extensive prose passages but have been applied to mathematics texts. Aiken (1972) provides a summary of some of these investigations. A recent study of mathematical texts and of factors affecting their readability is reported by Rothery et al. (1980). An interesting feature of this study is its classification of categories of writing in textbooks as follows: E exposition of concepts and methods including explanations of vocabulary and notation, and rules. instruction to the reader to write or draw, or do. examples and exercises for the reader to work on; usually these are routine problems to be solved. peripheral writing such as introductory remarks, summaries meta-exposition (writing about the exposition), jollying the reader along, giving clues, etc. Signals headings, letters, numbers, boxes, logos, etc.

I X

These headings provide a crude system of analysis. Each heading represents a particular kind of response from the reader. The exposition is to be passively read and digested. Instructions require the reader to operate outside the context of the book and carry out the tasks described. Examples and exercises involve the solution of simple or complex problems; the reader must puzzle out what to do and how to do it, and then find the answer. Peripheral writing is to be read in a passive way though in contrast to exposition it need not to require full attention and concentration; it is not likely to contain crucial information and it would not be

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important to try to remember the contents. Signals are of course not really read though their use should convey a vast amount of important information; their purpose is not explicitly instructional; rather than teach maths, they guide the reader through the page, helping identify and clarify the different parts of the text. An example is given of a section of text analysed in this way, although the technique is rather crude, it does concentrate attention on the purpose of the separate parts of the text and may lead to ideas for improvements:

One of the identififiable changes in mathematics teaching over the past twenty years or so is the increasing demand on pupils to read and write in mathematics lessons. Texts are used not only as a source of examples, but as a meduim of instruction; and the use of work-cards and independent learning has emphasisezed this even more. Increasingly, authors use easier words and less complicated linguistic forms (see Austin and Howson, p.173). This restriction of language is unsatisfactory in itself, and leads to the downgrading of word problems and a tendency to the verbal cue situation of Nesher and Teubal (1975), already discussed in Chapter Six. It is unlikely to contribute either to the pupils motivation or to his ability to apply mathematics. But what alternative is there? Language difficulties may hamper pupils whose mathematical development might otherwise proceed apace. Call and Wiggin (1966) show that the provision of special reading instruction can help to improve performance in the solution of word problems. It is arguable that questions
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involving actual situations should be read and the situation discussed first, before pupils proceed to the abstraction of mathematical relationships. Trueblood (1969) suggests that illustrated problems, which pupils discuss orally, permit development of both verbal skills and problem solving ability, and thus help to overcome reading difficulties. He also comments that interest is increased if such problems are created by pupils themselves. In a general discussion of how to ameliorate language problems in the use of textbooks, Rothery (1960) suggests three lines of attack: 1. Improve the text; 2 Improve the teachers use of the text; 3. Improve the reading ability of the reader. This section of the Children Reading Maths, report is perhaps the most valuable in making precise recommendations although its reliance on research findings is a little tenuous. Under (1), (improve the text), there is a discussion of vocabulary problems, and then the following points of prose style are given: 1. Use short sentences; 2. Use simple words, 3. Remove unnecessary expository material; 4. Keep to the present tense and particularly avoid the conditional mood. For instance If butter costs Z2 a pack, how much would 5 packs cost? can be re placed by Butter costs E2 a pack. How much do 5 packs cost? Words like if, suppose, given that are traditional, though often unnecessary and confusing opening phrases; 5. Avoid sentence structure which involves the reader having to remember clauses presented initially. For example: Using a radius of 42 cm draw a circle ... and Taking as 3.14 and assuming that the tank is a perfect cylinder, find the amount of water stored. Under (2), (improve the teachers use of the text), some suggestions are given for the usual situation where the teacher is presented with pupils and a ready-made text which may not be entirely suitable but which it is too late to alter, Then under (3) a number of activities are suggested which could help pupils to become stronger readers of mathematical texts.

6. Language in Exercises and Examination

In this section, we consider how language is used and interpreted in set exercises, especially in examinations. The following is suggested as a model of the place of reading and linguistic ability in ongoing mathematical activity (as distinct from initial concept formation):

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Understanding of real situation

Understanding of mathematical relationship

Description of situation in (written) words

Expression of mathematical relationship in symbols and precise terminology

This kind of process is needed to derive algebraicrelationships from a word problem (especially when these relationships are expressed in simultaneous or quadratic equations) or, sometimes, to identify the appropriate arithmetical procedure in a word problem. The left-hand side is a process of interpretation, the top arrow is an abstraction (or, sometimes, modelling) process and the right-hand side demands representation in symbols and special terminology. We have previously seen a number of examples in which attempts co short-circuit the process across the bottom produce incorrect results (Kuchemann, 1977, Galvin and Bell, 1977) in algebra. Similar ideas in arithematical problems show up in the CSMS work on ratio, where some children look for verbal cues in the wording rather than try to understand the situation thus percentage for some always means divide by 100. Nesher and Teubal (1975) have studied this particular phenomenon, and show that reliance on such verbal cues without over-all analysis of the situation is frequently encouraged by an artificial mode of presentation of word problems in a specific and limited vocabulary. This is reflected in both textbooks and examinations; so that certain key words influence the choice of mathematical operation. This must surely defeat the purpose of such word problems, which are intended to encourage the revealing of underlying mathematical relations in a situation, regardless of the particular verbal formulation. What is going on here cannot be merely a translation from English into mathematical symbols. (Note that even translation from one language to another is not just verbal cues; it demands first interpretation then representation there are plenty of ludicrous illustrations of the folly of word-forword translation without understanding but there is nothing to correspond with the modelling or abstraction stage in mathematics.) In a discussion of examination questions, Graham (1977) considers the following (from, East Midlands CSE, 1975): (a) In show-jumping a horse is penalised four faults for each fence it knocks down, and three faults for each refusal (i) If Manhattan knocks down x fences and refuses at y fences, write down an expression for the numbers of faults it incurs.

(ii) If Summertime finishes a round with 1.0 faults, how many fences did it knock down, and how many did it refuse?
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(b) In another show-jumping event, the horses jump two rounds, each consisting of seven fences. During the first round the horses score one point for clearing the first fence, two points for clearing the second, three points for the and so on up points for the final fence. In the second round, seven points are subtracted from their first round total for knocking down the first fence, six points are subtracted for knocking down the second, and so on, down to one point subtracted if they knock down the final fence. (i) Psalm jumps two clear rounds. How many points does it score?

(ii) Kingfisher knocks down the third and sixth fences on its first round, and the fifth and seventh fences on its second round. How many points does it score? (iii) Sportsman scores 22 points in its first round. Which fences did it knock down? (There are four possible answers to this part of the question; give them all.) There is scope for failure here in most of the ways just described: Graham discusses the difficulty under the heading of language, but the greatest difficulty seems to lie in the context more than anything else. In any case, the essential difficulties appear to have nothing overtly to do with mathematics. A number of examples have already been described where the abstraction process is made difficult by the unfamiliar context rather than the mathematical concepts (Boycotts batting average in the APU survey, and the snowfall problem in the NAEP survey). Since the context appears to account for a fair amount of variation in the facility of such tasks, some care is needed if these are intended to develop and test the understanding of mathematical concepts. It must be pointed out that the arrows can go the other way: mathematical activity involves moving back and forth in this diagram. In this section, we have concentrated on problems in reading and understanding ordinary words (on the left): we now turn our attention to the difficulties of representation by and interpretation of symbols and terminology.

7. Mathematical Terminology, Symbolism and Linguistic Structure

It is commonly stated that mathematics is itself a language. Obviously, the authors of this statement must consider that it possesses a certain degree of validity and has implications which make it worth saying. However, Love and Tanta (1977) regard this statement as a meaningless slogan and Austin and Howson describe it as somewhat dangerous and potentially confusing. There is an article by Sweet (1972) entitled Children Need Talk, a title which is in agreement with suggestions already made; and Sweets discussion of concept formation in the article suggests that her experience of childrens use of words in this development supports what has been said here. However, the article contains the misleading statement that as mathematics is a precise unambiguous language, our first concern must be to teach the language then the grammar will follow. It is probably best to go along with Austin and Howsons clear assertion that mathematics is not a language: it is an activity and a body of accumulated knowledge. It may in theory be enacted and
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described in a variety of languages, although an internationally recognized syntax and vocabulary has developed but the system of symbols and terminology is not mathematics itself any more than the words used to describe an experience are the actual experience. The language in which mathematics is presented is actually not so precise or consistent as might be popularly supposed, and Austin and Howson suggest the need for a mathematical counterpart to Fowlers Modern English Usage. Of course, such a book would not solve the essential difficulties in understanding mathematical symbols and terminology. But beyond this, the way in which mathematics exploits the spatial properties of its symbolisms and develops manipulations of symbolic expressions is a special characteristic which it does not share with ordinary language; it also is rather more prolific in its concept creation and hence its symbol creation than most disciplines. Some of these spatial aspects are discussed by Bell (1979) . It is obviously possible to Study the use of symbols and terminology in books and examinations, just as the readability of ordinary language has been investigated and it may prove more worthwhile. Grahams (1977) analysis of CSE questions includes the following (part question, East Anglian Board, 1975):

P, Q, R and S are subsets of E = {5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15} P = { x:x <11} Q = { y: 9< y 14} (a) (b) (c) (d) R = {z:z2 <80} S = {odd numbers}

Place the sign between the appropriate two sets. Which of the two sets are disjoint? Write the set { 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15} in terms of R. List the elements of Q S.

It is a question essentially about the use of symbols and words: the four sub-sets need to be first written out as lists of members. The answer expected for (a) is unique (R P) but of course any of the four sets could be given as a sub-set of E. (b) is virtually uninterpretable presumably there is an error, but what kind of error? The request to write the set in (c) in terms of R is a bit odd: it is of course the complement of R. Linguistically, the question is a bit of a mess. The earlier show jumping question and this one are admittedly extremes, but they cast some doubt over what CSE mathematics examinations test. They may involve understanding of real-world vocablulary and contexts, or of symbolic notation to which meaning has to be attached. Does either of these constitute mathematics? Some work on the analysing of mathematical terminology in primary texts and workcards has been carried out by Preston (1978). In eight schemes, he identifies 18 ways in which addition is presented:

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3, 5 5 and 3 equal 5+3 5 plus 3 3 greater than 5 The total of 5 and 3 is 5 add 3 Add 3 and 5 The sum of 5 and 3 is

5 and 3 together make 5 and 3 5 more than 3 Add 5 to 3 5 count on 3 Write the number facts for 8 using 5 and 3 What must be added to 5 to make 8 Increase 5 by 3 How many are there altogether? (Picture of 5 and 3 items)

One text, ostensibly designed for average/below average children, uses 14 of the 18 alternatives in two pages. Each of the eight texts uses, on average, seven alternative forms. It may be that the recognition of different forms is a worthwhile objective in mathematics, but it is certainly bad practice in terms of the standards relating to normal language development. Otterburn and Nicholson (1976) have investigated the understanding of words used in mathematics by 300 pupils following CSE courses. The test instructions and table of results are given below. On the left of the page is a list of words used in mathematics. In column (l) put Yes if you understand what the word means, No if not. In column (2) put the Symbol for the word if it has one (not all the words have them In column (3) Draw a diagram, or use Numbers or Symbols to show what the word means. In column (4) Describe in words what the word means, use an example if you like. An example was given.

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(1) Word Plus Yes/No Yes

(2) Symbol +

(3) Draw a diagram oo oo ooo ooo oo + o = ooo 4+ 5=9 Percentages

(4) Describe in words Add, e.g., four plus five are nine

Correct Minus Multiply Square Remainder Fraction Rectangle Parallel Area Decimal Fraction Square Number Radius Perimeter Volume Prime Number Kite Reflection Average Intersection Square Root Rotation Parallelogram Perpendicular Factor Rhombus Union Ratio Gradient Symmetry Product Multiple Similar Congruent Index Mapping Interger Trapezium 99.7 99.7 94 92 91 88 77 72 68 65 64 64 58 52 49 45 43 41 40 37 37 35 32 31 26 25 23 22 21 20 19 18 16 16 15 11

Blank 0.3 0.3 2 8 8 4 19 11 29 24 25 29 35 34 20 51 37 50 44 60 41 61 62 47 65 71 73 75 59 45 67 67 78 81 76 79

Confused 0 0 3 1 0.3 8 3 17 2 10 11 8 7 13 32 4 19 9 16 3 22 4 6 22 9 4 4 3 20 34 15 15 5 3 9 10

Note: the figures above are generally given to the nearest whole number.)

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It t is possible to question the importance of these words in understanding mathematics but they are part of the lanaguage used in examination papers, where undersranding of their meaning is presumbly taken for granted. Again, what is being tested in such papers? In a follow-up to this study, Nicholson has reported an investigation in which pupils and classes were tested so as to determine the extent to which they were handicapped by lack of mathematical vocabularly. It is of course difficult to isolate this as a critical factor, but it would be useful to know whether a considerable number of children who are able to understand the mathematical principles involved are seriously held back by lack of vocabulary. Nicholson suggests that, broadly speaking, the middle 50 per cent of the whole ability-range are significantly handicapped way. Summer (1975) showed similarly the effect of low reading-ability on performance in written, as compared with practical, tests. In the classroom it might be possible to devise and administer short, diagnostic tests to show up these difficulties; and some efforts might then be made to remedy them, perhaps on an individual or small-group basis. Some of difficulties arise not from the vocabulary of mathematicial writings but from their linguistic structure. Austin and Howson point to the use of quantifiers as a particular difficulty: quantifiers are often hidden in definite or indefinite articles, in words like always, everywhere and sometimes or are omitted entirely. Strevens (1974) also provides some examples which show that many simple words and expressions (e.g., let, is and for) are used in a particular lingusitic form in mathematics to convey logical relationships. Thornton (1970) has shown the considerable confusion which this causes in mathematics, and the use of the word any is especially shown to he associated with logical inconsistency. An earlier article by Thornton (1967) draws attention to the confusion which arises in manipulating symbols through use of learned phrases (cancelling, turning upsidedown, taking out brackets, taking ... as, etc.); these are aids to automatic manipulation, but are not sufficiently informal to be distinguishable from the formal mathematical terminology. Interpretation and mathematical explanation of the processes would appear to be preferable.

8. Learning Mathematics in a Weakly Known Language

A number of investigations exist of the effects of bilingual upbringing, or the change in language through migration, on childrens mathematical upbringing. Austin and Howson report various such studies. Macnamara (1967) in his study of Irish children, and Morrison and McIntyre (1971) reporting on work in the Philippines and amongst Puerto Ricans in New York, suggest that bilingualism hampers a childs progress in problem solving but not in mechanical arithmetic. Gallop and Kirkman (1972) have investigated the teaching and setting of examination papers (in both English and Welsh) in Wales and have reached the view that bilingual children may well be in an advantageous position over-all. Similar results are reported by Trevino (1968) amongst Spanish/English children, and by Giles (1969) in Canada.
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A survey paper by Engle (1975) on education through a second language provides a variety of material, not specifically mathematical. It appears to suggest, however, that there is no essential disadvantage (other circumstances being favourable) in starting to learn mathematics in a second language. It may be that some retardation may be attributable to weak understanding of the language being used; but this can eventually be made good with appropriate teaching and facilities. There is a sense in which this section might appear to contradict some earlier findings. Thus language factors have sometimes been shown to be very important: here language differences do not seem to have a significant effect. In all this, there is what may be termed a language variability question: on the one hand, there are those (such as Preston, 1978) who criticize the great variation in symbols and terminology; and on the other, there are situations in which expressing the mathematical ideas in more than one way may be beneficial. Situations in which the use of more than one system of notation may be either helpful or confusing, for example, could be quoted. The apparently advantageous effect of bilingualism may be a case in which mathematical abstraction is enhanced by linguistic variability. The way in which talk is useful in mathematics teaching (in addition to the use of texts or work-cards) may also be an example of this: the written and verbal language together convey understanding more effectively than either on its own. Certainly the discussion by Watts (1979) of the particular problems of teaching mathematics to deaf children, supports this idea.

REFERENCES
AIKEN, L.R. (1972): Language Factors in Learning Mathematics. Mathematics Education Reports, Columbus, Ohio: ERIC. ARNOLD, H. (1973): Whychildren talk; language in the primary classroom, Ed for Teaching. AUSTIN, J.L. and HOWSON, A.G. (1979): Language and mathematical education, Ed Stud Math, 10, 16197. BELL, A.W. (1979): The learning of process aspects of mathematics, Ed Stud Math, 10, 36187. BOURNE, L.E., EKSTRAND, B.R. and DOMINOWSKI, R.L. (1971): The Psychology of Thinking. Prentice Hall. CALL, R.J. and WIGGIN, N.A. (1966); Reading and mathematics, Maths Teacher, 59, 14957. EASTON, J.B. (196G): A Tudor Euclid, Scripta Mathematical, 27, 33955. HENRY, J. (1971): Essays in Education. Harmondsworth:Penguin.

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KUCHEMANN, D.E. (1978): Childrens understanding of numerical variables, Maths in School September. LOVE, E. and TAHTA, D. (1977): Language across the curriculum: mathematics, Maths Teaching, 79, 489. MACNAMARA, J.(1967): The effects of instruction in a weaker language, J Soc Issues, 23, 12034. MMARI, G.R.V. Languages and the Teaching of Science and Mathemataics with Special Reference to Africa (Accra workshop). London: Commonwealth Association for Science and Mathematics Education. MORRISON, A. and MCINTYRF, D. Schools and Socialisation. Harmondsworth: Pelican Books. NESHER, P. and TEUBAL, E. (1975): Verbal Cues as an Interfering Factor in Verbal Problem Solving, Ed Stud Math, 6, 4151. NICHOLSON, A.R. (1977); Mathematics and Language, Maths in School, 6, 5, 324. OTTERBURN, M.K. and NICHOLSON, A.R. (1976): The language of (CSE) mathematics, Maths in School, 5, 5, 1820. PHILIP, H. (1973): Article in Exeter Congress proceedings, See HOWSON, A.G. (Ed): Developments in Mathematical Education. Cambridge University Press. PIAGET, J. (1926): The Language and Thought of the Child. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. PRESTON, M. (1978): The Language and thought from the genetic point of view, Acta Psych, 10, 8898. ROTHERY, A. et al. (1980): Children Reading Maths. Worcester College of Higher Education. SAPIR, E. (1963): Language. London: Rupert Hart-Davies. SCHOEN, H.L. (1976): Self-paced mathematics instruction: how effective has it been in secondary school? Arith Teacher.

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The Language of Mathematics do you speak it?

Camille Bell-Hutchinson

Over the last two weeks I have been involved in the annual marking exercise of the mathematics examinations for the Caribbean Examinations Council (CXC). This activity always stirs various emotions within me as I come face to face with what one could interpret as the outcomes of more than ten years of mathematics instruction. There are moments of elation when responses reflect sound mathematical thinking and an understanding of the knowledge, skills and concepts being tested. And there are moments of despair when responses point to significant gaps in mathematical knowledge and skills and an inability to interpret what is required. It was in one of my moments of despair that the topic for todays article emerged. As I read through the question paper and looked at responses from candidates across the Caribbean, my thoughts went to the important role that language plays in the teaching and learning of mathematics. Most persons who have learnt mathematics will agree that there lies within the discipline a unique form of symbolic communication which provides the foundation for working with many of the central ideas of the subject. (In a later article, I will examine the challenges to learner and teacher inherent in this.) When communicating mathematics we also use words. How does mathematical English differ from ordinary English? David Pimm, an English mathematics educator who subscribes to the notion that mathematics is a language, has written extensively on the role of both written and spoken language in the mathematics classroom. He has coined the term mathematical register to denote that special vocabulary used in mathematics with precise mathematical connotations and argues that much confusion can exist within the use of the mathematical register. In particular he suggests that failure to distinguish between mathematical and ordinary English leads to incongruous errors being made by students. I remember quite vividly when, on moving to England, my son, then only six years old, was being interviewed by a teacher for placement in school. The question posed to him was What is the difference between 43 and 63? His response was One starts with a 4 and the other with a 6.

Reprinted from: Camille Bell-Hutchinson, The Language of Mathematics do you speak it? In Window on Mathematics, The Sunday Gleaner.

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While proving hilarious at the time much to his distress he was quite right. Here, the word difference was being used by the teacher within a mathematical context, but was being interpreted by my son within an everyday English language context. There are several examples where words which have one meaning in everyday use, have a quite different meaning in the mathematical register and can therefore be ambiguous. In fact, with words such as similar, relation, vulgar, odd, plane, volume, chord each carries a precise meaning when used in mathematics, but has a very different meaning in everyday life. It may be that as you read the words, some of you ascribed your own meaning to these words according to your experiences with them and you did not necessarily assign any mathematical meaning to them. Its no different for students. I cannot forget the written response a student gave to the instruction draw the plane shape formed when a cone is cut open along its edge. His drawing resembled an aero-plane! We can only speculate what might come to students minds when they encounter the word depression.

Learning to speak mathematics

It seems critical for teachers to ensure that words are used with appropriate clarification through examples and accurate definitions. In fact, Anthony Orton, in discussing this issue, wonders whether educators actually contribute to this problem. He questions whether it is a help or hindrance when teachers introduce certain topics using examples which bear no resemblance to the mathematical idea being presented, for example, when starting the topic Relations by referring to the various members of a family. He suggest that in order to facilitate the learning of mathematical ideas, it is important that children are given help with the language they will be expected to use in discussing and working with these ideas. Since precision is a key characteristic of mathematics it is vital that the language used in mathematics is precise. And even as appropriate language patterns are being fostered, allowing students to talk, offers advantages to the teachers by giving them access to the students thinking. This provides the opportunity for teachers to deal with misconceptions as they arise and for students to develop their own mathematical register and become confident in speaking mathematics correctly.

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Communicating with symbols

Camille Bell-Hutchinson

In my last article I looked at the need for precision in the use of mathematical language and discussed the difficulties which students can experience if the distinction between mathematical English and ordinary English is not carefully established in the classroom. Today, I would like to examine briefly the symbolic nature of mathematical communication and the accompanying challenges that both teachers and students must face as a consequence of this. Symbolic ways or representing ideas are not new to society. Indeed, we have become accustomed to interpreting road signs, we easily identify companies by their logos, and we recognize and use icons in our various computer software programmes. Yes, symbols have become a part of our everyday experience. Yet the ease with which we work with symbols in our day-to-day lives changes drastically as we move into the world of mathematics where symbolic usage is one of the subjects most apparent and distinctive features. No doubt, this lack of ease stems from the fact that the manner in which symbols are used, and the purposes for which they are used in mathematics are significantly different to usage of symbols in our daily lives.

CATEGORIES OF SYMBOLS
David Pimm, an English mathematics educator, identifies four distinct categories of symbols used in mathematics. At the simplest level, mathematics makes use of what Pimm calls logograms. These are special symbols not used outside a mathematical context. The dollar sign $, the signs which represent the four basic operations +, x, -, and the integral sign used widely in calculus, the greater than (>) and less than (<) signs are all examples of logograms. Then there are other types of symbols which he categorises as pictograms, (associated mostly with statistics but not restricted to this topic), punctuation symbols, (for example in symbolising ratios 5:4, where the colon is used, or the factorial notation as in n! where the exclamation sign is used), and, of course the very familiar alphabetic symbols, which are typically used in algebra. Whatever the nature of the symbols, the reality is that an understanding of mathematics demands the ability to ascribe meaning to these in a variety of contexts. And this is not necessarily an easy task for learners of mathematics. In fact, many mathematics educators believe that a significant obstacle to the learning

Reprinted from: Camille Bell-Hutchinson, Communicating with symbols. In The Daily Gleaner, Window on Mathematics, July 2001.

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of mathematics is the haste with which written symbolism is introduced with an apparent lack of sensitivity to the difficulties inherent in symbolic representation.

TRANSITION FROM ARITHMETIC TO ALGEBRA

One major area this affects is algebra, where not only are symbols often too hastily introduced, but in the transition from arithmetic to algebra, the context in which symbols are used, and therefore their meaning, also changes. So, though the same symbols may be used in both areas, these symbols are not necessarily governed by the same structural rules. For example, whereas certain combinations of symbols denote multiplication in algebra, the same combination in arithmetic denotes place value as the following illustration demonstrates. If c = 2 and d = 4, what is 3cd? In algebra this means 3 x c x d = 3 x 2 x 4. In arithmetic this means 324! The use of letters as physical objects raises another potential difficulty in the early study of algebra. 4a + 3b for example, is often taken to mean 4 apples plus 3 bananas especially when introducing the concepts of like and unlike terms. While this may provide an easy route for teachers to convince children that unlike terms cannot be added, using such examples detracts from the mathematical meaning attached to the terms. This can sow seeds of potential difficulties when students need to think of the letters as representing either fixed numbers (as in the solution of 2x + 1 = 5, for example) or varying numbers (such as x > 5). Communicating with symbols lies at the heart of mathematics. As Anthony Orton puts it Written symbols are the stock in trade of mathematicians and are the essential tools for the subjects study. It seems vital, therefore, to ensure that students develop the conceptual understanding necessary for them to use and interpret the wide variety of symbols they encounter as they study this rather intriguing discipline.

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Mathematics Through Problem Solving

Margaret Taplin

WHAT IS A PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACH?

As the emphasis has shifted from teaching problem solving to teaching via problem solving (Lester, Masingila, Mau, Lambdin, dos Santon and Raymond, 1994), many writers have attempted to clarify what is meant by a problem-solving approach to teaching mathematics. The focus is on teaching mathematical topics through problem-solving contexts and enquiry-oriented environments which are characterised by the teacher helping students construct a deep understanding of mathematical ideas and processes by engaging them in doing mathematics: creating, conjecturing, exploring, testing, and verifying (Lester et al., 1994, p. 154). Specific characteristics of a problem-solving approach include: interactions between students/students and teacher/students (Van Zoest et al., 1994) mathematical dialogue and consensus between students (Van Zoest et al., 1994) teachers providing just enough information to establish background/intent of the problem, and students clarifying, interpreting, and attempting to construct one or more solution processes (Cobb et al., 1991) teachers accepting right/wrong answers in a non-evaluative way (Cobb et al., 1991) teachers guiding, coaching, asking insightful questions and sharing in the process of solving problems (Lester et al., 1994) teachers knowing when it is appropriate to intervene, and when to step back and let the pupils make their own way (Lester et al., 1994) a further characteristic is that a problem-solving approach can be used to encourage students to make generalisations about rules and concepts, a process which is central to mathematics (Evan and Lappin, 1994).

Schoenfeld (in Olkin and Schoenfeld, 1994, p. 43) described the way in which the use of problem solving in his teaching has changed since the 1970s:
My early problem-solving courses focused on problems amenable to solutions by Polyatype heuristics: draw a diagram, examine special cases or analogies, specialize, generalize, and so on. Over the years the courses evolved to the point where they focused less on heuristics per se and more on introducing students to fundamental ideas: the importance of mathematical reasoning and proof..., for example, and of sustained mathematical

Source: http://www.mathgoodies.com/articles/problem_solving.shtm

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investigations (where my problems served as starting points for serious explorations, rather than tasks to be completed).

Schoenfeld also suggested that a good problem should be one which can be extended to lead to mathematical explorations and generalisations. He described three characteristics of mathematical thinking: 1. Valuing the processes of mathematization and abstraction and having the predilection to apply them 2. Developing competence with the tools of the trade and using those tools in the service of the goal of understanding structure mathematical sense-making (Schoenfeld, 1994, p. 60). 3. As Cobb et al. (1991) suggested, the purpose for engaging in problem solving is not just to solve specific problems, but to encourage the interiorization and reorganization of the involved schemes as a result of the activity (p. 187). Not only does this approach develop students confidence in their own ability to think mathematically (Schifter and Fosnot, 1993), it is a vehicle for students to construct, evaluate and refine their own theories about mathematics and the theories of others (NCTM, 1989). Because it has become so predominant a requirement of teaching, it is important to consider the processes themselves in more detail.

The Role of Problem Solving in Teaching Mathematics as a Process

Problem solving is an important component of mathematics education because it is the single vehicle which seems to be able to achieve at school level all three of the values of mathematics listed at the outset of this article: functional, logical and aesthetic. Let us consider how problem-solving is a useful medium for each of these. It has already been pointed out that mathematics is an essential discipline because of its practical role to the individual and society. Through a problem-solving approach, this aspect of mathematics can be developed. Presenting a problem and developing the skills needed to solve that problem is more motivational than teaching the skills without a context. Such motivation gives problem solving special value as a vehicle for learning new concepts and skills or the reinforcement of skills already acquired (Stanic and Kilpatrick, 1989, NCTM, 1989). Approaching mathematics through problem solving can create a context which simulates real life and therefore justifies the mathematics rather than treating it as an end in itself. The National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM, 1980) recommended that problem solving be the focus of mathematics teaching because, they say, it encompasses skills and functions which are an important part of everyday life. Furthermore it can help people to adapt to changes and unexpected problems in their careers and other aspects of their lives. More recently the Council endorsed this recommendation (NCTM, 1989) with the statement that problem solving should underly all aspects of mathematics teaching in order to give students experience of the power of mathematics in the world around them. They see problem solving as a vehicle for students to construct, evaluate and refine their own theories about mathematics and the theories of others.

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According to Resnick (1987) a problem-solving approach contributes to the practical use of mathematics by helping people to develop the facility to be adaptable when, for instance, technology breaks down. It can thus also help people to transfer into new work environments at this time when most are likely to be faced with several career changes during a working lifetime (NCTM, 1989). Resnick expressed the belief that school should focus its efforts on preparing people to be good adaptive learners, so that they can perform effectively when situations are unpredictable and task demands change (p. 18). Cockcroft (1982) also advocated problem solving as a means of developing mathematical thinking as a tool for daily living, saying that problem-solving ability lies at the heart of mathematics (p. 73) because it is the means by which mathematics can be applied to a variety of unfamiliar situations. Problem solving is, however, more than a vehicle for teaching and reinforcing mathematical knowledge and helping to meet everyday challenges. It is also a skill which can enhance logical reasoning. Individuals can no longer function optimally in society by just knowing the rules to follow to obtain a correct answer. They also need to be able to decide through a process of logical deduction what algorithm, if any, a situation requires, and sometimes need to be able to develop their own rules in a situation an algorithm cannot be directly applied. For these reasons problem solving can be developed as a valuable skill in itself, a way of thinking (NCTM, 1989), rather than just as the means to an end of finding the correct answer. Many writers have emphasised the importance of problem solving as a means of developing the logical thinking aspect of mathematics. If education fails to contribute to the development of the intelligence, it is obviously incomplete. Yet intelligence is essentially the ability to solve problems: everyday problems, personal problems ... (Polya, 1980, p. 1). Modern definitions of intelligence (Gardner, 1985) talk about practical intelligence which enables the individual to resolve genuine problems or difficulties that he or she encounters (p. 60) and also encourages the individual to find or create problems thereby laying the groundwork for the acquisition of new knowledge (p. 85). As was pointed out earlier, standard mathematics, with the emphasis on the acquisition of knowledge, does not necessarily cater for these needs. Resnick (1987) described the discrepancies which exist between the algorithmic approaches taught in schools and the invented strategies which most people use in the workforce in order to solve practical problems which do not always fit neatly into a taught algorithm. As she says, most people have developed rules of thumb for calculating, for example, quantities, discounts or the amount of change they should give, and these rarely involve standard algorithms. Training in problem-solving techniques equips people more readily with the ability to adapt to such situations. A further reason why a problem-solving approach is valuable is as an aesthetic form. Problem solving allows the student to experience a range of emotions associated with various stages in teh solution process. Mathematicians who successfully solve problems say that the experience of having done so contributes to an appreciation for the power and beauty of mathematics (NCTM, 1989, p. 77), the joy of banging your head against a mathematical wall, and then discovering that there might be ways of either going around or over the wall (Olkin and Schoenfeld, 1994, p. 43).

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They also speak of the willingness or even desire to engage with a task for a length of time which causes the task to cease being a puzzle and allows it to become a problem. However, although it is this engagement which initially motivates the solver to pursue a problem, it is still necessary for certain techniques to be available for the involvement to continue successfully. Hence more needs to be understood about what these techniques are and how they can best be made available. In the past decade it has been suggested that problem solving techniques can be made available most effectively through making problem solving the focus of the mathematics curriculum. Although mathematical problems have traditionally been a part of the mathematics curriculum, it has been only comparatively recently that problem solving has come to be regarded as an important medium for teaching and learning mathematics (Stanic and Kilpatrick, 1989). In the past problem solving had a place in the mathematics classroom, but it was usually used in a token way as a starting point to obtain a single correct answer, usually by following a single correct procedure. More recently, however, professional organisations such as the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM, 1980 and 1989) have recommended that the mathematics curriculum should be organized around the problem solving, focusing on: (i) developing skills and the ability to apply these skills to unfamiliar situations (ii) gathering, organising, interpreting and communicating information (iii) formulating key questions, analyzing and conceptualizing problems, defining problems and goals, discovering patterns and similarities, seeking out appropriate data, experimenting, transferring skills and strategies to new situations (iv) developing curiosity, confidence and open-mindedness (NCTM, 1980, pp. 23). One of the aims of teaching through problem solving is to encourage students to refine and build onto their own processes over a period of time as their experiences allow them to discard some ideas and become aware of further possibilities (Carpenter, 1989). As well as developing knowledge, the students are also developing an understanding of when it is appropriate to use particular strategies. Through using this approach the emphasis is on making the students more responsible for their own learning rather than letting them feel that the algorithms they use are the inventions of some external and unknown expert. There is considerable importance placed on exploratory activities, observation and discovery, and trial and error. Students need to develop their own theories, test them, test the theories of others, discard them if they are not consistent, and try something else (NCTM, 1989). Students can become more involved in problem solving by formulating and solving their own problems, or by rewriting problems in their own words in order to facilitates understanding. It is of particular importance to note that they are encouraged to discuss the processes which they are undertaking, in order to improve understanding, gain new insights into the problem and communicate their ideas (Thompson, 1985, Stacey and Groves, 1985).

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CONCLUSION
It has been suggested in this chapter that there are many reasons why a problemsolving approach can contribute significantly to the outcomes of a mathematics education. Not only is it a vehicle for developing logical thinking, it can provide students with a context for learning mathematical knowledge, it can enhance transfer of skills to unfamiliar situations and it is an aesthetic form in itself. A problem-solving approach can provide a vehicle for students to construct their own ideas about mathematics and to take responsibility for their own learning. There is little doubt that the mathematics program can be enhanced by the establishment of an environment in which students are exposed to teaching via problem solving, as opposed to more traditional models of teaching about problem solving. The challenge for teachers, at all levels, is to develop the process of mathematical thinking alongside the knowledge and to seek opportunities to present even routine mathematics tasks in problem-solving contexts.

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REFERENCES
Carpenter, T. P. (1989). Teaching as problem solving. In R. I. Charles and E. A. Silver (Eds), The Teaching and Assessing of Mathematical Problem Solving, (pp. 187202). USA: National Council of Teachers of Mathematics. Clarke, D. and McDonough, A. (1989). The problems of the problem solving classroom, The Australian Mathematics Teacher, 45, 3, 2024. Cobb, P., Wood, T. and Yackel, E. (1991). A constructivist approach to second grade mathematics. in von Glaserfield, E. (Ed.), Radical Constructivism in Mathematics Education, pp. 157176. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Cockcroft, W.H. (Ed.) (1982). Mathematics Counts. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Teaching of Mathematics in Schools, London: Her Majestys Stationery Office. Evan, R. and Lappin, G. (1994). Constructing meaningful understanding of mathematics content, in Aichele, D. and Coxford, A. (Eds.) Professional Development for Teachers of Mathematics, pp. 128143. Reston, Virginia: NCTM. Gardner, Howard (1985). Frames of Mind. N.Y: Basic Books. Lester, F.K. Jr., Masingila, J.O., Mau, S.T., Lambdin, D.V., dos Santon, V.M. and Raymond, A.M. (1994). Learning how to teach via problem solving, in Aichele, D. and Coxford, A. (Eds.) Professional Development for Teachers of Mathematics, pp. 152 166. Reston, Virginia: NCTM. National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM) (1980). An Agenda for Action: Recommendations for School Mathematics of the 1980s, Reston, Virginia: NCTM. National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM) (1989). Curriculum and Evaluation Standards for School Mathematics, Reston, Virginia: NCTM. Olkin. I. & Schoenfeld. A. (1994). A discussion of Bruce Reznicks chapter. In A. Schoenfeld (Ed.). Mathematical Thinking and Problem Solving. (pp. 3951). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Polya, G. (1980). On solving mathematical problems in high school. In S. Krolik (Ed). Problem Solving in School Mathematics, (pp.12). Reston, Virginia: NCTM. Resnick. L. B. Learning in school and out, Educational Researcher, 16, 1120. Romberg, T. (1994). Classroom instruction that fosters mathematical thinking and problem solving: connections between theory and practice. In A. Schoenfeld (Ed.). Mathematical Thinking and Problem Solving (pp. 287304). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

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Schifter, D. and Fosnot, C. (1993). Reconstructing Mathematics Education. NY: Teachers College Press. Schoenfeld, A. (1994). Reflections on doing and teaching mathematics. In A. Schoenfeld (Ed.). Mathematical Thinking and Problem Solving (pp. 5369). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Stacey, K. and Groves, S. (1985) Strategies for Problem Solving, Melbourne, Victoria: VICTRACC. Stanic, G. and Kilpatrick, J. ( 1989). Historical perspectives on problem solving in the mathematics curriculum. In R. I. Charles and E.A. Silver (Eds), The Teaching and Assessing of Mathematical Problem Solving (pp. 122). USA: National Council of Teachers of Mathematics. Swafford, J.O. (1995). Teacher preparation. in Carl, I.M. (Ed.) Prospects for School Mathematics, pp. 157174. Reston, Virginia: NCTM. Thompson, P. W. (1985). Experience, problem solving, and learning mathematics: considerations in developing mathematics curricula. In E.A. Silver (Ed.), Teaching and Learning Mathematical Problem Solving: Multiple Research Perspectives, (pp. 189 236). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Van Zoest, L., Jones, G. and Thornton, C. (1994). Beliefs about mathematics teaching held by pre-service teachers involved in a first grade mentorship program. Mathematics Education Research Journal. 6(l): 3755.

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Caribbean Examinations Council Regional Workshop Mathematics October 30-November 1, 1996

Camille E. Hutchinson

DIAGNOSIS
Central to all the activities which occur in the mathematics classroom is the element of diagnosis finding out what went on in a students mind as he/she worked through a given mathematics problem. This is not only one of the most challenging aspects of the teaching of mathematics but is also the most critical if effective teaching is to occur. What is diagnosis? How do we apply this art to the day-to-day activities of the already hectic classroom? In the dictionary1. diagnosis is defined as the identification of diseases from the examination of symptoms. To many this definition is seen, on the surface, as being applicable only to the medical field. And understandably so. However, on further examination it seems quite in order to compare medical diagnosis with diagnosis as it applies to teaching. In fact, this is exactly what Cooney (1975)2 has done:
We may approach the consideration of diagnosis by drawing an analogy between what a doctor does. If you are ill and seek the services of a doctor she probably asks you what the trouble is. You tell her how you feel and perhaps what you think. Depending on what your discomfort is, the doctor asks you some questionsShe may ask you to have an x-ray, one or more blood tests, a urinalysis or other tests. The doctor does all this to collect data that form the basis of subsequent diagnosis what the cause of the discomfort is. Having made the diagnosis she then prescribes remediation The end result is hopefully, removal of the difficulty. p. 203.

Diagnosis in the classroom is very much like the above. Let us look at the steps involved. (1) The teacher has to determine exactly what type of error is being made. This can only be done by careful analysis of the students work. (The blood tests, x-ray etc) Here, one has to be careful. Is the error due to mere carelessness? (Is it just poor diet?) Is it a clear lack of understanding of the underlying

Collins Dictionary and Thesarus. 1987

Cooney et al. Dynamics of Teaching Secondary Mathematics. Hoaughton Mifflin Co. (1967)

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concept(s)? ( Is it life threatening?) These questions must be carefully addressed since it is the answers gleaned here which informs the next stage. (2) Having collected the information, it now becomes necessary for the teacher to make judgement, as to the cause of the error(s) identified. This judgement may or may not be correct. In order to test its correctness, further testing must take place with appropriate items which will either prove or disprove the judgement made. (A biopsy has to be done). In addition, teachers should engage students in oral discussions in order to obtain a clearer insight into their thinking.

Having done all of the above however, the problem itself is still present. The effective teacher now takes the information gained in (1) and (2) and moves to step (3). (3) Remediation (prescription). The teacher assesses the information gained and uses it to set up remediation programmes, which will assist in correcting the misconceptions.

Very often the misconceptions discovered stretch far back to earlier learning and if the stage at which they are discovered is near to major examinations, such as CXC examinations, teachers often find it difficult to adequately prepare students. This serves to underscore the importance of early diagnosis, which just as in medicine, is highly desirable not only for remedial treatment but as a preventative measure.

How do we apply diagnosis to the day-to-day activities of the classroom?

Rees and Barr (1984)3 suggest that one important aspect in diagnosis is the development of appropriate diagnostic tasks. The tasks must be both related to the curriculum of the learners and effective for diagnosis. Questions should be clear and unambiguous if proper use is to be made of the information obtained. Multiple choice tasks may be used because the distractors can be designed to reflect common ways of incorrect thinking. Most importantly, tasks must be so chosen as to expose the algorithm being used by the learner. For example, the items below look similar, but to the learner they present quite different kinds of difficulties. Can you see how important it is to set the right type of task in order for real understanding to be assessed? Of course, we know that students seem to prefer straight algorithmic procedures which they can apply with minimum thinking. Evidence from the CXC examinations in mathematics suggest that there is often very little thinking taking place and that algorithms are being applied without evidence of understanding. Teachers need to be sensitive to this from very early in the school, so that pitfalls can be avoided later on. Rees and Barr sum it up very well:

Rees. Ruth and George Barr Diagnosis and Prescription. Some Common Maths Problems. Harper and Row Ltd London. 1984.

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A Learner Algorithmic 0.4 x 0.4 0.16 A teacher marks Practice tasks written 0.9 x 0.9 0.8 x 0.8 0.7 x 0.7 (2 digits in answer) 0.5 x 0.4 0.4 x 0.4 Could be 10 10 but Diagnostic 0.3 x 0.37 0.9 marks

but

0.3 x 0.3 0.2 x 0.2 0.4 x 0.2 0.1 x 0.1 May be 0 10

(1 digit in answer)

Effective early diagnosis can be a great saver of time. . .The prescription which should follow involves turning the microscope on ourselves: thinking more carefully of the tasks we set, looking and listening to the way they are carried out, watching the language we use to explain mathematical ideas.

CONCLUSION
Let us conclude by repeating what was stated in the first paragraph. Diagnosis is the central activity to effective teaching. On a daily basis teachers should be setting tasks which will reveal misconceptions early in the learning process. If this approach is used as part of the routine of teaching much of the difficulties experienced by students later in school could be alleviated and that final year preparation for external examinations may not be as traumatic as it now is for many students. We need to be committed to this task if we truly seek to improve the standard of mathematics in our region.

Both learners and teachers need to As teachers we need to be So that our students may have the

LOOK, LISTEN and LEARN AWARE, EXPLICIT and FLEXIBLE CONCEPT, COMPETENCE and CONFIDENCE4

Ibid. P15

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