Space-Time, 'Science' and the Relationship between Physical Geography and Human Geography Author(s): Doreen Massey Reviewed

work(s): Source: Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1999), pp. 261-276 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers) Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/623127 . Accessed: 08/03/2013 18:36
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'science' and the relationship Space-time, between physicalgeographyand human geography

Doreen Massey
thattheremay be commonalities between This paper exploresthe possibility in of and human ways conceptualizing geography emerging physicalgeography It argues thatone of the things holdingphysicaland space, timeand space-time. to physicsas an human geographyapart forso long has been theirrelationship assumed model of 'science'. It is proposed here thatnot only is thisan inadequate of model of sciencebut thatit has led us astrayin our inherited conceptualizations is now evidentin both physical both timeand space. The urge to think'historically' the basis fora and human geography. The paper argues thatthisboth forms conversation and also us to rethink our notions of possible obliges space/space-time. key words space-time/time-spacecomplexity emergence physicsenvy
Walton Hall, Milton Keynes MK7 6AA Facultyof Social Sciences,Open University, revised manuscriptreceived 1 June1999

Connections
This paper is a preliminary dip intodeep waters.It will doubtless be taken to task on all sides. In a sense (althoughI would rather not be proven too in that horriblywrong), might itselfnot be too dismaying. For the argument presented here arises not only out of my theoretical interestin but also out ofanother conviction. For space(-time) a whole varietyof reasons,the carving-upof the world and of scientific endeavour between disciplines has been experiencedrecentlyas increasinglyuntenable.One of the most well-established and best-fortified of these old divides within knowledge has been that between the 'physical' and 'human' sciences. Yet even that ingrained between so-called 'natural' and counterposition 'social' is increasingly being questioned,and my conviction is thatiftheyare now up forreinspection and problematization,then geographers should be in a good position to make a leading In some areas theyhave long done so, contribution.

of course - one thinksof socialistenvironmentalthere is new work:that ism,forinstance. Moreover, of Whatmore(1999) and Murdoch (1997) among othersspringsto mind.This paper takesa particular tack at the issue. It stems fromthe idea that theremay be some questions that both physical and human geographers are concerned with, which we might, therefore, be able to debate There are, potentially, together. many such questions(includingthosethatbranchoff from the one under considerationhere - questions of realist of the conceptualization of entities, of philosophy, of path-dependence, of questionsof reductionism, and indeterminacy, etc); thispaper is a probability in one direction, tentative but a direction that foray - thenatureof is at theheartof ourjointenterprise (I will argue) of space-time. space, and therefore The immediatestimuliforthispaper were articles fromgeographersworkingin fieldsvery different (I had thought)frommy own. They were JonathanRaper and David Livingstone's (1995) 'Developmentofa geomorphological spatialmodel

TransInst Br GeogrNS 24 261-276 1999 of BritishGeographers)1999 ISSN 0020-2754? Royal Geographical Society (with The Institute

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using object-oriented design' and David Sugden's ice sheet:unstableice or (1996) 'The East Antarctic unstable ideas?'. The latterwas David Sugden's vice-presidentialaddress at the 1996 RGS-IBG annual conferenceand in it he urged that his thehistory readingof thecontroversy surrounding of the Antarctic ice sheet carried'further implications for geomorphologyin particular and for physical geography and geographyas a whole' (451). The present paper is in part an attempt to pick up thatbaton and to explore the connections to and implicationsfor my neck of the geographicalwoods. Let me begin, however, with Raper and Livingstone'spaper. This is an argumentfor the importanceof a concept of relativespace in the of environmental representation/modelling problems. '[T]he way thatspatio-temporal processesare influenced studied',theyargue,'is strongly by the model of space and time that is adopted' (1995, the authorsargue, while envi364). Traditionally, ronmentalrepresentations have been somewhat about the conceptsof space and time unthinking thattheyimply and necessarilyincorporate, they have in factbeen dominatedby "'timeless" geometric methods focused on two dimensional planes' (363). Raper and Livingstone'saim is to thisunthought and to arguefor disrupt assumption a moreself-conscious and 'relative'understanding. In doing this,theyturnto 'theoretical developto Einstein mentsin physics'(363) and in particular and Minkowski.This allows themto do a number it providesconceptsthatenable us of things. First, to understandspace and timeas 'dimensionsthat are definedby the entitiesthatinhabitthem and not vice versa':

Doreen Massey In the object-oriented the environmental approach mustdeclarethe natureof the real-world scientist entitiesidentified first:their characteristics and behaviour structure thespatial (360) representation. of thisis, of course,thatthe GIS (The implication folk have to receive the spatio-temporal framework from the applicationdomain,rather than,as themselves heretofore, beingin a positionto decide enablesthe it.) Second,thisapproachto space-time of entities themselves as a set of conceptualization 'worlds' (365), where each world has its own four-dimensional referencesystem. 'Time', they 'is a property oftheobjects'(366).Third, and write, implicitin all of this,is thatforthe kind of work that Raper and Livingstoneare addressing,it is necessaryto thinknot in termsof space and time separately,but in terms of a four-dimensional space-time(364). All ofthiswas, for It rang me,totally engrossing. many bells withmy own work,and thatof many others,withinhuman geography.We, too, have been struggling to understandspace (and spacethan the social, rather time) as constituted through as dimensionsdefining an arena within which the social takesplace. We too have triedto considerthe idea of local time-spaces, time-spaces specific to the entities with which theyare mutuallyconin rethinking stitutive. Thrift's (1996) explorations and space together and Whatmore's(1997) theory proposals for relational thinkingare prominent examples,as is muchoftheworkthatdraws on the ofBrunoLatour.The new Open University writing course on Understanding citiestriesto conceive of citiesas open time-space intensities of social relaand a tions,themselves interlocking encompassing of different groupsand varietyof sub-time-spaces In brief, activities. a number ofhumangeographers must be considered relative ie, concepts, spaceandtime to rethink as integrally are now trying spacespace and behaviour of the are determined the nature they by time and to conceptualize space-timeas relative that'inhabit' of 'relative entities them(the concept ofthesituation where space (definedin termsof the entities'within' it), relaspace').Thisis theinverse form a rigid which has tional (as constitutedthroughthe operation of andtime themselves framework of social relations,throughwhich the 'entities'are of an existence the entities (the concept independent 'absolute of and integral to theconstitution also constituted) space').(363) are local timethemselves(the entities the entities betweentwo approachesto spaces). Sometimesit can make yourhead hurtto Thus theydistinguish the spatial modellingof environmental problems: thinkin this way, but as Raper and Livingstone indexed (absolutespace) and the argue (1995, 364), 'the way that spatio-temporal thegeometrically influenced (relativespace). object-oriented by the processesare studiedis strongly In that is and time model of adopted.' other space Using the former approachmakes the coordinate a difference. it it makes matters; words, of ... intotheprimary index thespatial represystem oftheworld is thisway ofconceiving muchof the representational Moreover, sentation and dictates of interest. coming onto the agenda in wider debates within of the environmental structure problem

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'science' andthe between andhuman 263 Space-time, relationship physical geography geography the philosophy of social sciences. Perhaps most up in such ideas as 'quintessentialEnglishness' there are resonances hereofDeleuze and and moregeneralforms ofexclusivist nationalisms evidently, Guattari's(1984) 'events'and 'becomings'- see the and parochialisms. definitionof 'entities' above (although I would But to registerthese points is not at all to is a lot better on time attempt to distancemyself/ourselves from what is argue thattheirformulation than it is on space). And, of course,the projectof happening in Raper and Livingstone's part of reunitingspace and time, and freeingourselves geography.Ratherit is to suggest that what we fromthe debilitating separationof them that we have here is the potentialfor debate and discushave inherited, primarily (thoughnot only) from sion, together.Maybe there are questions and Kant,is one now being takenup by manywriters debates, and even some tentative'answers', that (see, for instance, Massey 1992 and references different partsof geographyhave in common. Unwin (1993), in the resoundingcoda to therein). his book, argued fora reunification of geography of timeprecisely around a reconceptualization 'Science' and physics envy space. Indeed, ratherthan arguingfora reprioritization of space (in a kind of competitionwith Therewas, moreover, anotheraspect of Raper and time),we should perhapsbe arguingfora unified Livingstone'spaper that rang bells with me as a As Larry Grossberghas written: human geographer. As I said, theyturnto physics understanding. 'The bifurcationof time and space, and the for stimulation in the development of their - of privilegingof time over space, was perhaps the approach.In thistheyare adoptinga strategy to a 'harder' science - that is common foundingmoment of modern philosophy' (1996, referring he adds, 'the crucialissue is the across the subspecialismswithingeography(and 178); in a footnote, of the indeed beyond). Cultural geographersmay cite two' (187). separation it was clear chaos theory, urban theorists turnto formulations Now, even at thislevel of generality, to me, on reading Raper and Livingstone,that fromquantum mechanics,anyone arguing about therewere also differences of emphasis between the nature of knowledge might draw on the theirapproach and mine. Thus, to give one exam- thinking of Heisenberg. on 'entities', Two thingsin particular interest me about this ple, theyfocustheir conceptualization while it is perhaps more usual in the debates of phenomenon: on theone hand howwe do it (thatis, whichI am aware in humangeography to focuson the termson which we make the appeal) and on the mutualconstitution of relationsand entities, theother hand theintellectual ofwhy we do history Their approach is explicitly it. It is my opinionthat, at least in some cases, this along withspace itself. and the objects come beforethe habit of referring to physicsbears witness to an 'object-oriented' For me itis easierand morehelpfulto implicit bothofa model ofscienceand space-times. imagination understandentities and space-times as being con- ofa particular betweenthedisciplines. relationship in the same momentand as thatin itself It is an imaginationthat physical and human stituted of geographers case it share,even thoughin thelatter happening throughthe relationalconstitution themboth.Thiskindofrelational of is less understanding explicitlyheld and would probably be is gaining denied ifopenlychallenged(as I am challenging it space and of entities/objects/identities withinhuman geography. It is here). Moreover, I want to argue,it is an imaginaincreasing currency now quite frequently argued that(social) spatiality tionwhich,while it maybe sharedby physicaland and entitiessuch as 'places' are products of our human geographers, nonetheless servesto hold us The implicationsare numer- apart. (social) interactions. ous and range from a queryingof the tendency to Raper and Livingstoneare careful about the see space as necessarilydivided into closed and natureoftheir reference to physics.Theyare aware bounded regions- a queryingwhich would aug- of the need to definethe limitsto validityof the - claims they are making, and remain consistent ment this with a focus on interconnections to the more assertion that we have with the argumentsof physics in acceptingthat through general a responsibility forthe spatialitiesthroughwhich concepts of absolute space may be suitable for we live and construct our lives. It is an approach some spheresofgeographical work(theycitelandthatopens up questionsof thesupposed 'essences' resourcemanagement as an example). This is not, ofplaces, along withnotionsofauthenticity bound then,a generalproposition about the applicability

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Doreen Massey of concepts of relativespace. Their point is that There is a particularcontradiction here: many of 'there are argumentsfor the use of a "relative our appeals to physicsthesedays are in factto the space" approach in the study of environmental new views of the world coming out of quantum This is problems' (1995, 363).1 Moreover, they turn to mechanicsand more recentdevelopments. thatithas 'expanded the quite acceptablewhen thereference takestheform physicson definedterms: to a stimulating new idea or a potential range of conceptsavailable' (363). In otherwords, ofpointing it is treated as a provocation, a stimulus to thought. analogy.But when it takes the formof a demonIn this, from some stration ofproofsimplythrough however, theyare quite different appeal to a higher the irony is that that authoritywas others,in both physical and human geography, authority, who turnto physicsas a kind of higherauthority, established in relationto, and in the days of, a as a sourceof unimpugnable truth. It is what I call much older formof physics.We need, then,to be thereverential if'physics'says so, who are circumspectabout the nature and status of our reference: we to disagree? references. Such an attitude In human geography and relateddisciplines, for is, ofcourse,builtupon implicit that lie deep within us, as both instance, what preciselyis the statusof appeals to understandings intellectualsand 'ordinary citizens'. There has quantummechanicsor chaos theory? What,really, developed over thelast fewcenturies (buildingon are the grounds for evocations of fractalspace? even older foundations)an acceptance of a hier- As provocationsto the imaginationtheymay be as implicit assertions ofa archyamong the sciences,betweenthe disciplines, wonderfully stimulating; and betweenforms of knowledge.It operatesboth singleontology need as invocations they justifying; in general and with great precision.Withinthe of a higher,truer science they may be deeply standard disciplines,physics is at one end and suspect.3 Thereare,moreover, further reasonsforcaution. (say) cultural studies and the humanitiesat the Neoclassical economicshas striven other. to distin- It is rare,forinstance, thatone can legitimately or guish itselffromothersocial sciences and to give unequivocally appeal to 'recentdevelopmentsin itself as much as possible the appearance of a physics'in proofor demonstration ofan argument in science. on another for such field, physical (hard) Physical geographers developmentsare often occasions think they are 'more scientific'than themselves thesubjectof fierce debate.In my own human geographers,where the term 'scientific' work on the reconceptualization of spatialityin conjuresup images of the statusand worthof the ways adequate to faceup to some of the problems knowledge acquired. And yet,while the physical posed by modem times,I have also foundmyself Indeed, not geographermightfeel thisway about the human, exploringdebates about temporality. in terms thefeelings are reversed when theyturnto facethe onlywould I argue thatwe need to think but also I would prootherway. Thus Frodemanwritesof 'the "physics of space-time/time-space, seems to suffer from pose that any conceptualizationof space has a envy" thatgeologysometimes (ie the sense of inferiority concerningthe status (logically) necessary corollary in a particular of time.The factthat of geology as compared with other, "harder" 'matching'conceptualization in And a different often work with 'unmatched ...' (1995, 961). sciences) people pairs' is, I that of biology,Steven Rose maintain, the sourceof a numberof the difficulties disciplinealtogether, faced in of all sortshave frequently deploys a verysimilarlanguage to argue thathis thatscientists froma sense of thismatter. disciplineis often'said to suffer The conceptofspace forwhichI wantto argueis of "physicsenvy" (whichmay perhaps inferiority, be whythesedays manymolecular to one that holds that space is open and dynamic. biologists try behave as iftheyarephysicists!)' (1997,9).2 This is That is (and given what was said above about it is an envy that is deeply embedded, and it pro- space-time), 'space' cannotbe a closed system: as an absence to the not stasis,itis notdefined vides an implicitgroundingforreferences negatively it is not the classic 'slice through of physicsin many a part of geography. of temporality, authority Thereare manyreasons to contestthisassump- time'. Indeed, the closed-system/slice-throughof of space denies the possibility the established timeimagination tion of authority. Most evidently, - forthereis no mechanismfor and its truth- a real temporality of its methodology statusof physics, claims,is based on an image of thatdisciplinethat moving fromone slice to the next (Massey 1997). thatI envisagewould be open, thespatiality is now out of date. Physics itselfhas moved on. Rather

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andthe between 'science' andhuman 265 relationship physical geography geography Space-time, in the process of being made on the natureof geology as a science,argued the would be constantly (the relationsyet to be established,or not) and following: would have elementsof both order and accident Historical science ... cutsacrossthetraditional lines (the latterderivingfromthe happenstancejuxtabetweenthe various sciences:physics,chemistry, positions and separationswhich - I argue - are astronomy, geology, biology, anthropology, psychology, intrinsic to space). It would be integralto spaceandtherest. Eachofthese hasboth historical sociology, of space, howtime.That kind of understanding and nonhistorical theproportions of aspects, although thetwodiffer thesciences the ever,'matches' with a particularview of time:as named, Among greatly. historical element rolein physics, and the vehicle of novelty.Now, I irreversible playsthesmallest whereit is frequently and the greatest in could appeal to 'physics'forcorroborating witness ignored, where theexistence ofnonhistorical sociology, aspects to thisargument; but I could also - being honestis sometimes denied - oneofthereasons that sociology find a physics that proposed quite the opposite has not It is nota been ranked as a science. always point of view. And, within physics, I am not coincidence that there is a correlation with complexity competentto judge. We must not, then,resortto and levelsof integration, thesimplest physics being tacticsthat in realityamount to picking out for and sociology themost science in this complex partial or quotation - and as 'proof' - one's favourite, list. ofscience havetended Unfortunately philosophers mostcompatible, 'harder' scientist. toconcentrate ononeendofthis andthat the spectrum, I will not belabour any further all these arguso much as to givea distorted, and in some simplest, instances idea ofthephilosophy mentsagainstthesupposed scientific ofscience of quitefalse, superiority as a whole. save to make two brief and one physics, points more extended one. First that,however 'hard' a science is, it is still the productof a process con- A whole hostofissues clamourforattention in that ducted within and influencedby a wider social quotation.To begin with,Simpsonmakes the very context and theconditions and character ofitsown important pointthatthemove along the spectrum The work of sociologistsof knowl- from performance. model) to sociolphysics(nineteenth-century and others theorists is now too ogy involves an increase in complexity. edge, actor-network Physics' well knownforthispoint to need further elabora- focus on relatively and therefore, simple systems, tion. Second that,whereverone findsoneselfon especiallythe initialfocus on the simple,timeless this supposed 'spectrum'fromphysicsto cultural systemsof classical mechanics, has been problemofotherforms ofknowlstudies,certaindebates in which one is engaged aticalforthedevelopment seem to be sharedwithat least some of thoseboth edge. The assumptionthatnon-simpleaspects of upstreamand downstream.The work of Isabelle the world were in principlereducible to simple comes to mind: systems (or, in terms of knowledge-production, Stengersand of MarilynStrathern neitherof themgeographers but both widely read would need to be if 'scientific' knowledgewere to As a social scientist much preoc- be gained from by geographers. them),thattheywere reallysimple I findthe debates within systemswithtoo much 'noise' in them,prevented cupied withessentialism, or notof'naturalkinds' themfrombeing addressed in theirown rightas biologyabout theexistence (and, if theyexist,debates about theirconceptual- complex systems.As is now being ever more frethemove from ization) to be both fascinatingand unsettling quentlyargued in a rangeof fields, (see, for instance, Goodwin 1995; Rose 1997). an assumption of simplicityto a recognitionof Argumentsin numbertheoryabout the status of complexity (withopenness,feedback, non-linearity Is there and a move away fromsimple equilibrium)can 'naturalnumbers'keep me equally riveted. here a return to a PlatonismwhichI, in mypartof change the picture entirely,to the point of the forest, am struggling to be freefrom? thoroughly undermining many of the conclusions The finaland more extendedpoint stems from arrivedat through the analysis of simple systems the factthatthereis a considerable literature and Stengers (1984) and Prigogine deny- alone. Prigogine ing the view of 'physics' (in classical mechanical (1997) arguethispointat some length, expandingit thatan overconcenguise) as theone truemethodofdoing scienceand to make thewider observation as the purest formof scientific on simple systemsmight, at least on occaknowledge. Both tration Frodeman and Rose argue this position,as do a sions, have led us thoroughly astray.With such host of authorsin both geology and geomorphol- arguments itwould gainingan ever-wider hearing, ogy.Thus Simpson(1963,46), in a classic statement seem that,at least withinacademe if not in more

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266 popular understandings,the higher status of branches of science that restricted themselvesto come in forfurther simplesystems might questioning. Perhaps disciplinesthat study 'complex systems' (frommeteorologyto sociology) can now lead the way. Certainlyit is now increasingly approaches argued that a number of different can be taken to the analysis of any individual objectof study.Richards(1990; 1994,forexample) makes a strongand detailed case forthis in geoenabling a move away fromreducmorphology, and a greater of complexopen tionism recognition and And feedback effects. Spedding (1997) systems proposes a new kind of questionforgeomorphology, one that gives priorityto compositional relationships rather than to detailed process studies. Crucial to this is anotherimplicationof - emergence: complexity ofemergence enables us to describe Thephenomenon don't have to underforms sui We generis. emergent to understand even standbrainchemistry language, the without wouldnotbe possible thelatter though former. communication) personal (Sayer in David Sugden's analysisofthehistory Similarly, ice sheet,two approaches are of the east Antarctic and the geomorthe biostratigraphical presented: phological.The two approacheslead to verydifferof the ice sheet. of the history ent understandings The biostratigraphical approach appears to favour a historyof dynamic change, while the geomorphological points to a more stable past. It is a thathas signifiin theanalysisofhistory difference view implies each cantcontemporary implications: results of the a different potential prognostication of global warming. In recentyears,the biostratigraphical approach has had the wider currency. Sugden's challengeis of its data has ignored the that interpretation broadergeomorphological This,he argues, setting. is typical of a more general phenomenon: that geomorphologyhas, in recent decades 'stressed short-term process studies and retreatedfrom studies of landscape evolution' (1996, 451). This, in turn, he relates to the traditionalview that are a kind of physics geologyand geomorphology manqu&: tobe in this anddriven Viewed bytheaspiration light thatgeomorunderstandable it is perhaps scientific, short-term has stressed reductionism, process phology to route as theoptimum and experimentation studies (451-2) knowledge.

Doreen Massey In otherwords, it has ignoredthe emergent phenomena:the landforms. And thisin turnis related to time-span. how an Sugden's paper demonstrates of the longer-term historicalgeounderstanding can lead to a different interpretation morphology of the history of the ice sheet. Sugden's aim (like that of Frodeman and Simpsonforgeology)is to argue thatgeomorphology mustbe understoodnot as a disciplinethatis an imperfect physicsbut ratheras a complex and attensciencethatcombineswithinitself synthetic of tion to 'timeless'processes and understanding what the argument as a historical ones. Certainly whole implies is that any comparisonsbetween physical and human geographyon the basis of we status'need to be laid aside. Rather, 'scientific should put in a claim fortheirboth being sciences whichare badly of the complexand thehistorical, served by looking to (an anyway now misconceived notionof)physicsas a model. This does not mean that no assumptionsof timelessprocesses maybe made; even in thesocial fieldsuch assumptions may on occasions be innocuous. But both physical and human geographers need to be to so-calledharder cautious about theirreferences sciencesand a good deal morerigorousabout the are made. Being termson which such references in that way, by wrenchingourselves self-critical we all vestigesof thatold imagination, away from mightfind at least a few elementsof a common ground:thatboth physicaland human geography - at least in large measure - are complex sciences about complexsystems.

Historicaltime
Simpson, in the quotation cited earlier,not only between simple and complex makes a distinction but also relatesit to a further and sciences, systems - betweennon-historical and historical. distinction One of the keys connection. This is a fundamental in this debate, certainlyamongst geologists and betweenprois the distinction geomorphologists, cesses (and thus formsof explanation) that are timelessand those thatare time-bound. (Different termsare sometimesdeployed in this distinction: Simpson (1963) uses immanent and configurational, Bernal (1951) immanentand contingent.) Thereare also intermediate cases, such as equilibrium systems(see below). But the crucial point in here is thattime-bound processes are historical

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'science' andthe between andhuman 267 Space-time, relationship physical geography geography the full sense that they develop a futurethat is this relationship of mutual admiration, Frodeman open. argues, remained long undisturbed.It was little Now, I want to argue thatthereare implications wonderthatso manydisciplinesdeveloped a form here for the way in which we understandtime of physicsenvy. itself. Otherphilosophersand branchesof philosophy Moreover, given my earlierpropositionthat any conceptualizationof the nature of time will have,however, long struggled againsttheseformuhave implications for the conceptualization of lations, largely developing in opposition to a space, I want to propose thatthereare also, hidden reductionof 'knowledge' to a narrow interpretawithinthisdebate, implications forhow we think tionof science.The impulseformuch of thislatter about space and spatiality. In other words, our investigation was thedouble argument on the that, to nineteenth-century relationship physicshas mis- one hand, 'science' was not the only - nor even led us not only about simplicity/complexity but necessarilythe best - way to gain knowledge of also about our concepts of time. This has had reality and, on the otherhand, thatthereis no one in both natural and social sciences. It has best scientific effects method. also had reverberations forhow we conceptualize Frodemanwishesto inject moreofthisstream of space. So, if we could overthrowsome of our philosophyintogeology:to abandon thesearchfor with nineteenth- general timeless laws for everything(see also fascinations (shared,if different) of a century physicswe mightalso be freeto reimagine Simpson1963) and to turnto thedevelopment historical space/space-time. specifically approach. Frodemanprovidesa good place from whichto This issue of history is crucial.Frodemanpoints As David for does out that time has been begin. Sugden geomorphology, absolutelycentralto the Frodemanproposes forgeologythatitbe accepted developmentof these criticalstrandsof philosoas an historicalscience.4Although he does not phy,but he does not develop the point further. In spell thisout,what is at issue hereis thenatureof fact, considerationof time was central to such time:timeless a notionof philosophiesprecisely because the classicalscience processesdo notgenerate This was the case open historicaltime. In other words, behind the of the day evoked timelessness. long-establishedstatus of 'physics' (largely in not only in the conceptof fullytimelessprocesses, the guise of classical mechanics) as the scientific but also in closed equilibriumsystems, where the is given,containedwithinthe initialcondidiscipline par excellencehas been an implicit future assumption about time that deprives it of its tions - it is closed. This flew in the face of what openness; reduces its possibility of being these criticalphilosophersknew of the world. A historical. long historyof the developmentof ideas about This has been reflected in the complexrelation- timewas setin train. and Stengers (1984) Prigogine Frodeman analysethishistory in detail.Theypointto a whole ship between 'science' and philosophy. in thecase ofgeology, thisrelationship string of philosophers, from Hegel through arguesthat, has been distant(geologistsbeing impatient with Heidegger to Whitehead,struggling against what philosophizingand philosophersnot seeing any- they feared were the wider implicationsof the and ontologicalclaims of the then thingof seriousimportwithingeology).However, epistemological he argues that this lack of dialogue has been set currentlydominant forms of science. Diderot, (and admiration) Kant, Hegel, Whitehead and Bergson all against a mutual commitment between science-as-physicsand philosophy-as- 'attempted to analyse and limit the scope of Such philosophy, positivism.5 especiallyin itsearly modem science as well as to open new perspecof people such as Carnap tives seen as radically alien to that science' days and in thewritings (1937), maintainedthatscience was the only road (Prigogineand Stengers1984, 79-80). Central to to knowledge and that therewas only one true theirstruggle was the argument thattimemustbe scientific itself to (its under- fullyopen-futured. method;it committed Bergsonwas crucial here: for the empirical method him,timewas about the continuousemergence of standings of) objectivity, and epistemological monism (which essentially novelty, in a way that is becoming 'To himthefuture Such an can never be a mere rearrangement of what has incorporateda reductionism-to-physics). approach can not admit 'the fullyhistorical'into been' (Adam 1990,24). the realm of the scientific. In spite of subsequent The 'hard sciences' were obdurate, however. such as those of Kuhn, Prigogineand Stengers(1984, 16) argue that this debates,and laterwritings

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268 of getting'science' to recognizea fully difficulty historicaltemporality As 'led to discouragement'. at that historical moment the choice it, they put seemed to be eitherto acceptthepronouncements of classical science or to resortto a metaphysical philosophy.Bergson (along with Whitehead and route. others)took the latter One resultof this,whichI believe to have been both utterlydevastating and at the same time foundationalfor much subsequent philosophical and social thought, was thatas a consequence of these philosopherslaying claim to the essential oftime, creativity space- postulatedas theintuitive came to be seen as therealmofthedead. opposite For Bergson,'space' became associated with the science with which he was embattled. If such scienceignoredtime(theopen temporality thathe was strugglingto assert) it must therefore be 'space' (a leap of 'logic' thatI findtotallyuntenhe able, but you can see why it happens). Further, the of scientific interpreted very process productionas one of'spatialization'(ie oftaking'time'out of things). Indeed, representation as a generic activitybecame associated with the spatial, an associationthatlives on strongly to this day. For Bergson,'the rationalmind merelyspatializes';he thoughtin terms of 'the immobilizing(spatial) (Gross 1981-82,62, 66): categoriesof the intellect'

Doreen Massey oftheir and Stengers day) and social (see Prigogine 1984; see also a numberof otheraccounts,such as Toulmin1990). also influHowever, this troubledrelationship enced the course thatwas takenby (some) philoOne example is the sophical and social theorizing. mentioned above: thatthereis a relaassumption To tionship between space and representation. 'represent'was (and still oftenis) understoodas being to 'spatialize'. This assumption runs as a Laclau's (1990) laterwork guidingthreadthrough on the philosophy of radical democracy; it is assertedwithout further explanation by de Certeau much of struc(1984); it reverberates throughout turalism.Even one of the strongest protagonists withinour own disciplineof theimportance ofthe spatial takes thisview: ofrepresentation, infact, is a spatialization Anysystem of sorts which automatically freezesthe flow of and in so doingdistorts whatit strives to experience 1989, 206) represent... (Harvey

There are two things going on here: firstthe thatrepresentation and fixes, argument necessarily therefore deadens and detractsfrom, the flow of life; and second that this process of deadening is I The first equivalentto 'spatialization'. proposition would not entirely I shall on to go dispute,though modify the form in which it is customarily For Bergson, themindis by definition orispatially ented. Buteverything and teeming couched. However,it seems to me thatthereis no creative, expansive case at all forthe second proposition: thatthereis with is not. the intellect can never Hence, energy help an between and us reach what is essential because itkills andfragments equivalence space representation. all thatit touches ... We must, concluded, It is one of those accepted thingsthatare by now Bergson breakout of the spatialization imposed by mindin so deeply embedded that theyare rarelyif ever with order toregain contact thecoreofthetruly living, questioned. in thetime which subsists dimension...6 I would argue threethingsand pose one quesonly tion. First argument: that this now-hegemonic in fact derives I want to propose that this engagementbetween equationofspace and representation and early twentiethbranchesofphilosophy(and from nineteenth-century 'science' and different battlesoverthemeaningoftime(as argued also social sciences) both has been genu- century thereby for above). This may be why, historically, representainelytwo-sidedand has had deep implications how we thinkabout space. In the era of classical tion has come to be equated with spatialization, is both mistakenand science- and on the issue of time- social science but in factsuch terminology thatrepresenSecond argument: wereclearly forquestions activelyharmful. and philosophy reaching that the dominantnatural scientists of theirday tationmay indeed 'fix' and 'stabilize' (thoughsee simplydid not grasp.These earlyso-calledharder below), but thatwhat it so stabilizesis not simply thatthis And thirdargument: have listenedto and timebut space-time. scientists could with benefit learned fromphilosophers and social scientists. historically significant way of imaginingspace/ an assumption notonlyderivesfrom thereasonsthattheydid not learn,or in spatialization Moreover, the ques- that space is to be defined simply as a lack of some cases thattheyresistedso fiercely tions and argumentsof certain criticalphiloso- temporality (holding time still) but also has con(accordingto the lights tributed substantiallyto its continuing to be phers,were both scientific

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andthe between andhuman 269 'science' geography physical geography relationship Space-time, point: that debates thoughtof in that way. It is, however,a totally Moreover,there is a further within physics itself are now challenging the inadequate conceptionof space. even there. What The question is this: given this association of argumentsabout temporality in his much of and the characterization with early work in Prigogine argued representation, space and physics, and now Prigogine and what optionsare therefor chemistry of space as immobility, is thatnaturalscience forGIS, to Stengers forcartography, arguemorebroadly, representing space itself is changing(mustnow change) its own view develop a formof mappingthat- althoughrepre- itself - does notreducespace to a dead surface. of time - that the new reconceptualizations of sentation of an open How can it be brought alive? This is an issue physics lead towards the recognition influenced bothby thetechniquesavailable and by and fully historicalnotion of time. So natural conceptual stance, and it is addressed by Raper science must change, and is indeed beginning and Livingstone (1995,362): theproblem'concerns to do so: of a continuous realityusing the representation are of non-equilibrium The results thermodynamics discreteentities';the issue, in otherwords and in close to the views expressedby Bergsonand of the temporal is not the spatialization of is indeed related to thecreation Whitehead. Nature my terms, is all than the is richer where (the dominantview of what representation possible unpredictable novelty, of space-time.And thereal.(Prigogine 1997, about) but the representation 72) of space-timeis itselfan emer- But what thisin turn the representation means, of course,is thatthe of thespace- science gentproductof theconceptualization which against Bergson and others time entities themselves. Deleuze and Guattari constructed their ideas no longer has to be thenotionofrepresen- combated... address thisby challenging tation. For them, a conceptshould expressan event thelimitations criticized are beginning to be Bergson ratherthan an essence. In Allen et al (1998), we not the scientific or overcome, by abandoning approach were aiming to reconceptualize the regionin this abstract butby perceiving thelimitations of thinking of was 'the-south-east-inway our object study ofclassical and bydiscovering theconcepts dynamics the-1980s' - what Deleuze and Guattarimightcall new formulations valid in moregeneral situations. an event,and what we would call a time-space. and Stengers 1984, 93) (Prigogine howDeleuze and Guattari(1984, 23) go further, This must also mean that,insofaras it was influever,and argue against any notion of a tripartite divisionbetweenreality, and subjec- enced - as it musthave been - by thebattleit was representation at thetime,Bergson'sown formulation can tivity:'Rather,an assemblage establishesconnec- waging In now itself be reworked. other we are not words, tions between certain multiplicities drawn from each of these orders.' Here representation is no obliged to follow his conclusions about space. Moreover and finally,and in case you were longerstasis,but an elementin a continuousproto point to an inconsistency here, my duction;a partof it all, and constantly 'becoming'. tempted of Prigogine(Nobel Prize winnerin a hard citing In geography, in Thrift's non(1996) explorations science,etc) is not done in themannerof reference representational theoryare pushing in a similar to the unimpugnable authorityof 'science', for direction. there are as many fierce debates among scientists But to returnto the main argument:all this about these matters as thereare amongstphilosoI of would came about misreading space, argue, it is simplyto Rather, because of social scientists' and philosophers' phers and social scientists. demonstrate that we no have to battle longer reactionsto naturalscience's intransigence on the to matter of time. It was as a result of science's against a 'science' that appears monolithically the opposite. say that some a intransigence philosophers sought way around its propositions. The argument here is thatthese lines of develin and human As I have argued, Imagining 'history' physical opmentcan now be rethought. geography the cultureof reverencefor physics is being (or needs to be) undermined. Not onlyis the (classical Some of this thinking is already well established mechanics) image of physics an outdated one, within physical geography. Barbara Kennedy but the validity of historical sciences, in their (1992), forinstance, has reflected on the history of own right,is being more properly recognized. geomorphology in this light. She argues that

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Doreen Massey the influence of Strahler's (1952) and, more In other words, his aim is to draw on recent particularly,Chorley's (1962) advocacy of a developmentsin theories of dynamical systems in a more genuinely dynamic as opposed to a historicalapproach to that open up temporality geomorphology(that is, in the termspreviously historical way.And, indeed,he draws on thework used here,theiremphasis on immanent processes, of,among others, Ilya Prigogine. and timelessness) has had a numberof What Thornesis doing,in otherwords,is again equilibrium effects that should now be questioned. Thus, she drawing on a supposedly 'harder' science for into the complexities of his own. What we argues, it has encouraged the emergence of a insight of the as the have here is and maths (or, in general,a history discipline gradual comingphysics to-dominanceof that 'scientific'(as opposed to range of 'harder' sciences) as themselves historical. As we have seen, there is nothingwrong with historical) approach to analysis.She argues: Allthis has led,as is almost toa 'folk' view drawing on such disciplinesso long as the terms inevitable, of thehistory of thesubject in whichthe of the relationship (analogy? provocation/ emerging, directtranslation? of the is simple reverence?) 'dynamic' triumph approach shownto be stimulation? foreshadowed of selected forerun- are made clear and adhered to. Taking up by theprescience ners: at itsworst, this vision leadsto a simple succes- Prigogine and others' work on far-fromsion of triumphant, dynamic 'goodies'and Hutton equilibrium systems,and the potential for the and so forth. begets Playfair, begets Lyell, (Kennedy productionof 'order out of chaos', Thornes can in original) 232-3, 1992, emphasis draw important conclusions about potential instabilities and landscape sensitivity: The firstthing Kennedy does is question that whena system is closetoa stable (suchas equilibrium of geomorphology's histeleologicalinterpretation in the environment randomfluctuations pediplain), Her second argument is even morecentral to tory.7 havelittle whereas ifthe is at may consequence, system the concernsof thispaper. Chorleytook the prinor closeto a bifurcation then smallfluctuations point, forthe sciencan have dramatic effects. Thisis whatis meant ciples of mechanicsas the blueprint by tific of the development discipline,opposed these (231) landscape sensitivity. principles to those of historical analysis, and about knowledge neglected the latter.Kennedy's argument(which However,thewiderpropositions and also morewidelyon chaos withinwhichThornesis workingare also interestdraws on Prigogine to his paper,he writesthatthe theoryand the study of non-linearsystems- ie ing. In the abstract is thatthe renewed interestin the long-term behaviour of post-mechanical physicsand chemistry) separationbetween these approaches is, perhaps, landforms'should be soundly based in theory more fluidthanhas often been supposed. rather than inferentially based on historical - and indeed sometimesthe studies' (225). And laterhe writesof 'the lack of The complexities - of thisevolvingdebate ironyof the complexities (as opposed to historicany accepted theoretical are broughthome by JohnThornes'proposals for inferential) model of long-term geomorphological an evolutionarygeomorphology(Thornes 1983). behaviour' (225). Now, thereare certainly particuHe takes up the challengeof the 'renewedinterest lar issues ofhistorical in geomorphology, inference in thelong-term behaviourofland forms' natureof theprocessesit (225) and given theverylong-term in and that interest it needs to be acknowledged emphasis geomorphol- studies.Nonetheless, argues fromthe observationof equilib- that 'theories' also involve inference.Newton ogy are shifting of this 'interpreted', and in his interpretations rium states (that is, in the terminology was withno truehistorical and contime); influenced paper,closed systems by thewidersocial movements his aim is to gain new insightsinto 'historical ditions of his day. On the wider canvas, both problems'(234). The approachhe adopts,however, 'immanent' and 'configurational'processes are fromthatadvocated by Sugden studied in historical is ratherdifferent contexts. Here, then,is a furor by Frodemanforgeology; therblurring forgeomorphology, to add to that alof the distinction his proposal is to shift, out drawn Moreover, Thornes' by Kennedy. ready to the to be confined seems notion of 'theory' se tothe states from theobservation ofequilibrium per But 'theories' and mathematical. abstract/formal and of stable of the existence multiple recognition it must be too. Finally, them and can apply to the historical thebifurcations between unstable equilibria, noted thatwhat we have herein Thornes'work is them. thetrajectories (234) connecting

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'science' andthe between andhuman 271 Space-time, relationship physical geography geography as in non-linear I shall All the stories of of dynamical systems. history sequence. Progress, Developto thispointin a moment. return ment, of Modernization(such as the movement What is particularly however,about fromtraditionalto modem), of the Marxistprointeresting, these developmentsin geomorphology is that in gressionthrough modes of production(feudalism, one way or another they are all rethinking the capitalism,socialism, communism)and of many of the story of 'globalization' (see concept of time and their relationship to it. formulations Whetherit be throughan emphasis on a more Massey 1999) share a geographical imagination science,or via an analysis of thatinvolvesthismanoeuvre:it rearranges qualitativehistorical spatial the potentialbifurcations in the paths of complex differences into temporalsequence.8Such a move the implication is thattimeis has enormous implications: it implies thatplaces dynamicalsystems, are not genuinelydifferent (I shall discuss below trulyopen-ended. One of the reasons I personally find this so what I mean by this) but simply 'behind' or is thatI believe a similarshift has been 'advanced' withinthle same story; their'difference' interesting underwayin thesocial/humansciences,or at least consistsonly of theirplace in thequeue. in partsof them.And thisis in spiteof thefactthat This, then,is a powerful (in the sense of frethese sciences - or most of them - would have quentlyhegemonic)imaginary whichgeography - serves to occlude the real significance planted themselves firmlyin the camp of the ironically historical. For there is, of course, history and of geography. It obliterates, or at minimumin its history.There are different ways of imagining muted forms reduces, the import and the full which implydistinct of measureof the real differences thatare at issue. So history conceptualizations time and temporality I want to argue thata full (and, as I shall go on to what is 'real difference'? of difference would understandit as argue in the finalsectionof thispaper, space and recognition more than in a spatiality). place sequence, forunderstanding Firstof all, of course,it is necessaryto note the difference as place-in-a-sequence is, after all, a kind versionofthatunderstanding of many attempts by human geographersto model oftemporo-spatial themselves on Newtonian physics. Notions of difference thatsees othersas reallyonly 'a variatimeless processes were integralto much of the tion on myself',where 'myself' is the one conthe imagination. So the countries of,say, modellingworkof the 1970s.And theclosed times structing of closed equilibriumsystemshave also figured theSouth of thisplanet (in thesemodernist imagiIn the human sciences more widely, nationsof progressemanatingon the whole from prominently. it has been the developmentof neoclassical eco- the North) are not reallydifferent - they are just nomicsfrom the 1870sto the 1900s (and stillgoing slow versions of us. In contrastto this, a fuller of difference would acknowledgethat strong today) thathas providedtheiconicexample recognition of an explicit physics envy that referred(and the South mightnot just be followingus; that it have its own storyto tell.9 A fuller refers)itselfto the physics thatwas dominantin might, rather, the nineteenth of difference would granttheother, the century. recognition There have, however, been ways in which different, at least a degree of autonomy in that 'history'has been imaginedin the social sciences, sense (where relativeautonomydoes not mean a which have themselves been problematical. - some stories are more Thus, lack of interconnection of overarching than others, forexample - but rather many of the great 'modernist'understandings theworld implicitly drew upon, and thereby estab- the absence of a teleologyof the single story).In lished as unthought a highly assumptions, particu- other words, a fuller recognitionof difference lar conceptualization of time,of space, and of the would entertain thepossibility oftheexistence of a betweenthem.The aspect of thisthat multiplicity of trajectories. relationship is mostsignificant forthepresent is their Now, to anticipatesomewhat the argumentof argument habitofconveningspace in temporal terms. it is also the case thatforthereto When, the finalsection, in economicgeographyforinstance, we use terms be multipletrajectories - forthereto be coexisting such as 'advanced' and 'backward', 'developed' differences - theremustbe space, and forthereto and 'developing', we are effectively Thus, imagining be space theremustbe multipletrajectories. between places, I want to argue,a moreadequate understanding spatial differences(differences of We are arrang- spatialityforour timeswould entail the recognicountries, etc) as temporal. regions, between places into historical tion thatthereis more than one storygoing on in ing differences

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Doreen Massey the world and that these storieshave, at least, a conceptualand political.Imaginingtime as truly not only influences how we analyse the relativeautonomy. historical when we turnto look theother The important however, past; it also implies, point forthe moment, influenced is that not only do these modernistnarratives way,thatthe future (thoughinevitably that to but the histories have led the full of the today) is also they by spatial suppress import to time. radicallyopen. also have a very ambiguous relationship is once again on the But if an open historicity They are tales of progressand change,and of the of time; they are historicalin that agenda in both physicaland social sciences,there irreversibility sense. And yet theyare also storiesin which the are stillquestionsas to quitewhatthismeans.John future is already foretold dynamicalsystems open up to (progress, development, Thornes'non-linear in a verydifferent Frodemanand modernization,socialism, globalization). This is history way from on morenarrative what ErnestoLaclau has dubbed a grand closed Sugden's stress approaches.And the is the that can be where politicalopennessof the everything big question system happens to it 'and everything acquires futureheld up to us by radical democracyand explained internally within the grandiose queer theory an absolute intelligibility (a societallevel of 'freewill', making scheme' (Laclau 1990,75). This is not the 'time as our own histories thoughnot,of course,in circum... is this element of'freewill' in some stances of thecontinuous ) ... by novelty' proposed emergence subverted the likes of Bergson;the way of becomingthatis way equivalentto (or ultimately by?) the of what alreadyis. nevera mererearrangement ontological indeterminacypostulated by some in recent Now, whathas been emerging yearsin versions(eg Prigogineand Stengers')of far-fromsome parts of politicalphilosophyand the social equilibrium systemsthinking? There are two major questions here. The first sciences is an attemptto recapturethatnotionof In different concernsboth the way we thinkabout knowledge the genuine openness of temporality. Some authorsseem to a radical to think this openness is and questions of ontology. attempt ways, integralto the projectsof Deleuze and Guattari be proposingthatwe can now all meet in a new, ontology (see, for example, 1984) - their imaginationof single (and necessarily'mathematical'?) - to thinking aroundqueer that has validityacross inorganic, nomadism,forinstance biological and whichI fields. arguments, (see, forinstance, Prigogine's Golding 1997) and to the sociocultural theory could be used to supportsuch a reworkings of Marxism through a grounded have citedearlier, would take a radicaldemocracy and through Gramscianism (see naturalistposition.Anti-naturalists thathuman view and assertmoststrongly Laclau 1990; Mouffe1993). There are fascinating different hereto what BarbaraKennedyis argu- and naturalsciences are dealing with fundamensimilarities of intenspheres:thatthepossibility ing within geomorphologywith her distinction tallydifferent - tionality,meaningfulnessand self-reflexivity is The latter between 'sequence' and 'progression'. to the human. she restricted the progressionists Dana, Horton) (Lyell, whichwould Thereis a morecomplexposition, argues, studied the past not to see 'how we got here fromthere'but to see how 'we must get here argue thattheremay well at some level be ontobut that these are articufrom there'(Kennedy1992,247, emphasisin origi- logical commonalities, manners in different spheres nal). In contrast,Hutton, Darwin and Gilbert lated in distinctive is a phethat this distinctiveness viewed the presentas merelyone of all possible and, moreover, she argues, saw 'historyas nomenon of emergence.Thus, althoughhumanly worlds. These latter, are connectionshere, if meaningful There (247-8). phenomena may not be reducibleto sequence' only distant and tentative,with some of the the phenomena studied by the natural sciences, fromthem.There may be In heterodox eco- theymay be emergent of radical democracy. arguments of functionin the abstract and evo- real similarities nomics,the developmentof institutional pattern the biological and the sociotowardsa ing of the inorganic, approachesalso entailsa shift lutionary historical vein, cultural,but in each sphere it is necessary that conceptof time.And in a different but in a direct parallel with the argumentsof we specify the actual, particular,'mechanisms' geomorphologistssuch as Thornes, economists through which this functioningoccurs. This is, it seems to me, something such as Krugmanand Lawson are drawingin part 'qualifiednaturalism' and physicsof like the position of Deleuze and Guattari with mathematics on thenew theoretical and their 'abstract Many of these projectsare integrally their 'bodies-without-organs' complexity.

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273 andhuman andthe between 'science' geography geography physical relationship Space-time, of in other on thousand A Landa's Manuel de geography:geology, machines',and of parts going GIS and so forth. (1997). geomorphology, history yearsofnon-linear In contrast to the prominence of time and The issues are enormousand I make no attempt in the debates thatI have explored so to address them fully here (at the moment of historicity had a very low profile.It is denihas I am a I think final draft this qualified far,space writing a absence of history as a for and/or not are distinctions but the simple naturalist!), grated important treatment to each accorded the same depth of intellectual majorthemeof thispaper: our relationship otheras physicaland human geographers(and - as time. The arguments about opening up models focus overwhelmingly what I have argued earlier has been one of the Newtonian-science Most of the developments docuissues previouslyholding us apart - the relation- on historicity. ship ofthesetwo partsof our disciplineto 'harder' mented above call for more explicitlyhistorical as sciences.Yet 'initialconditions'are geographical sciencessuch as physics). Earlierin this paper, I argued thatwe must be well as historical.We must be spatial,as well as sciences: both self-awareand precise about the termsby historical, indeed,thismustbe an implicain termsof space-time(see also to othersciences such as physics. tion of thinking which we refer We may turn to them as a stimulationfor new Spedding 1997). Yet the widespread development models into of evolutionary translation oftheir ideas, or fora direct approaches in a numberof fields but not geograon thinking The anti-naturalist concentrates ours,or out ofsimplereverence. history, natu- phy (see Martin's(1999) verypertinent thefull-blown do thefirst; critiqueof mightlegitimately failedto 'what have in economists this the in the ralistis entirely second; economics): justified doing must be carefulto distinguish recognizeis thatthe notionof "path-dependence" qualifiednaturalist between the generalitiesand the specifics,and thattheynow emphasize is itself place-dependent' What none (Martin mustpresentan accountof the latter.10 (Sugden's analypersonalcommunication) of these positionswarrants, however,is a turning sis of the ice sheetseems to me to implyprecisely both Bergsonand to 'a harderscience' out of simple admirationfor this point). And in philosophy, It would Laclau, while rigorously reference. its 'hardness' - the reverential time, retheorizing relegate of stasis.They ritualobeisance space to a kind of residualcategory be ironicifwe were to escape from to Newtonianmechanicsas a model forall knowl- end up withan incompatible pairingof space and thesame genuflecting time. What I want to argue is that all these reedge, onlyto adopt precisely on the of time,and all thisinsistence attitude towardsthe'new' physicsof thetwentieth theorizations in fact of true that should be we Rather, require (for historicity, physics openness pleased century. a parallel retheorizhas in some of its parts become more like the philosophical compatibility) to be open, space must complex and social sciences in other areas of ation of space. For history too. in feed be Ideas can rethought through philosophy knowledge.11 whose Let us go back fora momentto Bergson, to physicsas well as vice versa,insightsfromthe mustembodyopen creasocial sciences can be helpfulin biology ... Per- positionthattemporality has so much in common with many of the haps we should all have more confidencein our tivity own fields of endeavour,as well as in the links argumentsbeing put forwardtoday by philosobetweenthem. (and, as we have seen, phers and social scientists also natural scientists).Indeed, Bergson is an source fora numberof thesetheorists important For see Ho (1993) and Deleuze and Guattari (1984). And so again to space as we have seen,temporality is essentially Bergson, What I want to argue finally, however,is thatall open-ended: this is time as the continuousemerof the genceofnovelty; timeas a way ofbecomingthatis thesemovements towardsa reconsideration of what already is. natureof time/temporality/historicity necessarily never a mere rearrangement to reconsider how Withoutemergence,urges Bergson (and others), carrywith thema requirement about space. I can spell out theargument thereis no time. we think I would agreewiththisproposition. here in the abstract, but it is nonethelessan arguSensulato, It ment drawn frommy thinkingwithin my own does, however, in turnraise further questions.Why fieldofhuman geography. My questionis how this is there this ceaseless emergence?How does it of spatiality happen? One source that would seem not to be might relate to reconceptualizations

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Doreen Massey with A first this notions of the of mixed. of then, compatible openness history implication, impetusto would be that thingssomehow change in them- envisage temporality/history as genuinely open is selves (throughthe immanentunfoldingof some that spatialitymust be integrated as an essential forin thatcase part of thatprocess of 'the continuouscreationof unitaryundifferentiated identity), the termsof change would alreadybe specifiedin novelty'. the initial conditions.The futurewould not be Such an effectively creative spatialitycannot, in orderto retainan openness of the however, be just any kind of (way of thinking of) open. Rather, has to be conceived (just space. This cannot be 'space' as a static crossfuture, temporality/time as we have seen above, as I am suggesting time,for, space should be) as theproduct sectionthrough Nor can it be 'space' as of interrelations. Adam (1990) con- thisdisables history itself. of interaction, conceived of as stasis,forthis pretains extendeddiscussionof this way of thinking representation Nor can itbe 'space' as a who argue ciselyimmobilizes about time,and of the many theorists things. closed equilibriumsystem,for this would be a forsuch an approach to its conceptualization. thatalways returns to thatgoes nowhere, the following: spatiality Bergsononce asked himself Thiscannotbe 'space', either, as any kind the same. ... Time What is theroleoftime? prevents everythingof closure (the closures of bounded, comforting of from beinggivenat once ... Is it notthevehicle 'authentic' forthesewould also run down places), oftime the and choice? Is nottheexistence creativity it be space convened as can into inertia. Nor in indeterminism nature? of proof temporal sequence, for here space is in fact is closed. 'Indeterminism', here, stands precisely for occluded and the future in of imagining space are of these 'free will' None and the of and, ways creativity possibility with the desire to hold time open. conformable more recent parlance,politics. fortimegenuinelyto be held open, space ofthisstatement? How are we to think Well,it is Rather, of could be the allow that time be to imaginedas thesphereof theexistence may possible certainly of the possibilityof the existenceof vehicleof change. However, the fact that time multiplicity, Such a space is the sphere in which may be the medium withinwhich change occurs difference. each other, distinct stories that more coexist,meet up, affect (or, change-through-interradically, is not This or in into conflict the creacome mechanisms one of the is space cooperate. relationality does not mean that it is its static,not a cross-section tion of temporality) throughtime; it is discause. Time cannot somehow,unaided, bootstrap rupted,active and generative.It is not a closed as space-time, it is constantly, itselfinto existence.Nietzsche once mused that system; being made. ... can produce resultsthat are Now, I can see what all thismeans in myneckof 'only difference In other words, there must thewoods. I have an idea ofhow itmeanswe must also differences'. - to enable thepossibility of rethinkglobalization,reimagineregions/places/ be already multiplicity - forchangeto be produced as a result. nation states, reconceptualize cities. Those interaction in otherbooks and papers, are emerging there must be thoughts And for there to be multiplicity space. In otherwords,we must,as was indicated by myselfbut also by many othersbesides. But about to ways of thinking earlier,rework Bergson's logic, and rewritehim does itbear any relation Do forthereto be time space in otherpartsof the geographicalforest? thus:forthereto be difference, ... at least a few thingsmustbe given at once. To you have similardebates?Can we talk? of thispaper,the leap pick up an earlierargument the thatBergsonseems to have made is to go from is givenall at once Acknowledgements thatnot everything proposition to an assumptionthattherefore personI would like to thankis RogerLee, only one thingis The first concern have whose to he would seem at once. Moreover, during his editorshipto see this given witha journal as a forumfordebate in both human and done thisin consequenceofhis engagement notionof 'science'. physicalgeographyprovided an early encourageparticular is thattime ment to trymy hand at developing an argument But the real resultof thisargument linkthem.I would also like to thankthe needs space to get itself going; timeand space are thatmight born together, along with the relationsthat pro- participantsin a seminar at BirkbeckCollege, duce themboth. Time and space mustbe thought where I first presented some of these ideas. with colleagues, and commentson inter- Conversations fortheyare inextricably therefore, together,

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earlier drafts,have been extremelygenerous. I 6 like to thank David Sugden, should particularly Andrew Sayer,Keith Richards,Stephan Harrison, 7 John Allen, Steve Pile, Barbara Kennedy, Nick Spedding, Rob Inkpen and Ron Martin. Their positionsdid notby any means coincide,but it is to note thatin all the many 8 perhaps - interesting and multifarious commentsmade and opinions expressed there was no simple divide between those who mightbe thought of as human geographers and those who might be thought of as physical.

and therelationship between 'science' and humangeography 275 physical geography Space-time, Grossis herecompressing thearguments ofBergson's Time andfreewilland Matter and memory. As Kennedyremarks, such a processis 'almostinevitable'. This is not a process peculiar to geomorpholtheneed to be aware ofthetendency and to histories, thatwe all share. questionit,is again something It might be interesting to investigate whether thereis any relationship between this manoeuvre and of difference as Bergson's(and others')interpretation temporal change.Also, I have wondereda lot,though about whetherthereare any connecinconclusively, tionsbetweenthistemporalization of space in social sciences and the ergodichypothesis in geomorphology,where an attemptis made to explain distribu(Thornes and Brunsden 1977, 23; Thorn 1982). My feelingis thatthereis probablyno 'connection'in a historical or theoretical it is tempting to sense,though see one.

The production of such ogyor physical geography.

Notes
1 Thus theywritethat: Whilstmuch of the work of mathematicians and such as Minkowskiand Einsteinis relphysicists evant only at extreme scales or velocities,notions such as relativeconcepts of space and time are to environmental science.(364) pertinent I have to say thatat least one ofthegeomorphologists withwhom I have discussed thepresentpaper quite disagreeswiththispoint! but not coincidentally, the concern of Incidentally, Rose's book is not only to deny this customary subordination of complexsciences(or sciencesof the complex) such as biology,but also to understand in and organismsand - crucially- theirtrajectories constitution timeand space. Here is detectthrough able the crucial link - picked up again later in this and emergence. paper - betweencomplexity The book Intellectual imposters by Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont(1998) appeared while I was writingthis their own epistemological paper.Although positionis naive, it has to be said thatmany of the thoroughly social scientistswhom they quote (and mock) do seem to have been not only flaunting a halfknowledge of naturalscience,but also indulgingin an implicit'reverentialreferencing' that stands in totalcontradiction to theirwider positions. Frodeman's most general aim, like David Sugden's and my own, is thatintellectual communities should talkto each other. He says of his article, Its overallgoal is political, in the sense thatI hope it encourages conversationbetween intellectual communities who have muchto say to one another, but who too oftenare estranged.(1995,961) Frodemanactuallyuses the term'Analytical Philosophy' here, and distinguishesit froma philosophy criticalof this traditionthat he calls 'Continental Philosophy'.I have dropped thesetermsbecause, as was evidentfrom a numberof comments on an early draft ofthispaper,theygenerate moreconfusion than clarity.

tionsin timeby recourse to distributions in space

9 The workof some post-colonial such as theorists,

Spivak and McClintock, has been important in thisargument. establishing 10 Deleuze (1995) was asked in interview about his own use ofconceptsfrom His reply contemporary physics. is too long to quote here,but is interesting fortrying to negotiatea relationof connection withouta 'specious unity' (30). Interestingly, too, he takes up the cases of both Prigogineand Bergson.On the former he pointsout thattheconceptofbifurcation (used in our field both in formal modelling and in more and empirical is 'a good examphilosophical enquiry) sciple of a conceptthat'sirreducibly philosophical, and artistic too' (29-30). He also argues that entific, philosophersmay createconceptsthatare useful in science: 'Bergsonprofoundly influenced psychiatry'. 'no special status should be And, most importantly, whether field, assigned to any particular philosophy, science,art,or literature' (30). 11 And anyway- a pointwhich gives me pleasure and - some ofchaos theory illustrates thewiderargument had its earliest in meteorology; beginnings physicists were quite slow to take it up (Gleick 1987).

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