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July 2003
DEFENSE
MANAGEMENT
Opportunities to
Reduce Corrosion
Costs and Increase
Readiness
GAO-03-753
a
July 2003
DEFENSE MANAGEMENT
The Department of Defense (DOD) Although the full impact of corrosion cannot be quantified due to the limited
maintains equipment and amount of reliable data captured by DOD and the military services, current
infrastructure worth billions of cost estimates, readiness, and safety data indicate that corrosion has a
dollars in many environments substantial impact on military equipment and infrastructure. In 2001, a
where corrosion is causing military government-sponsored study estimated the costs of corrosion for military
assets to deteriorate, shortening
their useful life. The resulting
systems and infrastructure at about $20 billion annually and found corrosion
increase in required repairs and to be one of the largest components of life-cycle costs for weapon systems.
replacements drives up costs and Corrosion also reduces readiness because the need to repair or replace
takes critical systems out of action, corrosion damage increases the downtime of critical military assets. For
reducing mission readiness. example, a recent study concluded that corrective maintenance of corrosion-
related faults has degraded the readiness of all of the Army’s approximately
GAO was asked to review military 2,450 force modernization helicopters. Finally, a number of serious safety
activities related to corrosion concerns have also been associated with corrosion, including Navy F-14 and
control. Specifically, this report F-18 landing gear failures during carrier operations and crashes of several
examines the extent of the impact Air Force F-16 aircraft due to the corrosion of electrical contacts that
of corrosion on DOD and the control fuel valves.
military services and the extent of
the effectiveness of DOD’s and the
services’ approach to preventing DOD and the military services do not have an effective approach to prevent
and mitigating corrosion. and mitigate corrosion. They have had some successes in addressing
corrosion problems on individual programs, but several weaknesses are
preventing DOD and the military services from achieving much greater
benefits, including potentially billions of dollars in additional net savings
The departmentwide strategic plan annually. Each service has multiple corrosion offices, and their different
currently being developed should policies, procedures, and funding channels limit coordination. Also, the goals
contain clearly defined goals;
and incentives that guide these offices sometimes conflict with those of the
measurable, outcome-oriented
objectives; and performance operational commands that they rely on to fund project implementation. As
measures. The strategy should also a result, proposed projects are often assigned a lower priority compared to
identify standardized methods for efforts offering more immediate results. Together, these problems reduce
evaluating project proposals, the effectiveness of DOD corrosion prevention. While DOD is in the process
estimating resource needs, and of establishing a central corrosion control activity and strategy, it remains to
coordinating projects in an be seen whether these efforts will effectively address these weaknesses.
interservice and servicewide
context. The military services Examples of Corrosion Damage in the South Pacific
should develop overarching
strategic plans consistent with the
departmentwide plan. In written
comments, DOD agreed with all of
these recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-753.
Letter 1
Results in Brief 3
Background 4
Impacts on Military Costs, Readiness, and Safety Indicate That
Corrosion Is an Extensive Problem 6
DOD and Services’ Approach to Corrosion Control Is Not Effective
but Has Achieved Some Successes 21
Conclusion 38
Recommendations for Executive Action 39
Agency Comments 40
Appendixes
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 42
Appendix II: Examples of Corrosion Prevention Efforts That Have
Not Realized Their Full Potential 45
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense 52
Abbreviations
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1
Readiness is generally defined as a measure of the Department of Defense’s ability
to provide the capabilities needed to execute the mission specified in the National
Military Strategy. At the unit level, readiness refers to the ability of units, such as Army
divisions, Navy ships, and Air Force wings, to provide capabilities required of the
combatant commands.
2
P.L.107-314, section 1067.
DOD and the military services do not have an effective approach to prevent
and mitigate corrosion. While the military services have achieved some
successes on individual corrosion prevention projects, their overall
approach to corrosion control has significant weaknesses that have
decreased the effectiveness of their efforts. For example, DOD does not
have a strategic plan for corrosion prevention and mitigation, and the
services have either not developed such plans or have not implemented
them. While DOD is in the process of establishing a central corrosion
3
Cost estimates were not audited.
4
Koch, Gerhardus H. et al., Corrosion Cost and Prevention Strategies in the United States,
CC Technologies and NACE International in cooperation with the U.S. Department of
Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Sept. 30, 2001.
5
Corrosion in DOD Systems: Data Collection and Analysis (Phase I), Harold Mindlin
et al.; Metals Information Analysis Center, February 1996.
6
For example, the average age of the Air Force aircraft fleet is 22 years. By fiscal year 2020,
the average age will increase to nearly 30 years, with current programmed investments. This
would translate to 60-year-old tankers, 47-year-old reconnaissance/surveillance platforms,
and 44-year-old bombers. (The B-52 would be nearly 60 years old.)
Impacts on Military Numerous studies in recent years have documented the pervasive nature of
corrosion and its various effects on military equipment and infrastructure.
Costs, Readiness, and Although the full impact of corrosion cannot be quantified due to the
Safety Indicate That limited amount of reliable data captured by DOD and the military services,
current cost estimates, readiness, and safety data indicate that corrosion
Corrosion Is an has a substantial effect on military equipment and infrastructure. Costs are
Extensive Problem significant because corroded military assets must often be repaired or
replaced at great expense. Readiness is also severely impaired because
corrosion increases the maintenance needed and, therefore, the downtime
on a large quantities of military equipment. The effects extend to
infrastructure, which, in turn, has an adverse impact on the military’s
ability to meet mission requirements. Further, corrosion has an equally
profound effect on the safety of equipment and infrastructure.
7
U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding
Priorities and Strategic Planning Needed to Improve the Condition of Military
Facilities, GAO-03-274 (Washington, D.C.: February 2003).
8
Corrosion Prevention for Wheeled Vehicles, DOD Inspector General Audit Report,
Number 93-156, August 13, 1993.
9
U.S. Army TACOM-ARDEC communication referenced in Corrosion Costs
and Preventative Strategies in the United States, Gerhardus H. Koch, Ph.D., et al.;
CC Technologies Laboratories, Inc., September 30, 2001.
10
Cost of Corrosion: Final Report, prepared for Air Force Research Laboratory,
NCI Systems, Inc., Fairborn, Ohio, March 26, 2003.
Corrosion and its impact on readiness are especially a concern for the
Navy, because its ships operate in highly corrosive salt water and in
high-humidity locations. A notable example of these effects occurred in
2001 on the aircraft carrier USS John F Kennedy. Maintenance problems,
including many that were corrosion-related, were so severe that the
carrier could not complete its planned operations. Even more recently, the
carrier USS Kitty Hawk returned from a series of deployments, including
Operation Enduring Freedom, with significant maintenance problems
that also included topside corrosion. As a result, the carrier is expected
to undergo extensive maintenance.
Corrosion Poses Numerous Corrosion also poses numerous safety risks and is a source of major
Safety Risks concern to all military services. This concern is particularly acute when
associated with the safety of military aircraft. According to an Army study,
from 1989 through 2000 the Army experienced 46 mishaps, 9 fatalities,
and 13 injuries directly related to corrosion. During calendar year 2001, the
Army issued four Safety of Flight messages for its rotary wing systems due
to corrosion-related material deficiencies that adversely affected 2,100,
or over 88 percent, of its force modernization helicopters. As recently as
March 2002, the Navy suspended carrier operations for F-14 aircraft when
one aircraft crashed because its landing gear collapsed due to corrosion.
Pipelines that contain natural gas and other kinds of fuel also pose a
safety risk at military facilities. A majority of the pipelines are quite old and
are constructed largely of metal that is susceptible to corrosion, which is
the major cause of pipeline ruptures. Air Force facilities officials told us
that some of the pipelines were installed as far back as the 1950s, and
older pipelines pose an even greater hazard because they have a higher
probability of rupturing from corrosion. The services are gradually
replacing many of the metal pipelines with pipelines made of high-density
polyethylene plastic and other materials that are more corrosion resistant.
The use of cathodic protection devices also helps to prevent corrosion.
Facilities officials told us that despite these measures and periodic
inspections, they have experienced numerous pipeline ruptures they
attribute to corrosion. They said that until all of the existing pipelines are
replaced, such ruptures will continue to be a source of major concern.
However, replacing pipelines is very expensive, and facilities officials said
that it would take many years to obtain enough funds to replace all of them.
Facilities officials at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, said
that they have experienced several fuel line ruptures, many of them caused
by corroded pipe valves. They said fuel lines that run alongside base
housing pose the greatest safety concern, and they have begun to replace
these lines first. Eventually they hope to replace all of them throughout
the base.
11
Corrosion in DOD Systems: Data Collection and Analysis (Phase I), Harold Mindlin,
et al.; Metals Information Analysis Center, February 1996; and Corrosion Costs and
Preventative Strategies in the United States, Gerhardus H. Koch, Ph.D. et al.; CC
Technologies Laboratories, Inc., September 30, 2001.
12
Aviation Systems Performance Readiness and Corrosion Study (ASPRCS), Ken Mitchell,
Study Director, Center for Army Analysis, 2001.
13
A Study to Determine the Annual Direct Cost of Corrosion Maintenance for Weapon
Systems and Equipment in the United States Air Force, prepared for the Air Force Corrosion
Program Office, NCI Information Systems, Inc., Fairborn, Ohio, February 6, 1998.
Officials told us that the corrosion maintenance costs they would avoid in
the first year alone would exceed the total amount of funding needed to
build an additional facility, but they do not have the data or resources to
support the necessary analysis, and without it they cannot justify the
project or obtain approval for the funds.
Some Corrosion Prevention Major commands, program offices, and research and development
Improvements Are Being centers servicewide have made and continue to make improvements
in the methods and techniques for preventing corrosion. Corrosion
Introduced during and
prevention improvements can either be introduced during the design and
after Acquisition production phases or some time after equipment is fielded. For example,
Production Process durable coatings, composite materials, and cathodic protection are being
incorporated to an increasing extent in the design and construction of
military facilities and equipment to reduce corrosion-related maintenance.
Systems as diverse as the joint strike fighter, the DD-X destroyer,
amphibious assault vehicles, and HMMWV trucks plan to use composite
materials and advanced protective coatings to increase corrosion
resistance. The military services estimate that as much as 25 to 35 percent
of corrosion costs can be eliminated by using these and other corrosion
prevention efforts, which would amount to billions of dollars in potential
savings each year. Our recent report on total ownership costs of military
equipment discusses some of the approaches DOD is using to incorporate
maintenance reduction techniques, including corrosion mitigation, into the
design and development of new systems.14
14
U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently
Could Reduce Weapon Systems’ Total Ownership Costs, GAO-03-57 (Washington, D.C.:
February 2003).
Project officials claimed net savings of $225 million through the end of
fiscal year 2002. While officials state the project has proven to be a success
so far, they now estimate that it will take about 15 years to achieve the total
projected savings, or 5 years longer than originally planned. Army National
Guard officials told us they could achieve greater savings if they receive
additional funding earlier than is currently planned.
The Air Force’s bomb metalization project is also not achieving its full
cost savings potential. According to an Air Force study, treating cast iron,
general-purpose bombs with a special protective metallic spray coating
would save the Air Force at least $30 million in maintenance costs over
30 years, although one study estimated the savings to be as much as
$100 million. The Air Force stores about 450,000 of this type of bomb in
locations throughout the world. Air Force officials told us that the total
investment costs for the project are about $5 million, which, based on the
higher cost savings estimate, translates into a return on investment ratio
Strategic Plan Lacking for DOD does not currently have a strategic plan for corrosion prevention and
DOD and Service mitigation, and the services either have not developed such plans or have
not implemented them.
Corrosion Efforts
However, DOD is required within 1 year of enactment of the
Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003
(i.e., by December 2, 2003) to submit to Congress a report setting forth
its long-term strategy to reduce corrosion and the effects of corrosion on
military equipment and infrastructure.15 The act requires DOD include in
its long-term strategy performance measures and milestones for reducing
corrosion that are compatible with the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993 (GPRA).16 GPRA offers a model for developing an
effective management framework to improve the likelihood of successfully
implementing initiatives and assessing results. Under GPRA, agencies at all
levels are required to set strategic goals, measure performance, identify
levels of resources needed, and report on the degree to which goals have
been met. Without implementing these critical performance-measuring
elements, management is unable to identify and prioritize projects
systematically, allocate resources effectively, and determine which
projects have been successful. As a result, managers are not in a position to
make sound investment decisions on proposed corrosion control projects.
15
No later than 18 months after date of enactment of the act GAO is required to submit to
Congress an assessment of the extent that DOD has implemented its long-term strategy to
reduce corrosion.
16
P.L. 103-62, Aug. 3, 1993.
• In 1998, the Air Force published a business plan for equipment corrosion
control, but the plan was implemented for a short time and did not
contain all of the elements of a strategic plan. For example, it identified
three management goals,19 but did not include performance measures.
Also, the Air Force Equipment Maintenance Instruction that identifies
responsibilities for the Air Force Corrosion Prevention and Control
Office does not identify goals or performance measures. Although an Air
Force Instruction on Performance Management states that performance
17
Performance measures can include such data as return on investment, frequency of
required corrosion maintenance, equipment availability, readiness rates, and mean time
between failures.
18
The plan included three main objectives: decrease life-cycle costs by 40 percent, increase
readiness by reducing downtime, and reduce the maintenance burden on diminishing active
and reserve workforce resources.
19
The goals are as follows: (1) identify, advance and apply emerging materials and
processes to existing and future weapon systems; (2) identify current corrosion traits of
weapon systems and logistics processes, and (3) maintain data and technical manuals
related to corrosion control and provide expert consultation and technical support to field
and depot activities.
• The Navy commands (Naval Air Systems Command and Naval Sea
Systems Command) have engaged in some strategic planning for
corrosion control, but the Navy does not have a servicewide strategic
plan in this area, and its corrosion control offices lack the information
and metrics needed to track progress. The Naval Air Systems Command
planned to establish a corrosion control and prevention office but the
plan—which included goals and objectives and outlined how progress
would be measured—was never approved. The corrosion control and
prevention activity at Naval Sea Systems Command is also not a formal
program, and it lacks clearly defined overall goals and objectives. This
office has identified cost avoidance projects and tracks the amount of
savings achieved to date. However, more could be done to monitor
performance. For example, there was no analysis of the reasons why
specific projects were proceeding at a slow pace. Without this
information, the office is not in a position to know what actions can be
taken to improve the effectiveness of these projects.
• The Marine Corps has a corrosion control plan that includes long-term,
broadly stated goals but does not include measurable, outcome-oriented
objectives or performance measures. Marine Corps officials told us that
they are in the process of revising the plan to include measures that will
track progress toward achieving servicewide goals.
20
Integrated Product Teams are comprised of individuals representing a variety of
competencies or disciplines such as material science, system engineering, logistics,
and environmental management. These teams are assembled to take a multidisciplinary
approach to finding solutions to routine and nonroutine maintenance and acquisition
problems.
Limited Coordination Within DOD has multiple corrosion control efforts—with different policies,
and Among the Services procedures, and funding channels—that are not well coordinated with each
other; as a result, opportunities for cost savings have been lost. DOD is in
the process of establishing a central corrosion control office in response to
the authorization act, but no single office exists within each of the military
services to provide leadership and oversight for corrosion control of
equipment and infrastructure. Although the services have attempted to
establish central corrosion control offices, the responsibility largely falls
on numerous commands, installations, and program offices to fund and
implement projects. Military officials told us the offices were not fully
established, primarily because of limited funding. The Army, for example,
has established a central office for corrosion control of all service
equipment; the chain of command for the Army corrosion office for
facilities is separate from this office. Although a central office for
equipment exists, each Army command also has separate corrosion control
offices that are responsible for certain types of equipment—for example,
tanks/automotive, aviation/missiles, armaments, and electronics. Further,
individual weapon system program offices within each command may have
their own corrosion control functions. In addition, installations implement
their own corrosion control projects with the assistance of the Army
Department of Public Works and the Army Corps of Engineers. The
recently established Army Installation Management Agency provides
overall management and funding for upkeep on Army installations.
The Navy and Air Force also have multiple corrosion prevention and
mitigation offices. The Navy manages them through the materials offices
within the Naval Sea Systems Command and Naval Aviation Command.
The Air Force Materiel Command manages the Air Force’s efforts at an
office located at Robins Air Force Base. Like the Army, these commands
have multiple weapon systems program offices that also plan and
implement corrosion projects. The Navy and Air Force also have separate
organizations that are responsible for corrosion prevention and mitigation
efforts related to infrastructure. The Naval Facilities Engineering Center at
Port Hueneme, California, provides this service for both the Navy and
Marine Corps and, in turn, relies on the individual installations to manage
and implement their own efforts. The Air Force Civil Engineering Support
Agency provides this service for the Air Force.
Source: GAO.
These officials were unable to acquire the shelters because they did
not have the time or resources to undertake the analysis necessary to
support the purchase. They were aware that temporary shelters are
being used at other Marine Corps and Army installations, but they did
not know how the installations acquired the shelters or justified their
purchase. The officials suggested a standard mechanism for gathering
and communicating the information necessary to justify purchase of
the shelters.
• The Air Force conducted a series of multiyear studies that found that
using inexpensive corrosion-inhibiting lubricants on aircraft electrical
connectors has the potential to save hundreds of millions of dollars
annually. (See fig. 9.)
• Army National Guard officials in Hawaii told us that they were not
aware of the status of the Army’s nearby corrosion inhibitor application
center. (See fig. 10.) The facility currently has the capacity to apply
corrosion inhibitors to about 6,000 vehicles per year. National Guard
officials told us that they often store vehicles for long periods of time,
and corrosion is always a problem. They indicated interest in finding
out more about the Army’s facility and any opportunities for
participating with the Army if the corrosion inhibitors can reduce
corrosion cost effectively.
21
Technical Manual Organizational/Unit and Intermediate Maintenance, Avionics Cleaning
and Corrosion Control, NAVAIR 16-1-540, Air Force TO-1-1-689, Army TM-1-1500-343-23;
September 1, 2000.
Source: GAO.
22
Special working groups—within and across the services—have been established, such as
the Joint Council for Aging Aircraft, Air Force Corrosion Prevention and Advisory Boards,
and various Science and Technology Advisor programs. DOD has also established working
groups such as the Maintenance Technology Senior Steering Group, Joint Technology
Exchange Group, and the Joint Logistics Commanders to share information on acquisition
and maintenance issues, including corrosion control.
Conflicting Incentives and Because of the differing priorities between short-term operational needs
Priorities Limit Corrosion and long-term preventative maintenance needs, corrosion projects are
often given a low priority.
Project Implementation
Corrosion control offices act largely in an advisory role, providing
guidance, information, and expertise on initiatives and practices. They
have limited funding and authority, and they promote initiatives with
benefits that may not become apparent until a project is far along in its
implementation, which may be years in the future. These priorities and
incentives are very different from and sometimes conflict with those held
by the operational or installation commands and their subordinate units.
While these commands also strive for better corrosion prevention, they
place a greater emphasis on more immediate, short-term needs that are
directly tied to current operations.
Source: GAO.
Conclusion At present, DOD and the military services do not systematically assess
proposals for corrosion control projects, related implementation issues,
or the results of implemented projects, and they disseminate project
results on a limited, ad hoc basis. Without a more systematic approach
to corrosion problems, prevention efforts that have a high return on
investment potential will likely continue to be underresourced and
continue to proceed at a slow pace. As a result, DOD and the military
services will continue to expend several billion dollars annually in
Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our
recommendations. The comments are included in this report in
appendix III. DOD also provided technical clarifications, which we
incorporated as appropriate. In its technical comments, DOD did not
concur with our finding that the department does not have an effective
approach to prevent and mitigate corrosion. DOD noted that the
department develops and incorporates prevention and mitigation strategies
appropriate to DOD’s national defense mission within various constraints
associated with operational needs, affordable maintenance schedules,
environmental regulations, and other statutory requirements. DOD
noted that corrosion is one of many issues that must be managed and
incorporated into an overall defense mission. DOD also noted that it
continually endeavors to improve its ability to manage corrosion through
advanced research, upgrading of systems and facilities, application of new
materials, processes and products and continuous information sharing.
Our report recognizes and mentions DOD's efforts and successes with
corrosion mitigation. However, we believe that DOD lacks an effective
approach to deal with corrosion since it lacks an overall strategy, has
limited coordination within and among the services, and conflicting
incentives and priorities. As we noted in our report, the current DOD
approach has led to readiness and safety issues as well as billions of dollars
of corrosion-related maintenance costs for DOD and the services annually.
Our study focused on how the military services implement and manage
corrosion prevention and control efforts for both equipment and
infrastructure. To perform our review, we contacted corrosion control
offices and officials in each of the four military services. We also
reviewed studies and discussed military corrosion issues with experts
within and outside the Department of Defense (DOD). To develop an
in-depth understanding of how corrosion prevention projects are initiated
and managed, we visited field installations and developed case studies
on corrosion prevention and mitigation efforts. We also contacted and
obtained information from DOD, services headquarters, materiel
management, research and development, logistics, systems acquisitions,
safety, and installation management and maintenance organizations.
• Battelle Laboratories
To determine the extent to which DOD and the military services have an
effective approach to corrosion control, we interviewed officials and
obtained documentation from the four military services’ corrosion
control program offices for equipment and infrastructure. For equipment,
these included the Army Corrosion Prevention and Control Program,
the Air Force Corrosion Prevention and Control Office, the NAVAIR and
NAVSEA Corrosion Prevention and Control Programs, and the Marine
Corps Corrosion and Prevention Program. For infrastructure we
contacted the Army Corps of Engineers and Department of Public Works,
the Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency, and the Naval Facilities
Engineering Service Center Command. We also contacted and obtained
information from DOD, service headquarters, strategic planning, materiel
command, and field command officials. We reviewed corrosion prevention
and control plans, policies, procedures, instructions, regulations, studies,
trip reports, memos, and other forms of documentation. We also visited
selected military bases, where we held discussions with unit commanders,
facilities engineering and maintenance officials, and users of DOD
equipment such as aircraft, ships, tanks, trucks, and support equipment,
including discussions with operators, logistics, and maintenance
personnel. We interviewed officials and gathered data at the following
installations in California and Hawaii:
Durable Coatings for The Navy has over 11,700 tanks, such as ballast, fuel, and potable water
tanks, on all of its surface vessels and submarines. Because of their
Tanks on Navy Ships constant exposure to salt and moisture, these tanks rapidly lose their
exterior and interior protective coatings and begin to corrode. Although
maintenance personnel spend considerable time and resources removing
as much of the visible corrosion as possible and repainting while the ship is
deployed, some of the work cannot be accomplished until the ship returns
to its home port and undergoes scheduled and unscheduled maintenance.
Maintaining the tanks is labor intensive, costly, and extends the amount of
time ships must spend undergoing maintenance, thereby reducing their
operational availability. Naval Sea Systems Command has developed
coating systems that are expected to last 20 years instead of the 5 years
that existing coatings last. According to the Navy, the effort could
potentially save more than $170 million a year in maintenance costs. The
initiative appears to be somewhat successful, because the Navy reports
that it has achieved net savings of about $10 million a year. However, in
the past several years, the Navy has installed the new coatings on only
about 750 tanks, or less than 7 percent of the total. Navy officials attribute
the slow pace to the fleet placing higher priorities on other needs, and
explained that they often must defer the installation of the new coatings
because of the limited availability of ships due to increased optempo and
more pressing maintenance requirements. Navy officials added that
because of higher operational and maintenance priorities, resources in
the form of funding and manpower usually go to these needs instead of
prevention efforts such as tank coatings. These officials told us that the
shipyards that perform most of the maintenance for the fleet have difficulty
trying to complete the work currently scheduled with available resources
and would be further challenged by having to add the application of new
coatings to their existing workload. In addition, the officials told us that
there is limited incentive for shipyard maintenance workers to carry out
preventive projects that show benefits only in later years instead of
completing more immediate repairs that show more immediate benefits.
Army National The Army National Guard maintains a wide range of equipment that
includes M1 tanks, howitzers, air defense artillery systems, and radars.
Guard Controlled This equipment is susceptible to corrosion, and one of the primary causes
Humidity Preservation of corrosion is humidity. The Army National Guard estimates it could
achieve cost savings totaling more than $1.6 billion over 10 years by
storing its equipment in short- and long-term controlled-humidity
preservation centers. Depending on the type of equipment, some will be
stored in long-term facilities and some will be stored for the short-term.
Equipment that is not required for regular training use will be preserved in
metal shelters for an average of 3 years, while equipment for which there is
a recurring need will be preserved by installing dehumidifying air ducts in
crew compartments and other vehicle spaces. The project, which started in
1997, is expected to have a return on investment of over 9 to 1. According
to Army National Guard officials, through the end of fiscal year 2002, the
project has achieved a total of $225 million in cost savings. While Army
officials state that the project has proven to be a success so far, they now
estimate that it will take about 15 years to accomplish the total projected
savings, or 5 years longer than originally planned. They attribute the
delay to other needs being given a higher priority and, as a result, not
receiving the necessary funds and having to defer the installation of
some controlled-humidity centers. These officials still expect to acquire
and install all of the facilities, but at a slower pace. They acknowledge
that the delay will likely mean deferring a significant amount of cost
savings—perhaps as much as $100 million—for several years.
Fly Ash in Concrete airfield pavements for all of the military services have
experienced cracking and expansion that pose significant safety hazards,
Concrete Airfields impair readiness, and increase maintenance costs. One of the causes of this
deterioration results from a corrosive chemical reaction called alkali-silica
reaction, which occurs when alkalis react with water in ways that cause
cracking, chipping, and expansion of concrete. Examples of this kind of
damage have been reported at facilities for all military services, such as
Osan Air Base, Korea; Ft. Campbell Army Airfield, Kentucky; Naval Air
Station Point Mugu, California; and Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni,
Japan. The foreign object debris hazard caused by cracking and crumbling
concrete was so severe that the Air Mobility Command assessed a taxiway
at Little Rock Air Force Base as unsuitable for use. While the military
services do not have cost estimates, DOD facilities officials told us that
significant resources are spent each year on mitigating the effects of
alkali-silica reaction.
The Navy determined that one way to mitigate the effects of alkali-silica
reaction in the future is to substitute fly ash for a certain amount of cement.
According to a Navy study, the use of fly ash increases the strength and
durability of cement structures such as airfields. Navy officials told us
that this mitigation would increase the operational availability of airfields
because the facilities would experience less cracking and chipping and,
therefore, pose fewer foreign object debris hazards. While the Navy did not
perform the analysis, these officials told us that perhaps the greatest
benefit would be the savings that would result from a marked reduction
in manpower needed for maintenance. The study did not include cost
savings or a return on investment analysis because its focus was on the
causes of and methods for mitigating the deterioration. The study did
note that fly ash substitution could save the Navy about $4 million a year
in construction costs because the material is less expensive than the
kinds of cement currently being used. Navy officials told us that their
understanding of the overall benefits is convincing enough that the use of
fly ash is required for all Navy and Marine Corps construction projects that
include pavements.
The Air Force recommends the use of fly ash, but only in certain
circumstances. Air Force officials told us that requiring the use of fly ash
for all construction projects is not feasible because fly ash is not available
at all locations where the Air Force has facilities, and the additional
cost and time involved in transporting the material to these places may
be greater than the benefits from using it. However, Air Force officials
acknowledge that they have not done a return-on-investment analysis that
includes construction and maintenance costs, and additional information
like this would be very useful in making decisions regarding the use of
fly ash.
Army Corrosion Corrosion damage to tactical wheeled vehicles and ground equipment is
costly and prolongs equipment downtime. According to officials of the
Inhibitors Army Materiel Command, seawater that seeps into the inner cavities of
equipment that is being transported overseas causes serious corrosion
damage and represents the highest risk to the command. The equipment
then decays rapidly in humid environments.
Air Force Bomb The Air Force stores about 450,000 cast iron general-purpose bombs
in locations throughout the world. The bombs are estimated to have
Metalization a replacement cost exceeding $1 billion. Many of the locations are in
high-humidity environments that contribute to corrosion. As of
February 2003, more than 107,000 of these bombs, or 24 percent,
1
The services could not reach agreement on location, funding, and standard application
procedures.
Air Force studies show that although the metal arch spray coating process
is more expensive than the use of liquid paint, it greatly minimizes the risk
that bombs will need costly maintenance or deteriorate so severely that
they will need replacing. Despite these benefits, about 3 percent of Air
Force bombs have been treated with this coating process. While Air Force
officials recommended that a much higher percentage of bombs receive
this treatment, they explained that their role is mostly advisory, and the
Air Force Material Command and Pacific Air Force Command together
must determine the relative importance of the project, given other
competing priorities.
F-16 Aircraft Although not visible, the corrosion of connectors on aircraft electronics
equipment is prevalent throughout DOD and a significant safety risk for
Corrosion Inhibitors aircraft in all military services. The resources spent on this kind of
corrosion are so vast that it is estimated that the Air Force spends perhaps
as much as $500 million a year on corrosion control on the F-16 fleet alone.
The costs are high because of the significant amount of labor that is
involved in locating and eliminating the often microscopic sources of
corrosion on very sophisticated avionics equipment. Avionics corrosion
has been a topic of major interest to the Air Force for several decades. This
concern was particularly heightened in 1989, when the Air Force reported
several F-16 accidents caused by uncommanded fuel valve closures that
were believed to have been caused by corrosion.
For several decades, the Air Force has conducted extensive studies on the
corrosion of aircraft avionics connectors and what should be done about it.
In the 1990s, several studies recommended the use of certain lubricants
that have the potential of eliminating connector corrosion on F-16 aircraft,
with estimated savings exceeding $500 million a year. Although the Air
Force did not complete a return on investment analysis, the return would
be very impressive, given the low cost of purchasing this off-the-shelf
product. The Air Force has yet to take full advantage of these corrosion-
inhibiting lubricants, even though they appear to be widely available. While
the use of such lubricants is recommended in the joint service technical
manual on avionics corrosion control, it is not required. We were told
that the Air Force would need to amend in detail more than 200 specific
technical orders and job guides to require the use of lubricant to protect
F-16 aircraft electrical connectors, but progress in this area has been
sluggish at best.2 For every year that the Air Force does not require the
use of the lubricants, the service loses the opportunity to avoid annual
expenses that total hundreds of millions of dollars.
Army Helicopter Conflicting incentives also impeded the Army’s efforts to obtain modern
helicopter rinse facilities called “birdbaths.” According to the Army
Rinse Facilities Aviation Corrosion Prevention and Control office, these facilities are
expected to extend the life of costly aircraft components, reduce
contractor man-hour expenditures, increase aircraft fleet readiness, and
provide an added margin of crew safety. The project is estimated to cost
$12 million for startup and $400 thousand per year in operating costs.
Even more notable was the analysis showing a 31 to 1 return on
investment, with the investment costs recouped within 2 years. Citing
opportunities to implement and promote effective corrosion control, the
2
The F-15 aircraft program has established a pilot program requiring use of corrosion
inhibiting lubricants on electrical connectors during flightline depot maintenance by simply
mandating the recommended use as stated in the joint service avionics technical manual.
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