Grego vs Comelec

Date: June 19, 1997

Petiitoner: William Grego
Respondents: Comelec and Humberto Basco

Ponente: Romero

Facts: On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by the Court Court
upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by Nena Tordesillas.
Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during the
1988, local elections. He won and, accordingly, assumed office.
After his term, he sought reelection in the 1992 election. He again won. However, a case for quo
warranto was filed by Cenon Ronquillo (Candidate for councilor), who alleged Basco's ineligibility to be
elected councilor on the basis of the Tordesillas ruling. Other complaints were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman and in the DILG. In 1995, Basco ran again for councilor.
William Grego, claiming to be a registered voter of Precinct No. 966, District II, City of Manila, filed
with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification, praying for Basco's disqualification, for the suspension of
his proclamation, and for the declaration of Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilor of
Manila's Second District. The Manila BOC however proclaimed Basco as a duly elected councilor of the
Second District of Manila.
In view of the proclamation, Grego filed an urgent motion seeking to annul the illegal proclamation.
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification ruling that the administrative penalty imposed by
the SC on Basco was wiped away and condoned by the electorate who elected him.

Issue: WON Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 apply retroactively to those removed from office
before it took effect on January 1, 1992

Held: No

Ratio: Petitioner submits that although the Code took effect only on January 1, 1992, Section 40 (b) must
nonetheless be given retroactive effect and applied to Basco's dismissal from office which took place in
1981. It is stressed that the provision of the law as worded does not mention or even qualify the date of
removal from office of the candidate in order for disqualification thereunder to attach. Hence, petitioner
impresses upon the Court that as long as a candidate was once removed from office due to an
administrative case, regardless of whether it took place during or prior to the effectivity of the Code, the
disqualification applies. We do not, however, subscribe to petitioner's view. Our refusal to give retroactive
application to the provision of Section 40 (b) is already a settled issue and there exist no compelling
reasons for us to depart therefrom.
Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which
do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes
are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings,
unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the
enactment. There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates
retroactively. It, therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the Local Government Code is not applicable to
the present case."

Issue: WON private respondent's election to office as City Councilor of Manila in the 1988, 1992 and 1995
elections wipe away and condone the administrative penalty against him, thus restoring his eligibility for
public office

Held:

Ratio: At first glance, there seems to be a prima facie semblance of merit to petitioner's argument.
However, the issue of whether or not Basco's triple election to office cured his alleged ineligibility is
actually beside the point because the argument proceeds on the assumption that he was in the first place
disqualified when he ran in the three previous elections. This assumption, of course, is untenable
considering that Basco was NOT subject to any disqualification at all under Section 40 (b) of the Local
Government Code which, as we said earlier, applies only to those removed from office on or after January
1, 1992. In view of the irrelevance of the issue posed by petitioner, there is no more reason for the Court
to still dwell on the matter at length.
 Anent Basco's alleged circumvention of the prohibition in Tordesillas against reinstatement to any
position in the national or local government, including its agencies and instrumentalities, as well as
government-owned or controlled corporations, we are of the view that petitioner's contention is baseless.
Neither does petitioner's argument that the term "any position" is broad enough to cover without
distinction both appointive and local positions merit any consideration.
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the Tordesillas decision did not bar Basco from running for any
elective position. (And with prejudice to reinstatement..)
In this regard, particular attention is directed to the use of the term "reinstatement." Under the
former Civil Service Decree, 16 the law applicable at the time Basco, a public officer, was administratively
dismissed from office, the term "reinstatement" had a technical meaning, referring only to an appointive
position. In light of these definitions, there is, therefore, no basis for holding that Basco is likewise barred
from running for an elective position inasmuch as what is contemplated by the prohibition in Tordesillas is
reinstatement to an appointive position.

Issue: WON private respondent's proclamation as sixth winning candidate on May 17, 1995, while the
disqualification case was still pending consideration by COMELEC is void ab initio?

Held:

Ratio: The inapplicability of RA 7166 Section 20(i) to the present case is very much patent on its face
considering that the same refers only to a void proclamation in relation to contested returns and NOT to
contested qualifications of a candidate.
RA 6646 Section 6 does not support petitioner's contention that the COMELEC, or more properly
speaking, the Manila City BOC, should have suspended the proclamation. The use of the word "may"
indicates that the suspension of a proclamation is merely directory and permissive in nature and operates
to confer discretion. What is merely made mandatory, according to the provision itself, is the continuation
of the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest. Thus, in view of this discretion granted to the
COMELEC, the question of whether or not evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant suspension of
proclamation must be left for its own determination and the Court cannot interfere therewith and
substitute its own judgment unless such discretion has been exercised whimsically and capriciously. The
COMELEC, as an administrative agency and a specialized constitutional body charged with the
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has more than enough expertise in its field that its findings or
conclusions are generally respected and even given finality. The COMELEC has not found any ground to
suspend the proclamation and the records likewise fail to show any so as to warrant a different conclusion
from this Court. Hence, there is no ample justification to hold that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion.
Since Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646, the law which Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure seeks to implement, employed the word "may," it is, therefore, improper and highly irregular for
the COMELEC to have used instead the word "shall" in its rules.
Moreover, there is no reason why the Manila City BOC should not have proclaimed Basco as the
sixth winning City Councilor. Absent any determination of irregularity in the election returns, as well as an
order enjoining the canvassing and proclamation of the winner, it is a mandatory and ministerial duty of
the Board of Canvassers concerned to count the votes based on such returns and declare the result.
Finally, the cases of Duremdes, Benito and Aguam, supra, cited by petitioner are all irrelevant and
inapplicable to the factual circumstances at bar and serve no other purpose than to muddle the real issue.
These three cases do not in any manner refer to void proclamations resulting from the mere pendency of a
disqualification case.

Issue: WON Romualdo S. Maranan, a seventh placer, be legally declared a winning candidate

Held: No

Ratio: Obviously, he may not be declared a winner. In the first place, Basco was a duly qualified
candidate pursuant to our disquisition above. Furthermore, he clearly received the winning number of
votes which put him in sixth place. Thus, petitioner's emphatic reference to Labo v. COMELEC, where we
laid down a possible exception to the rule that a second placer may not be declared the winning candidate,
finds no application in this case. The exception is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions,
namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully
aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Both assumptions,
however, are absent in this case. Petitioner's allegation that Basco was well-known to have been
disqualified in the small community where he ran as a candidate is purely speculative and conjectural,
unsupported as it is by any convincing facts of record to show notoriety of his alleged disqualification.
In sum, we see the dismissal of the petition for disqualification as not having been attended by
grave abuse of discretion. There is then no more legal impediment for private respondent's continuance in
office as City Councilor for the Second District of Manila.