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v. CIVIL ACTION-LAW
This is an auto accident case. Plaintiff was a pedestrian in the intersection of 7th
and Cumberland Streets in the City of Lebanon when she was struck and injured by a
car driven by Defendant. Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, who was insured for
bodily injury liability by Erie Insurance Group. Erie retained counsel to defend the
action.
medical bills, and notified Plaintiff that it was asserting a lien in the amount of
$10,597.76 against any recovery Plaintiff might obtain from Defendant. Plaintiff’s
counsel notified Defendant, Erie, and defense counsel of the Medicare lien.
Plaintiff’s claim for $70,000.00. In negotiations leading up to the settlement, the parties
and Erie agreed that Plaintiff and her undersigned counsel would be responsible for
Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Erie and Defendant drafted a release that
starts by reciting “[Plaintiff], for and in consideration of the sum of Seventy Thousand
agreement, and at Defendant’s and Erie’s insistence, the release also contained the
“It is further understood and agreed that [Plaintiff] will indemnify and hold [Erie
and Defendant] harmless from any and all liability, damages, costs, fees and
expenses including, but not limited to medical bills, and expenses arising from
any subrogation, indemnity or other claims/suits made by any person or entity as
a result of any payments made to, or on behalf of [Plaintiff], which arise from and
relate to any injuries, losses or damages incurred by [Plaintiff] due to the above-
described incident. This promise of [Plaintiff] to indemnify, defend and hold [Erie
and Defendant] harmless extends but is not limited to, the claims of all persons,
insurers or entities which have paid . . . Medicare benefits (regardless of whether
said benefits are paid by a privately funded plan or otherwise), or other similar
benefits and are claiming an entitlement to indemnity/reimbursement from
[Plaintiff] under any contract or pursuant to federal or state law or regulation.”
discontinued the lawsuit, and returned the signed release and a clocked copy of the
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Settlement, Paragraphs 8, 9, and Exhibit “C”, all of which are admitted by Defendant).
Rather than send Plaintiff a single check for $70,000.00, Erie sent Plaintiff two checks
• “Sally Lingle and Henry & Beaver, LLP Her Attorneys”, $59,402.24
check”).
reissued, payable to “Sally Lingle and Henry & Beaver LLP, her Attorneys”. Defendant
Pa.R.C.P. 229.1, asking that Defendant and Erie be ordered to pay $10,597.76, plus
4.25% simple interest from July 31, 2009, to “Sally A. Lingle and Henry & Beaver, LLP.,
her attorneys”, plus attorney’s fees. Defendant and Erie have filed an Answer and an
Settlement, which simply requested additional relief. By agreement, the parties deem
The matter is ready for resolution and listed for October 30, 2009 Argument
Court.1
1
In keeping with the customary practice in Lebanon County, Plaintiff discontinued the action before
receiving any funds from Defendant or Erie. On Plaintiff’s motion, the Court, Tylwalk, P.J., struck off the
discontinuance on August 31, 2009, in order to decide the instant motion.
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II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
C. Should Defendant and Erie pay Plaintiff interest and reasonable attorney’s fees
in connection with the filing of this Motion?
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III. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENT
Plaintiff accepted that offer. The parties, as the result of negotiations, agreed that
Plaintiff would satisfy the Medicare lien. Defendant and Erie drafted a release
consistent with the negotiated agreement, and Plaintiff signed it exactly as drafted.
Erie have breached the settlement agreement, since they admit that they agreed that
Plaintiff would pay Medicare. Even if it is assumed for argument’s sake that there was
no such agreement, Plaintiff can find no decision, law, regulation, or rule of court that
requires a settling defendant or carrier to name Medicare as a payee, nor can Plaintiff
find any authority for the proposition that a settling defendant or carrier has an
affirmative duty to satisfy a Medicare lien. To the contrary, the law does not so require.
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IV. ARGUMENT FOR PLAINTIFF
Mazella v. Koken, 559 Pa. 216, 224, 739 A.2d 531 (1999); Pulcinello v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 784 A.2d 122, 124 (Pa.Super., 2001), appeal denied, 568 Pa. 703, 796 A.2d
984 (2002). “There is an offer (the settlement figure), acceptance, and consideration (in
exchange for the plaintiff terminating his lawsuit, the defendant will pay the plaintiff the
Gutnick, 526 Pa. 541, 547, 587 A.2d 1346, 1349, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 867, 112 S.Ct.
196, 116 L.Ed.2d 156 (1991). Where a settlement agreement contains all of the
requisites for a valid contract, a court must enforce the terms of the agreement. See
McDonnell v. Ford Motor Co., 434 Pa.Super. 439, 643 A.2d 1102, 1105 (1994), appeal
In this case, Defendant offered $70,000.00 to settle the case. Plaintiff accepted
the offer, and provided the required consideration by signing a release of all claims and
discontinuing the suit. An additional negotiated term of the settlement agreement was
that Plaintiff would be responsible for satisfying the Medicare lien. This is demonstrated
by the letter of July 9, 2009, which expressly states that “[Plaintiff] will settle the
Medicare lien and provide you and Erie with proof. Additionally, [Plaintiff] agree[s] to
Settlement, Paragraphs 5, 6, Exhibit “A”). Defense counsel drafted a release with such
language, Plaintiff signed it without change, and the action was discontinued.
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It also bears noting that very first sentence of the release drafted by Defendant’s
counsel clearly contemplates the payment of the entire settlement amount directly to
Plaintiff: “KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS THAT I, Sally Lingle (Releasor), for
and in consideration of the sum of Seventy Thousand Dollars ($70,000.00), the receipt
While Plaintiff does not concede the point, assuming for argument’s sake that the
release is ambiguous, the Court has the authority and responsibility to look outside the
terms of the release itself for other evidence to show both the intent of the parties and
the circumstances surrounding the drafting of the contract. See Harrity v. Medical
College of Pennsylvania Hospital, 439 Pa.Super. 10, 21, 653 A.2d 5, 10 (1994). Such
external evidence would be Plaintiff’s July 9, 2009 letter, Exhibit “A” to the Motion to
Erie and Defendant have breached the settlement agreement because, contrary
to their contractual obligation, they have not paid Plaintiff $70,000.00. They are
resorting to semantics to argue that they have complied with the settlement agreement.
By sending Plaintiff a separate check payable solely to Medicare for the lien amount,
Defendant and Erie, with all the earnestness they can muster, claim that they “. . . are
attempting to have Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel satisfy the Medicare lien by providing
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Settlement). Since it is payable solely to Medicare, Erie could have directly mailed the
Medicare check to Medicare from Erie Headquarters. Instead, they have mailed it to
Plaintiff and told her to re-mail it from the Lebanon Post Office! This is a distinction
When Plaintiff refused to accept a check payable solely to Medicare, Erie and
Defendant offered to issue a check in the lien amount payable to Medicare, Plaintiff, and
Since the Medicare Secondary Payor Contractor is in Detroit, this check would be, as a
practical matter, un-negotiable. This too violates the settlement agreement since,
contrary to the clear terms of the settlement agreement, Defendant and Erie are
ii. The law clearly places the primary duty to satisfy a Medicare lien on
Plaintiff, not Defendant or Erie
42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2), et. seq. (“MSPA”), and relevant provisions of the Code of
Federal Regulations. The MSPA does not require Defendant and Erie to name
Medicare as a payee on settlement checks. They may be required to do so, but only in
certain situations - not applicable to the case at bar - are they mandated to do so. 42
supplied):
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(1) In the case of liability insurance settlements and disputed claims under
employer group health plans, workers' compensation insurance or plan,
and no-fault insurance, the following rule applies: If Medicare is not
reimbursed as required by paragraph (h) of this section, the primary payer
must reimburse Medicare even though it has already reimbursed the
beneficiary or other party.
(2) The provisions of paragraph (i)(1) of this section also apply if a primary
payer makes its payment to an entity other than Medicare when it is, or
should be, aware that Medicare has made a conditional primary payment.”
with respect to an item or service under a primary plan. Such entities include insurers,
self-insurers, and third party administrators. 42 C.F.R. § 411.21. Therefore, Erie and
Stated simply, the MSPA and relevant regulations require Erie and Defendant to
Plaintiff can find no Pennsylvania state or federal decisions on this point, but at
least one federal court agrees with Plaintiff’s position. Tomlinson v. Landers, 2009 WL
Appendix A. Nevertheless, Pennsylvania courts have dealt with the general subject of
when a lien attaches. A lienholder’s right to subrogation does not accrue until the
injured plaintiff actually receives the compensation from a settlement or verdict. See
525-26 (Pa. 1993), re-argument denied. A third-party or UIM insurance carrier does not
Southern Council of Industrial Workers v. Ford, 83 F.3d 966, 968-69 (8th Cir. 1996).
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The real motive for Defendant’s and Erie’s breach of the settlement agreement
Defendant and Erie that Medicare’s lien will be satisfied rather than Medicare pursuing
Defendant and Erie directly for the Medicare amount which Erie has experienced in
other cases when the Medicare lien has not been satisfied by plaintiff or plaintiff’s
counsel.” No specific cases were cited, and this unverified averment has since been
withdrawn by amendment.
Putting aside the fact that the MSPA and its regulations don’t support Erie, if Erie
can’t trust Plaintiff to satisfy the lien, why should Plaintiff trust Erie to do so? Plaintiff
has agreed to indemnify Erie and Defendant if the lien isn’t paid, but they have made no
such promises to Plaintiff, who is “on the hook” to the same extent if Medicare isn’t paid.
The law expressly places the primary duty to satisfy the lien on Plaintiff, and makes
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iii. By breaching the settlement agreement, Defendant and Erie are
interfering with Plaintiff’s counsel’s right to charge Medicare a fee and costs for
collecting its lien
Plaintiff’s insistence that she be permitted to settle the Medicare lien directly and
without interference from Defendant and Erie is not merely an academic exercise.
Plaintiff’s counsel is entitled by law to charge Medicare a reasonable fee and a pro-rata
share of costs advanced, since his efforts created the fund out of which Medicare will be
reimbursed. Federal regulations require Medicare to reduce the amount of its recovery
“to take account of the cost of procuring the judgment or settlement if: (i)[p]rocurement
costs are incurred because the claim is disputed; and (ii)[t]hose costs are borne by the
includes reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs advanced. See In re Zyprexa Products
Liability Litigation, 451 F.Supp 2d 458, 478 (E.D. New York, 2006).
Insurance Company v. Wolfe, supra, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an
attorney for an injured employee was entitled to be paid first from a settlement fund
created by his efforts in a suit against a third-party tortfeasor, before the workers’
compensation carrier or the employee received any benefit from third-party settlement.
The court reasoned that the carrier could not expect to receive any settlement money
before the injured employee received such money, and that the employee in turn could
not expect to receive such money without first paying his attorney for creating the
settlement fund, per their fee agreement. 534 Pa. at 74-76, 626 A.2d at 525, 526.
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Although it was a workers’ compensation case, our Supreme Court in Wolfe discussed
general principles of equitable subrogation, and they are applicable to the case at bar.
dispute as to the terms of the settlement or the terms of the release. Sanctions under
the Rule are defined as simple interest at the Wall Street Journal Prime Rate for the first
edition of the applicable calendar year, plus one percent (1%), payable from the twenty-
first day after the release is received by Defendant, together with reasonable attorneys
fees incurred in the preparation of the affidavit2. The Wall Street Journal Prime Rate on
Plaintiff’s counsel estimates that he will spend at least 4 hours preparing, and
briefing the Motion to Enforce Settlement, as amended. Another estimated one hour
will be required, should there be oral argument. The Court should order Defendant and
Erie to pay simple interest at 4.25% per annum from July 31, 20093 plus attorney’s fees
2
Pa.R.C.P. 229.1(e) refers to the filing of an “affidavit” to enforce a settlement. Plaintiff asks the Court to
treat her Motion to Enforce Settlement as such an affidavit.
3
July 31, 2009 being three business days from the date the signed release and Discontinuance were
mailed to defense counsel. Motion to Enforce Settlement, Exhibit “C”
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V. CONCLUSION
Defendant, and Erie agreed that Plaintiff would directly settle the Medicare lien. Plaintiff
signed a release agreeing to indemnify and hold harmless Defendant and Erie if she
failed to do so. Plaintiff provided Defendant and Erie with a Settlement Distribution
Statement showing exactly how she proposed to reimburse Medicare. The law does
not require Medicare to be named as a payee, but does make Plaintiff – not Defendant
The Court should grant Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement and order
per annum simple interest from July 31, 2009 to the date of payment,
payable to “Sally Lingle and Henry & Beaver, LLP Her Attorneys”;
$210.00;
(d) Grant such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate.
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HENRY & BEAVER LLP
By:__________________________
CHRISTOPHER J. COYLE
I.D. #30686
AMY B. LEONARD
ID #93526
937 Willow Street
P.O. Box 1140
Lebanon, PA 17042-1140
(717) 274-3644
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Christopher J. Coyle, of the firm of Henry & Beaver LLP, do hereby certify that
on the date below I served a certified true and correct copy of the within Brief in Support
of Motion to Enforce Settlement upon the following person(s) in the manner specified
below:
______________________________
CHRISTOPHER J. COYLE
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APPENDIX A
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