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Front Matter Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, Dissolving Boundaries (Dec., 2003), pp.

i-iv Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: . Accessed: 23/10/2013 17:49
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Volue 5 ssue4 Deembe 200

Dissolving Boundaries: Introduction Suzanne Werner David Davis and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita AND REVERSED AGAIN Bruce Russett Manus I. Midlarsky T David Mason


Reintegrating the Subdisciplines of International and Comparative Politics The Impact of External Threat on States and Domestic Societies Globalization, Democratization, and the Prospects for Civil War in the New Millennium Where Do the Peacekeepers Go? Development and War Imposing Sanctions: States, Firms, and Economic Coercion II. A THEORY OF CONFLICT? International Relations Theory and Internal Conflict: Insights from the Interstices Mediation and Foreign Policy Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil and Interstate Wars Mediation and Peacekeeping in a Random Walk Model of Civil and Interstate War Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict

Michael Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman Douglas Lemke T. Clifton Morgan and Navin A. Bapat

David A. Lake Saadia Touval Virginia Page Fortna Alastair Smith and Allan Stam Barbara F. Walter

Iterntionl Publshedfor he

Blackwell Publishing


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Volume 5

Studies Review
December 2003

Number 4

Special Issue


This special issue of the International Studies Review is part of the International Studies Association's Presidential Series; each issue in this series elaborates on the theme of an annual meeting. This special issue reflects the theme of the 2001 annual meeting held in New Orleans, Louisiana, March 24-27 titled "Dissolving Boundaries: The Nexus Between Comparative Politics and International Relations." The issue will be simultaneously published as a book by the same title by Blackwell Publishing with the ISBN# 1-4051-2134-3.

Suzanne Werner, David Davis, and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita

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Contents Dissolving Boundaries: Introduction SUZANNE WERNER, DAVID DAVIS, and




I. The Second Image Reversed ... and Reversed Again Reintegrating the Subdisciplines of International and Comparative Politics

9 13

The Impact of External Threat on States and Domestic Societies


Globalization, Democratization, and the Prospects for Civil War in the New Millennium


Where Do the Peacekeepers Go? MICHAEL GILLIGAN and STEPHEN JOHNSTEDMAN Development and War

55 65

Imposing Sanctions: States, Firms, and Economic Coercion


II. A Theory of Conflict? International Relations Theory and Internal Conflict: Insights from the Interstices A. LAKE DAVID Mediation and Foreign Policy TOUVAL SAADIA Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil and Interstate Wars




Mediation and Peacekeeping in a Random Walk Model of Civil and Interstate War




Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict BARBARA F. WALTER


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THE INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW(ISSN 1521-9488) is published four times a year, in March, June, September and December by Blackwell Publishing, Inc., with offices at 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and PO Box 1354, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK. Call US (800) 835-6770 or (781) 388-8200, UK +44 1865 778315; fax US (781) 3888232, UK +44 1865 471775; e-mail US,UK customerservices@ Visit us online at also includes four issues of International Studies Quarterly and four issues of International Studies Perspectives. INFORMATION FOR SUBSCRIBERS New orders, renewals, sample copy requests, claims, change of address information and all other correspondence should be sent to the Customer Service Department at your nearest Blackwell office (see addresses above). SUBSCRIPTION RATES FOR VOLUME 5, 2003 The Americast Rest of Worldl ?578 Institutional Rate* $757 *Includes print plus premium online access to the current and all available backfiles. Print and online-only rates are also available (see below). tCustomers in Canada should add 7% GST or provide evidence of entitlement to exemption in the UK should add VATat 5%;customers in the EU should also add VATat 5%, QCustomers or provide a VATregistration number or evidence of entitlement to exemption. For more information about Blackwell Publishingjournals, including online access information, terms and conditions, and other pricing options, please visit or contact our customer service department, tel: (800) 835-6770 or (781) 388-8200 (US office) +44 1865 778315 (UK office). Individual members of International Studies Association receive a subscription to the Quarterly, and the Reviewas one of the many benefits of membership. Contact the ISA at Social Perspectives Science 324, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA. Tel.: (520) 621-1208. Checks and money orders should be made payable to Blackwell Publishing. Checks in US Dollars must be drawn on a US bank. Checks in Sterling must be drawn on a UK bank. All orders must be paid by check, money order, or credit card. BACK ISSUES Back Issues are available from the publisher at the current single issue rate. MICROFORMThe journal is availableon Microfilm. For microfilm service address inquiries to University Microfilms Library Services, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346, USA. MAILING Journal is mailed Standard Rate. Mailing to rest of world by Deutsche Post Global Mail. Canadian mail is sent by Canadian publications mail agreement number 40573520. Postmaster: Send all address changes to International Studies Review, Blackwell Publishing Inc., Journals Subscription Department, 350 Main St., Malden, MA 02148-5018. ADVERTISING For information and rates, please visit the journal's website at,email:,or contact Matt Neckers, Blackwell Advertising Representative, 50 Winter Sport Lane, PO Box 80, Williston, VT 05495. Phone: (800) 866-1684 or Fax: (802) 864-7749. For all other permissions inquiries, including requests to republish material in another work, please contact the Journals Permissions Manager at the publisher's Oxford office, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK, tel: +44 1865 778315. INDEXING/ABSTRACTING The contents of this journal are indexed or abstracted in the following: Cambridge Scientific Abstracts Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; CatchWord; EBSCO Online; Environmental Sciences & Pollution Management; Health and Safety Science Abstracts;Ingenta; JSTOR; Online Computer LibraryCenter FirstSearchElectronic Collections Online; Online Computer Library Center Public Affairs Information Service International; Safety Science Risk Abstracts. ? 2003 International Studies Association

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Dissolving Boundaries: Introduction Author(s): Suzanne Werner, David Davis and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, Dissolving Boundaries (Dec., 2003), pp. 1-7 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: . Accessed: 23/10/2013 17:49
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Review(2003) 5(4), 1-7 Studies International

Dissolving Boundaries: Introduction


Departmentof Political Science, Emory University


Departmentof Political Science, Emory University and


Hoover Institution, Stanford Universityand Departmentof Politics,New YorkUniversity The traditional boundaries drawn between comparative politics and international relations are dissolving. With only a few exceptions, international relations scholars acknowledge that "domestic politics matter" and matter much. Comparative politics scholars likewise recognize with increasing regularity that international politics influences relations within states. In this volume, we consider whether and the extent to which boundaries between the two fields are and should be dissolving. Although the boundaries between international political economy and comparative political economy are perhaps even more fluid, we focus here on issues related to domestic and international security and conflict. While this orientation reflects the editors' own interests and expertise, the focus on conflict and security issues also represents a particularly hard case for the dissolution of boundaries between the subfields as conflict has traditionally been viewed as high politics and the least likely to be affected by domestic politics (in the case of international security issues) or by international politics (in the case of domestic security issues). This work is divided into two broad parts. In the first part, we explore the relatively uncontroversial notions that domestic variables affect issues of international security and that international variables can affect issues of domestic security. There are articles that focus on theoretical concerns and trends in the field as well as those that consider specific instances of linkages across the subfields via either empirical or formal methods. In the second part of the work, we explore the more controversial notion that international and comparative politics are linked not only because conditions in one environment affect events in the other, but also because it is possible to use a single theoretical framework to understand domestic and international security issues. Once again there are articles that lay out some of the key issues and those that use a single theoretical framework to understand a particular security issue. In this introduction, we will provide an overview of the work and make the case for a true dissolution of boundaries between the subfields. We maintain that the boundaries are obsolete not only because domestic politics affects international politics and vice versa, but also because we believe that the fields can be unified under a single theoretical framework that focuses attention on political leaders as

? 2003 International Studies Review. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.

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Introduction DissolvingBoundaries:

actorsinterestedin attainingand maintainingthemselvesin power while subjectto institutional and other politicalconstraints. The Second Image Reversed ... and Reversed Again From our perspective, it is unsurprising and uncontroversialto expect that domesticconditionsinfluenceinternational conditions politicsor that international influence domesticpolitics.We assume (as we discussin greater detail below) that state leaders are strategicactors whose primary motivationis to stay in power. Because both domestic and internationalchallengerscan threaten their tenure, every decision leaders make must balancedomesticimperativeswith international constraints.Leaders in different domestic institutionalsettings or facing different types of domestic challengers will behave differentlyin the internationalarena. leaderswho occupydifferentpositionsin the international Similarly, systemor face more or less severe foreign threatswill behave differentlyin the domesticarena.A leader will alwaysbe cognizantof the challenger,either domestic or foreign, that poses the greatestthreat. More difficultis to go beyond merely assertingthat domesticand international politics influence one another to determine the complicatedcausal pathwaysby which each domain affectsthe other. Withininternationalrelations,the empirical connectionbetween democracyand peace, for example, is well established.Recent scholarshipin this area has focused on exactly how regime type may influence behaviorby consideringamong other things the motivationsof the leader as the size of the winning coalition and selectoratechanges (Bueno de Mesquitaet al. 1999, 2003), the effects of a democrat'sgreater sensitivityto costs (Filson and Werner forthcoming), or the consequences of greater transparency within democracies(Schultz1999). On the other side of the divide in comparative politics, it is widely accepted that globalization can affect domestic stability. Recent scholarshipexpands on this linkage by investigatinghow globalizationcan affect such diverseareasas the organizational abilityof socialmovements,the flexibilityof societaldemandsor governmentpolicyboth to respond in waysthat accommodate to repressthose demands,and the distributional consequencesof economicgrowth or stagnation.Determining the causal linkages between the subfields is further affects peace but peace can also affect democracy. Development affects the likelihood of war but war also affects the prospects for development. These complicated endogeneity issues only further reinforce the interconnections between internationalrelationsand comparativepoliticsand enhance the need to eliminatethe barriersbetween the subfields. In this work, several scholarsaddress the causalconnectionsbetween domestic relationsand domestic conflictand betweeninternational politicsand international an overview of Bruce Russett developmentswithinthese domains provides stability. and numerous examples to illustratehow each can inform the other. He also politicsthatwe have takenas a given is reallya productof a particular comparative
period in history (post-World War II) and the theoretical paradigms that dominated that time. Two distinct subfields are appropriate if one sees state leaders as so constrained by the international system that they have little foreign policy discretion or if one sees domestic politics as simply a product of the aggregation of the interests of various interest groups. The great political philosophers did not recognize the division we now take for granted. While Russett focuses primarily on the effects that domestic political institutions have on international conflict, Manus Midlarsky turns the causal arrow around in his article. He maintains that state leaders often respond to an insecure external environment by turning against their own citizens. Insecurity abroad can threaten persuasively argues that the division between international relations and complicated by the fact that the direction of influence is rarely one-way. Democracy

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democracy at home. In the aftermath of September 11 and the resulting growing sense of international insecurity, Midlarsky warns of dire domestic consequences that may result from the state's attempts to protect itself. In his article, David Mason similarly considers international influences on domestic politics. He draws on an extensive body of literature to explore the ways that changing conditions in the international system affect the future prospects of civil war. He argues that multiple systemic changes-such as increasing globalization, spreading democratization, and enhanced international involvement in domestic affairs-are altering not only the incentives of minority groups to challenge the government but also the government's incentives to retaliate with force. He shows that the effects, particularly of globalization, are often contradictory. While globalization can enhance a domestic challenger's ability to mobilize and, thereby, increase the potential for civil conflict, globalization can also ensure that the government's response is placed under an international microscope and, in turn, can lead to a reduction in the potential for civil conflict. Michael Gilligan and Stephen Stedman provide a nice follow-up to Mason's analysis by examining where peacekeepers are sent when civil conflicts emerge. The international community may be more involved since the end of the Cold War, as Mason argues, but for some countries gaining the attention of the international community is harder than for others. Gilligan and Stedman demonstrate, on the one hand, that peacekeepers are uniformly more likely to be sent as the costs of the conflict increase. On the other hand, they demonstrate that certain regions, like Europe, are far more likely to receive help than others. Surprisingly, Asia, not Africa, is the least likely region to receive peacekeepers when civil conflicts occur. Significantly, their analysis encourages us to rethink our ability to make broad statements about the effects of changing systemic conditions on domestic politics. As they show, changing systemic conditions, like international oversight, may not affect all regions equally. The article by Douglas Lemke pursues this last point even further. He points out that the empirical evidence increasingly demonstrates that relationships linking such important correlates of conflict as power and regime-type are not uniform across all regions. Lemke maintains that a certain level of economic and political development is a prerequisite for a state to participate in international relations as typically envisioned. Many so-called states are so politically underdeveloped that to assume that they have a monopoly on the instruments of coercion within their territory is truly heroic. In these areas, leaders envision security threats almost exclusively in terms of domestic, not international, threats to power. In fact, the government's ability to respond to these threats helps to create a state that exists in more than name only (Tilly 1975). To the extent that theories of international interaction lead us to expect different patterns of behavior as a function of political and economic development, it is important that we take into account different stages of political and economic development in our empirical analyses. Lemke also provocatively suggests that "controlling for" development may ultimately be inadequate. Regions may appear to act differently, not because there is a need for a "new theory" for each region of the world, but because the relevant political actors may differ depending on their stage of development. In Europe, states are the most relevant actors. In some regions of Africa, in contrast, nonstate actors may have far more control and power over certain territories than the state itself. To truly evaluate international relations in certain regions of the world, it may be necessary to extend our analyses beyond simply relations between states. Although the article by Clifton Morgan and Navin Bapat differs substantively from some of the other articles as it deals with economic rather than military conflict, these authors also make a case for the unavoidable linkages between domestic and international policies. Like Lemke, they maintain that an exclusive focus on states as international actors is too narrow. In their analysis of economic

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Introduction DissolvingBoundaries:

sanctions, they reconceptualize the strategic interaction as a game between the sendercountry that is trying to influence the policy of a target country via economic sanctions and the firms within that sender country. State leaders cannot simply choose whether or not a target state is sanctioned. Instead, the state leader can adopt a sanctions policy, but the implementation of that policy depends on whether the firms in the country choose to abide by the policy and curtail their business with the target country or not. The success of a government's foreign policy decision to sanction another state depends very much on their ability to influence domestic economic actors. Morgan and Bapat suggest that in an era when domestic firms can increasingly relocate their production facilities or make use of subsidiaries in other countries, firms may increasingly be independent actors that determine whether or not government attempts at coercion are successful. The articles in this part of the work cover a wide range of topics and highlight the numerous and complicated linkages between domestic and international politics. Whether one is dealing with economic sanctions, civil unrest, or interstate war, it is difficult to envision an explanation that does not cross the boundaries between the subfields. A Theory of Conflict? Given the overwhelming empirical evidence, we find it difficult to challenge the notion that domestic politics affects international relations and vice versa. More controversial is the idea that a single theoretical framework can be devised to study both international politics and comparative politics. Such a notion assumes fundamentally that there are no significant differences between the international and domestic realms and, more specifically,with respect to issues related to conflict, that there are no fundamental differences between interstate and civil conflicts. Any differences are better viewed as differences in degree and not fundamentally in kind. For many, such arguments are considered heretical since most of us internalized in the very first years of graduate school the notion that the international realm is fundamentally different from the domestic realm because the international system is anarchic while the domestic realm is hierarchic (Waltz 1979). Assuming this fundamental difference between the international and domestic systems has led to a similarly stark difference in the theoretical orientations of the two fields. International scholars think about security dilemmas and commitment problems; comparative scholars think about laws and institutions. David Lake's article in this volume challenges this differentiation. Anarchy or hierarchy are not exogenous conditions but are instead the result of decisions and choices made by the relevant actors in the system. In some instances of civil conflict, groups choose to work within the rules of the system while in other cases they may choose to challenge the state and the hierarchy it represents. Thus, anarchy is possible in any state; a hierarchy exists only so long as the groups within allow it to exist and consent to its terms. If the potential for anarchy shadows all of domestic politics, then the supposed consequences of anarchy are equally applicable to domestic politics as well. Similarly, if there are differences between the international and domestic realms, the source of these differences cannot be found within anarchy itself since anarchy shadows all relationships to some degree. If the supposed a priori distinction between comparative and international politics is more apparent than real, how might one approach the study of conflict generally? Saadia Touval's article provides some important guidance for responding to this question. In his critique of the mediation literature, he argues that existing studies fail to consider mediation from a political perspective. He argues that mediation, like other foreign policy decisions, must be seen as purposive

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strategic behavior or in Schelling's (1963:4) words, "behavior motivated by a conscious calculation of advantage." Echoing the strategic perspective summarized in Bueno de Mesquita's (2003) textbook, Principlesof InternationalPolitics, Touval argues that leaders make decisions (in this specific example regarding mediation) to advance their own ends. As a result, their decisions are going to reflect international constraints and objectives as well as domestic constraints and objectives. The leader in this perspective is the key actor balancing between the demands of domestic groups and the needs and demands of international groups. All foreign policy decisions--indeed, all political decisions-are best understood as a reflection of the leader's interests and the domestic and international constraints he or she faces. Within the specific example of mediation, Touval argues that the strategies and techniques chosen by mediators may in some instances have little to do with the actions that best facilitate the end of the conflict and much to do with the actions that best serve some ulterior or political motive of the mediator. This strategic perspective provides a solid foundation from which we can approach the study of both domestic and international conflict. Whether making decisions regarding domestic issues that must take into account international politics or making decisions regarding international politics that must take into account domestic politics, the leader and that person's desire to maintain power is a common starting point for any analysis regardless of whether the decision involves domestic or international politics. Conceptualizing war as a bargaining failure, as Lake does in his article, also provides an extremely useful and unifying way to approach the study of conflict (see Fearon 1995). The bargaining perspective conceptualizes war as a costly outside option, like going to court if one is in a legal dispute or going on strike if one is involved in labor negotiations. Since wars (or trials or strikes) are costly, there should exist bargains or negotiated agreements that both sides prefer to this costly option. Understanding why wars occur then is equivalent to understanding why negotiations fail. As Lake explains in greater detail, divisibility problems, problems arising from private information and incentives to misrepresent, and enforcement problems are typically identified as the key culprits that impede negotiations despite the disputants' strong incentives to reach an agreement. Significantly, this approach suggests that there are no fundamental differences between the causes of civil conflicts--whether motivated by ethnic or ideological differences-and the causes of interstate conflicts. States sometimes fight when they are unable to negotiate a settlement to divide up a piece of valuable territory. Similarly, governments and rebels sometimes fight when they cannot strike a deal as to how to share power. Of course, one may argue that certain problems are more acute in one domain than in another, as Barbara Walter (2002) has done with regard to enforcement dilemmas and the termination of civil conflicts when compared to interstate conflicts. The causal processes driving conflict, however, are fundamentally similar--differences of degree and not of kind. Significantly, such a conceptualization of conflict not only has the potential to unify our study of civil and interstate conflict but also the ability to unify conflict studies with such diverse fields as litigation and capital-labor relations. The contributions by Page Fortna, Barbara Walter, and Alastair Smith and Allan Stam offer evidence that a single theoretical logic can provide significant leverage on diverse questions across many different arenas. In her article, Fortna examines the durability of peace settlements after both interstate and civil wars. She argues that in both arenas, the inability of the belligerents to credibly promise to implement the terms of the agreement and maintain the ceasefire threatens the peace. The enforcement problem is not isolated to the international arena but is a general problem with which all belligerents struggle. She goes on to demonstrate empirically that the terms of the agreement, or the institutions put in place at the

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Introduction DissolvingBoundaries:

time of the ceasefire, can significantly improve the odds that the peace endures. Institutions matter both between and within states. Walter is interested in the conditions in which governments will choose to make concessions to minority groups to avoid violence. She maintains that private information regarding the government's willingness to fight can hamper negotiations because the government may have an incentive to create a reputation for toughness so as to prevent future challenges from other minority groups. Her empirical analysis shows that governments are less willing to accommodate minority groups when there are other minority groups that may challenge in the future. Although in a one-shot deal governments have a large incentive to avoid the costs of war by being accommodating, they may be willing to pay those costs if the game is going to be repeated. While her application deals specifically with civil conflicts, the analysis generalizes easily to the international realm. As Walter indicates, the argument applies equally well to territorial disputes between neighboring states. To deter future challenges, states that face numerous outstanding territorial disputes may be less likely to accommodate and more likely to invest in a reputation for toughness than states with few neighbors who might challenge them in the future. Smith and Stam take private information as their point of departure as well as they try to understand the duration of conflict. For them, war is caused by private information and the inability of the disputants to credibly reveal that information. Significantly, the war itself provides the information that makes it possible for the belligerents to reach a settlement (see also Wagner 2000; Filson and Werner 2002; Powell 2002; Slantchev forthcoming). They use this basic framework to analyze the conditions under which third parties can hasten the end of fighting. As they argue, their analysis is equally applicable to civil and international conflicts and the role third parties can play in these conflicts. Provocatively, their model suggests that third party mediation is unlikely to be successful. Third parties that are clearly biased toward either side cannot credibly reveal information but neither can supposedly neutral third parties. So long as the third party prefers peace to war, the belligerents will question whether the information the third party imparts is true rather than a product of the third party's desire for peace. In contrast, third party peacekeeping has a greater chance of success. Although third parties cannot effectively resolve the information problems that caused the war, by standing between the belligerents they can increase the costs of fighting sufficiently to encourage the belligerents to accept a broader range of settlements. Although each of these authors is addressing a different issue-the durability of peace agreements, the onset of conflict, the role of third parties in conflict management-they share a common conceptualization of war as a bargaining failure. Their analyses are not specific to interstate or civil conflict but, instead, focus on the commitment or informational problems that prevent the belligerents from peacefully resolving their dispute whether those belligerents are two states, two different ethnic groups, or a government and a domestic challenger. Conclusion This work covers a lot of ground. Although the articles are diverse, they are held together by a common belief that theoretical advances in the study of conflict are most likely to occur at the interstices of comparative and international politics. We do not expect that the boundaries between these two subfields will soon dissolve completely, but we do expect that international relations scholars will increasingly delve into the arena of comparative politics and that comparative scholars will increasingly be forced to become savvy about international politics. As scholars cross boundaries, we expect that theories and methods will too. Ultimately, we expect a theory of conflict to emerge that equally incorporates international constraints and domestic imperatives.

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BUENODE MESQUITA, BRUCE.(2003) Principles of InternationalPolitics: People'sPower;Preferences,and Perceptions.New York: Congressional Quarterly Books.

(1999) An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace. American Political Science Review 93:791-808. BUENO DE MESQUITA, M. SIVERSON, ANDJAMESD. MORROW. BRUCE,ALASTAIR SMITH,RANDOLPH (2003) The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. FEARON, (1995) Rationalist Explanations for War. InternationalOrganization49:379-414. JAMES. ANDSUZANNE WERNER. DARREN, FILSON, (2002) A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War. American Journal of Political Science 46:819-838. AND SUZANNE WERNER. FILSON,DARREN, (Forthcoming) Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes. American Journal of Political Science. ROBERT(2002) Bargaining Theory and International Conflict. Annual Review of Political POWELL, Science 5:1-30. THOMAS C. (1963) The Strategyof Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press. SCHELLING, KENNETH.(1999) Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two SCHULTZ, Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War. InternationalOrganization53:322-366. BRANISLOV. SLANTCHEV, (Forthcoming) The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations. AmericanPolitical ScienceReview. CHARLES. TILLY, (1975) Reflections on the History of European State Making. In The Formationof National States in Western Europe, edited by Charles Tilly. Princeton: Princeton University Press. R. HARRISON. WAGNER, (2000) Bargaining and War. AmericanJournal of Political Science 44:469-484. F. (2002) Committingto Peace: The Successful Settlementof Civil Wars. Princeton: WALTER, BARBARA Princeton University Press. KENNETH. WALTZ, (1979) Theoryof InternationalPolitics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

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Reintegrating the Subdisciplines of International and Comparative Politics Author(s): Bruce Russett Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, Dissolving Boundaries (Dec., 2003), pp. 9-12 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: . Accessed: 23/10/2013 17:50
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Review(2003) 5(4), 9-12 Studies International


Reintegrating the Subdisciplines of International and Comparative Politics

BRUCERUSSETT Departmentof Political Science, YaleUniversity Long before academic disciplines and subdisciplines emerged, the great writers on politics understood well how the fields of knowledge that we call international relations and comparative politics informed each other. The Greeks did not make a distinction between the two. Indeed, Thucydides, often regarded as the first great analyst of international relations, is centrally concerned with domestic politics. He considers how Athens' direct democracy encouraged quick and ill-considered decisions for war, and how failures in war, in turn, undermined that democracy. Although he does not offer contemporary-style generalizations about the international behavior of different regime types, his narrative is devoted to the details of leadership and debates on decision making. His famous statement, "What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta" (Thucydides 1972:1:23), is ambiguous. As a Greek of his day, Thucydides might well have believed in inevitability. But was it an avoidable fear that made the Peloponnesian War inevitable, or did the fear inevitably follow from the growth of Athenian power? If Thucydides means the latter, his reputation as a realist is fully deserved. His extraordinary concern with the effect of democratic politics, however, suggests something more complex.' Similarly, the second-image reversed is evident in Aristotle's premier text of comparative politics: ThePolitics.Aristotle sees oligarchies as derived from warriors and is well aware of the role of external intervention and defeat or victory in war in inducing constitutional change. One could go on with similar concerns in most of the canon, notably in Machiavelli's and Rousseau's writings. Hobbes was actually a theorist of the state, and Leviathan would likely fall into the contemporary box of comparative politics; application of his theories to international relations is essentially a twentieth-century phenomenon. Of course, Kant's theory provides an elaborate structure of interactions among domestic systems, wars, and alliances. Despite the rich precedent established by the great writers in politics, the study of international relations remains a distinct focus of analysis in that the security dilemma of self-help in a system of sovereign states conditions any effort to import propositions from comparative politics, which recognizes within most states a greater role for the monopolization of legitimate violence than characterizes the international system. In the shift of late twentieth-century enthusiasm away from
'Doyle (1997:Ch. 1) contends that Thucydides does not regard the full chain as inevitable but regarded both individuals and domestic structure as intervening. Kagan (1969:chapter 20) argues strongly that Thucydides does intend the full chain of inevitability, but that he was mistaken in doing so: that the war "was not caused by impersonal forces," but "by men who made bad decisions in difficult circumstances," and that neither "the circumstances nor the decisions were inevitable" (Kagan 1969:356). Woodruff (1993:xxx-xxxii) reads Thucydides as saying that the Athenians were engaged in "elaborate self-deceptions" about inevitability or necessity. ? 2003 International Studies Review. Publishedby BlackwellPublishing,350 MainStreet,Malden,MA02148, USA,and 9600 GarsingtonRoad,Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.

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the Subdisciplines and Comparative Politics Reintegrating of International

classical realism (for example, Morgenthau 1949) to Waltz's (1979) neorealism, domestic politics was relegated to a minor role (more than in Waltz 1959), with cruder variants characterizing states as bumping billiard balls of identical internal composition. Some noted works of comparative politics, in turn, regard the evolution of national governments as largely path-dependent from previous domestic experience, with little role for peaceful influences from abroad.2 Yet on both sides of the international relations (IR)/comparative divide, intellectual developments of the past decade have poked great holes in the boundary dividing the subfields and led to a wide exchange of ideas and movement away from excessive parsimony in both views. Neither can still be passed off as a bounded subdiscipline. Increasingly, we regard states' behavior in the international system as deriving from a combination of constraints and incentives that are both endogenous and exogenous to the state. Interest has shifted away from such pure IR systemic measures of power as bipolarity and multipolarity. This trend, of course, reflects the passing of Cold War bipolarity, but it also reflects the widespread empirical experience that it is unrewarding to look for consistent patterns of conflict intensity that are affected in any regular or simple way by the systemic distribution of power. The emergence of possible unipolarity in the present system has kept systemic models alive but without much historical referent from which to make persuasive empirical statements. A promising theoretical turn over the past decade has been from systemic or purely state-level influences to dyadic behavior, and more recently to directed dyads (which state does what). This turn makes it very clear that relative power matters-and matters a great deal. Other inducements or constraints also matter, however. It seems to make a great difference-both for the avoidance of violence and for active cooperation in international economic institutions (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002)-how the state is internally constructed and how each state with which it is interacting is so constructed. So far the major payoff from this turn seems to come from the distinction between autocracies and democracies, but further research is likely to extend and refine that payoff with finer theoretically informed distinctions. Robert Putnam's (1988) early bridge of two-level games has been followed by much game theoretic work on strategic interactions. This work demonstrates that leaders' policy preferences often vary according to whether their domestic political institutions force them to satisfy a broad coalition of supporters or a narrower set of those who can keep them in power or eject them from it. Importantly, this perspective applies both to international behavior and to the relative pursuit of private and public goods domestically with consequent effects on economic growth (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Diversionary wars are alleged to arise from the efforts of leaders whose grip on power is at risk because of domestic dissatisfaction or conflict, and, in turn, that possibility may affect the willingness of their external adversaries to provide a pretext for conflict initiation (Smith 1996). Not only does the type of domestic regime matter systematically, so too do transnational commercial ties and ties attributable to common membership in international organizations. Indeed, all these so-called liberal variables make a difference, as do such realist variables as power and perhaps alliances (Russett and Oneal 2001). Economic ties matter because they enhance the political role of groups with interests at stake in maintaining peaceful relations with other countries in general, and with particular other countries. Not only can these groups exert greater influence at home, but they can also become players in the political system
2This is true even of Huntington (1991:270-279), who famously crosses the IR/comparative boundary. His list of six conditions favoring the consolidation of new democracies identifies only one that is external.

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of their country's trading partners. International organizations also matter because they strengthen the role of nonstate actors in domestic politics as well as creating common interests between certain governmental institutions in both countries. International organizations also make a systematic contribution to successful transitions to democracy and to the consolidation of newly democratic regimes (Pevehouse 2002; and note Kant's idea of a mutually supporting confederation of republics). Democracies are more likely to cooperate with one another. Both transitions to democracy and the stability of new democracies are strongly affected by processes of international diffusion, especially from neighbors (Gleditsch 2002; Starr and Lindborg 2003). All these illustrate processes of IR/comparative feedback. Another example of the connection between international relations and comparative politics is the role of international institutions in promoting economic development. Not long ago it was common to ask simply whether aid from, for example, the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, was correlated with subsequent economic growth in recipients of that aid. But doing so ignored problems that in retrospect seem obvious: the international institutions, to enhance their own credibility, have an interest in aiding states that have the prerequisites for growth, and governments more committed to growth may be more likely to seek external assistance. Therefore, an apparent correlation between aid and growth may be spurious-the consequence of selection effects that may reflect the character of domestic regimes and their interest in growth (perhaps at the expense of economic equality). When selection effects are taken into account, the relation between aid and economic conditions turns out to be much less beneficial than might otherwise have been thought (Vreeland 2002). This kind of work fundamentally cuts across the comparative/IR boundary in terms of theory, institutions, variables, methods, and data. Further evidence of the artificiality of boundaries between comparative politics and international relations shows up in the emerging literature on civil wars. Civil wars violate the standard comparative politics characterization of the state as a monopolist with respect to the instruments of violence; sometimes the breakdown of this monopoly approximates the anarchy of the international system, even in that system's more violent phases. Moreover, in such circumstances the state's legal boundaries break down. Defining what constitutes national territory is part of the process of building identity for a national state, and it can promote or reduce conflict with nearby states. Partly for this reason, civil wars often have serious contagion effects, drawing in neighbors and often lengthening the war (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2001). Just as regime type matters to the likelihood of international conflict, the lack of democracy is likely to exacerbate ethnic conflicts because out-ofpower minorities have little leverage to redress their grievances (Gurr 2000). Civil wars may be least likely to occur in democratic states, and most likely in states that are weakly authoritarian--not democratic, but not dictatorial enough to be able to repress internal conflict effectively (Hegre et al. 2001). Stable and institutionalized settlements of civil wars are most likely to arise from political reform, elections, and democratization. And-to complete the IR/comparative loop-a civil peace is more likely to stick if the peace agreement is bolstered by a multidimensional and multilateral peace-building operation that goes beyond military intervention and provides economic reconstruction and reform of political institutions (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). An explosion of accessible and increasingly refined data, breakthroughs in statistical analysis, the shock of changes in the world, and major theoretical improvements have combined synergistically to offer a greater possibility for big advances in understanding comparative politics and international relations than ever before. Comparative politics scholars created many of the data sets now used in international relations research, including all the measures of domestic regime type. The Correlates of War Project, for instance, never showed any interest in

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the Subdisciplines and Comparative Politics Reintegrating of International

compiling that information. Both subfields have had to address similar specification problems for pooled data sets varying across time and space and for the management of selection effects. One cannot even begin to explain the end of the Cold War without understanding changes in both the international distribution of power and institutional crises within the formerly Communist countries, and without constructing new theoretical models that combine those influences. All these advances cannot be merely linear within each subdiscipline; they must be integrating as well, as each subdiscipline enriches the other. Just as feedback loops exist between domestic and international politics in the world, feedback loops exist between the scholars who try to understand them.


The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. MICHAEL. DOYLE, (1997) Waysof War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism,and Socialism. New York: W.W. Norton.
DOYLE, MICHAEL, AND NICHOLAS SAMBANIS. (2000) International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and the

Quantitative Analysis. AmericanPolitical Science Review 94:779-802.

ELBADAWI,IBRAHIM,AND NICHOLAS SAMBANIS. (2001) How Much War Will We See: Estimating

Prevalence of Civil War in 161 Countries, 1960-1999. Journal of ConflictResolution46:307-334. KRISTIAN. GLEDITSCH, (2002) All InternationalPoliticsIs Local: The Diffusion of Conflict,Integration,and Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Democratization. TED ROBERT. GURR, (2000) Peoplesversus States:Minoritiesat Risk in the New Century.Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992. American Political ScienceReview 95:33-48. SAMUEL in the Late Twentieth HUNTINGTON, P (1991) The Third Wave:Democratization Century.Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. DONALD. KAGAN, (1969) The Outbreak of the PeloponnesianWar.Ithaca: Cornell University Press. HELEN ANDB. PETER EDWARD, MILNER, MANSFIELD, ROSENDORFF. (2002) Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. International Organization 56: 477-513. HANS MORGENTHAU, J. (1949) PoliticsamongNations: The Strugglefor Powerand Peace. New York: Knopf. PEVEHOUSE, JON. (2002) Democracy from Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization. InternationalOrganization56:515-549. PUTNAM,ROBERT.(1988) Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. InternationalOrganization42:427-460. and RUSSETT, BRUCE,ANDJOHN R. ONEAL.(2001) Triangulating Peace: Democracy,Interdependence, InternationalOrganizations.New York: W.W. Norton. SMITH,ALASTAIR. (1996) Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems. International Studies Quarterly40:133-153. ANDCHRISTINA LINDBORG. HARVEY, STARR, (2003) Democratic Dominoes Revisited: The Hazards of Governmental Transitions, 1974-96. Journal of ConflictResolution47:490-519. THUCYDIDES. (1972) History of the Peloponnesian War. Translated by Rex Warner. Harmondsworth: Penguin. VREELAND, (2002) The IMFand EconomicDevelopment. JAMES. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. WALTZ,KENNETH.(1959) Man, the State, and War: A TheoreticalAnalysis. New York: Columbia University Press. WALTz, KENNETH. (1979) Theoryof InternationalRelations. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley. PAUL. (1993) On Justice, Power and Human Nature: Selectionsfrom the History of the WOODRUFF, PeloponnesianWar.Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.

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The Impact of External Threat on States and Domestic Societies Author(s): Manus I. Midlarsky Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, Dissolving Boundaries (Dec., 2003), pp. 1318 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: . Accessed: 23/10/2013 17:50
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Review(2003) 5(4), 13-18 Studies International

The Impact of External Threat on States and Domestic Societies'

MANUSI. MIDLARSKY Departmentof Political Science, Rutgers University I begin with the premise, amply validated, that liberal democracy is the best form of government for the avoidance of ethnic conflict. And by ethnic conflict, I mean violence to persons or property committed by members of one ethnic group against those of another, or by the state (often controlled by an ethnic majority) against members of any ethnic minority. Events occurring in the international arena that negatively influence democratic governance also can increase the probability of ethnic conflict. State security, which frequently is highly dependent on the state's immediate environment, is critically important in the maintenance of liberal democracy.

Democracy and State Security The concept of state security has been at the core of international relations (IR) theorizing, at least in the post-World War II period, if not earlier. The security dilemma as developed by Robert Jervis (1978) and Jack Snyder (1985), of course, has been at the heart of IR theory, as has the related concept of threat in Stephen Walt's (1987) transformation of the balance of power into the balance of threat. But in most IR applications, state security was deemed a function of interstate relations, without necessarily having an impact on either the state itself or on domestic societies. Quantitative analyses of arms races were exemplars of this interstate emphasis. Several years ago I found that state security had an impact on the inner workings of the state itself, particularly on the extent of its democratic governance. Diminished state security is associated with less democracy cross-nationally, and with the overthrow of democracy in favor of autocratic government (Midlarsky 1995, 1998, 2002). These findings are related to the "reversal of the causal arrow" in democratic peace theory suggested by me, and others such as William Thompson (1996) and PatrickJames and his colleagues (1999). Of course, the causal arrow can go both ways, but the reversal was put forward to suggest principally that the democratic peace is not a unidirectional phenomenon. In these studies, the state is the principal focus or dependent variable. Elements of its international environment threaten the state, and changes then occur in its modus operandi. But the state is not the only potential target of external threat. Societies also can be threatened in the form of events emanating from the international environment that can undermine the norms, values, and even the very foundations of civilizations as perceived by their residents. Here I refer to the mass murder and even genocides of populations who, rightly or wrongly, are perceived as uniquely threatening. One cannot begin to understand the genesis of
'An earlier version of this chapter was presented on the Roundtable titled "Using IR Theory to Understand Ethnic Conflict: Insightful or Irrelevant" at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, March 23-27, 2002. ? 2003 International Studies Review. PublishedbyBlackwellPublishing,350 MainStreet,Malden,MA02148, USA,and 9600 GarsingtonRoad,Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.

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TheImpactof ExternalThreaton Statesand Domestic Societies

the Holocaust or the more recent Rwandan genocide without taking into account the impact of events external to the societies in question. The rise of Communism in Russia and its export temporarily to Bavaria at the end of World War I was nothing less than traumatic to Bavarians such as Heinrich Himmler, later to be Reichsfiihrer-SS and an architect of the "Final Solution." Hitler himself, of course, was deeply affected by the emergence of Bolshevism in the heart of Europe that required troops of the German government to defeat. The presence of three Russian-Jewish emissaries at the head of this Bolshevik regime suggested that the traditional conservative Roman Catholic Bavarian way-of-life was to be utterly transformed. Germans in other parts of the country felt equally threatened. In other words, not only the state was subject to political transformation, but the structure and ordering of society was likely to be changed beyond recognition (Midlarsky forthcoming). Although the perception of threat was palpable, the reality of the deep patriotism of German Jews during World War I belied this perception. The reality consisted of 100,000 Jewish men under arms (80,000 having served in combat), 12,000 Jewish dead at the front, and 35,000 decorated for battlefield bravery. These statistics are out of all proportion to the roughly 500,000 Jewish citizens living in Germany in 1914 (Fischer 1998:120). Such a disparity between reality and perception is suggestive of the immense impact that external threat can have on domestic political life. In Rwanda, the threatened return of traditional Tutsi domination over the Hutu majority fed the genocidal fury of 1994. Military victories of the Tutsi-led Rwandese Patriotic Front invading from Uganda and concessions to the Tutsi during the Arusha negotiations made a renewed domination possible, even likely. The deaths of 500,000-800,000 people were a consequence of this perception. A Continuum of External Threat These considerations suggest that we can construct a continuum of external threat magnitude in relation to its impact on state and society. At one end we find threats confined principally to the state itself, which can result in state transformations but do not necessarily have much impact on the daily lives of people. This minimal impact tends to occur in ethnically homogeneous societies. The demise of democracy in response to various external threats in Eastern Europe during the interwar period is a case in point (Midlarsky 2002). In a relatively homogeneous country such as Estonia, the transition to autocracy had little impact on peoples' daily lives, whereas in more ethnically mixed Poland, individual citizens gradually came to be more affected. As the external threat to Poland became more severe, the tendency toward authoritarianism was more pronounced, and the lives of ordinary citizens were more deeply affected. The Polish case illustrates this transition across the threat continuum. Radicalization and its impact on ethnic minorities occur as a consequence of increased external threat, especially when legitimized by the relevant international community. In Poland, this transition began with the Locarno Pact of October 1925. Although hailed in the West as a milestone in the consolidation of peace because it gained German recognition of the inviolability of Germany's western borders as prescribed in the Treaty of Versailles, in the East it encouraged quite the opposite reaction. Instead of a direct international guarantee of Polish borders, Locarno obtained a French guarantee of these borders, but only within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations. In other words, France could act only after the cumbersome League machinery had been put into motion, thereby delaying any international assistance until it was probably too late to do any good. Thus, the Franco-Polish alliance that had served as the principal bulwark of Polish territorial

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integrity since 1921 had been diluted almost to the point of uselessness. At least this was the conclusion reached by the Polish General Staff and communicated to the Polish ambassador in Paris in February 1926 (Gieysztor et al. 1979:566-567). Gustav Stresemann, the German foreign minister, repeatedly announced that Locarno did not limit Germany's right to obtain "corrections" to her eastern border (Cienciala and Komarnicki 1984:273). Two additional factors were to compound the insecurity. The Soviet-German Neutrality Pact of April 1926 appeared to be explicitly directed against Poland (Leslie et al. 1980:158). German troops had occupied Poland during World War I, and the Polish-Soviet war had ended only five years earlier. Hans von Seeckt, commander of the German army, was known to hate Poland and sought her destruction (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:210). To avoid the limitations of the Treaty of Versailles, German troops actually began secretly training on Soviet soil; it would have been virtually impossible to conceal such military maneuvers from the Poles. Second, in 1925, Germany began a tariff war with Poland that compounded her economic difficulties. An internal economic insecurity was thereby added to the military uncertainty, principally because half of Poland's trade was with Germany (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:209). In May 1926, Marshal J6zef Pilsudski, hero of the Polish-Soviet war, overthrew the democratically elected government, significantly retaining the positions of minister of war and general inspector of the armed forces, after appointing trusted colleagues to civilian posts (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001:213). Initially, Pilsudski announced that the coup would have no revolutionary consequences for the polity or society (Gieysztor et al. 1979:579), which was largely true during the first years of his regime. Despite Pilsudski's desire to avoid antagonizing ethnic minorities and thereby to keep Poland's borders intact, majority-minority relations gradually deteriorated as the state aggregated authority to itself. The election of the Sejm (parliament) in 1930, characterized by electoral manipulation and other measures, returned a clear majority for a broad coalition of Pilsudski 's supporters (Leslie et al. 1980:176). At the same time, in response to Ukrainian nationalist provocations, the infamous "pacification of Eastern Little Poland" occurred, in which the rural population was terrorized by the army as it was billeted locally and carried out its investigations. Abandoned Orthodox churches were blown up, and sporadic attempts to convert the Orthodox to Roman Catholicism occurred. In 1934, a Polish version of the Nazi concentration camp (called an "isolation camp") was constructed to house Communists as well as members of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian opposition to Polish rule (Gieysztor et al. 1979:585-593). As the second largest minority in Poland after the Ukrainians (Vital 1999:763), the Jews also would not fare well as power was aggregated by the state, partly in response to the substantially increased threat on its western border after the rise of Hitler. In 1935, a new constitution was introduced, which endowed the president with enormous powers, simultaneously reducing the powers of the Sejm. Upon Pilsudski's death in that year, the gradually deteriorating condition of Polish Jews worsened considerably. As early as September 1934, J6sef Beck, the Polish secretary of foreign affairs declared to the League of Nations that Poland was not required to safeguard the rights of its minorities. Further, Jews would have to emigrate to places like Madagascar to reduce urban overcrowding. The increasingly common identification of Jews with Communism, although vastly exaggerated if not downright false, nevertheless increased the Polish Roman Catholic perception of threat emanating from the Soviet Union. Within one month of Pilsudski's death, in June 1935 a massacre of Jews took place in Grodno. The following year witnessed intermittent pogroms throughout Poland that continued until the war broke out (Dubnov 1973:880-881). Jewish university students were forced either to attend lectures seated in separate benches

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The Impactof ExternalThreaton Statesand Domestic Societies

set aside for them or to stand, which the vast majority chose to do. Only the onset of World War II prevented explicitly anti-Jewish legislation from being passed in the Sejm (Vital 1999:772). Poland was on the verge of either ethnic cleansing its Jews or excluding its Jewish minority from public life. International legitimation of "corrections" to the German border by the Locarno Pact set the entire process in motion that would be strongly intensified by the rise of aggressive irredentism in the Nazi regime. Thus, when the initial threatening agent becomes radicalized, so too does the potential victim, which in turn can victimize its own population. Members of victimized minorities also may turn against each other, as did many in Poland just prior to World War II. At the extreme end of the threat continuum, the rise of ideologies such as Bolshevism and its polar response, Nazism, had a tremendous impact. An impending threat to patterns of daily living can have enormous consequences, even giving rise to a competing totalitarian ideology like Nazism. Observers such as the Papal Nuncio in Munich, Eugenio Pacelli, later to be Pope Pius XII, would be affected to the extent that support of Nazi anti-Bolshevism would become Vatican policy during World War II (Phayer 2000). Between these extremes of the continuum lie many other behaviors in which both state and society can be affected. Permeability or penetrability of state boundaries is a key variable. Even highly secure states have permeable boundaries. One has only to recall the impact of the oil embargoes of 1973 and 1979 on US citizens. Earlier, the rise of McCarthyism in response to the European and Asian spread of Communism had a strongly deleterious effect on US policy. The purging of East Asian specialists from the State Department in response to Senator McCarthy's threats had much to do with the absence of sorely needed professional advice at the time of the US intervention in Vietnam in the mid-1960s. Loss of professional expertise at the level of policy formation had a profound impact, as did the loss of jobs and careers to those people most intimately affected by McCarthyism. Impact on Liberal Democracy and Its Diffusion The attacks of September 11 on the United States have threatened to take a toll on the civil liberties associated with liberal democracy. Initial anti-Muslim and antiArab sentiments were sometimes expressed in violent acts. Efforts of the Bush administration to keep the prosecution of suspected terrorists out of the civilian court system, characterized by its many civil rights protections, is a case of the potential impact of security concerns on basic elements of liberal democracy. Thus far, the impact of September 11 on both the US state and society has not been substantial, largely because it was a single event whose consequences have been, for the most part, successfully contained. But if future attacks occur, then serious limitations on civil rights could be imposed in the name of national security. If the source of these new attacks also was to be Al-Qaeda, then anti-Muslim or anti-Arab hostility could be renewed. Ethnic conflict within the United States might increase. When faced with extreme threat, substitution in state leadership of democracies is not uncommon. Winston Churchill, whose political career appeared to be waning, found himself propelled into the office of prime minister at the start of World War II. Ariel Sharon, a virtually unthinkable candidate for the Israeli prime minister's office prior to the onset of Intifada II and suicide bombing, easily defeated the less bellicose candidate, Ehud Barak. Sharon recently was reelected by a large majority. Personnel occupying important roles within the structure of political authority can experience radical change and a consequent introduction of new policies. But the rule of law in Israeli society itself thus far has not experienced much change except for some curtailment of civil liberties for suspected terrorists, as in the United States after September 11. However, if a weapon of mass

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destruction were to be used by terrorists, then civil liberties even in a mature democracy could be diminished to the point of liberal democracy's end. The now widely quoted aphorism, "the Constitution is not a suicide pact," succinctly indicates the primacy of state security. All this suggests that a theory of external threat is necessary for understanding many domestic behaviors, including ethnic conflict, both at the state and societal levels. Our current literature is sufficient to take on this theory-building task. But is it also possible that a more benign external environment can affect the democratization of societies? Here I refer to the literature on the diffusion of democracy (Huntington 1991; Starr 1991). Regional patterns can have a positive impact. Thus the external threat continuum could be extended to the impact of democracies on the development of democracy and human rights in neighboring countries. A continuum of this sort, of course, assumes that a single dimension exists, stretching from the malign effects of threat to the benign effects of democracy. Do these processes constitute a single dimension, or are they multidimensional? Because this question as yet remains unanswered, I propose that the theory underlying the threat continuum be investigated first, followed by any extensions in benign directions. Given the critical importance of liberal democracy for the avoidance of ethnic conflict, the events of September 11 have mandated the precedence of threat in any such research program. How democracies can cope successfully with terror attacks on their civilian populations has, of course, become a major issue. A criterion of success is not only the elimination of the terrorist threat, but also the maintenance of liberal democracy in all its many human rights dimensions. Threat Mitigation An emphasis on threat leads inevitably to an investigation of threat mitigation. How can threat be lessened or countered so that liberal democracy can thrive and ethnic conflict be minimized? Great powers have weapons of mass destruction that can effectively counter external threat, at least that emanating from competing states, but much also can be learned from the behavior of small powers. During the interwar period, two landlocked countries, Austria and Czechoslovakia, behaved in very different ways. Czechoslovakia, recognizing its geopolitical vulnerability, sought alliances with many powers both large and small. Austria was much less active in alliance seeking; only when the state appeared to be terminally threatened did the Austrian leadership seriously seek external help (Midlarsky 2002). Czechoslovakia survived as a democracy virtually until the start of World War II; Austria did not. Even when other factors are taken into account, alliance behavior proved to be critical in differentiating between the two countries. Alliances are a potent vehicle for the mitigation of external threat. Even superpowers such as the United States can profit from alliance activity. Not only is the international perception of great power influence enhanced, but the greater the number of allies, the smaller the amount of available territory for terrorist training facilities or safe havens. Exchange of information also is facilitated by a large number of allies. Toward the end of the Cold War, the United States was far more successful in its alliance activity than the Soviet Union. The same one-sided outcome appears to be developing in the current battle against terrorism. Conclusion Finally, the successful countering or mitigation of threat by a democracy can lead to the international furtherance of democracy. Democracy then appears to be ascendant in its competition with other "isms" and so is to be emulated. This, of course, is a benign outcome because ethnic conflict would likely also be diminished

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TheImpactof ExternalThreaton Statesand Domestic Societies

in extent and severity, at least in the long run after democracies mature. Thus, success in the minimization of threat on that end of the continuum can lead to the diffusion of democracy with its positive outcomes on the benign end. Much is at stake for democracy and ethnic conflict in the current war against terrorism. But the same can be said about the high stakes for democracy in the cold and hot wars of the last century. Democracy has fared reasonably well thus far and likely will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.


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Globalization, Democratization, and the Prospects for Civil War in the New Millennium Author(s): T. David Mason Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, Dissolving Boundaries (Dec., 2003), pp. 1935 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: . Accessed: 23/10/2013 17:50
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International Studies Review(2003) 5(4), 19-35

Globalization, Democratization, and the Prospects for Civil War in the New Millennium

Departmentof Political Science, Universityof North Texas The last half of the twentieth century was marked by dramatic changes in the patterns of armed conflict in the world. First, whereas wars between sovereign nation-states had defined the contours of international politics for the previous three hundred years, civil wars--revolutions, secessionist wars, and anticolonial revolts-became the most frequent and deadly forms of armed conflict in the postWorld War II era. The Correlates of War data indicate that between 1945 and 1999 there were only twenty-five interstate wars (resulting in a total of 3.3 million battle deaths), but five times as many civil wars (127) occurred, resulting in five times as many battle deaths (16.2 million) (Fearon and Laitin 2003:75). Second, whereas the major powers (including Europe, the United States, China, and Japan) had been the site of most of the world's interstate wars, the Third World-Asia, Africa, and Latin America-became the locus of almost all the armed conflict that punctuated the history of the last half-century. While Europe enjoyed what John Gaddis (1986) termed the "long peace" (the longest period in the post-Westphalia era without a major war among the major powers), conflicts in the Third World inflicted all but 176,000 of the 22 million battle deaths that occurred between 1945 and 1989 (Holsti 1992:37). If the restructuring of the international system that occurred in the aftermath of World War II could result in such a profound transformation in the global patterns of armed conflict, we might also expect a similar shift to occur with the end of the Cold War. In this article I will explore the question of what trends, if any, we might expect to see in patterns of civil war in the new century. Will the end of the Cold War bring an end to the age of civil war or simply result in the diffusion of such conflict to regions that heretofore were relatively immune to its occurrence? Investigating the prospects for another phase shift in global patterns of armed conflict requires that we relax the disciplinary boundaries between comparative politics and international relations. Changes in the structure of the international system have been implicated in the diffusion of revolutionary violence that occurred after World War II.1 The domestic conditions that most theories propose as causal antecedents of civil war-for example, extreme inequality of income and wealth, displacement of rural populations from the land, weak state capacity with repressive regimes-are, to varying degrees, outcomes of international processes, including the dismantling of colonial empires, the shift to export agriculture in many parts of the Third World, and the intervention of major powers in the domestic politics of Third World regimes in the service of Cold War geopolitical interests. Three trends in the post-Cold War international system have been identified as possibly (but not certainly) moderating the domestic conditions that fuel civil
'See, for instance, Wolf (1969), Paige (1975), Walton (1984), and Mason (forthcoming).

(0 2003 International Studies Review. PublishedbyBlackwellPublishing,350 MainStreet,Malden,MA02148, USA,and 9600 GarsingtonRoad,Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.

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and the Prospects Democratization, Globalization, for Civil War

war: (1) the globalization of national economies; (2) the third wave of democratization; and (3) the expanded use of peacekeeping operations as a means to bring civil wars to a peaceful conclusion. Globalization promises to bring new investments to Third World nations, diversifying their economies, stimulating growth, and potentially alleviating the deprivation that has fueled support for revolutionary insurgencies. The spread of democracy means that Third World states faced with opposition challenges will be far less likely to respond with the level of repression that has often turned peaceful opposition into revolutionary movements. And the expanded use of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations suggests that, when civil wars do occur, the international community is more likely to intervene to bring the war to an earlier and less destructive end. In the remainder of this article, I will examine the competing arguments on how these three trends might affect the frequency, destructiveness, and geographic distribution of civil wars in the new millennium.

Globalization and Revolution The end of the Cold War has accelerated the trend toward integration of national economies into a truly global economy. The dismantling of the economic wall between the market economies of the capitalist West and the state socialist economies of the Leninist East has encouraged the globalization of industrial production and finance to the Third World as well. This phenomenon is expected to alter the dynamics of national economic development in fundamental ways. The question for this article is whether these trends can create enough opportunity for enough of the population in the Third World to diminish the frequency of civil wars there. Optimists predict that globalization will result in higher rates of investment and economic growth in the Third World as those nations become full partners in a global system of production, consumption, and finance. The diffusion of industrial production to the Third World will make their economies less dependent on raw materials exports and less vulnerable to market fluctuations in the price of those exports. Expansion of the industrial and service sectors in Third World economies is expected to create occupational alternatives to agriculture that promise to absorb much of the surplus rural labor that traditionally has provided the civilian support for revolutionary insurgencies. In this manner, globalization promises to remedy the grievances that fuel popular support for revolutionary movements and thereby diminish the frequency with which civil wars occur. Critics of globalization acknowledge that the integration of the Third World into a global system of production and finance may well shift some low wage manufacturing jobs to the Third World. However, the local benefits of this trend will be limited and temporary. Benefits will be limited because the jobs will be lowskill and low-wage positions. As such, they promise little improvement in the standard of living of most workers there. Nor do they promise to alleviate the extremes of income inequality that most deprived actor models of revolution depict as the source of popular grievances. Moreover, continued high population growth rates in the Third World mean that the absolute number of people living in poverty will remain large, even if the anticipated benefits of globalization do lift some out of poverty. Eric Selbin (2001:289-290) points out that in Latin America more people live in poverty today than twenty years ago: "nearly half of the region's 460 million people are poor--an increase of 60 million in one decade." The growing number of poor will provide fertile recruiting grounds for opposition movements that can depict the incumbent regime--even a democratic one--as more responsive to the imperatives of global capital markets than to the needs of its own impoverished citizens.

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Whatever benefits flow from globalization will be temporary because those are precisely the kinds of jobs that are targeted for eventual elimination through automation. The only industries that will relocate to the Third World are those that pay low wages and generate the kinds of environmental problems that publics in wealthier nations will no longer tolerate. Indeed, part of the reason that these industries relocate to the Third World is that social movements in advanced industrial democracies have succeeded in getting "green" legislation enacted to compel manufacturers to invest in environmental clean up. Firms can avoid these costs by relocating to the Third World, where environmental movements are as yet politically weak if not nonexistent. Those firms often find that the promise of jobcreating investments overwhelms environmental concerns in the political calculus of elected officials in many Third World states. Thus, critics argue that globalization will have little if any effect on the economic grievances that fuel support for revolutionary movements. In short, an ample supply of impoverished individuals and communities will still provide the civilian support base to sustain revolutionary movements. To reconcile these contending views on globalization, we must inventory some of its specific effects on grievances among the rural poor, on mobilization of aggrieved populations, and on state responses to opposition social movements. Globalization and Economic Development In many ways, the arguments about globalization, both critical and optimistic, closely parallel earlier debates in the field of comparative politics over the concepts of "modernization" and "development." Half a century ago, modernization theorists extrapolated from the experience of Western Europe and North America to predict that the commercialization of agriculture in the Third World would transform the surplus rural population of those nations into an urban labor force that would fuel an industrial revolution in those countries (Lewis 1954, cited in McMichael 2000:274; see also Rostow 1990). Comparative advantage implied that these regions' economic development was best served by specializing in the production of raw materials for export to industrial economies of the North. Dependency and world systems theorists observed that the actual outcome of modernization has been something far less than the take-off to industrial maturity that Europe and North America experienced in the nineteenth century. Quite the contrary, the commercialization of agriculture has led to high rates of landlessness, overurbanization, environmental deterioration, and the impoverishment of large portions of the urban and rural populations. The much-anticipated industrial revolution did not occur in most nations of the Third World, especially those that were integrated into the global economy as exporters of agricultural commodities. If the prescription of comparative advantage failed to replicate Europe's industrial revolution, is there any reason to believe that the postmodern prescription of globalization will be any more of a panacea for Third World poverty? If not, why should we expect economic globalization to bring about any substantial decline in the frequency with which revolutionary situations emerge in the Third World? If the modernization paradigm envisioned Third World nations replicating the developmental path that Western Europe and North America had followed in the nineteenth century, globalization represents an abandonment of that goal. Instead, nations seek niches of specialization in a global economy whose dynamics are determined more by capital markets than by states. "Nation-states no longer 'develop'; rather, they 'position themselves' in the global economy" (McMichael 2000:275). Different nations or even regions within nations specialize in some phase of a globalized production process. In so doing, they hope to make themselves indispensable partners in a global production and distribution network. To the extent that they succeed, capital will flow into their economy, fueling the

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and the Prospects Globalization, Democratization, for Civil War

growth and prosperity that will allow them to become full partners in the global consumer market. To the extent that these expectations are not fulfilled, the economic grievances that fuel popular support for dissident movements will remain. Globalization and the State Both optimists and critics of globalization agree on one primary difference between the changes resulting from globalization and those predicted by modernization theorists: globalization will substantially diminish the capacity of the state to influence national economic development. Arrighi (1994) links the shift from "development" to "globalization" to the onset of the "financialization"of the global economy: a preference on the part of investors for liquid rather than fixed capital. The heightened mobility of capital has privileged financial speculation at the expense of fixed investment. It has also privileged international financial and corporate elites (including officials of international institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization) at the expense of government officials in the nations penetrated by the global trade and financial system (McMichael 2000:279). Under globalization, "boosting export production and offering attractive conditions for foreign investment became the new priorities for governments in the Third World, alongside an extraordinary roll-back of public investment" (McMichael 2000:281). To make their nation attractive to global financial elites, state leaders in the Third World are compelled to reduce taxes, devalue their currency, and cut public spending, whether it be for social welfare benefits or investment in infrastructure. It also requires the privatization of state assets, auctioning them off to these same global financial elites at prices dictated by global financial markets. Privatization increased tenfold over the course of the 1980s (McMichael 2000:281). Critics argue that structural adjustments of these sorts undermine the coherence and sovereignty of national economies. Lowering wages in order to attract foreign direct investment reduces purchasing power in the domestic economy. Privatizing public enterprises reduces the capacity of states to influence domestic economic development and to cushion their constituents against shocks emanating from the global economy. The promise of low-wage manufacturing jobs today can disappear tomorrow with shifts in global currency or capital markets, innovations in production technology, or changes in consumer demand. State elites who enact policies designed to attract foreign investments often find that global market forces are far more crucial than their own policies in determining the flow of investment into and out of their nation's economy. Compliance with the rules of the global economy results in the shrinking of state capacity. Shrinking the state has reduced its capacity to allocate and redistribute resources in response to the demands of popular sectors, including workers and peasants. States must give up some of the very policy instruments with which they could accommodate the demands of mobilized publics and defuse tensions that otherwise might fuel political violence, including civil war. Some argue that such changes will be good for the development of national economies. The fear of driving away foreign investment will make states less likely (and less able) to intervene in the economy in ways that disrupt markets. In the past, such interventions were justified on the grounds of protecting vulnerable domestic constituencies. However, such policies often produced more in the way of short-term political payoff for state officials than long-term economic protections for targeted sectors of the labor force. Brazil's failed experiments with import substitution and Argentina's populist policies under Peron are illustrative of the long-term economic consequences that can accrue to politically motivated

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interventions in markets. Globalization makes such interventions less likely by raising the costs to states-in terms of international investment-of intervening in the market. The globalization imperative also suggests that when popular discontent is mobilized, states will be far less likely to respond with repression for fear of scaring off international investment. The political risks that accompany state repression can deter foreign investment, especially when capital is as mobile as it has become today. Thus, the imperatives of globalization may make states in the Third World less repressive than they were during the Cold War when the prospects of large fixed capital investments could induce state elites to repress labor unions, peasant associations, and other popular social movements. The Mexican government's response to the Zapatista uprising on the day that NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) went into effect is instructive. During the Cold War, an armed uprising of the sort that occurred on January 1, 1994, would likely have provoked a harsh military response, no doubt with the active support of the United States. Instead, the Mexican government (at the urging of the United States) restrained its military response for fear of driving off investors who were poised to pour capital into the Mexican economy once NAFTA went into effect. Popular discontent can become politicized by state impotence in the face of economic grievances just as well as by state intervention in markets to redistribute the benefits and costs of economic development. Within the state, globalization has privileged the financial and trade ministries at the expense of ministries whose constituents include factory workers, peasants, the urban poor, and other marginal social groups. State agencies that support and regulate sectors of the economy that affect the lives of the majority of the citizenry have lost budgetary resources and policy influence to agencies concerned with and connected to global economic interests (McMichael 2000:281). States are no longer in a position to enter joint ventures with private firms, nor can they use such investments to "pick winners" in the domestic economy so as to shape the nation's developmental trajectory in ways that state leaders determine are best for the longterm health of the national economy or the short-term stability of the political system. Robert Snyder (1999:13) argues that shrinking the state will make revolution less likely because the diminished role of the state in the economy will make it less relevant as a target for popular discontent. Jeff Goodwin (2001:275) adds, "state power-the traditional prize of revolutionaries--has been dramatically eroded by the growing power of multinational corporations and by the increasingly rapid and uncontrollable movements of capital, commodities, and people." As globalization hollows out the state, it will no longer be a prize worth the costs and risks of revolutionary action. This argument is unconvincing. Control of the state in even the most impoverished nation provides, if nothing else, ample opportunity for rent-seeking on the part of those who control it, as evidenced by the ability of dictators such as Mobutu Sese-seko in Zaire, Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines to amass huge personal fortunes while presiding with indifference to their constituents' suffering from their failed development policies. Paul Collier and his colleagues at the World Bank have documented a trend among rebel organizations that do well by war. By capturing the flow of certain types of commodities (such as diamonds or illegal drugs), rebel organizations can extract enough income to prosper economically regardless of their chances of ever overthrowing the government (see Collier and Hoeffler 2001). A weakened state simply enhances these opportunities. If globalization diminishes the state's capacity to address the grievances of mobilized publics, how will the state respond to new social movements arising within the polity?

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and the Prospects Globalization, Democratization, for Civil War Globalization and Social Movements

Regardless of its effects on state capacity and economic development (and, therefore, on grievances), globalization also affects the ability of aggrieved populations to mobilize for collective action. The same global communications networks (including the Internet and wireless communications) that make possible the instantaneous movement of capital around the globe also facilitate the coordination of social movement activities across borders and the diffusion of social movement technologies to the most remote corners of the world. Globalization gives Third World social movement organizations access to supporters and resources exogenous to their own nation. Globalization also means that repertoires of contention are more easily diffused from one nation to another. And the coordination of supporters' behavior by dissident activists is facilitated by the same technologies of globalization that supposedly make revolution less likely by diminishing grievances. If, as Charles Tilly (1978), John McCarthy and Meyer Zald (1977), and others have argued, the emergence of dissident social movements is less a function of grievances and more a function of organization, the very trends that optimists point to as making revolution less likely in the Third World should make the proliferation of social movements all the more robust. The more social movements there are, the more likely it is that some of them will escalate to revolutionary violence. At the very least, any assessment of the prospects for civil war in the Third World must consider how changes in the global economy-and in the domestic political economy of those nations-affect the prospects for grassroots mobilization of peasants and the urban poor in the Third World. There is no reason to expect that globalization processes will act as a deterrent to grassroots mobilization in the Third World. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that mobilizing the poor for collective action will be facilitated by the trends toward globalization. Globalization builds links between communities, social organizations, and identity groups in the Third World and their counterparts in the North. The diffusion of social movement organizations, the emergence of transnational social movements, and the expansion of links between Third World social movements and their counterparts or sympathizers in wealthier nations in the North suggest that activists in the Third World will find the tasks of building a social movement organization and mobilizing the resources necessary to sustain the movement easier in an era of globalization than they were during the Cold War. The question then becomes how globalization will affect the willingness of nonelites to support and participate in dissident social movements. What matters to an impoverished individual are not the big issues of global integration but how these trends affect the immediate conditions of their daily existence. "Globalization tends to be understood as a process of economic integration--observed through local prisms, or 'grounded' in local terms, giving a local face to processes of globalization" (McMichael 2000:275). Although globalization is, first and foremost, a matter of integrating national economies into the global economy, the effects of this process are felt locally and are defined for people in local terms. For example, neoliberal reforms of the Salinas administration in Mexico had profound effects on peasant farmers in that nation. The elimination of guaranteed crop prices, reductions in state-subsidized credit, and the dismantling of trade barriers under the banner of NAFTA exposed Mexican farmers to competition from US agribusiness conglomerates, and this competition threatened their very livelihood (Harvey 1998:170). Some of Salinas' proposals on land tenure were perceived by indigenous communities in Chiapas as threatening, not just to their control of the ejidos,but to a way of life based around communal lands (Wager and Shulz 1995: 5-7). These threats became real precisely because of the local incentives created by NAFTA. Communities threatened by globalization were able to turn their own

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community institutions into mobilizing structures to mount organized opposition to NAFTA and to the Mexican government as the champion of NAFTA. Thus the de Liberacion Nacional or EZLN. Zapatista movement was born: the Eje'rcito Zapatsita The same trend toward economic globalization could, however, make it less likely that movements such as the EZLN will escalate to revolutionary violence. When the Zapatistas surprised the Mexican government and the world with their carefully timed uprising, the Mexican government resisted the reflexive response of retaliating with massive military firepower. Within two weeks after the EZLN's opening offensive, the government had declared a cease-fire and initiated settlement talks. Within six months, the government had poured over $220 million into social development projects in the region, a 44 percent increase over what had been budgeted (Wager and Shulz 1995:29). Had the government tried to crush the movement militarily, relying on its overwhelming advantages in troops and firepower, the surviving Zapatista combatants would likely have concentrated on building their own military capabilities. Some portion of their civilian support base would have become committed to supporting guerrilla operations. Although the prospects of a Zapatista victory would still have been remote, the likelihood of protracted guerrilla conflict destabilizing an already fragile Mexican economy would have increased. The fact that Salinas did not pursue the military response as aggressively as he could have is due in part to the international imperatives of globalization. Despite the intrusion of global issues into the local political economy and despite the growth in the number of transnational social movement organizations, it appears that "most political challengers continue to operate within fairly traditional, nationally-focused political arenas" (Smith 2000:3; see also Imig and Tarrow 2000, 2001a, 2001b). Globalization of national economies has not yet resulted in truly transnational social movements (Imig and Tarrow 2001a). Third World social movement organizations may have counterparts and colleagues in the wealthier nations of Europe and North America. However, to date, the emergence of transnational social movements has not kept pace with the globalization of national economies. Imig and Tarrow (2000) point to the higher costs of transnational activism and the difficulties in mobilizing both using voluntary support and labor impersonal, long-distance communications. Their research-and most of the research on transnational social movements-is focused on the European Union. If transnational social movements have a difficult time achieving success there-with well-educated and prosperous publics, and few barriers to the flow of people, capital, or information across national boundaries-it is unrealistic to expect transnational social movements to emerge either within the Third World or between Third World movements and their counterparts in the North. Smith (2000:9) notes that only 23 percent of transnational social movement organizations are based in the South. Even these are largely associations of people who, by local standards, would be considered elites. Rarely are transnational social movements associations of the poor. Even more rarely are they likely to involve heavy participation from the impoverished rural population that traditionally provides the civilian support base for revolutionary movements. Activists in the Third World may receive moral support, publicity for their cause, and even some financial support from their counterparts in the North. However, their Northern colleagues are not likely to relocate in large numbers to the Third World to serve as foot soldiers in Third World revolutionary movements. They may stage demonstrations in Europe and North America to raise public consciousness about land and poverty issues in the Third World, but they are not likely to show up in large numbers to participate in land invasions in rural areas of Asia, Africa, or Latin America. Therefore, Third World activists can expect to receive only marginal amounts of tangible assistance from their counterparts in the North and certainly

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and the Prospects Globalization, Democratization, for Civil War

not enough to affect the success of their movements or the frequency with which they escalate to revolutionary violence. Whether local activists succeed in mobilizing a following will be determined primarily by local conditions. Whether local movements remain nonviolent or transform into revolutionary movements depends in large part on how the state responds to nonviolent opposition movements. This brings us to a consideration of how the trend toward democratization in the Third World will affect the probability of revolution in any one nation and the frequency of revolutions across nations. Democratization: The "Coffin of Revolution"? The second trend that many predict will affect the frequency and destructiveness of civil war is what Samuel Huntington (1991) has labeled the "third wave of democracy." Over the last quarter of the twentieth century, we witnessed the transition from authoritarianism to democracy in over fifty nations, many of them in the Third World (Diamond 1997:xiii-xiv). Democratization is directly relevant to the future of revolutionary conflict because stable democracies do appear to be relatively immune to civil war (Krain and Myers 1997; Hegre et al. 2001). Jeff Goodwin states it more emphatically: "no popular revolutionary movement,it bears a consolidated democratic has ever overthrown regime"(Goodwin 2001:276; emphasizing, emphasis in the original). If, as Goodwin and Skocpol (1989:495) argue, "the ballot box . .. has proven to be the coffin of revolutionary movements," then the spread of democracy throughout the Third World should make revolutions and other forms of civil war less likely in the future. This domestic corollary of the democratic peace proposition holds that democracies are less likely to experience civil war because democratic regimes defuse revolutionary violence by diverting popular discontent into institutionalized channels of electoral competition and nonviolent protest. Dissident movements do not need to resort to organized violence against the state because they can seek to redress their grievances through electoral means and other forms of nonviolent collective action. Democratic states are also less likely to repress nonviolent protest. Hence, opposition social movements are not compelled by state repression to choose between withdrawing from politics in order to escape repression or shifting to violent tactics of their own in order to combat it. Empirical support for this proposition is found in the frequently cited "inverted U-curve" relationship between repression and civil violence. The inverted U suggests that established democracies and harshly autocratic regimes are less susceptible to civil war than weak authoritarian regimes (Muller and Weede 1990; Hegre et al. 2001). In a democracy, the benefits of peaceful negotiations exceed the benefits of violent conflict; revolution is not necessary. Conversely, harshly autocratic regimes preempt revolutionary violence by crushing opposition movements before they develop the capacity to mount a serious challenge to the state. In this circumstance, rebellion is irrational because the costs are prohibitively high, and the likelihood of success is remote. It is weak authoritarian states that are the most susceptible to civil war. They lack both the institutional capacity to accommodate opposition grievances through electoral mechanisms and the coercive capacity to crush opposition movements preemptively. When organized opposition movements do emerge, the weak authoritarian state attempts to repress them but fails. In so doing, the state converts nonviolent opposition into revolutionary movements (Mason and Krane 1989; Mason 1990). Thus, a theoretical basis and some empirical support exist for the notion that the third wave of democracy should bring about a decline in the incidence of civil war.
20Onthe inverted "U" relationship between state repression and civil violence, see Muller (1985), Muller and Seligson (1987), Muller and Weede (1990), and Hegre et al. (2001).

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However, there are several reasons for caution on this proposition. First, in several cases in which the transition to democracy took place while a civil war was already underway, democratization did not bring about an end to that conflict. In the Philippines, the guerrilla insurgency of the New People's Army persists after almost two decades of democracy. Likewise, more than twenty years of democracy has not brought an end to the Shining Path insurgency in Peru. Nor has the transition to democracy in Colombia brought an end to the civil war there. Thus, the transition to democracy does not automatically mean an end to revolutionary movements whose existence predates the transition. A well-established revolutionary movement may not be willing to compromise its demands if its leaders believe they still have a chance of achieving military victory, or if they believe that the best compromise they can hope to achieve through democratic processes is less than what they can gain through a continuation of violence. The persistence of revolutionary movements can impede democratic consolidation and even jeopardize the survival of democracy. The newly democratic regime in the Philippines has been threatened numerous times by attempted military coups, in part because of the inability of that regime to resolve the land issues that fuel popular support for the New People's Army. In Peru, the threat posed by Sendero Luminoso guerrillas was one of the motivations for President Alberto Fujimori's autogolpeof April 5, 1992. He suspended the 1979 constitution, arrested several opposition leaders, dissolved the Congress and the judiciary, and assumed virtual dictatorial powers. Second, the domestic version of the democratic peace applies most clearly to wellestablished democracies, and most of the new democracies of the Third World have not yet achieved democratic consolidation. Where democratization is confined to competitive elections and constitutional constraints on state power are weak or nonexistent, "illiberal democracy" can bring to power "elected tyrants" who become "predatory, maintaining some order but also arresting opponents, muzzling dissent, nationalizing industries, and confiscating property" (Zakaria 1997:32). The risk of reversion to nondemocratic forms of government cannot be discounted in many new democracies in the Third World. Huntington (1968, 1991) warned that new democracies can decay, and each of the three waves of democracy he describes was followed by a period of reversal in which some newly democratic regimes reverted to nondemocratic forms of governance. Adam Przeworski and his collaborators have identified a number of conditions that increase the probability of a democracy's demise (Przeworski et al. 1997:295). Among these are economic stagnation, poverty, and high rates of inflation. Democracies in which per capita income is less than $1,000 have a life expectancy of less than nine years, and those in the $1,000-2,000 range can expect to survive only about sixteen years. They also found that certain institutional configurations are less likely to survive than others. For instance, presidential (as opposed to parliamentary systems) with highly fragmented legislative party systems are less likely to survive than parliamentary systems with less fragmented party systems. Even though the transition to democracy may make revolution in the countryside less likely, the failure of new democracies to achieve consolidation--and the subsequent reversion to authoritarian rule-should make revolution more likely. Typically, the authoritarian juntas that seize power from failed democracies announce their rule by demobilizing popular sectors through violent repression. This pattern characterized South America's rash of bureaucratic-authoritarian coups during the 1960s and 1970s (see O'Donnell 1973; Collier 1979). When that occurs, we can expect some of the targeted social movement organizations to reconstitute themselves as revolutionary insurgencies. Just as the transition to democracy makes revolution less likely, the reversion to authoritarian rule makes it more likely. Given the history of the first two waves of democracy, and given the findings that Przeworski and his colleagues reported, we should expect some

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and the Prospects Democratization, Globalization, for Civil War

proportion of the third wave democracies to fail, and in some portion of those failed democracies revolution is likely to occur. Third, when democracy is installed in ethnically divided societies, it often fails to have the intended remedial effects on civil conflict. Indeed, democratic competition can, under some circumstances, exacerbate ethnic conflict. Donald Horowitz (1985) points out that in ethnically divided democracies, parties tend to form along ethnic lines, and this makes the consolidation of democracy problematic. Any effort on the part of leaders to form coalitions across ethnic lines or to forge multiethnic parties leaves them vulnerable to challenges from within their own ethnic group. The votes they hope to gain by making appeals across ethnic lines are fewer in number than the votes they stand to lose to challengers from within their own ethnic group who outflank them by appealing to ethnic solidarity. With an ethnically based party system, elections reduce to little more than an ethnic census. Ethnic minorities come to see themselves as relegated to the status of permanent opposition parties. Even though democratic consolidation requires that losers in elections accept their defeat, it also implies that they have a reasonable expectation of winning control of the government at some point in the foreseeable future. Ethnic minority parties may conclude that the latter condition is not true. In these circumstances, minority groups have strong motives to challenge the legitimacy of democratic rules that relegate them to permanent opposition status. As a permanent opposition, they are subject to the tyranny of an ethnic majority. If they resort to extra-constitutional means to challenge the dominance of ethnic majorities, the majority may feel justified in repressing that minority. An escalating cycle of repression and violence may ensue, culminating in revolution or secessionist violence. In Sri Lanka, the Tamil minority found itself victimized by democratically enacted legislation designed to confer advantages on the Sinhalese majority at the expense of the Tamil community. Under those circumstances, the legitimacy of Sri Lanka's democracy eroded in the eyes of the Tamil minority, and Tamil youth became increasingly susceptible to the appeals of radicals calling for violent secession from Sri Lanka (see Bush 1990; Singer 1992, 1996; Tambiah and Jayawardena 1992). Not surprisingly, most of the post-Cold War civil wars that have erupted have been ethnically based conflicts, and many of them have occurred in new democracies that are deeply divided along ethnic lines (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2000). Finally, the consolidation of democracy is, to some extent, dependent upon newly elected leaders' ability to resolve the economic problems that plague the rural and urban poor. Democracy empowers those segments of the population, at least in the sense that they are granted the right to vote. Because the poor are more numerous than their more prosperous fellow citizens, their votes can be decisive in elections. As a consequence, elected politicians in new democracies face what Barbara Geddes (1994) has termed "the politician's dilemma." On the one hand, the imperatives of getting elected and staying in office dictate that elected leaders enact policies that distribute economic resources according to patronage criteria. In short, government budgetary priorities are dictated by the goal of maximizing electoral payoffs for incumbents. On the other hand, the long-term consolidation of democracy depends on elected leaders' ability to build a strong and stable economy. This requires fiscal responsibility and, in the era of globalization, conformity to global standards of financial rectitude. Those standards-reinforced by pressure from international financial institutions and global capital markets--often require elected leaders to impose austerity measures on their constituents. Fiscally responsible elected leaders are vulnerable to being outbid at the polls by populist rivals who promise to end austerity and reinstitute social welfare spending. This dilemma confronts all democratically elected leaders. However, in new democracies, in which democracy is not yet viewed as "the only game in town," to borrow Linz and Stepan's (1996) phrase, the policy conflicts that arise from the

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politician's dilemma can embolden nondemocratic segments of the national elite to stage a coup or otherwise sacrifice democracy in the name of economic stability and austerity. This was the dynamic that gave rise to the spread of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. We cannot discount the possibility of similar antidemocratic reversions occurring among the new democracies of Asia, Africa, Latin America, or eastern Europe. The relevant lesson from that earlier era (the second wave of democracy) is that when authoritarian recidivists forcibly dismantle democratic regimes, hardliners use the coercive power of the state to demobilize popular sectors (including labor, peasants, and the intelligentsia) by repressing dissent and crushing social movement organizations. In those circumstances, the forcible displacement of newly democratic regimes by authoritarian restorationists makes the recurrence of civil war not only possible but also likely in nations that fall victim to this pattern. Peacekeeping and Peacemaking A third trend that should affect the duration and destructiveness of civil wars (if not the frequency) is the remarkable increase in the use of international peacekeeping operations as a device for conflict resolution. Forty-two of the fifty-five peacekeeping operations established by the UN since its inception in 1945 have been created since 1988.3 Not only has the number of operations increased, but their use has expanded to include civil wars as well as interstate conflicts, and their mission has grown from the traditional role of enforcing a truce to include postconflict reconstruction and reconciliation. The use of peacekeeping operations in civil wars was all but foreclosed during the Cold War. Rival superpower blocs treated Third World conflicts as battlegrounds in the East-West geopolitical struggle. Accordingly, it was rare that the UN Security Council, divided between the Soviet Union and the United States, could achieve the consensus required to authorize UN mediation of Third World civil wars. Besides Cold War politics, it was far more problematic for the UN to provide peacekeeping or mediation services in civil wars as compared to interstate wars. The introduction of peacekeepers in any conflict requires (1) the consent of the parties involved in the conflict, (2) the consent of any major power with the capacity to veto the operation, either formally in the Security Council or practically by intervening militarily in the conflict, and (3) the consent of donor nations who are willing to contribute the forces and funding to sustain the operation (Goulding 1993). In a civil war, securing the consent of both parties in the conflict is difficult, especially for the UN. At least one of the protagonists (the rebels) is not a sovereign state and, therefore, has no legal standing in the UN. This presents the UN with a diplomatic quandary. On the one hand, the organization will have a difficult time convincing the rebels that it can be a neutral mediator between them and one of its own members. On the other hand, for the UN to approach the rebels about peace negotiations can be interpreted by the affected state as a de facto grant of diplomatic recognition to the rebels and, by implication, a challenge to the sovereignty of that state. Thus, UN intervention in civil wars was often opposed on the grounds that it represented an intrusion on the principle of national sovereignty. Practically speaking, peacekeeping operations are difficult to implement in a civil war. Peacekeepers traditionally performed their function by establishing a buffer zone between the warring parties and policing a truce while settlement talks took place. Establishing a territorial buffer is difficult if not impossible when rebels use guerrilla tactics because the guerrillas and their civilian supporters are not confined
3These figures are from the web site of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (

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and the Prospects Democratization, Globalization, for Civil War

to a distinct territorial enclave. Civilians in any region of the nation can be covert participants in guerrilla war. With these constraints, it should not be surprising that UN peacekeeping was rare during the Cold War,and when such interventions were used, it was often in interstate rather than in civil wars (James 1995). The end of the Cold War dissolved some of the constraints on peacekeeping. The first step in this process involved a change in the major powers' willingness to sanction such operations or, more precisely, to refrain from vetoing them in the Security Council. In 1987 Mikhail Gorbachev reversed the long-standing Soviet position of skepticism toward UN peacekeeping when he publicly declared that UN military observers and peacekeeping forces played a valuable role in promoting international peace and security (Karns and Mingst 1998:208). His declaration forced the Reagan administration to moderate its own antagonism toward UN peacekeeping. The result was a dramatic increase in UN activism in mediating conflicts generally and civil wars specifically. Between 1989 and 1993, the UN initiated thirteen new peacekeeping operations, and almost all of them involved civil wars (Karns and Mingst 1998:210). These second-generation peacekeeping operations have assumed a wide range of functions beyond mere truce supervision. In some cases they have assumed the role of "peacemaking" in the form of armed intervention to force combatants to accept a cease-fire (Bertram 1995:389). NATO intervention in Bosnia (with UN authorization) represents the most visible example of this more muscular dimension of second-generation peacekeeping. Such missions effectively ignore the principle of host nation consent, but this is often justified on the grounds of preventing genocide or other humanitarian disasters. Ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and famine in Somalia were deemed sufficient cause to ignore or deny the need for consent from the host government, and in both cases the identity of the host state was sufficiently ambiguous to allow this requirement to be bypassed. Second-generation peacekeeping has also expanded to include postconflict reconstruction activities aimed at achieving a transition to democracy through the reform (or establishment from scratch) of basic state institutions (Bertram 1995:388). This has involved such specialized tasks as election supervision, police and civil administration training, as well as the traditional responsibilities of supervising the truce. In Namibia, UNTAG (UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia) supervised the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia and the establishment of a civilian police force, secured the repeal of discriminatory legislation, and oversaw the conduct of that nation's first free and fair elections (James 1995:248; Karns and Mingst 1998:209). In October 1991, peace agreements ending the civil war in Cambodia endowed the UN with the authority to demobilize combatant forces, repatriate refugees, train and monitor local police forces, and organize that nation's first elections under the new democratic regime (James 1995:248). This represented the first instance ever of the international community charging the United Nations with the political and economic restructuring of a member state (Karns and Mingst 1998:212). In Central America, ONUCA (UN Observer Group in Central America) oversaw the disarming and demobilization of combatants on both sides of the civil wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua. The ONUSAL (the United Nations Observers in El Salvador) took on the unprecedented task of documenting human rights violations that had occurred in El Salvador during more than a decade of civil war. In all, twelve of the twentyfive missions undertaken between 1988 and 1995 involved some measure of postconflict reconstruction and reconciliation (Bertram 1995:389). The willingness of the international community to intervene in conflicts for the purpose of bringing them to an end bodes well for the prospects of conflict management and prevention in the post-Cold War world. Besides the dramatic increase in the number of peacekeeping operations, the willingness of the Security Council to use peacekeepers in civil wars is especially noteworthy given that wars

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within nations have been (and presumably will continue to be) the dominant conflict modality in the international system. Clearly, this phase shift in UN operations represents a blurring of the lines between international and domestic politics. The expansion of peacekeeping mandates beyond truce supervision to include postwar reconstruction and reconciliation as well as state-building and nation-building functions should make it easier to sustain the peace in nations previously torn by civil war or interstate conflicts. Finally, the dramatic increase in the number of peacekeeping operations over the last decade of the twentieth century has, if nothing else, given the militaries of a number of nations considerable experience in the mechanics of peacekeeping, as opposed to war fighting. The success of most of these operations has made the UN as an institution, the major powers with veto rights on the Security Council, as well as nations that donate troops and equipment to such operations more confident in the likelihood of their success and, therefore, more willing to contribute to them. On the other hand, the expansion of peacekeeping missions to nation-building tasks creates new risks for the UN and for the nations that participate in these efforts. Supervising a truce between combatant forces is a difficult and risky proposition, but building the institutions of a new state and integrating former enemies into a single regime is a far more complex and risky endeavor to say the least. Supervising a truce is essentially a tactical military question with fairly explicit criteria for success and failure. At issue are relatively straightforward questions of troop strength, deployment patterns, and rules of engagement. Securing consensus on these requirements and implementing them, although by no means easy, is certainly easier than building consensus on an institutional formula for postwar state building. The latter requires not only the authorization of the UN Security Council but also the consent of the parties involved in the conflict. In addition, UN member nations will have to be persuaded to contribute funds, personnel, and logistical support to the operation. And whatever formula is adopted will ultimately have to win the support of the civilian population of the nation. One danger inherent in this expanded role, then, is that the enlarged array of UN responsibilities creates a greater array of opportunities for failure. And failed peacekeeping missions can create a hangover effect that makes major powers (such as the United States) less willing to intervene in the next crisis. The US experience in Somalia made President Clinton less willing to act early in the Rwanda crisis, resulting in a near genocide before the international community could bring itself to take any action. Inherent in the decision to authorize peacekeeping operations is a collective action problem: under what conditions is it in the interest of the international community to intervene in a civil war in one of its member states? Bobrow and Boyer (1997) have assessed the incentives for different classes of nations to support and contribute to UN peacekeeping. Most nations will suffer no direct costs from civil wars in other nations. The private benefits for nations that are reimbursed for contributing personnel to such missions are fairly obvious. And the benefits to nations in the region that are at risk of suffering economic costs and possible destabilization of their own regime from diffusion effects should be fairly obvious. the active However, authorization ultimately requires the consent-indeed support-of major powers. Bobrow and Boyer (1997:727) argue that major UN Security Council members-may benefit from "the powers-including maintenance of international and regional peace and stability, . . . the creation of environments more conducive to favored free and democratic elections, ... stability for commercial and economic development interests in a region, and... a number of humanitarian goals ranging from food distribution to the management of refugee problems." All too often, however, intervening in civil wars in Third World states offers no significant private benefits to major powers that would justify the costs and the risks (both to troops and to the electoral fortunes of leaders who

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and the Prospects Globalization, Democratization, for Civil War

commit their nation to the intervention). Given that major powers assume a substantial share of the costs of peacekeeping operations, and given that the expanded mandate of second-generation peacekeeping involves a greater commitment of resources for a longer period of time, elected leaders of major powers have strong private incentives to withhold support for such missions. Thus, civil wars continue in Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Sudan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Burma, and elsewhere, arguably because major powers have no private economic or security interests at stake in these wars. Humanitarian disasters such as genocides in Rwanda, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, or famine in Somalia evoke responses from major powers only when public pressure within their own polities compels elected leaders to act. Public pressure is not likely to reach the proportions necessary to induce action until the event requiring intervention has already escalated to the point of being a humanitarian disaster. Conclusion One general conclusion that emerges from the foregoing analysis is that the patterns of revolution and civil war in the future are likely to be different from what they were during the Cold War era. First, it is probably safe to conclude that democratization and globalization will have a moderating effect on the occurrence of revolution, at least in one sense. Nations will experience domestic political and economic crises that, with some nonzero probability, would have escalated to civil war during the Cold War. But because those nations have made the transition to democratic governance and are actively pursuing integration in the global economy, these crises are substantially less likely to escalate to civil war today. Mexico's response to the Zapatista uprising is illustrative of this dynamic. To the extent that democratically elected governments do refrain from repressing opposition movements, and to the extent that global economic forces exert pressure on those regimes to practice restraint in order to remain attractive to foreign investors, then civil wars will be less likely to occur than they would have been during the Cold War when international pressures were, in many cases, supportive of the sort of repression that transformed nonviolent movements into revolutions. On the other hand, we should not forget that it was globalization that provided movements like the Zapatistas with the motive for their uprising in the first place. The Zapatistas framed the issues confronting peasants in Chiapas in terms of the intrusion of global market forces disrupting their communities, their lives, and their survival strategies. Democratic reforms open the political space in which opposition movements can arise precisely because they are relatively free from state repression. Therefore, the same forces that might make civil war less likely also make the mobilization of opposition social movements easier. This expansion of social movements may strain the institutional capacity of newly established democratic regimes and embolden antidemocratic forces to attempt antidemocratic coups on the grounds that preserving domestic stability by repressing domestic opposition is essential to attracting foreign investment. That repression can transform democratic opposition movements into revolutionary insurgencies. Despite the potential for economic development that globalization promises, we must keep in mind the overwhelming demographic pressures that face most Third World regimes. In most nations that would otherwise be prime candidates for the sorts of revolutionary movements that punctuated politics during the last halfcentury, it is unlikely that globalization will lift enough of the population out of the grips of poverty to render these nations immune to political turmoil. There will continue to be an ample supply of impoverished people available for activists to mobilize in social movements that challenge the state. Indeed, as I mentioned above, globalization and democratization should actually facilitate the mobilization

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of political discontent in the Third World. Given this likelihood, the critical question becomes whether states respond with the sort of repression that converts nonviolent social movements into revolutionary movements. More precisely, the question is whether newly democratic regimes, when confronted with these movements, will be able to resist the antidemocratic forces in and around the state that view these movements as threats to the nation and view the democratic regime as incapable of adequately addressing the threat. If the institutions of democracy-including democratic political culture-are not fully consolidated when these social movements arise, then those newly democratic regimes will be vulnerable to overthrow by antidemocratic forces that view repression as the only remedy to mobilized political opposition. Under those circumstances, civil wars remain likely. Finally, even if revolutions continue to recur, we can take hope in the willingness and ability of the international community to intervene in civil wars for the purpose of bringing them to a peaceful conclusion. Civil war is costly, not just to the nation in which it occurs but also to the international community. When those costs threaten the territory or other vital interests of major powers, it is more likely now than during the Cold War that the international community will take action to resolve the conflict. However, when no such interests are jeopardized, we should not expect international action to resolve civil wars in the Third World. Revolutions and other forms of civil war have dominated the patterns of conflict during the Cold War era. But by no means does this mean that these forms of conflict will disappear with the end of the Cold War. Civil war is not some historically anomalous phenomenon, confined to some limited set of regime types that have been rendered obsolete by the end of the Cold War. Nor are they the product of some unique historical circumstance whose passing will render civil war no longer in vogue, to borrow Forrest Colburn's (1994) phrase. The end of the Cold War, the emergence of a more thoroughly global economy, and the spread of democracy to nations previously subject to various forms of authoritarian rule may render civil war less likely to occur in nations that previously were ripe for revolt. We should recall, however, that revolutions have always been a rare phenomenon; even if they become rarer still, they are not likely to become extinct. Moreover, revolutions are made by small minorities. Nothing in the current global scene suggests that poverty and repression will cease to exist, or that communities that are victims of these circumstances will forever cease to mobilize to remedy those conditions. There will still be a small minority of nations in which a small minority of the population manages to organize a challenge to the state, and in a small minority of those cases the state's response will compel the opposition to resort to revolutionary violence or perish at the hands of the state. References

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Where Do the Peacekeepers Go? Author(s): Michael Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, Dissolving Boundaries (Dec., 2003), pp. 3754 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: . Accessed: 23/10/2013 17:50
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Review(2003) 5(4), 37-54 International Studies

Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?'


Departmentof Politics, New YorkUniversity and


Departmentof Political Science, Stanford University What determines where and when the United Nations (UN) sends peacekeepers in civil wars? This is an important topic for at least two normative reasons. First, it is a necessary prerequisite for judging the extent to which the organization lives up to its aspirations for being a truly global body, capable of working to preserve international security and relieve suffering without preference to a state's choice of government, location, resources, or historical connection to the great powers. Second, given various attempts to suggest criteria or benchmarks for humanitarian intervention, it is important to know which cases are selected for intervention in the absence of such criteria. The procedures and standards of the UN provide little guidance as to the actual decisions of the Security Council regarding when and where peacekeepers will be deployed. Peacekeepers are deployed with reference to Chapters 6 or 7 of the UN Charter. Although these chapters differ with regard to the use of force or pacific means to resolve disputes, they agree that the prerequisite for their enactment is a threat to or an endangerment of "the maintenance of international peace and security." The question remains, why does the Security Council consider some civil wars threats to international security? The charter is silent on what constitutes a threat to international security, and the Security Council has shown enormous flexibility in invoking the language of threat to justify the deployment of peacekeepers. If previous deployments provide any indication, then one must wrestle with why civil wars in Mozambique, Somalia, Guatemala, and Sierra Leone were deemed essential for the promotion of international security, whereas civil wars in Kashmir, Sudan, Chechnya, and Algeria were judged as peripheral to security. Despite the importance of the issue, the amount of systematic research on the topic is extremely small in comparison with dozens of other topics that come under the heading of international cooperation. Partly as a consequence, unsupported claims by journalists, policymakers, and even some academics about where the UN sends peacekeepers have proliferated over the years. A common assertion is that peacekeepers go where the permanent members of the Security Council (or in some versions where the United States) have important national interests. Alternatively, it is claimed that peacekeeping is imperialism in disguise and, therefore, peacekeepers are sent where great powers have an economic interest in access to raw materials and primary commodities. A different version holds that peacekeeping since the 1990s embodies an ethos of democracy-building and that the great powers, who have an interest in increasing the number of democracies in the world, choose cases in which democracy is in short supply yet has the potential to take root.
'The authors want to thank George Downs and James Fearon for their extensive advice and comments. ( 2003 International Studies Review. Publishedby BlackwellPublishing,350 MainStreet,Malden,MA02148, USA,and 9600 GarsingtonRoad,Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.

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Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?

The issue of where peacekeeping missions are deployed has important policy ramifications. For example, in General Assembly debates in 2000 over the reform of UN peace operations, many Third World member states asserted that deployment of peacekeeping missions reflect the interests of the Security Council and, therefore, systematically ignore Africa and favor Europe. And even though such member states complain about what they see as the biases of the current system, they oppose reform of the system for fear that under new mission selection criteria Africa would be further marginalized (Stedman 2001 a). What is noteworthy is that neither claim is based on systematic evidence or analysis. After examining where and when the UN has sent peacekeepers, and where it has not, we conclude that the UN acts in ways that corroborate its humanitarian and security missions, but the pattern also shows a distinct bias toward conflict in Europe and the Western Hemisphere. Our results show that one of the best predictors of UN intervention is the number of deaths in a conflict, a finding that speaks well to the UN's mission to address costly human suffering. On the other hand, the UN has not been evenhanded in how it responds to deaths. The UN acts more swiftly when the deaths occur in Europe than in Africa, and it acts more swiftly in Africa than in Asia. Furthermore, the UN seems guided by considerations of power, cost, and risk: it responds to civil wars in weaker states, measured by the size of the country's army, at a much higher rate than it does to civil wars in stronger states. We begin by describing the extant literature on determinants of UN peacekeeping in civil wars and showing the theoretical and methodological flaws in that literature. Very little systematic research has been done on where and when the UN deploys peacekeepers. Moreover, the research that exists suffers from several problems, including selecting on the dependent variable, combining every interest of a permanent member state into a catch-all category called the "national interests of the Permanent 5," treating legal conditions for Security Council interventions as causal explanations for interventions, and treating deployment as an either-or variable. We then discuss our research methodology. To overcome the problems listed above, we used a data set of all post-Cold War civil wars and survival time techniques to predict the duration until the UN intervenes in a given civil war along with the hazard rate of UN intervention given various independent variables. We then present our findings and conclude with a brief discussion of their implications for future research and policy assessment of the UN. Prior Research Relatively little research has been done on the determinants of where the UN chooses to deploy peace operations. Journalistic accounts often accuse the UN of displaying a bias toward the interests of the United States or the Permanent 5 members of the Security Council in its decisions to intervene. For example, Phylis Bennis (1996:84) argues: or anyUN decision to legitimize to intervene In the realworldanyUN decision will or endorseany country's unilateral intervention againstanothercountry of of theintervening sideandtherelative reflect thedominant importance power foroutside thatthe realmotivation the subject nation ... anyone whobelieves is thealleviation or otherwise) intervention (UNendorsed military governmental of benevolence. froma serious delusion of civilian is suffering hardship Similarly, David Gibbs (1997) hints at classic imperialistic motives behind decisions to deploy peacekeepers, arguing that even in such seemingly unselfish interventions as Somalia, one can easily find more grubby motivations--such as access to primary commodities.

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Although most academics do not go as far as Bennis or Gibbs and sometimes present a more nuanced account of motivations, they also tend to emphasize the extent to which any decision to deploy peacekeepers must partially serve the national interests of the permanent members of the Security Council (the P-5). Chantal De Jonge Oudraat (1996:518-519), for example, argues that the choice of where the UN goes is determined by "the extent to which the interests of one or more of the members of the P-5 are engaged in the case in question; and the extent to which the conflict is believed by the P-5 to constitute a threat to international peace and security." She defines whether a case is a threat to international peace on the basis of whether the war spills over its borders to pose a larger regional threat. In a broader but similar vein, Laura Neack (1995) examines the extent to which state participation in peacekeeping operations, the geographical distribution of operations, and accounts of success or failure are the result of an idealistic commitment to the global community or a consequence of states' national interests. On the basis of an analysis of eighteen operations that took place between 1948 and 1990, she concludes that the findings support a realist interpretation; that is, "states whose interests were better served by the continuation of the status quo-that is, states of the advanced industrialized West and non-Western states that have enjoyed some prestige in the international status quo-have dominated UN peacekeeping" (Neack 1995:181). Peter Jacobsen (1996) argues that national interest is not the sine qua non for intervention that many believe, but that the power of what is known as the CNN effect is also less than many believe. He reaches these conclusions by examining the impact of five explanatory factors in a focused comparison of five peace enforcement missions. He finds evidence of two distinct motivational patterns, one of which is driven by self-interest in the form of concern about consequences of unambiguous interstate aggression and one of which is animated by humanitarian sentiment precipitated by massive human suffering. The two motivations operate in different ways. States are willing to take far higher levels of casualties when national interests are at stake than they are when only humanitarian motivations are present. The CNN effect is real, but it only operates when there is both a high probability of success and low probability of casualties. Andreas Andersson (2000) also disputes the argument that the national interests of the permanent members invariably account for where the UN chooses to go. Noting the broad geographical distribution of interventions and the many deployments that appear to be independent of any permanent member's direct interest, he argues that the Security Council has been guided primarily by a desire to promote democracy in the world. He interprets this motive as an idealistic interest of the permanent members related to the democratic peace hypothesis. If democracies never go to war with other democracies, then for reasons of international security the permanent members should desire to increase the number of democracies in the world. Taken in its entirety, the literature on the determinants of peacekeeping has a number of problems. At the theoretical level, the tendency to lump every interest of any permanent member into a category called the "national interests of the Permanent 5" threatens to obscure as much as it reveals. For example, the ongoing debate between realists and liberals has less to do with whether the permanent members are motivated by some national interest than the specific role of security and trade interests. More broadly, it makes a great deal of difference whether the interest we are talking about is a security or trade interest as opposed to a humanitarian interest. The evidence used to establish the fact that permanent member interests are paramount often approaches tautology. Because any permanent member can veto a Security Council resolution and their acquiescence is a legal requirement for any operation, it is impossible to disagree with statements like: "peacekeeping missions

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Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?

do not get off the ground without great power support" (Durch 1993:36). However, no research is necessary to support such a statement. It is true by definition. The more important issue is which cases get great power support. We want to know what motivates great power interest, and how, if at all, this has evolved over time. This information will allow us to think about the extent to which permanent member interests have distorted the role of the UN in relation to that which was envisioned in its charter and is embodied in the statements of principles that have been issued over the years. Similarly, if one thinks of great power support as a supply-side explanation for intervention, then one can examine the willingness of local parties to request or consent to the deployment of a peacekeeping mission as a demand-side explanation for intervention (Durch 1993:18-20). It is well established that the Security Council is much more likely to dispatch peacekeepers to a country that has consented to a mission; what we want to know is which states are more likely than others to request or at least to consent to such an intrusion. Two possible demand-side explanations deserve attention. First, stronger states may be better able to resist pressure on them to consent to intervention or to raise the costs of possible intervention enough to deter UN intervention. Second, the war aims of the rebels in civil wars may affect both the willingness of a state to consent to a mission and the willingness of the UN to deploy a mission. For example, states may be less willing to concede to a UN intervention if rebels are attempting to secede, out of fear that the mission may freeze a de facto partition of territory.2The supply-side explanation may be that the permanent members may be less willing to intervene in conflicts in which the state sovereignty principle is threatened, given that two of the permanent members, China and Russia, are themselves threatened by secessionist movements.3 Another theoretical limitation of the literature is that the rationales behind various hypotheses tend to be less well-developed than elsewhere in the international relations literature, often raising as many questions as they answer. Take, for example, Andersson's (2000) provocative thesis that peacekeeping decisions reflect a desire on the part of the permanent members to spread democracy. Although it is reasonable to assume that this is a priority for democratic states, it is far from clear why a desire to spread democracy should lead to a higher priority being placed on intervention in nondemocratic states than on intervention in existing democracies that are threatened with destruction. After all, success in the former seems far less likely than in the latter, which involves trying to sustain something that already exists. Although Andersson doubtless has reasons for believing why an emphasis on promoting democracy would focus on the bird in the bush rather than the one in the hand, he never makes those reasons explicit. As a consequence the reader cannot help but wonder whether Andersson's positive results stem less from a preoccupation on the part of the permanent members to convert states to democracy than from the fact that most civil wars take place in nondemocratic states. It is also unclear why China, a nondemocracy, would, as a permanent member of the Security Council, accede to interventions aimed primarily at promoting democracy. A lack of theoretical development is also evident in the literature that tries to determine which of a number of models best explains, on the basis of self-interest versus humanitarian-idealistic motives, where the UN intervenes. A single indicator often represents an entire perspective, and authors have a tendency to assume that because a given indicator is central to a particular perspective, any evidence that the variable is important demonstrates automatically the validity of that model and the weakness of rival models.
2We thank David Laitin and James Fearon for suggesting that war aims may influence deployment of missions and for providing us with the coding of this variable from their own data set on civil wars. 3We thank Andrew Mack for this suggestion.

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The difficulty is that even though an indicator may be especially central to one model, it may also be correlated with a variable that plays an important role in another model or is actually included in a rival model by virtue of its playing a very different function. As an example of the first problem, "massive human suffering" is a variable that is often associated exclusively with a humanitarian or idealist model of motivation, and the connection makes a lot of sense. If eliminating or reducing massive human suffering is not the central humanitarian goal, what is? The difficulty is that massive human suffering, although not a primary realist goal, tends to be correlated with the scale of conflict, which is a variable that a realist strategist potentially cares about a great deal.4 The presence or absence of a peace treaty provides another example of how the same variable can play different functions in different theories. From a realist perspective, the existence of a treaty is important because it signals the conditions under which a compromise among the conflicting interests of the permanent members is more likely than it would be otherwise. This factor was especially important during the Cold War, when the absence of a treaty would likely have suggested that either the allies of the Eastern or the Western bloc believed they currently held the advantage. For the realist, the existence of a treaty is also important because it indicates that the intervention will be more successful and involve lower costs than a prospective mission where there is no treaty. For the idealist, the existence of a treaty makes a mission more attractive because it allows the UN to function as a rule-driven and unbiased peacemaker that is defending the norm of neutrality in an increasingly partisan world. These interpretations raise the prospect that from an empirical standpoint distinguishing between the idealist and realist explanations will not be as easy as it first appears. Things can be clarified somewhat if we can find a more precise measure of the scale of conflict than massive suffering and use this in the model, but multicollinearity is still likely to create interpretation problems. If no separate and reliable indicator of scale of conflict apart from massive human suffering is available, then the same indicator will have to be used in both model specifications. The treaty variable must be used in both. In such cases, it is important to identify secondary and tertiary attributes of the two models that overlap less. This task is not easy given that the variety of reliable data collected for all, or even most, peacekeeping missions is modest. However, sometimes it is possible to expand the set of model indicators beyond what is normally employed in such a way that more clearly differentiates among the different approaches. For example, even though considerable overlap exists between the realist and humanitarian models with respect to the impact that massive suffering will have-if for quite different reasons-their predictions with respect to the effect of the conflict location are more distinct. For a realist, the location of a conflict plays a critical role in determining its importance because it plays a significant role in determining the degree of threat the conflict poses to a state's vital interests. This relationship stands in sharp contrast to the humanitarian or idealist model in which the location of the conflict should be largely irrelevant. But again even here modesty is required. A finding that the UN is more willing to intervene in Europe than in Africa may be a function of heightened international media attention and, therefore, greater demands for humanitarian action for conflicts in Europe. The literature on determinants of peacekeeping also tends to suffer from several methodological problems. By far the chief among these is a tendency to select cases on the basis of the dependent variable and, by so doing, to restrict the sample to

4Thus, De Jonge Oudraat (1996:519-522) uses a scale of conflict as a proxy for Security Council judgment about whether a civil war is a threat to international peace and security.

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Do the Peacekeepers Where Go?

peacekeeping operations that the UN has chosen to undertake. Characteristics that these cases share in common are then argued to be the keys to understanding UN motivation. Cases of civil wars or interstate aggression in which the UN has chosen not to intervene are simply ignored, so the reader has no idea whether they too possess these same characteristics-which would invalidate the inferences about what is responsible for the decision to intervene. Given that it is obviously important to know whether this is a problem or not, expanding the cases to include all situations in which the UN could have potentially intervened is critical. Doing so would also solve the related problem that the number of cases used in many of the analyses is often far too small to support a reliable conclusion in a statistical sense. A subtler problem has to do with how one measures intervention--the dependent variable. Almost invariably, when this is dealt with at all (recall most authors restrict their sample to interventions), it is dealt with as a dummy variable. Either the UN has initiated a peacekeeping mission in a given situation or it has not. However, it is important to know not only whether a peacekeeping mission has been initiated but also when it has been initiated. Everything else being equal, prompt intervention not only has a greater potential to save lives, but the timing of interventions can potentially tell us much more about what motivates and constrains the UN than can the analysis of where intervention has taken place and where it has not. Research Approach In this piece, we do not propose to test alternative theories of UN intervention. As we state above, there are powerful limitations on spelling out and testing theories of intervention that derive from the larger traditions of international relations theories. Rather, as a first step to understanding UN intervention, we hope to be able to provide some empirical findings on intervention that will allow us to evaluate claims about where and when the UN intervenes. To do so we examine the set of post-Cold War civil wars-civil wars that began after 1988 or those that began before 1988 but were still active after 1988. We have strong reasons for believing that pooling Cold War and post-Cold War samples would be inappropriate. During the Cold War, when there were sixty-three civil wars, the UN undertook only four missions in civil wars: two in Cyprus, one in Korea, and one in the Congo. In the post-Cold War era, there were sixty civil wars, and the UN launched nineteen missions. Clearly, a five-fold increase in the rate at which the UN has allocated missions to civil wars suggests that the mission selection procedures have changed dramatically with the end of the Cold War. In our results below, we provide some evidence that our choice to concentrate on the post-Cold War era was the appropriate one. We chose to examine the following independent variables associated with the various claims about UN deployment of missions. The variable "Deaths" is military and civilian deaths from the conflict in millions. We use it as a measure of humanitarian need for an intervention in the conflict. "Treaty" is a dichotomous dummy variable that equals one if the combatants had signed a peace treaty and equals zero otherwise. We use this variable to control for the possibility that the UN is more likely to intervene in a conflict if the combatants have signed a peace treaty. "Cold War" is a dichotomous dummy variable that equals one if the civil war in question began before 1989 and equals zero otherwise. It is used to control for the substantially lesser rate of UN involvement during the Cold War. We also include "Primary commodity exports" in millions of Summers and Heston real GDP units to test if the UN intervenes more in countries that are important sources of raw materials. To test the claim that the UN is more likely to send missions to countries that are democracies, we use a dummy variable that equals one if the civil war occurred in a "Democracy," as specified in the Alvarez et al. (1997) data set, and

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zero otherwise.5 We also test if the UN intervenes more in countries with which the permanent members have close ties, using a dummy variable that equals one if the civil war occurred in a country that is a "Former colony" of a permanent member of the Security Council and zero otherwise. To control for any regional differences in the way the UN allocates missions, we include dummy variables for four regions: "Latin America and the Caribbean," "Europe," "Asia," and the "Middle East." Africa is the excluded region (and, therefore, the baseline case). Prewar "Population" (in millions) and "Size of government army" (in thousands of troops) are included to see if the UN is more likely to avoid conflicts in large, militarily powerful countries. Finally we wanted to examine if the rebel's war aims affected the likelihood that the UN would intervene. Therefore, we included "Rebels' Aims: Control of Government," a dummy variable that is coded one if the civil war was a contest over control of the country's central government and zero otherwise, and "Rebels' Aims: Autonomy," a dummy variable that is coded one if the rebels were fighting to achieve national autonomy and zero otherwise. A third variable that is not reported below was coded one if the rebels have a mixture of the two motives and zero otherwise, and it serves as our residual category.6 Unless otherwise noted, we use the same data used by Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (2000), which is available on their World Bank web site ( papers/peacebuilding/index.htm). We have made some minor changes to the data (which are discussed in the appendix to Gilligan and Stedman 2003). We address our question of where peacekeepers are sent by employing survival time techniques. In other words, our dependent variable is the time elapsed (measured in years) until the UN intervenes in a given civil war. Transformation of the Doyle and Sambanis data into survival time data was relatively straightforward with a few exceptions, which we describe in Section 4 of the appendix in Gilligan and Stedman (2003). As a further check for robustness, we also estimate our results using logit on a dichotomous dependent variable equal to one if the UN sent an observer, traditional peacekeeping, or enforcement mission to the conflict, and zero otherwise. We also estimate ordered probit on a categorical dummy variable that is equal to one if the UN sent an observer mission, two if the UN sent a traditional peacekeeping mission, three if it sent an enforcement mission, and zero otherwise. As a final robustness check, we estimate a tobit model using the cost of the UN operations in millions of US dollars. Tobit is appropriate in this case because operation cost is bounded by zero: the UN could not spend less than zero dollars on the mission. Summary statistics for these variables and the independent variables described above are reported in Table 2 of Gilligan and Stedman (2003). We regard survival time techniques to be the most appropriate for our purposes because the data are right censored. Most of the wars in our sample ended before the UN intervened. We do not know what the UN would have done had those wars persisted. Logit or probit estimates with right censoring overestimate standard errors, which might cause us to reject inappropriately some of the hypotheses we discussed in the previous section. Besides, such methods throw away valuable information present in the data. Earlier intervention in a conflict suggests that the UN was more concerned about that conflict for some reason--information that is useful to us as we seek to uncover the determinants of UN intervention (Peterson 1991; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). In theory at least, survival time techniques are able to give us the same information that we could retrieve from logit or probit analysis on noncensored data, given that duration data are just an aggregation of binary data over time (Alt, King, and Signorino 2000). In addition to predicting the duration until the UN
5These data have been updated through 1999. See also Przeworski et al. (2000). 6We thank James Fearon and David Laitin for sharing these measures with us. See Fearon and Laitin (2003).

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Do the Peacekeepers Go? Where

intervenes in a given civil war, survival time analysis allows us to predict the hazard rate of UN intervention, conditional on our independent variables. This rate is the instantaneous rate at which the UN intervenes in a conflict given that it has not done so up to that point. Furthermore, like logit and probit, survival time techniques allow us to generate a predicted probability that the UN will intervene in a conflict given that it has not done so up to that point. Both of these values give us precisely the information that we want given that we are interested in determining which types of conflicts the UN is more prone to help pacify. The coefficients that we present in the tables below represent the change in the hazard rate for a oneunit change in the respective independent variable. Because hazard rates are sometimes difficult to interpret, we also report expected probabilities of UN intervention in a few examples. Findings The findings of our survival time analysis are presented in Tables 1 and 2. In most cases, we estimate the model on the post-Cold War sample of civil wars, but in columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 we estimated the model on the sample of 120 postWorld War II civil wars to check the robustness of our results with respect to choice of sample. In Table 3 we check the robustness of survival time results with respect to other possible choices of the dependent variable and estimation techniques. Logit results using the dichotomous dependent variable are reported in columns one and two, ordered probit estimates using the categorical dependent variable are reported in columns three and four, and tobit estimates using the cost of the operation are reported in columns five and six. We do not regard the results in Table 3 to be as trustworthy as those in Tables 1 and 2 because of the censoring problem mentioned above, but we present them as a robustness check. The results in Tables 1 through 3 point to ten broad findings, which we summarize below. 1: The more severe a conflict, measured by the number of deaths, FINDING the more likely the United Nations is to intervene. This was the most robust result in our analysis. The coefficient on this variable was significant at the 5 percent level or better in a one-tailed test in all specifications. Figure 1 graphs the probability that the UN will intervene in a conflict in a particular year given that it has not intervened in that conflict up to that point. It graphs this function for several of the independent variables of interest.7 For the moment we are concerned with the effects of deaths. To see the effects of deaths on these probabilities compare the line marked "baseline" with the line marked "hi deaths." The "hi deaths" case assumes one standard deviation more deaths (roughly 630,000). The probability of UN intervention in the tenth year in the baseline case is only about 1 percent whereas the probability of UN intervention in the high deaths case is by that point almost 50 percent. We also can examine the effects of deaths on the duration until the UN intervenes in a conflict. Take the case of Cambodia. The UN intervened in that civil war after 13 years. Our model predicts a UN intervention after 13.1 years-very close to the actual value. If the number of casualties in that war had been one million rather than three million, our model predicts that the UN would have intervened after 130 years, quite a dramatic difference. For all practical purposes, the model is telling us the UN would not intervene in this conflict with that level of casualties.
7To generate the predicted probabilities in Figure 1, we used the specification in column 1 of Table 2. The baseline case assumes the average number for each of the continuous variables-that is a value of 0.182, or 182,000 deaths, and of 246, or 246,000, for the size of the government army. It assumes a value of zero for each of the dummy variables-that is a civil war in an African country that began after the end of the Cold War.

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TABLE1. Determinants of UN Intervention in Civil Wars, Weibull Regression Estimates



(1.2216) 1.1158 (1.0756) -4.1432 (1.1087) -3.4439 (4.2757) 4.1256 (1.9828) 2.3387 (1.6294) 2.0649 (1.3167) -1.2015 (1.2516) -0.0112 (0.0145) -0.0007 (0.0004) -1.5961 (1.3798) -1.3225 (0.9238) -1.6395 (1.6158) -3.8903 (1.8199) 2.9483 (0.5953) 59 -18.73

(1.1296) 1.1875 (0.9624) -3.7221 (1.0483) -7.9059 (3.1674) 4.8936 (1.9074) 3.4074 (1.3306) 3.2937 (1.0447) -1.3850 (1.2080) -0.0232 (0.0136) -0.0006 (0.0004)

(1.1416) 1.1221 (0.9725) -3.4533 (1.0029) -7.6614 (3.2350) 4.7730 (1.8873) 3.1866 (1.2865) 3.3198 (1.0903) -1.5730 (1.2101) -0.0222 (0.0140) -0.0006 (0.0004)

(1.1500) 1.1716 (0.9669) -3.4445 (1.0008) -7.6519 (3.2628) 4.4492 (1.4365) 3.0535 (1.2144) 3.3213 (1.0748) -1.5717 (1.2086) -0.0222 (0.0139) -0.0006 (0.0004)

(1.0600) 1.2519 (1.0262) -3.1813 (0.8924) -5.8119 (3.0038) 2.9077 (1.0290) 1.6107 (1.1433) 2.8875 (1.0143) -1.0295 (1.1667) -0.0249 (0.0119)

(1.0248) 1.5417 (0.9895) -3.3444 (0.8882) -5.4776 (2.8878) 2.7158 (1.0167) 1.7654 (1.1376) 2.4878 (0.8818)

Treaty Cold War


Europe Middle East

Latin America & Caribbean Democracy Size of Government Army Primary Commodity Exports Former colony of P5 member Rebels Aims: Control of Government Rebel's Aims: Autonomy Constant

-0.0214 (0.0108)

-0.9511 (0.8549) -1.3248 (1.6114) -4.9204 (1.5822) 2.9750 (0.6088) 59 -19.37 -0.3590 (1.3462) -5.5640 (1.4699) 2.8496 (0.5716) 59 -19.9 -5.6256 (1.4656) 2.8553 (0.5714) 59 -19.9362 -5.0674 (1.3922) 2.4587 (0.4787) 59 -23.1385 -5.3625 (1.4037) 2.4520 (0.4804) 59 -23.5955


n LL

A valuesignificantly distribution. *Thisparameteraffectsthe shape of the Weibull greaterthan one impliesthat the hazard rate of UN interventionsincreasesover time. (Standarderrors are in parentheses;coefficientsthat are significantat 5 percentare in bold).

It is perhaps worth dwelling on one potential threat to the validity of this finding. We only have data for the total number of deaths in each war, so our measure cannot distinguish between pre-intervention deaths and postintervention casualties, the latter of which obviously could not have affected the UN's decision to intervene. The two most prominent cases in which a large number of deaths

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Do the Peacekeepers Where Go?

TABLE 2. Determinantsof UN Interventionin CivilWars,WeibullRegressionEstimates


1 2.3675 (0.9936) --

2 2.7676 (1.0993)

3 1.7284 (0.7460) 1.5191 (0.6357)

4 2.9039 (1.4194) 0.2385 (0.6928) -2.0870 (0.6317) -7.6499 (4.5614) 2.0191 (1.0715) 0.2458 (1.4409)

5 1.8888 (0.9756) 0.4645 (0.6132) -2.1049 (0.5886) -5.1590 (2.7107) 2.4252 (0.7691) 0.7338 (0.9450) 2.2718 (0.8033) -1.1694 (1.0692) -0.0219 (0.0099)

6 6.2470 (3.2167)

Treaty Cold War

-2.8052 (0.7795) -6.0691 (2.8528) 1.9144 (0.9073)


-2.9380 (0.7965) -6.9939 (3.1297) 1.7591 (0.9098) --

-3.4496 (0.8110) -3.2757 (2.1334) 0.5912 (0.8211)

-5.1880 (1.5175) -15.880 (8.7279) 2.7533 (1.3742)


Europe Middle East

Latin America & Caribbean Democracy Size of Government Army Primary Commodity Exports Former Colony of P5 member Rebels Aims: Control of Government Rebels Aims: Autonomy Population Constant

2.4800 (0.8300)

2.4072 (0.8719)

1.3002 (0.6351)

2.7922 (1.1668) -1.8079 (1.1196) -0.0211 (0.0144) -0.0008 (0.0005) -0.2393 (1.0005)

4.4511 (1.3029)

-0.0216 (0.0099)

-0.0198 (0.0111)

-0.0319 (0.0147)

-0.7264 (0.8649) 1.5951 (1.2925)

-0.0879 (0.0853) -3.1013 (0.9551) 2.1585 (0.4093) 59 -24.4807 -4.9693 (0.8928) 1.9187 (0.3699) 60 -32.547 -3.1404 (1.6058) 2.2101 (0.3980) 120 -31.1902 -3.4420 (0.8825) 1.8564 (0.3187) 120 -36.9215 -5.7617 (1.4540) 3.3079 (0.7671) 51 -11.0152

-3.5994 (0.8704) 2.1888 (0.4141) 59 -25.263

p* n LL

*This parameter affects the shape of the Weibull distribution. A value significantly greater than one implies that the hazard rate of UN interventions increases over time. (Standard errors are in parentheses; coefficients that are significant at 5 percent are in bold).

occurred after the UN intervened are Bosnia and Rwanda, but other possible cases might include Somalia, Liberia, and Angola. To address this issue we re-estimated the results excluding these cases. Those results, which are presented in column 6 of Table 2, are significantly stronger, suggesting that this finding is not an artifact of cases in which high casualties occurred after the UN intervened.

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TABLE 3. Logit, Ordered Probit, and Tobit Estimates of Determinants of UN Intervention in Civil Wars 1 Dependent Variable Estimator 2 3 4 5 Cost of Operation Tobit 6 Cost of Operation Tobit

Intervention Intervention

Level of Level of Intervention Intervention Ordered Probit 1.5856 (0.7237) 0.4290 (0.6983) -0.3404 (0.4101) -3.5112 (2.1245) 1.2131 (0.8618) -0.4342 (0.7457) Ordered Probit 1.7124 (0.7703) 0.3944 (0.8138) -0.3106 (0.3892) -3.9823 (1.9616) 1.1333 (0.8089) -0.5045 (0.8389) 1.9522 (0.6904) -1.3050 (0.7662) -0.0099 (0.0036) -




14.7701 (6.1055) 1.4118 (1.3953) -4.5214 (1.5777) -27.8552 (12.9734) 3.5594 (2.5702) 1.6555 (1.8512) 18.8602 (7.0047) -* -0.0549 (0.0374) -0.0015 (0.0010) -2.3804 (1.9404) -1.2668 (2.3748) -3.2666 (3.2571) 4.7983 (3.7305) -

8.5798 (3.7189) -

2115.44 (961.5721) 342.6481 (520.8233) -69.2868 (429.8699) -4197.08 (3100.257) 2592.16 (1023.153) 357.9556 (932.1456) 1165.335 (736.6521) -1303.89 (751.5265) -8.10424 (6.139003) -0.7572 (0.326267) -272.548 (753.9577) -712.179 (577.3001) -678.274 (946.6207) 742.296 (901.017)

2121.297 (1019.151) 245.3126 (589.735) -389.539 (464.526) -4261.95 (2877.673) 1511.751 (618.5604) 64.83039 (700.0333) 1470.08 (683.0769) -1027.35 (876.7648) -12.2676 (7.483431)

Treaty Cold War Asia

-1.8528 (1.2405) -17.1798 (7.1102) 0.5786 (1.3041)

Europe Middle East Latin America & Caribbean Democracy Size of Government Army Primary Commodity Exports Former Colony of P5 Member Rebel's Aims: Government Control Rebel's Aims: Autonomy Cutpoint 1** Cutpoint 2 Cutpoint 3 n LL

8.8585 (2.6421) -* -0.0455 (0.0165) -

1.7923 (0.7749) -1.2409 (0.8021) -0.0091 (0.0039) 0.0000 (0.0001) -0.1619 (0.5958) -0.1983 (1.1624) -0.3424 (1.3228) -0.6022 (1.5849) 0.0705 (1.6861) 1.6848 (1.8894) 59 -34.7824

1.5479 (1.0762) -

-0.3371 (0.9020) 0.3295 (0.9899) 1.9434 (1.2534) 59 -34.9473

-201.284 (723.204)

59 -10.2319

59 -13.6880

59 -159.05

59 -163.35

*The democracy variable is excluded from this specification because it would not converge with the variable included. **In the Logit and Tobit results in columns one, two, three and four, "Cutpoint 1" is actually the constant.

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Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?


0.7 0.6 -0.5 ~0.4 0.3 0.2



-+- baseline -- small army --coldwar -n-asia -- euro lac -- hi deaths

r- 0 "

o CyearsO LNO 0D

FIG.1. Probability of UN Intervention under Various Conditions.

FINDING 2: The United Nations is significantly less likely to intervene in civil wars in countries with large government armies.

This was the strongest result in our analysis, in the sense that the size of government army variable produced the largest changes in the probability of a UN intervention. This result is illustrated in Figure 1. The line marked with squares represents the "small army" case. Instead of an army of 246,000 assumed in the baseline case, we assumed an army of only 100,000. The standard error of the government army variable is approximately 330,000 so this is a change of less than one-half of a standard error from the baseline case. The effects of this relatively small change are profound. The probability that the UN would intervene in the conflict in the ninth year given that it had not intervened up to that point is virtually one whereas the probability that the UN would intervene in the baseline case in that year is only about 1 percent. We interpret these results to mean that strong states are less likely to welcome UN intervention in their internal affairs, and the UN, for reasons of cost and risk, is much less willing to send troops to a country with large armed forces without that country's permission. This result is not simply due to the fact the UN avoids missions in large countries, and large countries happen to have large armies. In column 2 of Table 2 we included a measure of each countries' population in millions. The coefficient is negative, suggesting that the UN has a slight bias against large countries, but it is not at all significant. Meanwhile, the coefficient on size of government army and its statistical significance changed little as a result of the inclusion of the population variable. The UN seems to care more about the military might than the size of the countries in which it intervenes. 3: The probability of a UN intervention in a given war increases as the war drags on.

This finding is shown by the estimated value of the shape parameter p. A value of that parameter greater than one implies that UN interventions occur with an increasing hazard rate. The parameter in all our post-Cold War sample results is greater than two and significantly different from one at high levels. For example

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the estimate ofp in our baseline specification in column 1 of Table 2 implies that the UN has roughly a twenty-five times higher rate of intervening in a war after ten years than after one year, other things being equal. Obviously, this result is also illustrated by the fact that all the lines in Figure 1 are monotonically increasing.
FINDING 4: There is no evidence that the United Nations intervenes in secessionist conflicts at a different rate than it intervenes in attempts to take over control of the government.

In column 1 of Table 1, the coefficients on the two variables "Rebels'Aims: Control of Government" and "Rebels' Aims: Autonomy" are very similar in magnitude, and neither is significantly different from zero. The UN does not seem to intervene in secessionist movements at a higher or lower rate than in civil wars aimed at control of the central government. The two coefficients continue to be at very low statistical significance in column 2 for which the insignificant variable--"Former colony of a permanent member"-is removed. In column 3, for which we dropped "Rebels' Aims: Control of Government" and used only "Rebels' Aims Autonomy," the coefficient on the latter still has very low significance levels. These results suggest that we can be quite confident that no strong relationship exists between the war aims of the rebels and the likelihood that the UN will intervene in a civil war. 5: There is evidence of regional bias in the UN's selection of missions, but the worst bias is against Asia, not Africa.

Africa is the residual category among our regional dummy variables; so if there were systematic bias against missions to Africa, we would expect the signs on all the regional dummy variables to be negative. Three of them are. The UN is consistently more likely to allocate missions to Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean than it is to Africa. The coefficient on the Middle East dummy is positive but not consistently significant across specifications. The coefficient on the Asia dummy, however, is negative and highly significant. Civil wars in Asia are the least likely of all the regions to receive UN help. For example, the civil war in Cambodia lasted thirteen years before the UN intervened. Our model predicts 13.1 years. Our estimates on the regional dummy variables tell us that the UN would have intervened in an identical war in Africa in less than a year (approximately 0.8 years), after about four months (roughly one-third of a year) if the war had been in Europe, and after only about three months (roughly one-quarter of a year) if the war had been in Latin America. These regional effects are illustrated in Figure 1. Recall that the baseline case corresponds to a conflict in Africa. The line with the asterisk markers graphs the probability of a UN intervention in the given year for a European conflict with all other variables at the same values as those for the baseline case. Notice that the probability of a UN intervention in the fifteenth year of a conflict, given that one has not occurred until that point, is less than 5 percent in the baseline (African)case, whereas it is about 15 percent in the European case. Conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean are even more likely to receive a mission than those in Europe, ceteris paribus, as shown by the line marked with circles. The Asia case is very difficult to see from Figure 1 because the probability of UN intervention remains very low (virtually indistinguishable from the horizontal axis) for the whole range of years. These three lines illustrate the rather striking differences in the propensity of the UN to intervene in each of the four regions.
FINDING6: There is no strong evidence that the United Nations is more likely to intervene in a conflict when the combatants have negotiated a peace treaty, but this is probably due to multicollinearity.

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Do the Peacekeepers Go? Where

This result is quite a surprise given the conventional wisdom that the UN requires a peace treaty before it will send in a peacekeeping mission. The variable is the proper sign in all specifications but simply not significant in any of them. A look at a contingency table like the one in Table 4 reveals that there is a significant bivariate relationship between the presence of a treaty and whether or not there was an intervention. A bivariate Weibull regression using only the treaty variable (not shown) also reveals a strong bivariate relationship in the right direction. The problem arises in the multivariate results. The culprit appears to be multicollinearity between the treaty and size of government army variable. The correlation coefficient between treaty and size of government army is -0.23. When size of government army is excluded from the equation, as we do in column 3 of Table 2, the standard error on the treaty coefficient falls by about a third, making the coefficient statistically significant. It would be premature to claim that the UN does not react positively to a negotiated peace treaty. These relatively weak results of the treaty variable are due to correlation between treaty and size of government army and a small sample size.
between Treatyand Intervention 4. BivariateRelationship TABLE
Treaty Intervention No Intervention 16 11 No Treaty 3 30

There is no evidence that the United Nations intervenes more in countries with high primary commodity exports. In fact, the coefficient on primary commodity exports was the wrong sign. Clearly we can reject the hypothesis that the UN is intervening in some neocolonialist fashion because of permanent member interests in securing steady flows of raw materials.

There is no strong evidence that the United Nations intervenes in democracies at a lower rate than it does in nondemocracies.

The coefficient on "Democracy" is negative, suggesting that the UN has a lower hazard rate for intervening in democracies, but the coefficient is significant in only one of the specifications in Table 1. A different measure of democracy, a five-year average of Ted Gurr's democracy measure, produced even weaker results, so to save space we do not report them. These weak results, combined with the logical flaws inherent in the argument that produced this hypothesis, make us confident that we can reject the claim that the UN sends fewer missions to democracies. 9: There is no evidence that the United Nations intervenes in of permanent members of the Security Council at a higher colonies former rate than it does in other areas.

In fact the coefficient on "Former permanent member colony" is negative in the specification in column 1 of Table 1. Because of its wrong sign and insignificance, we remove it from the analysis in the remaining specifications. 10: The end of the Cold War had a profound effect on the UN's FINDING propensity to conduct peacekeeping missions. Obviously this result is no surprise. The coefficient on the "Cold War" variable tells us that conflicts that began during the Cold War had a significantly lower

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hazard rate of UN intervention. The variable was highly significant in all of the specifications in Tables 1 and 2. Our estimates tell us that it would have been extraordinarily unlikely for a conflict like the one in Cambodia, with three million deaths, to last as long without UN intervention if it began in the post-Cold War era. Had that civil war begun in the post-Cold War era, our model predicts that the UN would have intervened in only 3.7 years rather than in the 13 years it actually took. This result is also shown in Figure 1. The line marked with triangles assumes the same variable values as the baseline case, except that the conflict began during the Cold War. The line follows the horizontal axis very closely showing that the probability that the UN would intervene in a conflict that began before the end of the Cold War was lower in any given year than a conflict that began after the end of the Cold War. Discussion The results that we report here suggest an image of a UN that attempts to balance between dictates of power and concerns of principle. With regard to the latter, the UN seems to respond, other things being equal, to civil wars that involve the greatest human catastrophes. The number of deaths that a conflict produced was the most robust predictor of UN intervention across all our specifications. In making its decisions, however, the organization responds to basic power considerations--both in terms of the importance that the Security Council places on different regions and in its reluctance to intervene in states that have greater lethal capacity. The result is that the UN has not been evenhanded in how it responds to deaths. More people must die in Africa than in Europe, and even more must die in Asia than in Africa, before the UN will intervene. Furthermore, the UN does not intervene at the same rate in countries with large government armies. Our estimates indicate that civil wars in countries with just average size armies have very low probabilities of receiving a UN mission, even after several decades of conflict. Our findings suggest two further research questions: (1) What are the causes of regional bias in UN interventions, and (2) is there a differential quality of care among those cases in which the Security Council intervenes? Regional Bias While it is understandable that the UN is loathe to become involved in civil wars in relatively powerful countries (measured by size of army), an interesting area of future research would be to try to understand why the regional differences exist. We can speculate that both supply- and demand-side reasons help explain the discrepancy. On the supply side, several answers suggest themselves. First, the permanent members, especially the United States, France, and the United Kingdom likely see wars in Europe, as opposed to wars in Africa, as more important to their vital security interests. Indeed, the single variable that clearly differentiates between explanations based on security interests of the permanent members as opposed to humanitarian interests is the location of the conflict. Just as plausibly, one can posit that these same members act in response to their own public opinion, and domestic demands for intervention are likely to be stronger when the wars are in Europe. This result may be attributable to the CNN effect or to the greater presence of immigrants from those countries, who then lobby for intervention. Or it could be that wars in Europe produce more asylum seekers to the major European powers, and hence a greater sense of urgency to terminate the war. All these explanations sound plausible for the results comparing intervention in Europe as opposed to Africa, but they seem problematic for understanding the Asia result. Given the rising prominence of that region for the security interests of the

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Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?

permanent members, as well as the increase in immigration from Asian countries to the United States and Europe, one would predict more interventions in Asia than Africa. It is possible that the answer lies in the demand side for intervention. During the Cold War, consent of warring states was viewed as a prerequisite for the deployment of a mission, and in the 1990s consent remained a key consideration in intervention decisions. One way of addressing the problem of regional bias would be to explore why Asian states that suffer from civil wars are less likely to provide consent for intervention than states in Africa in similar conditions. Our results suggest that a possible explanation for the greater proclivity of African states to consent to intervention may be their greater inability to resist pressures for intervention and to claim the prerogatives of sovereignty. A different answer might focus on regional norms and institutions. Whereas the Organization of African Unity gradually changed its stance in the 1990s toward conditional acceptance of interference in state sovereignty to encourage conflict resolution and war termination, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and states in the larger Asian region have consistently resisted the suggestion that humanitarian principles take precedence over state sovereignty and noninterference (Stedman 2001b). Quality of Care Understanding where the UN intervenes in civil wars is only a first step in evaluating whether the organization lives up to its universal aspirations. A second question is whether the UN provides an equitable quality of care to the countries in which it intervenes. Whereas the first question is akin to evaluations of public health systems that focus on who is admitted for care, the second question is akin to evaluations of such systems in terms of the quality of care, once people are admitted into the system. The results we have discussed so far suggest the patterns by which the UN allocates missions to civil conflicts. As a measure of the quality of the mission, we use the cost of the UN operation in millions of dollars. Table 5 reports summary statistics for this measure for all nineteen interventions in the postwar period and in various regional subsamples. The average cost of a mission in Europe is significantly higher than the cost of a mission in Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean, or the Middle East. Interestingly the one mission that the UN did conduct in Asia was also quite expensive. The specifications in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 use cost of operation as the dependent variable.8 The tobit coefficients confirm some of the more important patterns we discussed above. As before, the UN seems to react strongly to the number of casualties. The UN spent more resources, other things being equal, on civil wars that had large numbers of casualties. The bias in favor of missions to Europe continues to be evident. The strong bias against Asia was no longer evident in these specifications, probably because the one mission that was sent to Asia was also quite expensive. Size of government army was less significant in these results, although using a log of government army (results not reported) did produce significant results. Although these findings are preliminary, they suggest the need for further investigation into the question of quality of care in UN interventions. On the one

8Again we need to interpret these results with caution because the data exhibit right censoring. That is, we have no measure of what the UN would have spent on missions in wars that ended without an intervention had those wars continued. Furthermore, the data in this case are also left censored, not in time, but in the different sense that the UN could not spend less than zero dollars on a mission. As such, all missions in which the UN did not intervene take on the same value even though some may have been less a priority for the organization than others. To combat this latter form of censoring, we estimated the results using tobit, which controls for the left censoring problem.

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MICHAEL GILLIGAN AND STEPHEN JOHN STEDMAN 5. Summary Statistics on Operations Cost by Region TABLE Observed Full Sample Africa Europe Asia Latin America & Carribean Middle East 19 8 3 1 5 2 Mean 591.44 480.24 1583.66 1620.96 196.07 21.55 SD 1101.53 5550.42 2649.45 185.16 12.99 Minimum 4.57 16.40 27.04 1620.96 4.57 12.37


Maximum 4642.83 1686.42 4642.83 1620.96 443.41 30.74

hand, using UN resources as a proxy for quality is misleading, as each of the cases of intervention receive supplementary resources from regional organizations and member states. In the case of Bosnia, for example, the resources provided directly by the United States and the European Union dwarf the funds directly allocated by the UN. On the other hand, the fact that the European cases are much more likely to receive dramatic supplements by member states should raise greater concern about discrepant levels of UN funding by region. In either case, such an investigation would have to address the possibility that missions in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean cost less simply because the missions in those regions required fewer resources. Conclusion By examining where and when the UN sends peace missions, our research provides important evidence to gauge whether the institution is fulfilling its humanitarian and security missions, and what biases it shows in attempting to live up to its mandate. The results contain good news and bad news. The UN is probably more sensitive to its humanitarian mission than it is given credit for, but its behavior confirms the claims by many critics inside and outside the organization that it shows distinct biases toward different regions and regimes. Our findings present fundamental problems for an institution that has pledged to uphold universal norms and especially for its current secretary general, Kofi Annan, who argues that humanitarian intervention to stop horrific atrocities and abuses, whether they be the result of civil war or governmental policy, should be a universal imperative. The results suggest that considerations of power are at least as important as considerations of sovereignty in constraining the UN's universalism. References
GARYKING, AND CURTISSIGNORINO. ALT, JAMES, (2000) Aggregation among Binary, Count and Duration Models: Estimating the Same Quantities from Different Levels of Data. PoliticalAnalysis 9:1-24. ALVAREZ,MICHAEL, Jose ANTONIO CHEIBUB, FERNANDO LIMONGI, AND ADAM PRZEWORSKI.(1997) InternationalDevelopment31(2):3-36. Classifying Political Regimes. Studies in Comparative ANDREAS. ANDERSSON, (2000) Democracies and UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990-1996. International Peacekeeping7:1-22. BENNIS,PHYLIS.(1996) Calling the Shots: How WashingtonDominates Today'sU.N. New York: Olive Branch Press.

BRADFORD S. JONES. M.,AND BOX-STEFFENSMEIER, (1997) Time Is of the Essence:EventHistory JANET DE JONGE CHANTAL. OUDRAAT, (1996) The United Nations and Internal Conflict. In International

in Political Models Science. American Science 41:1414-1461. ofPolitical Journal

Dimensions editedby Michael E. Brown. MA: MITPress. of Internal Conflicts, Cambridge,

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Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?

MICHAEL SAMBANIS. DOYLE, W., ANDNICHOLAS (2000) International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis. AmericanPolitical Science Review 94:779-802. DURCH, WILLIAMJ. (1993) Getting Involved: The Political-Military Context. In The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping:Case Studies and ComparativeAnalysis, edited by William J. Durch. New York: St. Martin's. D. LAITIN. FEARON,JAMESD., AND DAVID (2003) Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War.AmericanPolitical ScienceReview 97:75-90. GIBBS, DAVID. (1997) Is Peacekeeping a New Form of Imperialism? International Peacekeeping4: 122-128. GILLIGAN, MICHAELJ., AND STEPHEN JOHN STEDMAN. (2003) Where Do the Peacekeepers Go? With Re-coding Appendix and STATA? Variable Names. Available at politics/faculty/gilligan/peacekeepers.pdf. PETER VIGGO.(1996) National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN JACOBSEN, Peace Enforcement after the Cold War?Journal of Peace Research33:205-215. NEACK, LAURA. (1995) UN Peace-keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self? Journal of Peace Research32:181-196. TROND.(1991) The Statistical Analysis of Event Histories. SociologicalMethodsand Research PETERSON, 19:270-323.

and Development.New York: Cambridge University Press. Democracy STEPHEN STEDMAN, JOHN.(2001a) The Future of Peace Operations. In A GlobalAgenda:IssuesBeforethe 56th GeneralAssembly of the United Nations. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. STEPHEN STEDMAN, JOHN. (2001b) United Nations Peacekeeping and the Future of the U.S-Japan Alliance. Paper prepared for United States-Japan Foundation Project on the Future of the Alliance.

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Imposing Sanctions: States, Firms, and Economic Coercion Author(s): T. Clifton Morgan and Navin A. Bapat Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, Dissolving Boundaries (Dec., 2003), pp. 6579 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: . Accessed: 23/10/2013 17:50
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Studies Review(2003) 5(4), 65-79 International

Imposing Sanctions: States, Firms, and

Economic Coercion'

Departmentof Political Science, Rice University and


Departmentof Political Science, Rice University

The majority of research on economic sanctions focuses on the effectiveness of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. Although the number of sanctions episodes is rapidly growing, the empirical record suggests that sanctions, while possibly effective for symbolic purposes, often fail to alter the behavior of target states (Wagner 1988; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 1990; Pape 1997; Drury 1998, 2001). But even though the empirical work indicates a poor performance record, many scholars have attempted to identify conditions under which sanctions have the greatest chance of success (Tsebelis 1990; Smith 1996; Drezner 1998). For example, Clifton Morgan and Valerie Schwebach (1996) argue that sanctions aimed at the political elites within a target state increase the probability that sanctions will succeed. Further research investigates the relation between sanctions success and target regime characteristics (Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Al-Sowayel 1999), unilateral versus multilateral imposition (Martin 1992; Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1998), conflict expectations (Drezner 1998), and the duration of imposition (Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000). Recently, scholars have advocated examining the effectiveness of threats to use sanctions in addition to imposing them to eliminate potential selection bias problems in current empirical research (Smith 1996; Drezner 1999; Morgan and Miers 1999). The research presented in these studies is typically based on the assumption that sanctions are an activity that occurs between states. The sanctions literature follows the argument that senders cut exchanges and impose costs on the target state. Although this assumption seems reasonable, the exchange halted as a result of sanctions frequently does not occur between states. Often, the imposition of sanctions affects the exchanges between the firms and the individuals of the sender and the target state. Sanctions prevent the sender's firms from trading with and investing in the firms of the target state. The halting of economic exchange between the sender and the target further prevents consumers in both countries from obtaining commodities. Although the majority of work on sanctions assumes that the target government suffers as a result of sanctions imposition, the firms and individuals of both the sender and the target state generally also absorb the costs of sanctions. With this type of sanctions, the sender seeks to alter target behavior through the influence of the sender's domestic actors. If the sender creates barriers to exchange
'The research presented here was supported by National Science Foundation Grant SES-0137792. We would like to thank Dan Drezner and the editors of this volume for their comments and suggestions.

O 2003 International Studies Review. Publishedby BlackwellPublishing,350 MainStreet,Malden,MA02148, USA,and 9600 GarsingtonRoad,Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.

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Coercion Sanctions:States,Firms,and Economic Imposing

with the target, such as high tariffs or export bans, the sender increases the cost to its own domestic actors for conducting business with the target. The increase in cost may compel domestic actors to cease exchange with the target by reducing the domestic actors' profits from such exchange. Although the goal of the sender is to force a target to change its behavior, the actions taken by the sender to accomplish this goal are directed at the sender's domestic economic actors. To illustrate this argument, consider the United States' Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. The language within the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 supports the argument that while sanctions are intended to alter the behavior of target states, the actions taken by sender states may be directed at firms trading with the target states. According to the law, the purpose of the act is:
to impose sanctions on persons making certain investments directly and enhance Libya'sweapons or aviationcapabilitiesor enhance Libya'sability to develop its petroleum resources.(US PublicLaw 104-172 [H.R. 3107])
significantly contributing to the enhancement of the ability of Iran or Libya to develop its petroleum resources, and on persons exporting certain items that

By threatening to prosecute companies or individuals that assist in enhancing Iran's and Libya's petroleum and aviation resources, the United States created disincentives for its domestic actors to engage in business with the two targets. As a consequence of inducing corporations to refrain from engaging in business with Iran and Libya, Iran and Libya would be subject to costs from sanctions. Although the law indicates that the goal of the United States is to deny these two targets the ability to develop until they stop supporting international terrorist movements, the method involves raising the price of conducting business with the target states for multinational firms. While the sender government believes that sanctions on the target are in its interest, sanctions are not necessarily in the interest of the sender's domestic actors. In many instances, the interests of the sender's domestic actors and the sender government may in fact conflict. By preventing exchanges between sender's domestic actors and the target, the sender's domestic actors must forfeit the gains from exchange with the target state. Sanctions may have the effect of forcing the sender's nationals to pay the costs of lost exchange with the target. For example, the US government policy on Cuba often argues that sanctions are the best way to enhance the prospects for a democratic transition in the Cuban government. Although US political interests may be advanced by sanctions, the interests of US companies are centered on profits. The policy of sanctions therefore runs contrary to the preferences of those US companies wishing to gain a foothold in the Cuban market. United States firms are compelled to pay the cost of lost business with Cuba whether or not they agree with the goals of the US government. Given that sanctions law impedes profitable exchanges, the domestic actors of the sender may attempt to illegally continue economic exchanges with the target. In some cases, the domestic actors could take steps to circumvent the sender's sanctions policy, such as moving their operations to countries that allow exchange with the target or using offshore locations. In other instances, domestic actors may violate sanctions law outright. If the domestic actors' violation of sanctions law goes unpunished, the domestic actors of the sender will continue to receive the benefits of economic exchanges with the target. The key problem for the sender in sanctions imposition is therefore inducing its domestic actors to comply with its sanctions laws through the use of its enforcement power. To deter its domestic actors from violating its laws, the sender must convince these domestic actors that violation will have substantial costs. In the earlier example of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of

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1996, if a firm or individual chose to violate sanctions and was caught, it would be prosecuted under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917. Successful prosecution could result in a potential $1 million fine and possible jail time. To change the incentives of domestic actors who wish to continue trading, a sender government must use its enforcement power strategically to ensure compliance with sanctions laws. To deter firms, senders must therefore vigorously enforce their sanctions laws. The problem, however, is that monitoring the behavior of firms and prosecuting those in violation of the law brings costs to the sanctioning state. Our purpose in the research reported here is to develop a game theoretic model to study the strategic interaction between sender governments and their domestic firms. The model is designed to demonstrate the conditions under which firms choose to abide by sanctions rather than choose to evade sanctions law. Additionally, the model demonstrates how states with restricted budgets for monitoring the behavior of firms strategically use enforcement power to induce compliance. The model is able to account for several predictable outcomes in addition to providing an explanation for several counterintuitive cases of sanctions behavior. In the next section, we present the model and discuss the model's implications. We conclude with a consideration for future directions for the model's development and possible research designs to empirically test its propositions. A Model of Sanctions Enforcement In what follows, we present an N-player game theoretic model to capture the strategic interaction between sender states and their domestic firms.2 Game theory is not intended as a means of presenting detailed descriptions of specific events, or even of classes of events. Rather, it is an abstraction and is intended to capture a phenomenon's general features that are essential for understanding variation in behaviors and outcomes. This game represents a stylized version of the process by which states impose and seek to enforce their sanctions laws. Our model is designed to identify the conditions under which sender states can induce the compliance of their firms in halting economic exchange with target states. With any game theoretic model, one must specify the players in the game, the moves available to them, the outcomes associated with each combination of the players' moves, the payoffs each player obtains from each outcome, and the solution concept used. We address each of these in turn. Players The model consists of a sender state, i, who has imposed sanctions on a target state k and a set of domestic firms J = {jl,2, , j3 .. . jn}. Each of the firms in J operates within i and conducts business with k. We assume that the preferences of each of the players can be characterized by Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. That is, the players' preferences over outcomes can be represented on a cardinal scale that is invariant up to a linear transformation, allowing us to specify any two points on a player's utility scale (the origin and the unit) without a loss of generality (for a further discussion, see Luce and Raiffa 1957; Morrow 1994). Moves The game begins after the sender state passes sanctions legislation to prevent its firms from exchanging with a target state. This legislation outlines both the firms that are subject to sanctions law and the penalty, F, for sanctions violation. Any firm
2Readers unfamiliar with game theory can find useful introductions in Luce and Raiffa (1957), Ordeshook (1986), Binmore (1992), and Morrow (1994).

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Coercion Sanctions: States,Firms,and Economic Imposing

inJ caught in violation of the sanctions law must pay the penalty F. The value of the penalty F is assumed to be exogenously determined.3 The game begins with a move by the sender state i. After the passage of sanctions legislation, the sender must decide how to best enforce sanctions law to achieve its policy objectives. The sender, i, makes a decision as to how many resources to appropriate to enforcing its sanctions law. These resources devoted to enforcement will be used to conduct investigations into the activities of its firms and prosecute transgressions. Each investigation allows the sender to monitor the activities of one of its domestic firms. We assume that each investigation into an individual firm's activities carries a fixed cost. The amount of resources allocated by the sender is determined by how many firms the sender wishes to investigate. The amount of resources allocated by i toward enforcing its sanctions laws is public information. Following i's allotment of enforcement resources, each of the individual firms in the setJ makes a decision of whether or not to comply with the sanction laws. If a firm decides to abide by the sanctions law, the firm halts its exchange with the target. Should the firm choose to violate sanctions, the firm continues its trade illicitly. The decision of each of the firms to comply or violate sanctions remains private information unless the state chooses to investigate a particular firm. While the firms in J make the decision of whether or not to violate sanctions, i makes a simultaneous choice of an investigation profile. The investigation profiles are lists of firms whose activities will be investigated by the sender. The number of firms that may be monitored by i is limited to the number of investigations for which funds are appropriated. For example, if the setJ consists of three firms and i has devoted resources for two investigations, i has a choice of three investigation profiles:
Firm 1
Investigation Profile 1 Investigation Profile 2 Investigate Investigate

Firm 2
Investigate No Investigation

Firm 3
No Investigation Investigate

InvestigationProfile 3

No Investigation



The choice of investigation profile determines which firms are subject to investigation. Each individual profile constitutes a pure strategy for i. A mixed strategy would involve randomizing the choice of investigation profiles. Outcomes We assume that firms care only about their own profits and are unconcerned about the issues over which sanctions are imposed. Thus, as far as each firm is concerned, the game has three possible outcomes. The first possible outcome for the firm occurs if it continues exchange with the target state and does not come under investigation by the sender. The firm may continue exchange with the target through dummy corporations, trading through its foreign affiliates, engaging in smuggling, or, as we shall see, by openly continuing its economic relationship with the target. Although the firm engages in illegal activity,j does not fall under the scrutiny of sender i. As a result, economic exchanges betweenj and k continue as if no sanctions law was in place. The firm continues its economic exchange with the target and achieves economic benefits for such activity. The second possible
3We recognize that the choice of penalty is an important strategic consideration. If we allow F to be endogenous, however, each equilibrium will involve the state setting F sufficiently high to deter all violations, and all firms abiding by sanctions law. Obviously, somethingkeeps states from establishing excessively severe penalties for many types of criminal activity (or we would execute jaywalkers, and probably nearly eliminate the incidence of such behavior). Presumably, there is some cost to the state of imposing penalties and this cost increases with the severity of the penalty. We, quite frankly, have no idea regarding how penalties are set or on the nature of the costs of, or constraints on, imposing severe penalties. Thus, we choose to treat the level of the penalty as being exogenously determined.

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outcome occurs should the firm halt its exchange with the target state in response to the passage of sanctions legislation. Since the firm suspends its business relationship with the target, the firm has lost the profits it received from ties with the target prior to the imposition of sanctions. The final possible outcome for each firm occurs if the firm violates sanctions law and is investigated by the sender. We assume if a firm is in violation of the law and is investigated, it is successfully prosecuted. That is, following the sender's detection of the firm's violation, all further exchange with the target is halted and the firm pays the penalty, F. Although the firm has been caught in violation, the firm was still able to complete some of the value of its exchange with the target. The firm is therefore able to receive the benefits of a percentage of its exchange with the target state. Similarly, we assume the sender state, i, cares only about the extent to which it achieves its policy objectives vis-a-vis the target, k, and the cost it must pay to enforce its sanctions policy. That is, i is not concerned about the profits of the firms inJ. Thus, as far as i is concerned, the outcome of the game can be expressed solely in terms of the change in k's behavior and the amount spent on investigating the firms inJ. We presume that k's behavior can be affected by economic sanctions, and that the extent to which k's behavior is affected is a function of the amount of economic exchange disrupted. Sender i prefers outcomes in which k's behavior changes more to those in which k's behavior changes less, ceteris paribus. We also assume that i prefers to pay as little as possible to investigate the firms inJ. Payoffs The payoffs for each of the firms are defined by two components. For each firm, we assume there exists some value for exchange (V1 . . V,,)with the target prior to the imposition of sanctions by i. If a firm continues its economic exchanges with the target in spite of sanctions law, the firm will receive the value of this economic exchange. If a firm abides by sanctions law and does not continue exchanges with the target, the firm does not receive any value for its exchange with k. The second component of the firms' payoff is the penalty a firm must pay should it be caught in violation of sanctions law. The firms' total payoffs will therefore be determined by the amount of exchange it completes with the target minus the level of fines it must pay should it be caught in violation. On the basis of the three possible outcomes, we partition the firms into three subsets ofJ. The three subsets of firms are: Firms 1 through q: Firms that abide by sanctions law. Firms q + 1 through r: Firms that violate sanctions law and are investigated by i. Firms r +l through s: Firms that violate sanctions law and are not investigated by i. Subset 1 through q consists of firms that choose to abide by sanctions. They receive a payoff of 0. Since the firms choose to severe their business relationship, the firms do not receive the value Vjof their exchange with the target but will not have to pay a fine for violation. Firms q + 1 through r are caught in violation of sanctions and receive a payoff of Vj?-Fwhere 0? ? 1. The term a represents the amount of exchange the subset of firms is able to complete with the target state prior to the sender's detection. Although the firms receive some portion of their benefits from exchange with the target, the firms are forced to pay the penalty for being caught in violation, F. For the subset of firms r + 1 through s, the payoff is the value of the exchange prior to sanctions imposition, Vj. Since the sender does not disrupt the exchange between this subset of firms and the target, the firms receive the same value of exchange with the target as they would receive if sanctions were not imposed.

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Sanctions: Coercion States,Firms,and Economic Imposing

For the sender i, the total payoff for the game is also determined by two components. First, the sender's payoff is affected by the extent to which its policy objectives vis-a-vis the target k are realized. The policy benefits achieved from sanctions imposition are represented as a function of the amount of economic exchange disrupted between the domestic firms and the target, I + (1 - a) Vj . For the subset of firms through q, the sender is able g L Vj to deny the target the full value of exchanges with this subset of domestic firms. For the subset of firms q +1 through r, the sender is able to disrupt the exchanges between the firms and the target after the firms are caught in violation of sanctions law. The value of exchange denied to the target is therefore the amount of exchange stopped after the sender concludes that the firms violated sanctions law. The final subset of firms r + 1 through s complete their total value of economic exchanges with the target. The sender is therefore unable to disrupt any exchange between this subset of firms and the target k. The shape of the policy benefit function g is assumed to be general. We impose only one restraint on g by preventing the value of g from decreasing as the amount of exchange disrupted increases. Although g may stay flat as the amount of exchange denied to the target increases, we do not allow the value of g to decrease as the amount of exchange disrupted grows. The second component of the sender's payoff is the cost of enforcing sanctions law and monitoring the activities of its firms. The cost of enforcement is the amount of resources the sender devotes toward investigating the firms at the beginning of the game. The amount of resources devoted to investigation by the sender is represented by the sum of the costs of investigation, 1C. Thus, the payoff for i is given by:



(1- )Vjj=q+1


Solution Concept We have defined the payoffs for each player at each of the game's possible outcomes. Given the potentially large number of firms in the game, we are unable to present a fully general solution to the game. As the number of players tends to infinity, the possible strategy combinations also dramatically increases, making the presentation of a full solution cumbersome and not conducive to interpretation. However, given specific values for each of the exogenous variables, we can easily solve the game using the subgame perfect equilibrium solution concept. Subgame perfect equilibrium requires that strategies employed by the players induce equilibrium in each of the model's subgames (Ordeshook 1986). This requires that the strategy of each player must be the best reply to other players' strategies in every subgame. In the following section, we present several cases to demonstrate how each of the model's variables affects the ability of sender states to induce domestic firms to comply with sanctions law. Specific Examples of the Game The numeric examples presented in Table 1 are designed to demonstrate that a wide range of outcomes is possible, depending on circumstances. In particular, it is interesting to note that some behaviors that appear quite peculiar can be rationalunder the right conditions. We can also use these examples as a guide to hypotheses relating general variablesto behaviors of both sender states and domestic economic actors. Each of our examples involves a sender state and three firms doing business with the target state. The value of the economic relationship to thejth firm is represented by Vj, e specifies the proportion of V that a firm can earn before being caught

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TABLE1. Numeric Examples


V1 Example Example Example Example Example 1 2 3 4 5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3

V2 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.41

V3 1 1 1 0.2 0.41

0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5

F 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2

C 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.8

T 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.25

should it violate the sanctions law, F represents the amount of the fine that must be paid by a firm that is caught violating the sanctions law, and C is the cost to the sender state of conducting a single investigation of a firm. Recall that the other variable included in the model is represented by g, the function specifying the amount of policy benefit obtained by the sending state for a given level of disruption in the economic relationship between the sending state's firms and the target state. To simplify matters in these examples, we specify g as the step function:

Z (1- a)Vj>T I :L Vj+ j=1 j=q+1

0 : E Vj+E (1c)Vj< T
j=1 j=q+l



This implies that the sender receives no policy benefits from the sanctions unless the value of the economic disruption exceeds some threshold, T. Once T is exceeded, however, the target state complies completely with the sender's demands and the sender state receives its full policy benefit.4 The structure of the game gives the first move to the sender state, which determines how many investigations will be conducted. The second move involves each firm deciding whether to violate the sanctions law by continuing to do business with the target state and the third move, which we assume to be made simultaneously with the second, involves the state selecting an investigation profile, which specifies which firms come under investigation. We assume that firms are expected utilitymaximizers. Thus, a firm will comply with the sanctions law if the utility of complying, which we specifiy as 0, is greater than or equal to its expected utility of violating the law. That is, firmj will comply if and only if 0 > p(aVj - F) + (1 -p)Vj (3) where p represents the probability that j comes under investigation by the state. Through algebraic manipulation, we solve for the value ofp needed to induce firmj to comply with the sanctions law: (4) p > Vj/(Vj + F a.Vj) Based on this inequality, the sender may calculate what probability of investigation is necessary to induce each of the firms to comply with sanctions law. In our first example (see Table 1), Firms 1, 2, and 3 place respective values of .2, .6, and 1 on their exchanges with the target, k. By placing the values of Example 1 in Equation (4) for each of the firms, we see that the only firm that can be induced to comply with sanctions is Firm 1. Given the parameter values in Example 1, Firm 1 complies ifp > 2/3. The sender thus knows that to get Firm 1 to comply with the sanctions law, the probability it is investigated must be greater than 2/3.
4Although it is probably not reasonable to believe that sanctions operate in this manner (Morgan and Schwebach 1997), we note that most of the literature evaluating the success of economic sanctions as an instrument of policy is based on precisely this assumption. Treating g in this fashion greatly simplifies our exposition. Moreover, all conclusions we advance here hold with a more general treatment.

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Sanctions: Coercion States,Firms,and Economic Imposing

The sender is able to make similar calculations for both Firm 2 and Firm 3. For Firm 2 and Firm 3, the expected utility of continuing exchanges with the target state remains higher than compliance with sanctions law regardless of the probability of investigation. For Firm 2, the probability of investigation needed to induce compliance is p ? 1.2 and for Firm 3, p 2 1.42. Since the state cannot investigate any firm with a probability greater than 1.0, we can see that both Firms 2 and 3 have dominant strategies to violate sanctions law regardless of the probability they will be investigated. In other words, these calculations indicate that while the sender may deter Firm 1 from violating sanctions, the sender is unable to deter Firms 2 and 3 from continuing their exchange with the target. The sender is now able to choose a strategy for the game by setting the level of resources to allocate to investigation and selecting an investigation profile. In selecting a strategy, the sender is attempting to choose an investigation profile that will disrupt enough exchange to reach the threshold level T needed to obtain the policy benefit. However, each investigation is costly. If the costs of the total investigations needed to reach the threshold level exceed the policy benefit, that is if XC> 1, the sender's payoff will be worse than if the sender devoted no resources toward enforcement. The sender will therefore choose an investigation profile that reaches the threshold level T with the fewest investigations. In Example 1, each investigation costs the sender .4. Since the payoff for the policy benefit is 1, the sender will only pay for a maximum of two investigations. If the sender adopts a pure strategy in which Firm 1 is investigated, Firm 1 will comply since the probability of investigation will exceed 2/3. This will allow the sender to deny the target .2, or the total value of its exchange with Firm 1. Firm 2 and Firm 3, however, will always violate sanctions. The sender may only disrupt the economic exchanges between these firms and the target if it chooses to investigate these firms. The sender disrupts .3 worth of exchange should it investigate Firm 2 and .5 worth of exchange should it choose to investigate Firm 3. In this example, no investigation profile exists that will disrupt a value of exchanges greater than the policy threshold value. If the sender chooses a profile that targets only one of the firms, the maximum amount of exchange the sender is able to disrupt is .5. This is accomplished through the investigation of Firm 3. If the sender chooses to conduct two investigations, the investigation profile with the greatest returns involves investigating Firms 2 and 3. However, this investigation profile only disrupts .8 worth of exchanges between the firms and the target, which is not sufficient to attain the policy benefits of sanctions. No matter which investigation profile is selected, the sender is not able to attain its policy goals vis-A-visthe target k. Since the policy benefit component of the sender's payoff will therefore be 0, the sender will choose to set C to 0 to avoid negative payoffs. If the policy benefit is unattainable as in this example, the sender will devote no resources toward enforcing its sanctions laws. The firms will therefore all violate sanctions and continue economic exchanges with the target as if no sanctions were in place. Empirically, this case would resemble a situation in which sanctions laws are imposed, but never enforced. Since firms will not be punished for breaking sanctions law, we expect that each of the firms will continue their exchanges with the target state.5

5It might strike some as incredible that a state would pass a law imposing sanctions on another state and then make no effort to prevent its domestic firms and citizens from violating the law. However, on July 22, 2002, several members of the US Congress made a concerted effort to reduce the appropriations for investigating and prosecuting violations of the ban on travel by US citizens to Cuba to $0 (Milligan 2002). No effort was made to change the sanctions policy. In effect, appropriating $0 for enforcement constituted a very clear signal to anyone looking for a cheap, sunny, spring break destination.

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In our second example, we hold all of the hypothetical values of the model's variables constant except for decreasing the value of a to .3. Literally, this indicates that should firms choose to violate sanctions, firms will now only be able to complete and obtain the benefits of 30 percent of their exchanges if the sender chooses to investigate. In the previous example, firms were able to obtain half of the value of their exchanges prior to detection. To determine how the change in t affects the strategic behavior of the players, we first calculate how the change affects the probability of investigation needed to induce each of the firms to comply with sanctions. Equation (4) demonstrates that a decrease in the value of a decreases the probability of investigation needed to induce the firms to comply with sanctions law. Firm 1 now requires a .58 probability of investigation to comply with sanctions. Firm 2 will comply with sanctions if the probability of investigation is .97. Although this is very high, Firm 2 in Example 1 had a dominant strategy to never comply with the sanctions law. Under the new conditions presented in Example 2, it is possible for the sender to deter Firm 2 from violating if the probability of investigating Firm 2 is high enough. Since the value of exchange is so high for Firm 3, Firm 3 still will not comply with sanctions despite the decrease in the amount of exchange it will complete prior to detection. Due to the change in a from Example 1 to Example 2, the sender has the ability to obtain the policy benefits of sanctions. The sender is again only willing to pay for up to two investigations. Regardless of whether or not Firm 3 believes it will be investigated, Firm 3 chooses to violate sanctions. If the sender investigates Firm 3, the sender is able to disrupt .7 worth of exchange between the firms and the target k. If Firm 3 is investigated, the sender will exceed the necessary threshold of .8 regardless of which other firm the sender chooses to investigate. Since the sender simply needs to exceed the threshold, the sender is indifferent between investigating Firms 1 and 2. The sender's strategy therefore requires payment for two investigations and conducting an investigation into Firm 3. The sender will receive the policy benefit while paying .8 for the two investigations, resulting in a total payoff of .2. The sender has accomplished its policy objectives through sanctions. In this example, there are an infinite number of equilibria. All involve the sender conducting two investigations, one of which is directed at Firm 3, and all involve Firm 3 violating the sanctions law. In one pure strategy equilibrium, the state also investigates Firm 1, which complies while Firm 2 violates. In another, Firm 2 is investigated and it complies while Firm 1 violates. The other equilibria involve mixed strategies. Notice that in both pure strategy equilibria, the state investigates one firm that it knows is abiding by the sanctions law (either Firm 1 or Firm 2) and it does not investigate one firm that it knows is violating the sanctions law. Furthermore, Firm 3 violates the law, even though it knows it will be investigated. We might think this odd if we observed it, but the model provides an explanation for such behavior. In this case, declaring clearly that either Firm I or Firm 2 will be investigated, and following through, will insure that the targeted firm will abide by the law. This enables the state to obtain its policy benefit without the expenditure of a third investigation. Firm 3 will violate, even though it knows it will be caught, because the value of the exchange it can complete before being caught is greater than the cost of the fine. Example 3 increases the value of a back to its original level of .5 and decreases T, the threshold necessary to obtain compliance by the target, to .4. The probabilities needed to induce each of the firms to comply with sanctions law are identical to the first example. Firm 1 will comply if the probability of investigation is greater than or equal to 2/3 while Firm 2 and Firm 3 will always violate sanctions. The key difference in this example is the decrease in the threshold level needed to obtain the policy benefits of sanctions. The sender's strategy must only disrupt .4 worth of exchange between the firms and the target k. In this example, the sender is able to exceed the threshold with only one investigation. If the sender selects an

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Coercion States,Firms,and Economic ImposingSanctions:

investigation profile that only targets Firm 3, the sender disrupts .5 worth of economic exchanges between the firms and the target state. This meets the requirements for the sender to obtain the policy benefits. Since the sender only pays for one investigation, the total payoff for the sender is equal to .6. Again, Firm 3 has a dominant strategy to violate the law, even though it knows it will be caught (as does Firm 2). The additional interesting aspect of this case is that Firm 1 will violate the law with impunity, even though it could be deterred from violating with a probability of being investigated of greater than 2/3. The state achieves a greater benefit from stopping half of Firm 3's exchanges with the target than it does from eliminating all of Firm l's exchanges. Thus, it will ignore Firm l's violations and Firm 1, knowing this, will continue to trade with the target. Example 4 sets V,the value for each of the firms' exchange with the target, to .2 and shifts the threshold level T to .5. Each of the firms will be deterred from violating if the probability of investigation is greater than or equal to 2/3. Investigations in this example cost .4, indicating that the sender will only pay for a maximum of two investigations. However, since the threshold level is .5, two pure strategy investigations will not disrupt enough exchange to obtain the policy benefit. With two investigations, the maximum amount of exchange the sender will deny the target is .4. While the sender is unable to achieve the policy benefit using pure strategies, the sender achieves the policy benefit if the sender plays a mixed strategy. Three possible investigation profiles are available to the sender. If the sender pays for two investigations and randomly selects from the investigation profiles, each of the firms is deterred from violation. The investigation profiles for this example are:
Investigation Profile 1 Investigation Profile 2 Investigation Profile 3 Firm 1 Investigate Investigate No Investigation Firm 2 Investigate No Investigation Investigate Firm 3 No Investigation Investigate Investigate 1/3 1/3 1/3

If the sender plays mixed strategies, each of the firms has a 2/3 probability of coming under investigation. This probability is sufficient to induce each of the firms to comply with the sanctions laws of the sender. Since none of the firms are willing to risk violation, the sender is able to deny the target .6 worth of economic exchange. This exceeds the necessary threshold of .5 for the sender to achieve the policy benefit. If the sender plays this strategy, the sender receives a payoff of .2. Although the sender could not obtain the policy benefit of sanctions through pure strategies, the sender's use of mixed strategies successfully induces all of the firms to abide by sanctions law. In our final example, Firms 2 and 3 place a value of .41 on their exchanges with the target while Firm l's exchanges are worth .3. While Firm 1 will comply with sanctions if the probability of investigation is greater than .85, Firms 2 and 3 have dominant strategies to violate. The sender's threshold for achieving the policy benefits of sanctions T is only .25, but the cost of investigations C is high at .8. The sender will therefore only pay for one investigation. Should the sender use this investigation on either Firm 2 or Firm 3, the sender will deny the target state .205 worth of economic exchange. This value does not meet the threshold to achieve the policy benefit. However, if Firm 1 is investigated, the sender denies the target state .3. This allows the sender to achieve the policy benefits to offset the costs of investigation. The sender's equilibrium strategy is therefore to use its investigation on Firm 1. The sender's strategy in the final example yields a somewhat counterintuitive result. The sender knows with certainty that neither Firm 2 nor Firm 3 will abide by sanctions law, yet the strategy of the sender is to ignore the illicit exchange between these firms and the target. Although these firms will violate sanctions, the sender's

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best strategy is to use its investigation on the firm that has the least economic exchange with the target and that is expected to comply with sanctions. Since the sender must ensure that Firm 1 will comply with sanctions, the sender must set Firm l's probability of investigation high enough to deter the firm from violating sanctions. In this case, Firm l's probability is set to 1 since the sender will only pay for one investigation. The result of this example is that the firm that is most likely to abide is subject to investigation while the sender ignores those firms that will always violate. In this example, breaking the law with certainty works to the advantage of the violating firms. Implications and Hypotheses The examples demonstrate some of the model's more interesting predictions concerning the strategies of the sender and the target. By setting the variables to certain values, we can develop predictions of strategies adopted by both the sender and the sender's firms. Although the examples only demonstrate a few cases, we see that the model can provide an explanation for almost all strategies chosen by both the sender and the firms. The next step in the analysis is to build generalizations from the model in order to develop a set of testable hypotheses. The purpose of the model is to explain the conditions under which firms choose to violate sanctions law and the ability of senders to induce compliance to receive policy benefits from sanctions. The examples demonstrate several cases in which firms violate the law and yield some insight into why certain firms are more likely to engage in illicit exchange with targets of economic sanctions. To develop hypotheses concerning when firms choose to violate sanctions law, we examine the conditions necessary for a firm to violate. Recall from Equation (3) that a firm violates the sanctions law when the expected utility of violation exceeds the payoff for compliance. In all of the examples, firms placing a high value Von their exchange with the target state were more likely to continue exchanging with the target state. Based on the expected utility calculation, increasing the values of Vi, holding all else constant, makes the condition for violation easier to meet. If a firm is highly dependent on its relationship with the target state, the firm is more likely to break the laws of the sender.
HYPOTHESIS 1: As the value a firm places on its economic exchange with a target state increases, the firm is more likely to violate sanctions laws.

An example of this can be seen in the case of the United States versus Myanmar (Burma) (Boyd 2002). In response to continued human rights violations by the Myanmar government, as well as its refusal to surrender power to the elected government, the United States passed a law banning its citizens and firms from engaging in economic activity with Myanmar. In response to this law, several firms, including Pepsi, pulled out while other firms, such as Unocal, made concerted efforts to circumvent the policy. It is worth noting that Pepsi's decision to pull out cost the company some $8 million per year while the contracts signed by Unocal with Myanmar after the law imposing sanctions promised enormous returns on a $1.2 billion dollar development of an oil pipeline (Salpukas 1997). This is clearly consistent with the model's implications. Equation (3) also indicates that the higher the probability of getting investigated, the more likely that a firm will comply with the sanctions law. This is because caVj-F must be less than Vj, which suggests that as p increases, the right side of the inequality must decrease, making the condition easier to meet. Note, however, that the condition cannot be met unless another condition, F> aVj is also met. Otherwise, the right side of the inequality must be greater than 0. Thus, a firm

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Coercion States,Firms,and Economic ImposingSanctions:

will not comply unless the cost of the fine for violation exceeds the benefits that are gained from completing the portion of the exchange that can occur before the firm is caught. 2: As the probability a firm will come under HYPOTHESIS investigation for sanctions violation increases, the firm is less likely to violate sanctions, if and only if F> acVj. Since the fine must exceed the benefits of continued exchange in order for the firm to consider compliance with sanctions, increasing the value of the fine will make firms more likely to abide by sanctions law. If the penalty of sanctions violation involves the seizure of the firm's property, freezing all assets of the company, or imposing the death penalty on the firm's leadership, firms should be more likely to comply with sanctions. Yet, the majority of fines for sanctions violation entail some form of monetary penalty and a slight risk of jail time. This poses an interesting puzzle. Empirically,we do not observe many instances in which the fines for sanctions violation are excessively high. We avoid this puzzle in this model by making the value of the fine exogenous. An interesting question is why senders do not set fines for violation at such high levels. Although this is not a focus of this particular study, further investigation into sanctions law may lead to some insight into this puzzle. Nevertheless, we can see from Equation (3) that as F increases, it is more likely that a firm will comply with sanctions law.
HYPOTHESIS 3: As the level of the fine for sanctions violation increases, the probability a firm will violate sanctions decreases.

In Example 1, The decision of firms to violate is greatly affected by the value of 0C. none of the firms comply with sanctions law and the sender is unable to obtain the policy benefits of sanctions. However, decreasing the value of a while holding all else constant in Example 2 ensures that it is possible to deter some of the firms from allows the sender many violating the law. The simple shift from a=.5 to -a=.3 options in how to obtain the policy benefit whereas previously, no possible strategy for reaching the threshold existed. If a firm is able to complete the vast majority of its exchanges with the target prior to detection, a firm is more likely to violate sanctions. On the other hand, if a firm is not able to complete a significant percentage of its exchanges should it be investigated, the firm is less likely to violate sanctions. Even in cases in which a firm places an extremely large value on its exchange with the target, decreasing oato very low levels makes the condition for violation very difficult to meet. Additionally, decreasing the value of camakes the easier to meet. This indicates that for low levels of cx,firms are condition F> caVj more likely to have some probability of compliance. A key factor in a firm's decision of whether or not to violate sanctions is the firm's estimation of how much value from its exchanges it will be able to complete prior to detection should the sender choose to investigate illicit exchange. 4: As the value of exchange a firm anticipates HYPOTHESIS completing prior to detection by the sender state increases, the probability a firm will violate sanctions law increases. To illustrate this point, we refer to a case of sanctions violations by the Los Angeles Dodgers in .1999 (Reddy 2002).6 Due to the US sanctions on Cuba, both the United States government and major league baseball bar teams from signing players from Cuba. Despite laws forbidding the recruiting of Cuban players, the
6"We are grateful to Daniel Drezner for calling this case to our attention.

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Dodgers signed two Cuban players to tryout contracts. In response to this, the US government brought a case against the Dodgers, which ultimately resulted in the Dodgers paying a $75,000 fine. Interestingly, the Dodgers were allowed to keep the players, suggesting that = 1.0. Considering that the average salary of a major league baseball player exceeds $2 million, a $75,000 fine would probably not have deterred the Dodgers, even if o = .5 and they had been forced to return one of the players. This case illustrates the empirical predictions regarding t. If a firm is able to enjoy a substantial portion of its exchanges with the target even if it is detected and punished, it is more likely to violate sanctions laws. It is interesting to speculate about what factors might be associated with a firm's ability to complete, at least, a significant proportion of its transactions before being caught. One obvious factor might be whether the firm's activities in the target country are ongoing or involve a single transaction. As in the case of the Dodgers, if the transaction can be completed before the firm can be detected, the firm will have an incentive to violate the law. Another factor might be the complexity of the corporate structure. If the firm has a number of subsidiaries and units involved in the transaction, particularly if some of these are foreign operations, it might take the sending state longer to investigate and prosecute any violations. Thus, a greater volume of exchange would occur while the investigation and prosecution are ongoing. Similarly, firms with existing mechanisms (such as offshore subsidiaries) that facilitate avoiding sanctions laws should be able to complete a larger volume of exchange than could firms that have to set up such enterprises. Finally, firms that deal in products that are perishable might have a stronger incentive to complete contracted transactions than do firms that deal in less- or nonperishable items. If one does not deliver a shipment of diamonds to a target state, the diamonds will retain their value when they are sold weeks, months, or even years later. On the other hand, if one does not deliver a shipment of bananas to a target state, their value will diminish rapidly. The model also leads to two hypotheses regarding the behavior of the sanctioning state. Although the firms' decision of whether or not to violate sanctions is influenced by several factors, the actions taken by the sender state only influence one-the probability a firm will be investigated. The sender's objective is to deny the target as much value from exchanges with its domestic firms as possible. The more investigations pursued by the sender, the greater its ability to deny the target the benefits of exchange. However, the ability of the sender to conduct investigation is constrained by the costs. As the costs of individual investigations increase, the policy benefits obtained by the sender as a result of the investigations are more likely to be offset by the costs of investigations. If the price of investigation decreases, senders are more willing to pursue multiple investigations. This increases the probability of investigation for each of the sender's domestic firms. The policy value to be gained by changes in the target state's policies also affects the willingness of the sender state to conduct investigations. As this benefit increases, the more willing the sender is to pay for additional investigations. Moreover, if the policy benefit function is altered from the step function used in the examples to a continuous function, we can estimate the value of the marginal increase in policy benefits in comparison to increasing the cost of C incrementally. 5: As the cost of investigation decreases, the number of HYPOTHESIS investigations pursued by the target state increases. 6: As the value of the policy benefit for the sender HYPOTHESIS vis-a-vis the target state increases, the number of investigations pursued by the target state increases.

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Coercion States,Firms,and Economic ImposingSanctions: Conclusion

In this piece, we have examined economic sanctions in a different manner than has been done in the traditional literature. The literature on sanctions adopts the argument that sender countries impose costs on target countries by cutting off the sender's trade and investment to the target. We argue that the ability of sender countries to impose such costs on target countries is dependent on the degree to which the sender government can induce its national firms to abide by sanctions law. Certainly,US public laws involving the imposition of sanctions are intended to restrict the ability of domestic firms to conduct business with the target state. If the sender is successful in reducing the volume of economic exchange between its national firms and the target, the sender will receive the policy benefits of its sanctions law. We seek to account for the varying ability of sender governments to reduce the exchange between its national firms and target countries. Through the use of a game theoretic model, we discover that sender governments may use threats to investigate and punish the firms to coerce the firms into complying with sanctions law. While senders wish to stop exchange between the national firms and the target, the national firms have an interest in maintaining their trading relationships with the target state. If the national firm places a high value on its trade with the target state, the firm may choose to violate sanctions regardless of threats from the sender government. Additionally, the model indicates that firms with the ability to complete larger percentages of their sales to a target government prior to detection are more likely to violate sanctions law. The model provides simple explanations for some behaviors that appear perplexing intuitively. It also yields several hypotheses for empirical testing. One of the hypotheses drawn from the model is that firms that place a greater value on exchange with the target are more likely to violate sanctions. We should expect that firms with heavy dependence on their trade with target states will attempt to continue their exchange illicitly. However, the willingness of firms to violate sanctions is dependent on the probability of being caught, how much of the exchange it can complete prior to detection, as well as the level of the fine for violation. If the firm is able to complete a significant portion of its transactions with the target state prior to detection, firms are more likely to violate sanctions. Several avenues for future research exist. In the model, we examine how states use investigative power and fines to affect the behavior of its national firms. The model establishes that states are able to use these powers to affect firm behavior, but does not specifically examine which types of governments are effective at doing so. It is possible that the structure of government institutions and laws decrease the price of conducting investigations, thereby increasing the amount of influence over domestic firms. The model suggests that the threat of the fine is an instrumental weapon to compel firms to abide by sanctions law. Despite the importance of the level of the punishment, many states do not impose severe penalties on companies despite observable sanctions violations. A closer examination of government institutions may yield more insight as to why certain governments are more effective than others at inducing firm compliance. We may further examine what affects the shape of the policy benefit function. In the examples, g is presented as a step function of the amount of exchange denied to the target. However, the model allows the shape ofg to be general. Future research may attempt to specify what shape the policy benefit function takes for specific sanctions episodes. While the policy benefit function for some senders might be a step function in certain episodes, it might be continuous in others. Examining the effects of different forms of this function would lead to a number of interesting questions. Viewing the policy benefits from sanctions as continuous would enable us to investigate the conditions under which the marginal benefit of an additional investigation would be worth the marginal cost.

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Our purpose in this discussion has been to contribute to the study of sanctions by presenting a new framework for analyzing the sanctions process. To impose costs on target states in an effort to change the target's behavior, sender countries create laws to disrupt the trade between their national firms and target countries. The effectiveness of sender governments in enforcing these laws will determine how successful sanctions are in restricting the flow of goods to the target and ultimately how much policy benefit the sender receives from maintaining sanctions. In addition to further developing the theoretical model, our next step is to subject the model's hypotheses to more systematic and rigorous empirical testing.

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LUCE, R. DUNCAN, AND HOWARD RAIFFA. (1957) Games and Decisions. New York: Wiley. MARTIN, LISA. (1992) Coercive Cooperation:Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions. Princeton:

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Foreign Policy: The Role of Domestic Politics. InternationalInteractions21:247-263. ANDVALERIE L. SCHWEBACH. MORGAN,T CLIFTON, (1997) Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises. InternationalStudies Quarterly41:27-50. D. (1994) Game Theory MORROW, JAMES for Political Scientists.Princeton: Princeton University Press. C. (1986) GameTheory and Political Theory.New York: Cambridge University Press. ORDESHOOK,PETER PAPE, ROBERT. (1997) Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. InternationalSecurity22:90-136. ANITHA.(2002) Ikea, Tyson Foods among U.S. Embargo Violators. WashingtonPost, News REDDY, Section, July 3:EO1. SALPUKAS, AGIS.(1997) Foreign Energy, Domestic Politics; Burmese Project Tests Unocal Resolve. New YorkTimes, May 22:D1. SMITH,ALASTAIR. (1996) The Success and Use of Economic Sanctions. International Interactions21: 229-245. THELEN, K. S., AND K. STEINMO.(1992) Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. In StructuringPolitics,edited by K. S. Thelen, K. Steinmo and E Longstreth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. GEORGE. TSEBELIS, (1990) Are Economic Sanctions Effective? A Game Theoretic Analysis. Journal of ConflictResolution 34:3-28. WAGNER,R. HARRISON. (1988) Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence. InternationalOrganization42:461-482.

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International Relations Theory and Internal Conflict: Insights from the Interstices Author(s): David A. Lake Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, Dissolving Boundaries (Dec., 2003), pp. 8189 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: . Accessed: 23/10/2013 17:51
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International Studies Review(2003) 5(4), 81-89


International Relations Theory and Internal Conflict: Insights from the Interstices

Departmentof Political Science, Universityof California, San Diego The presumption that international relations theory can help explain internal conflict is widely shared and accounts for the hubris of many who came late to the topic of domestic violence and civil war from the study of international politics.' There has been some useful arbitrage with theories of interstate war providing insights into the causes of intrastate war. But the belief that international relations theory has something uniquely important to contribute to the study of internal violence is a single, unified theory of wrong-or at least misstated. Rather, we are approaching violence of which and interstate intrastate war political may be particular forms. I because this has not emphasize approaching general theory yet been fully worked out and may because the particular forms of violence and the relationships between them have not yet been defined. Nonetheless, considerable progress has been made. The real question is what does this general theory tell us about violence? What are the commonalities between interstate and intrastate war? What are the differences? How can the study of one help inform our understanding of the other? If so far scholars have arbitraged from international relations to civil war, it is important to recognize that trade is a two-way process; we should seek to exploit opportunities for gain in both directions. Doing so highlights the irrelevance of some analytic boundaries long taken for granted in the field of political science and focuses our attention for future research on the role of extremists within both domestic groups and states. The Bargaining Theory of War In the last decade, the field of international relations has undergone a revolution in the study of conflict. Where earlier approaches (Wittman 1979; Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992) attempted to identify the attributes of individuals, states, and systems that produced conflict, the bargaining theory of war now explains violence as the product of private information with incentives to misrepresent, problems of credible commitment, and issue indivisibilities (for a synthesis and elaboration, see Fearon 1995). In this new approach, war is understood as a bargaining failure that leaves both sides worse off than if they had been able to negotiate an efficient solution. This general theory of violence, in turn, is similar to
'I count myself as one of the latecomers, although my occasional collaborator, Donald Rothchild, is not and has saved me over the years from many mistakes of ignorance (see Lake and Rothchild 1998). Our work has focused primarily on ethnic conflict, but I have now come to the position that there are few if any unique qualities to communal violence and that we should be studying domestic, not ethnic, conflict.

O 2003 International Studies Review. PublishedbyBlackwellPublishing,350 MainStreet,Malden,MA02148, USA,and 9600 GarsingtonRoad,Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.

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International RelationsTheory and InternalConflict Bargaining Range New Bargaining Range

A q-a (B's idealpoint) q q+b p-a p

B p+b (A's idealpoint)

FIG.1. The Costs of War and Efficient Bargaining. (Adapted from Fearon 1995.)

models of strikes and labor unrest, law (especially whether to contest disputes through trial or settle beforehand), and many forms of market failure. The basic idea is quite simple. Two actors, A and B, have well-defined preferences over the division of an issue, say a piece of territory that lies between them or a set of rules (that is, property rights) that will generate income (for simplicity, a one time event). A prefers to control all the territory or enact that set of rules that gives it all the income, the same for B. Arrayed on a single dimension and valued (without loss of generality) between zero and one, A's ideal point is to the far right at one, B's ideal point is to the far left at zero (see Figure 1).2 The division of the issue is determined by the (actual or expected) outcome of a violent contest (q). If the actors were to fight to alter the division, they would incur costs a and b, respectively. Their net benefits to fighting are, for A, q-a and, for B, q + b." Since fighting is costly, it opens up a bargaining space (between q-a and q + b) in which both parties would prefer any division of the issue to actually fighting. Even if one side becomes more powerful and could shift the division to, say, p (representing the expected outcome of a war under a new distribution of capabilities), a bargaining space would still exist between, now, p-a and p + b. Thus, even though one side becomes more powerful and the old status quo (q) is no longer satisfactory,both parties still have an incentive to negotiate rather than fight. As James Fearon (1995) succinctly shows, bargaining may fail and war may occur in this framework only if (at least) one of three conditions holds. First, bargaining failures can arise when the parties have private information with incentives to misrepresent. Private information is knowledge an actor possesses that is not available to the other. Such knowledge can include information about the actor's own preferences as well as the strategies of bargaining and fighting it might use. For bargaining failures and war to occur, however, an actor must also have some incentive not to reveal its private information since doing so would otherwise allow a mutually preferred bargain to be reached and the costs of war to be avoided. War plans are especially prone to misrepresentation and, thus, bargaining failures. Since the utility of war plans is greatly reduced once known, as the opponent can then devise a more effective counter-response, actors have little incentive to truthfully reveal their strategies, thereby making successful negotiations less likely. Private information with incentives to misrepresent may have contributed to the 1991 Persian Gulf War between Iraq and the United States-led coalition. Iraq anticipated a coalition invasion through Kuwait and counted on it being a long, bloody battle through that country, raising the costs of war to the United States.
2A single dimension is merely an expository simplification. The same framework carries over to an Ndimensional issue space. In such a case, the single line in Figure 1 is equivalent to the contract curve created by the tangencies of the indifference curves of the two parties and has the effect of enlarging the number of Paretopreferred points (to include the entire lens created by the relevant indifference curves) but does not contravene the basic point that, as long as war is costly, some mutually preferred bargain always exists to war. 3Both sides incur costs in fighting. Adding b to q is required by the assumption that the issue ranges from zero to one. It does not imply that B sometimes benefits from fighting.

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Expecting the coalition to bear a higher cost, Iraq held out for a bargain more favorable to itself.4 Coalition forces, in turn, planned the now famous "left hook" in which they deployed further west along the border of Saudi Arabia and Iraq driving rapidly north and then east to attack the entrenched and unsuspecting Iraqi forces. Expecting a low cost war, the United States refused any bargain with Iraq short of complete capitulation and retreat from Kuwait. Had the United States revealed how it intended to minimize its costs of war before the outbreak of hostilities in an effort to convince Iraq to withdraw, the value of this plan would have been negated. In this case, the two sides disagreed fundamentally about the expected costs of the war ex post, preventing them from reaching a satisfactory bargain ex ante. Second, wars also arise when the parties are unable to commit credibly to respect the bargain they may reach. A bargain is credible only when it is in the interests of the parties to fulfill its terms when called upon to do so. Problems of credible commitment often follow from the informational imperfections just discussed. When one side is unsure of the other's preferences (its "type"), it may not put great faith in its opponent's promises of future behavior. Over the 1990s, for instance, the United States became sufficiently frustrated with Iraq's apparent failure to disarm as required under various UN resolutions passed after the 1991 war that it was unwilling to believe any statements from Baghdad indicating its weapons of mass destruction had been dismantled or any promises that it would not rebuild these weapons in the future. As a result, the administration of George W. Bush became convinced that the United States had no choice but to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein. Even when both sides possess complete information about each other, problems of credible commitment may also arise when relative capabilities shift exogenously over time or there are random shocks that affect capabilities. If one party is expected to grow stronger in the future, any self-enforcing bargain the opponents might reach today will become incredible tomorrow; the actor that is growing stronger will not be able to convince the other that it will abide by the agreement possible today and not demand more later when it can. Uneven rates of growth, as a result, are especially destabilizing, and may have contributed to the outbreak of World War I.5 Third, bargaining failures may also occur because the issue contested by the parties is indivisible. The model above assumes that the issue under dispute can be divided into infinitely small gradations and that bargains, as a result, can perfectly reflect the balance of capabilities between the two parties. But if issues are "lumpy" and divisible only into relatively large units or not divisible at all, it may become difficult to find an acceptable solution. Despite the attempts of diplomats to persuade one another otherwise, few issues truly take an "all-or-nothing" form. In addition, "side payments" or linkages to other issues often allow actors to compensate one another for the lumpy quality of relatively indivisible issues. At least theoretically, issue indivisibilities would appear not to be major impediments to successful bargaining (Fearon 1995: 382). Nonetheless, strong "homeland" loyalties often carry great emotional appeal and, thus, serve to render issues less divisible and to make compromise more difficult for some actors (Brubaker 1996). This factor has been particularly important in some ethnic conflicts.

4Iraq's motivations and calculations in 1990-91 remain somewhat opaque. With the defeat of the Baathist regime in 2003, new information may become available. For a detailed study of the war based on then publicly available information, see Freedman and Karsh (1993). 5Traditional explanations for World War I emphasize Germany's growing economic power at the center of Europe (see Choucri and North 1975; Calleo 1978). Copeland (2000) argues that Russia's increasing might was the destabilizing force.

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International RelationsTheory and InternalConflict

The bargaining theory of war has generated an active research program. Much recent work has focused on the problem of private information with the implication, described by Eric Gartzke (1999), that it is precisely the unobservable traits of the actors that lead to violence and, in turn, make war so difficult to predict. The major study using this approach, Robert Powell's (1999) In the Shadowof Power, examines exogenous changes in the distribution of capabilities and, in turn, the probability of war under different configurations of power. Problems of credible commitment have been addressed more fully in the literature on war termination (Walter 1997; Goemans 2000). Even more recent work is focusing on the anomaly of why, once they start, wars are not ended quickly with the idea that conflict is a process in which information is revealed, prior beliefs are updated, war aims are altered, and so on (Wagner 2000; Filson and Werner 2002; Reiter 2003; Slantchev 2003). The theory has also proven remarkably useful in understanding war. Most visibly, it now provides the foundation for several important but still competing explanations of the democratic peace (among others, see Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Schultz 2001). It has also been usefully applied to the study of ethnic conflict (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Fearon 1998; Lake and Rothchild 1998; de Figueiredo and Weingast 1999). It directs our attention away from ancient hatreds, animosity, and competing claims to territory to the proximate causes that turn domestic disagreements into violence. Moreover, it suggests clear mechanisms for enhancing peaceful bargaining through greater transparency, confidence-building measures, mediation, and third-party guarantees (Walter 1997; Lake and Rothchild 1998). The Essential Irrelevance of Anarchy As we recognize the similarities in bargaining failures across different arenas, we must confront the question of anarchy, the trait that supposedly sets international relations off from virtually all other areas of politics (see Waltz 1979). If the same general theory explains strikes and legal strategies that occur under the shadow of a hierarchic state as well as war and internal conflict, we can reasonably ask "does anarchy matter"? Many scholars automatically assume that anarchy, defined as the absence of any higher authority, does matter to domestic violence. Indeed, that was the initial rationale for arbitraging theories from international relations (Posen 1993). When the wave of domestic conflicts broke out in the early 1990s, many international relations scholars, myself included, jumped to the topic with the idea that we now had something to contribute. We expected that as states "failed" and slipped into anarchy, our theories of interstate war would have direct relevance. This expectation, I believe, was not entirely wrong-headed. But equally true, thinking about the conditions for stability and effective bargaining in divided societies tells us just as much, if not more, about anarchy and international politics than vice versa. Although Somalia, Sierra Leone, and other states descended into anarchy and then widespread violence, there are many other cases of fragile but still effective states being pulled apart by civil war. There is no simple correlation between failed states and domestic violence. In turn, there are states that "failed" but managed to avoid large-scale communal violence, including the "velvet divorce" between the Czech Republic and Slovakia and the several states of the former Soviet Union. Anarchy appears to be neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for violence to erupt. If internal violence is as much a cause as consequence of state collapse, there must be some prior stage in which authority is reinforced or unravels. In other words, groups must either decide to accept and work within the rules of the hierarchical state or reject those rules and deny the state's authority-thereby

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bringing about the anarchy that then characterizes the relationship between the actors. In short, anarchy is endogenous. Civil war forces us to see this fact, long ignored in international relations, with potentially profound implications for how we think about politics and especially the distinction between international relations and comparative politics. Analytically, the endogenous nature of anarchy implies that the common and often-prized distinction between international relations (the realm of anarchy) and comparative politics (the realm of hierarchy) evaporates, at least when we try to understand internal conflict. When groups choose to take up arms and challenge the status quo through violence, they are opting to act outside the constitutional rules of politics and rejecting the current hierarchy within their states. For any one state, there is no inherent difference between anarchy and hierarchy. Just like agreements between states, a domestic hierarchy is self-enforcing and exists only so long as the parties to that hierarchy consent to its terms. Groups can seek to destroy hierarchy by challenging it, just as the anticipation of its destruction can cause groups to turn to self-defense to protect themselves. Lurking underneath every hierarchical facade is the potential for internal conflict. This actuality presents an opportunity, then, for arbitrage back from the study of civil war to international relations and political science. In doing so, we see venerable international relations concepts in a new light. For instance, the security dilemma is one of the core concepts in international relations theory and was one of the first "exports" to the study of internal conflict (Posen 1993). It is typically understood as an inherent feature of anarchy in which the efforts of one side to improve its security must necessarily threaten others, who respond in return, precipitating a cycle of escalation and potential violence (Jervis 1978). Yet, when applied to cases of civil war, the security dilemma can exert its devastating effects even prior to state failure-indeed, it may be one of the prime motors of state collapse. Rather than being a necessary consequence of anarchy, the problem of internal conflict coupled with the bargaining theory of war described above help scholars to see that the security dilemma is actually a problem of asymmetric information coupled with a problem of credible commitment. Since each party is unsure of the preferences of the other-whether it is aggressive or not-and no party can bind itself not to exploit the other should the opportunity arise, each must attend to its own security and arm more fully than if these bargaining problems could be resolved. This point is not merely semantic. When reformulated as a problem of asymmetric information and credible commitment, it is immediately apparent that the security dilemma is neither unique to anarchy, since bargaining failures occur in many realms, nor inherent in international relations, since there are mechanisms for mitigating bargaining failures even in the absence of a third-party enforcer. This use of the concept is quite different from how those in international relations typically conceive of it. The challenge becomes to identify the conditions and processes likely to create this potentially lethal combination of private information and uncredible commitments. But if the distinction between anarchy and hierarchy is essentially irrelevant to this dilemma, then the conditions and processes that spur violence within and between states might well be quite similar. The Role of Extremists The great weakness in the bargaining theory of war, at least in its current guise, is the "bad men" of history phenomenon. We know that some leaders are, at the very least, willing to run a higher risk of war than others and, at most, may positively desire war. Informational asymmetries, credible commitments, and issue indivisibilities only go so far in explaining violence. There appear to be "war lovers," as John Stoessinger (2001) terms them, who pull countries into violence even

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International RelationsTheory and InternalConflict

when bargains may not only be available but known to be available by all parties. Wars prompted by such individuals are hard to reconcile with a bargaining approach.6 This parallels the problem of "extremists" in internal conflicts who often appear to desire violence for its own sake or who possess aspirations that cannot be satisfied through bargaining and, therefore, resort to violence. Indeed, Stoessinger (2001) labels Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia a "war lover" as well, arguing that the same desires that drove Adolf Hitler and Saddam Hussein to attack their neighbors led Milosevic to seek Serbian supremacy through violence against other groups within the former Yugoslavia. Although war lovers and extremists are no doubt important, they do not themselves bring nations to war. Given the costs of fighting that are imposed upon their countries or groups, how do these leaders recruit followers? Why do groups or whole societies follow these warriors into costly conflicts? International relationists often sidestep this question by retreating into models of the state as a unitary actor or assuming that extremists already control the instruments of state. But the case of internal conflict again imposes questions upon scholars more forcefully. At the start of civil wars, extremists are often not in power and, indeed, may exist as mere fringe groups within society. How do extremists build support in the first place and ultimately convince their followers that violence is the best course of action to accomplish their aims? This is, in my view, the central question in conflict studies today. This essay cannot provide a complete answer. It would appear, however, that extremist leaders use violence or the threat of violence to bolster their own political power either vissometimes both. In turn, this a-vis other states or internal opponents-and behavior suggests the need for a more dynamic conception of bargaining and conflict in which the purpose of violence, at least in its early stages, is to alter the perceptions of moderates and shift their support to the extremists. (For a similar argument about terrorism, see Lake 2002.) Extremists by definition hold political preferences that, in any distribution of opinion, lie in one of the "tails."In other words, their political beliefs are not widely shared by others.7 It follows from this condition that extremists typically lack the supporters necessary to obtain their goals, at least at first. They are a minority divorced, and often alienated, from the majority. The strategy adopted by extremists follows from their political weakness. Highlighting, accentuating, and even provoking foreign threats, extremists seek to create a "rally around the flag" (or cause) that expands their support. Such actions, of course, are similar to diversionary war hypotheses in international relations (Levy 1989), but the logic is more general. As is well known, Hitler played off feelings of German pride and vulnerability in throwing off the yoke of Versailles, although it is not clear that he was still using foreign threats to bolster his regime when he attacked Poland and began World War II. Similarly, ethnic extremists in the former Yugoslavia clearly precipitated violence toward outgroups to drive ethnic moderates into their arms, leading to a fractionalization and polarization of that state. Indeed, Serbian extremists disguised as Croats may even have used violence against Serbs and desecrated Serbian graves to heighten fears within their own communities and thereby drive moderates into their arms for protection.
6Knowing that B has a greater propensity for risk or for lower costs of war should induce A to offer a more favorable bargain to B but should not affect the probability of war. Only when B's costs of war are not only negative (that is, B gains positive utility from war) but greater than As costs of war is violence inevitable. In short, war lovers must love war far more than others detest it to actually produce war. 7A bargaining approach does not itself explain why individuals hold the preferences that they do. For my purposes, it is necessary only to posit that preferences are diverse and randomly distributed over a population, implying that within any society some "extremists" do exist.

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Bargaining Range 0


1 p B



If p > q+b+a, as shown here, violence now "pays"to shift the bargainingrange in the future. FIG.2. Extremist Strategy and the Shifting Probability of Victory.

Extremists use violence not so much against the other side-although that may be a not undesired consequence-but to mobilize political power for their own purposes. Their ambition is to shift the balance of power in their favor and, over time, to shift the bargaining range closer to their ideals. By running a greater risk of war or even fighting a war, extremists seek to build support for their cause. Just as leaders facing a difficult election or domestic crisis can resort to violence abroad, extremist leaders who lack broad domestic support can provoke ethnic violence and exacerbate threats to build group solidarity. The success of this strategy depends, of course, on the reactions of the opponent and, in turn, the moderates in the extremist's own society or group. As Rui de Figueiredo and Barry Weingast (1999) demonstrate, for this strategy to succeed the threatening state or group must act in ways that confirm the extremist's dire warnings of the hostility of the other. A modest or moderate response from the target may well reveal the extremist as a demagogue or provocateur. But a vigorous and violent response can lead moderates to revise their view of the opponent in a more hostile direction. When the stakes are high, this revision may be sufficient to cause the group or state to rally behind the extremist and follow him into war. Indeed, if the issue is genocide or national survival, even small changes in the beliefs of the moderates about the true intent of the opponent may generate massive shifts in opinion in favor of the extremists; better to ally with the extremists who promise to protect you, the moderates may reason, than to be vulnerable to an opponent who may destroy you. By playing on these fears, war lovers who lack broad support may threaten or use violence to drive frightened moderates into their arms and thereby create new supporters. In terms of the model above, provoking the opponent and even fighting a war can be rational as long as the increased support from moderates is large enough to shift the outcome of a future conflict (p) by more than the best deal the extremists could hope to get today (q + b) and current costs of fighting (a). In other words, extremist violence "pays" as long as future p > q + b + a (see Figure 2).8 Of course, future p is dependent upon the actions of the target as well as the new support obtained from the moderates, neither of which is captured in the simple heuristic model used here. But the key point is that violence now can sometimes be used to shift the balance of power in favor of the extremists later. In this way, war can be an effective part of a long term, dynamic strategy aimed not at bargaining over the division of an issue today but at shifting the bargaining range for the future. In current bargaining models, the distribution of capabilities, even if evolving over time, is taken as exogenous. The case of extremist violence highlights that changing the distribution of capabilities can be an action available to actors and needs to be incorporated into the strategic setting-forcing us to reconsider how we model and, in turn, understand violent conflict. Even more important, it reveals
8Although Powell (1999:132-133) is concerned with long-term exogenous shifts in power and, therefore, does not consider the possibility that p might shift more than the total per period cost of fighting (a + b), inverting his proposition 4.1, as is done here, demonstrates that war will occur under these circumstances even in the presence of complete information.

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International RelationsTheory and InternalConflict

once again that very similar processes are at work in both "domestic" and "international" conflicts. Conclusion There are important gains to be had from intellectual arbitrage on both sides of the interstate divide. It is not just researchers in international relations who may have something to add to the study of internal conflict, but the study of civil wars may help produce better theories of international politics as well. Internal conflict forces scholars to rethink cherished distinctions. Anarchy is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for violence, nor is it a cause of the security dilemma. Theories of war premised on the unique nature of international politics are thereby called into question. Indeed, there is a need to endogenize both anarchy and the distribution of capabilities-elements of international structure long taken as exogenous (Waltz 1979). Ultimately, differences between interstate and intrastate war may be found and recognized as important. But, we should not presume that such differences are large or profound or that one form of violence is wholly distinct from another. As always, insights are most likely to be found at the interstices.

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R. (1993) The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict. In Ethnic Conflictand International BARRY POSEN, Security,edited by Michael E. Brown. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ROBERT. POWELL, (1999) In the Shadow of Power: Statesand Strategiesin InternationalPolitics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. DAN. (2003) Exploring the Bargaining Model of War. Perspectives on Politics 1:27-43. REITER, KENNETH A. (2001) Democracyand CoerciveDiplomacy.New York: Cambridge University SCHULTZ, Press. SLANTCHEV, BRANISLAV. (2003) The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States. AmericanPolitical ScienceReview 97:123-133. STOESSINGER, JOHN G. (2001) WhyNations Go To War.8th ed. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins. WAGNER, R. HARRISON. (2000) Bargaining and War. American Journal of Political Science 44:469-484. F. (1997) The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement. International Organization WALTER, BARBARA 51:335-64. KENNETH. WALTZ, (1979) Theoryof InternationalPolitics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. WITTMAN, DONALD. (1979) How a War Ends. Journal of ConflictResolution 23:743-763.

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Mediation and Foreign Policy Author(s): Saadia Touval Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, Dissolving Boundaries (Dec., 2003), pp. 9195 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: . Accessed: 23/10/2013 17:51
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Review(2003) 5(4), 91-95 Studies International

Mediation and Foreign Policy


Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced InternationalStudies,Johns Hopkins University Although mediation of international conflicts plays an important role in international relations, the theoretical study of mediation is not well integrated into studies of international politics. Analyses of international mediation often treat it as an autonomous activity that is impacted by politics but is not part of politics. This chapter offers a different approach, presenting mediation from a political perspective, which views it as part of foreign policy.The term foreign policy is used here in the sense of a purposive strategic behavior, a "behavior motivated by a conscious calculation of advantages" (Schelling 1963:4). This premise is obviously a simplifying, but useful one, because it provides us with a framework for understanding, comparing, and evaluating state behavior. The discussion that follows focuses only on a segment of the broad field of international mediation, examining only one actor in the drama-states performing the role of mediator. It calls attention to domestic and foreign policy considerations that shape the mediating state's behavior, and suggests directions for research into the subject. I start with a few comments about a common approach to the study of mediation and then present an alternative approach that views mediation as part of foreign policy. Given this political framework, I discuss three issues that seem to reflect interesting links between domestic and international concerns: (1) the perception of mediation as possessing a moral dimension, (2) the domestic and international influences shaping mediators' strategies, and (3) criteria for evaluating mediation. A Common Approach Mediation theory initially developed with reference to conflicts within states-such as arise within families, within communities, in labor relations, or between business firms. Much of the literature on mediation is written with reference to a prescriptive framework on how third parties need to act to induce disputants to abandon their confrontational behavior toward each other. Theoretical work in this vein tests the validity of various precepts of mediation and seeks to improve and refine knowledge about strategies and tactics that are effective in reducing the severity of conflicts as well as help disputants to settle contentious issues. In applying mediation theory to international conflicts, many studies (for example, Bercovitch 1997; Touval and Zartman 2001) recognize that the political environment influences the mediation process, describing mediation as taking place within "the context" of international politics. Some (Mitchell 1988; Touval and Zartman 2001) take the view that the main motives for states and intergovernmental organizations engaging in mediation are political, or are oriented toward "rewards" derived from "constituents." But after stating that mediation is initiated for political purposes, mediation theory takes over. Analyses usually do not follow up on the premise that political purposes generate mediation, instead proceeding to discuss and evaluate it in terms of a prescriptive theory of mediation. When the influence of political considerations is acknowledged, these are often treated as "background" and "antecedent" conditions influencing the mediator's
2003 International Studies Review. Publishedby Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.

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Mediation and ForeignPolicy

perceptions and relationships with the disputants or as a "concurrent" external factor, enhancing or constraining mediator's efforts to change the disputants' attitudes and behavior (Bercovitch and Houston 2000). Similar thinking is also apparent in evaluations of mediation activities. Even when the mediator's political motives and foreign policy objectives are acknowledged, the evaluation addresses only the effectiveness of mediation in reducing the conflict. It tends to ignore the question whether the mediation has contributed to the attainment of other domestic and foreign policy objectives that motivated it in the first place (Kleiboer 1996). An Alternative Approach If we take the view that mediation is foreign policy, we shift from the limited perspective of techniques for influencing conflict dynamics to the broader framework of strategic action within the international and domestic political systems. Instead of limiting our inquiry to how the mediator influences the relationship between the disputants, we deal with the broader perspective of how goals and strategies of states lead them to mediate in a conflict. Mediation is seen here as deriving from the mediator's perceptions of the international system, from its domestic needs, and from its foreign policy objectives and strategies. This perspective perceives mediation to be part of foreign and domestic policy and not a separate activity taking place "within the context" of international politics. The mediating state is no longer perceived as focusing its efforts on ending the conflict, but rather as pursuing a broadly conceived foreign policy in which the effective reduction of the conflict among the disputants plays a part, but only a part. This alternative perspective assumes that domestic and foreign policy considerations do not merely motivate states to engage in mediation, but also shape the strategies and tactics of mediation. It further assumes that a state's strategies, tactics, and goals in performing a mediation are frequently shaped by concerns external to the conflict. This assumption does not mean that mediating states disregard principles for effective mediation, but rather that effectiveness is usually a secondary consideration, subordinate to the mediating state's primary domestic and foreign policy concerns.1 A couple of illustrations might clarify what I mean by saying that we can view mediation as deriving from the mediator's domestic and international concerns. In June 1970 the United States launched an initiative to end the "War of Attrition" between Egypt and Israel. Its purpose was described in a "background briefing" by Henry Kissinger (1979:579-580), the president's National Security Adviser at the time: "We are trying to expel the Soviet military presence. " In other words, given the context of the Cold War, the United States saw the Soviet military presence in Egypt as detrimental to its interests, and took a number of steps, including a mediation between Egypt and Israel, to have the Soviets removed. The mediation derived from a broad perspective of international politics and US strategies in combating the Soviet Union. Among the interesting questions that this case raises is the choice of mediation as a means for removing the Soviets. It also suggests that in evaluating the outcome of the initiative it is appropriate to ask not only whether it helped to end the Egyptian-Israeli war, but also whether the mediation contributed to ending the Soviet military presence in Egypt. Another example is the US initiative in 1995 to put an end to the war in Bosnia. Until the summer of 1995, the United States left the search for a settlement to UN and EU mediators and to a "Contact Group" of five states in which the United States participated. The United States changed its policy and undertook a new
1For a description of a similar perspective of international negotiation (not merely mediation), see Druckman (1997:89-90).

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initiative when it appeared that the maintenance of US leadership of the Western alliance might require it to assist militarily in the evacuation of its allies' military personnel from Bosnia (serving there as UN peacekeepers), and that US troops might have to be sent to the area during the forthcoming presidential election campaign. The initiative to end the war was, thus, derived from broader foreign policy (US-European relations) and domestic political needs. The timing of the initiative was chosen not because of any consideration that the conflict was "ripe" and that the parties were ready to settle, but because the looming crisis threatened to impact US-European relations and the US presidential campaign (Touval 2002:143-145). Mediation in the Nexus of Domestic and Foreign Policy This alternative perspective, which sees mediation as derived from a state's domestic and international concerns, seems well suited for a closer examination of the relationship between mediation and domestic and foreign policy. I wish to call attention to three issues that seem to be particularly relevant in this context. Perceptionof Mediation as Possessinga Moral Dimension It appears that the public, as well as the officials engaged in mediation, perceive the activity as a moral obligation. To be sure, many policies, including the initiation of a war, are sometimes presented as stemming from a moral obligation. There is a difference, however, because mediation is equated with peacemaking, and peacemaking is universally regarded as morally desirable. The identification of mediation with morality probably has consequences, both domestic and international. Considering that mediation is a form of intervention in a conflict situation, sometimes in the domestic affairs of another state, it is remarkable that unlike other interventions it is seldom criticized. Can the lack of criticism be attributed to the perception of mediation as a moral obligation? Does the moral dimension of mediation facilitate the development of domestic consensus about policy directed at a conflict area? Does it help in generating domestic support for office holders and their policies, which otherwise would not be available?A similar question arises with respect to foreign audiences and reactions of other governments. Does the moral image of mediation help in obtaining the acquiescence of other states in the intervention? It has been observed that means are often transformed into goals, and goals sometimes become means. Considering that within the mediationis foreign policy perspective, mediation serves as a means toward achieving certain primary foreign policy goals, the transformations of goals and means merits examination. How does the moral dimension of mediation affect the dynamics of such transformations? Does it help to generate a dynamic transforming mediation from an instrument aimed at achieving strategic objectives to becoming a central foreign policy objective on its own account? If so, how does the transformation of a policy means to a prominent goal affect the overall strategic framework of the state's foreign policy? Domesticand InternationalInfluences on Mediators'Strategiesand Tactics According to the common approach to mediation outlined above, mediation theory describes and prescribes methods that third parties can use for influencing disputants to reduce or end their conflict. Within this approach, the actions of mediators are examined with reference to prescribed techniques for inducing disputants to change their attitudes and behavior toward each other. Although the theory is indeterminate, leaving room for a wide range of interpretations and

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Mediation and ForeignPolicy

rationalizations, it can serve as a useful frame of reference for explaining and evaluating mediators' actions. If we view mediation as part of foreign policy, then mediator's choices of strategies and tactics are assumed to derive from the mediator's primary political goals, both domestic and international. Consider the mediation efforts to end the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Domestic and international concerns inhibited the United States from engaging in preventive diplomacy. The timing of the European mediators' intervention was determined not by their estimation of the "ripeness" of the conflict, but by the mediators' own domestic and foreign policy concerns. A wide range of the mediating states' domestic and international interests determined the choice of the various agencies through which they conducted their peacemaking efforts: whether and when to pursue mediation through an international organization and, if so, which; whether to convene an international conference; when to call for the assistance of an international judicial commission; how to organize the use of force; and, with respect to the United States, whether to take control of the mediation activities. Finally, the decisions whether potential outcomes of the peacemaking effort might be acceptable to the mediating states were also shaped by policy interests of the mediating states, and not only by the mediators' ability to induce the disputants to accept them (Touval 2002). Obviously, the perspective of viewing mediation as foreign policy opens numerous directions for inquiry. Besides questions regarding specific strategies and tactics, two broader issues deserve attention. One is policy coherence. How consistent is the mediation with the mediator's multiple goals and the variety of instruments used in their pursuit? This problem is especially relevant to great powers that typically are involved in more mediation attempts than smaller states. Great powers usually have more numerous interests, relating to a wider range of issues, over wider geographical areas, than smaller and weaker states. This is what disposes them to intervene and to mediate. But, their multiple interests make it very difficult for great powers to reconcile inconsistencies among goals so as to produce coherent policies. There appears to be a contradiction between the relative effectiveness of great powers' mediation, derived from their formidable capability to influence weaker actors to change their policies, and the impairment of great powers' effectiveness caused by the difficulties they encounter in conducting a coherent foreign policy. The second issue concerns mediators' flexibility. According to the common perspective of mediation, mediators enjoy wide flexibility with respect to the terms of possible agreements: almost any terms that can be agreed upon by the disputants are likely to be acceptable to the mediator (Druckman and Mitchell 1995). But if we assume that mediation is merely an instrument employed in pursuting primary policy objectives, then the mediator's flexibility about the terms of a settlement may be restricted: not anything that may be acceptable to the disputants is necessarily acceptable to the mediator. This restriction in flexibility raises the question whether mediators sometimes forego opportunities to bring a conflict to an end because terms of a possible settlement are unacceptable to them. An inquiry as to the kinds of domestic and international considerations that restrict mediators' flexibility about terms of settlements might yield some interesting insights. Criteria for Evaluating Mediation Within the common perspective, mediation is evaluated with reference to its ostensible goal of conflict reduction (Kleiboer 1996). One may inquire into the effectiveness of mediation in achieving its proclaimed goals, the degree to which conflict reduction or resolution has been achieved, or the stability of the settlement. One may also inquire into the efficiency of the settlement--whether a better outcome for all concerned was possible.

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Within the alternative perspective, which views mediation as foreign policy, it is not enough to evaluate the outcome of mediation in terms of its contribution to the settlement of a dispute. One needs also to evaluate its contribution to the attainment of the primary goals that motivated mediation in the first place. These may include such diverse goals as the promotion of domestic consensus for foreign policy, the expansion of the mediator's geopolitical influence, and the advancement of world order. Whatever the goals, it raises the question whether mediation is a suitable means: for what kinds of domestic and international goals is mediation a suitable instrument? Evaluating mediation within this perspective obviously leads to much broader questions than how effective it is as a method for conflict management. Conclusion The perspective of mediation as foreign policy views mediation as a policy instrument. As such it lends itself to comparison with other policy instrumentsdiplomatic (such as the construction of alliances, coalitions, and institutions), military, and economic (trade and other economic measures). All of these straddle both the domestic and international arenas, and all of them sometimes undergo the transformation from being means to becoming goals. The reciprocal interaction between domestic and international considerations in selecting foreign policy instruments, in fashioning the strategies and tactics for applying these instruments, and in the shifting transformations of means and goals provides a rich field for inquiry.

(1997) Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, a Review of Practice. In Peacemakingin International Conflict, edited by I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. ANDALLISON BERCOVITCH, HOUSTON. (2000) Why Do They Do It Like This? An Analysis of the JACOB, Factors Influencing Mediation Behavior in International Conflicts. Journal of ConflictResolution 44:177-202. DANIEL DRUCKMAN, (1997) Negotiating in the International Context. In Peacemakingin International Conflict,edited by I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. DRUCKMAN,DANIEL, AND CHRISTOPHERMITCHELL, eds. (1995) Flexibility in International Negotiation and Mediation. The Annals of the AmericanAcademyof Political and Social Science, 542. KISSINGER, HENRY (1979) WhiteHouse Years.Boston: Little, Brown and Company. MARIEKE KLEIBOER, (1996) Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation.Journal of ConflictResolution40:360-389. R (1988) The Motives for Mediation. In New Approachesto International CHRISTOPHER MITCHELL, Mediation, edited by Christopher R. Mitchell and K. Webb. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. THOMAS C (1963) The Strategyof Conflict.New York: Oxford University Press. SCHELLING, SAADIA TOUVAL, (2002) Mediation in the YugoslavWars. New York: Palgrave. ZARTMAN. (2001) International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era. TOUVAL, SAADIA,ANDI. WILLIAM In TurbulentPeace, edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

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Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil and Interstate Wars Author(s): Virginia Page Fortna Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, Dissolving Boundaries (Dec., 2003), pp. 97114 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: . Accessed: 23/10/2013 17:51
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Studies Review(2003) 5(4), 97-114 International

Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil and Interstate Wars

Saltzman Instituteof Warand Peace Studies, ColumbiaUniversity Arguably the most important innovation in conflict management in the last fifty years is the practice of peacekeeping: the concept of sending personnel from the international community to help keep peace in the aftermath of war.' What is now referred to as "traditional peacekeeping" developed during the Cold War and generally involved international personnel monitoring a cease-fire, or placing themselves between belligerent armies. Most peacekeeping operations during the Cold War involved wars between sovereign states (exceptions include United Nations [UN] missions in the Congo, Lebanon, and Cyprus, and the Organization of African Unity's mission in Chad). Since the end of the Cold War,the international community and the UN have moved beyond traditional peacekeeping, becoming much more involved in civil conflicts. Doing so has meant adding a new set of functions--election monitoring, police training, sometimes even administering the state-to facilitate the transition from war to peace. Scholars and practitioners of peacekeeping have debated the merits of the new wave of more "robust" and complex forms of peacekeeping and peace enforcement developed after the Cold War and the effectiveness of more traditional forms of peacekeeping (Tharoor 1995/96; Luttwak 1999). The conventional wisdom in this debate is that the international community has been better at peacekeeping between states than within them. But no one has tested this assumption. There is a dearth of rigorous empirical studies of the effects of peacekeeping in either setting, let alone a comparison of the two. Does peace last longer when peacekeepers are deployed than when belligerents are left to their own devices? And are the effects of peacekeeping different after internal and interstate conflicts? This article presents some preliminary analysis of the effects of peacekeeping on the duration of peace in both interstate and civil conflicts to begin to answer these questions. The assumption that peacekeeping would be less effective in internal conflicts than between states stems first from the fact that civil wars presented a new challenge to the UN. By the end of the Cold War, the established principles and practices of interstate peacekeeping rested on decades of experience. Applying this tool to internal wars meant developing new practices and operating in an unfamiliar environment. No longer could peacekeepers simply interpose themselves between well-defined armies and keep watch along a fixed cease-fire line. Now they had to become involved in disarmament, in military training for newly created unified armies, in electoral procedures, and many other civilian tasks.

'Peacekeeping is usually done by the UN, but regional organizations have also undertaken it. The Organization of American States monitored the ceasefire between El Salvador and Honduras after the Football War; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been the primary peacekeeper in Bosnia. Peacekeeping is also sometimes performed by an ad hoc group. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee sent monitors to observe the cease-fire in Korea. ? 2003 International Studies Review. Publishedby BlackwellPublishing,350 MainStreet,Malden,MA02148, USA,and 9600 GarsingtonRoad,Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.

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Insideand Out

Because these procedures were new, they were difficult. Moreover, the few prior experiences of peacekeeping in civil wars, such as in the Congo, had not gone well. Second, the conventional wisdom is that it is harder to maintain peace after civil wars than after interstate wars. Maintaining peace after either type of war requires cooperation, and there are significant obstacles to cooperation in both. In each case, the actors are deadly enemies with good reason to try to take advantage of each other and to fear the worst about the other's intentions. In the atmosphere of deep mistrust after mortal combat, even small provocations or incidents can spark renewed warfare. The processes that might lead to a resumption of conflictaggression, security dilemma spirals, and accidental escalation-are likely to operate in similar ways within and between states. For a fuller theoretical discussion of the cooperation required to maintain peace after war, see Page Fortna (forthcoming:Ch. 1). Nonetheless, there are plausible reasons to think that the problem may be more difficult for internal wars. The necessity of living together within one state requires that parties settle their political differences (whether by force or negotiation). Unlike sovereign states that have fought each other, belligerents in civil wars cannot easily reach an armistice in which they retreat to opposite sides of a cease-fire line and agree to disagree indefinitely. This process is quite common after interstate wars, but in internal conflicts the basic issue is who rules, which is more difficult to put on hold. After civil wars, individual soldiers come into contact with their former enemies and their civilian victims. A border does not separate them. Retribution and reconciliation are therefore day-to-day rather than abstract issues. Barbara Walter (2001) argues convincingly that the commitment problem entailed in disarming and creating a single national army makes reaching a stable negotiated settlement much harder for civil war combatants than for sovereign states. That peace is likely harder to maintain after civil wars does not necessarily mean that peacekeeping will be less effective, however. In fact, just the opposite might be true. If it is easier for sovereign states to maintain peace, they may be more able to do so on their own; internal belligerents may be more likely to need the help of the international community to overcome the greater obstacles to cooperation. So even if the job of keeping peace is more difficult after civil wars, peacekeeping may make a larger difference in these cases. Peacekeeping may be most effective in civil wars precisely because they are more prone to resume if left alone. This article has four sections. First, it surveys the literature on peacekeeping, with a focus on the few studies that have systematically addressed, at least in passing, the effects of peacekeeping on peace. The existing studies come to contradictory findings about whether peacekeeping works in either interstate or civil conflicts. None compares the two. The second section addresses the endogeneity of peacekeeping. Because international personnel are not deployed to conflicts at random, like treatments in a laboratory experiment, it is important to take selection effects into account. Any study of the effects of peacekeeping must control for factors that affect both the likelihood that a mission will be deployed and the degree of difficulty of the case. The third section describes the data sets and the quantitative model used in the fourth section to assess the empirical effects of peacekeeping. These findings show that peacekeeping does contribute to more stable peace and suggest, contrary to conventional wisdom, that peacekeeping is no less effective at keeping peace between belligerents in civil wars than between sovereign states. The record of peacekeeping has been at least as good inside as out. Before proceeding, two caveats about this comparison are in order. Because the two data sets used here were not compiled in exactly the same way, the comparison between civil and interstate wars can only be made tentatively. More important, the distinction between the two types of war is not always clear-cut. Many of the civil wars examined here were heavily "internationalized" by outside intervention, whereas some of the interstate wars were tightly entwined with internal conflicts.

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Because of this overlap, some conflicts appear in both data sets: the civil war within Cyprus and the interstate war between Turkey and Cyprus, for example, or the war of partition in India that became an interstate war when Pakistan and India gained independence. For learning about the effectiveness of peacekeeping in different settings, this "double counting" of wars is more appropriate than an attempt to make a clear but arbitrary distinction between them. Nonetheless, the comparison made here should be taken as suggestive rather than definitive. The Existing Literature: Conflicting Findings The literature on peacekeeping is vast and growing. It includes evaluations and explanations of a mission's success or failure, debates over the use of force, the merits of nontraditional peacekeeping, and many case studies (see, for example, Wainhouse 1973; Rikhye 1984; Haas 1986; Mackinlay 1989; Diehl 1993; Durch 1993, 1996; Fetherston 1994; Daniel and Hayes 1995; Doyle 1995; Allan 1996; Bratt 1996; Roberts 1996; Zacarias 1996; Coulon 1998; Heje 1998; Ryan 1998; Howard 2001; and the journal InternationalPeacekeeping). Surprisingly little of it, how well examines whether or however, peacekeeping works, that is, whether it makes peace more likely to last. Does peace last longer when international personnel are deployed to keep the peace than when belligerents are left to their own devices? Single case studies of peacekeeping either do not address this question or provide only implicit counterfactual assessments (see, for example, Holiday and Stanley 1993; Dawson 1994). Comparative work tends to focus on whether missions are successful or not, taking peacekeeping missions as the universe of cases (for a good example, see Howard 2001; see also Mackinlay 1989; Bratt 1996). Very few studies compare peacekeeping cases to nonpeacekeeping cases; those that do come to contradictory conclusions. These studies include three examining interstate conflicts and three exploring internal conflict. On the interstate side, there have been a few studies of general UN involvement, including discussion and resolutions, fact-finding and mediating, observation, peacekeeping, and enforcement actions in international crises. Ernst Haas (1986; see also Haas, Butterworth, and Nye 1972) has produced a substantial body of work assessing conflict management by international organizations. In the 1986 study, for example, he examines interstate disputes referred to the UN, to regional organizations, and nonreferred disputes. Of particular note for our purposes, Haas finds that UN operations of a military nature (that is, observer missions, peacekeeping forces, and the one instance of enforcement in Korea) are almost always moderately or largely successful, if success is measured as the organization's impact on stopping hostilities, conflict abatement for three years, conflict settlement, and isolation of the conflict. Haas' measures of success do not allow a direct comparison of disputes involving the UN with nonreferred disputes, however, because "success" is measured only for referred disputes. His measures are based on an implicitly counterfactual assessment, presumably relative to no UN involvement. In contrast, even though Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Michael Brecher (1984) find that the UN makes it more likely that an interstate crisis ends in an agreement than when this organization is not involved, they find that the UN has no effect on the likelihood of "tension reduction" measured by whether the parties experienced another crisis within five years. Surprisingly, however, in this part of their study, the authors do not consider the endogeneity they have identified in the first part of their article: namely that the UN tends to get involved in the most "serious" cases in terms of violence, gravity of threat, and several other indicators. More on this issue later. In a similar, but more quantitatively sophisticated, recent study, Paul Diehl, Jennifer Reifschneider, and Paul Hensel (1996) also examine the effects of UN

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Insideand Out

involvement on the recurrence of interstate conflict. Although they do not examine when the UN is most likely to get involved, they do control for other factors that might make recurrence more likely, such as the level of violence, the history of conflict, relative power, and whether the crisis ends in stalemate, compromise, or victory. Diehl and his associates (1996:697), too, find that the UN has no significant effect on the "occurrence, timing, or severity of future conflict." However, they also "control" for the level of UN involvement, which seems to be the very thing they are assessing. Research examining, at least in passing, the effect of peacekeeping on the duration of peace after civil wars is more recent. In their work on peacebuilding in all civil wars since World War II, Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (2000:779) find that "multilateral United Nations peace operations make a positive difference." In particular, they find strong evidence that multidimensional peacekeeping, that is, "missions with extensive civilian functions, including economic reconstruction, institutional reform, and election oversight," significantly improve the chances of peace building success, if success is measured both in terms of a durable peace (specifically an end to the war, lower residual violence, and uncontested sovereignty two and five years after the war) and by a stricter measure in terms of a durable peace and a minimum standard of democratization. They find weaker evidence that observer missions and enforcement missions improve the chances for peace, but, surprisingly, that traditional peacekeeping has no effect on the chances for peacebuilding success. Caroline Hartzell, Mathew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild (2001) examine, among other things, the role of third-party enforcement on the duration of negotiated settlements to civil wars (also in the period since 1945). Their coding of third-party enforcement includes peacekeeping missions (as in Angola, El Salvador, and Mozambique).2 They find that such third-party involvement significantly and substantially increases the duration of peace. However, in a study using Doyle and Sambanis' data set but more sophisticated statistical techniques, Amitabh Dubey (2002) finds, inter alia, that third-party peacekeeping interventions, including those by the UN, have no significant effect on the duration of peace after civil wars (see also Bailey 2002). In sum, of the six studies reviewed here, three (Wilkenfeld and Brecher 1984; Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel 1996; and Dubey 2002) find peacekeeping to have no effect. Two (Haas 1986 and Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001) find a significant effect, and one (Doyle and Sambanis 2000) finds that only some kinds of peacekeeping are effective. From the existing studies, it is not at all clear whether peacekeeping works in either interstate or civil conflicts. Nor has an explicit comparison been made between the two types of peacekeeping. The literature on war termination, and especially on the duration of peace after war is bifurcated between studies of interstate wars and those of civil wars.3 In part, this bifurcation is the result of an appreciation of the differences between the two types of conflict, but it is also driven by our data. It is difficult to compile perfectly comparable data on inter- and intrastate conflicts, but the bifurcation has meant that many assertions about the differences between civil and interstate conflicts have gone untested. Although the present research does not create an integrated data set that allows for direct comparison of the two types of

2Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild (2001:205) define a third-party enforcer as "an outside power that sends troops to separate or protect civil war antagonists from one another or at least promises to do so if the security situation calls for such action." This finding is consistent with a related study not of the durability of peace but of war termination and the implementation of peace agreements: In that study, Walter (2001) argues that third-party security guarantees are critical to overcoming the commitment problems inherent in peace processes after civil wars. "On interstate wars, see Wittman (1979), Maoz (1984), Werner (1999), Goemans (2000), and Fortna (2003, forthcoming). On civil wars, see Licklider (1993, 1995), Mason and Fett (1996), and Walter (2001).

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conflict, it does assess peacekeeping in both contexts as a preliminary exploration of differences and similarities between them. Assessing the Impact of Peacekeeping: Selection Effects How would we know how well peacekeeping works? A quick comparison of whether war resumed after peacekeepers were deployed and when they were not is sobering, but misleading. Of the 115 cases of cease-fires in civil wars examined here, peace breaks down eventually in about 42 percent when belligerents are left to their own devices and in about 39 percent when peacekeepers are present, a statistically indistinguishable difference. Among interstate wars, peacekeepers are more likely to be associated with renewed war than with stable peace. Of forty-eight cease-fires between states, war resumed in almost 53 percent of those with peacekeepers deployed, compared to only 21 percent of those in which belligerents were left to their own devices. In this case, the negative association between peacekeeping and stable peace is statistically significant, Pr(X2)= 0.045. Is it possible that peacekeeping is actually detrimental to peace? A moral hazard argument would suggest that by keeping a lid on violence, peacekeepers remove any incentive for enemies to resolve their conflict. Longstanding peacekeeping missions, like the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), for instance, may have removed any urgency for Turkish and Greek Cypriots to settle their differences, current peace initiatives notwithstanding. However this argument cannot explain the numbers above, for they refer to whether violent conflict has resumed, not whether underlying issues are resolved. The poor showing of peacekeeping is more likely the result of selection bias. Peacekeeping is not applied to cases of war at random like treatments in a laboratory experiment. If peacekeepers tend to be deployed only to relatively easy cases, in which peace is quite likely to last in any case, then looking just at whether peacekeepers were present and the duration of peace will lead us to overestimate any positive effect on peace. When analysts of peacekeeping argue that the international community should only deploy "when there is peace to keep" and when the parties exhibit "political will" for peace (arguments that have become almost cliches in policy discussions since the mid-1990s), they may help the UN and the international community to avoid embarrassing failures, but if pushed too far, this policy will also ensure the irrelevance of peacekeeping.4 In contrast, if as is quite plausible, peacekeepers tend to be sent where they are most needed, when peace would otherwise be difficult to keep, this first glance at the cases will underestimate the effectiveness of peacekeeping. Statistics on crime make a good analogy. Crime rates are probably highest in neighborhoods with the most cops on the street, the most programs for troubled youth, and so on, not because police or youth programs cause crime but because they are put in place in response to the likelihood of crime. Either way, to reach accurate assessments of the international community's effectiveness at maintaining peace, we need to control for the "degree of difficulty" of the various cases, that is, for other factors that affect the stability of peace (see Blechman et al. 1997). If we were assigned the task, like that of an actuary, of assessing the chances for lasting peace in a particular case, what would we want to know? Existing studies of the durability of peace after both civil and interstate wars suggest a number of potentially important factors. These studies have found peace to be more stable after wars that end with a decisive military victory rather than a stalemate or tie (on civil wars, see Licklider 1995; Dubey 2002; on interstate wars,
40n the importance of taking selection effects and endogeneity into account in assessing the effectiveness of international regulatory regimes, see Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom (1996).

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Insideand Out

see Maoz 1984; Stinnett and Diehl 2001; Toft 2003; Fortna forthcoming) and they have found peace that is ushered in with a formal peace treaty may be more stable than an informal truce. In the context of civil wars, many (Licklider 1995; Kaufmann 1996; Doyle and Sambanis 2000) have argued that identity conflicts are particularly intractable, though there is conflicting evidence on this count (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Dubey 2002; see Walter 2001 on this debate). The issue in dispute is also thought to affect the tractability of interstate conflict with many arguing that territorial issues are particularly salient and difficult to resolve (Hensel 1996; Stinnett and Diehl 2001; see also Huth 2000; Hensel 2000 for literature reviews and summaries of findings). And there is evidence that wars that threaten the very existence of one side are more likely to resume (Fortna forthcoming). Knowing something about the parties' prior history, whether they have fought in the past, might help us predict how difficult it will be to keep peace (see Goertz and Diehl 1992, 1993 on "enduring rivalries") because violent conflict tends to breed further violence or, simply, because a long history of violence is a good indicator of more intractable conflicts. Similarly, the cost of the war just ended may affect the stability of the peace, although here interestingly the evidence suggests different findings for civil and interstate wars. Intrastate wars with high death tolls have been found to be more likely to resume than less deadly conflicts (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Dubey 2002), but the opposite appears to be the case in interstate wars (Werner 1999; Fortna 2003). The duration of war may also affect the duration of peace, either because long wars are another indicator of intractable conflict or, in the other direction, because long wars lead to war weariness that fosters greater desire for peace (see Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Dubey 2002 for conflicting evidence on this point). We might also expect peace to be easier to maintain in conflicts between just two parties than in more complicated wars among several states or factions. More actors mean more potential "spoilers" of the peace (Stedman 1997). Wars between neighboring states have been found more prone to resumption than those between states separated by greater distances; so in our examination of interstate wars, we should control for contiguity. Given that combatants in civil wars are almost by definition contiguous, this is not a variable in internal conflicts.5 Peacekeepers are less likely to be deployed to keep the peace between, and especially within, large powerful states regardless of whether they are permanent members of the Security Council who have veto power over UN missions (Gilligan and Stedman 2001; Fortna 2002). If wars involving such powerful states are more or less likely to resume than others, then we should also control for this factor to obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect of peacekeeping. Furthermore, because of the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council (that is, the United States, Russia/Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China), we need to control for whether one of these states was directly involved in the war. Some recent studies have emphasized the effects of changes that take place after a war ends to explain the recurrence of conflict (Werner 1999; but see Fortna 2003). Because these changes typically occur after the point at which decisions to deploy peacekeepers are made, their omission cannot be said to lead to spurious findings. These changes may affect peace but they do not cause peacekeeping. So even though they may be important additional determinants of stability, they are not included here.

'One could propose following the contiguity argument, that civil wars ending in partition should be less prone to recurrence than others. However, Sambanis (2000) finds such is not the case in his analysis of partition after ethnic conflicts.

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Data and Model

To find out how well peacekeeping works, we therefore need data on civil and interstate wars, whether or not peacekeepers were deployed, how long peace lasted, and on the control variables discussed above. This paper uses two data sets, one of interstate wars, one of civil wars. Both cover wars ending between 1947 and 1997. The former was developed for a study of the effects of cease-fire agreements on the durability of peace (Fortna forthcoming)." The latter is adapted from the data put together by Doyle and Sambanis (2000) (hereafter D&S) for their study of peacebuilding.7 In each data set, an observation is a spell of peace starting with a cease-fire, that is an end to or break in the fighting, whether or not it represents the final end of the war.s Although it is possible that both data sets miss some short-lived ceasefires, this problem is much more likely in the civil war data given the messy nature of internal conflicts, their stop-and-start nature, and the greater difficulty of obtaining good information on civil wars. In either data set, this missing data problem is almost sure to bias our findings away from the conclusion that peacekeeping makes peace last longer because we are much more likely to notice and there is probably better information on cease-fires that failed quickly when peacekeepers were present than when they were absent. Because this problem is likely to be worse for civil wars, a comparison of the effects of peacekeeping is likely to be biased toward the finding that peacekeeping is more effective in interstate wars than in civil wars. The dependent variable, the durationof peace, is the time between the termination of fighting and the start of another war, if any, between the same parties. If no war has resumed, the duration of peace is considered censored (see below) on December 31, 1999.9 In twenty-one of the forty-eight interstate cases, or just under 44 percent, peace eventually failed with the eruption of another war. Forty-seven of the 115 civil wars, or just over 40 percent, saw another round of fighting. Of those that failed, the shortest civil war cease-fire in the data set was fifty-one days (in Georgia-Abkhazia in 1993), the longest was almost twenty-seven years (the spell of peace in Rwanda between 1964 and 1990). The average time it took a cease-fire to fail was a little over six years. For interstate wars, the shortest cease-fire was sixteen days (in the Turco-Cypriot war in 1974), the longest was the peace between Israel and Lebanon that stretched from1949 through 1982, and the average length of an interstate cease-fire that eventually failed was just over eight years. Peacekeepingis coded both with dummy variables (any versus none), and by mission type. For the interstate data, peacekeeping comes in two flavors: unarmed observer missions and (lightly) armed or "traditional" peacekeeping forces. In the civil war data, a third category captures multidimensional peacekeeping, that is, missions that involved significant civilian components (election monitoring, police training or monitoring, human rights monitoring, and so on). All of these types of peacekeeping are deployed with the consent of the parties themselves, and, if undertaken by the UN, are authorized under Chapter VI of the Charter. Reflecting the prevalence of more forceful missions to keep peace in civil wars in the last decade, the civil war data also include a measure for enforcement missions
6Data are available at vpf4. 7These data are available at The D&S data were converted to a time-varying data set by Amitabh Dubey, whom I thank for generously sharing his work as well as for his consultation on numerous cases and coding decisions. 81n the interstate data, each dyad of a multilateral war is considered a separate (though not necessarily independent) case. 9The time-varying version (see below) of the interstate data is effectively censored on December 31, 1997, because of missing capability data. Note that this affects the India-Pakistan case in which peace failed in 1999 with the fighting in Kargil.

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Insideand Out

authorized under Chapter VII, but not necessarily requiring the consent of the parties.'0 These measures include peacekeeping conducted by the United Nations, by regional organizations such as NATO and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),and by ad hoc coalitions of states. For reasons discussed below, peacekeeping is coded in two ways: as a time-constant and time-varying covariate. The former notes the most extensive type of peacekeeping deployed for the case and does not vary over the peace spell, whereas the latter records changes in mission type over time or the termination of the mission. So, for example, in the time-varying version, Cambodia is coded as having a traditional peacekeeping mission at first, then a multidimensional peacekeeping mission starting in March 1992, and as having no peacekeeping after the withdrawal of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in September 1993. In the timeconstant version, Cambodia is coded simply as having a multidimensional mission. International personnel were sent to keep the peace in over two-thirds of the interstate cease-fires (34 out of 48), but to only 41 out of the 115 civil war cases examined here. However, 34 of these internal missions took place after 1989 (twelve of which were Chapter VII enforcement missions mostly conducted by actors other than the UN). Because 55 of the 115 civil wars took place after 1989, the proportion of civil wars receiving peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period is much closer to the proportion of interstate wars that have seen peacekeeping in the last fifty years. Because peacekeeping in civil wars has only become common practice since the end of the Cold War, the analysis below examines the post-1989 period as well as the longer period since World War II. Of the interstate peacekeeping missions, 27 were undertaken by the UN and 7 by regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions. Of the missions deployed in intrastateconflicts, the UN sent 30, states or organizations other than the UN sent 23 (12 cases had both UN and non-UN peacekeepers). In both data sets, a dummy variable marks whether the war ended in a tie or stalemate or in a decisive militaryvictory.Another dummy variable marks wars that ended with a formal peace treaty."1There are two measures of the stakes or issues of the conflict in each data set. In the civil war data set, ethnic, religious, and identityconflicts are distinguished from ideological, revolutionary, or other wars. A separate variable denotes secessionistwars.12 In the interstate war data, territorial wars are distinguished from wars over other issues; wars that threaten the very existenceof one side are also noted.13 In both the civil and interstate war data sets, the cost of war is measured as the natural log of the death toll. Because of the high proportion of noncombatant

"'Note that enforcement missions are not included in the interstate data on peacekeeping. When the UN has used Chapter VII to authorize action in interstate wars, as in Korea and Iraq, these enforcement missions were warfighting operations and not intended to keep peace between belligerents. 1"Note that in the civil war data these are mutually exclusive categories. The outcome of war is coded as victory, informal cease-fire, or peace agreement. As with most quantitative studies of civil war, D&S do not distinguish between the military outcome (victory vs. stalemate) and the political outcome (settlement vs. none). This lack of distinction is problematic for interstate wars, in which it is possible to have both a victory by one side and a peace settlement (for example, after the Yom Kippur War), but is probably less so for civil wars. More problematic is the lack of distinction between the formality of an agreement, if there was one, and whether it was a cease-fire or a political settlement. That is, should a formally signed cease-fire be treated as an "informal truce" or a "peace treaty"? D&S appear to include such cases in their "informal truce" category. To match this distinction, the treaty variable in the interstate data is coded 1 only for peace agreements (defined as those that renounce the use of force or restore diplomatic relations), not for formal cease-fire agreements. The Armistice Agreement ending the Korean War does not qualify as a peace agreement, for example. This variable does not capture the content or strength of any agreement. See Fortna (forthcoming). '2The former variable is wartype from the D&S data. The latter, which includes wars of self-determination, is derived from Sambanis and Zinn (2002) with missing data filled in from Kohn (1986) and Brogan (1990). 'The former variable (rev_terr) is derived from the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) data set's coding of "revision type." The latter is derived from the coding of "gravity of highest value threatened" in the International Crisis Behavior data set (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1992).

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deaths in civil conflicts, this measure includes civilian deaths for internal wars. The durationof war is measured in months. Dummy variables note whether the war was a multiparty conflict involving more than two states or factions. Although reliable data on the relative strengths of rebel and government forces does not exist, the civil war data include a measure of the government'sarmy size. A somewhat comparable measure in the interstate data notes the military capabilities of the stronger side.14 Direct involvement by permanent members of the Security Council either as a primary combatant (Russia in Chechnya or the United States and China in Korea) or as a third-party combatant (the United States in the Dominican Republic or France in Chad) is measured in both data sets with dummy variables. Prior history of conflictis measured in the interstate data set as the extent to which the belligerents' shared history before the war was marked by militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). Dispute data at the civil war level do not exist, but a rough equivalent marks the extent to which the country's history is marked by wars between the same parties. In both cases, the number of prior disputes or wars is divided by the number of years in which conflict could have been observed; that is, since the start of the relevant data set (MID or D&S) or independence, whichever occurs later. A final control variable in the interstate data marks whether the belligerents are contiguous. Hazard analysis (also known as duration analysis) and, more specifically, a Weibull model'5 is used to test the effects of peacekeeping on the duration of peace. This model estimates the effects of independent variables on the risk, or "hazard" of peace failing in a particular time period, given that peace has lasted up to that time period. It can thus tell us whether the risk of renewed warfare is lower after wars that end in a victory, say, and whether the risk falls when peacekeepers are present or rises when they depart. Duration models are also particularly adept at dealing with censored data. Even though a fragile peace was holding in Liberia when the D&S data were compiled, it has faltered since. The peace, such as it was, between the United States and Iraq after the Gulf War failed after this research was done but before it appeared in print. Even on the Korean peninsula, where peace has lasted for half a century, we cannot be certain that it will continue to last. Duration models can cope with this uncertainty about future outcomes. In the tables that follow, hazard ratios are reported rather than coefficients that might be more familiar to readers used to linear or logistic regression. Hazard ratios are interpreted relative to one (1.0). A hazard ratio greater than one means that high values of that variable increase the risk of another war (that is, they are associated with peace that fails more quickly); hazard ratios less than one indicate variables that decrease the hazard (that is, are associated with more durable peace). The interpretation of hazard ratios is easiest to see for a dichotomous variable. A hazard ratio of 2 would mean that the variable doubles the risk of another war. A hazard ratio of 0.75 would mean that the variable reduces the risk of another war by 25 percent (from 1 to 0.75).16
'4Capability data is from the Correlates of War capabilities index, measuring a states' share of the interstate system's total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military manpower, and military expenditures. 15I use the Weibull distribution rather than some of the other possible duration models because it requires no a priori assumption about whether peace becomes more or less difficult to maintain over time. The Weibull also provides more precise estimates than a proportional hazards model such as the Cox in a small data set such as the one used here (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997:1435). The results do not differ substantially if the less restrictive Cox model is used. 16Because not all of the cases in the data are necessarily independent of each other, robust standard errors are calculated with cases clustered by country. The civil war cluster variable is from D&S's clust2. In addition to wars within the same state, it groups together cases within the former Soviet Union as well as those in the former Yugoslavia. The interstate cluster variable groups all of the cases within the Arab-Israeli conflict together, all those between India and Pakistan, and so on.

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Insideand Out

Findings Table 1 shows the effects of peacekeeping as well as the control variables (discussed further below) on the duration of peace after interstate wars. Whether treated as a single dummy variable, or broken out by mission type, peacekeeping is associated with more durable peace. The hazard ratio of 0.67 for the peacekeeping dummy in column 1, for example, indicates that the presence of peacekeepers reduces the hazard of another war by over 30 percent. That is, at any given time, the risk of resumed fighting when peacekeepers are present is about 67 percent of the risk if no peacekeepers are deployed. Observer missions are estimated to cut the risk of another war by about 30 percent, traditional peacekeeping missions by about 40 percent, relative to cases in which belligerents are left to their own devices. But the large standard errors mean that these effects are not statistically significant, they could simply be artifacts of the data. Table 2 shows the effects of peacekeeping after civil wars, both for the full time period and for the post-Cold War period in which the international community has

Measureof TABLE 1. Effectson Durationof InterstatePeace,WeibullRegressionwith Time-Varying Peacekeeping standard errors in parentheses) (Robust
Hazard Ratios Peacekeeping Observer Missions Traditional Peacekeeping Military Victory Peace Treaty Territory Existence at Stake Cost of War Duration of War Multilateral Power of Stronger Side P-5 Involvement History of Conflict Contiguous p Subjects Observations Log Likelihood 0.007*** (0.006) 0.120* (0.142) 0.057* (0.084) 9.749*** (3.669) 1.831 (0.833) 0.898* (0.049) 1.589 (1.341) 1.000 (0.001) 0.004*** (0.008) 2.893*** (0.978) 1.326 (0.308) 0.922 (0.225) 48 876 -44.274 0.672 (0.441) 0.709 (0.657) 0.618 (0.681) 0.007*** (0.006) 0.109 (0.167) 0.053* (0.090) 8.916** (9.059) 1.865 (1.048) 0.898** (0.048) 1.655 (1.726) 1.000 (0.001) 0.004** (0.009) 2.887*** (1.039) 1.334 (0.267) 0.921 (0.220) 48 876 -44.270

Statistical significance: *p< 0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p < 0.01; js: joint significance.

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TABLE2.Effects on Duration of Civil Peace, Weibull Regression with Time-Varying Measure of Peacekeeping (Robuststandarderrorsin parentheses) Hazard Ratios 1947-1999 Chapter VI Peacekeeping Observer Missions Traditional PK Multidimensional PK Chapter VII Enforcement Military Victory Peace Treaty Identity War Secessionist War Cost of War Duration of War Multilateral Government Army Strength P-5 Involvement History of Conflict P Subjects Observations Log Likelihood 2.611 (1.604) 0.107*** (0.093) 0.371 (0.303) 1.231 (0.589) 0.724 (0.282) 1.203* 0.295* (0.211) 0.225* js* (0.177) 0.252js* (0.259) 0.940js* (0.654) 2.642 (1.563) 0.102** (0.098) 0.364 (0.315) 1.243 (0.601) 0.725 (0.296) 1.204* 0.055* (0.094) 0.000** js*** (0.000) 0.065 js*** (0.125) 0.158 js*** (0.192) 1.595 (2.089) 0.059 (0.106) 0.064 (0.113) 0.568 (0.523) 0.749 (0.751) 1.208 1989-1999

1.327 (1.891) 0.058 (0.103) 0.071 (0.121) 0.623 (0.602) 0.744 (0.695) 1.259





1.268 (0.634) 0.9995 (0.001) 0.552 (0.543) 0.708 (0.409) 0.735* (0.090) 112 257 -99.336

1.230 (0.633) 0.9995 (0.001) 0.567 (0.580) 0.736 (0.480) 0.749* (0.095) 112 257 -98.801

2.092 (2.793) 0.998 (0.001) 0.670 (0.593) 0.054* (0.066) 0.844 (0.153) 53 87 -40.422

2.989 (4.027) 0.998 (0.001) 0.575 (0.568) 0.043** (0.063) 0.892 (0.182) 53 87 -39.048

Statistical significance: *p< 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01;js: joint significance.

actively attempted to maintain peace in internal conflicts. Over the full time period, the hazard ratio of 0.295 (column 1) means that consent-based peacekeeping (authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter) reduces the hazard of another war by about 70 percent. Breaking these deployments down by mission type (column 2), we can see that all types of consent-based peacekeeping lead to a more durable peace. These effects are jointly significant, but only at a somewhat lax p<.10 level.17 However, Chapter VII enforcement missions are, if anything, associated with peace that falls apart more quickly. The hazard ratios in columns 1 and 2 estimate that peace is over two and a half times more likely to fail when an enforcement
'7Jointsignificanceis calculatedwith a X2measure using Stata's"test"command.All indicationsof statistical are based on two-tailedtests. significance

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Insideand Out

mission is present than when no peacekeepers are deployed. This effect is not statistically significant, so it should be taken with a grain of salt, but the possible negative effect of enforcement missions on stability is surprising. We might have expected missions with much stronger mandates and the ability to fight if necessary to be more effective than missions constrained by the need to maintain consent and limited in their ability to use force. We may, however, here be seeing the result of remaining selection bias. International intervention of some sort is probably most likely where peace is most precarious, and enforcement missions may be chosen over consent-based missions in the most difficult cases within this subset. The control variables used here may not be sufficient to capture this selection process. But it may also be the case that enforcement missions, which almost by definition make enemies in the war, end up having to fight these enemies again relatively quickly to maintain an imposed peace. This has been the case in Liberia, for example, with the Nigerian-led Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) enforcement mission and Charles Taylor's forces (Adebajo 2002). Restricting the analysis to only the post-Cold War period (columns 3 and 4 of Table 2), we observe an even larger positive effect for consent-based peacekeeping. The risk of another war drops by almost 95 percent when such a mission is present relative to those in which combatants are left to their own devices. All types of Chapter VI peacekeeping have a very large and jointly statisticallysignificant effect, but the effect of observer missions is most dramatic. There is only one failed observer mission in the post-Cold War period, the first cease-fire in Angola, monitored by the UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II). The detrimental effects of enforcement missions appear less pronounced in the post-Cold War period. Comparing the results in Tables 1 and 2, it is clear that peacekeeping is no less effective in internal conflicts than between states. In fact, if anything, just the opposite appears to be true. Peacekeepers have had a larger and more clearly significant impact on the risk of another civil war than on the risk of recurrent interstate wars. Such is particularly true in the most recent era of active international involvement to keep peace in internal conflicts. The results in Tables 1 and 2 use the time-varying measure of peacekeeping described above. This measure arguably underestimates the true influence of peacekeepers. Using this version means peace that continues to hold after peacekeepers leave counts against the hypothesis that peacekeeping has an effect. The model assumes that if a purported cause (peacekeeping) is taken away and the result (peace) still holds, there is evidence that peacekeeping is not the real cause. So peacekeepers are not given any credit for peace lasting after they are gone. But for the UN and other policymakers involved in peacekeeping, true success is not just preventing another war but the ability to go home and still have peace hold-to create a self-sustaining peace. To measure the lasting effects of peacekeepers even after they complete their mission and leave, the time-constant version of the peacekeeping variables should be used. Tables 3 and 4 show the results for interstate and civil wars, respectively. As expected, the effects of peacekeeping on the duration of peace are larger for both types of war when international personnel are given statistical credit for peace that lasts after they depart. After interstate wars the hazard ratio now drops considerably (indicating a larger effect). The risk of another war when a peacekeeping mission is present is less than 10 percent that of other cases. Observer missions reduce the hazard of war by almost 95 percent, traditional peacekeeping by 65 percent. These effects are now statistically significant at p < .10 for the dummy variable and jointly at the conventional p<.05 level when one differentiates between observer missions and lightly armed traditional peacekeeping missions. The magnitude of peacekeeping effects is also larger for the time-constant version after civil wars, though the difference is only slight when the sample is restricted to the post-Cold War period. Such a result is to be expected as these

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TABLE 3. Effects on Duration of Interstate Peace, Weibull Regression with Time-Constant Measure of Peacekeeping (Robuststandarderrorsin parentheses) Hazard Ratios Peacekeeping Observer Missions Traditional Peacekeeping Military Victory Peace Treaty Territory Existence at Stake Cost of War Duration of War Multilateral Power of Stronger Side P-5 Involvement History of Conflict Contiguous P Subjects Observations Log Likelihood 0.002*** 0.087* (0.125) 0.055 js** (0.099) 0.351 js** (0.234) 0.002***

0.210* (0.193) 0.050* (0.086) 9.871"** (2.327) 1.525 (0.651) 0.915** (0.034) 1.841 (1.938) 0.9996

0.308 (0.278) 0.276 (0.686) 31.956*** (40.773) 1.245 (0.753) 0.911** (0.041) 0.644 (0.975) 1.00

0.003** (0.009) 4.513** (2.502) 0.936 (0.209) 1.062 (0.146) 48 876 -41.765

0.010 (0.032) 4.393*** (2.272) 1.016 (0.165) 1.065 (0.131) 48 876 -41.308

Statistical < 0.01;js: joint significance. 0.10; **p significance: *p o < 0.05; ***p

peace spells are censored much closer to the time of the cease-fire (peace can last at most ten years before censoring in this subset of the data). The hazard ratio of 0.242 in column 1 indicates that in the longer time period, the risk of peace failing is over 75 percent lower when a Chapter VI mission has been deployed. In the postCold War era, peacekeeping reduces the risk by almost 99 percent.Is The positive effects on peace of each mission type considered separately are also larger when the time constant measures are used. Note also that in Table 4, enforcement missions in civil wars in the post-Cold War era are no longer associated with peace that falls apart more quickly. The hazard ratios in columns 3 and 4 are less than one, though still not significant. The difference between the effects of peacekeeping in interstate and civil wars is less stark in Tables 3 and 4 than in Tables 1 and 2. But it is certainly not the case that peacekeepers have been less successful in their more recent attempts to foster
'8The smallernumberof casesin the restrictedsamplemeansthat the effectof the peacekeepingdummyis not significant.

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Insideand Out

TABLE4. Effects on Duration of Civil Peace, Weibull Regression with Time-Constant Measure of

Peacekeeping (Robuststandarderrorsin parentheses) Hazard Ratios 1947-1999 Chapter VI Peacekeeping Observer Missions Traditional PK Multidimensional PK Chapter VII Enforcement Military Victory Peace Treaty Identity War Secessionist War Cost of War Duration of War Multilateral Government Army Strength P-5 Involvement History of Conflict P Subjects Observations Log Likelihood 2.200 (1.207) 0.091*** (0.073) 0.354 (0.262) 1.333 (0.646) 0.687 (0.275) 1.210* (0.128) 0.997 (0.003) 1.249 (0.617) 0.999 (0.001) 0.561 (0.541) 0.778 (0.445) 0.740** (0.092) 112 257 -98.842 0.242** (0.154) 0. 174** js* (0.135) 0.226 js* (0.239) 0.402 js* (0.333) 2.153 (1.208) 0.086** (0.086) 0.342 (0.308) 1.322 (0.644) 0.702 (0.288) 1.217* (0.131) 0.996 (0.003) 1.218 (0.611) 0.999 (0.001) 0.571 (0.579) 0.797 (0.515) 0.746** (0.095) 112 257 -98.682 0.014 (0.038) 0.000"**js*** (0.000) 0.018js*** (0.053) 0.030** js*** (0.053) 0.387 (0.383) 0.017 (0.049) 0.049 (0.108) 0.948 (0.811) 0.401 (0.427) 1.251 (0.202) 0.9996 (0.005) 6.607 (11.878) 0.998 (0.002) 0.514 (0.606) 0.033* (0.065) 1.093 (0.368) 53 87 -36.487 1989-1999

0.368 (0.424) 0.017 (0.046) 0.049 (0.110) 0.972 (0.880) 0.392 (0.346) 1.283 (0.210) 0.998 (0.007) 4.460 (8.730) 0.998 (0.002) 0.635 (0.630) 0.039* (0.071) 1.029* (0.328) 53 87 -37.790

Statistical *p< 0.10; **p significance: < 0.01;js: joint significance. < 0.05; ***p

durable peace among belligerents in internal conflicts than in their more traditional role keeping peace between sovereign states. In the post-Cold War period in which most peacekeeping in civil wars has taken place, these missions have had at least as large an impact as has peacekeeping between states. There is no evidence for the conventional wisdom that the task of keeping peace after civil wars is much harder than after interstate wars. Tables 1 through 4 also shed light on the control factors hypothesized to affect the duration of peace. In all of these tests, wars that end in a decisive military victory yield more stable peace. The risk of another war after a decisive military outcome is only about 10 percent that of wars that end without a clear winner and loser. This effect is not statistically significant for civil wars in the post-Cold War period, but this result is most likely due to the smaller number of cases rather than a reduction in the effect of this factor over time; the magnitude of the estimated effect is, if anything, larger. The existence of a peace settlement (defined simply as

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an agreement that restores relations or explicitly renounces the use of force) is also associated with a lower risk of future conflict, though in many tests, not significantly so. Civil wars fought over ethnicity or identity are slightly more prone to resumption over the full time period, but are less prone to recurrence in the 19891999 period. In neither case is there a significant difference and this flip-flopping of the direction of the effects suggests that this finding is simply an artifact of our data. Surprisingly, secessionist wars are associated with a lower risk of resumption, but again, there is no statisticallysignificant effect. The findings for interstate wars show that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, territorial conflicts are, if anything, less prone to resumption rather than more. Wars in which one side's very existence is at stake, however, are more likely to resume. In all four tables, the effect of the cost of war is to increase the hazard of another round of fighting. Although not statisticallysignificant, this result is noteworthy as it contradicts findings for interstate wars in previous studies (Werner 1999; Fortna 2003). Civil and interstate wars are more alike in this regard than previous research has shown. However, longer wars end with more stable peace, significantly so for interstate conflicts. This finding supports the war weariness hypotheses, although the weaker effect of this variable for civil wars suggests that the animosity built up over long wars may offset this effect when former belligerents have to live together in the same country. Complicated wars among many parties are associated with a higher risk of another war, but this effect flips in Table 3 and is never statistically significant. Neither the capabilities of the stronger side in interstate wars nor the size of the government's army in civil wars has any discernable effect on the duration of peace. The hazard ratios are extremely close to one, indicating no effect. In the past halfcentury (though arguably not over a longer historical sweep), wars involving a great power, that is, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, have been unlikely to re-erupt. This effect is much smaller (and not significant) for civil wars, however. States whose prior history is marked by frequent militarized disputes are significantly more likely to fight again than those with less conflictual histories, but surprisingly this finding does not hold up for civil wars. In fact, if anything, just the opposite is true of belligerents in internal wars. The measures of prior histories of conflict are somewhat different in the two data sets because there is no equivalent of the Militarized Interstate Dispute data for civil wars, so this difference between the two types of conflict may simply be a matter of measurement error, but it deserves further research. The value of P, noted toward the bottom of Tables 1 through 4, indicates the shape of the hazard function. That is, it tells us whether peace tends to get more precarious over time or whether it becomes consolidated, with peace less likely to fall apart the longer it has lasted. As with hazard ratios, P is judged in relation to a value of one, which would indicate a flat hazard (a constant risk over time). In most of the models here, particularly when P is statistically significant, it is less than one. This result suggests that peace is most precarious when it is new, but that the risk of another war is reduced as time passes. However, the fact that P is slightly greater than one in Table 3 and in the post-Cold War period in Table 4 means that we should treat this finding with caution. For most of the control variables, the effects on civil and interstate wars are much the same. The process governing the durability of peace appears to be marked by more similarity than difference in the two contexts. Conclusion In general, peace lasts longer when peacekeepers are present than when belligerents are left to their own devices. In other words, peacekeeping works.

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Insideand Out

Once we take into account the fact that peacekeepers are not deployed to cases at random, and particularly if we use a model that gives peacekeepers credit for peace that lasts even after they depart, analysis of both interstate and civil wars over the past half-century shows the positive effects of international peacekeeping on the duration of peace. The civil war data show, however, more surprisingly, that Chapter VII enforcement missions have not been as effective at maintaining peace and may even be detrimental to stable peace, although the possibility that selection effects remain unaccounted for should make us cautious about such a conclusion. The comparison made here between peacekeeping in civil and interstate wars is preliminary. The two data sets examined here and the various control variables are not fully comparable. Nonetheless, the results discussed above indicate that very similar processes affect whether civil and interstate wars will resume. Our theories about one are much more applicable to the other than the bifurcated nature of their study would suggest. The findings in this paper also cast significant doubt on the conventional wisdom about peacekeeping. The international community has adapted the tool of peacekeeping for use in internal conflicts. Contrary to the standard characterization of this endeavor as much less successful than traditional peacekeeping between sovereign states, the record of peacekeeping in civil wars is at least as good as that for interstate wars. In short, peacekeeping is no less effective at maintaining peace between belligerents within states than between belligerents who are both states. It is at least as effective inside as out. Even though a definitive comparison must await better data on both types of conflict, this finding warrants optimism. Given that civil wars are much more prevalent than interstate wars, the international community is increasingly called on to help maintain peace in war-torn societies. Peacekeeping is no panacea of course, but it does improve the chances for peace between states and, especially, within them. References
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Mediation and Peacekeeping in a Random Walk Model of Civil and Interstate War Author(s): Alastair Smith and Allan Stam Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, Dissolving Boundaries (Dec., 2003), pp. 115135 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: . Accessed: 23/10/2013 17:52
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Review(2003) 5(4), 115-135 International Studies

Mediation and Peacekeeping in a Random Walk Model of Civil and Interstate War

Departmentof Politics, New YorkUniversity and


Government Department,DartmouthCollege The Sinai Peninsula that separates Israel and Egypt covers roughly 24,000 square miles. It is a largely arid desert with much of it presenting conditions favorable for either mechanized infantry transport or, in its barren mountains, providing ideal shelter for guerilla forces. Following the United Nations (UN) partition plan in 1947 that ultimately led to the creation of Israel, the Israelis and Egyptians fought in or over the Sinai Peninsula in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1968-1970, and 1973. In 1977, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat traveled to Jerusalem. There, he accepted an invitation from the newly elected Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to begin negotiations that might lead to a normalization of relations between Israel and Egypt, two countries that had maintained active hostilities toward one another since the founding of Israel (Humphreys 1999; Stein 1999). Following the initial meetings in Jerusalem, the US President Jimmy Carter initiated a third-party mediation effort that culminated in the Camp David accords in 1978. These negotiations, in turn, led to the historic 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty. Under the terms of the agreements, the UN was to enforce the initial terms of the settlement as it affected the Sinai. Since the expiration of the UN mandate in 1982, there has been an ongoing multinational, US-led peacekeeping mission deployed to the Sinai to separate Egyptian and Israeli forces. For the past twentyfive years, US-led peacekeepers in the Sinai have helped prevent the renewal of fighting between Egypt and Israel-the longest period of peace Israel has known with any of its neighbors. This case is an example of both successful mediation and peacekeeping. Absent President Carter's mediation efforts, it seems unlikely that the two sides would have reached an agreement (Telhami 1990; Princen 1992). More recently, Israel and Jordan signed a treaty settling many of the issues that had led to frequent uses of force between these two countries. Notably, the two states were able to reach agreement about one of the thorniest issues in the desert: water distribution rights. Again, the United States, this time under President Bill Clinton, played an important role as an interested third party providing mediation and technical assistance during the process (National Research Council 1999). While US mediation and peacekeeping efforts have been stunningly successful in the Sinai, third-party mediation and peacekeeping efforts more generally have been a notable failure (Bercovitch 1996). Third-party intervention has a history almost as long as the history of warfare. Warring parties have looked to intermediaries to help them negotiate settlements bringing an end to war. Modern analysts look to the promise of conflict management for even greater returns. The
? 2003 International Studies Review. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.

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Mediation and Peacekeeping in a RandomWalkModel

intention of the modern mediation and peacekeeping literatures is to develop an understanding of the means by which third parties can hasten the end of war and even prevent war from occurring in the first place (see, for example, Diehl 1993; Dixon 1996; Regan 1996; Regan and Stam 2000; Walker 2002a, 2002b). In the former instance, supporters of mediation believe that certain intervention policies can bring wars to conclusion well before the point at which the two sides would otherwise seek a solution on their own. Unfortunately, these efforts offer mixed results, both in terms of the effects observed in the historical record as well as in the context of scholars' attempts to understand the causal mechanism that accounts for intervention success and failure. In this article, we outline a theory of mediation and peacekeeping that suggests the sources of recent successes in the Middle East as well as the reasons for the more general pattern of third-party mediation failure. One of the shortcomings of the existing research on conflict management has been the notable lack of formal deductive theorizing on the subject (for an exception, see Morgan 1995). The majority of existing research on the subject is descriptive. While this allows for detailed and nuanced analysis of individual cases, it does not provide either systematic theory or reproducible empirical findings consistent with large numbers of other, similar cases. Much of the existing quantitative work, while rigorous in its analysis, falls short in terms of providing a systematic and deductive theory of war and fighting. Absent a general theory of war and war termination, it is difficult to demonstrate clearly the role that conflict management can play in shortening or lessening the costs of war. We believe that the best way to advance progress in the development of rigorous explanations of conflict management is through deductive theorizing. To this end, we examine third-party intervention and mediation within the context of a random walk model of warfare and war termination. In our model, nations fight over forts. These nations can be separate nations within a single nation-state, as would be the case in a civil war, or two independent nation-states, as is the case in interstate wars. Should one nation manage to capture all the forts, it is the decisive victor. The victorious nation can then impose terms on the losing side in the war. However, while some wars continue to a decisive end, more commonly nations reach negotiated settlements before this point. The longer nations fight, the more certain they become about the expected outcome of another battle. Once each side's beliefs about future outcomes have converged sufficiently, the two sides can gain little by further fighting. The nations can then split the prize according to their shared expectation of what future fighting would look like. Within this context, we ask how third parties can hasten the end of fighting. We show that while mediators can end fighting using side payments or threats to intervene directly, they are unable to help nations solve their informational differences. Using a game theoretic model of war termination, we parse out the multiple roles that third parties can play in mediation and peacekeeping and show deductively which ones work and which do not. Two Paths to Peace We examine two mechanisms by which third parties can be instrumental in creating and keeping peace. As commonly argued, for instance by James Fearon (1995) and by David Lake in this issue, disagreements over the relative strength of the two parties can lead to a breakdown in bargaining. The traditional method for modeling such a scenario is to assume bargaining failure results in an all-out war, typically modeled as a one-time lottery. In reality, wars are rarely so complete or simple. In our story, nations learn about their relative strengths through the process of armed conflict. Nations fight only so long as their beliefs about relative strength are sufficiently divergent that they both believe they can do better by continued fighting rather than by accepting the deal on the table. As nations fight,

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they learn about their relative strength. In the random walk framework that we propose, nations fight until they agree sufficiently about their relative strength; at that point, they cut a deal. Of course, fighting is only one way nations can learn about their relative strength. We start our theorizing by examining the possibility that mediators can help end a war by providing additional information about the two sides' relative strength. If mediators can credibly provide such knowledge, they can help circumvent the need for the two sides to fight in order to learn the information needed to strike an equitable bargain. Our results suggest that while mediators possess the theoretical possibility of shortening conflicts by solving the informational asymmetries between the combatants, in practice, mediators cannot achieve these goals for one of two reasons. Either mediators' desire for peace or their preference for one nation's interests over the other's prevent them from acting as the honest broker that is required in order to credibly provide the information the combatants need to cut a deal. Unfortunately, this proposition leads us to the conclusion that mediators are poorly adapted to resolve conflicts created through informational asymmetries. In this context, effective mediation requires the ability to threaten coercive punishments and material rewards rather than information. Fortunately, once peace breaks out, the presence of third-party peacekeepers can do much to prevent the denigration of the peace and a return to war. It is not an accidental fact that many national borders are along natural geographical features such as rivers, mountains, or marshes. Our model provides an explanation as to why such natural borders are stable. In our random walk model, we present war as a series of battles over the possession of forts. We use the term forts here as a convenient metaphor; in reality, we are talking about any area of land. If nations choose to go to war then nation A might capture a fort from nation B or vice versa. Not all forts, however, are equally easy to capture. In some locations such as mountain ranges, swamps, or jungles, the terrain conveys an advantage to the defender; in other locations, neither side has an advantage (Kaufman and Glaser 1998). This characteristic of geography is one component of the offense-defense balance, or the relative ease of attack that the offense enjoys compared to the defense. In the context of our model, battles fought across a river or over mountainous terrain are more likely to favor the defender, thereby presenting situations where it is much harder for an attacker to obtain an additional fort. Technically, in our theory below, we model this factor by assuming lower transition probabilities for battles fought over such geographical boundaries than is the case for battles fought over open territory. In many circumstances, natural geographical barriers do not exist or when they do, they do not reflect the distribution of political preferences, represented commonly by linguistic, ethnic, or cultural cleavages. In such circumstances, wars are harder to end and more likely to restart than if natural barriers exist that make defending the borders easier. By acting as artificial barriers that mimic the effects of natural and easily defendable borders, peacekeepers can stabilize settlements. Following the successful mediation efforts of the Carter administration, for example, the United States placed approximately one thousand American soldiers in the Sinai (Telhami 1990). Both Israel and Egypt knew that in order to go to war with one another again, they would first have to fight their way through the American troops. While both states might reasonably assume they could defeat the small multinational peacekeeping force, they also could reasonably assume it would be a small and pyrrhic victory and that the attempt would likely be followed by a large-scale and terribly costly US military reprisal. The fear of these costs potentially imposed by peacekeepers helps make an otherwise difficult to defend border quite stable. In the rest of the article, we proceed as follows. (1) We introduce the literature on conflict management and present the facts as we know them about the effectiveness,

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Mediation and Peacekeeping in a RandomWalkModel

or lack thereof, of third-party mediation efforts and subsequent peacekeeping efforts. (2) We present a random walk model of war, discussing how our approach differs from others. Though formal attempts to model the nature of warfare are only just beginning, there are several alternative approaches pursued by other scholars. We pay particular attention to how our model differs from existing modeling approaches. (3) Using a specific example, we explore how, if a mediator could credibly add information to a system, such information would alter the propensity of the belligerents to continue prosecuting a war. We then examine the motivations of the mediator and conclude that unless the mediator is a genuine honest broker, one that always honestly reports information, then the belligerents cannot believe the mediator. To earn the designation genuine honest broker a mediator must possess two important characteristics: be unbiased, not preferring outcomes that favor one side to the other, and, equally important, cannot have an aversion to war. A broker averse to war will have incentives to do whatever is necessary to hasten the end of fighting. Unfortunately, the peace-loving broker's bias toward peaceful solutions makes his or her claims less believable compared to a broker who is indifferent to war or peace. Hence, the peace-loving broker's efforts will be ineffective. Because we believe that a primary motivation of mediators is to end violence, most mediators cannot successfully resolve the informational asymmetries between nations that lead to war in the first place.

What Do We Know about Conflict Management? To start with, we know that successful third-party mediation attempts are rare. For example, in what is probably the most comprehensive data set on third party interstate mediation, less than one-third of mediation attempts are successful at achieving a partial or full settlement of the disputes in question. Jacob Bercovitch and Jeff Langley (1993) present data on 364 cases of mediation in interstate conflicts, of which they judged only 29 percent of the mediation efforts to be successful. The results of their analysis suggest that there are certain characteristics of conflicts that are more consistently associated with a successful outcome. In general, the more intense, hostile, and long-running a dispute is, the less effective mediation is likely to be. William Dixon (1996) identifies 221 cases where states accepted third-party mediation in an attempt to resolve a conflict. Of those, 90 led to some de-escalation of the conflict, 38 to escalation, the other 93 attempts had no observable effect. One interpretation of this evidence is that 40 percent were successful in the short term while 60 percent were unsuccessful. An alternative, and less appealing, inference is that successes and failures are about equally likely and that in a significant number of instances the efforts of third parties actually have negative consequences. The frequent negotiated cease-fires during the war in Bosnia did little to affect the likelihood of ultimate settlement but they did allow the two sides to resupply their forces in the field under far less risky conditions than they would have faced absent the cease-fires (Woodward 1995). Similar dynamics occurred during the twenty-year civil war in Angola where both sides frequently used negotiated breaks in the fighting to rearm and redeploy troops to more favorable locations (Ciment 1997). Peacekeeping success rates are similar. Duane Bratt (1997) estimates that less than 50 percent of third-party peacekeeping missions, whether UN-led or otherwise, succeed in any substantial way. More recently, Page Fortna (2003) finds that UN-led efforts between 1946 and 1992 had no measurable effect on the duration of peace following cessation of fighting in interstate wars. In the context of civil wars, Michael Doyle and Nicolas Sambanis (2000) found similar results to Fortna, suggesting that peacekeeping efforts have only a marginally significant effect on the duration of peace after a settlement. Others are more optimistic, in

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part at least due to their focus on a somewhat different indicator of success or failure. The bulk of the conflict management literature attempts to account for the effectiveness of third-party interventions on the resolution of international conflict by examining the empirical relationships between structural, contextual, and actor characteristics and the outcome of the conflict management efforts (for comprehensive surveys, see Wall and Lynn 1993; Kleiboer 1996). For example, Marieke Kleiboer, after surveying a decade of research into mediation, identifies four factors associated with mediation success: (1) characteristics of the dispute, (2) characteristics of the mediator, (3) the interrelationship among the parties, and (4) the international context. Variables serving as proxies for dispute characteristics attempt to account for the nature of the conflict in which the mediation is attempted or, in other words, indicate if the conflict is one of high intensity, has resulted in a large number of casualties, is associated with a protracted conflict relationship, or is over tangible or intangible issues (see Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991; Bercovitch and Langley 1993). Scholars doing this research are particularly concerned with factors such as the extent of the disparity in power between combatants or the polarity of the international system (Bercovitch 1996; Dixon 1996). Much of Dixon's (1996) work focuses attention on the attributes of the actors-both the mediators and combatants--relating the status of the mediator to successful outcomes as well as the role of democratic governmental institutions to the outcomes of conflict management efforts. Peter Carnevale (1986) has explored the effect of particular strategies of mediation on its ultimate success. Patrick Regan (1996) examined the role of outside interventions in intrastate conflicts and found that under certain conditions military or economic interventions can contribute to the cessation of hostilities. Jane Holl (1993) argues that battlefield conditions and perceptions about the future course of the conflict can affect the perception of a stalemate. In addition, Loraleigh Keashly and Roger Fisher (1990) contend that different conflicts need context-specific and, therefore, different strategies. Meanwhile, Richard Haass (1990:139) has proposed that the notion of ripeness is the critical factor in resolving conflicts, ripeness being a necessary condition for negotiated ends to conflict but "not a natural condition." Saadia Touval and William Zartman (1985) posit that conflicts reach a precipice or a plateau at which point efforts to move the combatants off this stalemate or precarious footing are more likely to be effective. In each instance, the implication is that intolerable conditions lead to an increased willingness to take risks at the negotiating table. One can see this operate in the process of negotiating the outcome of the Salvadorian civil war (Stanley 1996). The same offensive that demonstrated the FLMS's capabilities also highlighted its weaknesses, leading both sides to conclude that the status quo was both unacceptable and stable. Similarly, in the Russo-Japanese war, Japan's stunning victories simultaneously demonstrated that it was a power the other great powers of the day would have to reckon with, and one that was on the verge of bankruptcy because of the costs associated with building and supplying a navy capable of demonstrating this power (McLaren 1916; Esthus 1988). If the conditions under which negotiated efforts to resolve disputes are not always present, the question becomes how to create these conditions. Paul Pillar (1983) sees negotiating an end to conflict as a bargaining process of which the first step is to facilitate the development of the conditions under which both sides will agree to negotiate. According to this argument, the process of getting to the negotiating table and eventually to a resolution involves a series of compromises that alter the expected costs and benefits of continued conflict. Negotiating to get to the bargaining table includes both recognition that the payoffs may be greater from a compromise outcome and that each party has something to trade. The sequential unfolding of the negotiating process suggests that events on the battlefield,

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Mediation and Peacekeeping in a RandomWalkModel

concerns in the domestic arena, and time all contribute to the ultimate outcome of the resolution process. Most wars, Pillar argues, ultimately end at the negotiating table. Goertz and Regan (1997) suggest that the effect of conflict management should show up in long-term trends in the hostility of a conflict and that enduring rivalries should illuminate this process most clearly. There are two common themes in this broad literature. First, much of the work, whether quantitative or qualitative, is inductive in nature. Second, the work that presents theoretical explanations for the success or failure of mediation is largely descriptive of individual cases. There is surprisingly little development of formal deductive theory on this important question. One notable exception is recent work by Andrew Kydd (2002) who conceives of mediation as "cheap talk," that is, signals or communications in a strategic setting that do not impose costs on either the sender or target of the signal. James Morrow (1994) has demonstrated that cheap talk by third parties can be quite useful in games of coordination. Most interstate wars or disputes, however, are fought, not over how to solve the so-called battle of the sexes but, instead, over how to divide some valuable stake in an often zero-sum setting. Kydd's major contribution is to show that cheap talk by mediators, if the mediator is biased in particular ways, may be able to provide useful information when the problem blocking resolution is private information about resolve. He has shown that under certain conditions, mediators biased toward one party may be able to convince that party to make concessions it might not otherwise make. This argument assumes that the mediator biased toward side A will nonetheless have credible and otherwise private information about side B's advantages over side A that it can share with side A, thereby inducing A to settle where it would not have otherwise. Empirically, this sort of situation seems unlikely to occur with any great frequency. In this article, we present a formal theory of mediation and peacekeeping, but take a somewhat different tack than Kydd, whose model builds directly on Fearon's (1995) argument about the role of private information and the problem of one or both sides in a dispute being unable to signal resolve credibly to the other. Here we assume each nation has different beliefs about the probability of victory in the next battle. However, in contrast to the standard assumption that these beliefs are private information, we assume each player is aware of the other's beliefs but thinks them wrong. In allowing the players to "agree to disagree," we assume known but noncommon priors.' As we shall see, a failure to agree about the probability with which each side is likely to win the next battle prevents a negotiated settlement to the dispute. Unfortunately, contra Kydd's argument, we show that mediators and peacekeepers cannot help nations resolve their differences in beliefs in a way that would shorten the length of a war. A Random Walk Model of War Within the formal literature on interstate wars, there are two standard ways of modeling war. The most common is the lottery model. In this conception of conflict, when nations go to war, they roll the proverbial iron dice and one nation probabilistically emerges the victor. This model is straightforward to use and has many attractive features, which no doubt explains its ubiquity. The model, however, lacks dynamism--attributes of give and take commonly observed in real war. The lottery model of war also presumes that all wars produce a decisive victor. In reality, wars differ drastically in their intensity and duration. The other way of modeling war, the war of attrition model, offers a temporal dimension to conflict. It assumes
'There is a considerable literature debating the use of common versus noncommon priors. For a comprehensive, yet accessible, discussion we recommend Morris (1995).

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that war continues until one side gives up, at which point its opponent becomes the victor. Each side pays a cost to remain in the contest. The war of attrition produces conflicting incentives: each nation wants to outlast the other, but conditional upon losing, each nation wants to stop the war as quickly as possible. Although the war of attrition model introduces a temporal dimension to war, each period of the game is identical and fails to reflect the ebbs and flows of conflict. It also rules out the possibility of decisive victories, which do occasionally occur. The deficiencies in the simple lottery and war of attrition models have received considerable attention in the literature (Morrow 1997; Smith 1997, 1998a, 1998b; Wagner 2000; Filson and Werner 2001, 2002; Powell 2001, 2002; Smith and Stam 2002; Slantchev 2003). In this article, we will present a random walk model of conflict that consists of a series of battles over a set of forts or other territorial units. We use the term fort metaphorically. Historically, while many wars have revolved around capturing and retaining forts or fortified towns, modern warfare typically does not have this focus. More precisely, we think of forts as strategically important territorial objectives. We begin the model by supposing that there are N forts. At the beginning of the war nation A possesses Xt of these forts with nation B possessing the remaining N-Xt forts. The stochastic model of war characterizes the waging of war as a series of battles. In each of the battles, either A captures a fort from B, B captures a fort from A, or the two nations draw, leaving the distribution of forts constant. Formally, we refer to the distribution of forts as the state variable. Should A capture a fort, then the state moves to Xt+1 = Xt+ 1, where Xt is the number of forts held by A at time t. We assume that the probability of A capturing a fort in any battle is p, the probability that B captures a fort is q, and the chance of an indecisive battle, or a draw, in which no forts change hands, is 1-p-q. Should either nation run out of forts, we say it is decisively defeated and no longer able to prosecute the war. At this point, the other nation imposes its most preferred settlement. Although the model allows for the possibility of a decisive victory, many conflicts end with the combatants negotiating a settlement before this point. The outcomes of wars that terminate with negotiated settlements are more difficult to evaluate. In these situations, nations' success or failure emerges in the context of prewar expectations. Nations that emerge from the negotiations worse off than they expected suffer from military failure. Nations that achieve or surpass their prewar objectives enjoy military success. Note that these outcomes differ from the zero-sum nature of the outcomes resulting from wars fought until a side is defeated decisively. Wars that end with negotiated settlements may end with both sides believing they succeeded or with both sides believing they failed. Within this general setup, we have produced a number of variants of the model (Smith 1997, 1998a, 1998b; Smith and Stam 2001, 2002). For example, we have examined the means and ends of conflict. In Smith (1997) as well as Smith and Stam (2001), we allowed the transition probabilities, for instance, the probability of winning the next battle, to co-vary with the state value (the number of forts held by nation A). Additionally, in this research we explored how the aims of a conflict affected the process of fighting. In particular, we examined two situations. In the first, we looked at what happens when the forts or the territories the nations are fighting over have intrinsic value. In the second scenario, the forts had no value per se, but were an intermediate factor related obliquely to gains on some unrelated policy dimension that the nations cared about most. Since the setup of the model varies somewhat depending upon the question we address, we next move to the specific questions we will consider here. Rather than reiterate all the formal material contained in each of the earlier papers, we will provide a brief informal introduction to each of the scenarios and place technical details in the appendix.

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in a RandomWalkModel Mediation and Peacekeeping

Meditating Peace through the Revelation of Information When nations disagree about their relative strength, bargaining can fail. Here we build on Smith and Stam (2002) and assume nations care most about gaining some policy concession from their opponent rather than the forts or territory they are fighting over. Each nation receives a payoff of V if their ideal point is imposed and a payoff of 0 if their opponent's ideal point is implemented. For each period that the nations fight, both pay a cost of K. If the nations agree with each other on their relative strength, the transition probabilities p and q, then they can also agree to a shift in the policy dimension that mitigates either nation's desire to initiate a fight. Unfortunately, when nations disagree about the probability of A winning the next battle, then they cannot necessarily reach agreement. To model this scenario, we assume nations A and B have different beliefs about the probability that A will win the next battle (p). In particular, we assume these beliefs are beta distributed with parameters, cAo and f/AO for nation A, and cBo and /B0 for nation B. Although we dispense with a detailed discussion of these belief structures here (see Smith and Stam 2002), these parameters have a simple interpretation. The probability of A winning the next battle is p. The prior beliefs cAo and f/A0 can be thought of as A's beliefs about seeing another head if a coin is flipped, given that A has thus far seen oAo heads and /A0o tails. Based on these beliefs, A expects to win the next battle oAo/(QAo + /AO) proportion of the time. These beliefs provide the basis for a simple learning process in the game. Suppose, for example, that nation A wins four consecutive battles. Following these victories, the nations update their beliefs following a Bayesian process, which means that A's beliefs are now OA4 -LAO+4 and OA4-/AO +0. Having seen four consecutive victories, A is more confident that it will win any subsequent battle than it was at the beginning of the fighting. In particular,A expects to win the next battle with probability




We use the beta distribution to specify the beliefs because of this simple updating. Our results do not hinge on this specific distributional assumption. The key updating result is that as nation A wins battles it becomes more convinced that it is likely to win the next battle and it also becomes more convinced that this belief is correct, or more certain about its own estimate of its chances. If A loses battles then it believes future victories are less likely. If A loses a similar number of battles to those that it wins, a situation that must occur during a long war with no decisive winner, then A's beliefs converge toward the p =q. In each period of the war, A can offer B a revision of the policy space. The value of gaining this policy prize is V, and nations pay a per-period cost of K for each period of fighting. If, in period t, A proposes an agreement bt E [0, V] which is accepted by B then A's payoff is V-bt-Kt, where V-bt represents A's share of the prize and Kt is the cost of fighting for the t periods before reaching an agreement. B's corresponding payoff is b1-Kt. If B rejects A's proposal then the nations fight another battle in which a fort is transferred from either A to B or from B to A. The war continues until either B accepts one of A's proposals or one nation is decisively defeated. This model is unlike the traditional single-shot models of war where the military contest is a one-off roll of the dice. Here costs accumulate progressively as the strategic military balance ebbs and flows. One effect of this accumulation of costs is that the settlements the sides will be willing to accept reflect more than just the distribution of forts or territory, but also the costs the nations incur getting there. This means that the nations may fight for some time, perhaps returning to the distribution of forts present at the outset of fighting following the ebb and flow of multiple battles. Having done so, even though the situation on the ground is the

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ALASTAIRSMITH AND ALLAN STAM B's beliefthat it willbe the eventualwinnershouldthe warbe foughtout untila decisive winneremerges. t=9 t=5 t=6 t=7 t=8 t=3 t=4 t=1 t=2 t=O 1 1 1 0 0.99 1 1 0.99 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98 2 0.9 0.92 0.96 0.94 3 0.8 0.87 0.84 0.82 4 0.91 0.71 0.69 0.77 0.73 State, Xt 5 0.82 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.62 0.59 6 0.38 0.39 0.4 0.39 7 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.22 8 0.1 0.09 0.09 9 0 0 0 10


B's beliefaboutthe expected time untilthe warends shouldthe warbe foughtout untila decisive winneremerges t=7 t=8 t=9 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=O 0 0 0 0 11.97 8.53 10.42 1 12.9 14.18 11.29 2 9.24 15.16 12.32 13.92 10.15 3 17 16.12 13.46 14.99 4 11.26 17.74 16.97 14.6 State, Xt 5 12.52 15.98 18.74 17.53 18.2 15.46 16.65 6 18.2 18.74 7 17.53 16.65 18.74 17.53 18.2 16.65 8 17.74 15.98 16.97 9 0 0 0 10 FIG.1. B's beliefs that it will be the eventual winner (L(Xt,t))and the expected length of conflict (D(X,,t)).

same as it was at the beginning of the war, the two nations' expectations will be quite different than they were at the outset of the war. Such will be the case even though there has been no shift in the territorial status quo. The two nations' new expectations of what they expect to gain in the subsequent bargaining round reflect in part their updated beliefs about the true value of their chances as well as the costs of fighting to get to that point. To illustrate our results we use a numerical example with ten forts (N= 10), beginning with an equal distribution of forts between the two nations (Xt= 5). We set the distribution of the policy parameter a bit out of line with the distribution of forts and the two nations' beliefs about their chances of winning the marginal battle initially expects to win the next battle with probability E[p] = 2/3, while B believes A's chances of winning the next battle are E[p] = 1/3. We start by examining deals that nation B is prepared to accept. Suppose nations fight to the end without reaching agreement. We define B's beliefs that it would be the eventual and decisive winner (that is, capture all the forts, state 0) starting from state Xt at time period t as L(Xt, t). Let D(Xt, t) represent the expected additional number of periods that the conflict will last given a particular starting point in both the material factors and the two sides' belief systems. Figure 1 illustrates these functions calculated for our numerical example. We can see that in the initial state, nation B believes it has an 82 percent chance of being the eventual winner and that the war can be expected to last an average of thirteen periods. If B wins the first battle (that is, moves to state X1 = 4) then L() and D() are 91 percent and eleven periods respectively. Returning to the initial state, we consider the bargains that nation B might be prepared to accept from nation A. At the start of the war, B believes it has an 82 percent chance of being the eventual victor if the war was fought to the end. This is the chance of hitting state 0 before hitting state 10, given that B initially believes the expected value of p is one-third. Hence, by fighting the war to the end, B could expect to do no worse than receive a payoff of 0.82V-12.5K. That is to say, B expects
(V= 30, K = 1, A0 = 4, AO= 2,

2, fBO= 4, and q = 1-p). This means that A

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Mediation and Peacekeeping in a Random Walk Model

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to win and hence get the full value of the policy prize V with probability0.82 and to pay an expected cost of 12.5 rounds of fighting to do so. Nation B would never accept an agreement btwith a payoff less than 0.82V-12.52K = 12.1 because B could expect to do better by continuing to fight. Nation A could end the fighting immediatelyby offering B a deal of at least this amount, but given A's different beliefs about p (the probabilityof winning the next battle), nation A believes it is better to fight. As the fighting continues, the outcome of the battles provides additional information to both A and B about the value of p as shown in Figure 2. And as the nations continue to fight, their beliefs about relative strength begin to converge. Figure 2 indicates a potential path the nations might follow and the small graphs in the upper part of the figure show how A's and B's beliefs about p change during the course of conflict. In each period of the war, nation A faces a choice. It can offer B policy concessions large enough so that B will prefer to accept the agreement rather than continue fighting, or A can choose to fight another battle. The advantage of fighting another battle is that it provides the opportunity to indicate to B that A's beliefs about the value of p are more accurate. Since A is more optimistic than B is about A's chances, A therefore believes that it is more likely to win, which will shift B's beliefs closer to A's. Unfortunately, however, fighting an additional battle imposes cost K on both nations. From A's perspective, if the expected shift in B's beliefs (due to losing another battle) will lead to a policy shift worth more than the expected cost of fighting another battle, then A will prefer to continue fighting. Once the nations' beliefs converge sufficiently, though, the marginal gain in future bargaining advantage from bringing B's beliefs even closer to A's does not offset the cost of additional fighting. At this point, A offers to split the policy Y at nation B's reservation value and the two sides are able to reach a deal. The numbers in the lower part of Figure 2 represent A's expected payoff for each state in the game. The shaded states represent situations where fighting occurs. These are states in which A anticipates gaining more by continuing to fight rather than offering the best deal that B will accept. The two sides continue to fight until they are able to agree about each other's relative strength, or to a point where one side or the other fears being driven from the war. At either point, they are able to conclude an agreement that ends the fighting.

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Mediation The model's equilibria show that fighting continues until beliefs converge sufficiently for the two sides to agree that the costs of continued fighting exceed the likely gains in the bargaining process. Our question now is whether a mediator can possibly end wars of this sort by speeding up the convergence of the nations' beliefs through the nonviolent revelation of information. If a mediator could credibly reveal the true value of p, then nations could immediately reach an agreement and avoid the necessity of continued fighting. While it is obviously unrealistic to assume mediators are all-knowing, we will consider that the objectivity and knowledge of mediators provide them with some additional insight into which side will win the next battle (the value of p). Some mediators have access to intelligence assets that neither side in the war may posses. For example, the United States during the Falklands War had access to satellite reconnaissance that neither British nor Argentines were able to generate on their own (Freedman 2003). Since the 1980's, the United States has flown weekly U-2 missions over the Golan heights providing intelligence information to both Israel and Syria that neither would be able to acquire on its own (Gold 1994). There are a variety of ways to model the mediator's knowledge. For simplicity, we suppose the mediator's information takes the form of a costless battle; that is, with probability p, the mediator sees a head, and with probability I -p, the mediator sees a tail. Although the extension to observing multiple coin flips is straightforward, we restrict our attention to the case where the mediator sees a single coin flip. Hence, we consider the messages 1,0 (meaning one head and no tails) and 0,1 (meaning no heads and one tail) and compare them to the case of no signal (0,0). We start by considering the mediator as a pure honest broker. That is to say the mediator simply passes on to A and B the information as she or he sees it. In this sense, the mediator is a nonstrategic actor. If the mediator honestly passes on knowledge, then this information will alter the beliefs of A and B. The figures to follow show the effects of this information graphically. Figure 3 shows A's continuation value regarding the game (the payoff it can expect to obtain playing the game from that point) for each possible state assuming no additional information. The shaded areas indicate those states where A prefers to continue the war rather than offers B an acceptable deal. Figures 4a and 4b show comparable information after a mediator has passed on information to the combatants. In particular, the numbers in Figure 4a show A's continuation value for the game given that the mediator honestly reveals what his or her information was (1,0). Again, the shaded states represent those in which A continues the war rather than offers B an agreement sufficient to end hostilities. Figure 4b shows the comparable information for the case where the mediator's information is (0,1). The shaded areas in all three figures represent the states in which fighting continues and the numbers represent A's continuation value for that state. In a peaceful, nonshaded state, the continuation value is simply A's share of the policy prize from the negotiated settlement. In the shaded states, the nations do not strike a deal, so A's continuation value reflects the value A expects to get in the future following more fighting. As the figures show, additional information changes the pattern of conflict and the deals reached. Indeed, as a general feature of the model, the signal (1,0) indicates that A is stronger than the nations previously believed. Hence, following the signal (1,0), B is likely to accept smaller deals that, in turn, will improve A's continuation values throughout the war, whether the two sides are able to settle or not. The signal (0,1) produces the opposite effects. The mediator's information alters when the fighting continues and when the two sides are able to strike a deal. For example, suppose the state is X5 = 2 when the mediator intervenes and provides an opinion. If the two sides believe the mediator,

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Mediation and Peacekeeping in a RandomWalkModel

t=1 t=2 t=4 t=7 State Xt t=3 t=5 t=6 t=8 t=9 t=O 1 8.67 10.68 12.36 2 10.80 15.65 3 14.43 4 25.73 27.10 53. 6 29.08 30.00 30.00 30.00 7 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 8 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 9 30.00 30.00 30.00 FIG. 3. A'scontinuationvalue and stateswhere the war continues (shaded)given no signal from the mediator. (a) State Xt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (b) State Xt 1 2 3





t=4 t=5 11.75

t=7 t=6 13.53

t=9 t=8 14.97 18.60 26.66 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00

25.67 27.70 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 29.09 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00





t=4 8.05

t=5 10.92

t=6 9.84

t=7 12.72

t=8 11.40 16.29

t=9 14.25

5 29.91 28.70 27.20 6 30.00 30.00 7 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 8 30.00 30.00 30.00 9 4. (a) A'scontinuationvalue and stateswhere the war continues (shaded)given the signal (1,0) FIG. from the mediator.(b) A'scontinuatuinvalue and stateswhere the war continues (shared)given the signal (0,1) from the mediator.

then the message affects whether the war continues or they reach a deal. As Figure 3 shows, without any outside information, the nations continue to fight in state Xt= 2. Fighting would also continue if the mediator's announced signal is (1,0). However, if the signal is (0,1) then A and B would immediately reach an agreement with a (10.9, 19.2) split. This example demonstrates how an honest broker, by providing information, can alter the course of a conflict. Unfortunately, this example also undermines the realistic possibility that such an event will ever actually happen. Unless the mediator is a genuinely neutral actor, then he or she is impotent to affect the conflict's progress. The problem lies in whether we can believe that a mediator can ever be truly unbiased. To understand this statement, let us pose a simple thought experiment by considering two possible motivations that would lead mediators to provide information to the warring nations. First, we assume that the mediator cares about the policy settlement reached. Second, we assume the mediator, although completely unbiased relative to the protagonists, prefers peace to war.

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Returning to our example, suppose in state X5 =2 the mediator's opinion is sought and that this opinion is biased in favor of A. If the mediator announces (1,0), then any deal subsequently reached will be more favorable to A than if the announcement were (0,1). Since the mediator's signal is cheap talk, meaning it costs no more to say (1,0) than (0,1), it is inherently unbelievable.2 If nations A and B believe in the mediator, then he or she should always say (1,0) because such a response generates a more favorable outcome from the mediator's perspective. However, if the mediator always says (1,0) whatever the information, the message is inherently uninformative. As the example shows, a biased mediator cannot play an informative role. While in many cases mediators might have a preference concerning which side obtains the most advantageous deal, in others, some mediators might be genuinely neutral and strive only to obtain peace. Unfortunately, however good the mediators' intentions might be, they are struck by the same curse as the biased mediator: their information is inherently unbelievable. Returning to the case when the mediator's opinion is sought in state X5 = 2 and the signal is believed, if that signal is (1,0) then the war continues; if the signal is (0,1) then the war immediately ends. As a dove, preferring peace above any other outcome, the mediator would always prefer the signal (0,1). Again this preference creates a similar credibility problem: whatever the mediator's private information about the future outcomes in the war, he or she will indicate (0,1) which will hasten the end of fighting if the nations believed the message. However, the nations, aware of the mediator's bias for peace, realize that shortening the war might come at the expense of one of their narrower interests. Not knowing whether the mediator is telling the truth that the nations would be better off settling or lying to hasten the end of the war, the nations cannot trust what the mediator says, thereby making the message uninformative and hence unbelievable. We do not provide a rigorous mathematical analysis of all the signaling possibilities. To do so would require modeling how the mediator learns and what the consequences of messages in all possible paths would be. Nevertheless, the example shows that while truly honest brokers could alter the course of a conflict by providing information to the belligerents if the nations could believe the mediators' claims, as a practical matter mediators are never believable. If they prefer one side to another, their signals lack credibility. Equally, if they seek peace, their capacity to inform and solve the information gap that prevents the sides from agreeing without further fighting is also reduced. Why is this so? The possible motives for a mediator in a two-sided war are quite limited. The mediator can only be biased in three possible ways: (1) toward one of the nations, which makes any signals unbelievable to the other nation; (2) toward peace, which makes any signal unbelievable to either nation; or (3) toward continued fighting, in which case the mediator would not provide information to shorten the war. The only possibility for mediation to hasten the end of a war, civil or interstate, is for the two nations to enter into a binding arbitration process where the mediator receives compensation from the two nations and hence has no other particular interest in the outcome of the war. Unfortunately, in the context of either civil war or interstate war, the institutional framework that would provide the credible commitment necessary to enforce the agreement is either being contested or does not exist; thus, this option does not seem viable. Absent a nonbiased and binding arbitration process or a completely dispassionate mediator who cares neither about which side wins nor whether the war continues, we believe mediation cannot work solely through a process of information revelation.
2The literature on the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of cheap talk is considerable (see Farrell and Gibbons 1989; Banks 1991; Farrell and Rabbi 1996). Recent applications in the IR context include Smith (1998b) and Sartori (2002).

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Mediation and Peacekeeping in a RandomWalkModel How Does Mediation Ever Succeed?

From the discussion above, it is clear that in the context of our model mediation cannot succeed if its only contribution is the provision of information. However, while mediation does not succeed with any great regularity, at times mediators have been able to cobble together negotiated deals that would not have occurred otherwise. What sorts of mechanisms enable some mediators to succeed? President Carter's mediation efforts reveal a great deal about how the United States was able to influence the negotiations between Israel and Egypt. Carter's ability to prod the two sides toward agreement was the result of several factors, all of which held the potential to alter the outcomes of a random walk war. The situation in the Egyptian-Israeli negotiating sessions matches our intuition that disagreement about war outcomes is a significant source of conflict. As the negotiations continued, Carter recalled that Begin began by discussing Sadat's proposal, vigorously refuting one point after another. The discussion became tense and heated with them arguing about who defeated whom (Princen 1992:78). As negotiations between Begin and Sadat continued to deteriorate, Carter recognized that simply providing information might not be enough to bring the stalemated conflict to a halt. Initially, Carter had viewed his position as simply an unbiased information broker, but this approach did not reap many, if any, benefits. Over the next several days, Carter met with his staff, with the Egyptian delegation, with the Israeli delegation, and--separately--with Sadat and Begin. He explored the nuance of each position, seeking an opening for change. He pushed for flexibility and tried to explain to one side the views and commitments of the other. Nevertheless, it looked hopeless (Princen 1992:81). With the negotiations heading toward complete breakdown, Begin implored Carter not to ask the Israeli's to make concessions on their settlements in the Sinai, explaining that he vastly preferred an agreement with the United States; a deal with the Egyptians was not nearly as important. Thomas Princen (1992) shows that Carter suddenly realized that the two sides' preference to have a separate deal with the United States could work in favor of the mediator, whose preference was only for peace:
It was true that the relationship betweenour two nationswas vitalto Israel,but I also knewit wasa good negotiatingtacticby either Sadator Begin to firstreachan agreementwith me and then to have the two of us confrontthe third. Sadathad understood this strategybefore he arrived at Camp David. Begin wasjust now
beginning to realize the disadvantage of being odd man out. I must admit that I

on this situationwithboth delegationsin order to get an agreement;it capitalized greatlymagnifiedmy own influence. (Carteras quoted in Princen 1992:81)

Carter realized that his ability as mediator lay not in his impartiality or bias toward a particular side, but instead in his ability to exploit the two sides' preference to have a deal with the United States versus no deal at all or even a deal with the other side. By exploiting this preference, he was able to get the two sides to continue negotiating just at the point the negotiations were about to break down. In the end, how did Carter manage to get the criticalconcessions needed for a deal between the two protagonists? Ultimately, Carter used his power as leader of the wealthiest country in the world to make side payments to both of the adversaries. In early 1979, with the elections approaching and with the fall of the Shah of Iran, Carter needed a political success. He went first to Egypt where he and Sadat celebrated the close ties between their countries. Carter pledged to get the best possible agreement for Egypt while in Israel. He promised Sadat that once the treaty was signed, the latter could plan for a massive government-to-government relationship in the military and economic fields (Princen 1992:85). Begin had other plans, however. When Carter arrived in Israel, Begin informed him that there was no chance that they would be able to sign the peace agreement (Humphreys 1999). The revelation of private information

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was not what Begin was after. He was now bargaining with the United States and demanding a large side payment, recognizing the US preference for an agreement (Tessler 1994). Carter obliged. Sixteen days later when Egypt and Israel signed their accord; the United States signed a separate agreement with Israel codifying US economic and military aid that amounted to over three billion dollars in the first year alone. The United States also was now committed to supporting a peacekeeping mission to maintain the peace into the future (Princen 1992:86).

Peacekeeping Stable borders between nations are typicallynot the result of accidents.Nations with expansive territorialambitionsare likely to accept the bordersbetween them when neither side believesit has the prospectsof easilygainingadditionalterritory and when they are likely to be able to successfullydefend the border from an aggressive neighbor. Since natural geographic features such as broad rivers or mountain ranges dampen incentives for conquest by providing advantages to defenders, they often become stable borders. Relatedly,many of the notoriously unstablebordersremainingin the international systemtodayare the resultof often and colonial hasty capricious boundary policies. Many of the borders between former colonies do not reflect either naturalgeographicboundariesnor ethnic or linguisticborders.The result has often been long periods of instability. The random walk model of war that we developed provides a convenient platform on which to analyze this phenomenon. Suppose in our simulation,for example, that there are seven fortsand there is a riveror mountainbetweenforts 3 and 4. This river makes it harder for nation A to capture fort 4 from B. It also makesit harderfor nation B to capturefort 3 fromA. This difficultyin prosecuting the war across a natural boundary can be expressed in the transition matrix. Suppose thatin states 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, A has a 40 percentchanceof capturinga fort from B (p= 0.4), B has a 40 percentchanceof capturinga fort fromA (q= 0.4), and there is a 20 percentchanceof a draw.This is the situationwhen a battletakesplace on flat featurelessterrain.The presence of the naturalbarriermakesit harder for either side to secure a victory.Forinstance,we might suppose bothp and q drop to 0.1, meaning a draw is likely 80 percent of the time. This is shown in Figure 5, which graphs the transitionprobabilities for each state. We now ask the questionas to how this geographicalfeaturealtersthe patternof war.To do so we use the model in Smith(1997) and ask the conditionsunder which a statusquo resultsin peace relativeto war.In commonwith the bargainingmodel above, the nations need to reach agreement on a policy dimension,y. In each period, nation A receivesa payoff of y associatedwith this policy and B receivesa payoffof (1-y). In each period that conflictoccurs,nationspay a costK. If nationA decisivelywins the war,then the policyswitchesto y 1 and if B decisivelywins the policy switchesto y = 0. All payoffsare discountedby a common discountfactor. In each period,both nationsdecidewhetherto fightor not. If neitherside wantsto the other must prosecutethe war,then the statusquo (SQ)prevails.If eitherattacks, decidewhetherit wantsto concedeor to fightback.If a nationconcedes,we assume
the policy moves to its opponent's ideal point. In the situation considered here, no nation ever concedes so this concern is not relevant. Our purpose is to uncover whether the addition of the boundary at state 3 alters the pattern of conflict. Note that here, as above, nations care about forts only instrumentally in that they affect the ability to alter policy. In Smith (1997, 1998a, 1998b) and Smith and Stam (2002), we consider the consequences of nations inherently caring about forts. The effects in such a scenario are largely similar to those described here. We have focused on policy objectives in this model to reflect the theme of the first analysis. Suppose the SQ policy is y = 0.5. When there are no natural boundaries (ps - 0.4, q3- 0.4), then conflict occurs in every state with the cost of fighting is k <0.039.

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Mediation and Peacekeeping in a RandomWalkModel Transition Probabilities with a Boundary




s -60% 20%


1 2

3 4 5
State, Xt

when there is a naturalboundaryat state 3. FIG. 5. Transitionprobabilities

Only when the per period cost of fighting rises about this level are there any states in which neither nation wants to prosecute the war. In particular at K = 0.039 there are two equilibria with a peaceful outcome. In the first, the SQ prevails in state 3, but fighting occurs in all other states, with nation A initiating the fight in states above 3 and B initiating the conflict in states below 3. There is a similar equilibrium where the SQ prevails in state 4. The introduction of a natural boundary drastically improves the prospects for peace. When a decisive battle is hard to achieve in state 3, (p3 = 0.1, q3= 0.1), nations will only fight when the cost of fighting, K, is less than 0.015. Once the cost of fighting each battle rises above this level, then the SQ prevails in state 3. Conflict still occurs in other states until the cost rises substantially. While the introduction of a natural barrier does not eliminate the possibility of war under all conditions, it reduces by nearly a factor of three the cost of fighting sufficient to prevent more fighting. Alternatively expressed, when a natural boundary exists it is much easier to maintain the peace at this state than would be the case if no natural feature existed.

Peacekeeping Redux The hypothetical example formalizes the intuitive idea that there are fewer incentivesto start or continue wars when the combatantsare on either side of a is of featurethatbenefitsdefenders.However,this illustration naturalgeographical little help if the front line of the fightingis not along the naturalboundary.Under once a war begins, fighting will continue until either one side such circumstances, decisivelywins or the front lines of the battle end up on some naturalboundary. The existence of such a geographicalfeature improves the prospects for peace.
When such features are absent, a peaceful settlement is harder to obtain. Peacekeeping forces offer the possibility of an artificially constructed boundary between the warring parties. Powerful nations such as the United States, with an interest in maintaining the peace between two warring sides, place troops on the ground to artificially create a natural boundary. United States troops on the ground in the Sinai and between North and South Korea change the transition probabilities for the two sides if they were to contemplate re-igniting the war between them (Cha and Kang 2003; Kang 2003). Australian troops in East Timor play a similar role (Chalk 2001). The barrier need not be soldiers on the ground however. States often are separated by water. In these instances, a third party may help keep the peace with naval emplacements. The case of the US 6th fleet in the Mediterranean preventing the Turkish navy from reaching Cyprus illustrates this proposal (Hitchens 1997). The US fleet was simply placed in the way between the Greeks and the Turks, making it harder to attack across the sea and effectively lowering the transition probabilities. Similarly, the US has placed ships between Taiwan and China several times during crises (Van

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Vranken 1994). The effect is to reduce the probability with which China can make a successful attack on Taiwan and, hence, lower the overall value of initiating war. Weak peacekeepers do not reduce the probability of a successful battle as much because they are less likely to be effective at deterring the warring parties from continuing the war.

Conclusion Although the conflict resolution literature is rich in both descriptive studies and large-N statistical studies, it has failed to produce unambiguous results allowing us to predict when conflict mediation will succeed and when it will fail. In contrast, using a deductive formal modeling approach, we derived the conditions and mechanisms through which third parties can act as effective mediators or peacekeepers. While various authors present conjectures linking numerous mechanisms to how third parties resolve disputes, these inductive efforts have provided little purchase in explaining the conditions under which each mechanism might work. In this paper, we attempt to address the puzzle of mediation and peacekeeping. We do so by examining whether mediators can resolve informational asymmetries between warring nations and how third parties can enforce the robustness of settlements by acting as a substitute for a natural geographical boundary, thus making it harder for either side to prosecute the war. When nations agree about the nature of future battles, they can negotiate settlements that reflect this common perception. Unfortunately, when one or both sides to a conflict are overly optimistic about their chances in a possible war, conflict negotiations become more difficult and peaceful settlements become less likely. In such circumstances, each side believes that the other side is asking for more than it can reasonably demand. Violent conflict is one way to determine whose expectations are more realistic. In principle, third-party mediation offers a potential mechanism to shortcut such conflict if the mediator can supply unbiased information about the parties' capabilities and how they would interact in a possible or continued war. In practice, however, a mediator can never credibly transfer such information. If the mediator prefers outcomes that favor one nation to another, then the mediator's incentive to pass on the message that favors its friend undermines the credibility of its signal. This inability to communicate credibly persists even if the mediator is a genuinely neutral actor who wants only to end the conflict. In this latter case, if the message were to be believed, the mediator would deliver the message that most effectively reduces the length or costs of the war. In this situation, since the mediator always wants to tell the combatants the message that is most likely to shorten the conflict, such messages contain no useful or credible information. While mediators cannot resolve informational differences between states absent manipulation of the material costs and benefits the protagonists face, as the Camp David Accords example above showed, mediators can hasten agreement between nations by offering possible incentives or threats (Tessler 1994). Third parties can also be effective as peacekeepers by providing an artificial geographical boundary between nations. When borders straddle natural geographical features such as rivers, mountains, or marsh, the difficulty of successfully winning a battle across the boundary reduces the incentive to continue prosecuting the war (Westwood 2002). Unfortunately, absent such boundaries, nations are more likely to continue any war with any peace settlement likely to lack robustness. By positioning themselves between the potential combatants, peacekeepers reduce the probability that either side can win the next battle, such as a mountain or other geographical feature does. The more powerful the peacekeeping force and the more difficult it is for combatants to circumvent it, the more successful peacekeeping efforts are likely to be.

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in a RandomWalkModel Mediationand Peacekeeping

Deductive reasoning has allowed us to parse out the mechanisms through which third parties influence conflict. Our analyses indicate that mediators cannot function solely as information providers. Further, we show that in the absence of naturally defensible geographical features, peacekeepers can stabilize agreements by making war more difficult to prosecute.

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Mediation and Peacekeeping in a RandomWalkModel

and Practice. Boulder: TOUVAL, SAADIA,AND I. W. ZARTMAN,eds. (1985) InternationalMediationin Theory Westview. VANVRANKEN, DENNIS.(1994) United States-Taiwan SecurityTies: FromCold Warto Beyond Containment. Westport, CT: Praeger. WAGNER, R. HARRISON. (2000) Bargaining and War.American Journal of Political Science 44:469-484. A., ANDANN. LYNN.(1993) Mediation: A Current Review.Journal of Conflict37:160-194. WALL, JAMES F. (2002a) Committingto Peace: The Successful Settlementof Civil Wars. Princeton: WALTER, BARBARA Princeton University Press. F. (2002b) Reconceptualizing Conflict Resolution as a Three-Stage Process. WALTER, BARBARA InternationalNegotiation. WESTWOOD, JOHN. (2002) The Historyof Middle East Wars.London: JG Press. SUSAN.(1995) Balkan Tragedy:Chaos and Dissolutionafter the Cold War.Washington, DC: WOODWARD, Brookings Institution Press.

Appendix An Informational Model of Bargaining Smith and Stam (2002) contains all the proofs for the propositions presented here. Starting from state X, in time period z> 0, we define the resolution time, R(X,) = min{(t - z) > OXt = 0 or Xt = N}, as the time taken until either nation A or nation B attains complete victory (states Xt=N, 0 respectively). We define the probability that nation A will eventually lose the war if it is fought to the end while starting in state y given beliefs a, /3, as L(a, fl,y) = Pr{XR 0= IX, y}. With complementary probability A will emerge the eventual winner: W(, /3,y) = Pr{XR= NIX, = y} = 1 - L(, ,y). Finally, we define D(, fl,y) = E[R(y)] as the expected number of battles before either A or B will win the war, given we start in state y with beliefs a and /. To calculate L(a, /3, y), W(a, /3, y), and D(c, /3, y) we use some well-known results from the stochastic processes literature (Taylor and Karlin 1994; Grimmett and Stirzaker, 1992). In particular, if the transition probabilities are p and q = 1-p and the current state is y then the probability of reaching the absorbing state 0 before reaching the absorbing state N is - (q/p)N) i p 1/2 if ((q/p)Y (q/p)N)/(1 (N -y)/N if p = 1/2' The probability of reaching state N first is simply 1-X(p, y). The expected number of periods until reaching either state 0 or N is 4(p,y)

-(q/p)N))] if p 1/2 [RPy= 1/(qp)-N((1 (q/p))/(1 y(N y) if p 1/2'

and /, the followingintegralscharacterize L(, /3,y), W (, /3,y) and D(c, /, y).


Nations A and B are uncertain as to the true value of p. However, given beliefs a,
l, y)







D(C, 3,y) =

. (1-(p, y))f(p; , )dp

E [Rp,y1f(p; , fl)dp

We now calculate the additional expected value of fighting the war until an eventual winner emerges. Suppose at time t, and state Xt, nations A and B calculate the expected value of fighting the war to an absorbing state, less any cost from fighting already accumulated. Given the Xt and t, A's and B's beliefs are (oAo + (t +

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135 and

and + (t - Xt + Xo)/2) Xt - Xo)/2 JAO + + Xt Xo)/2), respectively. #BO (t Hence,


( Bo+(t + Xt - Xo)/2

Xt, t)] =CA(Xt, t) = VW( XAO + E[UA(fightindefinately

-KD + (CAO

+ -XXt) fAO



, Xt)

E[UB(fightindefinately IXt,t)] =CB(Xt,t) = VL(aeo + t+XX0 flBO Xt) + 2 t -KD(cBO h , Xt) + t+X flAO These expressions represent the overall probability of victory multiplied by the value of victory (V) less the expected duration of the conflict multiplied by the per period cost (K). These calculations are made from the perspective of each individual nation for the subgame starting at Xt. CB(Xt,t) is B's estimate of what B can expect to receive by fighting the war to a conclusion. However, we can also calculate B's expected value of fighting out the war from A's perspective: C (Xtt) = + (t + Xt - Xo)/2, VL(AO + (t + Xt- Xo)/2, AO+ (t - Xt + Xo)/2,Xt) - KD(aAO #AO+ (t - Xt + Xo)/2,Xt). By dominance, B never accepts any agreement bt<CB(XI, t), since B always expects to do better by continuing to fight. We define M(Xt,t) = (V - max{O, CB(X, t)}). The max is included to reflect that all deals must be on the interval [0, V]. Hence even if CB(Xt, t) is negative A cannot offer B a deal worth less than 0. Also by dominance, A never proposes an agreement, bt, (which B would (Xt,t). From this our first accept) that is worth less than continued fighting: V - btCA result follows directly:

is CA(Xt,t) necessaryconditionfor a negotiatedsettlement This implies fighting alwayscontinuesif CB(Xt,t) + CA (Xt,t) > V. An Informal Description of the Equilibrium In Figure 2 on page 566, the solid line represents A's beliefs, + t + Xt - X AO + t - Xt + Xo0 (P; 2 2 f;AO flO and the dotted line represents B's belief, f(P; aBo+ t +?Xt Xo
+ t - Xt +Xo

< M(Xt,t).

As the figure shows, the longer the war lasts the less the divergence of opinion about the true value of p. Lemma 1 is a technical result that states that A's and B's beliefs converge. Lemma 1: For all e> 0, there exists a t(e) such that for all t>t(e), and for states Xt E {1,...,N1}, ICs(Xt,t)


2: In all t>t= t(K),A offersbt = max{0, CB(Xt,t)} whichB accepts. PROPOSITION CORROLARY: The smaller K, the larger i. induction:8O(Xt, t) = max{M(Xt, t), -K + EA[plXt,t]O(Xt definedby backwards + 1,t + 1) t where EA 1, }, 1) +(1 [plXt,t])O(Xt + t )dt pf(p AO t+ EA[p|Xt,t] = AO+tAO + o+ flAO O A O- +B"pA O 2
PROPOSITION 3: For t t, O(Xt,t) =M(Xt,t).


t<t, A's continuation values are

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Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict Author(s): Barbara F. Walter Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, Dissolving Boundaries (Dec., 2003), pp. 137153 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: . Accessed: 23/10/2013 17:52
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Review(2003) 5(4), 137-153 Studies International

Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict'


GraduateSchool of InternationalRelations and Pacific Studies, Universityof California, San Diego The most intractable civil wars in the last half of the twentieth century were not ethnic civil wars or ideological civil wars. The most intractable conflicts were those fought over territory. Between 1940 and 1996, combatants fighting territorial civil wars were 70 percent less likely to initiate peace negotiations than combatants fighting any other type of civil war (Walter 2002). And once begun, these negotiations rarely brought peace. In only 17 percent of the cases in which a government faced rebels who sought independence or greater regional autonomy did the government agree to accommodate the rebels in any way. This pattern also exists in the international arena. Evan Luard (1986), K. J. Holsti (1991), Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl (1992), and John Vasquez (1993) each found that territorial issues are one of the most frequent sources of war between states and competing governments are less likely to resolve disagreements over territory than any other issue. Paul Hensel (1996) found that territorial disputes between states are more likely to escalate, to produce a greater number of fatalities, and to be more conflictual than nonterritorial confrontations. Unlike most other issues, governments show a surprising unwillingness to negotiate over land in order to avoid or end otherwise costly conflicts. Why do governments so often refuse to negotiate over territory? Under what conditions will they agree to negotiate and make some accommodation for greater autonomy or independence? Existing research on territorial conflict tends to focus on the value of a given piece of land to explain why fighting breaks out in some cases and not others (Gilpin 1981; Holsti 1991; Goertz and Diehl 1992; Coakley 1993; Diehl 1999). According to this view, governments are less likely to seek a peaceful settlement if the contested piece of land holds important natural resources, serves vital security functions, or plays a critical role in the identity of a country; they will peacefully relinquish lands that do not. The nature of the stakes under dispute, therefore, predicts how the dispute will end. Empirically, however, such is often not the case. Governments are often willing to part with resource-rich land as well as frequently fight over land that appears to hold little economic value. Argentina settled its dispute with Uruguay over the oil rich international boundary along the Rio de la Plata River, yet fought Britain over the Falkland Islands. And Saudi Arabia settled border disputes with Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates even though rich oil deposits were at stake (Huth 1996b). Governments are also often willing to expend more resources

'The author wishes to thank Rui de Figueiredo, Jr., George Gavrilis, Zoltan Hajnal, Ted Hopf, Patrick James, Andrew Kydd, Ken Schultz, participants at the conference on Bargaining and War at Yale University, March 2001, and participants in seminars at Columbia University, University of Southern California, Dartmouth College, University of California San Diego, and Columbia University. Thanks also to Kathleen Gallagher, Stephanie McWhorter, and Chad Rector for excellent research assistance. ( 2003 International Studies Review. Publishedby BlackwellPublishing,350 MainStreet,Malden,MA02148, USA,and 9600 GarsingtonRoad,Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.

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Explainingthe Intractability of Territorial Conflict

to keep a piece of land than they could ever hope to extract from it. East Timor's alleged oil reserves, for example, are believed to be far less than the hundreds of millions of dollars the Indonesian government spent to pursue its fifteen-year war. And Chechen oil fields are, by most accounts, not worth the cost of that war (see especially di Giovanni 2000). Moreover, the strategic value of land often appears unrelated to how governments will respond when challenged. According to a widely cited study by Paul Huth (1996b), governments are only 6 percent less likely to compromise if the territory under dispute is strategically important. Rapid technological innovations in transportation and communication over the last hundred years might have made territorial buffers such as mountains, deserts, and rivers less critical for the defense of a country, yet governments appear no more willing to part with land. Psychological explanations also do not appear to consistently explain why governments sometimes agree to relinquish territory deemed vital to the national identity and other times not. The Israeli government, for example, negotiated away the Sinai and parts of the West Bank and may eventually agree on a division of Jerusalem. These cases suggest that the economic, strategic, or psychological value of land does not fully explain government decisions to settle or fight when territory is at stake. Further work, therefore, needs to be done to understand when and why governments choose to negotiate, and why territorial issues appear so intractable. In contrast to existing explanations, I argue that a government's decision to negotiate with one set of challengers has relatively little to do with the value it places on the piece of land being contested and more to do with what it expects will happen in the future. In the case of territorial disputes, governments consistently refuse to negotiate not because land is especially valuable as many people have argued, but because they fear that a concession to one state or one separatist group will encourage other parties to seek their own share of a limited pie. As a Jakarta-based political analyst (see Bull 1999) pointed out, "If Aceh is allowed to break away, other places will ask for the same treatment." Refusing to negotiate with the very first challenger and incurring the costs of an immediate war, even though seemingly irrational in the short term, becomes part of a very rational strategy to eliminate the higher long-term costs of multiple future wars. The low rate of negotiation, therefore, is the result of reputation-building in which governments actively choose to fight an early challenger in order to deter others from making similar demands. But why is reputation-building more important when territory, rather than any other issue, is at stake? The answer has to do with supply and demand. In situations in which multiple challenges are anticipated and supply is limited-a condition that appears to exist when territory is at stake--reputation-building is likely to become the dominant strategy for dealing with these disputes, even seemingly inconsequential ones. Since 1980, governments have received seven times as many territorial challenges as any other type of challenge and the number of challenges is rising (see the Minorities at Risk data project). At the same time, governments have only a limited amount of territory over which to make deals; too many deals and a government will negotiate itself out of existence. As Boris Yeltsin pointed out to border guards in Chechnya, "we do not have any spare, unneeded land in Russia!" (see Breslauer 2002). It is because land is so highly coveted and the supply limited that reputation-building becomes so important. This article is divided into five sections. Section one describes the theory of reputation-building in greater detail and draws out specific hypotheses for testing. The theory presented here is not new; arguments based on reputation have been proposed by scholars in economics and political science. Indeed, the present piece stands very much on the shoulders of scholars such as Thomas Schelling (1966),

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David Kreps and Robert Wilson (1982), and Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1982).2 In addition, the theory builds directly on the chain store paradox first introduced by Richard Selten (1978) to understand predatory behavior by firms in the marketplace. What this section is intended to show, however, is that reputation arguments can be fruitfully applied to the question of intractable conflicts in international relations, especially those fought over territory. Section two discusses the two main critiques of reputation arguments, namely that government interests and capabilities play a much larger role in government behavior than concerns about future credibility. Section three provides an empirical test of the implication of the reputation model in the context of all self-determination movements between 1940 and 2000. And section four presents the findings. What we see is that governments that preside over countries with multiple disaffected minority groups are far less likely to negotiate with any group of separatists than are governments that preside over more homogenous populations. Governments appear to be very conscious of the signal they are likely to send if they decide to negotiate with one group. They will refuse to negotiate if they believe such behavior will deter other minority groups from demanding their own share of a highly desirable prize. The fifth, and final section, discusses some implications this study might have for scholars interested in interstate wars as well as those interested in the more narrow issues of territory, contiguity, and conflict.

Theory: When Will Governments Negotiate? In an application of signaling games, I argue that under certain circumstances it is always rational for the government to refuse to negotiate if doing so imparts information that will deter additional challengers. The basic story is this. If a government believes it will be forced to negotiate multiple separatist agreements, it will choose to invest in a reputation for toughness now rather than face multiple challenges down the road. A reputation for toughness means that others believe that given a sufficiently similar situation, the player will behave in the future the same way he behaved in the past. In contrast, if the government knows it will face such a challenge only once, or relatively infrequently, there is less reason to invest in a reputation and negotiation will likely result (see especially Spence 1973:355-374). War, then, is a means to transfer information, not to the first group, which has already chosen to challenge the government, but to all the other potential territorial challengers down the road (Kreps and Wilson 1982:543). But why would reputation-building deter additional challengers? Here the answer depends on uncertainty. Assume that a country contains only one minority group that must decide whether to seek self-determination or accept the status quo. If the group chooses to challenge the government for self-determination, the government must decide whether to acquiesce or fight. Acquiescing would mean offering the separatists some territorial concession in return for peace. If the government refuses to acquiesce, the government has a chance to retain full control over its territory, but it pays the costs of fighting, where "fighting" denotes anything from repression to outright war. Faced with only one challenger, governments are likely to acquiesce because there is no value in developing a reputation and paying for a costly war. As long as the potential separatist knows that the government's optimal response is to offer some form of accommodation, it is generally rational for
2The theory is also heavily influenced by work on entry deterrence and advertising in the economics literature (Spence 1973; Rosenthal 1981; Schmalensee 1981, 1983; Dixit 1982; Kreps and Wilson 1982; Kennan and Wilson 1993; Milgrom and Roberts 1993) and by work on reputation and deterrence in political science (Schelling 1966; Alt, Calvert, and Humes 1988; Huth 1988; Nalebuff 1991; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett 1993; Mercer 1996; Hensel 1996; Toft 2001).

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Explainingthe Intractability of Territorial Conflict

the separatist to seek self-determination as well as for the government to agree to compromise. All this changes, however, when multiple separatists emerge. Here, the government must consider that the game could be repeated as many times as there are separatist groups. Moreover, the government's behavior in the first period could affect decisions by other separatists in subsequent periods. The shortrun benefits of accommodation with the first challenger must now be weighed against the possible long-run costs of additional confrontations. In a situation of multiple potential challengers, the first group decides whether to seek self-determination or accept the status quo. This time, however, all other potential separatist groups have the chance to observe what the government does and they can use this information to update their beliefs about what the government will do if they themselves choose to act. If the government chooses to acquiesce, these groups will know they face an uncommitted opponent and will launch their self-determination movements knowing they will be rewarded with their own set of concessions. If the government chooses to fight, they remain unsure about what type of government they face and are less likely to launch a challenge as a result. In this situation, it is generally in the government's interest to fight early challengers in order to develop a reputation for toughness and thus improve the chances that it will reap the long-term benefits of increased peace in the future. Basque leaders, for example, claim that the Spanish government will never accept a self-determination referendum because the government fears it "would lead to similar demands from other autonomous regions, like Catalonia and Galicia" (Anderson 2001:43). Reputational concerns, therefore, explain why a government would consistently refuse to negotiate over a piece of land that by all other measures appears worthless or insignificant." It becomes rational to fight for any piece of territory if doing so would deter similar demands in the future. The theory presented above offers at least one hypothesis for testing: 1: A government's willingness to accommodate demands for territorial autonomy or independence will be inversely related to the number of additional challengers a government expects to encounter in the future.

Alternative Explanations Opponents of the reputation argument contend that the behavior of the government has less to do with reputation than with the interests at stake or the relative capabilities of the disputing parties (Maxwell 1968; Jervis 1970; George and Smoke 1974; Press 2001). Governments will choose to fight (and separatists will choose to challenge) when the land under dispute is highly valued or when they are significantly more powerful than their opponent, and not for any reputational reasons. Interestsat Stake Most of the existing literature on territorial disputes relies on interest-based arguments to explain why fighting breaks out in some cases and not others (Gilpin

3It also explains why some minority groups will still choose to challenge a government even if the government refused to negotiate with earlier groups. There will almost always be a group that is so committed to obtaining autonomy or independence that they are willing to risk war. For an analysis of the incentives ethnic groups face, see Walter (2002).

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1981; Holsti 1991; Goertz and Diehl 1992; Coakley 1993; Diehl 1999). Contested regions often contain natural resources, fertile agricultural zones, or critical tax bases that are vital to the well-being of the central government. It is these resources that make governments hesitant to negotiate. Much of Nigeria's petroleum, for example, came from the secessionist region of Biafra. Congo's Katanga corridor holds important mineral deposits. And East Timor is believed to lie just north of significant deep-sea oil reserves. Strategic value is another possible influence on the decision to negotiate. Outlying territories can provide access to strategic waterways and mountain ranges that are crucial for maintaining the security of the state (Mackinder 1919; Richardson 1960; Touval 1972; Luard 1986; Holsti 1991; and Diehl 1999, especially the chapter by John P. Vanzo). The Golan Heights, for instance, sheltered Israel from Syrian rocket attacks and gave it a vital listening post to Syrian army movements. Bosnia offered Serbia at least limited access to the Mediterranean Sea. And one could argue that Kashmir's mountains help buffer Pakistanfrom India. Territory can also be valued for a third, less tangible, reason. Certain pieces of land hold great symbolic value, containing sites, landmarks, and buildings that form the basis of a group's identity (Coakley 1993; Diehl 1999; Newman 1999). Ownership and occupation of these territories is often perceived to be critical to the cohesiveness and socialization of the group. Israel and the Palestinians, for example, have consistently rejected the notion of a shared binational state, demanding instead exclusive rights to their own land. If two groups hold the same strong attachment to a piece of land, as the Arabs and Jews do in the West Bank, the stakes could easily be defined in all-or-nothing terms, making compromise unlikely. Thus, three additional hypotheses can be drawn from these theories: 2: Governments will be less willing to acquiesce to a challenge HYPOTHESIS the higher the economic value of the disputed piece of land. 3: Governments will be less likely to acquiesce to a challenge HYPOTHESIS as the strategic value of the land under dispute increases. 4: Governments will be less willing to acquiesce to a challenge HYPOTHESIS as the symbolic value of the territory under dispute increases. Balance of Capabilities In contrast, a large literature in international relations has argued that relative capabilities are a far better predictor of how a government will respond to a challenge than any investments in reputation (Huth and Russett 1984; Leng and Gochman 1984; Huth 1988; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett 1993). If this statement is true, then governments will base their decision to fight or negotiate not on any expectation of future interactions but on their likelihood of victory against a particular opponent. Governments will fight against weaker challengers whom they believe can be easily overpowered and will negotiate with the stronger ones. In the case of territorial conflict, it could be that secessionists are relatively easy to defeat, creating few incentives for the government to negotiate. When accommodation does occur, it occurs because a government is weak and unable to decisively defeat a challenger. Deterrence is all about power and capabilities, not reputation (Morgenthau 1978; Waltz 1979; Grieco 1988). One final hypothesis, therefore, can be drawn from theories that focus on the balance of capabilities. 5: The stronger a government is relative to a challenger, the HYPOTHESIS less likely the government is to acquiesce.

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of Territorial Conflict Explainingthe Intractability Empirical Analysis Case Selection

The aim of this research is to determine whether governments invest in reputationbuilding when determining whether to negotiate with groups seeking greater territorial autonomy or independence. To do this, the hypotheses were tested for every self-determination movement included in the Center of International Development and Conflict Management's (CIDCM) global survey of selfdetermination movements between 1956 and 2000. The CIDCM has defined a self-determination movement as any attempt launched by a territorially concentrated ethnic group for autonomy or independence from the central government using political or military means (see Gurr 2000:14). Although the list of movements included in CIDCM is fairly comprehensive, three potential problems with case selection were detected. First, CIDCM fails to include many of the claims for self-determination that arose in the former Soviet Union before and during its collapse, including demands from the Estonians, Ukrainians, and Georgians. In addition, some obvious cases such as the Slovaks in Czechoslovakia and the Sardinians in Italy are omitted for reasons that remain unclear. The CIDCM also only includes nonviolent cases of self-determination that have continued through the year 2000; cases that ended or were peacefully resolved before 2000 are not included. In an attempt to correct these oversights, the CIDCM list of self-determination cases was cross-referenced with a list of separatist and autonomy movements compiled by the Minorities at Risk (MAR)data project. The MAR project includes all separatist or autonomy movements launched by a minority group between 1940 and 1999.4 Although a significant amount of overlap existed between the MAR and CIDCM case lists, cross-referencing the two helped fill in many of the missing cases.5 Still, a number of prominent cases remained absent from both CIDCM and MAR for unexplained reasons. Lithuania and Latvia, for example, were not included in either list. To correct this oversight, both country specialists and detailed case histories were consulted, yielding the following cases: Croats/Yugoslavia, Karachay/Russia, Kazahks/USSR, Latvians/ USSR, Lithuanians/USSR, Tadhziks/USSR, Uzbeks/USSR, Moldavians/USSR, Russians/Estonia, Crimean Tatars/Ukraine, Uzbeks/Kyrgyzstan. In total, thirty-two additional cases were added to create a final list of 153 cases. The following analyses were performed using both case lists with no significant differences in the findings. A second concern arose regarding the problem of nonindependence of cases within the same country. The more potential challengers there are within a country, the more observations in the data set that will be accounted for by that country. Hence, there is a danger that one country (or a small number of countries) with many potential challengers could have an undue influence on the results. This problem was dealt with in two ways. First, countries were sequentially deleted to make sure that no single country was driving the results. In all but one case, this
4The variable in the MAR data project that was used was the variable Separatism (SEPX). Although MAR examines latent, historical, and active separatist or autonomy movements under this heading, only historical and active movements with a clear territorial component were added to this study. "Latent" movements were not included because these represented cases where a group had not actively challenged the state, but had merely been historically autonomous or had resided in another state at some point in the past. 5MAR lists twenty-three cases not included in the CIDCM survey. They were Lezgins/Azerbaijan, Muslims/ Bosnia, Slovaks/Czechoslovakia, Luba/Democratic Republic of the Congo, Arabs/Iran, Azerbaijani/Iran, Baluchis/ Iran, Turkmen/Iran, Sardinians/Italy, Russians/Kazakhstan, Basters/Namibia, Ingush/Russia, Kumyks/Russia, Tatars/Russia, Tuvinians/Russia, Zulus/South Africa, Jurassians/Swizerland, Russians/Ukraine, Estonians/USSR, Georgians/USSR, Ukrainians/USSR, Nilo-Saharans/Ethiopia, Konjo-Amba/Uganda. All of these cases except the Nilo-Saharans and the Konjo-Amba were added to the case list. The last two cases were omitted because no confirming evidence could be found in the secondary literature showing a historical or active separatist/autonomy movement.

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process had no substantive effect on the results. The one case in which the exclusion of a single country altered the results is noted below. Second, the standard errors were corrected for potential nonindependence within countries using the cluster option in STATA.6 Measuring the Dependent Variables To see whether the number of potential challengers predicts if governments will choose to negotiate, I created a categorical dependent variable called Accommodation that included four outcomes: no accommodation; some accommodation but not over territory (hereafter referred to as "reform"); accommodation offering some form of territorial autonomy; and accommodation granting full independence. These outcomes were ordered from zero to three ranging from the complete absence of any attempt to accommodate the challenger (0) to conceding full independence (3) (see Appendix for data sources). The dependent variable was broken down into these four categories to determine not only the conditions under which a government will make any compromise with a territorial challenger, but also the conditions under which a government will make successively greater

Measuring the IndependentVariables Three sets of hypotheses were proposed to account for when governments are likely to acquiesce if faced with demands for greater territorial autonomy or independence. The first set is drawn from the reputation model. Hypothesis one posited that the greater the number of potential separatist challengers, the less willing a government would be to negotiate. Governments would look down the road, determine how many groups could be potentially troublesome, and behave accordingly. The proxy used to measure the number of potential separatist challengers, therefore, is the "Number of Ethnopolitical Groups" in a given country listed in the Minorities at Risk data project. To be included as an ethnopolitical group by MAR, a group had to meet one of two criteria. A group had to be disadvantaged in comparison to other groups in their society, usually because of discriminatory practices, or a group had to be politically organized to promote or defend their collective interests (Gurr 2000:7-13). These criteria helped identify those groups that had either the incentive or the organizational capability to launch a separatist challenge against the government and would be most likely perceived by the government as a possible future threat. The second set of hypotheses claimed that the economic, strategic, and psychological "value" of land is likely to play a more important role in determining the actions of government. Three measures were used to test this proposition. The first, Economic Value, was measured using an additive scale that assessed the number of marketable resources a given piece of land contained. It was expected that a greater number of marketable resources would lead to less accommodation.
6It should be noted, however, that the nonindependence of cases is not simply a statistical problem. If the theory of reputation is correct, then challengers should be conscious of the number of additional challengers that may exist and will take this into account when deciding whether to challenge. Potential challengers in countries with many other potential challengers, therefore, may be less prone to confront the government because they assume that the government will be more concerned about reputation and more willing to fight. Although this relationship is difficult to directly test without isolating and empirically analyzing the decision of each potential challenger, one can rerun the analysis without clustering by country to see how the results change. In this case, no substantively different conclusions emerged. 7Although these four categories are presented as if they are clearly distinct on a theoretical level, all of the subsequent analyses were rerun with one or more categories of accommodation collapsed together to ensure that each category was in fact distinct empirically. The results indicated that none of the alternate codings provided a significantly better fit than the four-category variable used here.

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Explainingthe Intractability of Territorial Conflict

Even though a dollar value might have been preferable, regional estimates of the monetary value of different resources are rarely available and thus could not be included. In an attempt to get a measure that might more closely approximate the monetary value of the resources, a dummy variable was included (in alternate tests) indicating whether a given region had either oil or natural gas. The substantive findings did not change. To test for the effects of Strategic Value, a six-point additive scale was used to denote whether a given piece of territory included: (1) a sea outlet, (2) a shipping lane, (3) a military base, (4) an international border, (5) an attack route, or (6) a mountain range. Given that a sea outlet is arguably the most important strategic resource, in alternate tests a dummy variable was substituted indicating whether a given territory had access to the sea. It led to the same results as the original specification. The third variable, Psychological Value, was more difficult to measure and two admittedly inadequate proxies were used. The first was the length of time a given ethnopolitical group had resided on a piece of territory; its effect on psychological value could be either positive or negative. On the one hand, a government's attachment to a piece of land may decrease the longer a minority group resides on that piece of territory. On the other hand, its psychological attachment may also increase the longer that land remains in the hands of a rival group. Two different predictions, therefore, could be made on how this measure may behave. The second was a dummy variable indicating whether a particular ethnopolitical group had been historically autonomous from the central government at any point prior to the conflict. Governments were assumed to have less psychological attachment to territory that had previously been controlled by another group. The final set of hypotheses claimed that the balance of capabilities between the government and the challenger would significantly influence whether the government would choose to negotiate or fight. The concept of balance of power was particularly difficult to measure as it related to intrastate disputes. Measures that are available to assess the military capabilities of the government side, for example, are generally not available to assess the military capabilities of various ethnic groups. In lieu of data comparing the relative capabilities of the two sides using the same measures, I assessed Balance of Capabilities by including several different indicators of strength on each side. Two indicators were used to measure the strength of the separatist group. The first measure-the existence of ethnic brethren--indicates whether the group seeking self-determination was part of a larger ethnic group that extended beyond that country's borders. All else being equal, groups with ethnic brethren in neighboring states were viewed as relatively more powerful than groups with no such outside support. The second measure was the percent of the total population the separatist group represented. The larger the group, the stronger it was assumed to be. Two indicators were then used to measure the strength of the targeted government. The first looked at the average annual military expenditures of the government during the duration of a challenge, the second at the average annual number of military personnel during a challenge. Countries with relatively small defense expenditures and relatively small armies were expected to be more likely to accommodate challengers than countries with large defense expenditures and large armies. In addition to this main set of explanatory variables, three control variables were included to ensure that the existence of any aforementioned relationships in the analysis were not spurious. A large literature has arisen in the last two decades arguing that democratic regimes are more likely to negotiate with challengers than nondemocracies. Democratic governments are thought to face greater domestic constraints on the use of force, be more sensitive to the rights of individuals seeking self-determination, and have a greater range of possible compromise solutions to

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offer ethnic groups (see Doyle 1986; Morgan and Campbell 1991; Goemans 2000). If this is true, then the type of regime or regimes in power during a challenge will almost certainly affect the likelihood of accommodation. A control variable, Democracy, therefore was included to test for this effect. A dummy variable for "Violence" was also included to see if the use of force by a separatist group increased the likelihood that a government would accommodate their demands. Finally, a measure of the Duration of a conflict was included to address the possibility that longer disputes were more costly to governments and therefore more likely to end in some form of accommodation. Details on the measurement and coding of each of these variables as well as data sources can be found in the Appendix to this article.

Findings Are governments more concerned with the long-term reputational effects of their actions when they decide how to respond to a demand for greater selfdetermination or are they, as many people have argued, more influenced by interests and capabilities? Table 1 presents the results of an ordered probit regression with Accommodation as the dependent variable. What we see is that a government's reaction to the demands of one separatist group is heavily influenced by reputation, but also is affected by the level of democracy and government military spending.8 As the top of Table 1 reveals, the greater the number of ethnopolitical groups in a country, the less likely the government is to accommodate any given territorial challenge. Governments appeared to be quite conscious of potential future challengers when determining whether to negotiate or acquiesce to any demand. The number of ethnopolitical groups in a country, however, was not the only factor to influence government decisions to accommodate separatists. As Table 1 also shows, two additional variables appear to play a significant role in the government's willingness to offer compromise settlements. First, more democratic countries appear to be significantly more likely to accommodate the demands of territorial challengers than less democratic countries. In an attempt to determine why this might be so, two additional variables were created that measured specific institutional features of democracy. The first was a dummy variable indicating whether a democracy was based on Proportional Representation; the second measured the degree of State Centralization/Federalism within each country. (See the Appendix for a detailed description of each.) Each of these variables was then added separately to the ordered probit model in Table 1 to see which of the three democracy measures was most closely linked to government accommodation. The analysis (not shown) suggests that it is something about democracy itself, rather than either of these institutional features, that affects a government's willingness to cooperate, although it remains unclear what it is about democracy that encourages cooperation. It could be that the constraints imposed by the public's aversion to war increase the likelihood of accommodation, but it could also
8Given the possibility of nonlinear relationships between some of the independent variables and different levels of accommodation (that is, that violent conflict might not affect the willingness of a government to offer political reform, but increase the likelihood of a government acceding to full independence), the model was rerun as a multinomial logit regression. Although an identical multinomial logit model could not be run because of the limited number of cases, a modified model confirmed the basic results of ordered probit regression. In particular, the number of potential challengers, democracy, and government military expenditures retained their significance. The multinomial regression did, however, differ from the ordered probit in three minor ways. The economic value of a disputed region had a significant negative effect on the likelihood that the government would offer political reform. Also the proportion of the population that belonged to the ethnopolitical group and the strategic value of a disputed region had a significant and negative effect on the likelihood that a government would offer some form of increased territorial autonomy.

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Explainingthe Intractability of Territorial Conflict

TABLE 1. Ordered Probit Analysis of Government's Decision to Accommodate Demands for Self-Determination

Independent Variables Number of Ethnopolitical Groups Economic Value Strategic Value Psychological Value: Length of Residence History of Autonomy Democracy Balance of Power: Neighboring Ethnic Group Group's Proportion of Population Government Military Expenditures Violent Conflict Duration Constant 1 Constant 2 Constant 3 Pseudo R2 X 2 N

Coefficient -.23** .06 -.06 .18 -.07 .06* -.18 -2.63 3.85e** .07 .00 -.04 .38 2.27 .19 40.61** 106

Standard Error .05 .06 .17 .31 .10 .02 .13 1.52 1.18e .32 .01 .98 .98 1.02

Heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors clustered by country; *p< .05, **p< .01.

be greater sympathy for the rights of individuals seeking self-determination or the greater variety of possible concessions that democracies can offer that drives behavior. Future research will be required to distinguish which of these alternatives is really at play. Second, there is a significant relationship between the government's average military expenditures during the period of conflict and the level of accommodation in that conflict. Balance of capabilities arguments predicted that stronger governments would be less likely to accommodate challengers, all else being equal. However, Table 1 shows that governments with higher military expenditures are more likely to accommodate territorial challengers, not less. One possible explanation is that government military spending is actually a sign of relative government weakness rather than strength. Governments that face particularly strong challengers may be forced to increase military spending in response to this significant threat. In many cases, this increased military spending may not be enough to secure the government's victory over a strong challenger and accommodation may result. Indonesia's war in East Timor illustrated this type of dynamic in which Jakarta's military expenditures as a percent of gross national product almost doubled in the years leading up to the granting of independence (World Bank figures, 1985-1997). Further analysis (not shown) found a similar significant, positive relationship between the number of military personnel under arms, an alternative measure of government strength, and accommodation. None of the other variables included in Table 1 were found to be significantly related to government accommodation. Table 1 provides no support for arguments that place the value of a given piece of land as the primary determinant of how the government will respond. Governments are no more or less likely to accommodate demands for self-determination if the land in question has high economic value or is strategically important. This conclusion was confirmed by additional tests in which different measures of economic and strategic value were substituted into the analysis. Table 1 also reveals that the psychological value of a given piece of land

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does not appear to play any role in a government's decision to compromise. Neither the length of time that a group has occupied a piece of territory nor any history of regional autonomy is significantly related to government accommodation in this case. These findings suggest that previous accounts emphasizing the specific characteristics of a parcel of land to explain government behavior have overlooked a key motivation driving government decisions. Governments seem to care far less about the land itself than about the implications their behavior will have on challengers on the horizon. The strength of the challenger group, the presence of violence, and the duration of the conflict also had no predictive power in determining how governments would respond to self-determination movements. Governments were no more likely to accommodate separatist groups that comprised a large share of the population than a small share or ethnic groups that extended into neighboring states. This mirrors two findings from Paul Huth's (1996b) study of interstate territorial disputes. He finds that the presence of minority groups along the border with ethnic ties to the general population of the challenger had no strong effect on the likelihood of a compromise settlement. He also reports that military strength of the challenger is not a necessary condition for the challenger to remain unyielding in its negotiating position over disputed territory. Similarly, Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl (1992), in their research on interstate territorial disputes, do not find a strong relationship between the balance of military capabilities and the use of armed force in achieving territorial changes from 1914 to 1980 (but see Mandel 1980 and Huth 1996a:13-14 on this debate). Ordered probit results, however, are difficult to interpret. To make the results easier to understand and to show which factors are more likely to trigger different levels of government accommodation, each of the significant coefficients was converted into predicted probabilities (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 1999). Predicted probabilities were calculated by varying the measure of interest while holding all other variables at their mean (or modal) values. Table 2 presents the probability of different levels of government accommodation as each of the significant variables in Table 1 moves from their lowest to highest values. The predicted probabilities confirm the strong relationship between the number of ethnopolitical groups and government accommodation, between democracy and
TABLE 2. Predicted Probability That Governments Will Accommodate Probability of No Accommodation Number of Groups Low (1) High (28) Percent Difference Level of Democracy Low (-10) High (+ 10) Percent Difference Government Military Expenditures Low (333) High (142,000,000) Percent Difference Probability of Increased Territorial Autonomy 60 0 -60** Probability of Independence 12 0 -12"**

Probability of Reform

16 99 83*

12 0 - 12*

87 48 -39*

7 16 9

7 34 27*

0 2 2

79 0 -79*

10 0 -10*

11 9 -2

0 90 90*

Probabilities are derived from the ordered probit analysis presented in Table 1; *p< .05, **p< .01.

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Explainingthe Intractability of Territorial Conflict

government accommodation, and between military expenditures and government accommodation. They also reveal the extent to which each of these variables affects different levels of government accommodation. As can be seen in the top left corner of Table 2, the number of ethnopolitical groups greatly affects the probability that governments will agree to different levels of accommodation. In line with the reputation argument, governments that face many ethnopolitical groups are 83 percent more likely to refuse any form of accommodation than if they faced only a few ethnopolitical groups. A large number of ethnopolitical groups also significantly reduced the odds of a government offering reform, increased territorial autonomy, or independence. Governments facing multiple potential challengers were 12 percent less likely to offer reform, 60 percent less likely to offer some form of increased territorial autonomy, and 12 percent less likely to offer independence. Democracy's effect on a government's willingness to accommodate territorial challenges was similarly strong. As we can see in the middle row of Table 2, highly democratic regimes were 39 percent more likely to agree to some type of accommodation than highly autocratic regimes, and were significantly more likely to offer both reform and increased territorial autonomy when confronted with a self-determination movement. However, higher levels of democracy appeared to have little effect on a government's willingness to offer full independence. This finding suggests that democracies, although perhaps more willing than their authoritarian counterparts to offer a variety of territorial concessions, are equally unlikely to grant full independence. The effects of government military expenditures were more variable. Countries that spent a large amount of money on their military were 79 percent more likely to offer some form of accommodation. In contrast, military expenditures were less closely related to a government's willingness to offer some form of political reform or increased territorial autonomy. Military expenditures were, however, most closely related to the likelihood that a government would agree to independence. Governments that dedicated large sums of money to defense were 90 percent more likely to ultimately agree to independence than low spending governments. This result lends further support to the argument that military expenditures are a sign of government weakness, not strength. In this case, high levels of military spending indicate a particularly weak government that has little choice but to eventually grant full independence. This lends support to a balance of capabilities view of these conflicts. A Closer Look at Democracy The results to this point strongly suggest that governments are forward-looking and concerned about their reputations. They do not, however, tell us whether all types of governments are equally likely to care about setting these types of precedents. To determine whether democracies and nondemocracies are equally likely to take into account the number of potential future challengers when they deal with a given conflict, I divided the cases into these two groups. The results are presented in Table 3. The results presented above reveal that democracies and nondemocracies are equally likely to care about reputation. Both types of governments appeared to invest in reputation-building when confronted with a large number of challengers. Still, the results in Table 3 suggest that democracies and nondemocracies are not alike in all ways. Democracies appear to be more willing to accommodate minority groups that have resided on a particular piece of territory for long periods of time. Such may be the case since it is more difficult for democracies to ignore groups with long histories in a particular country either because they are better able to work within the system or because longevity may reinforce the legitimacy of a group's

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TABLE3. Ordered Probit Analysis of Factors Affecting a Government's Decision to Accommodate

Demands for Self-Determination: Democracies versus Nondemocracies Independent Variables Number of Ethnopolitical Groups Economic Value Strategic Value Psychological Value: Length of Residence History of Autonomy Balance of Power: Neighboring Ethnic Group Group's Proportion of Population Government Military Expenditures Violent Conflict Duration Constant 1 Constant 2 Constant 3 Pseudo R2 S2 N
Standard Errors in Parentheses; *p< .05, **p<.01.

Democracies -.25 (.07)** .11 (.08) -.17 (.19) .96 (.49)* .08 (.15) .02 (.17) -2.49 (1.99) 4.02e (1.52e)** .01 (.45) -.00 (.01) 1.51 (1.32) 1.95 (1.33) 4.39 (1.42) .21 27.47** 62

Nondemocracies -.32 (.11)** -.25 (.14) -.04 (.28) -.10 (.46) -.17 (.17) -.17 -1.82 -2.18e -.41 .00 -2.92 -2.43 -.41 .24 19.7* 48 (21) (1.94) (3.31e) (.60) (.01) (2.43) (2.41) (2.41)

demands. In contrast, nondemocracies appear more concerned with the economic value of a piece of land. Although the relationship is not quite significant, the higher the economic value of the land in dispute, the less willing nondemocracies are to accommodate. One potential explanation is that leaders of autocracies often control and personally benefit from economic resources to a greater degree than democratic leaders and, therefore, have greater incentive to retain such assets. Conclusion The goal of this research was to explain why governments regularly refuse to negotiate over territory and to identify the conditions under which they would accommodate demands for greater autonomy or independence. Contrary to current explanations that focus on the value of the specific piece of land under dispute or the relative capabilities of the disputants, I argue that in the case of territorial disputes, investing in a reputation for toughness serves the important role of signaling to other potential challengers that separatism will be costly. This information then encourages subsequent groups to remain at peace. The empirical analyses supported this explanation. Not only did the number of potential challengers significantly affect a government's decision to accommodate or fight, but reputation-building occurred in the ways predicted by the theory. Both democratic and undemocratic governments were more likely to invest in reputation against early challengers. Reputation models, therefore, tell us much about when we can expect governments to negotiate over territory as well as why war might occur even when the land under dispute appears to hold little value. Two tasks remain. The logic of the argument should apply equally well to territorial conflict between states and not just to self-determination disputes within states. States that face many neighboring countries should be more concerned about reputation-building and should be less willing to settle border disputes than countries that have few neighbors. China with its many contiguous states, for

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Explainingthe Intractability of Territorial Conflict

example, should be significantly less willing to negotiate boundary disputes with its neighbors than Canada should with its neighbor: the United States. Extending this theory to the international arena, therefore, would tell us that border disputes, especially those between countries with many potential territorial claimants, will be particularly difficult to resolve and will exhibit many of the characteristics of intrastate territorial conflicts. Empirical studies on territory, contiguity, and conflict appear to support this prediction. Not only are governments frequently unwilling to negotiate over interstate territorial disputes, but proximity is one of the best predictors of whether two states will go to war. Although scholars have long known that a significant relationship exists between contiguity and war, they have assumed this relationship exists because proximity creates more opportunities for countries to come into conflict and war is easier when distances are small. What the present research indicates, however, is that another explanation might be more accurate. Neighboring states are more apt to go to war to settle territorial disputes because these are the cases in which reputation-building is most important. Just as governments appear to care deeply about deterring ethnic groups within their state from seeking self-determination so, too, do they care about deterring neighbors outside their state from seeking greater territorial gains. Finally, it is important to be clear about the policy implications of this research. The results of this study do not suggest that the international community should encourage every government to fight every challenger that seeks some redefinition of a boundary in order to deter additional challenges over time. What it does suggest is that reputation-building is a very issue-specific strategy and that governments can reduce the number of potential disputes by very carefully differentiating one conflict from another. Israel can grant the Palestinians their own state without encouraging Syria, Jordan, or Egypt to demand their own territorial adjustments by accentuating the unique and exceptional characteristics of each particular case. By doing so, governments can negotiate long-standing disputes in one case without encouraging additional conflicts in the future. References
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Appendix of Description Dependent and Independent Variables Dependent Variable: ACCOMMODATION. A categorical variable that includes four outcomes: (0) no accommodation, (1) some accommodation but not over territory, (2) accommodation leading to some form of territorial autonomy, (3) accommodation leading to independence. A dispute was coded as having ended in "no accommodation" if the government was either unwilling to negotiate with the challenger or if the government chose to negotiate but was then unwilling to make any concessions. If the government was willing to make a concession, one of three outcomes was possible. A dispute was coded as having ended in "accommodation, reform" if the government was willing to offer some concessions such as greater participation in government or greater cultural autonomy in response to a challenge. A dispute was coded as having ended in "accommodation, territorial autonomy" if the government was willing to grant the challenger some degree of territorial autonomy. Finally, a dispute was coded as having ended in "accommodation, independence" if the government granted full independence to the challenging party. Source: Keesing's Contemporary Archives, group profiles provided by the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data project (see, and individual case histories. IndependentVariables: A variable indicating the total number of OF ETHNOPOLITICAL NUMBER GROUPS. in a given country. Each group had to meet one of two ethnopolitical groups criteria. A group had to be disadvantaged in comparison to other groups in their society, usually because of discriminatory practices, or a group had to be politically organized to promote or defend their collective interests. Source: MAR data set. known to exist on a given piece of land. These resources included oil/petroleum, natural gas, coal, iron ore, steel, aluminum, titanium, bauxite, salt, sulfur, tin, nickel, chromium, cobalt, tungsten, phosphate, gold, silver, copper, zinc, lead, magnesium, uranium, diamonds, water, wheat, timber, fishing, tourism, commercial nuclear plants, or important manufacturing plants. Source: US Geological Survey maps, the CIA Factbook, and group profiles provided by the MAR data project.

resourceswere ECONOMICVALUE. A 31-point scaleindicatinghow many marketable

included (1) a sea outlet, (2) a shipping lane, (3) a military base, (4) an international border, (5) an attack route, or (6) a mountain range. Source: US Geological Survey maps, the CIA Fact book, and group profiles provided by MAR. Length of Residence: A variable coded 1 if immigration occurred since 1945, 2 immigration occurred in the nineteenth or early twentieth century, or Two indicators were used to measure psychological value. (1) VALUE. PSYCHOLOGICAL

6-point scale indicating whether a given piece of territory

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3 = immigration occurred pre-1800. Source: MAR data set (variable TRADITN2). (2) History of Autonomy: A dummy variable coded 1 = the group was historically autonomous at some point in time, 0 = group was never historically autonomous. Source: MAR data set (variable AUTON). (1) Neighboring ethnic groups: the number of adjoining countries in which segments of the ethnopolitical group involved in the dispute also resided. Source: MAR data set (variable: NUMSEGX). (2) The percent of the total population an ethnopolitical group represented was also obtained from MAR (variable: GPRO). (3) Military expenditures: average annual military expenditures in thousands of 1996 US dollars during the self-determination movement under observation. Source: J. David Singer and Melvin Small's "MaterialCapabilities, 1816-1995" data set, which collected its information from "The Military Balance" published annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Information for 19921998 was added using IISS. (4) Military personnel: average annual number of military personnel during the case of self-determination movement under observation. Source: Same as for military expenditures. democracy-autocracy scale was used that assigns two scores (0-10) to every country: one based on a government's autocratic features, and one based on its democratic features. The incumbent government's autocracy score was then subtracted from its democracy score to produce a net democracy number that ranges in value from very autocratic (-10) to very democratic ( + 10). If there were a number of regime changes during a dispute, the case was coded based on the most democratic year during the duration of the dispute, assuming that this would have been the moment at which combatants were most likely to settle. Source: Polity III data set, Jaggers and Gurr (1996). A dummy variable coded 1 if a political system was PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. based on proportional representation, 0 if not. This variable was also coded based on the highest level of proportional representation during the duration of the dispute. Source: World Bank (Keefer data set) for years 1975-1998; Stateman's Yearbook for years 1955-1970.

BALANCE OFCAPABILITIES. Five indicators were used to measure the balance of power.

indicates the degree to which political authority is centralized (variable: CENT). Coded 1 for unitary states (centralized) in which only moderate decision-making authority is vested in local or regional governments; 2 for an intermediate category; 3 for a federal state (decentralized) in which local or regional governments have substantial decision-making authority. This variable was coded based on the lowest centralization score during the duration of the dispute. Source: Jaggers and Gurr (1996). A continuous variable ranging from a low of one year to a high of fifty-six years. Measured from the year a challenge was initiated to the year it officially ended. Source: Group profiles provided by MAR.

Polity III data set, this variable

VIOLENCE. A dummy variable coded 1 if a given group scored a 4, 5, 6, or 7 on

MAR's "REBEL"' scale. Coded 0 if it scored<4. Source: MAR data set (variable: REBEL45X-REBEL98X).

Summary statistics for all of the variables are available from the author upon request at

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Back Matter Source: International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, Dissolving Boundaries (Dec., 2003) Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: . Accessed: 23/10/2013 17:52
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Associationfor the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism

14th Annual Conference


Nationalism Debate
23rd -24th April 2004

London School of Economics

3 M04 Friday April 2004 Friday 223rd Aprn


24th April











of Smith

JohnBrueilly WalkerConnor Steven Grosby Eric Hobsbawm Anthony D Smith Pierrevan den Berghe



Panelsinclude: Theoriesof ethno-symbolism; in America; Nationalism Globalisation; Historyandhistoricity; Symbolsandmonuments; Zionism; Ethnicandnationalidentities

2004 Conference Committee, ASEN, A214, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK Enquiries to
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International Studies Review A Journal of the InternationalStudiesAssociation

A window on current trends and research in international studies worldwide, the Review includes analytical essays along with reviews of new books. Articles integrate scholarship, clarify debates, provide new perspectives on research, identify directions for the field, and present insights into scholarship in various parts of the world. Published four times a year, the Review is intended to help: (a) scholars engage in the kind of dialogue and debate that will shape the field of international studies in the future, (b) graduate and undergraduate students understand the major issues in international studies and identify promising opportunities for research, and (c) educators keep up with new ideas and research. Contents The Review contains four distinct sections. Detailed guidelines for preparing materials for these sections can be found at Reflection, Evaluation, and Integration: The heart of each issue is made up of three extended essays that reflect on, evaluate, and integrate research dealing with international institutions and the foreign policies, international interactions, and international relationships among such political actors as national governments, subnational groups, and international governmental and nongovernmental organizations. These essays can focus on overviewing topics of current significance to understanding world politics, theoretical approaches or basic concepts, methodological approaches, sub-fields or areas of study, or the state and nature of international studies in a particular region of the world. Essay reviews should not exceed 14,800 words. With a 12-point proportional font and one inch margins on all sides, 14,800 words are roughly equivalent to 55 manuscript pages. Up to 15 additional manuscript pages are available for references. Book Reviews: Approximately 20 books published within the past year will be reviewed in each issue. Book reviews are done by an international panel of reviewers. Persons interested in becoming part of this network should send the editorial staff a current vita and an indication of their interests and expertise within the field of international studies. Members of the panel will be asked to review no more than one book per year. Featured Book Reviews: Each issue also contains up to four extended reviews of books that have been published outside the United States and written in languages other than English or of books that make a particularly important contribution to the field regardless of where they were published. These reviews are also written by members of the international panel of reviewers. The Forum: A goal of the Review is to stimulate lively dialogue and debate about the nature and future directions of the field of international studies. The Forum provides an outlet for debates over concepts, theories, methods, and the state of current research as well as reactions to pieces published in the International Studies Review itself. Materials for the Forum generally contain contributions from more than one person. Submissions for the Forum should not exceed 7,100 words. With a 12-point proportional font and one inch margins on all sides, 7,100 words are roughly equivalent to 30 manuscript pages. For Additional Information The editorial offices of the Review are located in the Global Affairs Institute, Maxwell School, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244 USA. Members of the editorial staff can be reached through, at 315-443-4022 (phone), or at 315-4439085 (fax).

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The International Studies Association is a multidisciplinary organization that promotes collaboration among specialists whose interests are focused on international, cross-national, or transnational phenomena. It promotes interdisciplinary approaches to problems that cannot fruitfully be examined from the confines of a single discipline. ISA seeks to foster the growth of an international community of scholars, to encourage both theoretical and policy-oriented research on topics in international studies, to develop channels of communication between academics and policymakers, and to improve the teaching of international studies. Membership in the Association is open to scholars, professionals, and students of any nationality. More than fifty countries are represented in the current membership. Information on individual, regular, and student memberships is available from the Executive Officer, International Studies Association, University of Arizona, Social Sciences 324, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA.

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