Carnap's 'Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language'.

A Retrospective Consideration of the Relationship between Continental and Analytic hilosophy !ottfried !abriel" #epartment of hilosophy" $riedrich %chiller &niversity 'ena" !ermany. Rudolf Carnap is a classic proponent of the ideal language school within analytic philosophy. (e has divided opinion more sharply than other representatives of this tradition and thus contributed decisively to the ongoing separation of analytic and continental philosophy. The essay 'The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Languages' )Carnap *+,*" *+-+." in particular" contributed to the polari/ation because it made Martin (eidegger" the classic author of continental philosophy" the target of e0ercises in a logically inspired criticism of metaphysics. The following essay reconsiders the relationship between analytic and continental philosophy" using the Carnap1(eidegger controversy as an e0ample. 2e should bear in mind" however" that the roles of analytic and continental philosophy have in the meantime been strangely reversed. 2hereas the continental tradition struggles above all with the deconstruction of supposed remnants of old metaphysics" a new metaphysics is celebrating its reemergence in logically ingenious theories of analytic philosophy. The order of the day is not an elimination of metaphysics" but its new foundation through the logical analysis of language. 2e would suppose that this development would have the disapproval of both Carnap and (eidegger. $or e0ample" Carnap would surely have accused the metaphysics of possible worlds )and his philosophical grandchild #avid Lewis. of confusing internal and e0ternal e0istence" whereas (eidegger would have criti/ed such metaphysics as a 3ind of forgetfulness of 4eing of a presence1at1hand ontology )Vorhandenheitsontologie.. There are more profound reasons for assuming such agreement between Carnap and (eidegger. $or it is not so much the attitude towards metaphysics itself" but their views as to what remains for philosophy to do following the end of metaphysics that constitutes the opposition between Carnap and (eidegger.* This opposition shows in different forms of linguistic presentation" and indeed" it is primarily through linguistic differences that analytic and continental philosophers can be recogni/ed today. 4efore pursuing this idea" we discuss the philosophical1historical setting of Carnap's and (eidegger's thin3ing to display their common ground.

*5n the tacit common ground between (eidegger and Carnap cf. 6ambartel *+78" *+-1*+9: also Rentsch *+8-" *;<1*;7" *+= f.

To begin" we should remember that the distinction between analytic and continental philosophy is problematic in two ways. $irstly" the two designations are as3ew" because 'analytic' is a methodological determination" whereas 'continental' is geographical. %econdly" the implicit geographical division" according to which all analytic authors are assumed to be Anglo1%a0on" doesn't wor3. The ran3s of analytic philosophy include" along with Carnap" !. $rege" 4. Russell" !. E. Moore" L. 2ittgenstein" !. Ryle and '. L. Austin. $rege" 2ittgenstein and Carnap not only come from the Continent" but also received their essential intellectual formation there )$rege and Carnap in 'ena" 2ittgenstein in >ienna.. 2ith regard to Carnap and (eidegger their philosophical beginnings at least are congruous" albeit with different emphasis. 4oth received their initial education in the conte0t of ?eo1 6antianism@ Carnap under 4. 4auch in 'ena" (eidegger under (. Ric3ert in $reiburg. )#uring his time in $reiburg" Carnap also heard Ric3ert.. Carnap was influenced decisively by $rege" and (eidegger in a corresponding manner by (usserl. 4oth concurred with the anti1 psychologistic logism of their respective teachers in the form of a theory of validity )which goes bac3 to (. Lot/e.. 4oth" however" also ac3nowledged the other tradition@ the early (eidegger )*+*=" =<. refers to $rege" and the young Carnap to (usserl.= 2hereas for Carnap the distinction between validity and genesis of statements remained decisive throughout his life" (eidegger" under the influence of life1philosophy )2. #ilthey" $. ?iet/sche." distanced himself from lin3ing the concept of truth to statements" that is from the propositional concept of truth" essential for the logical tradition since Aristotle. This difference concerning the nature of truth drives Carnap and (eidegger in differing directions. 4ut this difference did not arise through Carnap's having paid no attention to life1 philosophy. Anstead" here too the initial situation for Carnap and (eidegger is identical. 4oth e0perienced the contest between ?eo16antianism and life1philosophy at the beginning of the twentieth century. Central to this conflict was the Buestion regarding the relationship between logic and life and C proceeding from this Buestion C the determination of the tas3 of philosophy. The result was that the two ?eo16antians treated the challenge of life1philosophy in different ways. $or (eidegger the course was set by (usserl" and for Carnap by 2ittgenstein. Their paths parted for good with (eidegger's inaugural lecture in $reiburg What is Metaphysics? )(eidegger *+=+.. Carnap had previously ta3en part in the famous dispute between E. Cassirer and (eidegger in #avos. Although the independence of (eidegger's thin3ing had also impressed Carnap" he remained philosophically bound to the rationalistically oriented ?eo16antianism as represented by Cassirer. 4y ta3ing his e0amples of meaningless metaphysical statements from (eidegger's inaugural lecture in particular" he sent a signal" for" as he emphasi/ed" he might DEust as well have selected passages from any

=Carnap *+=8. %ee the references to (usserl in the inde0 of names and bibliography.

other of the numerous metaphysicians of the present or the pastD )Carnap *+-+" 7+" footnote =.. The list of metaphysicians adduced by Carnap as e0amples )$ichte" %chelling" (egel" 4ergson" (eidegger. displays a large degree of agreement with the usual enumeration of continental authors with one important e0ception. ?iet/sche" who in today's controversy is viewed )by both sides. as a model author in the continental tradition" is spared in Carnap's criticism. This fact has not been appreciated sufficiently until now" not least because with his move to the &%A" Carnap had cut or at least suppressed his own continental roots in orienting himself to the new philosophical circumstances" especially to the pragmatism found there., An his intellectual biography only wea3 traces of the continental tradition are recogni/able" and even these have been ignored. $or several years a historical reconsideration of the origins of analytic philosophy that see3s to revise its 'forgetfulness of the Continent' has been in progress. After $rege had found his fi0ed place in ?eo16antianism )cf. !abriel =<<=." Carnap's relationship with this tradition" which dominated !erman philosophy at the turn of the century" has been largely investigated )cf. in particular Richardson *++8.. A part of Carnap's continental roots have thus been revealed. M. $riedman has presented the first thorough historical study of the relationship between Carnap and (eidegger" in which he attempts to show how" by dealing with the same basic ideas of ?eo16antianism" two traditions of philosophy were able to develop which have led to the current opposition of analytic and continental philosophy )$riedman *++7.. 5ne factor" however" which $riedman does not ta3e into account is the role of life1philosophy.; At is only by considering this that the picture is completed and the actual differences are brought into the open. The final section of Carnap's )*+,*. essay" entitled DMetaphysics as e0pression of an attitude towards life )Lebensgefhl.D" provides important clues here. The e0pression DLebensgefhlD is a central term for 2. #ilthey. resumably Carnap adopted the term not directly from #ilthey" but from his student (erman ?ohl" whom Carnap had heard in 'ena.- At is revealing that" apart from 4auch and $rege" ?ohl is the only one of his teachers in 'ena that Carnap mentions by name in his Intellectual Autobiography. And this mention is not limited to academic reasons. Carnap writes@

,At should be borne in mind that the older pragmatism itself had lin3s with the continent. (. Lot/e in particular had left traces of influence. At would be worth e0amining whether the holism of 2. >. 5. Fuine goes bac3 indirectly to the (egelianism of Lot/eGs metaphysics. ;An his new boo3 )$riedman =<<<. he does" however" draw attention to this. -The influence of #ilthey on Carnap was first pointed out by ?aess )*+78" ;*1;8.@ 'Metaphysics as the E0pression of an Attitude to Life. #ilthey" ?ohl and Carnap': cf. also at/ig *+77" *<<.

DA remember with special pleasure and gratitude the seminars of (ermann Hcorrectly@ (erman" !. !.I ?ohl )at that time a young instructor in 'ena." in philosophy" education" and psychology" even when the topic" for e0ample" (egel's Rechtsphilosophie" was often somewhat remote from my main interests. My friends and A were particularly attracted by ?ohl because he too3 a personal interest in the lives and thoughts of his students" in contrast to most of the professors in !ermany at that time" and because in his seminars and in private tal3s he tried to give us a deeper understanding of philosophers on the basis of their attitude toward life )D LebensgefhlD. and their cultural bac3ground.D )Carnap *+7," ;.

The personal element addressed here has its place in Carnap's life itself. The DfriendsD )such as the later pedagogue 2ilhelm $litner. were committed members of the !erman youth movement with whom Carnap bounded through the 'ena woods. The Ddeeper understanding of philosophersD mentioned here amounts to discerning their respective Lebensgefhl as the driving force of their differing metaphysics. The basis of such an assessment" which Carnap adopted from ?ohl" is #ilthey's Weltanschauung doctrine. 4efore turning to this as the actual 'point' of Carnap's 'Elimination of metaphysics'" A would first li3e to e0pand on the methodological framewor3 as set out in Carnap's essay )*+,*.. The basic features of the criticism of metaphysics developed by Carnap" namely the lin3ing of formal logic with the principle of verifiability are not new@ they had already been wor3ed out in 2ittgenstein's Tractatus" to which Carnap e0plicitly refers. The familiar problems with the formulation of the empiricist criterion of meaning are not to be elaborated here. #ifficulties already result from the fact that the meaning of a sentence is supposed to be determined by its truth conditions )cf. Carnap *+-+" 7=.. Meaning is hence lin3ed to the form of statements" and is reduced to propositional meaning. Accordingly" normative statements are considered meaningless by Carnap@ DAt is altogether impossible to ma3e a statement that e0presses a value Eudgment.D )ibid." 99. ?ow the criterion of meaning is not to be understood as a merely descriptive criterion of distinction" but as a normative criterion of e0clusion and hence falls prey to its own verdict of meaninglessness.7 An comparing Carnap and 2ittgenstein" an important terminological difference is to be noted. $or 2ittgenstein the only statements )propositions. that have sense are those that describe logically possible facts )in the sense of e0istent or non1e0istent states of affairs.. Already the statements of logic lac3 sense. This determination is not to be understood peEoratively" but merely as characteri/ing their status as logically true" i.e. as tautologies" that say nothing about the world. Carnap" however" understands these statements as being meaningful because they are Dtrue solely by virtue of their formD and follows 6ant in defining them as analytic statements )Carnap *+-+" 97.. Accordingly they are valid a priori. Alongside analytic statements Carnap recogni/es empirical statements corresponding to 6ant's synthetic a
7Cf. Carnap's self1critiBue in Carnap *+7," ;-f.

posteriori statements. As distinct from his 'ena dissertation Der Raum )*+=*. Carnap now denies the possibility of a priori synthetic statements. Carnap spea3s of meaningless statements )sinnlose !t"e. when words without meaning occur in them" or when they are not correctly logically syntactically formed. The meaningless statements in Carnap's terminology thus correspond to the nonsensical )unsinnigen. propositions in 2ittgenstein's terminology.9 The thesis that words without meaning occur in metaphysical te0ts is old. At is stated emphatically" for e0ample" by #. (ume. ?ew" however" is the view that there e0ist statements in which the logical synta0 is violated" though they accord with historical1grammatical synta0 )cf. Carnap *+-+" 7+.. This insight goes bac3 to $rege and was first developed into the basis of a criticism in principle of metaphysics by 2ittgenstein in the Tractatus. The basic features of this criticism are adopted by Carnap. The conseBuences he sees are admittedly Buite different from those of 2ittgenstein. 2hereas 2ittgenstein's farewell to metaphysics was not without sadness" Carnap cheerfully issues the command for philosophy of science to 'clean up' and allows philosophy to be absorbed by the logic of science. This 'way out' is ruled out for 2ittgenstein because for him a metalogic that attempted to 'say' once again what can only 'show' itself is impossible. The categorial discourse that sets out the logic of our language is compelled to overstep the limits of this logic. This discourse itself brea3s the rules of syntactic well1formedness that it see3s to e0plicate. (ence not only are the statements of traditional metaphysics nonsensical" but so too are those statements in which this criticism is formulated" in particular therefore the statements of the Tractatus itself. This view has conseBuences for the form of presentation of 2ittgenstein's te0ts" a form which must be called literary rather than logical. 2ittgenstein's Tractatus presents logic as literature. At is no wonder that through to the present day the logical and scientific faction within analytic philosophy has preferred to appeal to Carnap and has its difficulties with 2ittgenstein. At is the logical tradition of propositionalism that binds 3nowledge to the )true. proposition and causes the methodical function of forms of presentation to be misunderstood. The logic ta3en as a basis by both 2ittgenstein and Carnap is the propositional and predicate logic developed by !. $rege in his #egriffsschrift. An this logic the traditional subEect1obEect structure of propositions is replaced by an argument1function structure" through which a completely new and far1reaching analysis of language is made possible. 2ithin the framewor3 of such an analysis $rege had in particular proposed a logical distinction between

9At one point Carnap erroneously calls contradictory" i.e. logically false" sentences absurd )unsinnig. )Carnap *+-+" 9*" but cf. correctly 97..

four categorially different uses of the verb 'to be'@ predication )subsumption." identity" subordination )of concepts. and e0istence. Carnap ma3es use of these distinctions in his criticism of (eidegger. An doing so he presents some e0emplary sentences of (eidegger's" which C so as to heighten the rhetorical 'effect' C are contracted into the following passage@
D2hat is to be investigated is being only and C nothing else: being alone and further C nothing: solely being" and beyond being C nothing. What about this $othing? ... Does the $othing e%ist only because the $ot& i'e' the $egation& e%ists? 5r is it the other way aroundJ Does $egation and the $ot e%ist only because the $othing e%ists? ... 2e assert@ the $othing is prior to the $ot and the $egation. ... 2here do we see3 the ?othingJ (ow do we find the ?othingJ ... 2e 3now the ?othing. ... An%iety re(eals the $othing. ... That for which and because of which we were an0ious" was 'really' C nothing. Andeed@ the ?othing itself C as such C was present. ... What about this $othing? C The $othing itself nothings.D )Carnap *+-+" 7+.

An Carnap's view" (eidegger ma3es the logical mista3e Dof employing the word 'nothing' as a noun ))egenstandsname." because it is customary in ordinary language to use it in this form in order to construct a negative e0istential statementD )ibid." 9<.. The negative e0istential statement 'At is not the case that there e0ists something which has a certain property' is also e0pressed by the sentence that nothing has this property. At is through the obEectification of this use of 'nothing' that the meaningless tal3 of 'the nothing' comes about. art of the responsibility for this lies in the confusion of the uses of 'to be' in the sense of predication and in the sense of e0istence. ?ow Carnap in no way fails to recogni/e that something important can be addressed in metaphysics. (e disputes" however" that it can be represented in the form of meaningful statements. Apart from this Carnap admits that language still has functions other than ma3ing statements. Alongside a cognitive function it assumes an emotional one. This serves in particular to give e0pression of the attitude towards life )Ausdruc* des Lebensgefhls.. At is in precisely this function that Carnap sees metaphysics" which" however" attempts to clothe something in the form of statements that cannot be said. A legitimate need underlies metaphysics" however" the adeBuate e0pression of the attitude towards life is not metaphysics" but art@
DHAIn the case of metaphysics we find this situation@ through the form of its wor3s it pretends to be something that it is not. The form in Buestion is that of a system of statements which are apparently related as premises and conclusions" that is" the form of a theory. H...I The metaphysician believes that he travels in territory in which truth and falsehood are at sta3e. An reality" however" he has not asserted anything" but only e0pressed something" li3e an artist.D )Carnap *+-+" 9+.

As the historical source for his surrogate thesis )DMetaphysicians are musicians without musical ability.D. Carnap adduces ?iet/sche" as that metaphysician" Dwho perhaps had artistic talent to the highest degreeD )ibid." 8<. and was hence able to give e0pression to the Lebensgefhl in the form of poetry )in +arathustra.. At this point a surprising contiguity shows up between the positions of Carnap and (eidegger that leads us bac3 to the theme of forms of presentation. Af we consider the historical stoc3 of philosophical forms of presentation" we find the complete spectrum between the poles of science and poetry. The Buestion is always to which does one orient oneself. Carnap orients himself methodically towards science" that is" towards the Eustification of statements. 2ith him philosophy is absorbed by the logic of science: it no longer has contents of its own. These contents are passed onto poetry where they find the form appropriate to them. 2ith Carnap" so to spea3" $rege's #egriffsschrift lies on the des3 and ?iet/sche's +arathustra on the bedside table. $or the intermediate form of a Dconcept1 poetryD )#egriffsdichtung in the sense of $. A. Lange. there is no place on either. The result is a problematic dichotomy of cognition and feeling. Apart from this dichotomous accentuation (eidegger seems to proceed from the same finding of a conflict between the form and content of metaphysics. 4ut since it is the contents that matter to him" he departs from the scientific form and consistently approaches )as ?iet/sche did. the form of poetry. Carnap and (eidegger" as well as the philosophical traditions founded by the two" have a common point of departure" but proceed from there in opposite directions and thus arrive at diametrically contrary forms of philosophy. 2hat Carnap announces in 'The Elimination of Metaphysics' )Carnap *+-+" 7=." namely a detailed e0position of a DmetalogicalD theory of syntactically meaningful languages" is presented by him in The Logical ynta% of Language )Carnap *+,;" *+79.. At should be noted that this e0position of the )later. so1called Dlinguistic framewor3D represents a transformation of traditional category theories along the lines of the linguistic turn. 2hereas in Aristotle we are concerned with categories of being" and in 6ant with categories of thin3ing" the analyses of analytic philosophy of language pertain to the categories of language. Considered in terms of philosophical history" the following line of development results@ ontology K epistemology K philosophy of language. Carnap's analyses differ from related endeavours within analytic philosophy in that they do not lead to the establishment of a single categorial framewor3" but conceive of different framewor3s as being theoretically possible. An the course of its development C starting with Der Logische Aufbau der Welt )Carnap *+=8. via Die logische ynta% der prache )Carnap *+,;. through to Meaning and $ecessity )Carnap *+-7. C there were indeed shifts in accentuation in Carnap's thin3ing" namely from

a more epistemological )in the sense of ?eo16antianism." via a formal logical" through to a semantic analysis" but an attitude which Carnap )*+,;" ;;f.: *+79" -*f.. himself formulated as his Dprinciple of toleranceD prevailed constantly. This attitude is characteri/ed by a con(entionalist apprehension of languages within the framewor3 of the theory of science. Carnap also spo3e later of the Dprinciple of conventionality of language formsD )Carnap *+7," --.. The basic idea lies in resolving scientific1theoretical disputes over content" such as the foundational dispute between logicists and intuitionalists in mathematics" through the description of different language forms@
DIn logic& there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic" i. e. his own form of language" as he wishes. All that is reBuired of him is that" if he wishes to discuss it" he must state his methods clearly" and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments.D )Carnap *+79" -=.

The principle of tolerance is thus part of Carnap's endeavour to eliminate so1called metaphysical Dpseudo1problemsD from the sciences. At formulates a metatheoretical standpoint which amounts to replacing ontology with logical synta0. Carnap also applied the principle of tolerance in modified form to the dispute between nominalists and latonists in semantics. An doing so he distinguished between DinternalD Buestions of e0istence that must be answered relative to a specific language form )a Dlinguistic framewor3D. and De0ternalD Buestions of e0istence that are concerned with reality as such. E0ternal Buestions of e0istence continued for him to be pseudo1problems" whereas with admitting language forms that provide the framewor3 for internal Buestions of e0istence he recommended the principle of tolerance. The criterion for the admission of linguistic forms was to be scientific utility alone )Carnap *+-<: *+-7.. Carnap's distinction between internal and e0ternal Buestions" which has 6antian roots" has for a long time not been ta3en seriously enough in analytic philosophy.8 This is shown by the discussions of scientific realism which are troubled by not having distinguished )from the beginning. between internal and e0ternal realism. Let Carnap had already made clear that science presupposes an internal realism C an empirical realism in the 6antian sense C but that every attempt to found" inductively as it were" an e0ternal metaphysical realism on a scientific basis is an impossible underta3ing" because it involves a transcendent use of e0perience.+ The analytic students did not understand their teacher's continental inheritance.
8Cf. on this distinction 6rauth *+9<" esp. Chap. >AA: also ?orton *+99. 5n the relationship to continental philosophy cf. arrini *++;" esp. =9; f. )footnote ;. and the literature listed there. +Contrary to Carnap (. Reichenbach" Carnap's companion in promoting a Dscientific WeltauffassungD" was convinced at times that he could give an inductive Eustification of realism. $or a critical evaluation cf. 6lein )=<<<" section =.*<1=.*=..

Af" for a moment" one ignores the fact that Carnap restricts philosophy from the outset to the e0plication of scientific language forms" then one could say that he is in agreement with (eidegger at least in the criticism of the presence1at1hand ontology: he adheres" however" to a presence1at1hand synta%. The subEect of language forms is the 3ey to understanding the conflict between Carnap and (eidegger. 2ith the reEection of certain language forms the e0pressive possibilities of philosophy are curtailed. Carnap acts tolerant" but his tolerance e0tends only so far as it is possible to translate the language form into a logical synta0. (e accuses (eidegger of adopting Dmany pecularities of the (egelian idiom ) prachform. along with their logical faultsD )Carnap *+-+" 9-.. (eidegger reacted to this obEection in his DEpilogue to What is Metaphysics?'. (is answer shows that he had understood the point precisely.
DThe suspicion against 'logic'" of which logistics*< may be considered a consistently developed degeneration" emerges from the 3nowledge of that thin3ing which finds its source in the e0perience of the truth of 4eing H einI" but not in the consideration of the obEectivity of the being Hdes eiendenI. E0act thin3ing is never the strictest thin3ing H...I.D )(eidegger *+97a" ,<8.

(eidegger denies the logic oriented towards propositional thin3ing the right to establish logical linguistic forms as the possible forms of thought altogether. (e sees metaphysics as being at wor3 precisely in logistics" and this in the sense of an obEectual presence1at1hand ontology. )2ith his self1critiBue in the ,hilosophical In(estigations of the one1sided ontology of obEects in the Tractatus" 2ittgenstein later agreed with him indirectly.. Even though (eidegger has a different metaphysics from Carnap in mind" he too is concerned with an D-ber.indung of metaphysicsD )he uses this formulation several times.. Let he does not want to eliminate metaphysics" he wants to o(ercome it. (eidegger wants to direct thin3ing away from the Buestion of being as the being ) eiendes. towards the Buestion of 4eing ) ein. itself )(eidegger *+97b" esp. ,79f... The comparison of (eidegger and Carnap ought to have made clear that the difference between continental and analytic philosophy is above all a matter of the style of thought which manifests in linguistic style. The linguistic style is a matter of rhetoric" and it is not difficult to distinguish authors according as to whether their rhetoric orients itself towards poetry or logic. %uch an orientation is not simply a matter of personal taste" rather the apprehension of philosophy itself comes to bear therein C namely as to whether poetic metaphors or logical analysis ta3e on the guiding function in philosophical speech.

*<'Logistics' )Logisti*. was at the time the usual term" also used by Carnap" for mathematical logic.

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At remains to be as3ed whether analytic and continental philosophy can be 'reconciled' with one another against the bac3ground of their shared past. 2hat is meant by this cannot be a colorful 'postmodern' mi0ture of styles" or even the levelling of the differences e0isting between the forms of presentation. 2hat matters far more is a thorough analysis of the respective peculiarities from the point of view of their functions. Af the one1sided orientation towards the logic of linguistic forms could be overcome and e0tended in favour of a more comprehensive rhetorics of linguistic forms" then the distinction between analytic and continental philosophy will prove to be historically e0plicable" but systematically mista3en. $or the time being" however" something would already have been gained if the 'fears of contact' were bro3en down further. An this spirit A would li3e to conclude by bringing out some elements of continental thin3ing with Carnap. Af one ta3es 6ant's understanding of metaphysics as a basis" then the appropriate place for the metaphysical ideas )of $reedom" !od" and Ammortality. is in practical philosophy. %uch a shift in location is also underta3en by Carnap in that he traces the theoretical hypostasi/ations of metaphysics bac3 to practical needs. Carnap's moral point of view is comparable to that of a 6antian socialism" as had been developed in the Marburg ?eo16antianism. The essential difference lies in that" for Carnap" there is no practical reason which could do Eustice to this need discursi(ely. To this e0tent he follows ?iet/sche. Morality without Eustifiability amounts to moral decisionism. 2e are" however" also involved with practical" albeit not morally practical" decisions in the approach to the sciences. Carnap's best 3nown e0ample is the decision between idealism and realism )in the Buestion of the e0istence of an e0ternal world." which is classified only as theoretically" but not as practically irrelevant. Carnap also deals with other metaphysical Buestions in this way. At the official theoretical front door of his philosophy he turns them away" but at the same time he 3eeps open a bac3 door to the courtyard of practical decision ma3ing. This theory1practice dualism is the result of his 'crossing' of ?eo16antianism and life1philosophy.** The influence of 6ant shows itself with Carnap not only in the adoption of several distinctions )such as those between genesis and validity" and between analytic and synthetic statements." but also in matters of theory construction. Carnap was very well aware that the development of scientific theories ta3es place from the points of view of unity and fruitfulness )6ant's +.ec*m!/ig*eit.. %uch points of view are" however" e0ternal in 3ind. The metaphysical suspicion must then apply to them too. (ere once more Carnap bac3s out of the difficulties by declaring these matters to be practical ones relating to application.

**This connection already becomes clear in Carnap *+=8. Cf. in particular the conclusion MM *9+1*8,.

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As we have already seen" Carnap uses the e0pression 'metaphysics' in a somewhat indeterminate manner. An doing so he refers to authors and Buestions as e0amples and not generally to everything that has been traditionally counted as metaphysics. An a remar3 to the English te0t of 'The Elimination of Metaphysics' he notes that the e0pression 'metaphysics' is used Dfor the field of alleged 3nowledge of the essence of things which transcends the realm of empirically founded" inductive science. Metaphysics in this sense includes systems li3e those of $ichte" %chelling" (egel" 4ergson" (eidegger. 4ut it does not include endeavors towards a synthesis and generali/ation of the results of the various sciences.D )Carnap *+-+" 8<. 2ith the addition )in the last sentence." the regulati(e epistemological function )in the 6antian sense. of metaphysical ideas is obviously being addressed. A. ?aess has rightly noted that" despite the life1philosophical reinterpretation of the concern of metaphysics" Carnap and #ilthey have one thing in common with the metaphysical systems@ DThey are 'totali/ing' views of reality" in #ilthey's sense: they 'set' certain values and represent decisions.D )?aess *+78" ;7. Last but not least" this is already e0pressed linguistically in the programme of a Dscientific WeltauffassungD. The replacement of the #iltheyan e0pression Weltanschauung )cf. Carnap *+-+" 9+. with Weltauffassung is nothing more than a word1political measure.*= The difficulty remains of determining how the categorial discourse is to be understood that attempts to spea3 in a Dtotali/ingD manner about the whole of meaningful language and is hence compelled to go beyond the bounds which it determines as being such. At does not have to become 'poetic' for this reason alone" but it will not be able to abstain from metaphors and other 'rhetorical' forms of presentation. 2ith this philosophy has at least one foot in the poetry camp" it is concept1poetry. At is at this point" A thin3" that the discussion between Carnap and (eidegger" between analytic and continental philosophy is to be ta3en up once again. Translated by Andrew An3pin References Carnap" R. *+=8. Der logische Aufbau der Welt. 4erlin@ 2elt3reis1>erlag. =nd edition" (amburg@ Meiner *+7*. C. *+,*. DNberwindung der Metaphysi3 durch logische Analyse der %pracheD. 0r*enntnis 1@ ==<1=;*. C. *+,;. Logische ynta% der prache. >ienna@ 'ulius %pringer. C. *+-<. DEmpiricism" %emantics" and 5ntologyD. Re(ue Internationale de ,hilosophie 2@ =<1;<. Reprinted in Carnap *+-7" pp. =<-1==*. C. *+-7. Meaning and $ecessity. =nd edition" Chicago@ &niversity of Chicago ress. C. *+-+. DThe Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of LanguageD. An@ A. '. Ayer" ed." Logical ,ositi(ism. !lencoe" All.@ The $ree ress" pp. 7<18*. Translation of Carnap *+,*.
*=At probably goes bac3 to 5. ?eurath. Cf. %tadler *++9" ,9=.

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C.*+7,. DAntellectual AutobiographyD. An . A. %chilpp" ed." The ,hilosophy of Rudolf 3arnap. The Library of Living hilosophers" vol. **. La %alle" All.@ 5pen Court" pp. *18;. C. *+79. The Logical ynta% of Language. 9th impression" London@ Routledge O 6egan aul. $riedman" M. *++7. D5vercoming Metaphysics@ Carnap and (eideggerD. An R. ?. !iere and A. 2. Richardson" eds." 4rigins of Logical 0mpiricism. Minneapolis and London@ &niversity of Minnesota ress )PMinnesota %tudies in the hilosophy of %cience" vol. Q>A." pp. ;-19+. C. =<<<. A ,arting of the Ways' 3arnap& 3assirer& and 5eidegger. Chicago and La %alle" All.@ 5pen Court. !abriel" !. =<<=. D$rege" Lot/e" and the Continental Roots of Early Analytic hilosophyD. An E. (. Rec3" ed." 6rom 6rege to Wittgenstein' ,erspecti(es on 0arly Analytic ,hilosophy. 50ford@ &niversity ress" pp. ,+1-*. (eidegger" M. *+*=. D?euere $orschungen Rber Logi3D. An 6rhe chriften ))esamtausgabe" vol. *.. $ran3furt am Main@ 6lostermann *+98" pp. *91;,. C. *+=+. Was ist Metaphysi*? 4onn@ $riedrich Cohen. An Wegmar*en ))esamtausgabe" vol. +.. $ran3furt am Main@ 6lostermann *+97" pp. *<+1*==. C. *+97a. Afterword to@ Was ist Metaphysi*? An Wegmar*en ))esamtausgabe" vol. +." $ran3furt am Main@ 6lostermann" pp. ,<,1,*=. C. *+97b. Antroduction to@ Was ist Metaphysi*? An Wegmar*en ))esamtausgabe" vol. +.. $ran3furt am Main@ 6lostermann" pp. ,7-1,8,. 6ambartel" $. *+78. 0rfahrung und tru*tur' #austeine "u einer 7riti* des 0mpirismus und 6ormalismus. $ran3furt am Main@ %uhr3amp. 6lein" C. =<<<. 7on(entionalismus und Realismus' +ur er*enntnistheoretischen Rele(an" der empirischen 8nterbestimmtheit (on Theorien. aderborn@ mentis. 6rauth" L. *+9<. Die ,hilosophie 3arnaps. >ienna and ?ew Lor3@ %pringer. ?aess" A. *+78. 6our Modern ,hilosophers9 3arnap& Wittgenstein& 5eidegger& artre. Chicago and London@ The &niversity of Chicago ress. ?orton" 4. !. *+99. Linguistic 6rame.or*s and 4ntology' A Re:0%amination of 3arnap;s Metaphilosophy. The (ague" ?ew Lor3" and aris@ Mouton. arrini" . *++;. D2ith Carnap" 4eyond Carnap@ Metaphysics" %cience" and the RealismSAnstrumentalism ControversyD. An 2. %almon and !. 2olters" eds." Logic& Language& and the tructure of cientific Theories' ,roceedings of the 3arnap:Reichenbach 3entennial" &niversity of 6onstan/" =*1=; May *++*. ittsburgh and 6onstan/@ &niversity of ittsburgh ress and &niversitTtsverlag 6onstan/" pp. =--1=99. at/ig" !. *+77. Afterword to Carnap" cheinprobleme in der ,hilosophie. $ran3furt am Main@ %uhr3amp" pp. 8-1*,7. Rentsch" T. *+8-. 5eidegger und Wittgenstein' 0%istential: und prachanalysen "u den )rundlagen philosophischer Anthropologie. %tuttgart@ 6lett16otta. Richardson" A. 2. *++8. 3arnap;s 3onstruction of the World' The Aufbau and the 0mergence of Logical 0mpiricism. Cambridge@ &niversity ress.

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%tadler" $. *++9. tudien "um Wiener 7reis' 8rsprung& 0nt.ic*lung und Wir*ung des Logischen 0mpirismus im 7onte%t. $ran3furt am Main@ %uhr3amp.