Digests - Freedom of Expression

1 Gonzales v.
COMELEC
Gonzales v. COMELEC
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 4880 on the grounds that it violates their rights such as freedom of speech, of assembly, to form associations or societies. More so, they question the forms of election campaigns enumerated in the act. Facts: 1. Congress passed a statute (RA 4880) which was designed to maintain the purity and integrity of the electoral process and calling a halt to the undesirable practice of prolonged political campaigns, bringing in their wake serious evils not the least of which is the ever-increasing cost of seeking public office. th 2. Cabigao was an incumbent council in the 4 district of Manila and the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the position of Vice Mayor. He was subsequently elected to that position. Meanwhile, Gonzales is a private individual, a registered voter in the City, and a political leader. 3. They claim that the enforcement of RA 4880 would prejudice their basic rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law. Specifically, they challenge the validity of two new sections included in the Revised Election Code under RA 4880 which was approved and took effect on June 17, 1967. The said sections prohibit the too early nomination of candidates and limit the period of election campaign and political activity. More so, after defining the terms candidates and election campaign/partisan political activity, the acts which constitute election campaign were specified, and that simple expression of opinion and thoughts concerning the election was not to be considered as part of an election campaign. This prohibition was furthered by a proviso which provided that nothing stated in the Act shall be understood to prevent any person from expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of the candidates for public office whom he supports. 4. The acts deemed included in the terms election campaign of partisan political activity are: (a) forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a party or candidate; (b) holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar assemblies for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate; (c) making speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office; (d) publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials; (e) directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party; (f) giving, soliciting, or receiving contribution for election campaign purposes, either directly or indirectly. Ruling: 1. The Court held that the challenged statute cannot be declared unconstitutional on several grounds. First, it is premature to challenge the statutes validity. Second, the required number of votes was not met when the Court deliberated on the scope of election campaigns or partisan political activities. Precisely, the Court declared that RA 4880 could have been narrowly drawn and practices prohibited be more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of expression is a fundamental postulate of our constitutional system. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. What does it embrace? At the very least, free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment. There is to be then to previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. The vital need in a constitutional democracy for freedom of expression is undeniable whether as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing participation by the people in social including political decision-making, and of maintaining the balance between stability and change. The trend as reflected in Philippine and American decisions is to recognize the broadest scope and assure the widest latitude to this constitutional guaranty. It represents a profound commitment to the principle that debate of public issue should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open. It is not going too far, according to another American decision, to view the function of free speech as inviting dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Freedom of speech and of the press thus means something more than the right to approve existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures, to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public consequence.
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Case Digests on Freedom of Expression Mark Justin Mooc
2 Gonzales v. COMELEC
5. From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that, at all times and under all circumstances, it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition. 6. As for freedom of assembly, the Bill of Rights as thus noted prohibits abridgment by law of freedom of speech or of the press. The Bill of Rights likewise extends the same protection to the rights of people peaceably to assemble. As pointed in US v. Bustos, this right is a necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of free speech. 7. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. 8. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority in Thomas v. Collins, it was not accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. They are cognate rights and assurance afforded by the clause of this section of the Bill of Rights, wherein they are contained, applies to all. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right (right of people peaceably to assemble) is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. 9. Our Constitution likewise recognizes the freedom to form association for purposes not contrary to law. With or without a constitutional provision of this character, it may be assumed that the freedom to organize or to be a member of any group or society exists. With the explicit provision, whatever doubts there may be on the matter are dispelled. Unlike the cases of other guarantees, which are mostly American in origin, this particular freedom has an indigenous cast and could be traced to the Malolos Constitution. 10. In a sense, however, the stress on this freedom of association should be on its political significance. If such a right were non-existent, then the likelihood of a oneparty government is more than a possibility. Authoritarianism may become unavoidable. Political opposition will simply cease to exist; minority groups may be outlawed, constitutional democracy as intended by the Constitution may well become a thing of the past. 11. Nonetheless, the Constitution limits this particular freedom in the sense that there could be an abridgment of the right to form associations or societies when their purposes are contrary to law. It is submitted that the phrase for purposes not contrary to law is another way of expressing the clear and present danger rule for unless an association or society could be shown to create an imminent danger to public safety, there is no justification for abridging the right to form associations or societies. 12. In considering whether Republic 4880 is violative of the rights of free speech, free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association, the Court cannot ignore the legislative declaration that its enactment was in response to a serious substantive evil affecting the electoral process, not merely in danger of happening, but actually in existence, and likely to continue unless curbed or remedied. To asset otherwise would be to close ones eyes to the realities of the situation. Nor can we ignore the express legislative purpose apparent in the proviso that simple expressions of opinion and thoughts concerning the elections shall not be considered as part of an election campaign, and in the other proviso that nothing herein stated shall be understood to prevent any person from expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of the candidates for public office whom he supports. Such limitations qualify the entire provision restricting the period of an election campaign or partisan political activity. 13. According to the act, *i+t shall be unlawful for any political party, political committee or political group to nominate candidates for any elective public office voted for at large earlier than 150 days immediately preceding an election, and for any other elective public office earlier than 90 days immediately preceding an election. This provision affects the right of association. Political parties have less freedom as to the time during which they nominate candidates; the curtailment is not such, however, as to render meaningless such a basic right. Their scope of legitimate activities, save the above cited, is not unduly narrowed. Neither is there such an infringement of their freedom to assemble. They can do so, but not for such purpose. Thus, the Court sustained its validity unanimously. 14. On the one hand, it cannot be denied that the limitations thus imposed on the constitutional rights of free speech and press, of assembly, and of associations cut deeply into their substance. On the other, it cannot be denied either that evils, substantial in character, taint the purity of the electoral process. The justification alleged by the proponents of the measures weighs heavily with the members of the Court, though in varying degrees, in the appraisal of the aforesaid restrictions to
3 Santiago v. Far East Broadcasting

which such precious freedoms are subjected. They are not unaware of the clear and present danger that calls for measures that may bear heavily on the exercise of the cherished rights of expression, of assembly and of association. The Court, with five justices unable to agree, is of the view that no unconstitutional infringement exists insofar as the formation of organizations, associations, clubs, committees, or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes or undertaking any campaign or propaganda or both for or against a candidate or party is restricted and that the prohibition against giving, soliciting or receiving contribution for election purposes, either directly or indirectly, is equally free from constitutional infirmity. The restriction on freedom of assembly as confined to holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar assemblies for the purpose of soliciting votes or undertaking any campaign or propaganda or both for or against a candidate or party, leaving untouched all other legitimate exercise of such poses a more difficult question. Nevertheless, the Court rejected the contention that this should be annulled. The other acts, likewise deemed included in election campaign or partisan political activity tax, to the utmost, the judicial predisposition to view with sympathy legislative efforts to regulate election practices deemed inimical because of their collision with the preferred right of freedom of expression. From the outset, such provisions did occasional divergence of views among the members of the Court. Originally, only a minority was for their being adjudged as invalid. It is not so any more. This is merely to emphasize that the scope of the curtailment to which freedom of expression may be subjected is not foreclosed by the recognition of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, the debasement of the electoral process. The majority of the Court is of the belief that the ban on the solicitation or undertaking of any campaign or propaganda, whether directly or indirectly, by an individual, the making of speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interview for or against the election for any party or candidate for public office, or the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, suffers from the corrosion of invalidity. However, to call for a declaration of unconstitutionality, it lacks one more affirmative vote to that effect. It is understandable for Congress to believe that without the limitations set forth in the challenged legislation, the laudable purpose of RA 4880 would be frustrated and nullified. Whatever persuasive force such approach may command failed to elicit the assert of a majority of the Court. This is not to say that the conclusion reached by the minority that the above portions of the statute now assailed has passed the constitutional test is devoid of merit. It only indicates that for the majority, the prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or that undertaking of any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party, is repugnant to a constitutional command. To that extent, the challenged statute prohibits what under the Constitution cannot by any law be abridged. 20. In terms of the permissible scope of legislation that otherwise could be justified under the clear and present danger doctrine, it is considered opinion of the majority, though lacking the necessary vote for an adjudication of invalidity, that the challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. 21. It is undeniable, therefore, that even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. For precision of regulation is the touchstone in an area so closely related to our most precious freedoms. 22. It is of the opinion that it would be premature, to say at least, for a judgment of nullity of any provision found in RA 4880. The need for adjudication arises only if in the implementation of the Act, there is in fact an unconstitutional application of its provisions.
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Santiago v. Far East Broadcasting

Santiago, the campaign manager of the Popular Front Sumulong, asked Far East Broadcasting for the purchase of air time for the broadcast of the political speeches delivered at the Opera House. However, respondent would only do so if the party submits in advance the complete manuscript of the speeches to be delivered. Facts: 1. Petitioner (Santiago), being the campaign manager of the political party Popular Front Sumulong, asked respondent (Far East Broadcasting) for the purchase of air time for the broadcast of the partys political speeches at the Opera House on September 3, 1941.
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4 Primicias v. Fugoso
2. However, respondent refused to do so except should the party submit in advance the complete manuscript of contemplated speeches. Because of this, petitioner questioned the act of respondent in refusing to allow the use of its station for broadcasting the speeches and constitutes unlawful censorship and a violation of the freedom of speech guaranteed by our Constitution. parade or procession. Moreover, he would be able to determine where to hold such activities. Ruling: 1. The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But, it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. Under Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 of the City of Manila, that the holding of athletic games, sports or exercises during the celebration of national holidays in any streets or public places of the city and on the patron saint day of any district may be permitted provided that a permit be issued by the Mayor who shall determine the streets, or public places or portions thereof where said activities may be held. From the Revised Ordinance of the City, there is no express and separate provision regulating the holding of public meeting or assembly at any street or public places. As Section 1119 is susceptible to two constructions: one, that the Mayor of the City is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting in the streets and other public places of the City, and second, that the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject only to the latters reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, the Court believed that it must adopt the second construction. It means that the ordinance does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting be held. The other alternative when adopted because it would mean that the Mayor has the power to grant or refuse to grant the permit, which would be tantamount to authorizing him to prohibit the use of the streets and other public places for
Ruling: 1. It is clear from the laws and the regulations adverted to that the respondent had the right to require the petitioner to submit the manuscript of the speeches which he intended to broadcast. The Court failed to perceive the cogency of such argument. It does not bolster up the case for the petitioner. It impliedly admits that a speech that may endanger public safety may be censored and disapproved for broadcasting. How could the censor verify the petitioners claim that the speeches he intended to broadcast offered no danger to public safety or pubic morality, if the petitioner refused to submit the manuscript or even its gist? If the petitioner had complied with respondents requirement and the respondent had arbitrarily and unreasonably refused to permit said speeches to be broadcasted, he might have reason to complain.
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Primicias v. Fugoso
The Coalesced Minority Party applied for a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda for purposes of petitioning the government for redress to grievances. However, the City Mayor, founding his actions on Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927, did not issue the permit. Facts: 1. The Coalesced Minority Party applied for a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda on a Sunday afternoon, November 16, 1947, for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress to grievances. However, the Mayor of the City of Manila (Valeriano Fugoso) did not issue the permit. For this purpose, the campaign manager of the party (Cipriano Primicias) instituted this action for mandamus. Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 provides the power of the City Mayor of Manila to grant or issue permits for the holding of assembly or meeting, 3.
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5 Mutuc v. COMELEC
holding of meetings, parades or processions. Moreover, said construction would render the ordinance invalid and void as it contravenes constitutional limitations. The Mayor reasoned that, in granting the permit, the speeches delivered in the meeting would undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order. In reiterating the pronouncements of the US Supreme Court in Whitney v. California, *f+ear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burned women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech, there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. 1. In unequivocal language, the Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has been our constant holding that this preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. What the COMELEC did, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional right is directed. Nor could COMELEC justify its action by the assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle, would be free, either by himself or through others, to use his mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not to be emasculate by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other mechanical contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondent Commission, then the effect would hardly be distinguishable from a previous restraint. That cannot be validly done. It would negate indirectly what the Constitution in express terms assures. Mutuc was allowed to use political taped jingles.
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Mutuc v. COMELEC
Mutuc seeks to be a delegate of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. In his campaigns, he used political jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. Facts: 1. Amelito Mutuc is a candidate for delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. In his making his candidacy known, he used jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. By a telegram sent to him on October 29, 1970, the COMELEC informed Mutuc that his certificate of candidacy was given due course, but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units. However, according to Mutuc, the said order is violative of his constitutional right especially his freedom to speech. However, COMELEC contends that the justification for the prohibition was premised on the provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful for candidates to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes and the like whether of domestic or foreign origin. More so, the contention was that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the above statute subject to confiscation. 3.
Navarro v. Villegas
The City Mayor offered the Sunken Gardens, instead of Plaza Miranda, as venue for an assembly. Facts: 1. The Mayor of the City of Manila (Villegas) expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for peaceful assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when they would not cause unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities of the community and has further offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda as the site of demonstration sought to be held that afternoon. The Mayor believes that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as to compared to one at the Sunken Gardens as he suggested, poses a clearer and more imminent danger of public disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies, and petitioner has manifested that it has no means of preventing such disorders.
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6 Reyes v. Bagatsing
1. Every time that such assemblies are announced, the community is placed in such a state of fear and tension that offices are closed early and employees dismissed, storefronts boarded up, classes suspended, and transportation disrupted, to the general detriment of the public. Petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of Mayor to grant petitioners application for permit unconditionally. Thus, the Court denied the writ prayed for by Navarro and dismissed their petition. quite explicit that *n+o law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech. Reiterating the ruling in Thomas v. Collins, the American Supreme Court held that it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of the right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, of other legitimate public interest. What is guaranteed by the Constitution is peaceable assembly. One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The utmost calm though is not required. As pointed out in US v. Apurado, *i+t is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on
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Reyes v. Bagatsing
The Anti-Bases Coalition planned to hold a peaceful march and rally. It would start in Luneta Park and end at the gates of the US Embassy. After the march, a program would follow whereby two brief speeches were to be delivered. However, the City Mayor did not act on the request of organization for permit. Facts: 1. Retired Justice J.B.L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon. The route is from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the US Embassy which is two blocks away. The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference. A short program would be held after the march. During the program, there would be a delivery of two brief speeches. After which, a petition based on the resolution adopted on the last day by the International Conference for General Disarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be presented to a representative of the Embassy or any of its personnel who may be there so that it may be delivered to the US Ambassador. The Mayor of the City of Manila however intruded by not acting on the request of the organization for permit. Rather, he suggested with the recommendation of the police authorities that a permit may be issued for the rally if it would be held at the Rizal Coliseum. As such, Reyes, on behalf of the organization, filed a suit for mandamus. 4. 3.
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Ruling: 1. 2. Reyes petition was granted. The Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a permit. The Constitution is
7 Cabansag v. Fernandez
such occasions, feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievances and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided. To give free rein to ones destructive urges is to call for condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high estate occupied by intellectual liberty is our scheme of values. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. If it were, then the freedom of access becomes discriminatory access, giving rise to an equal protection question. The principle under American doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were marked by turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful character. Even then, only the guilty parties should be held accountable. It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be granted. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place is that the permit must he for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberta, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent sad grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favourable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus, if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. 10. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with other intellectual freedom, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary even more so than on the other departments rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been felicitously termed by Justice Holmes as the sovereign prerogative of judgment. Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of suds rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.
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Cabansag v. Fernandez
Cabansag wrote a letter to the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission seeking for the fast resolution of his case pending at the CFI of Pangasinan. Fernandez prayed that Cabansag be declared in contempt of court for a line in his letter. Facts: 1. Petitioner (Apolonio Cabansag) sought for the ejectment of Geminiana Fernandez from a parcel of land who, on the other end, filed their answer and a motion to dismiss. Even though pleadings were submitted, the hearings were suspended several times from 1947 to 1952. Upon President Magsaysays assumption in office and creation of Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC), Cabansag wrote the PCAC, a letter copy which he furnished the Secretary of Justice and the Executive Judge of the CFI of Pangasinan. He claimed that the case which had been long been pending be decided already. The Secretary of Justice indorsed the said letter to the Clerk of CFI Pangasinan. Counsel for defendants (Atty. Manuel Fernandez) filed a motion before Judge Morfe praying that Cabansag be declared in contempt of court for an alleged scurrilous remark he made in his letter to the PCAC when he wrote thru the careful manoeuvres of a tactical lawyer.
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8 Cabansag v. Fernandez
1. The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances. The First Amendments of the Federal expressly guarantees that right against abridgment by Congress. But mention does not argue exclusion elsewhere. For the right is one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and th political institutions principles which the 14 Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due process clause. The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means of assuring judges their independence is a free press. Two theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between freedom of expression and the independence of the judiciary. These are the clear and present danger rule and the dangerous tendency rule. The first as interpreted in a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the substantive evil sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the disorderly and unfair administration of justice. This test establishes a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration of justice. The US Supreme Court has made the significant suggestion that this rule is an appropriate guide in determining the constitutionality of restriction upon expression where the substantial evil sought to prevented by the restriction is destruction of life or property or invasion of the right of privacy. The Court furthers clear and present danger of substantive evil as a result of indiscriminate publications regarding judicial proceedings justifies an impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press only if the evils are extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the courts, upon the theory that in such a case, it must be necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justice. The possibility of engendering disrespect for the judiciary as a result of the published criticism of a judge is not such a substantive evil as will justify impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press. As declared in Craig v. Harney, the US Supreme Court said that the *f+reedom of speech and press should not be impaired through the exercise of the punish for contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question are a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. A judge may hold in contempt one who ventures to publish anything that tends to make him unpopular or to belittle him The vehemence of the language used in newspaper publications concerning a judges decision is not alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. Furthered in Pennekamp v. Florida, *a+nd in weighing the danger of possible interference with the courts by newspaper criticism against the right of free speech to determine whether such criticism may constitutionally be punished as contempt, it was ruled that freedom of public comment should in borderline instances weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases. Thus, the question in every case, according to Justice Holmes, is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. The second, which is the dangerous tendency rule, has been adopted in cases where extreme difficulty is confronted in determining where the freedom of expression ends and the right of courts to protect their independence begins. There must be a remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule lies in that the freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the right to petition for redress of grievance, while guaranteed by the Constitution, are not absolute. As held in Gilbert v. Minnesota, *t+hey are subject to restrictions and limitations, one of them being the protection of the courts against contempt. As furthered by the US Supreme Court in Gitlow v. New York, the dangerous tendency rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the State has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring
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9 Ruiz v. Gordon
about the substantive evil the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent. 8. It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the press, which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language, and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. Reasonably limited, it was said by story in the passage cited, this freedom is an inestimable privilege in a free government; without such limitation, it might become the scourge of the Republic. 9. The Court saw at once that it was far from Cabansags mind to put the court in ridicule and much less to belittle or degrade it in the eyes of those to whom the letter was addressed for. This is clearly inferable from its context wherein, in respectful and courteous language, Cabansag gave vent to his feeling when he said that he has long since been deprived of his land thru the careful manoeuvres of a tactical lawyer. Analyzing said utterances, one would see that if they ever criticize, the criticism refers, not to the court, but to opposing counsel whose tactical manoeuvres has allegedly caused the undue delay of the case. The grievance or complaint, if any, is addressed to the stenographers for their apparent indifference in transcribing their notes. 10. The only disturbing effect of the letter which perhaps has been the motivating factor of the lodging of the contempt charge is the fact that the letter was sent to the Office of the President, asking for help because of the precarious predicament of Cabansag. Such act alone would not be contemptuous. To be so, the danger must cause a serious imminent threat to the administration of justice. Nor can the Court infer that such act has a dangerous tendency to belittle the court or undermine the administration of justice for Cabansag merely exercised his constitutional right to petition the government for redress of a legitimate grievance. prayer-rally at the Rizal Triangle on December 4, 1983 from 1:00 pm to early evening. Ruiz delivered the letter on behalf of the Olongapo Citizens Alliance for National Reconciliation, Justice for Aquino Justice for All, Concerned Citizen for Justice and Peace, Damdamin Bayan na Nagkakaisa and United Nationalist Democratic Organization. Aside from the holding of the prayer-rally, the said groups sought to hold a parade/march from Gordon Avenue to the Rizal Triangle starting at 1:00 pm. In his manifestation, respondent, among others written, mentioned in the Guardian that he had granted the permit of the petitioner.
2. 3.
Ruling: 1. As shown both in the manifestation and the answer, this action for mandamus could have been obviated if only petitioner took the trouble of verifying on November 23 whether or not a permit had been issued. A party desirous of exercising the right to peaceable assembly should be the one most interested in ascertaining the action taken on a request for a permit. Necessarily, after a reasonable time or, if the day and time was designated for the decision of the request, such part or his representative should be at the office of the public official concerned. If he fails to do so, a copy of the decision reached, whether adverse or favourable, should be sent to the address of petitioner. In that way, there need not be waste of time and effort not only of the litigants but likewise of a court from which redress is sought in case of a denial or modification of a request for a permit. The petition is dismissed. The Court deems it best to set forth the above to specify in more detail, the steps necessary for the judicial protection of constitutional rights with the least delay and inconvenience to the parties and with the greater assurance that the factual background on which is dependent the determination of whether or not the clear and present danger standard has been satisfied.
2.
People v. Perez
Perez uttered phrases which called for the beheading of Wood in a discussion on political matters. Facts: 1. Respondent (Isaac Perez), while holding a discussion with several persons on political matters in Pilar, Sorsogon, uttered the phrases: Asin an mangna Filipinos na caparejo co, maninigong gumamit nin sundang asin haleon an payo no Wood
Ruiz v. Gordon
A prayer rally and parade/march was to be conducted by petitioners. They allege that the Mayor of Olongapo City, Gordon, did not act on the matter. Facts: 1. Petitioner (Ruiz) personally delivered to respondent Mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) a letter application which sought to request a permit to hold a
10 US v. Bustos
huli can saiyang recomendacion sa pag raot can Filipinas (and the Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Woods head for having recommended a bad thing for the Philippines). Leonard Wood was the Governor-General during that time, April 1, 1922. For said phrases, Perez was accused for violating Article 256 of the Penal Code.
US v. Bustos
The justice of peace filed a case against numerous citizens of Pampanga after the latters case was dismissed. They were charged for the libellous statements against him. Facts: 1. Numerous citizens of Pampanga assembled, prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary through Crossfiled & OBrien charging respondent Roman Punsalan, justice of peace of Macabebe and Masantol with malfeasance in office. Likewise, they ask for Punsalans removal. Punsalan was charged for three specific charges which happened to Francisca Polintan, Valentin Sunga and Leoncio Quiambao. They allege that Punsalan used his position to benefit from their legal needs like keeping Polintan as a servant for 4 days aside from taking her two chickens and twelve gandus. The case against the justice of peace was dismissed. Thus, Punsalan filed criminal charges against defendants for the libellous statements against him.
2.
Ruling: 1. It is our course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292(Treason and Sedition Law) must not be interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to assembly and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State. In the case at bar, the person maligned by the Accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official position, like the presidency of the US and other high offices, under a democratic form of government instead of affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free speech and common decency. More than a figure of speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws. Being the representative of the executive civil authority in the Philippines and of the sovereign power, a seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the rights of the Filipino people and on American sovereignty. As a matter of fact, Section 8 of the same act contemplates the said situation. For such reasons, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and one an act which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies, which tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, which tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety or order of the Government.
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Ruling: 1. The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is necessary for free speech. As held in Howarth v. Barlow, the US Supreme Court declared that *t+he people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism. Moreover, the guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. It is a duty which everyone owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all to know of any official dereliction on the part of the magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty is to inquire into and punish them. The right to assemble and petition is a necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the right of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply without fear
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11 Lagunzad v. Soto vda De Gonzales

of penalty to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must assume responsibility for the charges made. The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy, which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, through, as an incidental result, it may, in some instances, afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer. Qualified privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. A communication made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contain criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable. Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. Personal injury is not necessary. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms. Finally, if a party applies to the wrong person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials, such an unintentional error would not take the case out of the privilege. A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny will defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. A petition prepared and signed at an assembly of numerous citizens including affidavits by five individuals, charging a justice of peace with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal, was presented through lawyers to the Executive Secretary. The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of first instance of the district. The judge of first instance, after investigation, recommended to the Governor-General that the justice of the peace filing a motion for new trial, the judge of first instance ordered the suppression of the charges and acquitted the justice of the peace. Criminal action was then begun against the defendants, charging that portions of the petition presented to the Executive Secretary was libellous. On a review of the evidence, the Court finds that express malice was not proved by prosecution. Good faith surrounded the action of the petitioners. Their ends and motives were justifiable. The charges and the petition were transmitted through reputable attorneys to the proper functionary. The defendants are not guilty and instead of punishing them for an honest endeavour to improve the public service, they should rather be commended for their good citizenship. It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be considered libellous per se. The charges might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a government official. As a general rule, words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace of dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct, touching him in his office are actionable.
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4.
Lagunzad v. Soto vda De Gonzales

The parties entered into a licensing agreement for the filming of The Moises Padilla Story. Soto vda. de Gonzales is the mother of Moises. Moises half-sister objecred to the movie as it exploited Moises life. Facts: 1. Lagunzad and de Gonzales entered into a licensing agreement for the former was filming The Moises Padilla Story. Manuel Lagunzad was a newspaperman and, through his MML Productions, began the production of the movie. The movie was based on the book of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr.s The Long Dank Night in Negros. Although the focus on the film on the Moises life, there were portions which dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his mother, Maria Soto Vda. De Gonzales. The movie was scheduled for a premiere showing on October 16, 1961. Thirteen days prior to it, Moises half-sister, Mrs. Nelly Amante, objected to the movie as it exploited Moises life.
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Ruling: 1. The Court neither finds merit in petitioners contention that the Licensing Agreement infringes on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press, in that, as a citizen and as a newspaperman, he has a right to express his thoughts in film on the public life of Moises Padilla without prior restraint. The clear and present danger rule was applied. In quoting Gonzales v. COMELEC, *t+he prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the balancing-of-interests test. The principle requires a court
2.
12 Ayer Productions Pty Ltd. V. Capulong

to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation. In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into account eh interplay of those interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern. Constitution. Private respondent, on the other hand, asserts a right of privacy and claims that the production and filming of the projected mini-series would constitute an unlawful intrusion into his privacy which he is entitled to enjoy. The freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in theatres or to diffuse them through television. In our day and age, motion pictures are a universally utilized vehicle of communication and medium of expression. This freedom is available in our country both to locally-owned and to foreignowned motion picture companies. Furthermore, the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression. Indeed, commercial media constitute the bulk of such facilities available in our country and hence to exclude commercially-owned and operated media from the exercise of constitutionally protected freedom of speech and of expression can only result in the drastic contraction of such constitutional liberties in our country. The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture does not constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondents right of privacy. More so, the motion picture is not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile, but it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role played by Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events of the change of government. The privilege of enlightening the public is not limited to the dissemination of news in the scene of current events. It extends also to information or education, or even entertainment and amusement, by books, articles, pictures, films and broadcasts concerning interesting phases of human activity in general, as well as the reproduction of the public scene in newsreel and travelogues. In determining where to draw the line, the courts were invited to exercise a species of censorship over what the public may be permitted to read; and they were understandably liberal in allowing the benefit of the doubt. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events. There must, in other words, be no knowing or reckless disregard of truth in depicting the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution. There must be no presentation of the private life of the unwilling private respondent and certainly no revelation of
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Ayer Productions Pty Ltd. V. Capulong

Ayer Productions Pty Ltd. sought to film the EDSA Revolution. They informed Enrile regarding the motion picture and he wrote that he would not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/ore exhibition of his name or picture or that of any member of his family in any cinema. Facts: 1. Hal McElroy owns the production company, Ayer Productions Pty Ltd. Through this movie production company, he intended to make a movie that would depict the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA in a six hour mini-series. The proposed motion picture is entitled The Four Day Revolution, and was endorsed by the Movie Television Review and Classification Board as well as the other government agencies consulted. General Fidel Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production. Petitioner McElroy had likewise informed Juan Ponce Enrile about the projected motion picture, enclosing a synopsis of it. Enrile replied that he would not and will not approve of the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name or picture or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production. Because of this, petitioners deleted the name of Enrile in the movie script and proceeded to film the projected motion picture. Despite of the deletion, Enrile still sought to enjoin petitioners from producing the movie, which was later on granted. 4.
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Ruling: 1. Petitioners claim that in producing the The Four Day Revolution, they are exercising their freedom of speech and of expression protected under the
13 People v. Alarcon
intimate or embarrassing personal facts. To the extent that the motion picture limits itself in portraying the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution to those events which are directly and reasonably related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into private respondents privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may be carried out even without a license from private respondent. decision of a pending case. There is no pending case to speak of when and once the court has come upon a decision and has lost control either to reconsider or amend it. That, the Court believes is the case at bar, for here the Court has a concession that the letter complained of was published after the CFI of Pampanga had decided the aforesaid criminal case for robbery in band, and after that decision had been appealed to the Court of Appeals. The fact that a motion to reconsider its order confiscating the bond of the accused therein was subsequently filed may be admitted; but, the important consideration is that it was then without power to reopen or modify the decision which it had rendered upon the merits of the case, and could not have been influenced by the question publication. It is suggested that even if there had been nothing more pending before the trial court, this still had jurisdiction to punish the accused for contempt, for the rule that the publication scandalized the court. The rule suggested, which has its origin at common law, is involved in some doubt under modern English law and in the United States, the weight of authority, however, is clearly to the effect that comment upon concluded cases is unrestricted under our constitutional guaranty of the liberty of the press. Other considerations argue against our adoption of the suggested holding. As stated, the rule imported into this jurisdiction is that newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts; that the rule is otherwise after the case has ended. In at least two instances, this court has exercised the power to punish for contempt on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle (Villavicencio v. Lukban), on the corrective and not on the retaliatory idea of punishment (In re: Lozano and Quevedo). Contempt of court is in the nature of a criminal offense, and in considering the probate effects of the article alleged to be contemptuous, every fair and reasonable interference consistent with the theory of defendants innocence will be indulged, and where a reasonable doubt in fact or in law exists as to the guilt of one of the constructive contempt for interfering with the due administration of justice, the doubt must be resolved in his favour and he must be acquitted. Respondent was acquitted.
People v. Alarcon
A columnist of the Tribune published the copy of a letter in his article. The letter is about the conviction of 52 tenants of a hacienda. Facts: 1. A letter signed by one Luis Taruc was addressed to his Excellency, the President of the Philippines, and a copy of which, having found its way to a columnist of the Tribune, was quoted in an article of the said newspaper in its September 23, 1937 issue. The letter is about the charging and conviction of 52 tenants in Flroridablance, Pampanga for robbery in band because they took each a few cavans of palay for which they issued the corresponding receipts, from the bodega in the hacienda where they are working. The letter furthers that the tenants have the right to take the palay for their food as the hacienda owner has the obligation to given them rations of palay for their maintenance and their families to be paid with their share of their crop. For this purpose, respondent was required to show cause on grounds of contempt of court. 2.
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Ruling: 1. The elements of contempt by newspaper publications are well-defined by the cases adjudicated in this as in other jurisdictions. Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after cause has ended. It must clearly appear that such publications do impede, interfere with, and embarrass the administration of justice before the author of the publications should be held for contempt. What is thus sought to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the
3.
In re: Vicente Sotto

Atty. Vicente Sotto, a member of the Congress, was frustrated with how the Court interpreted the law he authored in a particular case. In his letter, he mentioned that he would file a bill seeking the reorganization of the Court.
14 In re: Laureta
Facts: 1. Vicente Sotto issued a written statement, published in the Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the locality, in connection with the Courts decision in In re: Angel Parazo. Sotto is disappointed with how the Court interpreted the Press Freedom Law, of which he is the author, in the case of Angel Parazo. More so, he declared the incompetency of narrow-mindedness of the majority of the Courts members. He furthers that the only remedy for the deliberate narrow-mindedness is to change the members of the Court. 3. purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration of justice. It is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the press must be protected to its fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the right of citizen, is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. In the words of Justice Holmes in US v. Sullens, *t+he administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogatives and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, this Court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition if its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. Sotto was found guilty of contempt of Court; thus, fined of Php 1,000.
2.
Ruling: 1. Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well-founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed but if it is not well-taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the Court in reversing or modifying its decision. Had the respondent in the present case limited himself to as statement that our decision is wrong or that our construction of the intention of the law is not correct, because it is different from what he, as proponent of the original bill, which became a law had intended, his criticism might in that case be tolerated, for it could not in any way influence the final disposition of the Parazo case by the court; inasmuch as it is of judicial notice that the bill presented by the respondent was amended by both Houses of Congress, and the clause unless the Court finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the State was added or inserted; and that, as the Act was passed by Congress and not by any particular member thereof, the intention of Congress and not that of the respondent must be the one to be determined by this Court in applying said act. The respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending reconsideration of the Parazo case. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members of Justices from eleven to seven, as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But, the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent
4.
In re: Laureta
Ilustre, whose case before the Supreme Court was resolved against her favour, wrote to the members of the First Division of the Court and threatened them. Furthermore, she filed a complaint before the Tanodbayan. Facts: 1. Wenceslao Laureta is the counsel of Eva Ilustre. Ilustre wrote to the members of the First Division of the Supreme Court, namely Justices Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano. In her letter, she threatened the members for their minute resolution which went against her favour. She threatened the members that the entire Filipino population would know the procedures in the Court and to charge them, which she apparently did so. She filed
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15 Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan
an affidavit-complaint before the Tanodbayan for having knowingly and deliberately rendered with bad faith, an unjust extended Minute Resolution. Ruling: 1. The Court finds Ilustre has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice in her letters addressed to the individual Justices; in the language of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan; in her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Court and/or the official actions of the Justices; and in her unjustified outburst that she can no longer expect justice from the Court. The fact that said letters are not technically considered pleadings nor the fact that they were submitted after the main petition had been finally resolved does not detract from the gravity of the contempt committed. The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court. the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the court. The substantive evil here involved, in other words, is not as palpable as a threat to public disorder or rioting, but is certainly no less deleterious and more far reaching in its implications for society.
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan
Gonzales filed a motion for reconsideration. He was found guilty of contempt of court and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Ruling: 1. The clear and present danger doctrine invoked by respondents counsel is not a magic incantation which dissolves all problems and dispenses with analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech, and which compels a court to exonerate a defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of impending apocalypse. The clear and present danger doctrine has been an accepted method for making out the appropriate limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is not, however, the only test which has been recognized and applied by courts. Under either the clear and present danger test or the balancing-of-interest test, the Court believes that the statements here made by Gonzales are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. It is important to point out that the substantive evil which the Supreme Court has a right and duty to prevent does not, in the instant case, relate to threats of physical disorder or overt violence or similar disruptions of public order. What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a substantive evil consisting not only of
2.
16 US v. Kottinger
US v. Kottinger
Kottinger was charged for keeping for sale in the raided store of Camera Supply Co. of obscene and indecent pictures. The pictures revealed six different postures of non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines. Facts: 1. The premises of Camera Supply Co. at 110 Escolta, Manila was raided and subsequent to said raid, post-cards were used as evidence against the manager of the company (J.J. Kottinger). Kottinger was charged for keeping for sale in the store of obscene and indecent pictures in violation of Section 12 of Act No. 277. Act No. 277 is the Philippine Libel Law. Section 12 made obscene or indecent publications as misdemeanours. The pictures reveal six different postures of non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines, including the Bontoc Woman, Moros, and Kalinga Girls, among others. 4. to sexual impurity, and has the same meaning as is given at common law in prosecutions for obscene libel. The pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they appear and can be seen in the regions in which they live, are not obscene or indecent within the meaning of the Libel Law. The pictures in question merely depict persons as they actually live, without attempted presentation of persons in unusual postures or dress. The aggregate judgment of the Philippine community, the moral sense of all the people in the Philippines, would not be shocked by photographs of this type. The court is convinced that the post-card pictures in this case cannot be characterized as offensive to chastity, or foul or filthy.
2.
Gonzales v. Katigbak
The Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television, upon condition that certain parts be changed and removed, classified the motion picture Kapit sa Patalim as for adults only. Facts:
Ruling: 1. 1. The word obscene and the term obscenity may be defined as meaning something offensive to chastity, decency, or delicacy. Indecency is an act against good behaviour and a just delicacy. The test ordinarily followed by the courts in determining whether a particular publication or other thing is obscene within the meaning of the statutes, is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall. Another test of obscenity is that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. The Philippine statute does not attempt to define obscenity or indecent pictures, writings, papers or books. But the words obscene or indecent at themselves descriptive. They are words in common use and every person of average intelligence understands their meaning. Indeed, beyond the evidence furnished by the pictures themselves, there is but little scope for bearing on the issue of obscenity or indecency. Whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case. Obscene as used in the Federal Statutes making it a criminal offense to place in the mails any obscene, lewd, or lascivious publication, according to the US Supreme Court and lesser Federal courts, signifies that form of immorality which has relation The motion picture Kapit sa Patalim was classified For Adults Only. As such, the president of the Malaya Films (Jose Antonio Gonzales) questioned the scope of the power of the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television and how it should be exercised. The chairman of the said board is Maria Kalaw Katigbak and Gen. Wilfredo Estrada as its vice-chairman. In classifying the said movie as For Adults Only, there must be made c ertain changes and deletions enumerated. For this purpose, a petition for certiorari was filed.
2.
Ruling: 1. Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perception by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits are considerable. Nor as pointed out in Burstyn v. Wilson is the importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform. There is no clear dividing line between what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. If such distinction were sustained, there is a diminution of the basic right to free expression.
2.
3.
17 People v. Go Pin
2. Press freedom, as stated in the opinion of the Court in Reyes v. Bagatsing, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. This is not to say that such freedom, as is the freedom of speech, absolute. It can be limited if there be a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. Censorship or previous restraint certainly is not all there is to free speech or free press. As early as 1909, in the case of US v. Sedano, a prosecution for libel, the Supreme Court already made clear that freedom of the press consists in the right to print what one chooses without any previous license. It is the opinion of the Court that to avoid an unconstitutional taint on its creation, the power of respondent Board is limited to the classification of films. It can, to safeguard other constitutional objections, determine what motion pictures are for general patronage and what may require either parental guidance or be limited to adults only. That is to abide by the principle that freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is against its validity. The test to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also present. There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the require of its being well-nigh (almost) inevitable. The basic postulate is that where the movies, theatrical productions, radio scripts, television programs, and other such media of expression are concerned included that they are in freedom of expression censorship, especially so if an entire production is banned, is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest. There is merit to the observation of Justice Douglas that every writer, actor, or producer, no matter what medium of expression he may use, should be freed from the censor. It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned: a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set. Children then likely will be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown. It cannot be denied that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young. 7. The petition was dismissed because the enough number of votes was not mustered.
People v. Go Pin
Go Pin held an exhibition of what was alleged to be indecent and/or immoral pictures in a recreational center. Facts: 1. Go Pin, a Chinese citizen, exhibited at the Globe Arcade in Manila, a recreational center, a large number of one-real 16 mm films about 100 feet in length each, which are allegedly indecent and/or immoral. He pleaded not guilty at first but when allowed to change his plea, he did so.
3.
4.
Ruling: 1. Paintings and pictures of women in the nude, including sculptures of the at kind are offensive to morals where they are made and shown not for the sake of art but profit would commercial purposes, that is, when gain and profit would appear to be the main, if not the exclusive consideration in their exhibition, and the case of art only of secondary or minor importance. If such pictures, sculptures and paintings are shown in art exhibits and art galleries for the cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated by people interested in art, there would be no offense committed. However, the pictures here in question were used not exactly for arts sake but rather for commercial purposes. In other words, the supposed artistic qualities of said pictures were being commercialized so that the cause of art was of secondary or minor importance. Gain and profit would appear to have been the main, if not the exclusive consideration in their exhibition; and it would not be surprising if the persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance fees for the privilege of doing so, were not exactly artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, but rather people desirous of satisfying their morbid curiosity and taste, and lust, and for love for excitement, including the youth who because of their immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield themselves from the ill and perverting effects of these pictures. The decision is affirmed.
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18 Dela Cruz v. Ela

Dela Cruz v. Ela
Members of the Jehovahs Witnesses applied for a permit from the Mayor of Sta. Cruz, Zambales in order to hold a public meeting with a kiosk at the public plaza. It was granted by the Mayor however specified that they hold the meeting at the north-western part of the plaza. Facts: 1. Members of the Jehovahs Witnesses sought to hold a public meeting at the public plaza of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, together with the kiosk on such date and time. As such, they applied for a permit from the respondent Mayor (Norberto Ela). In his answer, Ela stated that he had not refused the request of the petitioners to hold a religious meeting at the public plaza as he gave them permission to use the north-western part of the plaza on the said date (July 27, 1952). However, the members of the Jehovahs Witnesses declined to avail of it. As such, petitioners brought an action to compel Ela to issue a permit. or the happening of untoward incidents, they deemed it necessary to prohibit the use of that kiosk by any religious denomination as a place of meeting of its members. This was the policy adopted by respondent for sometime previous to the request made by the petitioners.
US v. Apurado
Several individuals compelled the members of the municipal council to dismiss several officials and replace them with the people they had recommended. Facts: 1. A large number of individuals assembled about the building of San Carlos, Occidental Negros, crowded into the council chamber and demanded the dismissal from office of the municipal treasurer, the municipal secretary and the chief of police, and the substitution in their places of new officials who were suggested by the spokesman of the party. This was done upon the opening of the session by the municipal council. The council, even though the persons who took part in the movement where wholly unarmed except that a few carried canes, acceded to their wishes and drew up a formal document setting out the reasons for its actions, which was signed by the councillors present. Moreover, the crowd was fairly orderly and well-behaved except in so far as their pressing into the council chamber during a session of that body. The cause of such movement was that the members of the movement believed that said officials whom they want dismissed have outspoken allegiance to one of the factions into which the town was at that time divided. Apurado, together with several individuals, was convicted of the crime of sedition.
2.
Ruling: 1. The right to freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble, though guaranteed by our Constitution, is not absolute, for it may be regulated in order that it may not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society, and this power may be exercised under the police power of the State. It is true that there is no law nor ordinance which expressly confers upon respondents the power to regulate the use of the public plaza, together with this kiosk, for the purposes for which it was established, but such power may be exercised under his broad powers as chief executive in connection with his duty to issue orders relating to the police or to public safety within the municipality (Section 2194(c) of the Revised Administrative Code). And it may even be said that the above regulation has been adopted as an implementation of the constitutional provision which prohibits any public property to be used, directly or indirectly, by any religious denomination. The power exercised by the respondent cannot be considered as capricious or arbitrary considering the peculiar circumstances of this case. It appears that the public plaza, particularly the kiosk, is located at a short distance from the Roman Catholic Church. The proximity of said church to the kiosk has caused some concern on the part of the authorities that to avoid disturbance of peace and order,
2.
2.
3. Ruling: 1.
3.
It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would become a
19 Malabanan v. Ramento
delusion and a snare and the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefore, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising. The evidence does not establish the guilt of the accused. Ruling: 1. It is true that petitioners held the rally at a place other than that specified in the permit and continued it longer than the time allowed. Undeniably too, they did disturb the classes and caused the work of the non-academic personnel to be left undone. Such undesirable consequence could have been avoided by their holding the assembly in the basketball court as indicated in the permit. Nonetheless, suspending them for one year is out of proportion to their misdeed. As declared by the Court in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression which is identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment and which is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. Petitioners are entitled to invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens, the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as in this case. They do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. While, therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. On a more specific level, there is persuasive force to this formulation in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District: The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. Among those activities is personal intercommunication among the students. This is not only an inevitable part of the process. A students rights do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria or on the playing field, or on campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without materially and substantially interfering with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school and without colliding with the rights of others. But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place or type of behaviour materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.
2.
2.
Malabanan v. Ramento
Student leaders at the Gregorio Araneta University, after holding the meeting, marched towards the Life Science building using megaphones and giving utterance to language severely critical of the school authorities. Classes were disturbed while the non-academic personnels work was interrupted. 3. Facts: 1. Petitioners organized a meeting, being officers of the Supreme Student Council of Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. They were granted the permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on August 27, 1982 at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court. However, they held the general assembly at the second floor lobby of the VMAS, contrary to what is stated in the permit. During the gathering, they manifested their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture, in a vehement and vigorous language. After the assembly, at around 10:30 a.m., they marched toward the Life Science building and continued their rally, using megaphones and giving utterance to language severely critical of the University authorities. As a result, classes were disturbed aside from the work of non-academic employees within hearing distance. The petitioners were placed under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly in front of the Life Science building. Respondent, the Director of NCR of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, found the petitioners guilty of the charge of having violated paragraph 146(c) of the Manual for Private Schools, more specifically their holding of an illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation.
2.
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4. 5.
20 Villar v. TIP
4. If in the course of such demonstration with an enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances, extremely critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable. Student leaders are hardly the timid, diffident types. They are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into account the excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the nonacademic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense. Petitioners cannot be totally absolved for the events. There was violation of the terms of the permit. Accordingly, they could be disciplined. 1. In the aforementioned Malabanan v. Ramento decision, the Court held that *a+s is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression, which is identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment and which is not limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. An equally relevant excerpt from the opinion therein follows that *p+etitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech, they are entitled to do so. they enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their thought to those disposed to listed in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. Petitioners have a valid cause for complaint if the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and peaceable assembly was visited by their expulsion from respondent College. The academic freedom enjoyed by institutions of higher learning includes the right to set academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being disregarded.
5.
2.
3.
6.
Villar v. TIP
The facts are similar with Malabanan v. Ramento. However, the petitioners have incurred failing grades thus were disallowed to enrol. Facts: 1. 2. Petitioners had engaged in some assembly. For this purpose, they were barred from enrolling. Aside from the assembly, the failed subjects of the petitioners were considered in their being barred from enrolling.
PBM Employment Association v. PBM

In airing their concerns regarding the excesses of the Pasig police, employees of the Philippine Blooming Mills decided to stage a mass demonstration at the Malacaang. The Company feared of losses to be incurred from 6 am to 2 pm. Facts: 1. 2. Petitioners decided to stage a mass demonstration at the Malacaang in protest of the alleged abuses of the Pasig police. Said demonstration would be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 am to 2 pm) as well as those in the regular second and third shift (from 7 am to 4
Ruling:
21 PBM Employment Association v. PBM

pm and from 8 am to 5 pm, respectively), and that they informed the respondent company, Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. of their proposed demonstration. 5. Ruling: 1. The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general principles. In the pithy language of Justice Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. Ones rights to life, liberty and property to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections. Laski proclaimed that the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. Is interest, not its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise. The freedoms of expressions and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected. The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to mans enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms, the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs political, economic or otherwise. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. The freedoms of speech and of the press, as declared in New York Times v. Sullivan, as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed. The demonstration held by petitioners before the Malacaang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer; said demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular before the appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were police excesses. As a matter of fact, it was the duty of PBM Co. to protect petitioners from the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest of PBM to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks, enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein the employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of PBM were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of the employer that it would suffer loss
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22 Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union

or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 am to 2 pm, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. 9. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is a potent means of inhibiting speech and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 10. It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence, its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted by final judgment through a forced confession, which violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination; or who is denied the right to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, even after the accused has already served sentence for 22 years. agreement (between employer and labor organization) shall not cover members of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization. Being a member of a religious sect which prohibits affiliation of its members with any labor organization, Victoriano tendered his resignation to the Union in 1962. However, no action was taken by the Union; thus, petitioner reiterated his resignation 12 years later. The Union, on the other end, wrote a formal letter to the Company asking for the separation of Victoriano from service as he was resigning from the Union as a member. The management in turn notified Victoriano and his counsel that unless they (Victoriano) could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss him from service.
3.
4.
Ruling: 1. Both the Constitution and RA 875 recognize freedom of association. Section 1(6) of the Article III of the 1935 Constitution as well as Section 7 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, provide that the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Section 3 of RA 875 provides that employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. What the constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the right to form or join associations. Notwithstanding the different theories propounded by the different schools of jurisprudence regarding the nature and content of a right, it can be safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a right comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. It is therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association; and should choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at any time. It is clear that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union. Inasmuch as what both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union

The enactment of RA 3350 which directed that the agreement between employer and labor organization is not binding to members of religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members to any such organization. In order to remain with the Company, according to the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the employee should likewise be a member of the Union. Facts: 1. Benjamin Victoriano was a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo and was employed by Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. since 1958. He was a member of the Workers Union, whose collective bargaining agreement with the company provided that *m+embership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees. Republic Act 3350 was enacted on June 18, 1961. It introduced amendment to Section 4[4(a)] of RA 875. Said section of RA 875 did not preclude the employer from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees. However, due to the amendment introduced by RA 3350, such
2.
2.
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23 In re: Edillon
recognized, and guaranteed to the employee, is the right to join associations of his choice, it would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in the same breath, upon the employee the duty to join associations. The law does not enjoin an employee to sign up any association. The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is limited. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only member of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs. What the exception provides is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. if in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join. RA 3350 does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association. maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues. Ruling: 1. An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State for, as the Latin maxim goes, Salus populi est suprema lex. The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar Examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organizations for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The SC, in order to further the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the
4.
5.
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In re: Edillon
Atty. Edillon did not want to pay the membership dues. He questioned the so-called infringement of the integration of the Integrated Bar on right to association. Facts: 1. Respondent, Atty. Marcial Edillon, stubbornly refused to pay his membership dues to the IBP despite the due notice of the Board of Governors of the IBP which recommended to the SC the removal of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. Edillon contends that membership and the obligation to pay membership dues infringe his constitutional right because he is compelled, as a precondition to
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2.
24 Subido v. Ozaeta
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. 5. The power to regulate is not synonymous with the power to prohibit. Stated differently, the power to make regulations does not carry with it the power to prohibit. To the extent that newspapers and others who have no direct or tangible interest in the records are obstructed from making an examination thereof, a part, indeed the larger part of the public, is thereby excluded from the right granted by law. Such prohibition is at war with the requirement that the books and records of registered lands shall be open to the public. Public is a comprehensive, allinclusive term. Properly construed, it embraces every person. From the language of section 56 of Act No. 496, as amended, the regulations which the Register of Deeds or the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or the Secretary of Justice is empowered to promulgate are confined to prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that damage to, or loss of, the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the books and documents and other employees may be prevented, that the right of other persons entitled to make inspection may be insured and the like. When it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful, it is not duty under the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the records. It is not their prerogative to see to it that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the officials having the custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. As to moral or material injury which the publication might inflict on the parties, that is the publishers responsibility and lookout. Newspapers have a better-established right of access to records of titles by reason of their relations to the public than abstractors or insurers of title. Whether by design or otherwise, newspapers perform a mission which does not enter into the calculation of the business of abstracting titles conducted purely for private gain. Newspapers publish information for the benefit of the public while abstractors do so for the benefit of a limited class of investors and purchasers of real estate only. It is through the medium of newspapers that the public is informed of how public servants conduct their business. The public through newspapers have the legitimate right to know the transactions in real estate which they believe have been registered in violation of the Constitution. The publication of these matters is certainly not only legitimate and lawful but necessary in a country where, under the Constitution, the people should rule.
Subido v. Ozaeta
Petitioner wanted the Register of Deeds of Manila, in compliance to Justice Circular No. 128, to furnish him a list of real estates sold to aliens and registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila. Facts: 1. Petitioner, the editor of the Manila Post, prays that an order issue commanding the respondents to furnish to petitioner the list of real estates sold to aliens and registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila since the promulgation of Justice Circular No. 128 or to allow the petitioner or his duly accredited representatives to examine all records in the respondents custody relative to said transaction. Said request was first denied by the Register of Deeds and by the Secretary of Justice, on appeal.
2.
6.
Ruling: 1. The petition in part is grounded on the liberty of the press. The Court however believes that this constitutional right is not in any way involved. The refusal by the respondents does not constitute a restriction upon or censorship of publication. It only affects facilities of publication, and the respondents are correct in saying that freedom of information or freedom to obtain information for publication is not guaranteed by the Constitution. The right to examine or inspect public records is purely a question of statutory construction. The right of inspection of title records is a subject of express statutory regulation in the Philippines. Section 56 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3300, provides that all records relating to registered lands in the office of the Register of Deeds shall be open to the public subject to such reasonable regulations as may be prescribed by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office with the approval of the Secretary of Justice. The Chief of the General Land Registration Office does not seem to have adopted any regulations in pursuance of this provision. The Register of Deeds has inherent power to control his office and the records under his custody and has some discretion to exercise as to the manner in which persons desiring to inspect, examine, or copy the records may exercise their rights.
7.
2. 3.
4.
25 Baldoza v. Dimaano
8. Petition was granted commanding the respondents to allow the petitioner or his accredited representatives to examine, extract, abstract, or make memoranda of the records of sales of real properties to aliens subject to such restriction and limitation as may be deemed necessary not incompatible with this decision. role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nations problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed, *m+aintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases. Restriction on access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order. The case against respondent was dismissed.
Baldoza v. Dimaano
To know the peace and order situation of the municipality, employees of the Municipal Mayor of Taal wanted to examine the criminal docket records of the municipal court. However, it was refused by the judge. As such, he was charged of abuse of authority. Facts: 1. The employees of the Municipal Mayor of Taal wanted to examine the criminal docket records of the municipal court to secure data in connection with their contemplated report on the peace and order situation of the municipality. However, it was not approved by the respondent municipal judge. The said municipal trial court judge was charged with abuse of authority in refusing to allow employees to access the records of the Municipal Trial Court. 5. 4.
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission

Legaspi requested information regarding the civil service eligibilities of two sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. However, the CSC initially denied said request. Facts: 1. Legaspi requested for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons (Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas) employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. They were, according to petitioner, represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians. But, his request was denied. For this purpose, a special civil action for mandamus was instituted.
2.
Ruling: 1. In a democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance; hence, the peoples right of free access to public records is predicated on their right to acquire information on matters of public concern. Mandamus would lie to compel a public official to allow an interested party access to the records in his custody. Thus, predicating the right to examine public records on statutory provisions and to a certain degree by general principles of democratic institutions, this Court stated that while the Register of Deeds has discretion to determine the manner in which persons desiring to inspect, examine or copy the records in his office may exercise their rights, such power does not carry with it the authority to prohibit. Publics right of access to public records is not merely predicated on statutory right but on the constitutional right of the press to have access to information as the essence of press freedom. The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on matters of public concern and thus are expressly granted to access to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental
2.
2. Ruling: 1.
3.
The new provision reads that *t+he right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. T hese constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules which the right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the Constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature. What may be provided for by
26 Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission

the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest. However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Article III, Section 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter. In recognizing the peoples right to be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter, expressly mandate the duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records, documents, papers and in addition, government research data used as basis for policy development, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The guarantee has been further enhanced in the New Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full public disclosure, this time, which reads: Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. Government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the public. The Court is emphatic in the statement that the authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to a particular information and the authority to regulate the manner in which the access is sought to be afforded. The first is a limitation upon the availability of access to the information sought, which only the Legislature may impose. The second pertains to the government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, undue interference with the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the same constitutional right by other persons shall be assured. While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus in a proper case. But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the constitution, access to official records, papers, etc. are subject to limitations as may be provided by law. The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security. It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, the government is in an advantageous position to marshal and interpret arguments against release. To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus. In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. Public concern like public interest is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain government employees that they are civil service eligible for the positions to which they were appointed. The constitution expressly declares as a State policy that *a+ppointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and except as to positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, by competitive examination.
6.
2.
7.
3.
4.
8.
5.
9.
27 Valmonte v. Belmonte
10. But, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For Mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. 11. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. and of the press. Far from it, the right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decisionmaking as well in checking abuse in government. Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. The peoples right to information is limited to matters of public concern, and is further subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Similarly, the States policy of full disclosure is limited to transactions involving public interest, and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. A corporation has no right to privacy since the entire basis of the right to privacy is injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief. Neither can the GSIS through its general manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature. The government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the same function of service to the people. Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right of the right to information. The consideration in guaranteeing access to information on matters of public concern does not however, accord to citizen the right to compel custodian of public records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire such information. The petition was granted.
3.
Valmonte v. Belmonte
Valmonte, through a letter, requested the GSIS to furnish him a list of the names of the opposition members of the Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a loan of Php 2 million. Facts: 1. Valmonte wrote to Belmonte, who is the GSIS General Manager at that time, requesting the latter to furnish the list of names of the opposition members of the Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of Php 2 million each on guaranty of Imelda Marcos. However, the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS replied that they cannot respond positively to his request.
4.
5.
2.
Ruling: 1. The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner working of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution. The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech
6.
7.
Badoy Jr. v. COMELEC

Badoy, who is a candidate for the Constitutional Convention for the lone district of North Cotabato, prayed that Section 12(f) of the Constitutional Convention Act be declared unconstitutional for it abridged the freedom of expression of individuals. Facts: 1. Anacleto Badoy, Jr. is a candidate for delegate tot eh Constitutional Convention for the lone district of North Cotabato.
2.
28 PCIB v. PHILNABANK Employees Association

2. He prays that the Section 12(f) of RA 6132 (Constitutional Convention Act) be declared unconstitutional for in so far as it prohibits the printing and publication of such comments and articles, which are not paid, unless the names of all candidates are mentioned with equal prominence. He purports that said provision unduly abridges the freedom of expression of an individual whether candidate or not. 5. Freedom of expression is not immune to regulation by the State in the exercise of its police power. The validity of the abridgment is gauged by the extent of its inroad into the domain of the liberty of speech and of the press, when subjected to the applicable clear and present danger rule or the balancing of interests tests. If the restriction on the invaded is so narrow that the basic liberty remains, then the limitation is constitutional. The evident purpose of the limitation in Section 12(f) of RA 6132 on the freedom of the candidate or his sympathizer to spend his own money for his candidacy alone and not for the furtherance of the candidacy of his opponents. It is to give the poor candidates a fighting chance in the election. While it is true that the mere mention of the poor opponent in the same advertisement or paid articles does not by itself alone engender perfect equality of chances, at least the chance of the poor candidate for victory is improved because thereby his name will be exposed to the reading public in the same article as that of the wealthy candidate. Section 12(f) of RA 6132. Prohibiting the publication of paid comments or paid articles without mentioning the names of all the other candidates with equal prominence, is not unconstitutional as unduly abridging the freedom of expression of an individual. Against the background of the several facilities accorded by the law for all candidates, rich and poor alike, and the prohibitions as well as penal sanctions to insure the sanctity of the ballot against desecration and the equality of chances among the candidates, the restriction on the freedom of expression of the candidate or any other individual prescribed in Section 12(f) is so narrow as not to affect the substance and vitality of his freedom of expression itself. Under the guarantee of free expression, the candidate who pays for a comment or an article has the duty not only to inform the electorate about his qualifications and proposals for constitutional reforms, but also to inform truthfully the public who his opponents are, so that the public or particularly the electorate can determine the truth and merit of his claims vis--vis those of the other candidates. Otherwise, the candidate will be guilty of gross and unpardonable deceit on the people. This duty on the part of the candidate was underscored by John Milton in his stirring rhetorical denunciation of the suppression of truth as he appealed for the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties. The same was stressed by Justice Murphy when he delineated the contours as well as facets of the freedom of expression as the freedom to publish publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment. The candidate, to enjoy the freedom, therefore has the concomitant duty to campaign for himself truthfully according to his conscience. If he is not truthful, he forfeits the freedom. His freedom of expression is not and should not be limited to his own personal right to know the truth of the claims of the other candidates. Petitions were denied.
Ruling: 1.
6.
PCIB v. PHILNABANK Employees Association

The PHILNABANK Employees Association had used placards in their demonstration against the incompetence of the banks management. The petitioners found the cards to be causing dishonour because it read that their bad accounts were transferred to the PNB. Facts: 1. PHILNABANK Employees, in denouncing the lack of business foresight, incompetence, mismanagement, arbitrary and despotic acts of the management to heed the legal and legitimate demands, put up placards along the PNB building in Escolta, Manila. The placards read: PCIB Bad Accounts transferred to PNB-NIDC? According to petitioner, these placards were causing dishonour, discredit or contempt of a juridical person.
2.
3.
2.
Ruling: 1. The labor union made use of its constitutional right to picket. From the time of Mortera v. CIR, a 1947 decision, this Court has been committed to the view that peaceful picketing is part of the freedom of speech guarantee of the Constitution. The latest case in point where such a principle was reaffirmed expressly is Associated Labor Union v. Gomez, a 1980 decision. There is no mention of the other placards but it is not unlikely that to bolster its claim, mention was likewise made and in bold letter at that of such alleged failing of its management. It is a fact of industrial life, both in the Philippines as in the United States, that in the continuing confrontation between labor and management, it is far from likely that the language employed would be both courteous and polite. Such being the
4.
2.
29 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

case, there is no affront either to reason or to the law in the complaint for libel being dismissed. In pricing reliance on the constitutional right of freedom of expression, this Court once again makes manifest its adherence to the principle first announced by Justice Malcolm in US v. Bustos. In no uncertain terms, it made clear that the judiciary, in deciding suits for libel, must ascertain whether or not the alleged offending words may be embraced by the guarantees of free speech and free press. Decision is affirmed. weekly circulation was over 20,000, with the result that the tax applied only to 13 out of 124 publishers in Louisiana. These large papers were critical of Sen. Long who controlled the state legislature which enacted the license tax. The censorial motivation for the law was thus evident. In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commr of Revenue, the tax was found to be discriminatory because although it could have been made liable for the sales tax or in lieu thereof, for the use tax on the privilege of using, storing, or consuming tangible goods, the press was not. Instead the press was exempted from both taxes. It was however later made to pay a special use tax on the cost of paper and ink which made these items the only items subject to the use tax that were component of goods to be sold at retail. The US SC held that the differential treatment of the press suggests that the goal of regulation is not related to suppression of expression, and such goal is presumptively unconstitutional. It would therefore appear that even a law that favors the press is constitutionally suspect. The VAT is different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege; much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.
4.
3.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

The Expanded Value-Added Tax Law was challenged by several petitions. The Philippine Press Institute contends that the law discriminates against the press after the law removed the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintained those granted to others. Facts: 1. 2. Several motions were filed in order to have RA 7716 declared unconstitutional. RA 7716 is known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. It is contended by the Philippine Press Institute that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, even non-discriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional. 5.
Ruling: 1. As a general proposition, the press is not exempt from the taxing power of the State and that what the constitutional guarantee of free press prohibits are laws which single out the press or target a group belonging to the press for special treatment or which in any way discriminate against the press on the basis of the content of the publication, and RA 7716 is none of these. It would suffice to say that since the law granted the press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the constitution. The reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to which other businesses have long ago been subject. The license tax in Grosjean v. American Press Co. was found to be discriminatory because it was laid on the gross advertising receipts only of newspapers whose
Soliven v. Makasiar
The President of the Philippines filed a complaint for libel against the petitioners, who were the publisher and columnist of the Philippine Star, based on the following statement in Beltran's column of Oct. 12, 1987 totle "The Nervous Officials of the Aquino Administration": "If you recall, during the August 29 coup attempt, the President hid under her bed while the firing was going on - perhaps the first Commander-in-Chief to do so." Facts: 1. In this case, upon the issue raised by petitioner Beltran, the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest was called for an interpretation. Beltran wrote in the Philippine Star that during the August 29 coup attempt, the President hid under her bed while the firing was going on. Due to this, the President filed a libel complaint against petitioners.
2.
3.
30 Soliven v. Makasiar
Ruling: 1.

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