THE TRIKAYA: A STUDY OF THE BUDDHOLOGY OF THE EARLY

VIJNANAVADA SCHOOL OF INDIAN BUDDHISM

by
MERVIN VIGGO HANSON
M.A., University of Saskatchewan, 1970
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.
in
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
Department of Religious Studies
We accept t h i s thesis as conforming
to the required standard
THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
August 1980
(5)Mervin Viggo Hanson, 1980
In pr es ent i ng t h i s t hes i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l me n t of the requi rements f o r
an advanced degree at the Un i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Col umbi a, I agree t hat
the L i br ar y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r ef er ence and study.
I f ur t her agree t hat per mi ssi on f or ext ens i ve copyi ng of t h i s t hes i s
f o r s c ho l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or
by hi s r epr es ent at i v es . I t i s understood t hat copyi ng or pu bl i c a t i o n
of t h i s t hes i s f o r f i n a n c i a l gai n s ha l l not be al l owed wi t hout my
wr i t t e n per mi s s i on.
Department of R E L I G I O U S S T U D I E S
The Un i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia
2075 Wesbrook Pl ace
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1W5
Date August 1980
ABSTRACT
This i s a study of the t r i k a y a (the s o - c a l l e d "three bodies of the
Buddha") doctrine whereby the early Indian Vijnanavada Buddhists harmonized
various b e l i e f s about the Buddha.
The most important twentieth-century studies are reviewed, but are found
to contain no r e l i a b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the early doctrine. Therefore, I
have undertaken t h i s study to c l a r i f y and i n t e r p r e t the t r i k a y a . The main
t e x t u a l source i s Asanga's Mahayanasamgraha, which contains the e a r l i e s t
systematic o u t l i n e of the Vijfia.nava.da system. The Buddhological passages have
f i r s t been t r a n s l a t e d (from Tibetan and Chinese) i n l i g h t of the commentaries
by Vasubandhu and Asvabhava. They have then been compared and arranged to
expose the general structure of Asanga's t r i k a y a .
Why did Asanga introduce the t r i k a y a when other i n t e g r a t i v e Buddhologies
( e s p e c i a l l y the rupakaya/dharmakaya of the prajnaparamita) were already at
hand? A comparison of his a p p l i c a t i o n . o f the t r i k a y a with the prajnaparamita
treatment of s i m i l a r concerns reveals that the former integrates one idea that
the l a t t e r does n o t t h a t of the Buddhafield. The necessity to include t h i s
nascent doctrine appears to have been the main reason f o r the introduction of
the t r i k a y a .
In the conclusion, the t r i k a y a has been analyzed further to obtain an
abstract S t r u c t u r a l i s t model e x h i b i t i n g Asanga's Buddhology i n terms accept-
able to the non-believer. It i s a useful framework within which to study the
concept of Buddhahood i t s e l f , and i t s r e l a t i o n to other Vijnanavada dogma. It
i s also a convenient way to compare the r e s u l t s of modern "".investigations.
This model, derived by an extension of Asanga's own search for the
i m p l i c i t pattern behind diverse s c r i p t u r a l statements about Buddhahood, i s
s i m i l a r to those used by the anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss. Therefore,
various hypotheses were suggested by h i s writings.
The model i s a two-dimensional diagram which represents the encounter
between Buddha (Svabhavikakayaat the top) and Man (Prthagjanaat the
bottom). They are, simultaneously, poles of a d i a l e c t i c a l tension and
uninhabited e x i s t e n t i a l categories. The inhabited region in-.the middle of the
diagram i s composed of a continuum of three s i t u a t i o n s along the h o r i z o n t a l
axis. Each contains three elements: Buddha, Aspirant and Environment. The
actual encounters between Buddha and Aspirant occur i n these s i t u a t i o n s . "They
include that of the Neophyte i n the world, for whom the Buddha i s merely a
message; the Sravaka who i s approached by a Nirmanakaya ( " h i s t o r i c a l Buddha")
who teaches him by pain, and the Bodhisattva who approaches the Sambhogakaya
(the god-like f i gure i n a Buddhafield) who matures him through pleasure. In
the course of these three, the aspirant undergoes " r e o r i e n t a t i o n , " i . e . ,
moves up the v e r t i c a l axis to become a Buddha who, i n turn, reaches out to
another aspirant. The remainder "of the Buddhological ideas from the text are
placed within t h i s diagram.
F i n a l l y , the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h i s model to other Buddhological questions
i s examined.
i v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
ABSTRACT i i
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS i x
LIST OF FIGURES x
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS x i
INTRODUCTION 1
'! NOTES k
CHAPTER
I. REVIEW OF SCHOLARSHIP 5
1. W. W. R o c k h i l l , The L i f e of the Buddha (1907)- . . . . 5
2. H. Kern, "Sur 1 ' invocation d'une i n s c r i p t i o n
bouddhique" (.1906) 6
3. L. de La Vallee Poussin, "The Three Bodies of a
Buddha" (.1906) 8
k. D. T. Suzuki, Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism (1907) 10
5. M. P. Masson-Oursel, "Les t r o i s corps du bouddha"
(1913) 13
6. L. de La V a l l e e Poussin, "Note sur l e s corps du
Bouddha" (.1913) 19
J. A. Coomaraswamy, Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism
(1916) 2k
8. C. Akanuma, " T r i p l e Body of the Buddha" (.1922) . . . . 25
9. L. de La Vallee Poussin, Vijnaptimatratasiddhi
(1928-29) . . . . . 28
V
CHAPTER PAGE
10. D. T. Suzuki, Studies i n the Lankavatara S u t r a (1932) . 32
11. Hobogirin 3^+
12. A. K. C h a t t e r j e e , The Yogacara Idealism-(.19.62) . . . 36
13. A. Matsunaga, The Buddhist Philosophy of A s s i m i l a t i o n
(1969) 38
1^. G. P a r r i n d e r , Avatar and I n c a r n a t i o n (1970) . . . . ^1
15. G. Nagao, "On the Theory of Buddha-Body" (.1973) . . . ^3
SUMMARY OF SCHOLARSHIP k6
CONCLUSION 60
1. MAITREYA 62
2. ASANGA 63
3. VASUBANDHU 6k
NOTES 67
I I . THE TRIKAYA DOCTRINE IN THE MAHAYANASAMGRAHA 70
A. SOURCES 71
B. WHAT IS THE VIJNANAVADA? 73
C. VIJNANAVADA OF THE MAHAYANASAMGRAHA 80
D. A STUDY OF VIJNANAVADA BUDDHOLOGY IN THE
MAHAYANASAMGRAHA 85
1. 11:33: THE TWENTY-ONE GUNAS OF THE BUDDHA . . 87
a. The Noetic A b i l i t i e s 92
b. The E f f e c t i v e A b i l i t i e s 92
i . The Domain of the Buddha . . . . 93
i i . The Buddha-body 95
i i i . The Buddha-mind 96
v i
CHAPTER PAGE
2. THE DHARMAKAYA 98
a. Obtaining the Dharmakaya 98
i . R e o r i e n t a t i o n of the A l a y a v i j n a n a . 98
i i . Obtaining the Dharmakaya:
The Epistemic E x p l a n a t i o n . . . . 100
By Non-conceptual and
Subsequent Awareness . . . . 101
By the F i v e - F o l d P r a c t i c e . . . 105
By Amassing the Accumulation of
Equipment on A l l Bhumis . . . 107
By the Vajropamasamadhi . . . 107
i i i . The Dharmakaya as R e o r i e n t a t i o n
of the Skandhas 108
b. The Dharmakaya What Is I t ? . . . . 113
i . C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s Claksanas) of
the Dharmakaya Ilk
i i . X:7: The Buddhadharmas . . . . 125
i i i . X:9-27: Gunas A s s o c i a t e d w i t h
the Dharmakaya 128
c. The Dharmakaya as Seen by the
Bodhisattva . 130
d. The Dharmakaya A Summary 133
3. THE TRIKAYA l l l l
a. A U n i f i e d T r i k a y a or Three Kayas? . . . iki
b. Which Three Kayas? lk3
v i i
CHAPTER PAGE
c. The Mrmanakaya: Buddha i n the World . . ihQ
i . The Mrmanakaya: A Summary . . . 156
d. The Sambhogakaya Buddha i n
the Buddhafield 159
i . The Sambhogakaya General . . . 159
i i . The Buddhafield l6k
i i i . Bodhisattvas Residents of
the Buddhafield 168
Pleasure 171
Reorientation 172
Sovereignty 172
Awareness (j nana or
n i r v i k a l p a j nana 175
Pleasure and the Other . . . . 177
Pleasure and the Bodhisattva's
Maturation 178
e. The Three Kayas: I n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s . . 180
i . Mrmanakaya and Sambhogakaya
Compared 185
i i . The Trikaya and C l a s s i c a l Problems . 187
One Buddha, or Many Buddhas? . . 188
Is the Buddha Mortal, or
Immortal? 192
Does the Buddha Remain i n
Nirvana, or Not? 196
v i i i
CHAPTER PAGE
C o n c l u s i o n 198
f . Why Three Kayas? 198
NOTES 200
I I I . CONCLUSION 216
A. CRITERIA FOR A MODEL 220
B. ELEMENTS OF THE MODEL 221
C. STRUCTURALISM 22*1
D. DEVELOPING THE MODEL 227
1. THE PRTHAGJANA 231
2. THE NEOPHYTE 232
3. THE SRAVAKA-NIRMANAKAYA ENCOUNTER . . . . 232
k. REORIENTATION 23k
5. THE SAMBHOGAKAYA-BODHISATTVA ENCOUNTER . . . 23h
6. THE SVABHAVIKAKAYA 235
7. THE FULL MODEL 236
8. THE MODEL APPLIED 2h0
a. R e o r i e n t a t i o n and S o t e r i o l o g i c a l
P r o g r e s s 2^1
b. S v a b h a v i k a k a y a , Dharmakaya, and S u p p o r t
f o r t h e Rupakayas 2^3
E. FINAL COMMENTS 2^7
NOTES 252
APPENDIX A: BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SECONDARY SOURCES 25^
APPENDIX B: BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SELECTED PRIMARY SOURCES . . . 262
i x
ABBREVIATIONS
BEFEO B u l l e t i n de l ' E c o l e Frangaise d'Extreme-Orient.
Dk Dharmakaya
JAOS Journal of the American O r i e n t a l Society
LC Lokesh Chandra, Tibetan Sanskrit Dictionary (New
Delhi: International Academy for Indian Culture, i960)
Mvy Mahavyutpatti and Index to Mahavyutpatti.
C o l l e g i a t e Series, no. 3, 3rd p r i n t i n g (Kichudo:
Kyoto U n i v e r s i t y , Dept. of L i t e r a t u r e , 1965)
Nk Nirmanakaya
Sbk Sambhogakaya
Svk Svabhavikakaya
X
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE PAGE
1 223
2 229
3 231
h 238
5 2kh
6 2U8
x i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to thank those who have helped prepare t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n ,
e s p e c i a l l y L. Hurvitz, my advisor, who has read i t scrupulously at the l a s t
minute. His d e t a i l e d suggestions have greatly eased the f i n a l w r i t i n g .
Many f a c u l t y and graduate students have contributed ideas and comments.
Special thanks are due to Professor G. Nagao (Professor Emeritus, Kyoto
University) and Alan Sponberg (Princeton). Professor Nagao's encouragement
and advice has helped me to f i n d , and keep t o , a productive l i n e of enquiry.
Dr. Sponberg has p a t i e n t l y shared h i s knowledge of t e x t u a l sources, and given
valuable c r i t i c i s m .
Professors N i c h o l l s , C l i f f o r d , Kassis and Mosca have struggled mightily
to administer the doctoral program and myself. As administrators can expect
l i t t l e appreciation short of the eschaton, may they a l l be granted that
s p e c i a l corner o f f i c e reserved for those who a r r i v e with t h e i r f i l e s In Order.
Mrs. Ruby Toren has displayed remarkable patience and co-operation
through t h i s d i f f i c u l t typing job. The q u a l i t y of her work speaks for i t s e l f .
I would also l i k e to thank those whose extraordinary assistance has made
my studies at UBC possible. F i r s t mention must go to Dr. S. I i d a , whose many
kindnesses i n the f i r s t years, i n c l u d i n g his willingness to vouch for an
inexperienced l e c t u r e r , opened the program to: me. A l l of us i n the Buddhist
program owe Dr. I i d a an acknowledgement for h i s personal sponsorship of
Professor'Nagao's 1976,visit.
I f Dr. K. C i s s e l l had not spent a tremendous amount of her own time
teaching me to read Buddhist Chinese, the Chinese texts would s t i l l be closed.
Thank you, Kathy.
x i i
E s p e c i a l l y warm thanks are due J . Richardson and N. K. C l i f f o r d who, i n
addition to o f f e r i n g innumerable gestures of personal f r i e n d s h i p and o f f i c i a l
a i d , have been i n s p i r a t i o n s to the s c h o l a r l y l i f e . From Professor Richardson
i n p a r t i c u l a r , I learned that the study of another's f a i t h i s p r i m a r i l y an
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d act of respect.
The importance of the t r i k a y a was brought to my attention by the
a c t i v i t i e s of the Tibetan sprul-sku, whose t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e i s informed and
l e g i t i m i z e d through t h i s doctrine. Their Western careers show that i t i s a
powerful mold for human a s p i r a t i o n s . P a r t i c u l a r thanks go to Tarthang Tulku,
who gave me many days of his time. I must also acknowledge with great respect
the examples of the Venerable Dezhung Tulku and Kalu Rinpoche. Both are
paragons of the concepts studied here.
The usual inadequate thanks go to my wife, Judith. Her capable
assistance throughout the study has again proven the truism that wives of
graduate students must read two canonical languages, be experienced copy-
e d i t o r s , published authors and secure c i v i l servants. She i s ; and we made i t .
1
INTRODUCTION
This d i s s e r t a t i o n i s a study of the t r i k a y a (the s o - c a l l e d "three bodies
of the Buddha") d o c t r i n e o n e of the main schemes through which Mahayana
Buddhists have understood the concept "buddha."
Buddhahood^" i s the most important notion underlying the Buddhist b e l i e f s
and p r a c t i c e s of the past two m i l l e n n i a . It i s both the impetus f o r , and the
goal of, the r e l i g i o u s l i f e . The Buddhist t r a d i t i o n o f f e r s a saving message to
those enmeshed i n a p a i n - f i l l e d world. This message originated from a Buddha,
who claims to be a r t i c u l a t i n g the method by which he personally found release
from pain, and works to convert the aspirant, who has accepted the message,
into a Buddha. This new Buddha then reformulates a message for the salvation
of others. While these are two d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s i n s o f a r as they possess
d i f f e r e n t personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , they share the same Buddhahood insofar as
the e f f i c a c y of t h e i r teaching i s concerned.
The e a r l y Indian community s p l i t into several schools which developed
numerous b e l i e f s about Buddhahood. While the h i s t o r y of t h i s period i s murky,
i t i s safe to say that many leading masters of the fourth century A.D. were
acquainted with a broad spectrum of b e l i e f s i n every area of dogma and were
attempting to formulate c a t h o l i c systems within which these could be
accommodated. The broadest of the r e s u l t i n g schools was the Vijnanavada (or
Yogacara ) whose development continued i n both Tibet and the Far East.
The founders of the Vijnanavada divided Buddhist theory into several
categories of concerns and developed a comprehensive theory, capable of i n c o r -
porating a wide range of opinions, around each. The category which included
the various early ideas about Buddhahood was organized around the hew., t r i k a y a
theory. In addition to harmonizing the early ideas, the t r i k a y a has since
2
proven capable of stimulating the development of new Buddhological doctrines :.
i n other cultures, and i n harmonizing them with the Indian ones.
Despite i t s importance, no s a t i s f a c t o r y explanation of the t r i k a y a i s
a v a i l a b l e . Modern i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s have f a i l e d i n at l e a s t one of three ways:
Many scholars, working only from the t r i k a y a passages of the Vijnanavadin
t r e a t i s e s , have produced i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s which contradict other key aspects
of the system.
Many have produced narrow i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the doctrine i n one c l a s s i c a l
t e x t , which are i n a p p l i c a b l e to l a t e r developments grounded i n the c l a s s i c a l
3
t r i k a y a and explained by reference to i t .
The few scholars who have worked from the l a t e r t r a d i t i o n s (e.g., H. V.
Guenther) have often produced i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s which appear to be anachro-
n i s t i c when applied to the e a r l i e r t e x t s .
In t h i s study I attempt to develop an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which w i l l be a p p l i -
cable to the entire range of Indo-Tibetan Buddhology. The study includes a
survey of previous scholarship, an intensive examination of the t r i k a y a
doctrine as i t appears i n Asanga's Mahayanasamgraha, the derivation of a s t r u c -
t u r a l model through which to i n t e r p r e t the doctrine, and a b r i e f commentary of
the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h i s model to other t e x t s . In a d d i t i o n , a bibliography
of primary sources for an expanded study i s included
-
' i n Appendix B. While the
arrangement and analysis of the data from the Mahayan as amgr aha constitutes the
bulk of the study, i t s focus i s the new s t r u c t u r a l model.
While formulating t h i s model
:
, i t became obvious that-the'analysis of the
factors which l e d Buddhists to replace a two-kaya-by a t r i k a y a theory, and to
3
defend the l a t t e r even while adopting further multi-kaya t h e o r i e s , illuminates
the broader question of how the r e l a t i o n s h i p between aspirant and other gives
r i s e to various two, three and four-term descriptions of r e l i g i o u s experience.
One of the next stages i n an extended enquiry would be to begin a comparative
study of t r i n i t a r i a n i s m on the basis of these i n s i g h t s .
k
NOTES
^ Western emphasis on the h i s t o r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l has degraded the symbolic
"buddha" to a proper noun, a personal designation which i s automatically read
as "a Buddha" or "the Buddha." In order to preserve some polyvalence, t h i s
term which would simply be "buddha" i n the texts under consideration w i l l be
rendered by "Buddhahood" i n t h i s study. Please note that "Buddhahood" i s not
a state of being i n which an i n d i v i d u a l Buddha may e x i s t .
2
The lack of agreement on a name for t h i s school i s due to the many
t r a d i t i o n s descending from the early masters (who usually c a l l e d t h e i r message
simply the "Mahayana"). Later adherents to t h i s t r a d i t i o n i n India, Tibet,
China and Japan understood the teaching i n s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t ways, accepted
d i f f e r e n t t r a d i t i o n s about i t , and c a l l e d i t by d i f f e r e n t names. In addition,
some saw the early Vijnanavada as several t r a d i t i o n s and applied a d i f f e r e n t
name to each. Most of the names are versions of three l a b e l s : Vijnanavada
(those who speak about vijnana), Vijnaptimatra or Cittamatra ("Ideation-only"
or "Mind-only"), Yogacara ("Practitioners of Yoga") or Fa-hsiang ("Dharma-
marks"a Far-Eastern term).
In the present study the early t r e a t i s e s ascribed to Maitreya-Asanga-
Vasubandhu are regarded as one loose "Vijnanavada" system. This term was
chosen over "Yogacara" because i t stresses the systematic rather than the
meditative aspect.
An example i s the Tibetan i n s t i t u t i o n of "'.sprul-sku" in- which a c e r t a i n
monastic r o l e i s continuously f i l l e d by the same i n d i v i d u a l v i a the o f f i c i a l
recognition of his or her successive reincarnations. This i n s t i t u t i o n i s
derived from the t r i k a y a (";spr.ui-sku" i s simply the Tibetan t r a n s l a t i o n of
''Mrmanakaya," one of the three kayas of the trikaya) and can be understood
only through the parent doctrine. I f that i s interpreted i n the usual way
( i . e . , the Mrmanakaya i s an incarnation of a r e a l transcendent Buddha), many
d e t a i l s of the '. sprulrsku's status and* functions remain-incomprehensible.
CHAPTER I
REVIEW OF SCHOLARSHIP
5
The lack of any adequate i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the t r i k a y a i s not due to
neglect of the t o p i c . As early as 1939 Lamotte had spoken of the "immense"
l i t e r a t u r e on the t o p i c , ^ and several studies have been published since.
New research must begin with a c a r e f u l review of the e a r l i e r work. In
t h i s section I s h a l l present such a review and attempt to define those
approaches which have been most (and l e a s t ) successful. A complete survey of
scholarship i s unnecessary. The. following review deals only with the major
twentieth-century studies. No mention has been made of notices from the
nineteenth century (Burnouf, Edkins, Beal, Schlagintweit and Kern a l l touched
on i t ) , or of passing references i n p r a c t i c a l l y a l l l a t e r populatizations of
the Mahayana. In addition to the primary s c h o l a r l y i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , a few
Indian, Japanese and B r i t i s h works have been included because they represent
the popular modern understanding of the doctrine i n those countries. The
entries are i n chronological order.
As several of these studies are sprinkled with non-standard, inconsistent
restorations of Sanskrit terms and other d i f f i c u l t i e s , I have not marked
s p e c i f i c errors within quotations.
1. W. W. R o c k h i l l . The L i f e of the Buddha. London: Kegan Paul & Co., 1907
(actual t r a n s l a t i o n s done i n 188^).
This pastiche of Tibetan texts includes the abbreviated sutra on the
^ 2
t r i k a y a c a l l e d the 'phags-pa sku-gsum shes-bya-ba theg-pa chen-po'i mdo.
Rockhill's t r a n s l a t i o n reads as follows:
Once I heard the following discourse (said Ananda), while
the Blessed One was stopping at Rajagriha, on the Vulture's
Peak, together with an innumerable number of bodhisattvas,
devas, and nagas who were doing him homage. Then from out
t h i s company, the Bodhisattva Kshitigarbha (Sa'i-snying-po),
who was (also) there, arose from h i s seat and spoke as follows
6
to the Blessed One: 'Has the Blessed One a body?' The Blessed
One s a i d , 'Kshitigarbha, the Blessed One, the Tathagata, has
three bodies: the body of the law (Dharmakaya), the body of
perfect enjoyment (Sambhogakaya), the a p p a r i t i o n a l body
(Nirmanakaya). Noble s i r (Kulaputra), of the three bodies
of the Tathagata, the Dharmakaya i s a p e r f e c t l y pure nature
(svabhava), the Sambhoghakaya i s a p e r f e c t l y pure samadhi;
a p e r f e c t l y pure l i f e i s the Nirmanakaya of a l l Buddhas.
Noble s i r , the Dharmakaya of the Tathagata i s the preroga-
t i v e of being without svabhava l i k e space; the Sambhogakaya
i s the prerogative of being v i s i b l e l i k e a cloud; the
Nirmanakaya being the object of a l l Buddhas, i s the prerog-
ative of permeating a l l things as does a r a i n . ' . . .
The Bodhisattva Kshitigarbha said to the Blessed One,
'Make v i s i b l e these d e f i n i t i o n s of the true bodies of the
Blessed One.' Then the Blessed One said to the Bodhisattva
Kshitigarbha: 'Noble s i r , the three bodies of the Tathagata
w i l l be discerned thus: the Dharmakaya i s d i s c e r n i b l e i n the
whole a i r of the Tathagata; the Sambhogakaya i s d i s c e r n i b l e
i n the whole a i r of a bodhisattva; the Nirmanakaya i s
d i s c e r n i b l e i n the a i r of d i f f e r e n t pious'men. Noble s i r ,
the Dharmakaya i s the nature inherent to a l l buddhas; the
Sambhogakaya i s the samadhi inherent to a l l buddhas; the
Nirmanakaya i s the object of a l l buddhas. Noble s i r ,
p u r i t y i n the abode of the soul, the science l i k e a mirror
(adarsadjnana), i s the Dharmakaya; p u r i t y i n the abode of
the s i n f u l mind i s the science of equality (samatajnana);
p u r i t y i n the perceptions of the mind, the science of
thoroughly analysing, i s the Sambhogakaya; p u r i t y i n the
abode of the perceptions of the f i v e doors, the science of
the achievement of what must be done, i s the Nirmanakaya'
(pp. 200-202).
While R o c k h i l l made no attempt to explain t h i s l i t t l e passage, l a t e r
references show that i t provided a succinct statement of the doctrine which
enabled everyone to discuss the same t h i n g , no small matter i n the early days
of widespread confusion about Mahayana texts and doctrines.
2. H. Kern. "Sur.1'invocation d'une i n s c r i p t i o n bouddhique de Battambang."
Translated by La Vallee Poussin from an a r t i c l e i n Dutch, 1899- Museon,
T (1906): i+5-66. '
:
.
This begins:
7
namo stu paramarthaya vyomakalpaya yo dadhau
dharma-sambhogi-nirmana-kayam ( l ) trailokyamuktaye:
Nous traduisons: "Hommage a l a supreme v e r i t e ,
semblable a. l'espace vide, qui pour d e l i v r e r l e t r i p l e
monde, a p r i s un Dharmakaya, un Sambhogakaya, un
Nirmanakaya.' (p. k9).
Kern begins by asking how " l a supreme v e r i t e " (paramartha) beyond the
realm of thought, can clothe i t s e l f i n a t r i p l e body for the salvation of the
world. He proposes (somewhat doubtfully) that the three are conventional
(samvrti) bodies as i s the world which they save. Hence the ultimate does
not r e a l l y become or assume form.
What r e a l l y i n t e r e s t s Kern i s the place of t h i s doctrine i n Indian
thought. Is i t merely a Buddhist version of the Hindu t r i m u r t i ? He notes
that the t r i m u r t i r e f e r s t both: past-present-future, and the manifestation
of the supreme being--through the three gunas. For the t r i k a y a to be
r e l a t e d to these, i t would have to exhibit a s i m i l a r meaning. To determine
whether or not such a r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s , he defines the terms dharma,
sambhoga and nirmana. His d e f i n i t i o n s , and consequent i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the
t r i k a y a theory with the Samkhya, are simply too i l l - i n f o r m e d to be s e r i o u s l y
considered. However, his major conclusion s t i l l stands, although we might
question why he chose the h o r i z o n t a l t r i m u r t i rather than a v e r t i c a l t r i a d
such as Brahma-Visnu-Krsna:
De ce qui precede, i l s u i t qu'entre l a Trimurti et l e
Trikaya i l y a seulement c e c i de commun q u ' i l s disposent en
t r i a d e s l a serie des phenomenes.
F i n a l l y , Kern asks,
Pour quelle raison l e s Mahayanistes o n t - i l s i n t r o d u i t
dans l e u r systeme i d e a l i s t e , et y o n t - i l s adapte, t a l i t e r
8
q u a l i t e r , une doctrine a fondements m a t e r i a l i s t e s et
r e a l i s t e s comme l ' e s t evidemment l a doctrine des t r o i s
corps? Nous ne l e savons pas. On peut conjecturer que
certaine condescendance a l'egard d'adversaires portes a
l'accommodement, avec lesquels on se sentait apparente
sous beaucoup de rapports et qu'on se s e r a i t v o l o n t i e r s
associes contre un puissant et commun ennemi, a eu pour
consequence l a c o n c i l i a t i o n de deux systemes primitivement
divergents: mais l e s donnees necessaires nous manquent
pour v e r i f i e r cette hypothese (p. 57) -
Although there i s l i t t l e validf.information i n t h i s a r t i c l e , Kern's :
approach', i s very interesting.. ^e^does^hot"" simply quote-definitions from a
sastra, but bases his i n v e s t i g a t i o n on the following considerations:
As Buddhism developed v i s - a - v i s other Indian systems, a doctrine should
be explained i n i t s Indian context.
Certain l o g i c a l problems are obvious to the European scholar. An attempt
to resolve them w i l l shed l i g h t on the theory.
F i n a l l y , the raison d'etre of the theory must be considered.
Kern's a r t i c l e i s the l a s t of the "remarks" by the older scholars. A more
informed debate was i n i t i a t e d i n the same year by two d i s s i m i l a r and aggressive
young men: Louis de La Vallee Poussin and D. T. Suzuki.
3. L. de La Vallee Poussin. "Studies i n Buddhist Dogma: The Three Bodies of
a Buddha (Trikaya)." JRAS (1906): 9U3-9TT.
M. La Vallee Poussin connects the t r i k a y a with the "Mahayana school,"
paying l i t t l e attention to possible differences between actual schools i n
India, China, Japan and Tibet * He distinguishes three phases:
an early speculative doctrine of Buddhahood drawn from Sunyavadin sources.
a broadening of t h i s early doctrine to cover the e n t i r e f i e l d of dogmatics
9
(the Yogacara d o c t r i n e a l t h o u g h La Vallee Poussin understands Yogacara as
the system of Asvaghosa),./
a concluding t a n t r i c phase.
He i s interested only i n the f i r s t two phases. He knew, and wished to
know, nothing whatsoever about the tantras;
The Tantric authors . . . are more obscure and abstruse
the more vulgar and obscene are the f a c t s that they have made
the starting-point of t h e i r insane or f r a n t i c lucubrations . .
Using the above d i v i s i o n s , La Vallee Poussin examines each of the three
kayas i n turn. Unfortunately, his understanding of Mahayana theory was incom-
plete and few of h i s comments are acceptable. It w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t to quote
h i s summary:
I. The doctrine of the Trikaya as Buddhology, a f t e r i t s com-
p l e t i o n , but yet free from the "ontological" and cosmogonic
speculations.
(A) The very nature of a Buddha i s the Bodhi (Enlightenment),
of Prajnaparamita (Perfect Wisdom), or knowledge of the
Law (Dharm'a), i . e . , of the absolute Truth. By acquiring
t h i s knowledge, nirvana i s r e a l i z e d i n potentia or i n
actu. The Dharmakaya, Body of the Law, of a Buddha i s
the Buddha i n nirvana or i n nirvana-like rapture
(samadhikaya = dharmakaya).
(B) A Buddha, as long as he i s not yet merged into nirvana,
possesses and enjoys, for h i s own sake and for others'
welfare, the f r u i t of h i s charitable behavior as a
Bodhisattva. The second body i s the Body of Enjoyment
or B e a t i f i c Body (sambhogakaya).
(C) Human beings known as Buddhas are magical contrivances
(nirmanakaya) created at 'random by r e a l Buddhas, i . e . , by
Buddhas possessed of b e a t i f i c bodies, sovereigns of celes-
t i a l worlds , Tusita-heavens or 'Paradises' (Sukhavatis).
I I . The doctrine of Trikaya as an ontologic and cosmologic
system.
(A) By Body of Law one has to understand the void and perma-
nent r e a l i t y that underlies every phenomenon (dharma),
or the store of the
1
dharmas,' or more exactly the
uncharacterized I n t e l l e c t (vijnana).
(B) Body of Enjoyment i s the Dharmakaya evolved as Being,
B l i s s , Charity, Radiance, or the I n t e l l e c t as f a r as i t
i s i n d i v i d u a l i z e d as Buddha or Bodhisattva.
(C) Magical or rather Transformation Body i s the same I n t e l -
l e c t when d e f i l e d , when i n d i v i d u a l i z e d as 'common people'
(prthagjana), i n f e r n a l being, etc. (pp. 9^5-9^+6).
While t h i s pioneering study helped to open the subject to Western
scholarship, i t contains l i t t l e acceptable information. In t h i s early phase
of his career La V a l l e e Poussin was acquainted with only a few Buddhist t e x t s ,
and lacked the overview of Mahayana Buddhism necessary to make h i s t o r i c a l and
d o c t r i n a l d i s t i n c t i o n s within the "Mahayana school." His three-stage model
i s confused and, should the reader supply more accurate d i s t i n c t i o n s , the
argument d i s i n t e g r a t e s .
Above a l l , the author i s not dealing with the t r i k a y a doctrine but with
a doctrine of three separate kayas, each studied i n an historical-developmental
manner.
k. D. T. Suzuki. Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism. London: Luzac, 1907-
The sole s i m i l a r i t y between the approaches of La Vallee Poussin and
Suzuki i s the fact that both describe a Mahayana school i r r e s p e c t i v e of time
and culture. La Vallee Poussin was the European scholar for whom Buddhism was
an extension ( v i a Sanskrit) of c l a s s i c a l s t u d i e s a complex t e x t u a l puzzle.
He seems not to have entertained the s l i g h t e s t suspicion that a continuing
Mahayana t r a d i t i o n might be extant, or that adherents to i t could throw l i g h t
3
on t h e i r own s c r i p t u r e s .
Suzuki's apologetic i s a breath of l i f e amidst t h i s a r i d arrogance. His
Mahayana i s not a p h i l o l o g i c a l game but a developing f a i t h :
It i s naught "but an i d l e t a l k to question the h i s t o r i c a l
value of an organism, which i s now f u l l of v i t a l i t y and active
i n a l l i t s functions, and to t r e a t i t l i k e an archeological
object, dug out from the depths of the earth, or l i k e a piece
of bric-a-brac, discovered i n the ruins of an ancient r o y a l
palace. Mahayanism i s not an object of h i s t o r i c a l c u r i o s i t y .
I t s v i t a l i t y and a c t i v i t y concern us i n our d a i l y l i f e . It
i s a great s p i r i t u a l organism; i t s moral and r e l i g i o u s forces
are s t i l l exercising an enormous power over m i l l i o n s of souls;
and i t s further development i s sure to be a very valuable
contribution to the world-progress of the r e l i g i o u s conscious-
ness. What does i t matter, then, whether or not Mahayanism
i s the genuine teaching of the Buddha? (p. 15)-
This attitude underlies the e n t i r e book. Suzuki accepts the Japanese
t r a d i t i o n , as i t reached him, as "Mahayana." He shows comparatively l i t t l e
i n t e r e s t i n i t s h i s t o r y , p r e f e r r i n g to present a doctrine palatable to West
tastes. The fact that t h i s w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y be a modified form of the
doctrine he himself has received bothers him not at a l l . A f t e r a l l , i t has
been continuously adapting for more than two millenniawhy stop now? In
b r i e f , Suzuki i s a missionary.
From h i s Western contacts (e.g., Paul Carus), Suzuki seems to have
concluded that the modern consciousness i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y Hegelian and
devoutly C h r i s t i a n , and has presented Buddhism i n terms drawn from both.
Two chapters of the Outlines are e s p e c i a l l y relevant: chapter IX, "The
Dharmakaya," and chapter X, "The Doctrine of Trikaya." Suzuki views the
Dharmakaya as the cornerstone of h i s Mahayana-Hegelian-Christianity (with
some Vedanta thrown i n for u n i v e r s a l i t y ) :
The Dharmakaya may be compared i n one sense to the God
of C h r i s t i a n i t y and i n another sense to the Brahman or
Paratman of Vedantism. It i s d i f f e r e n t , however, from the
former i n that i t does not stand transcendentally above the
universe, which, according to the C h r i s t i a n view, was created
by God, but which i s , according to Mahayanism, a. manifesta-
t i o n of the Dharmakaya himself. I t i s also d i f f e r e n t from
Brahman i n that i t i s mot absolutely impersonal, nor i s i t
a mere being. The Dharmakaya, on the contrary, i s capable
of w i l l i n g and r e f l e c t i n g , or, to use Buddhist phraseology,
i t i s Karuna (love) and Bodhi ( i n t e l l i g e n c e ) , and not the
mere state"of being.
This pantheistic and at the same time e n t h e i s t i c Dharma-
kaya i s working i n every sentient being, for sentient beings
are nothing but a self-manifestation of the Dharmakaya.
Individuals are not i s o l a t e d existences, as imagined by most
people. I f i s o l a t e d , they are nothing, they are so many
soap-bubbles which vanish one a f t e r another i n the vacuity
of space. A l l p a r t i c u l a r existences acquire t h e i r meaning
only when they are thought of i n t h e i r oneness i n the Dharma-
kaya. The v e i l of Maya, i . e . , subjective ignorance, may
temporally throw an obstacle to our perceiving the u n i v e r s a l
l i g h t of Dharmakaya, i n which we are a l l one. But when our
Bodhi or i n t e l l e c t , which i s by the way a r e f l e c t i o n of the
Dharmakaya i n the human mind, i s so f u l l y enlightened, we
no more b u i l d the a r t i f i c i a l b a r r i e r of egoism before our
s p i r i t u a l eye; the d i s t i n c t i o n between the meurn and t e m i s
o b l i t e r a t e d , no dualism throws the nets of entanglement over
us; I recognise myself i n you and you recognise y o u r s e l f i n
me; t a t tvam a s i . . .
This state of enlightenment may be c a l l e d the s p i r i t u a l
expansion of the ego, or, negatively, the i d e a l a n n i h i l a t i o n
of the ego. A never-dying stream" of sympathy and love which
i s the l i f e of r e l i g i o n w i l l now spontaneously flow out of
the fountainhead of Dharmakaya (pp. k6-kl,).
Suzuki sees the "Doctrine of Trikaya" as a somewhat d i f f e r e n t doctrine,
which he does not r e a l l y understand. He quotes from the Suvarnaprabhasa but
does not seem to.'.utilize i t s ideas. Suzuki has no d i f f i c u l t y with the two-
kaya model, into which he quickly s l i p s . The Dharmakaya i s God or Being,
which i s manifested i n the phenomenal earthly Nirmanakaya. Suzuki r e a l i z e s ,
with some embarrassment, that t h i s does not r e a l l y touch the three kaya
doctrine, and t r i e s to explain away the Sambhogakaya as an i n t e r l o p e r :
But the conception of Sambhoghakaya i s altogether too
mysterious to be fathomed by a l i m i t e d consciousness. . . .
the most p l a u s i b l e conclusion that suggests i t s e l f to modern
s c e p t i c a l minds i s that the Sambhogakaya must be a mere
creation of an i n t e l l i g e n t , f i n i t e mind, which i s i n t e n t l y
bent on reaching the highest r e a l i t y , but, not being able,
on account of i t s l i m i t a t i o n s , ' t o grasp the object i n i t s
absoluteness, the f i n i t e mind f a b r i c a t e s a l l i t s i d e a l s
a f t e r i t s own fashion into a s p i r i t u a l - m a t e r i a l being, which
i s l o g i c a l l y a c o n t r a d i c t i o n , but r e l i g i o u s l y an object
deserving veneration and worship. And t h i s being i s no more
than the Body of B l i s s . It l i e s h a l f way between the pure
being of Dharmakaya and the earthly form of Nirmanakaya," the
Body of Transformation. It does not belong to e i t h e r , but
partakes something of both. I t i s i n a sense s p i r i t u a l l i k e
the Dharmakaya, and yet i t cannot go beyond material l i m i t a -
t i o n s , for i t has a form, d e f i n i t e and determinate. When the
human soul i s t h i r s t y a f t e r a pure being or an absolute which
cannot be comprehended i n a palpable form, i t creates a
hybrid, an i m i t a t i o n , or a r e f l e c t i o n , and t r i e s to be s a t i s -
f i e d with i t , just as a l i t t l e g i r l has her innate and not
yet f u l l y developed maternity s a t i s f i e d by tenderly embracing
and nursing the d o l l , an inanimate i m i t a t i o n of a r e a l l i v i n g
baby. And the Mahayanists seem to have made most of t h i s
c h i l d i s h humanness. They produced as many sutras as t h e i r
s p i r i t u a l yearnings demanded, quite regardless of h i s t o r i c a l
f a c t s , and made the Body of B l i s s of the Tathagata the author
of a l l these works... . (pp. 267-268).
Modern Mahayanists i n f u l l accordance with t h i s i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n of the Doctrine of Trikaya do.not place much
importance on the objective aspects of the Body of B l i s s
(Sambhogakaya). They consider them at best the f i c t i t i o u s
products of an imaginative mind . . . modern Buddhists look
with disdain on these e g o t i s t i c m a t e r i a l i s t i c conceptions
of r e l i g i o u s l i f e (pp. 268-269).
In b r i e f , Suzuki s h i f t s to a two-kaya theory interpreted o n t o l o g i c a l l y , A
f i n a l attempt to deal with the t r i k a y a by homologizing i t to the C h r i s t i a n
t r i n i t y founders on the fact that he understands the Holy S p i r i t no better
-than the Sambhogakaya...
5- M.. P. Masson-Oursel. . "Les t r o i s corps du bouddha." Journal Asiatique
series 2, 1 (1913): 58I-618.
M. Masson-Oursel had the following materials at h i s d i s p o s a l : two i n -
s c r i p t i o n s , Stael-Holstein's Tibetan version of the Trikayastava, R o c k h i l l
text, La Vallee Poussin's 1906 a r t i c l e , Suzuki's Outlines, the text of the
Aphisamayalankara (which he had read with S. L e v i ) , and a r e l a t e d portion of
an u n i d e n t i f i e d manuscript. He proposes a t e n t a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of these
materials, e s p e c i a l l y of the data offered by La V a l l e e Poussin and Suzuki.
The a r t i c l e i s i n three parts:
an examination of each kaya.
a discussion of the h i s t o r i c a l and p h i l o s o p h i c a l roots of the doctrine.
extracts from the Abhisamayalankara and the u n i d e n t i f i e d manuscript.
He begins by defining kaya as "organism" or "system" rather than "body,"
pointing out that i n Buddhist theory, the only s t a b i l i t y i s to be found i n the
r e l a t i o n s h i p s which occur between phenomena: "Kaya designe une l o i de ce genre,
par opposition a l a f i x i t e r i g i d e d'une substance ou d'une personnalite."
The author maintains that "dharma" i n "Dharmakaya" has a dual s i g n i f i c a -
t i o n : the sense of a moral r u l e or law (as i n the P a l i dhammakaya), and the
sense of e s s e n t i a l q u a l i t y , r e a l i t y , true nature. As the prototype of
morality i t i s the f i r s t r e l i g i o u s p r i n c i p l e . As the supreme abstraction i t
i s the f i r s t metaphysical p r i n c i p l e .
While La Vallee Poussin has c r i t i c i z e d Suzuki f o r accepting the former,
Masson-Oursel castigates him for ignoring the l a t t e r . Further, he points out
the inconsistency between La Vallee Poussin's r e j e c t i o n of the Dharmakaya as
o n t o l o g i c a l substrate and the o n t o l o g i c a l l y oriented explanation i n h i s 1906
a r t i c l e .
Masson-Oursel goes on to i d e n t i f y the tathagatagarbha with the
alayavijnana and tackles the problem which to La Vallee Poussin had presented
a "cosmic" dimension:
II peut sans doute sembler etrange que l e Dharmakaya
15
d'un Bouddha (car tous l e s Bouddhas possibles possedent,
theoretiquement, l e s t r o i s kaya) s o i t proclame l a matrice
des autres Bienheureux; mais c'est simplement .urie facon
d'indiquer que l e Dharmakaya appartient en commun a tous
l e s Tathagatas, c'est-a-dire d'affirmer l ' u n i t e du
bouddhisme, l ' i d e n t i t e de sa philosophie et de sa morale
a travers l ' i n f i n i e m u l t i p l i c i t e des Bouddhas concevables
(pp. 58^-585).
He also mentions the mythical i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the Dharmakaya with such
figures as Vairocana. He concludes that, "en raison de ses a t t r i b u t s a l a
f o i s metaphysiques et moraux, est proprement l a conception Mahayaniste de
l'absolu." As such, i t i s somehow "above" the other two they are aspects
of i t .
The author t r a n s l a t e s "Sambhogakaya" l i t e r a l l y as "body of beatitude,"
of "body of sympathy," but admits that t h i s helps very l i t t l e . He begins
with La V a l l e e Poussin's observation that, "un Bouddha, tant q u ' i l n'est pas
encore plonge dans-le Nirvana, j o u i t , pour son propre avantage et pour
l'avantage d'autrui, du f r u i t de sa conduite c h a r i t a b l e comme Bodhisattva."
But, objects Masson-Oursel, i f the Sambhogakaya i s a stage p r i o r to f u l l
Buddhahood, how can i t be a body of the Buddha? La V a l l e e Poussin's second
explanation was that " l e Dharmakaya evolue a l ' e t a t d'etre, de beatitude, de
c h a r i t e , d'eclat lumineux ou 1 ' i n t e l l e c t (vijnana) en tant q u ' i l est i n d i v i d u -
a l i s e comme Bouddha ou Bodhisattva." To t h i s Masson-Oursel asks, "Nous
aimerionsasavoir quel est l e rapport entre l a jouissance qu'a l e Dharmakaya
lui-meme, et son e x t e r i o r i s a t i o n en d'autres etres." Presumably t h i s i s an
honest question and not a r h e t o r i c a l r e f u t a t i o n l i k e the l a s t . C e r t a i n l y i t
has been a key question for the Buddhists themselves.
Masson-Oursel's own understanding i s that the Sambhogakaya i s an i n t e r -
mediate kaya, sharing the natures of both Dharmakaya and Nirmanakaya. It i s
16
manifested for the benefit of the Bodhisattvas, whose nature explains the
character of the manifestation. To t h i s idea he t i e s an explanation of the
samadhikaya, the vipakakaya or punya-sambhara, and of the marks of the Buddha.
But a l l of t h i s does not explain how or why the t o t a l l y transcendent
Dharmakaya manifests i t s e l f . Masson-Oursel notes La Vallee Poussin's dual
explanation:
that the Buddha's store of merit automatically gives r i s e to a Sambhogakaya
for the s a l v a t i o n of a l l beings.
that the Sambhogakaya represents a compassionate response on the part of
the Buddha.
But, Masson-Oursel asks, i f the manifestation i s mechanical or automatic,
why i s the concept of compassion necessary? These two are, he f e e l s , contra-
d i c t o r y . We may remark here that Masson-Oursel seems to be unacquainted with
the Bodhisattva vow and i s probably trapped by Western connotations of
"compassion."
To answer the question of how a Buddha may possess a Sambhogakaya, the
author r e f e r s to a passage of the Suvarnaprabhasa quoted by Suzuki: the simile
of moon, water and v i s u a l patch, a l l three of which are required to constitute
an image, The moon represents the Dharmakaya, the water the Bodhisattva, the
v i s u a l patch the Sambhogakaya which unites them. This tapers o f f into an
obscure argument from Spinoza. F i n a l l y , he says:
La p r i n c i p a l e d i f f i c u l t e que nous eprouvons a nous f a i r e
une idee du Sambhogakaya reside dans son caractere a l a f o i s
o b j e c t i f , comme manifestation, et s u b j e c t i f , comme beatitude.
Mais toute metaphysique a ete forcee, bon gre, mal gre, de
reconnaitre a l'absolu ces deux caracteres; l e Dharmakaya
n ' e t a i t - i l pas deja etre et bodhi? Nous ne nous f l a t t o n s
pas, d i a i l l e u r s de d i s s i p e r l e s i n c e r t i t u d e s qui f l o t t e n t
17
autour du concept de Sambhogakaya: l e rendre pleinement
i n t e l l i g i b l e s e r a i t se meprendre sur sa s i g n i f i c a t i o n authen-
tique, p u i s q u ' i l faudrait etre Bodhisattva pour penetrer
veritablement son sens, de meme que l e Dharmakaya n'est
comprehensiblea supposer qu'on a i t encore l e d r o i t .c~
d'employer ce motqu'aux seuls Bouddhas (p. 590)-
Although t h i s explanation i s c e r t a i n l y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y , Masson-Oursel has
brought out two important points:
the close r e l a t i o n s h i p between Sambhogakaya and Bodhisattva.
the intermediate, r e l a t i o n a l character of the Sambhogakaya.
Both of these must be retained i n any future discussion.
The author i s much more c e r t a i n about the Nirmanakaya:
Dans l e Dharmakaya l.Vessence du Bouddha e t a i t tellement
i n t e r i e u r e a elle-meme, qu'.'elle se renfermait en une i n d i v i -
s i b l e unite, superieure a toute conscience; dans l e Sambho-
gakaya cette essence se rend a c c e s s i b l e , sans t o u t e f o i s se
d i v i s e r , aux etres devenus l e s plus proches d'elle-meme;
dans l e Nirmanakaya e l l e s'.'exteriorise en apparences impar-
f a i t e s , i n d i v i d u e l l e s , multiples. . . .
Nirmanakaya designe avant tout l e s Bouddhas sous l a
forme ou i l s ont apparu ou apparaitront sur cette t e r r e . Au
l i e u de r e s t e r indifferents. dans l ' e t e r n i t e , i l s envoient en
ce monde de misere des r e f l e t s (pratibimba) d'eux-memes. . .
(p. 591).
This seems reasonable. However, he continues:
Le nom de Nirmanakaya s'applique en outre, en un sens
plus l a r g e , a toutes apparences sensibles, aux phenomenes
du monde du desir (kamaloka). Aussi ce kaya e s t - i l present
partout (sarvatraga); i l est l e createur (nirmatar) de cet
univers, theatre de notre v i e (p. 591)
The author accounts for these two ideas (Nirmanakaya as Sakyamuni and
Nirmanakaya as samsara) by suggesting that they r e f e r to opposite views of the
18
same r e a l i t y , that the Nirmanakaya i s an ambiguous concept, "La meme idee se
retrouve i c i sous une forme plus imagee, dans cette i d e n t i t e du createur et du
saveur ausein du Nirmanakaya." Should t h i s suggestion r e a l l y hold up, i t would
provide an a l t e r n a t i v e to La V a l l e e Poussin's h i s t o r i c a l stages separating the
Buddhological from the cosmological.
A f t e r h i s review of each kaya, the author surveys the h i s t o r i c a l and
p h i l o s o p h i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of the doctrine. He says frankly,
II est regrettable que 1'insuffisance des documents dont
nous disposons nous a i t contraint de r e s t i t u e r cette abstruse
theorie des t r o i s corps au moyen de textes des provenances et
des epoques l e s plus disparates. Le sens de l a doctrine ne
sera vraiment connu que lorsque nous pourrons determiner dans
quelles circonstances e l l e est nee, dans quelle mesure e l l e
a v a r i e (p. 592).
A f t e r a b r i e f h i s t o r i c a l sketch,:of the Lokpttara idea, Masson-Oursel
summarizes:
A i n s i , l e probleme des t r o i s corps naquit d'un e f f o r t
s p e c u l a t i f pour c o n c i l i e r l e s t r a i t s c o n t r a d i c t o i r e s de l a
personnalite du Bouddha: l a valeur absolue de son enseigne-
ment et l e s contingences de sa v i e humaine. La s o l u t i o n
consiste a poser dans l ' e t e r n e l un Dharmakaya absolu, et a
projeter dans l e temps, dans l'espace, dans l e monde, une
ombre de ce dieu, l e Nirmanakaya. . . . l a doctrine prend
une forme metaphysique bien plus a b s t r a i t e chez Asanga.
. . . E l l e revet aussi l a forme d'un c u l t e populaire; des
exvoto sont consacres au Sambhogakaya ou au Nirmanakaya
comme chez nous au Sacre-Coeur. Le dogme nouveau s'etend
au Tibet, a l a Chine, a l a Mongolie, au Japon, i l s'y
perpetue jusqu'a nos jours. Au cours du moyen age, l e
tantrisme m u l t i p l i a selon sa f a n t a i s i e l e s corps du Bouddha,
qui furent quatre, cinq, ou plus nombreux encore (p. 59^)-
This, of course, does not r e a l l y explain the t r i k a y a system, only a two-
kaya idea, plus an added popular cult.- Masson-Oursel also speaks of. the influence
of 'Tpopula;*"' Hinduism: "Le trikaya-fait," en quelque . sort e pendant a. .la t r i m u r t i , "
19
but does not go so f a r as to suggest that the t r i a d i c pattern was simply a
c u l t u r a l given which could account for the t r i k a y a independently of .any l o g i c
i n t e r n a l to the doctrine.
Two Sanskrit texts and t r a n s l a t i o n s dealing.with the'-kayas:. are" appended
to t h i s a r t i c l e . The f i r s t i s an extract from the Abhisamay&lankara. The
second i s an u n t i t l e d Vijffanavadin manuscript. From these he reaches the
following conclusions:
Pour conclure, en ce qui concerne l a theorie des corps,
l a contribution p r i n c i p a l e que l e s textes c i t e s apportent a
notre enquete, c'est que l e Svabhavikakaya et l e Dharmakaya
sont des systemes d'ideaux (dharma, dharmata), conditions
abstraites de l a connaissance supreme, sans d u a l i t e , sans
m u l t i p l i c i t y , sans developpement; que l e Sambhogakaya est
un systeme de signes (laksana, anulaksana) par lesquels un
Bouddha se manifeste aux Bodhisattvas| enfin que l e Nair-
manikakaya est.un systeme d'actions (karmani) par l e q u e l un
Bouddha se revele d'une fagon phenomenale aux Cravakas, etc.
. . . Quant a f i x e r l e sens precis de l a multitude de con-
cepts auxquels i l est f a i t a l l u s i o n dans ces textes, c'est
pour 1'instant une entreprise peu abordable, car nous n'avons
guere pour l a plupart d'entre eux d'autre point de comparai-
son que l e Mahayana-SutraUamkara d'Asanga, . . (pp. 6l7-6l8). ,
6. L. de La V a l l e e Poussin. "Note sur l e s Corps du Bouddha." Museon,- 32
(1913): 257-29 0.,
La Vallee." .Poussin. rejoins:' the 'discussion with a flourish.:
Pour se f a i r e une idee exacte des Corps du Bouddha,
c'est-a-dire d'un chapitre important de l a "bouddhologie,"
i l faut embrasser toute l ' h i s t o i r e du Bouddhisme, depuis
l e s origines jusqu'aux mythologies et aux theosophies s i
penetrees de Civaisme qu'elles meritent a peine l e nom de
bouddhiques. II faut aussi passer en revue diverses
philosophies. . . . Et c'est l a notre ambition (p. 257)-
Although the notes which follow f a l l short of t h i s grand i n t e n t i o n , they
reveal the author's growing awareness of the complexity of Buddhist doctrine.
20
He maintains h i s e a r l i e r perspective hut subdivides h i s three stages and
i n t e r p r e t s them i n a more sophisticated manner. He f i r s t discusses "Archaic
Buddhism," which recognized a - v i s i b l e form (rupakaya), and the l i v i n g embodi-
ment of the doctrine (Dharmakaya). He does not explain his r e j e c t i o n of the
notion that the "kaya" i n Dharmakaya indicates that the doctrine was the l a t e r
representative of the charismatic Buddha.
He then turns to "Scholasticism," i n which the Buddhists retained the word
"Dharmakaya" but s h i f t e d the s i g n i f i c a n c e of "dharma" to an Abhidharmic sense.
Hence, Dharmakaya came to mean:
. . . l e Bouddha lui-meme, c'est l a c o l l e c t i o n , l'aggre-
gat et l a s e r i e des elements psychiques et materiels qui
constituent l ' i n d i v i d u qu'on appelle un Bouddha, son ame et
son corps, dans notre langage occidental. Mais dharmakaya
s'entendra au propre des "elements" qui font que cet i n d i v i d u
est un Bouddha.
Le Bouddha, en tant q u ' i l est v i s i b l e , l e rupakaya,
"corps v i s i b l e , " c o l l e c t i o n des dharmas v i s i b l e s ou
materiels, n'est qu'une portion du Bouddha. Ces dharmas
v i s i b l e s , plus l e s dharmas i n v i s i b l e s , sensations, pensees,
etc., sont tout l e Bouddha (p. 258).
However, he r e a l i z e s that f i n e r d i s t i n c t i o n s must be made:
3. Mais i l faut distinguer t r o i s ecoles.
A. L'ecole d'Abhidharma ou du P e t i t Vehicule. . . .
Cette ecole c r o i t a l a r e a l i t e s u b s t a n t i e l l e des dharmas, et
sa c r i t i q u e s'arrete a l a negation de l ' i n d i v i d u (pudgala-
nairatmya).
B. -C. L'ecole Madhyamika ou n i h i l i s t (premier s i e c l e
de notre ere?) et l ' e c o l e Vijnanavadin ou i d e a l i s t e (un peu
posterieure?) nient.1'existence en soi des dharmas: c'est l a
21
these du dharmanairatmya, qui c a r a c t e r i s e l e s philosophies du
Grand Vehicule. Ces deux ecoles tiennent que tous l e s corps
et toutes l e s pensees sont "vides" (gunya). La r e e l l e nature
(tathata) des choses comme des i n d i v i d u s , des Bouddhas comme
de tous l e s etres, c'est l a "vacuite" (guriyafa); et 1'expres-
sion dharmakaya peut etre comprise dans l e sens de " r e e l l e
nature," "corps e s s e n t i e l " (svabhavika kaya) (pp. 258-259).
The author now s h i f t s to the t r i k a y a . He examines each i n the l i g h t of
each of the two Madhyamika perspectives. From the conventional perspective
they appear mythological:
. . . l e s Bouddhas sont de grands personnages d i v i n s ,
entoures de grands saints qui sont de futurs Bouddhas; tous
l e s etres doivent, pour parvenir au Nirvana, passer d'abord
par l ' e t a t de Bouddha.
On distinguera done t r o i s corps du Bouddha.
1. Le Dharmakaya, dont-la d e f i n i t i o n se superpose a
peu pres a c e l l e de 1'Abhidharma. C'est 1'ensemble des
connaissances et des qualites morales du Bouddha, aussi
bien c e l l e s qui se rapportent au monde que c e l l e s qui sont
productrices du Nirvana: d'une part, l a compassion, l e pou-
v o i r de detruire l e s passions de ceux qui voient l e Bouddha;
d'autre part, l e s meditations abstruses qui aboutissent a
1'inconscience: t e l l e par exemple l a meditation du neant.
2. Le Sambhogakaya, corps glorieux, l e Bouddha en tant
que v i s i b l e , " l e corps orne des trente-deux marques": c'est
l e rupakaya, l a "forme v i s i b l e " de l a v i e i l l e t r a d i t i o n .
Mais ce corps, comme nous allons l e d i r e , est i n v i s i b l e aux
simples mortels. Ceux-ci n'en apergoivent que des doubles
magiques, plus ou moins ressemblants a 1 ' o r i g i n a l .
3. Le Nirmanakaya, "corps cree par magie," sur l e q u e l
nous i n s i s t e r o n s davantage.
.Cakyamuni, dans leBouddhisme du P e t i t Vehicule, est un
homme. . . . Cet homme obtint l a q u a l i t e de Bouddha, revela
l e chemin, et entra dans l e Nirvana, desormais i n v i s i b l e aux
dieux et aux hommes: car i l est d e l i v r e de 1'existence.
La secte des Vetulyakas que l a t r a d i t i o n place avant
Agoka, et que je c r o i s t r e s ancienne, congut une idee plus
haute de Qakyamuni et du Bouddha. . . . gakyamuni est
devenu Bouddha i l y a t r e s longtemps; i l regne dans l e c i e l
des dieux Tusitas d'ou on crut faussement q u ' i l e t a i t
descendu pour s'incarner et conquerir i c i l a q u a l i t e de
Bouddha; l e Qakyamuni que l e s hommes ont T U n'est qu'un
fantome cree par l e v r a i Cakyamuni, un "corps magique" ou un
"corps cree" (nirmanakaya).
Ce docetisme aboutit, dans l e Grand Vehicule . . . a l a
conception de Bouddhas presque eternels, intervenant i c i - b a s
par des apparitions magiques qui prechent et donnent aux
hommes l e spectacle e d i f i a n t et i n s t r u c t i f de toute l a geste
d'un Bouddha, de toute l a genese de l a q u a l i t e de Bouddha.
Les Bouddhas sont de grands dieux mythologiques, tronant
dans quelque paradis ou de grands saints l e s entourent. A
l a seule apparition' magique dont p a r l a i e n t l e s premiers
docetes, du moins a en c r o i r e nos sources, beaucoup d.'autres
sont ajoutees: pendant l a longue periode de son regne, et
dans 1'univers qui est son "champ," un Bouddha est l ' u n i v e r -
s e l l e providence: par son corps magique, d i v i s e a l ' i n f i n i ,
i l "murit" l e s etres pour l e salut (pp. 277-278).
From the ultimate perspective:
Nous arriverons au Nirvana en p r o f i t a n t de l'enseigne-
ment que donnent l e s corps magiques (nirmanakaya, en contem-
plant l e corps glorieux. lorsque nous serons devenus des
saints (bbdhisattvas); en devenant nous-memes des Bouddhas,
c'est-a-dire des dharmakayas, c o l l e c t i o n s de dharmas t r e s
purs qui constituent des etres deja illumines (buddha) et
t r e s proches du Nirvana. Et i l n'y a pas d'autre moyen
d'arriver au Nirvana.
Cependant, au point de vue metaphysique, l a p o s i t i o n
des N i h i l i s t e s n'est pas exactement c e l l e des'Idealistes.
Pour l e s N i h i l i s t e s , l e s deux premiers corps (dharma .
et sambhogakaya) forment un seul etre, l e Bouddha, etre r e e l
au point de vue de 1'experience, mais "vide" au point de vue
metaphysique: car l e s dharmas qui l e composent n'existent
pas en s o i .
Pour l e s I d e a l i s t e s , l e dharmakaya est l e Bouddha t e l
q u ' i l s'apparait a lui-meme, t e l q u ' i l a conscience de s o i :
connaissances productrices de Nirvana et pensees mondaines,
tournees vers l e salut du monde: l e s premieres, l o r s q u ' e l l e s
sont tres pures, se confondent avec ce que nous avons appele
" l a pensee sans plus" (p. 273); ce sont des connaissances
d'ou 1'opposition de "connaissable" et "connaissance" est
exclue et, par consequent, des connaissances qui sont des
non-connaissances; l e s secondes sont "imaginees" dans l a
mesure, t r e s reduite, ou e l l e s comportent cette opposition:
car l a charite du saint est vide de l ' i d e e de "donneur," de
23
don et de "receveur"; l e corps glorieux est l e Bouddha t e l
q u ' i l apparait aux saints (bodhisattvas), qui croient encore
a 1'existence de l a matiere (rupa); l e corps magique est
l e Bouddha t e l q u ' i l apparait aux etres i n f e r i e u r s (gravakadi )
qui ne peuvent encore v o i r que des formes t r e s p a r t i c u l a r i s m s .
Les deux derniers corps apparaissent aux saints et aux etres
i n f e r i e u r s par l ' e f f i c a c e de l a pensee mondaine qui est une
p a r t i e du dharmakaya, par l ' e f f i c a c e aussi du merite acquis
par l e s saints et l e s etres i n f e r i e u r s eux-memes.
On peut, e n f i n , considerer comme l e v r a i corps (kaya)
du Bouddha, ce que l e Bouddha est au point de vue de l a
v e r i t e absolue. La nature vraie (dharmata) d'un Bouddha sera
appelee son dharmakaya, en termes plus c l a i r s , son svabhavi-
kakaya ou dharmatakaya, son corps v r a i . Nous sommes ren-
seignes sur l a nature vraie des dharmas qui constituent l e
Bouddha: ces dharmas ne sont pas produits "en s o i " ; i l s ne
sont pas produits, au point de vue de l a v e r i t e absolue; i l s
sont "vides"; i l s ont pour nature l a "vacuite" (gunyata).
On peut en d i r e autant de tous l e s dharmas, et de l a
foule des etres que constituent l e s dharmas: tous l e s etres
ont done l e meme v r a i corps (svabhavikakaya = dharmatakaya
= dharmakaya) que l e s Bouddhas.
Toutefois, dans l e s Bouddhas predominent l e s dharmas
producteurs^de Nirvana ( l o k o t t a r a ) , a 1'exclusion des dharmas
mondains. Les Bouddhas ont done, a peu pres, p u r i f i e l e u r
v r a i corps: i l s sont vides, ou a peu pres, au "point. '.;de .-.vue.'
meme de l a v e r i t e d'apparence (pp. 279-281)..
F i n a l l y , the author notes various t h e o r i e s , e s p e c i a l l y the tathagatagarbha,
which he considers to be part of the "immanentise"Buddhology of the Mantrayana,
and speculates on p a r a l l e l s between Mahayana Buddhism and Vedanta. He c l e a r l y
wishes to see the t r i k a y a within the general context of the development of
Indian r e l i g i o u s thought but does not have the necessary expertise to do more
than draw attention to a few s i m i l a r i t i e s .
This a r t i c l e has been quoted i n d e t a i l because, despite shortcomings i n
the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i t o f f e r s the f i r s t summary of the major features which
l a t e r scholars came to consider t h e i r prime data.
2h
7. A. Coomaraswamy. Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism. New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1916.
This hook i s important because i t establishes the p o s i t i o n found i n most
l a t e r popular Indian works. Like Suzuki, Coomaraswamy sees the t r i k a y a as an
o n t o l o g i c a l doctrine, but draws p a r a l l e l s to Vedanta rather than C h r i s t i a n i t y .
The Mahayana i s thus distinguished by i t s mystical
Buddha theology. . . . The Mahayana Buddha theology, as
remarked by Rhys Davids, " i s the greatest possible contra-
d i c t i o n to the Agnostic Atheism," which i s the c h a r a c t e r i s -
t i c of Gautama's system of philosophy. But t h i s opposition
i s simply the i n e v i t a b l e contrast of r e l i g i o n and philosophy,
r e l a t i v e and absolute t r u t h , and those who are interested i n
the science of theology, or are touched by a r t , w i l l not be
l i k e l y to agree i n denouncing the Buddha gods as the inventions
"of a s i c k l y scholasticism, hollow abstractions without l i f e
or r e a l i t y " : i n t h i s contingent world we l i v e every day by
r e l a t i v e t r u t h s , and for a l l those who do not wish to avoid
the world of Becoming at the e a r l i e s t possible moment these
r e l a t i v e truths are f a r from lacking:'in l i f e or r e a l i t y . The
Mahayana as a t h e i s t i c f a i t h i s so only to the same extent as
the Vedanta, that i s to say i t has an esoteric aspect which
speaks i n negative terms of a Suchness and a Void which cannot
be known, while on the other i t has an exoteric and more
elaborate part in.which the Absolute i s seen through the glass
of time and space, contracted and i d e n t i f i e d into v a r i e t y .
This development appears i n the doctrine of the Trikaya, the
Three Bodies of the Buddha. These three are ( l ) the Dharma-" -
kaya, or Essence-body; (2) i t s heavenly manifestations i n the
Sambhogakaya, or Body of B l i s s ; and (3) the emanation, trans-
formation, or p r o j e c t i o n thereof, c a l l e d Nirmanakaya, apparent
as the v i s i b l e i n d i v i d u a l Buddha on earth. This i s a system
which hardly d i f f e r s from what i s implied i n the C h r i s t i a n
doctrine of Incarnation. . . .
Thus the Dharmakaya may be compared to the Father; the
Sambhogakaya to the f i g u r e of Christ i n glory; the Nirmanakaya
to the v i s i b l e Jesus who announces i n human speech that 'I and
my Father are One.' Or again with the Vedanta: the Dharmakaya
i s the Brahman, timeless and unconditioned; the Sambhogakaya
i s r e a l i z e d i n the forms of Isvara; the Nirmanakaya i n every
avatar. The essence of a l l things, the one r e a l i t y of which
t h e i r f l e e t i n g shapes remind us, i s the Dharmakaya. The Dhar-
makaya i s not a personal being who reveals himself to us i n a
single incarnation, but i t i s the all-pervading and t r a c e l e s s
ground of the soul, which does not i n fact s u f f e r any
25
modification' but appears t o us t o assume a v a r i e t y of forms:
we read t h a t though the Buddha (a term which we must here
understand as impersonal) does not depart from h i s seat i n
the tower ( s t a t e of Dharmakaya), yet he may assume a l l and
every form, whether of a brahma, a god, or a monk, or a
p h y s i c i a n , or a tradesman, or an a r t i s t ; he may r e v e a l
h i m s e l f i n every form of a r t and i n d u s t r y , i n c i t i e s or i n
v i l l a g e s : from the highest heaven t o the lowest h e l l , there
i s the Dharmakaya, i n which a l l s e n t i e n t beings are one.
The Dharmakaya i s the personal ground of Buddhahood from
which the personal w i l l , thought and love of innumerable
Buddhas and Bodhisattvas ever proceed i n response t o the
needs of those i n whom;, the p e r f e c t nature i s not yet r e a l -
i z e d . In some of the l a t e r phases of the Mahayana, however,
the Dharmakaya i s p e r s o n i f i e d as Adi-Buddha (sometimes
Vairocana) who i s then t o be regarded as the Supreme Being,
above a l l other Buddhas, and whose s a k t i i s Prjnaparamita.
Dharmakaya i s commonly t r a n s l a t e d 'Body of the Law,'
but i t must not be'.interpreted merely as equivalent t o the
sum of the s c r i p t u r e s (pp. 237-239).
I t i s h a r d l y necessary t o point out t h a t these remarks, which are grounded
i n a thorough r e d u c t i o n of Buddhism t o Vedanta, are an u n s a t i s f a c t o r y t o o l f o r
i n t e r p r e t i n g a Vijnanavadin theory t o the modern Westerner. They are u s e f u l
as a c l e a r and elegant i n t r o d u c t i o n of an u n s a t i s f a c t o r y answer which, i s met.,
many times i n l a t e r w r i t i n g s , f r e q u e n t l y i n an obscured form.-
8. Akanuma, Chizen. " T r i p l e Body of the Buddha." Eastern Buddhist, 2 (1922):
1-29-
Akanuma, l i k e Suzuki, was a b e l i e v e r , but one w i t h greater knowledge and
l e s s w i l l i n g n e s s t o accept f a c i l e comparisons. He r e f e r s t o a wide range of
Indian Buddhist t e x t s .
Akanuma b e l i e v e s t h a t the Dharmakaya was the f i r s t aspect of the t r i k a y a
t o appear. He sees the Dharmakaya d o c t r i n e as the r e s u l t of three f a c t o r s :
The strong f a i t h o r i e n t a t i o n of Buddhism.
There i s no doubt that the r a p i d growth of Buddhism i n
India was c h i e f l y due to the greatness of the Buddha's own
personality which demanded f a i t h and love i n his d i s c i p l e s .
They were unconsciously drawn towards t h e i r leader and took
i n a l l h i s words with absolute f a i t h . . . . This attitude
. . . n a t u r a l l y r e f l e c t e d i t s e l f i n t h e i r conception of the
personality of the Master, r e a d i l y preparing the way for h i s
d e i f i c a t i o n by the l a t e r Buddhists (pp. 1-3).
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n of Buddha and dharma.
By "Dharma," or "Dhamma" ( i n P a l i ) , i s meant f i r s t of
a l l the doctrine of the Buddha. . . . And as the doctrine
taught by the Buddha i s the t r u t h , u n i v e r s a l and absolute,
which was revealed i n his inmost consciousness, the term
n a t u r a l l y came to be i d e n t i f i e d with the Law; and then the
Law and the Doctrine were conceived to have united themselves
i n the personality of the Buddha. The Buddha therefore was
not a body which was only apparent to our p h y s i c a l eye, but
a s p i r i t or a moral person i n whom the Dharma or Law was
incarnated . . . the Doctrine i s what constitutes the Body
of the Buddha, and he who sees the Doctrine and the Truth as
revealed i n i t i s he who sees the Buddha. Buddhahood consists
i n his s p i r i t u a l i t y and not i n h i s p h y s i c a l being, however
majestic i t may be. To interview him, therefore, means to
understand the Truth through the teaching of the Buddha.
When t h i s idea was further developed by the l a t e r Buddhists
as one of t h e i r metaphysical problems the Buddha-Body came L:
to be i d e n t i f i e d with the Law or Truth or Tathata (suchness)
. . . (pp. k; 6-7; 8-9).
The transcendental conception of the dharma.
I f a l l the Buddhas and Bhikkhus and i n fact any Buddhist
followers were enabled to a t t a i n i l l u m i n a t i o n by means of the
one vehicle (ekayana) of the Dharma, i t was quite natural for
Buddhists to assume the transcendental existence of one Truth,
which was designated by them as Dharmata or Tathata meaning
the essence or suchness of things. This i t was that would -
exist for ever regardless of the appearance or disappearance
of the Tathagata, and the Dharmakaya which had been understood
as meaning one who experienced or was i n possession of the
Dharma or Truth, came to mean one i n whom the Truth i t s e l f
was embodied or one whose body was the Dharma i t s e l f . ' The
idea of the Buddha as the Dharmakaya thus came to be enter-
tained by h i s d i s c i p l e s as time went on a f t e r his entrance
into Parinirvana (p. 9).
27
These three strands converged around a d e v o t i o n a l i s t i c core to form the mature
Dharmakaya.
As years r o l l e d on, the d i s c i p l e s grew more and more
convinced of the e t e r n a l i t y and supernatural p e r s o n a l i t y of
the Buddha. While he was walking among them on earth, the
love and reverence they f e l t for him was r e a d i l y s a t i s f i e d ,
hut with his passing t h e i r emotional l i f e would not he
p a c i f i e d with empty i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m (p. 1 0 ) .
Akanuma traces the r i s e of multi-body theories from t h i s single numinous
Dharmakaya. He sees the Jataka s t o r i e s , the t r a d i t i o n of the thirty-two
marks, and the l o k o t t a r a tendencies, as elements which were l a t e r systematized
as the t r i k a y a doctrine. He believes that t h i s systematization f i r s t appeared
i n those Mahayana sutras ( e s p e c i a l l y the Prajnaparamita) which revealed a
p l u r a l i t y of Buddhas and culminated i n the "Nagarjian" two-kaya system of the
Ta Chih Tu Lun.
Akanuma:..realizes that the l o g i c a l gap between the two and the three-kaya
systems cannot be bridged by the supposition that the two just n a t u r a l l y
developed into the three. Furthermore, he r e j e c t s the pious s o l u t i o n of sup-
posing that Nagarjuna himself formulated the t r i k a y a . In doing so" he i s drawn
into another important problem Why didn't Nagarjuna do so? He must'have
been acquainted with the figure of Amitabha i n the Pure Land sutras. Why did
he not r e a l i z e that Amitabha would not f i t within a two-kaya system, a r e a l i z a -
t i o n which would force him to some type of trikaya? Akanuma concludes that
Nagarjuna must never have grasped t h i s d i f f i c u l t y . b e c a u s e - i t i s a - h i s t o r i c a l
fact that the t r i k a y a , f i r s t appearing i n such t r a n s i t i o n a l sutras as the
Mahaparinirvana and Samdhinirmocana, postdates Nagarjuna. Akanuma maintains
that the f u l l t r i k a y a doctrine was f i r s t stated by Asanga i n the Mahayanasam-
graha. He paraphrases:
28
The Body of Self-nature (svabhavakakaya) corresponding
to the Dharmakaya, and the Body of Enjoyment (sambhogakaya)
corresponding to the Vipakakaya (Recompense Body) together
with the Body of Transformation (nirmanakaya), have f i n a l l y
come to e s t a b l i s h the dogma; of the T r i p l e Body of the
Tathagata. The basis and reason of the T r i p l e Body i s the
Dharmakaya, through which the other two Bodies are capable
of maintaining t h e i r existence, and consequently the three
separate bodies are i n f a c t the three aspects of one essence
i n which we conceive Tathagatahood. The object of worship
or f a i t h has thus now been t r a n s f e r r e d from the h i s t o r i c a l
and natural Buddha to the Vipakakaya Buddha or Recompense
Body of Tathagatahood.
In conclusion:
. . . the dogma of the T r i p l e Body f i r s t started from
the worshipful a t t i t u d e of the e a r l i e r Buddhists towards
t h e i r Master, which r e s u l t e d i n the conception of the Law
Body (Dharmakaya), and how t h i s l a t t e r conception, once
f i n d i n g an a r t i c u l a t e expression both i n the Sutras and the
sastras, s t e a d i l y grew up so as to make Nagarjuna formulate
h i s theory of the Two Bodies (dvikaya) of the Tathagata,
and f i n a l l y how t h i s Nagarjuna doctrine developed into
Asang'a's T r i n i t y where the t h i r d Body, the Vipakakaya or
the Body of Recompense, came to f i n d i t s legitimate place.
The T r i n i t y , thus complete as dogma, has now put the Vipa-
kakaya Buddha i n the place of the natural Buddha as the
Buddhist object of f a i t h , making i t s content ever deeper and
ever more enhancing. This reconstruction of the theory of
the Buddha-body marks one of the d i v i d i n g l i n e s between the
Mahayana and Hinayana (pp. 28-29).
9. L. de La Vallee Poussin. Vijnaptimatratasiddhi: l a siddhi de Hiuan-tsang.
P a r i s : Paul Geuthner, 1928-29.
This i s an annotated t r a n s l a t i o n of Hsuan-tsang's seventh-century
compendium of Vijnanavadin thought, the Ch'.'.eng Wei Shih Lun. The penultimate
section deals with the t r i k a y a , and the appendix contains La V a l l e e Poussin's
mature study of the t o p i c . Having t r a n s l a t e d both t h i s text and the Abhidhar-
makosa and studied much of the r e l a t e d l i t e r a t u r e , he has replaced the v i t r i o l
of his e a r l i e r writings with concrete references. While no nearer to his
29
grand plan of 1913, he has a more r e a l i s t i c appreciation of the problem.
1. Ces notes sur l e s corps du Bouddha sont presque
exclusivement d'ordre dogmatique. De toute evidence, l a
speculation et l e s inventions de l ' e c o l e ont leurs causes
l o i n t a i n e s ou proches dans l e s r e l i g i o n , c u l t e , mythologie,
iconographie. En plusieurs rencontres, l a chronologie ne
trouve d'appui que dans l e s monuments f i g u r e s . La descrip-
t i o n des theories abstraites n'est qu'une p a r t i e , non
negligeable, d ' h i s t o i r e de l a bouddhologie.
Ces notes ne sont pas meme un sastra. N'ecrit pas un
sastra qui veut. De graves lacunes: l e Sraddhotpada
deliberement exclu.. (voir p. *j6k, 788); l e s grands Sutras,
t e l s l e Lotus, l e Lankavatara, a peine examines; l e s v a r i -
antes des Sastras f o r t imparfaitement resumees, et 1'echeveau
des sectes chinoises insoupconne (voir Demieville, Sur
1'authenticity...); sans p a r l e r de l a theorie des corps
applique . au pantheon. Notre propos e t a i t d'etudier l e s
antecedents des doctrines de l a Siddhi, c a r r i e r e du Bodhi-
sattva, Tathata et l e reste. II est a t t e i n t s i nous avons
montre qu'Asahga est au bout d'une l i g n e speculative toute
bouddhique.
2. F a u t - i l ajouter que cette l i g n e est, aussi bien,
indienne? S i Gaudapada emprunte des expressions bouddhiques,
bien plus, s'empare des textes p r i s dans l e s C o r b e i l l e s ,
Mahamati s'inquiete s i l e Bouddha du Lankavatara ne vedantise
pas. On pourrait d i r e que l e Lokottaravada krishnaise.
La doctrine des t r o i s corps nous apparait comme exclu-
sivement f a i t e de materiaux bouddhiques: mais e l l e a ete
elaboree dans un pays ou l'on adorait des Avatars, ou l'on
e t a i t anxieux de L'Absolu. Le cocher d'Arjuna est un
nirmanakaya: l e corps sublime q u ' i l montre a Arjuna, corps
v i s i b l e aux seuls Yogins,'est l e sambhogakaya quiest v i s i b l e
aux seuls Bodhisattvas; et 1'ineffable Brahman correspond au
svabhavikakaya ou, mieux encore, a l a tathata. La comparaison
des deux systemes s'impose.
3. Je s e r a i plus reserve en ce qui concerne.les i n f l u -
ences iraniennes, occidentales, judeo-chretiennes qu'auraient
subies l e Bouddhisme (pp. 8 l l - 8 l 2 ) .
La V a l l e e Poussin begins with an excellent bibliography (which has been
incorporated into the present study) and then surveys the various kaya theories
to be found i n Buddhist t e x t s . This survey may be summarized as follows:
30
a. P a l i Canon theories
The Nikayas d i s t i n g u i s h three kayas:
caturmahabhumikakaya: the c o r r u p t i b l e body composed of the four elements.
manomayakaya: the body i n which the Buddha v i s i t s the Brahma world or i n
which he appears as Mara i n the Mara realm.
dharmakaya: the body of teaching. Only metaphorically a "body."
b. Sarvastivadin theories
The Abhidharmakosa mentions three kayas:
Dharmakaya: the c o l l e c t i o n of anasrava but samskrta dharmas which form a
Buddha.
Vipakakaya or Rupakaya: the body, born i n Lumbini' possessing the thirty-two
laksanas.
Nirmanakaya: the a p p a r i t i o n a l body created by the Buddha.
c. Lokottaravadin theory
The Lokottaravadins held the Buddha to be composed of dharmas unconnected
with the three dhatus (e.g., of tathata and tathatajnana) while appearing i n
the world by an a r t i f i c i a l body.
d. The Bodhisattva and Buddha of the Ta Chih Tu Lun
Although La Vallee Poussin was unable to extract a coherent system from
t h i s text he has summarized the various ideas i t contains. As we now have
i+ 5
Lamotte's t r a n s l a t i o n and a systematic study i t i s c l e a r that a two-kaya
model i s basic to t h i s text. However, i t also contains, i n a very disorganized
31
state, most of the elements which fed into the t r i k a y a theory.
e. Theories of Asanga-Dharmapala
These include the mature three and four-kaya theories of such texts as
the Yogasastra, the Ahhisamayalankara and the Mahayanasamgraha. La V a l l e e
Poussin thinks that a l l of these teach the same doctrine i n d i f f e r e n t ways.
f. Variant theories
A number of texts introduce v a r i a t i o n s on Asanga's standard system. These
include Vasubandhu's Saddharmapundarikasastra, the Suvarnaprabhasa, the
Lankavatara and the Avatamsaka. He surveys, very b r i e f l y the kayas mentioned
i n each text.
g. The Eternal Buddha
This survey of various theories about the duration of a Buddha's existence
raises points relevant to our study, but La Vallee Poussin f a i l s to r e l a t e i t
to h i s other comments.
In b r i e f , La Vallee Poussin retains the historical-developmental approach
of h i s e a r l i e s t writings. He continues to view the theory of the early
Vijnanavada masters as "the" t r i k a y a doctrine and to consider l a t e r develop-
ments as new ideas or deviations from the basic doctrine. 'He does not review
or repudiate h i s notes of 1913, so we may assume that these s t i l l represent
h i s basic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s .
32
10. D. T. Suzuki. Studies i n the Lankavatara Sutra. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul Ltd., 1932, pp. 308-338.
This exposition of the t r i k a y a i s very d i f f e r e n t from that i n Suzuki's
1906 Outlines. Not only has he learned more about the doctrine, "but he
r e a l i z e d that a developmental study i s a better presentation for Western
readers than a simple C h r i s t i a n i z a t i o n . He quotes extensively from three
sources: the Lankavatarasutra, the Suvarnaprabhasasutra and the Mahayana-
sraddhotpada. In the f i r s t he finds many elements of the doctrine but no
actual t r i k a y a . In the second he finds the f u l l t r i k a y a , and i n the t h i r d he
finds the mature t r i k a y a doctrine of the Sino-Japanese t r a d i t i o n .
Most of t h i s passage i s devoted to an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the separate e l e -
ments found i n the Lankavatara. These are: a Dharmakaya and a Dharmata-Buddha
which were to become the Dharmakaya of the t r i k a y a , a Nirmana-Buddha which was
to become the Nirmanakaya, and Nisyanda-Buddhas and Vipaka-Buddhas which were
the forerunners of the Sambhogakaya and the Nirmanakaya.
Suzuki takes very s e r i o u s l y the question of why each of these concepts
arose, although h i s answers are naive. The Dharmakaya derives from an "innate
idea" that great men are immortal (p. 31^). A major reason for the Sambhoga-
kaya i s man's
. . . deep human longing for a body of t r a n s f i g u r a t i o n .
We are not s a t i s f i e d with our corporeal existence, we are a l l
the time oppressed by the f e e l i n g of imprisonment, our s p i r i t
soars away from t h i s world of p h y s i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s , we long
forever f o r a manomayakaya (will-body). This p h y s i c a l body
does not f u l l y express the meaning of the s p i r i t , i t deranges,
i t tyrannises. In fact a l l the r e l i g i o u s struggles and
aspirations we experience i n t h i s l i f e are centered on the
control of t h i s body.-.(p. 331).
Suzuki's primary contribution here i s h i s discussion of the mechanism
33
whereby the Sambhogakaya and Nirmanakaya (or equivalent Lankavatara terms)
appear i n the world. He understands that t h i s discussion must remain focussed
on the Bodhisattva vow (p. 233). He also r e a l i z e s that t h i s vow sets i n motion
a series of c a u s a l l y - r e l a t e d events within the world, rather than an i r r u p t i o n
of sacred r e a l i t y into the world.
The nature of a Vipaka-Buddha i s that of a Nishyanda-
Buddha when t h i s i s understood i n the sense of a r e s u l t
flowing from an antecedent cause, that i s , as one of the f i v e
e f f e c t s (pancaphala), .and not i n the sense of something
secondary whichiissues out of a more primary substance; . . .
(p. 330).
Suzuki does not explore a l l the implications of t h i s point; he does mention
the major one. The aspirant cannot be a passive r e c i p i e n t of the Buddha's a i d
but i s himself n e c e s s a r i l y involved i n the appearance of the Buddha i n the
world. That i s , the Nirmana-Buddha i s a r e l a t i o n a l concept.
Thus, the existence of the Nirmana-Buddha can be under-
stood i n two ways: one from the standpoint of the Buddha
himself, whose l o v i n g heart cannot help r e s o r t i n g to every
possible means of s a l v a t i o n , and the other from the stand-
point of s i n f u l mortals who desire every possible help from
a power higher than themselves. This mutuality has f i l l e d
the world with Nirmita-nairmanika Buddhas * Wherever we turn
we come across one of these transformations, and i f we are
earnest and sincere and longing from the depths of the heart,
we can see even the r e a l Buddha himself i n and through them
(p. 333).
Aside from t h i s valuable i n s i g h t , t h i s work i s s t i l l badly flawed by
appeals to human nature, rather than to Vijnanavadin theory.- For example,
The r e l a t i o n of the three Buddhas to one another may
be understood i n the analogy of an i n d i v i d u a l person; That
there i s something ultimate making up the reason of t h i s
i n d i v i d u a l existence i s to be granted, because the very
conception of i n d i v i d u a l i t y i s impossible without postulating
something behind i t . . . . This corresponds to the concep-
t i o n of the Dharmata, or when p e r s o n i f i e d , to the Pharma'ta-
Buddha.
3^
Now t h i s i n d i v i d u a l person stands i n every possible
manner of r e l a t i o n s h i p to h i s fellow-beings, human or other-
wise. . . . In the case of a l i v i n g person t h i s v a r i a b i l i t y ,
temporal and constant, reaches i t s l i m i t s . The person him-
s e l f has not apparently changed but he assumes or seems to
assume d i f f e r e n t forms to his neighbours, May not t h i s
aspect of h i s being be c a l l e d h i s Nirmana value? In spite
of a l l these external and r e l a t i o n a l mutations, the i n d i -
v i d u a l has not at a l l changed to his own consciousness. That
he i s himself he at a l l times knows and he enjoys h i s per-
s o n a l i t y . This corresponds to the Vipaka-Buddha, or
Sambhogakaya.
Every conscious being may thus f i g u r a t i v e l y or rather
metaphysically be said to be the owner of the T r i p l e Body.
In the case of the Buddha, the doctrine i s f i l l e d with
r e l i g i o u s s i g n i f i c a n c e and i t has played a most important
r o l e i n the development of Mahayana Buddhism. One thing we
have to notice here i s the replacing of the Buddha-trinity
by that of the Body (kaya). That Buddhist philosophers have
come to t a l k of the Trikaya instead of Buddhatraya. It i s
not a matter of mere change of terminology, i t involves a
deeper meaning. The reason i s that Kaya has a more synthe-
s i s i n g value, while Buddha suggests more of i n d i v i d u a l i t y .
The three d i f f e r e n t kinds of Buddhahood make one think of
three d i f f e r e n t , separate i n d i v i d u a l s , but the Trikaya means
one p e r s o n a l i t y with three aspects. In the conception of
the T r i p l e Body we trace a systematising thought (pp.- 3 3 3 - 3 3 M.
This analogy i s not only vague, but, as we s h a l l see l a t e r , i t i s incompatible
with Asanga's formulation of the t r i k a y a doctrine.
11. Hobogirin: Dictionnaire encyclopedique du bouddhisme, s.v. "Busshin," n.d.,
fasc. 2: lT"+-l85.
This a r t i c l e i s a wide-ranging examination of a l l Buddhakaya (Japanese:.
Busshin) theories including the t r i k a y a . Most of the a r t i c l e i s a survey of
Buddhist texts which mention the various Buddhakayas. A b r i e f statement of
the place of each text i n the h i s t o r y of Buddhism i s followed by a summary of
relevant passages. This information has been incorporated into the b i b l i o -
graphy of the present study.
35
In addition, i n the "Apergu General," the author^ proposes a simple theory
of the development of various Buddhakayas. He suggests that the diverse conno-
tations of "Buddhakaya" developed from an ambiguity i n the term kaya. It meant
both:
an organized body or organism, i n the sense of nikaya.
a material or concrete mass.
The early Buddhist community, needing an object of worship, substituted
the teaching (= Dharmakaya) for the departed Buddha.
Others developed more complex Buddhologies, The Mahasamghikas held that
the Buddha was e n t i r e l y transcendent. Others s a i d that the purely human Buddha
disappeared at the parinirvana, but that the "buddha elements" p e r s i s t e d . This
d i v i s i o n into a form-body and dharma-body harmonized with the two-truth idea
and and continued i n the early Mahayana schools, based on the Mahaparinir-
vanasutra and the Prajnaparamita sutras. The Avatamsaka, on the other hand,
m u l t i p l i e d bodies unsystematically.
The Vijnanavadin master Asanga formulated the d e f i n i t i v e t r i k a y a doctrine
on the basis of ideas contained i n such sutras as the Lankavatara. In the mid-
s i x t h century, Paramartha a r r i v e d l i n China and announced that India had f i x e d
the doctrine. This was included i n his t r a n s l a t i o n of the Sraddhotpadasastra
and i n the chapter added to the Suvarnaprabhasasutra. The T'ien-T'ai and
-other groups b u i l t on t h i s .
The author concludes with a warning that i n s u f f i c i e n t documentation i s
a v a i l a b l e for a proper h i s t o r y of the t r i k a y a to be written.
This a r t i c l e i s e s s e n t i a l l y a b i b l i o g r a p h i c a l essay on the primary t e x t u a l
sources. As such i t i s a primary reference work for t h i s study, but contains
few ideas which could be applied d i r e c t l y to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the t r i k a y a .
12. A. K. Chatterjee. The Yogacara Idealism. Varanasi: Benaras Hindu
U n i v e r s i t y , 1962.
This introduction to the Vijnanavada seems to represent contemporary
Indian scholarship on the subject. Chatterjee sees the Tathagata as the
u n i f y i n g Buddhological concept:
The Tathagata occupies the same-place i n Buddhism as
Isvara does i n Advaita Vedanta. He i s the God of r e l i g i o n ,
an object of worship and veneration. He has also i n f i n i t e
compassion for the s u f f e r i n g mankind but for Whose grace
t h e i r redemption would not be possible (p. 223).
Chatterjee discusses the necessity and the l o g i c a l t e n a b i l i t y of t h i s
concept, and then expounds h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the three kayas of the
Tathagata. He draws a l l supporting references from the Mahayahasutralankara
The concept of the Tathagata i s constituted by d i f f e r e n t
metaphysical p r i n c i p l e s . This fact i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n the
theory of the three kayas of the Buddha. It i s one of the
most important doctrines i n the whole of Mahayana r e l i g i o n
and i t i s nothing p e c u l i a r to the Yogacara who accepted the
t r a d i t i o n a l doctrine.
There are three aspects of the God-head, t e c h n i c a l l y
known as the three kayas of the Tathagata. They are:
1. The Svabhavika kaya. 2. The Sambhoga kaya and
3. The Nairmanika kaya.
1. The Svabhavikakaya of the Buddha i s the p r i n c i p l e or
pure W i l l (visuddha Tathata) which i s the
-
.ultimate r e a l i t y .
As such He i s i d e n t i c a l with the Absolute. It i s also c a l l e d
dharma-kaya, being the dharmata (essence) of things. I t s
e s s e n t i a l character (laksana) i s asrayaparavrtti, i . e . , the
withdrawing or r e t r a c t i n g of the Kl&ya. When under the i n f l u -
ence of Avidya, the i l l u s i o n of o b j e c t i v i t y , the Alaya i s
compelled into a forward movement. It goes on creating forms
of o b j e c t i v i t y which i n t h e i r turn further replenish i t . On
the sublation of t h i s disturbing i l l u s i o n a r e t r a c t i n g move-
ment of t h i s Alaya i s started. I t no longer p o s i t s an other
but rests i n i t s e l f . This i s the state of Vijnaptimatrata,
of consciousness as pure Act. It i s the dharmakaya of the
Buddha and i s His natural aspect.
37
Being e s s e n t i a l l y i d e n t i c a l with the Absolute, the
question of the number of Buddhas has no meaning. . . .
The dharmakaya of a l l the Buddhas i s i d e n t i c a l , as a l l are
i d e n t i c a l with the Absolute. I t i s also beyond thought as
t h i s i d e n t i t y cannot be grasped, with mere concepts.
2. The second aspect of the Buddha i s His Sambhogika
kaya His body of B l i s s . It i s t h i s body with which the
Buddha enjoys His creation (dharmasambhoga). S t r i c t l y
speaking, t h i s i s the concept of God par excellence. A l l
the g l o r i f i e d descriptions of the Buddha found i n the
s c r i p t u r e s , e.g., rays emanating from the innumerable pores
of His skin and penetrating to the remotest corners of the
universe, pertain to t h i s kaya. The Buddha dwells i n the
Akanistha Heaven, surrounded by a host of Bodhisattvas and
other minor personages. Sambhoga kaya i s the p e r s o n a l i t y
of the supreme God, associated with a l l powers and excel-
lences. It i s comparable to the concept of God i n the
Brahmanical systems which finds the best i l l u s t r a t i o n i n
the eleventh chapter of the Bhagavad Gita.
3. The Nairmanika Kaya i s the a p p a r i t i o n a l body of the
Buddha. Hence one i s e x p l i c i t l y warned that the human form
which the Lord might temporarily assume should by no means
be mistaken for His r e a l body. This assumption i s s o l e l y
for the purpose of lending succour to mankind. The forms
assumed can be i n f i n i t e i n number. . . . Whereas the body
of B l i s s characterises such q u a l i t i e s e x i s t i n g for the sake
of others. . . .
In short, the human Buddha who i s o r d i n a r i l y seen i n
the various worlds and exemplified i n d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s
i s the nirmanakaya of the Buddha. It i s of t h i s kaya that
any h i s t o r i c i t y can be ascribed. That body which i s v i s i b l e
to some heavenly beings i s His Sambhogakaya which obviously
has no h i s t o r i c i t y . But both the Kayas are h i s free assump-
t i o n s . The u t t e r i n d i v i s i b i l i t y . . . of any form i s His
Dharmakaya. This i s His r e a l essence. The Sambhogakaya i s
the supreme God while the Nirmana kaya i s the Sakyamuni who
a c t u a l l y took b i r t h amongst us (pp. 230-232).
Chatterjee o f f e r s l i t t l e more than did Coomaraswamy i n 19l6. The i n t e r -
vening developmental studies have been ignored and the doctrine treated as
revealed dogma. H i s t o r i c a l assertions, i . e . , that the t r i k a y a was a general
Buddhist doctrine, not a Vijnanavadin development, are not j u s t i f i e d . A l l
information i s drawn from a single early text which i s not one seen as c e n t r a l
38
by other i n v e s t i g a t o r s . The great exegetical t r e a t i s e s i n which such texts
were discussed and c l a r i f i e d are ignored i n favor of the b l i n d assumption that
the Vijnanavada i s a l l but i d e n t i c a l with the Vedanta. The r e s u l t i n g explana-
t i o n i s simple and predictable but useless as a basis for further studies.
13. Matsunaga, A l i c i a . The Buddhist Philosophy of A s s i m i l a t i o n . Tokyo:
Monumenta l i p p o n i c a Monograph, 1969.
This book i s t y p i c a l of modern popular works on Buddhism i n English -
.published from Japan. I t promises to-be p a r t i c u l a r l y relevant" t our
enquiry as i t takes a developmental approach, showing how c e r t a i n doctrines
became i n t e g r a t i v e centers around which new ideas coalesced as these-doctrines
developed and as Buddhism spread to China and Japan.
The book does not l i v e up to i t s
-
" i n i t i a l promise. While the passages on
the h i s t o r y of the Buddhology are c l e a r (although adding nothing to the
Hobogirin account), the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which the authors derive from i t i s , '.,
at l e a s t to t h i s w r i t e r , u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . Each explanation involves an appeal
to some ambiguous, undefined European term. While these terms may not be
ambiguous within the modern Japanese academic community, the Western reader of
a work written i n English expects a shared terminology. For example, the
t r i k a y a section opens:
H i s t o r i c a l l y , i n Buddhism there have always been at l e a s t
three points of view i n considering the 'Buddha'; f i r s t , as a
human being, second as a s p i r i t u a l p r i n c i p l e , and l a s t l y , as
something i n between the two former views. The actual h i s t o r -
i c a l existence of Gotama (Skt. Gautama) Buddha has never had
a tremendous s i g n i f i c a n c e i n the Buddhist f a i t h , as' he has
been p r i m a r i l y considered to be an archetype, and secondly
a h i s t o r i c a l personage (p. 78).
" S p i r i t u a l p r i n c i p l e " s u r e l y the l e a s t meaningful term p o s s i b l e i s not
39
explained. The statement concerning the h i s t o r i c a l existence of Gautama would
require an entire chapter of development before i t would be accepted (or even
r e j e c t e d ) . What i s meant by "archetype"? That term was popularized by C. G.
Jung, but his use of i t cannot be stretched to cover the manner i n which
ancient Buddhists regarded the Buddha. Even the notion that the t r a d i t i o n had
a concept of a " h i s t o r i c a l " Buddha i s questionable (Caroline Rhys-Davids not-
withstanding). I f i t d i d , surely t h i s i n d i v i d u a l was just that Gautama^ "Buddha
who, our author-
-
maintains, was p r i m a r i l y an archetype, not a h i s t o r i c a l i n d i -
v i d u a l . But more b a s i c a l l y , i n separating archetype and h i s t o r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l ,
i s the author:' not d i v i d i n g the e s s e n t i a l from the e x i s t e n t i a l , the one move
which many other scholars agree i s t o t a l l y against the s p i r i t of the t r i k a y a
doctrine?
The remainder of the exposition i s i n two parts: the t r i k a y a as r e l i g i o u s
experience and the t r i k a y a as p h i l o s o p h i c a l doctrine. The d i s t i n c t i o n between
these, or even the grounds for making the d i s t i n c t i o n , i s not stated. Both
seem to involve theory although the " p h i l o s o p h i c a l " discussion seems to involve
more Madhyamika and the " r e l i g i o u s experience" section seems to involve more
Vijnanavada.
The p h i l o s o p h i c a l discussion opens as follows:
P h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , the Dharma-kaya i s equivalent to sunyata,
the u n i v e r s a l t r u t h declaring that a l l subject-object d i f f e r -
e n t i a t i o n based upon discriminative knowledge i s i n v a l i d . In
more p o s i t i v e terms t h i s can be equated with the essence of
Enlightenment (nirvana) which merely consists of an under-
standing of P r a t f t y a samutpada ( r e l a t i v i t y ) or the a b i l i t y to
view t h a t - w h a t - i s - a s - i t - i s ( t a t h a t t ) . We can therefore say
that the Dharma-kaya. i s also the system of cosmic unity or
order that exists everywhere but i s unable to be grasped by
reasoning.
Since the Dharma-kaya functions as a u n i v e r s a l t r u t h , i t
cannot remain a mere p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r i n c i p l e , but constantly
1+0
appears i n r e l i g i o u s experience. Such an appearance or r e a l i -
zation of t h i s t r u t h i s the Sambhoga-kaya.,
. . . In essence, the Sambhoga-k.aya i s also the experi-
ence of 'enjoyment' of the t r u t h of stonyata, or the r e a l i z a t i o n
of Absolute Truth. . . the Sambhoga-kaya i s not a s t a t i c state.
From t h i s r e l i g i o u s experience there comes the natural desire
to enlighten others and hence the Nirmana-kaya or system of
the manifestation of the essence of Enlightenment (sunyata)
issues forth'.to a l l sentient beings. This l a s t function or
aspect of Enlightenment i s s i m i l a r to the concept of sunyata
artha or feature of recognizing the phenomenal world as based
upon discriminative knowledge and using upaya to lead sentient
beings from discriminative knowledge to Enlightenment (pp. 8 l -
82).
Comment i s hardly necessary. Every major problem i s brushed aside. The
r e l a t i o n s h i p of the Dharmakaya to sunyata i s one of "equivalence." The
Sambhogakaya i s the r e a l i z a t i o n of the Absolute Truth, and the Nirmanakaya i s
due to a "natural d e s i r e . " I can see only the s l i g h t e s t connection between
a l l of t h i s and the c l a s s i c a l Vijnanavada theory.
As r e l i g i o u s experience, the t r i k a y a i s described by a confused s c a t t e r i n g
of Vijnanavada ideas:
It was the Yogacara" with t h e i r conception of conscious-'
ness (vijnana) as the basis of Enlightenment that gave a
systematic form to the doctrine of the Trikaya, and i t was
t h i s form that permeated a l l l a t e r Mahayana. The e a r l i e s t
stage of the Yog&c&fa conception can be found i n .the Lanka-
vatara Sutra. . . .
In the f i n a l form of the Trikaya theory the Dharma-kaya
became the aspect of Buddhahood as Absolute Truth or r e a l i t y ,
while the Sambhoga-kaya and Nirmana-kaya were upaya or mani-
f e s t a t i o n s of the Dharma-kaya t a i n t e d by degrees of i l l u s i o n
i n r e l a t i o n to t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the phenomenal world,
hence having form. We can compare both the Sambhoga-kaya
and Nirmana-kaya to mirrors r e f l e c t i n g the p u r i t y of l i g h t
from the Unconditioned Dharma-kaya. The former i s a l i g h t
and glorious r e f l e c t i o n , but i t i s s t i l l a mirror attempting
to capture the rays of the i n f i n i t e and indescribable at an
i d e a l l e v e l of r e l i g i o u s r e a l i z a t i o n , i t i s f a r removed from
i t s source. The l a t t e r tends to be a dark r e f l e c t i o n , .since
i t i s clouded by i t s appearance i n the phenomenal world that
I l l
can only f a i n t l y glimpse the dim r e f l e c t i o n i t c a r r i e s of
the Absolute Truth.
From the sphere of r e l i g i o u s experience, the Yogacara
were able to teach that the Sambhoga-kaya and Nirmana-kaya
represented mind-made emanations from the Dharma-kaya or one
eternal Buddha. Both these l a t t e r forms appearing i n the
i l l u s i v e world were unreal, just as a l l phenomenal existence
i s unreal. . . . From such a basis of r e l i g i o u s understand-
ing i t i s easy to comprehend the source of Mahayana mysticism.
The Yogacara emphasis.upon.the r e l i g i o u s .experience of E n l i g h t -
enment symbolized as the Trikaya as w e l l as the importance
of consciousness as the basis for the movement towards
Enlightenment n a t u r a l l y placed a higher value upon mystical
experience than empirical knowledge (pp. 83-85).
Wot only does a l l of t h i s avoid the r e a l questions but i t leaves a
suspicion that the authors may not be well acquainted with t r a d i t i o n a l V i j n a -
navadin theory. Was there ever a school which d i d not regard consciousness
Q
as the basis of enlightenment? Surely Suzuki i s correct i n saying that
Vijnanavada i s distinguished by i t s theory of the mechanics of the enlighten-
ment process ( i . e . , the a s r a y a - p a r a v r t t i) .
However, the most serious doubts a r i s e from the constant use of ontolog-
i c a l models. Such phrases as "tainted by degrees of i l l u s i o n i n r e l a t i o n to
t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the phenomenal world" seem inconsistent with'the
trisvabhava basis of the system. This question w i l l be taken up l a t e r when
examining Asanga's Mahayanasamgraha.
1^. Geoffrey Parrinder. Avatar and Incarnation: The Wilde Lectures i n Natural
and Comparative R e l i g i o n i n the U n i v e r s i t y of Oxford. London: Faber
and Faber, 1970.
The previous a r t i c l e s have been the work of scholars of Buddhism or
Buddhist apologists. It might be argued that t h e i r primary task was not to
produce an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n but to present the l i t e r a t u r e and construct a h i s t o r y
of i t s development* The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of these data might he considered a
task for the generalist such as the student of comparative r e l i g i o n , h i s t o r y
of r e l i g i o n , and so on.
Unfortunately, few generalists have dealt with the t o p i c . The present
work by Parrinder i s the most promising treatment. As he begins the sixty-page
section devoted to Buddhism by noting the apparent anomaly of a Nirmanakaya
resembling an avatar or incarnation i n this- non-theistic r e l i g i o n , i t i s
reasonable to expect him to speak d i r e c t l y to our concern to derive a frame
of reference broad enough to accommodate both Western t h e i s t i c and Buddhist
ideas. This would be the key to i n t e r p r e t i n g the t r i k a y a .
No such derivation i s forthcoming. The bulk of the relevant chapters i s
simply a synopsis of the Buddha myth from various sutras. Parrinder seems
unaware of the sastras and badly informed about the t r i k a y a d o c t r i n e n o t one
of the studies i n t h i s present survey of scholarship appears i n his b i b l i o g -
raphy. With the exception of Lamotte's H i s t o i r e du bouddhisme indien, h i s
secondary sources are the l e a s t r e l i a b l e of a l l the popularizers. From them
he has accepted a s t a r t l i n g assortment of misunderstandings as simple data:
. . . the Buddha was. a c t u a l l y a l l the Buddhas of the
past. . . . The corporeal l i f e of a Buddha was i l l u s o r y
anyway . . . a l l the Buddhas have the same essence . . .
they can appear i n various forms to many beings. These are
acts of grace. . . . So the idea of Buddhahood was devel-
oped into a universal pantheism, or rather pan-Buddhism . . .
(p. 178).
These sources also supplied him with a very d i s t o r t e d version of the
t r i k a y a , or rather with the view that the t r i k a y a was not important. Parrinder
did not take the t r i k a y a s e r i o u s l y at a l l : "The basic d i s t i n c t i o n was between
the p h y s i c a l body and Dharma-body, i t i s these two that are u s u a l l y compared
^3
and contrasted" (p. 177).
From these ideas he draws a few general conclusions, the most important
heing that the Buddha theories are merely a "weak" (p. 2^0) form of the avatar
doctrine and can he dismissed along with i t .
A l l of t h i s i n i t i a l l y appears as a puzzling negligence on the part of
such a respected scholar. The picture becomes c l e a r e r when, i n chapters 17
and 19, Parrinder throws aside h i s s c h o l a r l y guise and reveals the polemical
theologian who, on the basis of the e a r l i e r conclusions, finds a l l a l i e n
r e l i g i o n s wanting and exalts C h r i s t i a n i t y i n a r i n g i n g a l t a r . c a l l .
Although neither Matsunaga nor Parrinder helps us d i r e c t l y , t h e i r
books have been included to demonstrate how l i t t l e of the research which has
been done has penetrated the popular l e v e l . As most other writers are far
more naive than these, no other popular works w i l l be reviewed.
15. Wagao, Gadjin. "On the Theory of Buddha-Body." Translated by Hirano
Umeyo. Eastern Buddhist, 6 (May, 1973): 25-53.
Professor Nagao approaches the t r i k a y a with great sympathy, profound
knowledge of the t e x t s , and a cautious a t t i t u d e .
In section one, he discusses the various ideas which fed into the t r i k a y a .
The section concludes:
It was i n the philosophy of the Yogacara school (or the
Vijnana-vada school) represented by Asafiga and Vasubandhu
that the two-body theory developed u n t i l i t was consummated
into a three-body theory. The ideas and f a i t h s that became ...
the materials for the three-body theory must have been
established i n various forms before that time. There was
already a tendency toward the u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n of the con-
cept of Buddha. It was thought that Gautama Buddha was not
the only Buddha; that there had been many Buddhas i n the
past, and there would be many Buddhas i n the future; and
hk
that a c t u a l l y there existed innumerable Buddhas i n the
innumerable Buddha-lands i n the ten d i r e c t i o n s . Thus, names
of Buddhas, such as Vairocana, Aksobhya, Amitabha, Amitayus,
Bhaisajya-guru, and countless others had already been con-
ceived. It was the Yogacara-vijnana school that organized
the three-body (tri-kaya) theory by synthesizing these
conceptions of the Buddha (p. 30) .
Section two deals with the Yogacara t r i k a y a . Nagao pays p a r t i c u l a r
attention to the Sambhogakaya and asks why the Sambhogakaya, sharing i n the
natures of both Dharmakaya and Nirmanakaya, did not replace both of them:
The sambhoghika-kaya, through t h i s double character,
l i e s between the svabha*vika-kaya and nairmanika-kaya, serv-
ing as a l i n k between the two. No, the sambhogika-kaya
rather occupies the c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n i n the triple-body doc-
t r i n e ; e s p e c i a l l y , the soteriology i n Buddhism i s developed
revolving around the axis of t h i s double character of the
sambhogika-kaya. In t h i s sense, the sambhogika-kaya can be
c a l l e d the Buddha par excellence. However, i f i t i s so, i t
might be possible to say that the one Buddha-body of sambho-.
gika^kaya i s s u f f i c i e n t , and neither the svabhavika-kaya nor
the nairmanika-kaya i s necessary. In f a c t , such a p o s i t i o n
i s p o s s i b l e , and i t might have been supported e s p e c i a l l y from
the standpoint of r e l i g i o u s monotheistic demand. But the
s p e c i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the Mahayanic doctrine of Buddha-
body, l i e s i n the persistent maintenance of the t r i a n g u l a r
p o s i t i o n of the three Buddha-bodies. For i n that respect
there i s something fundamentally d i f f e r e n t from either the
one-body or the two-body theory. . . . The t h e o r e t i c perfec-
t i o n of the doctrine of Buddha-body l i e s ' i n the t r i a n g u l a r
concept of the three Buddha-bodies; the two-body theory
would be i n s u f f i c i e n t , and the four-body and other many-body
theories would be p l e t h o r i c i n p r i n c i p l e (pp. 37, 38- 39) .
Nagao believes that t h i s t r i a d i c scheme i s the key to Vijnanavadin
Buddhology:
A l l the a t t r i b u t e s and v i r t u e s of the Buddha were also
c l a r i f i e d i n the system of the trikaya,. As i t i s impossible
to describe them here one by one, I s h a l l only give a few
examples: the Buddha's wisdom was regarded as an a t t r i b u t e
e s p e c i a l l y belonging to the svabhavika-kaya; h i s w i l l
(asaya, vow) was e s p e c i a l l y treated i n the sambhogika-kaya;
and h i s acts (buddha karman) e s p e c i a l l y i n the naifmanika-
kaya. But at the same time, since the three Buddha-bodies
are not independent of each other but are i n the r e l a t i o n
of a basis and a thing based on i t , these v i r t u e s are also
considered transferable to each other. S i m i l a r l y , the
e l u c i d a t i o n of such questions as whether there i s only one
Buddha or other Buddhas numerous i n number, or for what
reason the Buddha i s said to be e v e r l a s t i n g and always
abiding, and so f o r t h , has been attempted through the sys-
tem of the t r i k a y a . I w i l l not go into these problems here,
but I would say t h a t , i n short, these problems w i l l not
l i k e l y be answered thoroughly without the t r i k a y a theory
(p. 38) .
In section three, Nagao develops his methodology through a c r i t i q u e of
Coomaraswamy and Chatterjee's attempts to r e l a t e the t r i k a y a to C h r i s t i a n and
Hindu concepts. He concludes:
The t r i k a y a doctrine developed as a system with a back-
ground of these Mahayana concepts, which i n t h e i r turn became
ever more s o l i d i f i e d by having recourse to the t r i k a y a doc-
t r i n e . Therefore, we must say that the t r i k a y a doctrine i s
f a i r l y d i f f e r e n t from the T r i n i t y of C h r i s t i a n i t y or the
t r i m u r t i of Hinduism (p. h2).
F i n a l l y Nagao points out that while the t r i k a y a doctrine may explain a
Buddha's c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , i t does not explain how a-Buddha comfesf into', existenc
It i s true that by t h i s t r i k a y a theory the nature of
the Buddha and a l l his v i r t u e s has been delineated. But as
f o r how Gautama, a human being, was able to become a Buddha
possessing v i r t u e s equal to those of a divine being, almost
nothing has been said i n these theories. How can a leap
from the r e l a t i v e world to the absolute world be made? Since
Gautama was an exceptional person, as h i s d i s c i p l e s thought,
i t might have been possible f o r him to become a Buddha by
dint of his innumerable virtuous deeds accumulated i n the
past. But i f only that, Gautama would have only been a
divine existence from the beginning, and not a human being.
Moreover, that would be a unique case for Gautama alone, and
would not explain anything about the existence of a l l the
Buddhas i n the ten d i r e c t i o n s . In Mahayana Buddhism, i t i s
s p e c i f i c a l l y t o l d that a l l l i v i n g beings are expected to
a t t a i n Buddhahood, but then, i t must be asked: In what way
i s i t possible for a common l i v i n g being to become a Buddha?
1+6
The p o s s i b i l i t y of a l l l i v i n g beings a t t a i n i n g Buddha-
hood i s a problem that seems to have been answered from two
sides. One i s the idea that i s mainly advocated by the
tathagata-garbha (tathagata-matrix) theory. The other i s
the introduction of asraya-paravrtti (the revolving of the
basis) . . . (p. kk).
The d e s c r i p t i o n of these theories constitutes the bulk of the a r t i c l e .
While t h i s short a r t i c l e only touches upon each issue, i t establishes a
reasonable model for a study. Nagao's insistence that the t r i k a y a i s an
i n t e g r a t i v e scheme within the Vijnanavada, and hence should be interpreted by
reference to the ideas i t incorporates, w i l l prevent much premature compar-
ative r e l i g i o n . His separation of questions about the structure and function
of the t r i k a y a from questions about i t s o r i g i n should prevent the h i s t o r i c a l
questions from obscuring the f u n c t i o n a l ones.
The b i b l i o g r a p h i c information on Chinese texts contained i n his footnotes
has been incorporated into the bibliography of the present study.
SUMMARY OF SCHOLARSHIP
The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the t r i k a y a by the remaining important "scholar,
H. V. Guenther, w i l l be examined l a t e r i n l i g h t of the following summary. As
the contributions made by these divers scholars over nearly a century are
s t i l l very d i f f i c u l t to compare, I w i l l now summarize the previous a r t i c l e s to
obtain a basis for planning future research.
La V a l l e e Poussin's 1906 a r t i c l e , with i t s d i v i s i o n of the t r i k a y a into a
Buddhological and an o n t o l o g i c a l doctrine, began to reveal the complexity of
the concept and marked the end of r e d u c t i o n i s t i c treatments. Later workers
generally treated i t as a symbolic or open-ended scheme for organizing a
1*7
v a r i e t y of ideas rather than as a t i g h t l y circumscribed dogma.
By 1913 he had extended h i s understanding to the r e a l i z a t i o n that the
t r i k a y a could not be understood i n i s o l a t i o n from the h i s t o r y of Indian
Buddhism ( t a n t r i c developments, exempted) and made some progress toward seeing
i t i n that perspective. To do t h i s he revived Kern's use of the d i s t i n c t i o n
between conventional and absolute t r u t h to resolve apparently contradictory
notions within the doctrine. While t h i s idea w i l l be discussed l a t e r , i t i s
safe to say that La Vallee Poussin's.. 1913-..understanding of the d i s t i n c t i o n
between Madhyamika and Vijnanavada was so incomplete t h a t - i t should not be-
taken s e r i o u s l y .
La Vallee Poussin's f i n a l contribution i n the Vijnaptimatratasiddhi
(1928) contains l i t t l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . It i s an expanded s e l e c t i o n of Indian
t e x t u a l sources ( s t i l l avoiding the t a n t r i c ) and a bibliography of scholarship.
Both are s t i l l u s e f u l .
In the 1913 a r t i c l e Masson-Oursel consolidates the previous conclusions
and examines a c l a s s i c a l Vijnanavadin t e x t , from which he i s able to formulate
two advances. F i r s t , he states e x p l i c i t l y what La Vallee. Poussin has recog-
nized i m p l i c i t l y t h a t the term kaya i n the t r i k a y a i s only metaphorically a
"body" but a c t u a l l y designates a set of o r g a n i c a l l y - r e l a t e d facts about Buddha-
hood. The p r e f i x (e.g., Dharma-) i d e n t i f i e s the p a r t i c u l a r c l u s t e r of f a c t s .
Second, he c l a r i f i e s the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the Sambhogakaya, although he
f a i l s to explain i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p to the other two kayas. It i s c l e a r that
Masson-Oursel could have resolved h i s dilemma regarding the Sambhogakaya as
compassionate response, had he possessed s u f f i c i e n t general knowledge of the
Vijnanavada to r e a l i z e the r o l e of the Bodhisattva vow.
1+8
While Suzuki's i n t e n t i o n may not have a l t e r e d between the Outlines (1906)
and the Studies (1930), his knowledge increased and his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n (or
presentation) changed almost beyond recognition. While the Outlines contains
few u s e f u l ideas, the ease with which Suzuki, as a b e l i e v e r , modifies the
concept of kaya supports La Vallee Poussin's and Masson-Oursel's idea that i t
i s not a f i x e d "body." The works of these three writers appear to have
discouraged others from wasting e f f o r t on a search for the " r e a l " or " o r i g i n a l
pure" t r i k a y a doctrine. Most concentrated on the ideas that i t systematizes
i n any p a r t i c u l a r text or system.
Suzuki's major contribution i n the Studies i s the insistence that the
Nirmana-Buddha of the Lankavatara (and by i m p l i c a t i o n , a l l three of the kayas
that emerged from the tri-Buddha system of that text) i s a r e l a t i o n a l concept.
While I doubt that the idea should be pushed as f a r as Suzuki does, i t w i l l be
a key to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Mahayanasamgraha.
Akanuma (1922) and Nagao (.1973) have adopted s i m i l a r approaches. As Nagao
has the advantage of the intervening half-century, his a r t i c l e may be regarded
as the culmination of Akanuma's work. Their approach i s distinguished by a
primary l o y a l t y to the Buddhist sources rather than to the Western or Indian
analogs. This l o y a l t y leads to"
1
more applicable categories and more relevant
primary questions.
The basic message of Nagao's a r t i c l e appears i n the portions quoted.
Although i t may be u n f a i r to c a l l these preliminary r e s u l t s "conclusions,"
they are the most sophisticated preliminary r e s u l t s i n t h i s set of a r t i c l e s .
The other studies may be set aside just as were those of Parrinder and
Matsunaga. Coomaraswamy and Chatterjee both ignore any h i s t o r i c a l development
or v a r i a t i o n of the doctrine which they simply regard as a theism. They have
not used t h e i r knowledge of the Indian m i l i e u . Their sources are r e s t r i c t e d ,
h9
t h e i r methods u n c r i t i c a l and t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s r e d u c t i o n i s t i c . R o c k h i l l ' s
l i t t l e sutra and the Hobogirin a r t i c l e have been important sources but neither
suggests an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
The bulk of these studies a c t u a l l y constitutes data for a h i s t o r y of the
Vijnanavada, i . e . , information about texts and contents, comments on t h e i r
h i s t o r y , and insights into the structure of the system. Incorporation of these
data into a h i s t o r i c a l account i s a straightforward process. Interpretation
of them i s more d i f f i c u l t . A few general i n t e r p r e t a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s can be
derived from these studies.
The f i r s t i s that the word "kaya" i s . not a simple object but an open
concept which has attracted a v a r i e t y of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . I would suggest
that t h i s notion can be maintained by regarding kaya as a symbolic rather than
a denotative concept.
The general Buddhakaya, i n p a r t i c u l a r , has been found to contain several
general categories of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . It i s obviously the r e s u l t of r e l i g i o u s
p r a c t i c e , i . e . , i t i s something obtained by following the p r e s c r i p t i v e message,
.I.e., the Buddha i s , i n some sense, a reoriented aspirant. The l o g i c a l p o s s i -
b i l i t y of t h i s transformation i s accounted for by the tathagatagarbha theory,
and the abstract mechanical question of how i t occurs i s answered by the
asrayaparavrtti theory. This aspect of Buddhahood does not appear to r a i s e
any problems whose answer i s not touched upon i n the a r t i c l e s .
However, the Buddha i s also what La V a l l e e Poussin c a l l s an " o n t o l o g i c a l
or cosmological" concept which, as a form of the "dharma" or u n i v e r s a l norm,
transcends the personal and accidental. When seen anthropomorphically as an
object of r e l i g i o u s devotion, t h i s may be the aspect which Masson-Oursel
understood as the cosmogonic Buddha.
The clearest agreement i s on the h i s t o r i c a l development of the t r i k a y a .
An o r i g i n a l doctrine centered on Sakyamuni quickly developed into a two-kaya
form as the need was f e l t to d i s t i n g u i s h between Sakyamuni the teacher and
other ways of viewing him ( e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r the parinirvana). The two-kaya
model was the e s s e n t i a l pattern underlying many of the multi-Buddha or m u l t i -
kaya theories of the early sects, e s p e c i a l l y those based on the prajnaparami-
tasutras.
The t r i k a y a was an innovation of the early Vijnanavadin masters Maitreya-
Asanga-Vasubandhu. It became the basis for l a t e r multi-kaya t a n t r i c develop-
ments i n Indian and for various Sino-Japanese elaborations. The d e t a i l e d
h i s t o r y of the appearance of the t r i k a y a i n the writings of the Vijnanavadin
masters i s more obscure and the h i s t o r y of the l a t e r Indo-Tibetan and Sino-
Japanese developments has attracted even l e s s attention.
Kern's desideratum, that the t r i k a y a should be understood i n r e l a t i o n to
the general development of Indian r e l i g i o u s thought, i s s t i l l i m p r a c t i c a l .
Scholars became more d i f f i d e n t as they became better acquainted with the
problem. The great modern surveys of Indian i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y ( i . e . , Renou
and F i l l i o z a t ' s L'Inde classique and Dasgupta's History of Indian Philosophy)
have simply drawn attention to the magnitude of the remaining task and paucity
of r e l i a b l e sources. At present no scholar of Buddhism can be expected to
produce a d e t a i l e d h i s t o r y of the relevant area of Indian thought and then f i t
the t r i k a y a into i t .
While incorporation of a general i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y i s s t i l l a long-
term desideratum, the fact that our authors have produced s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t s
based only on the i n t e r n a l structure of the t r i k a y a doctrine suggests that
such a h i s t o r y i s not indispensable.
For our purposes, the more important question i s why each of these devel-
opments occurred. Suggested reasons for the s h i f t from one to two-kaya models
51
include: need to d i f f e r e n t i a t e the human from the abstract Buddha; need for a
c u l t focus a f t e r the parinirvana; need to apply the Madhyamika two-truth model
to the Buddhology, etc. At l e a s t some of these sound reasonable.
The d i f f i c u l t question i s why the two kayas (which could a c t u a l l y accom-
modate varying number's of kayas under a two-term-model) were turned i n t o a
t r i k a y a . Since only a few of our authors have noted the force of t h i s question
and none has produced a s a t i s f a c t o r y answer, t h i s i s one of the basic questions
for further study.
An answer to the above question w i l l provide the context for considering
the c e n t r a l one: What i s the t r i k a y a doctrine? While a l l writers agree that
the three kayas provide a framework by which apparently diverse aspects of
Buddhahood may be affirmed simultaneously, there i s l i t t l e agreement on how
the d i v i s i o n s should be understood. Kern's suggestion that they represent the
ultimate and conventional standpoints i s expanded by Masson-Oursel and the
others to encompass an idea of three t r u t h s , i . e . , that the three are the same
Buddha seen from three d i f f e r e n t perspectives.
However, t h i s notion i s obviously inadequate as i t throws a l l the respon-
s i b i l i t y on the aspirant and ignores the mechanics of his Bodhisattva vow.
Suzuki's r e l a t i o n a l explanation seems more s a t i s f a c t o r y .
Once the fundamental nature of the three d i v i s i o n s i s s e t t l e d , the. f i n a l
two questions can be r a i s e d : What i s each kaya, and what are the r e l a t i o n s h i p s
among the three? Since each i s an open-ended symbolic concept, the "What" can
be answered only by a tabulation of the aspects a t t r i b u t e d to each. While a
c e r t a i n number of these are found i n the a r t i c l e s reviewed, a glance at a
major t r i k a y a text (e.g., chapter X of the Mahayanasamgraha) reveals many more.
The study of these should be straightforward.
The question of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s among the three should be answered
52 .
l a s t , as i t -will "be l a r g e l y determined by the answers to the previous questions.
We need only note the tremendous v a r i e t y of ideas i n the a r t i c l e s . Those who
saw the basic pattern as a two-reality model had t r e a t t r o u b l e . f i n d i n g any
room for the Sambhogakaya, l e t alone deciding how i t was r e l a t e d to the others.
Nagao, however, s e r i o u s l y wonders why any kaya other than the Sambhogakaya
i s necessary!
Many of the basic but elusive c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Buddhahood, such as
tathata and tathatajnana, the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the Buddhaland, and the
actions of the Nirmanakaya, also seem to be bound up with the question of
r e l a t i o n s h i p s ; and have been dealt with as such.
Although none of the preceding works contains a broad, s o l i d framework
within which any reasonable version of the t r i k a y a may be understood, we must
consider one f i n a l scholar who appears to o f f e r just that. H. V. Guenther's
understanding of the doctrine i s the most promising, and most i d i o s y n c r a t i c ,
of any examined so f a r .
Although he has published only short a r t i c l e s on the t r i k a y a , t h i s
doctrine i s c e n t r a l to h i s v i s i o n of Buddhism and i s mentioned i n most of his
numerous p u b l i c a t i o n s . P a r t i c u l a r l y useful passages can be found i n The Jewel
Ornament of L i b e r a t i o n , 1959 (chapters 20 and 21); The L i f e and Teaching of
Naropa, 1963 (pp. ^7-50, llH-ll+5); Tibetan Buddhism Without M y s t i f i c a t i o n , 1966
(pp. 57-59); and Kindly Bent to Ease Us, 1975 (chapter 13). The most extensive
development of his ideas on the t r i k a y a i s probably "The Experience of Being:
The Trikaya Idea i n I t s Tibetan Interpretation" ( i n Roy C. Amore, ed., Devel-
opments i n Buddhist Thought, 1979).
Guenther's approach to the t r i k a y a i s unique i n that he works from the
l a t e r Tibetan texts which others have set aside as " t a n t r i c " and therefore
non-Vijnanavadin. Guenther sees these texts as containing the culmination of
53
the Vijnanavada doctrine begun f i f t e e n hundred years ago i n the writings of
Asahga and Vasubandhu. His i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the t r i k a y a i s inseparable from
h i s understanding of t h i s mature t a n t r i c Vijnanavada. This understanding i s
summarized i n many of h i s books. A t y p i c a l passage occurs i n The Tantric
View of L i f e (Berkeley: Shambhala, 1972):
Tantrism begins with the concrete human s i t u a t i o n of man's
l i v e d existence, and i t t r i e s to c l a r i f y the values that are
already i m p l i c i t i n i t . . . . i t attempts to study the f i n i t e
existence of man as l i v e d from within. . . . the world of man
i s h i s horizon of meaning without which there can neither be a
world nor an understanding, of i t so that man can l i v e . This
horizon of meaning i s not something f i x e d once and for ever,
but i t expands as man grows and growth i s the a c t u a l i t y of
man's l i v e d existence. Meanings do not constitute another
world, but provide another dimension to the one world which
i s the locus of our actions. . . . There i s thus no escape
from Being, and what Tantra i s t e l l i n g us i s that we have to
face up to Being; to f i n d meaning i n l i f e i s to become Buddha
' e n l i g h t e n e d , ' but what t h i s meaning i s cannot be s a i d
without f a l s i f y i n g i t . . . . the problem i s not man's essence
or nature, but what man can make of h i s l i f e i n t h i s world so
as to r e a l i z e the supreme values that l i f e affords . . . .
In the pursuit of Being there i s a joyousness and directness
which appears elsewhere to be found only i n Zen, that i s , the
culmination of Sino-Japanese Buddhism. . . . Tantrism can be
s a i d to be the culmination of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism (pp. 2 - 5 ) .
In short, Buddhism points to a meaningful present by a theory which
concentrates on concrete existence rather than on abstract essence. This
value-charged l i f e i s r e f e r r e d to as "Buddha" and described by means of the
t r i k a y a .
Guenther makes much of the fact that "kaya" was understood to be ambiguous
by the Tibetans who t r a n s l a t e d i t (according to context) by either " l u s " (the
ordinary body) or "sku" (the kaya of the Buddha). While he i s content to
t r a n s l a t e lus as "body" he maintains that sku i s a dynamic, organizational
concept for which "body" i s inappropriate. He writes:
5h
This single r e a l i t y has s i g n i f i c a n t ramifications within
the l i f e of man. It i s these ramifications that are r e f e r r e d
to by the t e c h n i c a l term t r i k a y a (sku gsum), commonly, though
quite l u d i c r o u s l y , t r a n s l a t e d as the 'Three Bodies of the
Buddha,' due to the fact that the e a r l y t r a n s l a t o r s and t h e i r
l a t e r copyist f a i l e d to understand or to note the purely
d e s c r i p t i v e character of the word buddha ( s a n g s - r g y a s ) . . . .
The word buddha i s a past p a r t i c i p l e of the verb budh "to
wake up," and i t s e x c l u s i v e l y a d j e c t i v a l use describes the
experience a person has had, but not the person. This alone
should s u f f i c e to show that i t i s meaningless to speak of
"bodies." An experience tends to get expressed, but i t i s
neither fact nor bare ideas that get expressed but "values":
how i t f e e l s to be; and the meaning of f u l l n e s s of being i s
apprehended as embodied (p. 55) .
And again:
The human being has h i s house and family, and also h i s
homeland to which he becomes attached. His very l i f e depends
on the i n t e r a c t i o n between h i s existence conditioning t h i s
v i t a l f i e l d and the f i e l d conditioning h i s existence. This
explains why the world he inhabits i s c a l l e d a Nirmanakaya
just as he. himself i s a Nirmanakaya (p. 55) .
This f u l l n e s s of being presents i t s e l f i n two ways which may be considered
epistemological and o n t o l o g i c a l :
Fullness of Being and the f e e l i n g of happiness which i s
at the same time the awareness of t h i s f u l l n e s s , are not two
contrasting e n t i t i e s , but the two aspects of a single r e a l i t y .
Awareness c a r r i e s with i t the c e r t a i n t y that awareness is_ and
Being is_ i n so f a r as there i s awareness of i t . The one i s
the other and the d i s t i n c t i o n i s a matter of emphasis rather
than of difference, . . .
The t r i k a y a doctrine i s so complex because i t may be described from both
standpoints:
kLong-chen rab-'byams-pa i n t e r p r e t s the t e c h n i c a l term
sku, which I have rendered as " e x i s t e n t i a l value pattern,"
i n two d i f f e r e n t ways which are nevertheless intimately
r e l a t e d to each other. The one may be c a l l e d "epistemological"
and the other " o n t o l o g i c a l . " The "epistemological value-
55
pattern" i s " i n t r i n s i c awareness with i t s object- appearance."
I t i s
"That which appears before our senses (in i t s immediacy)
without being i n need of being asserted or denied, and that
which can be analyzed into ( i ) the senses (as c o n t r o l l i n g
powers), ( i i ) the psycho-physical constituents, and ( i i i ) the
(complex of the) objective s i t u a t i o n and the owner of the
objective s i t u a t i o n . "
To term t h i s complex a "value-pattern" i s j u s t i f i e d by
the f a c t that value does not reside i n one aspect alone, but
i n the t o t a l i t y of what constitutes the pattern.
The " o n t o l o g i c a l value-pattern" as a "form of c r e a t i v i t y "
i s represented as two patterns, the one holding to what i t i s
on the unerring path, the other just being the being-there as
pure existence. Of the former, kLong-chen rab 'byams-pa says:
"As i t holds to what i t i s i n i t s t r i a d of f a c t i c i t y ,
a c t u a l i t y , and cognitive responsiveness and leads to f u l l n e s s
of being as goal, i t is'.known (by such terms) as 'great
p l a y f u l f a s c i n a t i o n pattern,' 'crown-jewel pattern,' ' l i f e -
s t y l e supporting pattern.'"
The pure existence pattern i s said to be
"The t r i a d of the ground, path, and goal. The ground i s
the presence of absolute o r i g i n a l awareness; the path i s the
invariableness of an outward appearance i n radiancy and as an
(aesthetic) f i e l d pattern. The goal i s the absoluteness of
the three e x i s t e n t i a l patterns i n e f f o r t l e s s presence."
The e x i s t e n t i a l value-patterns which are both i n t r i n s i c
and e x t r i n s i c , are by no means to be considered as s t a t i c
e n t i t i e s to which man has to submit. Rather are they man's
very l i f e , p u l s a t i n g with wondrous experiences. The mani-
f e s t a t i o n of these value-patterns holds a f a s c i n a t i o n which
i s f e l t as pure playfulness, . . . (pp. k2-h3).
A s i m p l i f i e d summary of Guenther's t r i k a y a i s found i n Tibetan Buddhism
Without M y s t i f i c a t i o n (Leiden: E. J . B r i l l , 1966):
. . . c e r t a i n norms are revealed, which are always active
and dynamic. They have become known by t h e i r Indian names,
Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya, and Nirmanakaya, but never have been
understood properly, within the framework of t r a d i t i o n a l
Western semantics, because, of the e s s e n t i a l i s t premises of
Western philosophies. Essence i s that which marks a thing o f f
and separates i t from other e n t i t i e s of a d i f f e r e n t kind.
From such a point of view a l l of man's actions spring from
that which i s considered to he his i n t r i n s i c nature. I t s
f a l l a c y . i s that i t makes us overlook man's r e l a t i o n a l being;
the actual person always l i v e s in_ a world with others. And,
i n human l i f e , essence t e l l s man that he i s already what he
can be, so there i s no need to set out on a path of s p i r i t u a l
development.
Seen as e x i s t e n t i a l norms these three patterns reveal
t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e . Dharmakaya indicates the i n t e n t i o n a l
structure of the noetic i n man. I t i s the merit of Buddhism
that i t has always recognized t h i s feature of awareness: I
cannot know without knowing something, just as I cannot do
without doing something. But i n ordinary knowledge whatever
I know i s overshadowed by b e l i e f s , presuppositions, l i k e s
and d i s l i k e s . However, the more I succeed i n removing
myself from s e l f - c e n t r e d concerns and s i t u a t i o n s and free
myself from a l l b i a s , the more I am enabled to apprehend
things as they are. This happens i n d i s c i p l i n e d philosoph-
i c a l enquiry through which one gradually approaches no-
thingness and indeterminacy, from the vantage point of which
one can achieve a view of r e a l i t y without i n t e r n a l warping.
This cognitive indeterminacy which underlies the whole
noetic enterprise of man i s r i c h e r i n contents and broader
i n i t s horizons than any other awareness because i t i s an
u n r e s t r i c t e d perspective from which nothing i s screened or
excluded. I f anything can be predicated about i t , i t i s pure
potency which, when a c t u a l i z e d , enables us to see ourselves
and things as we and they r e a l l y are. In order to gain t h i s
capacity we have to develop our i n t e l l i g e n c e , our c r i t i c a l
acumen, which i s the main theme of the Paramitayana and
without which Mantrayana i s impossible. But a l l the i n f o r -
mation we receive through such sustained analysis i s not
merely for the sake of pure awareness or contemplation, but
i n order that we may act. Every i n s i g h t i s barren i f i t does
not f i n d expression i n action, and every action i s f u t i l e i f
i t i s not supported by sound i n s i g h t . Only when we succeed
i n understanding ourselves, our projects and our world from
a point of view which i s no point of view, w i l l a sound
d i r e c t i o n of human action be p o s s i b l e , because i t i s no
longer subordinated to petty, s e l f - c e n t r e d concerns. This
active mode of being i s r e a l i z e d through the two operational
patterns or norms, the Sambhogakaya and the Nirmanakaya, both
of which have t h e i r raison d'etre i n the c o g n i t i v e - s p i r i t u a l
mode. S t r i c t l y speaking, only the Nirmanakaya.is perceptible,,
although i t would be wrong to assume that i t i s of a p h y s i c a l
nature.
. . . Nirmanakaya s i g n i f i e s being i n the world, not so
much as a being among things and a r t i f a c t s , but as an active
being i n r e l a t i o n to a vast f i e l d of surrounding e n t i t i e s
57
which are equally v i b r a t i n g with l i f e , a l l of them ordered i n
a world structure. As an active mode of being Nirmanakaya i s
the implementation of man's whole being, the ordering of h i s
world i n the l i g h t of his ultimate p o s s i b i l i t i e s . . . . Real
being with others must spring up on the spur of the moment
and arouse us to our p o s s i b i l i t i e s . That which does so i s
the Sambhogakaya. Grounded i n u n r e s t r i c t e d and unbiased
cognition i t can e s t a b l i s h contact with others and s t i r them
to authentic action (pp. 57- 59) .
From t h i s , Guenther develops a complex i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the t a n t r i c
w r i t e r s ' multi-kaya theories. However, as these represent a stage beyond t h i s
study I w i l l simply point out that the a b i l i t y of his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to deal
with extensions of the basic doctrine indicates that i t w i l l be a serious
contender i n a broader study. Here we w i l l discuss only the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
outlined i n the preceding quotations.
An evaluation of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n involves two questions:
that of the v a l i d i t y of h i s view of t a n t r i c Buddhism
that of the v a l i d i t y of h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the t r i k a y a .
The l a t t e r question can be answered only a f t e r a p o s i t i v e answer to the former.
I s h a l l assume such an answer. In p a r t i c u l a r , I s h a l l assume:
Guenther's acquaintance with a wide v a r i e t y of relevant Buddhist sources
h i s f a m i l i a r i t y with European philosophy
the legitimacy of a hermeneutic which expresses Buddhist ideas i n terms and
thought-patterns drawn from contemporary philosophy and psychology.
Furthermore, I must i n s i s t that t h i s discussion does not turn upon the
peripheral issue (which Bharati, i n h i s "Tibetan Buddhism i n America," Tibet
Journal k, no. 3, p. 8, c a l l s one of the "red flags he keeps h o i s t i n g for his
c r i t i c s and detractors") of whether Guenther's replacement of "standard"
58
mistranslations by more accurate English terms i s j u s t i f i e d .
I w i l l discuss only the second question, i . e . : Is Guenther's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
of the doctrine s u f f i c i e n t l y c l e a r and general to be applied to any major Indo-
Tibetan version of the t r i k a y a , and to. any major doctrine based on i t ? This
can be divided into sub-questions: that of the g e n e r a l i t y , and that of the
c l a r i t y .
The concern of generality i s the more important. It i s usually phrased
somewhat as follows: Even granting that Tibetan t a n t r i c Buddhism (e.g., that
of Klong-chen-pa, l ^ t h century A.D.) i s the l o g i c a l culmination of the Indian
Vijnanavada, can an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n derived from i t be applied to much e a r l i e r
statements of the Indian masters (e.g., Vasubandhu, Uth century A.D.)? I
suggest that the answer depends p r i m a r i l y upon the i n t e r p r e t e r ' s i n t e n t . I f
he i s p r i m a r i l y an apologist, i t i s mandatory that he i n t e r p r e t the e a r l i e r
writings by reference to l a t e r a u t h o r i t i e s . For example, a C h r i s t i a n w i l l
i n t e r p r e t Genesis i n l i g h t of the Adam of the New Testament, understood through
theologians such as Aquinas or Luther, who w i l l themselves be understood--via
the writings of modern theologians or popularizers.
Since Guenther obviously i s such an apologist, and since the present
study i s not an apologetic work, t h i s approach i s suspect. I f we regard his
work as a more d i s i n t e r e s t e d study containing f a c t u a l assertions, a l o g i c a l
problem appears. I f something should be found i n the e a r l i e r l i t e r a t u r e to
which h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would not: apply, the l a t t e r would not be s u f f i c i e n t l y
general. However, t h i s can be determined only a f t e r a l l major instances have
been examined. Hence his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n cannot, on p r i n c i p l e , be judged
without further i n v e s t i g a t i o n . This i s simply an instance of the truism t h a t ,
while a t h e o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may y i e l d a p r i o r i knowledge, an i n v e s t i g a -
t i o n by an outsider can deal only i n a p o s t e r i o r i f a c t s .
59
This simple point i s frequently obscured by Guenther's ex cathedra
affirmations that h i s i s the correct understanding "of Buddhism." As i t i s
obvious that his work i s more apologetic than d i s i n t e r e s t e d , we must stand
back and r e a l i z e that the judgement of whether or not h i s understanding can
f i t the doctrine i n other texts and cultures can be made only a f t e r that
doctrine i s examined. One obvious focus for t h i s further study would seem to
be\the doctrine i n the writings of the e a r l y Vijnanavadin masters.
Of course, a completely new study of each Vijnanavadin text would be
ludicrous. The actual procedure would be that of any other piece of research.
One would devise and administer to each a t e s t of the t h e o r e t i c a l a p p l i c a b i l i t y
of Guenther's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Unfortunately, the d i s s i m i l a r i t y among the
previous a r t i c l e s prevents us from shortening the process s t i l l further by
simply using t h e i r data. It w i l l be necessary to examine each text ourselves.
The second consideration within the question of v a l i d i t y , that of c l a r i t y ,
c a l l s f o r a more subjective judgement. As we have seen, Guenther frequently
quotes very abstract formulations of the t r i k a y a which he i n t e r p r e t s i n an
equally abstract manner. Do these i l l u m i n a t e the very concrete phenomena to
which the scheme i s applied? Again, a thorough answer should involve an
examination of both h i s work and the t r i k a y a t e x t s . However, as Guenther
himself often seems unable to bridge the gap between the abstract and the
a c t u a l , the answer i s probably no. For example, his explanation of the t r i k a y a
i n Tilopa's attunement i n s t r u c t i o n s (Naropa pp. U^-kQ, lUl-155) reads, ". . .
CattunementH . . . i s n i n e f o l d : attunement to the three e x i s t e n t i a l patterns
or norms, while dying, sleeping, and becoming awake" (p. h8).
Guenther explains:
The aim of the various p r a c t i c e s outlined i n the i n s t r u c -
tions given to Naropa i s to a r r i v e at stable structures of
60
authentic being. S t a b i l i t y i s achieved by shedding whatever
there i s of con-structions, by dismantling the maze of dead
and deadening concepts, and by penetrating to a spaciousness
that i s pulsating with l i f e . The f i r s t step i s to experience
one's being-in-the-world as a god or goddess i n a mansion
which has the character of a magic s p e l l . It i s the magic
that i s important, not the s p e l l i t s e l f or i t s content (p. lh9)
The problem i s obvious. Guenther f e e l s that the actual d e t a i l s of the
r i t u a l are t r i v i a l compared to the meaning. It i s d i f f i c u l t to r e a l i z e that
he i s discussing c e r t a i n very s p e c i f i c , complex meditation r i t u a l s . This
denigration of the r i t u a l i s not the Tibetan view. The Tibetan masters usually
follow the l i t u r g i c a l axiom pratique d'abord. They stress that the r i t u a l
performance ("the s p e l l and i t s content") i s the s i t u a t i o n from which the
magic or meaning w i l l emerge.
I t i s at the s p e c i f i c l e v e l that important differences (e.g., differences
of meaning determined by which Bodhisattvas are involved) are present. I do
not f i n d Guenther's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n to be h e l p f u l for such questions.
In short, although Guenther! s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of-the' t r i k a y a is-ivalid^and'
u s e f u l f o r general discussions of-many"^aspects of Tibetan .Buddhism, i t does
not n e c e s s a r i l y cover the theory i n a l l Buddhist sects and i s not s u f f i c i e n t l y
s p e c i f i c to c l a r i f y d e t a i l s of practice' and .theory. Therefore, although h i s
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s the best a v a i l a b l e , further research, i s j u s t i f i e d , e s p e c i a l l y
on the older t e x t s , to reach a more useful understanding.
CONCLUSION
We now possess a f a i r idea of the development of the. surviving Indian
Buddhist l i t e r a t u r e , and can reconstruct the outlines of the development of the
concept of Buddhahood. It i s obvious that various c l u s t e r s of ideas about
Buddhahood became each of the kayas. Many of these ideas have been examined
and c l a r i f i e d . However, i t i s also c l e a r that the t r i k a y a i s more than the
sum t o t a l of three s t r a n d s i t i s a unique scheme defined by the relationships
among the three terms.
What i s s t i l l l a c k i n g i s a general understanding of the patterns i n t h i s
r e l a t i o n s h i p , s p e c i f i c a l l y an understanding expressed as a h e u r i s t i c model
capable of i n t e r p r e t i n g various versions of the doctrine. Guenther o f f e r s a
developed model but i t s generality and c l a r i t y are both i n doubt. Nagao has
made a modest beginning but has not developed i t .
Therefore, I suggest that the need for further research i s self-evident.
Also evident i s the fact that t h i s cannot be a simple continuation of any
previous study but must involve a fresh s t a r t and a wider scope. As none of
the previous studies has a c t u a l l y analyzed i n d e t a i l the doctrine i n one
a u t h o r i t a t i v e text, I suggest that the f i r s t step should be a d e t a i l e d study
9
of such a text. This study should be informed by the findings of e a r l i e r
scholars but should not be bound by them.
The choice of a text i s c r i t i c a l . It cannot be just any available text
which deals with the t r i k a y a but should be one which i s seen as a u t h o r i t a t i v e
by as many branches of the t r a d i t i o n as possible. This l i m i t s the choice to
the early Vijnanavadin writings i n which that t r a d i t i o n was f i r s t defined. A
summary of these writings follows.
As the t r a d i t i o n s regarding the early Vijnanavada have been summarized
many t i m e s , a n d as l i t t l e agreement exists on t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l value, t h i s
w i l l merely be a survey of the major t e x t s . More d e t a i l s on those which are
most useful for a t r i k a y a study w i l l be found i n Appendix B, "Bibliography of
Selected Primary Sources."
The Vijnanavada arose as a systematic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of those Mahayana
sutras which appeared i n India during the f i r s t centuries of our era. Although
we do not know which sutras were adopted by any s p e c i f i c Vijnanavadin master,
a small group i s c l e a r l y c e n t r a l to the t r a d i t i o n . It includes: the prajna-
paramita (most l i k e l y the Astasahasrika-prajnaparamita), the Lankavatara, the
Dasabhumika, some of the Ratnakuta group ( e s p e c i a l l y the Srimaladevi), and
above a l l , the Samdhinirmocana.
A l l t r a d i t i o n s c r e d i t three f i g u r e s M a i t r e y a , Asanga and Vasubandhu
with the basic formulation of new doctrine. Their major sastras are discussed
below.
1. MAITREYA
Maitreya i s e i t h e r an earthly teacher or the Bodhisattva Maitreya i n the
T u s i t a heaven. He i s generally regarded as the author of the following works:
The Yogacarabhumi, which i s one of the longest, e a r l i e s t and loosest of
the sastras. Although i t contains doctrines about Buddhahood, i t does not
seem to be an important source for the t r i k a y a . I t may represent a stage
p r i o r to the f u l l systematization of the Vijnanavada. Only a few chapters
have been t r a n s l a t e d into Western languages.
The Mahayanasutralamkara, an elegant verse summary of the Vijnanavada,
which would be nearly incomprehensible without the commentaries by Vasubandhu,
Asvabhava and Sthiramati. Asanga has incorporated p r a c t i c a l l y a l l of the
relevant passages on the Buddha into h i s own Mahayanasamgraha. The f a c t that
t h i s text i s one of the few Vijnanavadin works s t i l l extant i n Sanskrit may
account for i t s popularity with modern Indian scholars.
63
The Madhyantavibhaga i s again a work which would he incomprehensible
without the commentaries by Vasubandhu and Sthiramati. This t e x t , whose t i t l e
might be t r a n s l a t e d as "Discrimination between the middle and extremes,"
defines the orthodox ("middle") VijKanavadin metaphysical stance. I t does not
o f f e r a Buddhology per se and only a few chapters are a v a i l a b l e i n Western
languages.
The Dharmadharmatavibhaga. i s a further treatment of the metaphysical
stance, centered on the trisvabhava. It also c a r r i e s a commentary by Vasu-
bandhu. It has received l i t t l e study i n modern times outside Japan.
The Abhisamayalankara, a prajnaparamita text with commentaries by Vasu-
bandhu's p u p i l Aryavimuktisena and l a t e r w r i t e r s , contains a short passage on
the t r i k a y a but i s not a c e n t r a l Buddhological text. It i s b a s i c a l l y a system-
a t i z a t i o n of the Mahayana from a Madhyamika standpoint which has been placed
within the Vijnanavada. It provides a v i v i d demonstration that the Vijnanavada
masters were attempting to include rather than replace the other schools.
The Uttaratantra (or Ratnagotravibhaga) includes an important passage on
the t r i k a y a , but i s best known as the source of the tathagatagarbha theory.
Asanga has written a commentary to i t .
2. ASANGA
T r a d i t i o n holds that either Asanga was the p u p i l of a teacher named
Maitreya, or he was taken to the T u s i t a heaven where the Bodhisattva Maitreya
dictated to him the Yogacarabhumi and other t e x t s . In addition to the
commentaries on the Maitreya t r e a t i s e s , he i s credited with:
6k
The Abidharmasamuccaya, a Vijnanavadin abhidharma which, l i k e
v
the Vijnana-
vadin prajnaparamita of the Abhisamayalankara, shows how the e a r l i e r ideas were
integrated within the Vijnanavada. I t contains no d i r e c t discussions of the
t r i k a y a .
The Mahayanasamgraha, a systematic work which, i n c l u d i n g the commentaries
on i t by Vasubandhu and Asvabhava, establishes the broad outlines of the
Vijnanavadin system. Asanga arranged a l l the i n d i v i d u a l elements ( i . e . , the
abhidharma, the vijnaptimatra, the trisvabhava, the prajnaparamita, and the
trikaya) i n a new perspective. As t h i s text i s the focus of the present study
i t w i l l be discussed i n d e t a i l l a t e r .
3. VASUBANDHU
The r i c h and enigmatic t r a d i t i o n a l figure Vasubandhu i s usually considered
to have written the b r i l l i a n t Abhidharmakosa before being converted to Mahayana
by his brother Asanga. In addition to the commentaries already noted, Vasu-
bandhu i s credited with several important primary t e x t s . These include:
The Karmasiddhiprakarana, i n which the abhidharma reasoning of the Abhi-
dharmakosa i s developed i n a Vijnanavadin d i r e c t i o n . L i t t l e of i t i s d i r e c t l y
applicable to the t r i k a y a question.
The Vimsika and Trimsika are c r y p t i c verse summariesthe f i r s t of the
arguments for the mind-only t h e s i s , the second of the e n t i r e Vijnanavadin
system. The importance of the Trimsika derives from i t s use by the Chinese
p i l g r i m scholar Hsuan-tsang as the backbone for h i s Ch'eng Wei Shih.Lun, h i s
grand summary of the Vijnanavadin ideas current i n seventh-century India. In
t h i s work the opinions of various Indian masters are placed as commentaries to
appropriate verses of the Trims'ika. As l a t e r Chinese and Japanese masters
regarded the Ch'eng Wei Shih Lun as the a u t h o r i t a t i v e exposition of the V i j n a -
navadin system, the Trimsika came to be regarded as the basis of the Indian
Vijnanavadin t r a d i t i o n s .
These are merely the c e n t r a l sastras. Each of the three masters i s
credited with a d d i t i o n a l minor works, and t h e i r d i s c i p l e s produced a f l o o d of
writings during the following centuries. Moreover, t h e i r influence was not
confined to any one sectmost subsequent Mahayana Buddhist thinkers adopted
many of t h e i r ideas. Some attempted to form a Vijnanavadin-Madhyamika. Many
l a t e r popularizers, such as Santideva, obviously saw t h e i r basic ideas as
simply "Mahayana Buddhism."
In China, the Ch'eng Wei Shih Lun became the t e x t u a l basis for the
Fa-hsiang school which has continued to develop i n both China.and Japan. The
Vijnanavada, as well as the various Vijnanavada-Madhyamika systems, was the
basis for indigenous Tibetan developments. Tantric thought of India, Tibet
and Japan developed d i r e c t l y from the Vijnanavada.
A f t e r reaching t h i s point, ( i . e . , having read the preceding studies and
become acquainted with the l i t e r a t u r e ) , I had the opportunity, i n J u l y 1976,
to discuss the choice of a textual focus with Professor Nagao.
In response to a query about s c r i p t u r a l authority for the t r i k a y a doc-
t r i n e , he said that a search for such authority i n the e a r l y Mahayana sutras
was u n l i k e l y to be f r u i t f u l . Instead, he suggested that the voluminous Yoga-
carabhumi might y i e l d the e a r l i e s t d e t a i l s . He did mention one sutra passage
the chapter added to the Chinese Suvarnaprabhasasutrabut only as a l a t e r
culmination of the doctrine rather than an early authority for i t .
66
He suggested focussing f i r s t on the Mahayanasamgraha and Mahayanasutra-
laiikara and, to a l e s s e r extent, on the Abhi samayalankara. He also f e l t that
the Ratnagotravibhaga should not he a primary t e x t , hut agreed that i t s
tathagatagarhha theory could not he ignored.
The major Chinese sources which he recommended were Hsiian-tsang's Ch'eng
Wei Shih Lun and Hui-yuan's Ta - Slneng I Chang (T. 1851), a sixth-century
survey of Buddha-body theories.
A f t e r a discussion of h i s 1973 a r t i c l e (above), Professor Nagao stated
that he s t i l l agreed with the methods and sources but f e l t that he had not
s u f f i c i e n t l y emphasized the Mahayanasamgraha.
At t h i s point the best approach to the t r i k a y a doctrine appeared to be
through an intensive study of the Mahayanasamgraha. The choice of t h i s text
was dictated by the fact that i t i s the most systematic of the early t e x t s . It
contains more d e t a i l e d arguments than do the others, and i t locates them within
the context of Asanga's complete system. Each of the other early sastras
explains some p a r t i c u l a r idea: the Abhidharmasamuccaya outlines the dharma
theory; the Madhyant avibhaga- defines the l o g i c a l viewpoint of the school and
d i f f e r e n t i a t e s i t from that of the Madhyamika; and the Ratnagotravibhanga
develops the tathagatagarhha. Only the Mahayanasamgraha and the Mahayanasutra-
lankara integrate these into an
-
i n c l u s i v e s y s t e m . T h e importance of such
d o c t r i n a l context cannot be overstressed. A study of any s p e c i f i c notion must
be guided by an understanding of the wider net of theory i n which i t functions.
The Mahayanasutralartkara was eliminated from consideration a f t e r a c a r e f u l
reading of both i t and the Mahayanasamgraha revealed that the Buddhological
verses of the former were incorporated and explained i n the l a t t e r . Therefore,
the next section of t h i s study i s an examination of the Buddhological passages
of the Mahayanasamgraha.
67
NOTES
^ Etienne Lamotte, La Somme du grand vehicule d'Asanga (Mahayanasamgraha),
tomes 1- 2. Louvain: I n s t i t u t O r i e n t a l i s t e , 1973, tome 2, p. "+9-
2
R o c k h i l l ' s text was some version of the 'phags-pa sku gsum shes-bya-ba
theg-pa chen-po'i mdo (Suzuki r e p r i n t e d i t i o n No. 9^9: v. 37 P- 108- 2- 2) .
The c e n t r a l portion reads as follows:
/rigs-kyi-bu de-bzhin-gshegs-pa'i sku gsum n i rang-bzhin
rnam-par-dag-pa n i chos-kyi sku'o/ /ting-nge-'dzin rnam-par-
dag-pa n i long-spyod-rdzogs-pa
1
i sku'o / /spyod-pa rnam-par-
dag-pa n i sangs-rgyas thams-cad-kyi sprul-pa'i sku'o/
r i g s - k y i - b u de-bzhin-gshegs-pa'i chos-kyi sku n i nam-
mkha' l t a r rang-bzhin med-pa'i don-no/ /longs-spyod-rdzogs-
pa'i sku n i sbrin l t a r 'byung-ba'i don-no/ sprul-pa'i sku
n i sangs-rgyas. thams-cad-kyi ''phrin-las t e / char-ba l t a - b u
ste thams-cad bdas-pa'i don-no/ /bcom-ldan-'das l a byang-
chub-sems-dpa' s a ' i snying-pos 'di skad ces gsol-to/ /bcom-
ldan- 'das-kyi sku gsum-gyi bshad-pa j i - l t a r b l t a r - b a r bgyi/
bcom-ldan-'das-kyis byang-chub-sems-dpa' s a ' i snying-po-la
bka'-stsal-pa/
r i g s - k y i - b u de-bzhin-gshegs-pa'i sku gsum n i 'di l t a r
blta-bar bya'o/ /chos-kyi sku n i de-bzhin-gshegs-pa'i ngo-
gang l a blta-bar j bya'o/ /longs-spyod-rdzogs-pa'i sku n i
byang-chub-sems-dpa'i ngo-gang l a blta-bar bya'o/ sprul-pa'i
sku n i mos-pas spyod-pa'i so-so skye-bo'i ngo-gang l a b l t a -
bar bya'o
r i g s - k y i - b u chos-kyi sku n i sangs rgyas thams-cad dang
rang-bzhin mthun-par gnas-so/ /longs-spyod-rdzogs-pa'i sku
n i sangs-rgyas thams-cad dang ting-nge-'dzin mthun-par gnas-
so/ /sprul-pa'i sku n i sangs-rgyas thams-cad dang 'phrin-las
mthun-par gnas-so/
r i g s - k y i - b u kun-gzhi gnas-su dag-pa n i me-long l t a - b u ' i
ye-shes te chos-kyi sku'o/ nyon-mongs-pa'i y i d gnas-su dag-pa
n i mnyam-par-nyid-kyi ye-shes-so/ / y i d - k y i rnam-par shes-pa
68
gnas-su dag-pa n i so-sor kun-tu rtog-pa'i ye-shes t e / longs-
spyod-rdzogs-pa'i sku'o/ sgo-lnga'i rnam-par shes-pa gnas-su
dag-pa n i bya-ba grub-pa'i ye-shes te sprul-pa'i sku'o/
3
This point i s evident i n La V a l l e e Poussin's review of Suzuki's Outlines
i n the Journal o f the R o y a l s A s i a t i c Society of Great B r i t a i n and Ireland, 1908,
885- 89I +. While he i s w i l l i n g to extend a l l due courtesy to Suzuki the scholar,
he i s outraged at Suzuki the theologian's manipulations of the doctrines of
his own f a i t h . Of course, a good part of h i s pique i s caused by Suzuki's
penchant f o r "nourishing himself with the vapours of the German philosophic
alembics," and making "absurd comparisons" between C h r i s t i a n i t y and the
Buddhist "mysticism of sophistic n i h i l i s m " !
^ Etienne Lamotte, Le T r a i t e de l a grande vertu de sagesse (Louvain:
I n s t i t u t O r i e n t a l i s t e , tomes 1-k, 19^9-76).
^ K. Venkata Ramanan, Nagarjuna's Philosophy: As Presented i n the Maha-
Pra.inaparamita-Sastra (Tokyo, Vermont: Charles E. T u t t l e Company Inc., 1966).
^ The a r t i c l e i s unsigned. However, La Vallee Poussin, i n a b i b l i o g r a p h -
i c a l note i n Melanges ehiriois et bouddhiques, 1 (1932), p. 399, i d e n t i f i e s
Paul Demieville as the author.
7
For d e t a i l s see Appendix A B i b l i o g r a p h y of Primary Texts. Note that
the Mahayanasutralankara i s a curious choice for the sole source of informa-
t i o n . It i s an early Maitreyan text which i s hardly comprehensible without
commentary. Asanga incorporated i t s Buddhological statements into chapter X
of h i s Mahayanasamgraha, where they appear as only one strand feeding into h i s
t r i k a y a . It was Asanga's t r i k a y a rather than the more p r i m i t i v e versions which
appears to have been accepted by the Vijnanavadin t r a d i t i o n s . As the Mahayana-
sutralankara i s one of the few early Vijnanavadin texts s t i l l extant i n
Sanskrit, i t i s tempting to wonder i f the author has chosen i t f o r any more
serious reason than an i n a b i l i t y to read the more relevant texts which are
a v a i l a b l e only i n Chinese or Tibetan.
8
See Suzuki, Studies i n the Lankavatara Sutra, p. l8h.
69
y
Note that Ruegg, i n h i s Tathagatagarhha (pp. 6-7) says that he was
l e d by s i m i l a r reasoning to base his study of theTathagatagarhha "concept on
a detailed'analysis of" the Ratnagotravibhaga.
There i s l i t t l e r e l i a b l e h i s t o r i c a l information on the e a r l y devel-
opment of the Vijnanavada. Most accounts are based on a few Chinese and
Tibetan summaries of the t r a d i t i o n a l legends. The most important of these
summaries are contained i n Paramartha's sixth-century Chinese biography of
Vasubandhu, Bu-ston's fourteenth-century Tibetan h i s t o r y of Buddhism, and
Taranatha's sixteenth-century h i s t o r y of Buddhism i n India.
The t r a d i t i o n s summarized i n these works disagree on the basic h i s t o r -
i c a l questions, e.g.: Was Maitreya a man or a great Bodhisattva? How many
Vasubandhus were there? What i s the basic chronology? These questions have
been the focus of heated discussions by such scholars as Takakusu, Obermiller,
Lamotte, Johnston, Frauwallner, Schmithausen, Wayman, and Anacker. Summaries
of these controversies and b i b l i o g r a p h i e s may be found i n :
Ruegg, Tathagatagarhha, pp. 39-55-
Walpola Rahula's a r t i c l e "Asanga" i n Malalasekera's Encyclopaedia of
Buddhism, v o l . 2:1, pp. 133-1^6.
Jacques May's "La philosophie bouddhique i d e a l i s t e . "
Anacker's "Vasubandhu: Three'Aspects," pp. 1-33,-' This contains an-excellent
summary and discussion of the t r a d i t i o n s and recent studies concerning the
l i f e of Vasubandhu".
1 1
Janice D. W i l l i s a r r i v e d at a s i m i l a r view i n her'"Chapter 'on R e a l i t y . "
She says, "Asanga authored both the Yogacarabhumi and the Mahayanasamgraha
(among other works). Of these two, the l a t t e r i s the most representative as
a whole of h i s Mahayana views" (p. 3).
CHAPTER II
THE TRIKAYA DOCTRINE IN THE MAHAYANASAMGRAHA
71
A. SOURCES
The Mahayanasamgraha i s the most accessible of the early t e x t s . It i s
a v a i l a b l e i n both the Taisho (Chinese) and Peking (Tibetan) c o l l e c t i o n s . In
addition, a multitextual comparative e d i t i o n of four Chinese t r a n s l a t i o n s
(T. 159^- by Hsuan-tsang, T. 1596 by Dharmagupta, T. 1593 by Paramartha, and
T. 1592 by Buddhasanta) has been published by,Sasaki Gessho (Kan'yaku Shihon-
taisho Shodaijoron. Tokyo: Nakayama Shobo, 1959).
The edited Tibetan text and', a French t r a n s l a t i o n of the basic t e x t ,
together with t r a n s l a t i o n s of selected portions of the commentaries by
Vasubandhu and Asvabhava, has been published by Etienne Lamotte as La Somme
du grand "vehicule d'Asanga (Mahayanasamgraha), tome 1: versions TIbetaine et
Chinoise (Hiuan-Tsang); tome 2: traduction et commentaire. Louvain: I n s t i t u t
O r i e n t a l i s t e , 1973.
The present study i s based upon two versions of the Mahayanasamgraha:
Hsuan-tsang's Chinese t r a n s l a t i o n , ca. 6h8 A.D. (Taisho 159^; v o l . 31,
pp. 132-152), r e f e r r e d to as "H" and c i t e d by Taisho page, r e g i s t e r and
l i n e .
The ninth-century Tibetan t r a n s l a t i o n by Jinamitra, Silendrabodhi and
Ye-shes sde (Otani 55^9; v o l . 112), r e f e r r e d to as "T" and c i t e d by Peking
f o l i o numbering.
7 2
While I hare attempted to i n t e r p r e t the Buddhology of the Mahayanasamgraha
i n terms of i t s own i n t e r n a l l o g i c with minimal r e l i a n c e on the opinions of
l a t e r commentators, t h i s has frequently proved impossible. In such cases I
have consulted Vasubandhu's Bhasya, which i s a v a i l a b l e i n two versions:
Hsuan-tsang's Chinese t r a n s l a t i o n (Taisho 1 5 9 7 ; v o l . 3 1 , pp. 3 2 1 - 3 8 0 ) ,
r e f e r r e d to as "Bh" and c i t e d by Taisho page, r e g i s t e r and l i n e .
The eleventh-century Tibetan t r a n s l a t i o n by A t i s a and Tshul-khrims (Otani
5551; v o l . 1 1 2 , pp. 2 7 2 - 3 0 7 ) , r e f e r r e d to as "bh" and c i t e d by Peking f o l i o
number and l i n e .
As the Bhasya's glosses are, by the very nature of that genre of commen-
t a r y , terse (often no: more than c l a r i f i c a t i o n s of the grammar of the l o s t
S a n s k r i t ) , I have frequently been forced to consult Asvabhava's Upanibandhana,
which i s also a v a i l a b l e i n two versions:
Hsuan-tsang's t r a n s l a t i o n (Taisho. 1598; v o l . . 3 1 , pp. 3 8 5 - ^ 9 ) , r e f e r r e d to
as " U " and c i t e d by Taisho- page, r e g i s t e r and l i n e .
- The Tibetan t r a n s l a t i o n by Jinamitra, Silendrabodhi and Ye-shes sde (Otani
5552; v o l . 1 1 3 , pp. 1 - ^ 3 ) , r e f e r r e d to as "u" and c i t e d by Peking f o l i o number
and l i n e .
While Asvabhava undoubtedly postdated Asanga, I have f e l t j u s t i f i e d i n
consulting him because his comments seem to be grounded i n the l o g i c of t h i s
p a r t i c u l a r text rather than i n the orthodoxy of some l a t e r school. At any rate,
since h i s i s the f i r s t unambiguous l e v e l . o f commentary on many passages, there
i s l i t t l e a l t e r n a t i v e . Lamotte also r e l i e d heavily on the Upanibandhana.
73
In t h i s study, references to the Mahayanasamgraha i t s e l f are c i t e d
according to Lamotte's d i v i s i o n s , while Taisho references are reserved for
drawing attention to some feature of Hsuan-tsang's Chinese t e x t . Readers of
the Chinese should note that, while Lamotte.. divided the text into a prastavaria'
(foreword) followed by ten "chapters," Hsuan-tsang numbered each section
consecutively, beginning with the prastavana. " Hence,, -Lambtte-'s chapter one
w i l l be Hsuan-tsang's section two, and so on.
B. WHAT IS THE VIJHAHAVADA ?
The most s t r i k i n g feature of the system of which the t r i k a y a i s the
culmination i s i t s inclusiveness. G. Tucci^" wrote:
. . . we cannot f a i l to notice a general and fundamen-
t a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c common to a l l . I mean the attempt for
the c o n c i l i a t i o n of the various tendencies existent i n
Buddhism. . . .
. . . i t was c e r t a i n l y d i f f i c u l t to combine i n a l o g i -
c a l way a l l p r a c t i c a l , dogmatical, mystical and t h e o l o g i c a l
tenets representing the main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the two
schools. This was attempted by MaitreyaCnathal i n the
Sutralankara and c h i e f l y i n the Abhisamayalankara, where
the Hinayana as well as the Mahayana-c arya are combined i n
the abhisamaya. . . .
The Mahayanasamgraha i s also an i n c l u s i v e work, incorporating nearly every
f a m i l i a r abhidharma concept, snippets of prajnaparamita, and the major theories
usually i d e n t i f i e d with a wide v a r i e t y of Mahayana sutras Asanga's innovation
consists of the way i n which these are arranged to form a harmonious system.
This system can be described as..'a/hierarchy of nested concerns and theories
each contained within, and oriented by, i t s superior. An understanding'.of the
r e l a t i v e importance and r o l e of each l e v e l of the hierarchy w i l l prevent either
7^
under- or over-evaluation of.- any sub-theory (such as the trikaya'), and thus i s
the fundamental p r e r e q u i s i t e for more d e t a i l e d research.
A f t e r a c a r e f u l reading of the Mahayanasamgraha and associated l i t e r a t u r e ,
I have concluded that the o v e r a l l structure of i t s system i s as follows: The
primary concern i s s o t e r i o l o g i c a l the e n t i r e text i s a guidebook for a
s p i r i t u a l career. Within t h i s , the secondary concern is-.epistemological
Asanga wishes to elucidate the mechanism which w i l l allow the aspirant to
progress toward the ultimate goal of enlightenment (or "omniscience"). F i n a l l y ,
at a t e r t i a r y l e v e l of concern, Asanga i s attempting to integrate the various
theories into a metaphysics. As t h i s conclusion i s both c r u c i a l to my approach
to the t r i k a y a and; d i r e c t l y opposed to the usual view, I s h a l l summarize the
considerations that l e d to i t .
Any discussion of t h i s topic must begin with the simple fact that the
majority of contemporary scholars consider the Vijnanavada to be an idealism.
Should we accept t h i s designation for the doctrine of the Mahayanasamgraha,
:
we'
must explain exactly what type of an idealism i t i s , and why c e r t a i n non-
i d e a l i s t ideas have been included. Should we r e j e c t i t , we must demonstrate
why so many competent scholars have been mistaken.
For the purposes of t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n , B. K. M a t i l a l ' s i s the best and
c e r t a i n l y one of the broadest d e f i n i t i o n s of idealism: ". . . a denial of the
common-sense view that material/external objects exist independently of the
mind, i . e . , independently of t h e i r being perceived."
At f i r s t glance, t h i s seems to describe the doctrine of the Mahayana-
samgraha. For example, Asanga '<(-i"21-)v says :
In short, the alayavijnana i s a r e s u l t i n g - v i j n a n a
Ei.e., r e s u l t i n g from previous experienced whose nature
75
i s a l l the seeds [of future experienceH. It embraces
(samgrhita; bsdus; )
a
^ bodies i n the three worlds
3
and a l l stations of r e b i r t h .
Obviously, the alayavijnana (which i s frequently t r a n s l a t e d as some sort
of "mind") contains the entire perceived world. However, t h i s one idea does
not comprise a metaphysic. More d e t a i l s are required, e.g.: How does t h i s
r e l a t e to ordinary experience? What guidance does i t give i n f u l f i l l i n g
r e l i g i o u s aspirations? What does i t r e a l l y mean? It i s c l e a r that the various
investigators have reached widely varying conclusions..
P. T. Raju, -in I d e a l i s t Thought i n India, sees the Vijnanavada as a minor
v a r i a t i o n of the Advaita Vedanta. Therefore, the idealism l a b e l frees him from
the necessity of dealing with these problems at a l l . The Vijnanavada texts are
a l l footnotes to the h i s t o r y of Vedantac -though**-;-
Jacques May i n "La Philosophie bouddhique i d e a l i s t e " takes the i d e a l i s t i c
nature of the doctrine as an a p r i o r i f a c t . It i s simply part of the general
Western discussion of i d e a l i s t i c philosophy. As he e x p l i c i t l y disregards any
ideas which he i s unable to integrate within h i s i d e a l i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , no
problems (or fresh i n s i g h t s ) can a r i s e .
B. K. M a t i l a l i n h i s " C r i t i q u e of Buddhist Idealism" has taken the t e x t u a l
evidence ( c h i e f l y from surviving Sanskrit texts) much more seriously.'' He has
seen that as an idealism the doctrine i s a f a i l u r e , and i s forced to note the
r e l i g i o u s ( i . e . , s o t e r i o l o g i c a l ) ideas necessary to make sense of i t .
The best known modern i n t e r p r e t e r i s probably A. K. Chatterjee who, i n
Yogacara Idealism, has also worked from the surviving Sanskrit t e x t s . He r e -
gards the fundamental projects of Hegelian philosophers and the Vijnanavada
76
thinkers as very s i m i l a r . The major d i f f e r e n c e i s that Hegel retained both
subject and object, while the Vijnanavada masters have rejected the object to
e s t a b l i s h a pure Absolute. He sees t h i s notion as the l o g i c a l culmination
of the c r i t i c a l and s u b j e c t i v i s t i c trends present throughout a l l Buddhis.ts
philosophy. S o t e r i o l o g i c a l ideas are unconnected with the e s s e n t i a l philosoph-
i c a l concepts. These premises are r e f i n e d and restated but not changed i n h i s
Readings on Yogacara Buddhism.
While reviewing Yogacara Idealism Alex Wayman severely c r i t i c i z e s Chatter-
jee' s presupposition that the fundamental Yogacara p o s i t i o n i s that conscious-
ness i s the sole r e a l i t y . He suggests that, i n fore ing 't:h.e doctrine into such a
mold, Chatterjee has produced an: inadequate and misleading i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
While Wayman does not develop h i s own view, i t i s c l e a r that he would
place greater emphasis on the demands of s o t e r i o l o g i c a l p r a c t i c e s ( e s p e c i a l l y
meditation), on the Abhidharma portion, and on the tfisvabhava. Above a l l ,
Wayman i n s i s t s that those passages which describe the genesis of the perceived
world from mind must be read i n the l i g h t of s i m i l a r Samkhya doctrines which he
sees as t h e i r prototype.
A l a t e r essay by Chatterjee, contained i n Facets of Buddhist Thought, i s
more c l o s e l y reasoned and meets some of Wayman's c r i t i c i s m , but does not show
any fundamental change i n stance.
Although others have written on the subject, these scholars are among the
most respected. Their work shows that i n t e r p r e t i n g the Vijnanavada as an
idealism raises problems which are almost impossible to solve without ignoring
portions of the t e x t s . A fresh .approach i s indicated.
A second major reason for questioning the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h e i r notions
i s that they have drawn t h e i r ideas from a very narrow s e l e c t i o n of the early
77
Vijnanavada works, c h i e f l y the few surviving i n Sanskrit. This i s c l e a r , f o r
example, i n Chatterjee's comment that " . . . canonical l i t e r a t u r e , p e r t a i n i n g
e x c l u s i v e l y to the Yogacara, i s not p l e n t i f u l . " ^ This statement becomes
comprehensible, i f i n c r e d i b l e , when we r e a l i z e that he"'is ignoring the immense
corpus of Tibetan and Chinese t r a n s l a t i o n s and basing h i s research on the
Mahayanasutralankara with some reference to the Madhyantavibhaga and Vasu-
bandhu' s Vimsatika and Trimsika.
I f the author's primary concern i s not i d e a l i s t i c , w';at.,.may;...it'-~be? '' There
are two p o s s i b i l i t i e s : s o t e r i o l o g i c a l or p h i l o s o p h i c a l . I f the former, the
text w i l l present a doctrine which w i l l p r i m a r i l y advance the aspirant's
s p i r i t u a l progress. Although we should expect most of the doctrine to be
l o g i c a l l y consistent, i f some aspect does not seem to f i t , our question would
be, "Does i t , or does i t ' not, further the aspirant's progress?" and not, " i s
i t l o g i c a l l y consistent with the rest of the t e x t ? "
I f the text i s b a s i c a l l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l , i t .may be either epistemological- .
or metaphysical. I f the former, we should expect a d e s c r i p t i o n of the causes
of the various experiences open to man. There would be no necessity for an
explanation of the l o g i c a l status of the experiences. Only i f i t i s p r i m a r i l y
metaphysical should we expect a l l other considerations to be subordinated to
an account of the l o g i c a l status of such experience.
Some comments by H. V. Guenther w i l l help us to see possible a l t e r n a t i v e s
to idealism. In "Mentalism and Beyond i n Buddhist Philosophy" and i n Buddhist
Philosophy i n Theory and P r a c t i c e , he i m p l i c i t l y r e j e c t s any p o s s i b i l i t y of
separating soteriology from philosophy both are aspects of true philosophy.
What, then, do we have to understand by 'philosophy'?
C e r t a i n l y , i t can never be an achievement; i t remains a
movement, a continual s t r i v i n g for t r u t h by pre-eminently
78
i n t e l l e c t u a l means. In t h i s quest for t r u t h philosophy
brings about a change i n ourselves by opening our eyes to
wider horizons. Such a v i s i o n i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to the
desire to c u l t i v a t e and r e f i n e the personality. Moreover,
philosophy as an encompassing v i s i o n wants to know a l l that
i s knowable; unlimited cognition i s i t s basic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c .
Any l i m i t a t i o n imposed on i t w i l l i n e v i t a b l y k i l l i t . But
the most decisive point i s that i n t h i s s t r i v i n g f o r t r u t h ,
t r u t h i t s e l f i s the primal source of our thinking. Yet i t
becomes perverted e a s i l y by p o s i t i n g as absolute something
which i s v a l i d from c e r t a i n points of view and i n c e r t a i n
respects and at a p a r t i c u l a r l e v e l of thinking. It also
becomes f a l s e by considering the p a r t i c u l a r knowledge of
something within Being as the knowledge of Being as such
and as a whole. Philosophy as a quest for t r u t h born out
of t r u t h i s therefore constantly struggling against i t s two
foes: a b s o l u t i z a t i o n and c o n c r e t i z a t i o n . This i s the theme
of Buddhist philosophy i n p a r t i c u l a r . It begins with a
v i s i o n of what there i s , and then progressively enlarges
t h i s v i s i o n . Its r e j e c t i o n of the non-Buddhist systems,
a l l of which i n some way succumb.to a n t i - p h i l o s o p h i c a l
tendencies, as well as i t s trenchant c r i t i q u e of i t s own
digressions into t h i s dangerous t e r r i t o r y , are due to, and
r e f l e c t , the endeavour to keep the p h i l o s o p h i c a l s p i r i t
alive.'''
This notion that the Vijnanavada maintains the congruence of philosophy
and soteriology i s a t t r a c t i v e to an i n t e r p r e t e r of the Mahayansamgraha. The
two are not separated i n the text and,' i f i t s message can be understood without
introducing such a separation, the r e s u l t i s l i k e l y to be f a i t h f u l to the
original.. The problem
;
that arises ^ i s that Western i n t e r p r e t e r s , l i k e Guenther,
are apt-t'o respect such a philosophy only i n s o f a r as i t embodies a search for
the t r u t h by "pre-eminently i n t e l l e c t u a l means." However, the text contains
much more than i n t e l l e c t u a l means. It authorizes meditational and even mantric
techniques.. (V:2. 10) . How can these possibly" f a l l t h i n any Western
1
concept of
philosophy?
Guenther's answer i s that such a 'philosophy' includes both epistemological
and metaphysical components. The former, comprising the 'mind-only' doctrine,
can c e r t a i n l y involve the various psychological techniques for understanding
79
the operation of the perceptual mechanism. But t h i s can never be a metaphysical
doctrine of any kind, l e t alone an idealism.
The metaphysical doctrines are not the 'mind-only' ones, but the t r i s v a -
bhava and the t r i k a y a , which Guenther describes i n Buddhist Philosophy'.
However, such a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between epistemology and metaphysics
does not occur i n the early Vijnanavada t e x t s . Guenther a t t r i b u t e s t h i s
absence.to a confusion on the part of the early thinkers:
It i s also obvious that the Indian Buddhist i d e a l i s t s
whose thought i s r e f l e c t e d by the bKa'-brgyud-pas, were above
a l l concerned with epistemology, the r e l a t i o n between the
psychic event of the moment with i t s objective duplicate.
Only secondarily were they metaphysically i n t e r e s t e d , as when
they reduced the whole of r e a l i t y to the one p a r t i c u l a r
existent of sems (mind). It seems that the bKa
1
-brgyud-pas,
just as t h e i r Indian prototypes, due to t h e i r preoccupation
with epistemological problems, misunderstood the l o g i c a l
character of the metaphysical premise. They saw sems 'mind'
as a starting-point on which other assertions were to be
based, i n a word, as the basic premise, summed up i n the
words: "The whole of r e a l i t y i s mental."
However, epistemology i s one fact of philosophy, meta-
physics another. What distinguishes a metaphysician from
other philosophers i s not the premise he s t a r t s from but the
p r i n c i p l e o f ^ i n t e r p r e t a t i o n he brings to bear. He c e r t a i n l y
does not claim to reveal truths about a world which l i e s
beyond the realm of the senses. His concern i s with how to
take what happens here and now or how to get the things of
t h i s world into perspective. . . .9
Later, while summarizing the'Dk doctrine, I s h a l l show that t h i s comment
i s d i r e c t l y applicable to the Mahayanasamgraha, and argue that ..the task of
i n t e r p r e t i n g i t s doctrine involves deriving a metaphysics which w i l l harmonize
with the stated epistemology.
80
C. VIJNANAVADA OF THE MAHAYANASAMGRAHA
Our study must begin .with Asanga's foreword -(prastavana) with i t s concise
apologetic for "the Mahayana" ( i . e . , the Vijnanavada). While t h i s appears to
constitute a c l e a r statement of the primary concern of the t e x t , i t i s almost
impossible to force into an i d e a l i s t i c mold. I f the body of the text contains
an i d e a l i s t i c system, t h i s foreword i s an embarrassing appendage. I f , however,
the p o s s i b i l i t y that the contents are not an idealism i s allowed, then t h i s
foreword becomes a key to the author's i n t e n t .
Asanga states that the Mahayana message consists of the contents of the
ten chapters of the Mahayanasamgraha arranged i n the order necessary for the
aspirant's s p i r i t u a l development. They chart a c r e d i b l e , l o g i c a l path to great
enlightenment (mahabodhi). That i s , h i s primary intent i s s o t e r i o l o g i c a l ,
and within t h i s o r i e n t a t i o n he has arranged and integrated the teachings into
a coherent system. His aim i s fundamentally s o t e r i o l o g i c a l and secondarily
p h i l o s o p h i c a l .
This viewpoint w i l l a f f e c t the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of every element of the
system. I f the Mahayanasamgraha were regarded as a p h i l o s o p h i c a l t e x t , the
u n i f y i n g p r i n c i p l e would have to be p h i l o s o p h i c a l . As there are several major
p h i l o s o p h i c a l ideas contained i n the t e x t , one would have to be elevated to a
primary p o s i t i o n . As we have seen, the usual candidate has been the c l u s t e r
of i d e a l i s t i c notions. However, t h i s means that those other ideas-that w i l l
not f i t must be explained away or set aside.
I f however, the u n i f y i n g viewpoint i s s o t e r i o l o g i c a l , there i s no need to
assert the primacy of any one of the p h i l o s o p h i c a l theories so long as t h e i r
i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s can be shown. Freed from the necessity to elevate the
81
content of one of the chapters to the status of "the" core of the system, we
can examine the secondary l e v e l of concern with fewer preconceptions. Asanga
lays out the structure of t h i s secondary l e v e l i n his foreword.
[The actual content of each chapter of the Mahayanasamgraha:" i s : D
I. The alayavijnana i s c a l l e d the support of the knowable
(jneyasraya; shes-bya'i gnas; ^fj %0 )
I I . The trisvabhava: i . e . , the paratantrasvabhava, the
parikalpitasvabhava, and the p a r i n i spanrias vabhava, are
the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the knowable (jneyalaksana;
shes-bya'i mtshan-nyid; - ^ J ^ $ ^S- )
I I I . Ideation-only (vi.jnaptimatrata) i s the entry into the
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the knowable (jneyalaksanapravesa;
s n e s
~ k y
a
' i mtshan-nyid-la' jug-pa; ^ Jifj ^ Q ).
IV. The s i x paramitas are the cause and the r e s u l t of t h i s
entry.
V. The ten bodhisattvabhumis are the various ways i n which
the cause and r e s u l t of t h i s entry are c u l t i v a t e d .
VI. The Bodhisattva d i s c i p l i n e i s the higher morality
( a d h i s i l a ) involved i n t h i s .
VII. The samadhis ... are the higher mentation ( a d h i c i t t a )
involved i n t h i s .
VIII. Non-discriminating awareness (nirvikalpajnana) i s the
higher awareness (adhiprajna) involved i n t h i s .
IX. Non-staying nirvana i s the severance-result
(phalaprahana) of t h i s .
X. The t r i k a y a ... i s the awareness-result (phalajnana) of t h i s .
82
The key notion i s obviously "the knowable" and the basic s o t e r i o l o g i c a l
act i s the "entry" (pravesa; 'jug-pa; ^ ) to the knowable.
The term "the knowable" i s not a focus of i n t e r e s t by i t s e l f . Vasubandhu
(Bh 322b29-cl; bhll+5al) glosses i t as "that which may be Cor "should be"]
known,''"'""
1
and i d e n t i f i e s ^ i t with ,the s o i l e d and p u r i f i e d dharmas, or with the
t r i svabhava. Furthermore, he says (Bh322c7-8; bhl^a^O that the entry can be
equated with vijnaptimatrata i n the sense that t h i s s p e c i f i e d the manner or'.,
means of entry.
Asanga i s not p o s i t i n g some new transcendent e n t i t y c a l l e d "the knowable."
Had he wished to do t h i s , he already had a quasi-ontological tathata at hand.
I can only conclude that t h i s term throws the e n t i r e theory into an epistemo-
l o g i c a l form. That i s , within t h i s primary s o t e r i o l o g i c a l structure, Asanga
has chosen to order the i n d i v i d u a l ideas i n an epistemological perspective
indicated by "the knowable." He i s l e s s concerned.with describing how the
world looks from a l i b e r a t e d viewpoint than with explaining the mechanism
whereby the aspirant can acquire such a viewpoint.
Only at a t e r t i a r y l e v e l of emphasis does Asanga introduce the i n d i v i d u a l
t h e o r i e s , such as that of the alayavijflana or v i j napt imat r a t a, which might be
termed i d e a l i s t were they presented on the primary l e v e l . However, they are
not. They are on the same l e v e l as, and elaborately interconnected with, the
trisvabhava, paramitas, bhumis, samvara, samadhi, n i r v i k a l p a j nana, a p r a t i s t h i t a -
nirvana and t r i k a y a . The trap f o r the unwary i n t e r p r e t e r i s the fact that any
of these, i n the hands of a determined r e d u c t i o n i s t , could be made to contain
a l l the others and thus become "the e s s e n t i a l " doctrine. Only by some s e n s i -
t i v i t y to Asanga's stated aim can we appreciate the importance of each, and
hence be i n a p o s i t i o n to investigate h i s use of any one theory.
83
The view of chapters I-II can be summarized as follows: Asanga, l i k e a
Western phenomenologist, wishes to begin h i s project with the raw f a c t s of
experience. To him, r e a l i t y i s composed of a beginningless series of these
experiences which, because they make themselves known d i r e c t l y to the mind,
are cast i n m e n t a l i s t i c terms. The ground for the e n t i r e e x p e r i e n t i a l process
i s c a l l e d the alayavijnana and each experience i s termed v i j n a p t i . Questions
about the r e l a t i o n of t h i s m e n t a l i s t i c language to ordinary uses of these terms
are d i f f i c u l t and complex. I w i l l only point out that the alayavijnana i s not
some supermind. It belongs to a l e v e l of discourse i n which i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s
of the events, such as the notion that they pertain to a "mind" ( i n any common
sense) have been set aside.
The v i j n a p t i are not simply raw sense-data but, because of the organizing
e f f e c t of past experiences, present themselves as full-blown perceptions.
These include the perception of oneself as a perceiver with body and mind; the
perception of a sensory apparatus; the perception of an object of perception,
and the perception ofrlinterpretative schema (11:2). As these have no indepen-
dent r e a l i t y but are merely moments i n the a c t i v i t y of the alayavijnana, they
are said to be dependent on the alayavi j nana.
The common man. .may adopt one of two possible attitudes toward these per-
ceptions. He usually hypostatizes them into concrete things, thus strengthening
the notion that he i s a person surrounded by an environment of objects. Asanga
terms such objects " t o t a l l y imaginary" (II:3). On the other; hand, under the
influence of Mahayana teachings, he may begin to see through the apparent
s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of these perceptions. As he does so, he becomes free from the
ideas that he and h i s surroundings are immutable objects. His perceptions are
o 12
brought to p e r f e c t i o n " ( I I : M .
8k
In either case the perceiver, object and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n are mutually
13
dependent and co-variable. None of them remains constant while the others
change. There i s no room i n t h i s theory for a single observer who sees things
d i f f e r e n t l y or who sees, d i f f e r e n t things; there i s no notion of a r e a l world
which appears d i f f e r e n t to common man and Buddha. There i s no need to hold
any of these terms constant, since continuity i s provided by the alayavijnana:
the perceptual a c t i v i t y from which the common man and his world, and the
- Ik
Buddha and his world, may-emerge.. The way i n which these ideas apply to the
i n d i v i d u a l on the r e l i g i o u s path i s worked out i n d e t a i l throughout the text.
F i n a l l y , we should note an i n t e r e s t i n g extension of the Abhidharmic term
dharma to generate terms which apply to the Buddha. Asanga e a s i l y finds terms
for the ordinary perceiver, the object of h i s perception and the s e i z i n g
perceptions he employs, but a problem arises when speaking of the Buddha, the
environment which he perceives and the way i n which he perceives i t . Asanga's
s o l u t i o n i s to adopt a terminology based on the word dharma. Whereas the
common man sees himself as a s p e c i a l sort of object surrounded by other objects
at which he grasps, the Buddha sees himself as a group of dharmas (Dharmakaya),
surrounded by dharmas over which he exercises sovereignty. The f i e l d within
which t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n occurs i s c a l l e d the "dharma-realm" (dharmadhatu).""" ^
The i n t e r p r e t a t i v e , scheme that has.led him'to t h i s v i s i o n i s c a l l e d the "
:
"Mahayana dharma," As i t has been given to him by others who have previously
attained such a v i s i o n , i t i s c a l l e d an "outflow" of the dharmadhatu.
85
D. A STUDY OF VIJNANAVADA BUDDHQLOGY IN THE MAHAYANASAMGRAHA
As we have seen, Asanga has c i t e d a great number of t r a d i t i o n a l " f a c t s "
about Buddhahood from the a u t h o r i t a t i v e sutras and sastras. He does not appear
to have selected these for c o m p a t i b i l i t y since even the most contradictory
notions (e.g., there i s one Buddha/there are many Buddhas) are reproduced. As
the h i s t o r y and development of many of these have been studied elsewhere,^ I
have examined an i n d i v i d u a l notion i n d e t a i l only when such information i s
necessary to understand the use of i t i n t h i s t e x t .
The present study w i l l be p r i n c i p a l l y concerned with those doctrines by
which Asanga attempts to resolve contradictions between the i n d i v i d u a l ideas.
The general procedure.was as follows: A l l statements about Buddhahood
were located. Where they occurred i n c l u s t e r s , the.degree of r e l a t i o n s h i p
between contiguous elements was assessed and a decision made on whether each
could stand alone or whether the c l u s t e r should be retained i n t a c t . That i s ,
each statement was i s o l a t e d as f a r as l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e . In most cases, this,
judgement proved easier than expected. For example, as the twenty-one gunas
of the Buddha at 11:33 are obviously l i f t e d en bloc from the Samdhinifmocana-
sutra and are separated from the other Buddhology and i n t e r p r e t e d i n a
d i f f e r e n t manner by Asanga, they should be kept together. The. same reasoning
applies to the "associated" gunas at X:9-2T. On the other hand, many s t a t e -
ments are c l e a r l y d i s c r e t e or are embedded i n a discussion of some other t o p i c .
In either case, they may be removed from context and regrouped to i l l u s t r a t e
features of the basic framework, e.g., to bring together a l l statements
r e f e r r i n g to the Dharmakaya.
The ease with, which t h i s regrouping i s possible r e f l e c t s the e a r l y state
86
of t h i s t e x t . Although the chapters are i n a l o g i c a l order, many blocks of
doctrine within the chapters ( e s p e c i a l l y i n chapter X) are i n no obviously
meaningful order, and may be rearranged.' These.passages f e l l into three
categories, each of which required a d i f f e r e n t treatment:
1. The l i s t of gunas at 11:33 stands by i t s e l f . As i t i s not r e a l l y integrated
with the rest of the text, i t received only a cursory examination.
2. The passages dealing with the Dharmakaya showed that Asanga had used t h i s
term as a synonym for Buddhahood i n general. These passages contain most of
the t r a d i t i o n a l ideas with which he deals, but contribute d i r e c t l y to h i s
systematic project only by answering the question of how Buddhahood i s obtained.
Therefore, I have structured the examination of these around that question.
3. Those passages (mainly from chapter X) which show Asanga's attempts to
systematize the Buddhological ideas by the t r i k a y a scheme. These are the
primary focus of t h i s study.
Before beginning, a possible source of confusion must be noted. The
Buddhology of the Mahayanasamgraha hinges on the term "body." Lamotte has
t r a n s l a t e d a v a r i e t y of Tibetan and Chinese terms by " l e corps" ("body"), and
regarded them a l l as equivalent to the Sanskrit "kaya." Examining the t e x t s ,
I found that he has used '"le corps" for the following terms:
1.
T: sku, H: for any aspect of a Buddha (e.g., 'Nirmanakaya,
Sambhogakaya, Dharmakaya, Svabhavikakaya). These were
undoubtedly kaya i n the Sanskrit.
2.
T: lus and Hi'jpj? for the p h y s i c a l bodies of ordinary beings,
87
of Sravakas and of Pratyekabuddhas (e.g., '1:1+8; 1:50; 11:2.2;
11:11, etc. ).
3. T: lus_ and H: C t l for "category or " c l a s s " ( l : l l , I : 2 l ) .
Thus, by taking both Tibetan and Chinese t r a n s l a t i o n s into account, i t i s
always possible to determine which of the three senses of "body" i s intended.
1. 11:33 THE TWENTY-ONE GUNAS OF THE BUDDHA
11:33 contains a short, and apparently separate, Buddhology based on the
following l i s t of q u a l i t i e s (gunas) of a Buddha. This l i s t i s drawn from a
' ' ~ 17
prominent passage of the Samdhinirmocanasutra.
The Buddha:
0. Has a very pure i n t e l l i g e n c e
shin-tu rnam-par dag-pa'i bio mnga'-ba
&
:
i M>
1. Acts i n non-duality
kun-tu spyod-pa'i gnyis mi-mnga'-ba
* n
2. Enters the c h a r a c t e r l s t i c l e s s dharma
mtshan-nyid med-pa'i chos-la mchog-tu gzhol-bar mdzad-pa
88
3. Resides i n the Buddha-residence
sangs-rgyas-kyi gnas-pas- gnas-pa
4i f& it
k. Obtains an equality with a l l Buddhas
sangs-rgyas thams-cad dang mnyam-pa-nyid brnyes-pa
l i . f l - M ih if- % ML
5. Having no obstacles, reaches an understanding
Sgrib-pa mi-mnga'-bas rtogs-par thugs-su chud-pa
6. Has a dharma which cannot be overturned
phyir mi-zlog-pa'i chos dang-ldan-pa
7. Is not diminished by h i s sphere of action
spyod-yul-gyis mi-'phrogs-pa
8. Has a system which i s inconceivable
rnam-par bzhag-pa bsam-gyis mi-khyab-pa
9. Has reached the equality of the three times
dus-gsum mnyam-pa-nyid-du thugs-su chud-pa
89
10. Has a body that extends over a l l areas of the universe
' j i g - r t e n - g y i khams thams-cad-du khyab-pa'i sku dang-ldan-pa
11. Has a v e r i d i c a l awareness of things
chos-thams-cad-la the-tshorn med-pa'i ye-shes mnga'-ba
%> _ n ; i * j ^ i i .
12. Has a mind containing a l l practices -
spyod-pa thams-cad dang-ldan-pa'i bio mnga'-ba
its w it K tt
13. Has-an erforless_khowledge of things
chos mkhyen-pa-la nem-nur med-pa
* Vi it *t fe Jk
lh. Has a body CH: "as perceived by ordinary beings"] which i s
not imaginary
rnam-par ma-brtags-pa'i sku mnga'-ba
15. Has.an awareness which i s the goal of the vows of a l l Bodhisattvas
ye-shes byang-chub sems-dpa' thams-cad-kyis yang-dag-par mnos-pa [ s i c ]
- I. . % n *
16. Has t r u l y reached the p e r f e c t i o n of the non-dual Buddha-residence
sangs-rgyas-kyi gnas-pa gnyis-su med-pa dam-pa'i pha-rol-tu phyin-pa
4! & - ^ ; T4JUf ' .
90
17. Has arrived, at the culmination of the Tathagata's undefiled
l i b e r a t i n g awareness
de-bzhin gshegs-pa ma-'dres-pa'i rnam-par thar-par mdzad-pa'i
ye-shes-kyi mthar phyin-pa
18. Has reached the equal Buddhaland which has neither center nor
outlying areas
mtha'-dang dbus med-pa'i sangs-rgyas-kyi sa mnyam-pa nyid-du
thugs-su chud-pa
19. Has reached the dharmadhatu
chos-kyi dbyings-kyis klas-pa
ft TY> %~
20. Has reached the l i m i t of open space
nam-mkha'i khams-kyi mtha' gtugs-pa
21. Completely reaches the f i n a l l i m i t s
phyi-ma'i mtha'i mur thug-pa
Asanga's reason f o r g r a f t i n g t h i s passage tenuously onto the-..end of the

v
l 8
t r i svabhava chapter',, rather than: i n t e g r a t i n g i t within the trikaya, i s obscure.
However, as he has kept i t separate and interpreted i t d i f f e r e n t l y , almost to
the point of developing an alternate Buddhology, I have maintained his d i v i s i o n
91
and placed a short study of i t i n the following section.
The most obvious c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the above l i s t i s i t s imagery. It
evokes a mythopoeic image of a v i r t u a l l y omniscient and omnipotent Buddha of
cosmic dimensions i n h a b i t i n g a Buddha-residence, within a Buddhaland, i n a
state of perfect knowledge. The remainder of 11:33 shows us the e x i s t e n t i a l
interpretation"*"^ to which Asanga subjected t h i s l i s t as well as Vasubandhu's
and Asvabhava's expansion of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
I must repeat that the subject under i n v e s t i g a t i o n here i s not the
t r a d i t i o n a l image.but the manner i n which Asanga has interpreted i t . Unfortu-
nately, h i s only e x p l i c i t p r i n c i p l e i s expremely puzzling. He says, "The
phrase, 'The Buddha has a very pure i n t e l l i g e n c e (buddhi)' i s c l a r i f i e d by the
other phrases." A l l versions add, "Thus, the X i s properly explained." "X"
i s v a r i o u s l y , dharmata (Tibetan and H), ' f ' j r (Dharmagupta and Buddha-
santa) dr (Paramartha), or " l a nature du Buddha" (Lamotte). The author
obviously wishes to subsume a l l other gunas under the undefined concept of
"pure buddhi." Neither Vasubandhu nor Asvabhava o f f e r s substantial commentary,
and the idea i s not a major focus elsewhere i n the Mahayanasamgraha. I can
only suggest that i t may r e f e r to the doctrine which D. S. Ruegg has c a l l e d
20
" l a luminosite n a t u r e l l e de l a pensee," but i t s importance here i s impossible
to determine.
Asanga's comments reveal a consistent and comprehensible i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
He sees each gunaeven those ostensibly describing the Buddha's residence,
e t c . a s a reference to some q u a l i t y of the Buddha's personality. These may
be generally divided into those gunas which he regards as references to the
Buddha's noetic a b i l i t i e s , and those which he regards as references to the
Buddha's e f f e c t i v e a b i l i t i e s .
92
a. The Noetic A b i l i t i e s
Strangely enough, Asanga i n t e r p r e t s the two gunas which ostensibly inform
us of the way i n which the Buddha "acts" or "moves" as references to h i s noetic
rather than his e f f e c t i v e a b i l i t i e s :
1. "CThe Buddha] acts i n non-duality" i s glossed as "the q u a l i t y of
absolutely unimpeded entrance to the knowable." "Entering the knowable" r e f e r s
to obtaining an accurate comprehension of the o n t o l o g i c a l status of perceived
r e a l i t y , a comprehension which w i l l i t s e l f ensure accurate perception. This
- - '' 21
comprehension i s described i n the trisvabhava doctrine (II:9)- Asvabhava
supports t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by d e f i n i n g "non-duality" as "not sometimes
encountering obstacles and sometimes not encountering them," thus steering the
reader away from the obvious conclusion that the "non-duality" could r e f e r to
a non-dichotomizing conceptual process, a notion not i n accord with the
trisvabhava.
2. "He enters the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c l e s s dharma" i s interpreted as "he has
gone to the supremely pure tathata which i s characterized by a non-duality of
being and non-being." Asvabhava r e f e r s t h i s concept to the trisvabhava doc-
t r i n e which i n the Mahayanasamgraha i s invoked to explain a l l such assertions.
22
Thus, "Buddha a c t i o n " i s interpreted as an unhampered noetic act which,
together with "entry," r e f e r s to gaining a proper understanding of r e a l i t y ,
i . e . , an understanding by the trisvabhava.
b. The E f f e c t i v e A b i l i t i e s
The remainder of the gunas are references to the Buddha's a l t r u i s t i c
a c t i v i t y . These may be subdivided-into those which ostensibly describe- the
93
domain or place inhabited by the Buddha, 'and those which describe the Buddha
himself.
i . The Domain of the Buddha
5. "Having no obstacles, he reaches an understanding." (.The Chinese
says, "He has reached the non-impeded place (lUlb26).") Asanga explains t h i s
as the q u a l i t y of having c u l t i v a t e d the antidote to a l l obstacles. Asvabhava
adds that t h i s " c u l t i v a t i o n " i s the p r a c t i c e of the noble path.
This point i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to 1. and 2., but stresses the state
achieved rather than the action of achieving i t .
3- "He resides i n the Buddha-residence (vihara)" i s interpreted as
showing "the q u a l i t y of r e s i d i n g i n .unceasing, spontaneous Buddha-activity."
By various examples of "residence" (Devavihara, the four Brahmaviharas, the
dhyanas, sunyata, animatta, e t c ) , Asvabhava (UUl0c27-29).explains "residence"
to be any fundamental stance or p r i n c i p l e i n which an i n d i v i d u a l i s grounded
and from which he acts. Asvabhava i d e n t i f i e s the Buddhavihara with the
spontaneity with which a Buddha takes any appropriate stance to a i d sentient
beings, not by some p a r t i c u l a r Buddha-stance.
Here a l s o , a statement a s c r i b i n g a determinate state i s interpreted as
a reference to a c t i v i t y . Asanga i s not only i n t e r p r e t i n g a s p a t i a l myth i n
active terms but i s also affirming that the manner of the Buddha's acts cannot
be exhaustively s p e c i f i e d , but only l a b e l l e d "unceasing spontaneous Buddha
actions."
This phrase reveals the three parameters governing the Buddha's action
i n s p e c i f i c circumstances. "Unceasing" w i l l be dealt with i n number 21 below.
9k
"Spontaneity" reveals the Buddha's freedom to respond to the needs of others.
The t h i r d , "Buddha-activity," i s determined by the pattern of actions set up
during the graded p r a c t i c e of the paramitas which l e d to Buddhahood. This
pattern i s the subject of the next guna.
16. "He has t r u l y reached the p e r f e c t i o n (paramita) of the non-dual
Buddha-residence." Asanga says that t h i s i s "the q u a l i t y of having attained
the paramitas i n the equal Dharmakaya." To Asvabhava t h i s means that a l l the
paramitas have been developed to the highest degree and are "equal" or "non-
dual" insofar as they cannot be quantified (as they could while the Buddha was
s t i l l on the bhumis). Again, the Buddha-residence i s more than a determinate
pattern of action. I t i s the terminus of the development by which the
Bodhisattva became a Buddha, and as such defines the manner i n which the
Buddha w i l l act.
22
18. "He has reached the equal Buddhaland which has neither center nor
outlying areas." Asariga says that t h i s reveals the q u a l i t y of non-limitation
of the sphere of the three Buddha-kayas. Asvabhava adds a series of comments,
only two of which are of i n t e r e s t here: "the Dharmakaya, etc. l i v i n g i n t h i s
universe because there i s no place e l s e " and "the Dharmakaya, etc. penetrates
everywhere i n order to procure the welfare of sentient beings . . . "
While the Buddha-residence was the fact of the Buddha's a l t r u i s t i c action,
the Buddhaland i s the place of the action. Asvabhava concludes that t h i s place
cannot be other than the universe f i l l e d with the beings for whose sake the
action i s performed.
19. "He has reached the dharmadhatu" shows the q u a l i t y of having devoted
himself to the welfare and happiness of a l l sentient beings u n t i l the end of
samsara. Asvabhava says that the dharmadhatu can give r i s e to outflows such
95
as sutras and teachings. Therefore, the Buddha who reaches the dharmadhatu
devotes himself to the welfare and happiness of a l l sentient beings. Here the
s p a t i a l language i s interpreted as revealing the altruism of the Buddha's
actions.
20. "He has reached the l i m i t s of open space" reveals the q u a l i t y of
i n d e s t r u c t i b i l i t y ( o r " " i n e x h a u s t i b i l i t y " ) . .Asvabhava adds that "open space"
i s a metaphor for-'the Dharmakaya which, without i t s e l f a l t e r i n g of imposing
l i m i t s , works.for the welfare and happiness of sentient beings.
21. "He completely reaches the f i n a l l i m i t s . " There i s no comment by
Asanga and Asvabhava makes t h i s a part of number 20., but also suggests that
the " f i n a l l i m i t s " r e f e r to a perpetual non-interruption of the Buddha-activity,
since there w i l l never be an end to beings to be t r a i n e d . Thus, the s p a t i a l
l i m i t s are interpreted as the l i m i t l e s s n e s s of the action.
7. "He i s not diminished by h i s sphere of action CH: "His actions are
unimpeded"]." Asanga explains t h i s as "the q u a l i t y of not being diminished by
worldly things although born i n the world."
i i . The Buddha-body
Only two gunas deal e x p l i c i t l y with the body of the Buddha:
10. "His body extends over a l l areas of the universe" means to Asanga
that he manifests a Sambhoghakaya and Nirmanakaya i n a l l areas of the universe.
Asvabhava adds that t h i s i s for the welfare and happiness of a l l beings to be
d i s c i p l i n e d .
ih. "His body CH: "as perceived by ordinary beings"] i s not imaginary."
Asanga says that "he manifests himself according to the expectations Cof those
whom he teaches]." Asvabhava adds that although he may manifest himself with
96
a gold c o l o r , etc., his body i s not imaginary.
Note that the term " i s not imaginary"^ means that the object perceived
has not been generated by conceptualizing a c t i v i t y of the subject, as i s the
case with ordinary perception of another's body.
k. "He obtains an equality with a l l Buddhas." Asanga explains that there
i s no divergence between Buddhas as f a r as the support, i n t e n t i o n and action of
t h e i r Dharmakaya are concerned. Asvabhava adds that the support i s the
v i suddhaj nana; intentions are the i n t e n t i o n to work for the welfare of others,
and a c t i v i t i e s r e f e r to the r e s u l t i n g actions which a l l accomplish through
Nirmanakaya and Sambhoghakaya.
i i i . The Buddha-mind
The remainder of the gunas deal with the Buddha's awarenessthe way i n
which he sees, knows and understands.
11. "He has a v e r i d i c a l awareness' of things." Asanga c a l l s t h i s "the
q u a l i t y of c u t t i n g o f f doubts," and Asvabhava explains that, l a c k i n g doubt
himself, he i s able to cut o f f the doubts of others.
15. "His awareness i s the goal of the vows of a l l Bodhisattvas." Asanga
explains that "by i n c a l c u l a b l e numbers of bodies CH: "of supports"!] he under-
25 ^
takes the t r a i n i n g of sentient beings." Asvabhava explains that the
"bodies" belong to the Bodhisattvas whom the Buddha t r a i n s . The other Bodhi-
sattvas transmit t h i s teaching and so obtain the awareness which i s the object
of the vows of a l l Bodhisattvas.
13. "His knowledge of the dharma i s free from e r r o r . " Asanga says that
he knows the future a r i s i n g of dharma. According to Vasubandhu and Asvabhava,
the Buddha, unlike the Sravaka, i s able to perceive the subtlest seeds of
9 7
future Buddhahood i n some apparently i n c o r r i g i h l e i n d i v i d u a l , and so to encour-
age him.
9 . "He has reached the equality of the three times." Asanga adds that
he " i n s t r u c t s " (or " p r e d i c t s , " vyakarana). Asvabhava adds that t h i s means the
Buddha can know and explain things i n the past or future as i f they were
current events.
8. "His system i s inconceivable." To Asanga t h i s i s "the q u a l i t y of
systematizing the dharma." Asvabhava adds that the system cannot be compre-
hended by f o o l s or worldlings i n general.
6. "His dharma cannot be overturned." To Asanga t h i s means "he i s not
overcome by any t i r t h i k a s . "
1 7 . "He has a r r i v e d at the culmination of the Tathagata's undefiled
l i b e r a t i n g awareness." Asanga i n t e r p r e t s t h i s as the q u a l i t y of manifesting
undefiled (H: "various") Buddhalands i n accord with the aspirations of beings.
Asvabhava i n t e r p r e t s " l i b e r a t i n g awareness" as "awareness of a s p i r a t i o n
(vimoksa)." That i s , Asvabhava i n t e r p r e t s t h i s guna as the Buddha's a b i l i t y ,
to be aware of the aspirations of each sentient being.
12. "His mind contains a l l p r a c t i c e s . " Asanga says that t h i s i s "the
q u a l i t y of causing Cthose whom he teaches] to enter a l l sorts of p r a c t i c e s . "
The Buddha who emerges from 11:33 i s c e r t a i n l y not i r r e c o n c i l a b l e with
the figure found l a t e r i n chapter X. However, apart from h i s explanation of
the tenth guna, Asanga has simply not reconciled them. While t h i s curious
omission should make us very wary of simply reading 11:33 and chapter X
together, one common element i s obvious. Both are permeated by the idea of
being-in-control, an idea which the Mahayana l a b e l s "mastery" ( v a s i t a , see
note h2 below). That i s , experiences do not simply impinge upon the Buddha;
he takes an active r o l e i n properly understanding h i s world. From t h i s under-
standing he i s able to act, spontaneously and c r e a t i v e l y , i n order to transmit
t h i s understanding to others.
2. THE DHARMAKAYA
The second major Buddhology i s found i n passages describing the Dharmakaya.
It depicts Buddhahood as a single e n t i t y and provides the opportunity for the
questions, "How i s i t obtained?" and "What i s i t ? " The former e l i c i t s a
d e s c r i p t i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the aspirant to his goal. The l a t t e r
provides the occasion for developing a metaphysical d e s c r i p t i o n of the Buddha.
a. Obtaining the Dharmakaya
While the e n t i r e Mahayanasamgraha i s one long p r e s c r i p t i o n for obtaining
the Dharmakaya, a few passages give a synopsis of the process. These may be
divided into three groups according to the s t y l e of explanation i n each:
a highly abstract epistemological explanation i n v o l v i n g r e - o r i e n t a t i o n . o f
the alayavijnana
a very concrete epistemological one, s t r e s s i n g meditation and i l l u s t r a t i n g
the perceptual a t t i t u d e of the Dk
an active answer which involves the action of the Dk. i n the world.
i . I;l+6-U8 Re-orientation of the Alayavi j nana
The author has r a i s e d the question of how the s e e d - f i l l e d alayavijnana,
the cause of emotional involvement i n the world, can also be the seed of ways
99
of thinking which counteract such involvement. He answers that the seed of
world-transcending thought i s the impression formed i n the alayavijnana by
hearing the dharma (srutavasana) The i n i t i a l small impression gives r i s e to
a greater one as the subject i s thought out, and to a s t i l l greater one as i t
i s meditated upon, u n t i l i t completely takes over the alayavi j nana and dispels
a l l seeds of emotivity. The d e s c r i p t i o n of t h i s process shows the beginnings
of the Dk:
1: 48. "This small, medium or great seed implanted by hearing i s also
the seed of the Dharmakaya. It counteracts the a l a y a v i j n a n a i t i s
not the alayavijnana. Although i t i s worldly, as i t i s an outflow
of the transworldly and very pure dharmadhatu, i t i s the seed of
world-transcending thought. Even before world-transcending thought
a r i s e s , i t [the seed implanted by hearing"! counteracts the snare of
the klesas, Cthe p o s s i b i l i t y of r e b i r t h : inD a realm of s u f f e r i n g ,
and a l l bad actions. It helps one to meet Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.
" i t i s involved w i t h ^ the Dharmakaya of the neophyte Bodhi-
27
sattvas and i t i s also involved with the Vimuktikayas of the
Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas. Although i t i s not the alayavijnana,
i t i s involved with the Dharmakaya and Vimuktikaya.
"As i t develops through the stages of small, medium and l a r g e ,
the vipakavijnana w i l l become devoid of seeds and a l l i t s aspects
w i l l be cut o f f . "
Here the Dk i s presented as a reoriented alayavijfiana. The perceptions
(vijnana) of ordinary man e s t a b l i s h i n him the tendency to have s i m i l a r ones
i n the future. The t o t a l set of such tendencies (alaya-vijnana) i s the basic
100
substratum of h i s personality. According to t h i s passage, the dharma which a
man hears acts i n an analogous way but establishes a new substratum, the body-
of-dharma (Dharmakaya) which eventually replaces the alayavijnana as the
foundation of his existence. This i s confirmed by X : 7 . 1 : "by r e o r i e n t i n g the
alayavi.]nana, the Dharmakaya i s obtained."
This dharma, which comes from those who have already reached enlighten-
ment, i s c l e a r l y the Mahayana teaching, as the neophyte (adikarmika) Bodhisat-
tvas have the Dk but the ravakas and Pratyekabuddhas have a Vimuktikaya
instead.
Asvabhava (U 395bl-9) explains that the Vimuktikaya i s free ..only from the
klesavarana, whereas the -Dk i s free from both klesavarana and jneyavarana.
However, he then attempts to explain how a Bodhisattva can, at the very onset
of his career, be said to be free from both. He l i k e n s t h i s Bodhisattva to a
prince who has been imprisoned immediately a f t e r r e c e i v i n g abhiseka. When he
i s f i n a l l y freed from prison',, he w i l l immediately regain h i s prerogatives. This
seems to suggest that a p o t e n t i a l Dk i s obtained at the moment of s e t t i n g out
on the Bodhisattva career ,vbut i s -actualized only l a t e r . This notion of acquir-
ing a p o t e n t i a l Dk seems to overlap with that of being born i n the Tathagata's
.
+
28
gotra.
i i . Obtaining the Dharmakaya: The Epistemic Explanation
X:k "How i s the Dharmakaya i n i t i a l l y obtained CT: 'by contact'1?"
Both Vasubandhu and Asvabhava agree that the term "obtained" indicates
that the Dk i s not something "produced" because the body i s perpetual.
101
By Non-Conceptual and Subsequent Awareness*"^
The f i r s t answer to the question of how the Dk i s i n i t i a l l y obtained i s :
X:4.1 " . . . by non-conceptual awareness ( n i r v i k a l p a j nana) and subsequent
awareness (prsthalabdhajnana) which take as t h e i r object the common
Mahayana dharmas."
Vasubandhu does not comment, while Asvabhava (U ^37b28) says only, "the
meaning i s easy to understand," probably because these terms have already been
defined i n e a r l i e r passages which w i l l now be examined.
Chapter II has described the way i n which the p r a c t i t i o n e r begins to
understand the view of r e a l i t y set out i n the f i r s t chapters and hence enters
the Bodhisattva path. 111:12 describes the progress on the path:
By a calm and i n s i g h t f u l world-transcending awareness which
takes as i t s object the common dharmas, and by subsequent m u l t i p l e -
v i j n a p t i awareness, he has attenuated a l l the image-producing
seeds belonging t o the alayavijfiana and strengthened the seed
of contact with the Dharmakaya. A f t e r r e o r i e n t i n g the base, by
p e r f e c t i n g a l l the Buddhadharmas he acquires omniscient aware-
ness. . . .
The subsequent awareness, which'sees everything"arising from
the alayavijnana and merely mental appearances to be l i k e an
i l l u s i o n , arises by i t s very nature free from misapprehensions.
Thus, just as a magician i s free from misapprehensions about the
r e a l i t y of things he has created, so the Bodhisattva, although
speaking of cause and e f f e c t , i s always free from misapprehensions
about them.
102
This i s repeated at I I I : l 4 :
In the ten Bodhisattva bhj'imis . . . . because Cthe Bodhi-
sattva] p r a c t i c e s , for many m i l l i o n s of kalpas, the calm and
i n s i g h t f u l world-transcending awareness which takes as i t s object
the common dharmas and the subsequent awareness, he reorients
h i s bases. In order to obtain the three aspects of the Buddha-
kaya, he has p r a c t i c e d i n t h i s way.
F i n a l l y , i n the d e s c r i p t i o n of the Bodhisattva bhumis at V:2.10:
Why i s the tenth bhumi c a l l e d the dharma-cloud? Because i t s
awareness of a l l dharmas which takes as i t s object the common
Cdharmas1 contains the e n t i r e Cgroup of] means to l i b e r a t i o n
i n v o l v i n g dharartrs and samadhi Cjust as a cloud contains water],
because i t o b l i t e r a t e s major impediments as a cloud o b l i t e r a t e s
the sky, and because i t f i l l s the Dharmakaya.
The commentaries to a l l three passages are s i m i l a r . Despite minor d i f -
ferences i n terminology,, .they a l l deal with the same two types of "awareness"
(jnana), a term never used for ordinary common-sense "awareness-of-something"
(vijnana) but reserved for awareness exercised by the Buddha and Bodhisattva.
The two types of j nana are "calm and i n s i g h t f u l world-transcending aware-
ness which takes as i t s object the common dharmas" and "subsequent awareness."
As Asvabhava (U hl6o5-6) i d e n t i f i e s the f i r s t with the nirvikalpajnana, .these
are the same ideas as i n the o r i g i n a l passage at X:h.
In the phrase "calm and i n s i g h t f u l world-transcending awareness which
takes as i t s object the common dharmas," Asvabhava (U ^l6c6) glosses the terms
103
"calm" and " i n s i g h t f u l " r e s p e c t i v e l y as " i n a state of meditative concentration"
(samahita) and "free from misapprehensions." That i s , they are to he under-
stood i n t h e i r usual sense as meditational terms where "calm" (samatha) r e f e r s
to the untroubled state of mind gained through one-pointed meditation, and
" i n s i g h t " (vipasyana) r e f e r s to the accurate view gained by a mind i n t h i s
state. ^
This awareness i s also "world-transcending" ( l o k o t t a r a ) , glossed by Asva-
bhava (U Ul 6c 5) as "leading to enlightenment" (anasrava) and "free from con-
cepts" ( n i r v i k a l p a ) . That i s , i t aids the^Bodhisattva i n his progress along -
the path but should not be misunderstood as an awareness "of" a transcendent
r e a l i t y , or a class of mental operations y i e l d i n g knowledge about such a r e a l i t y .
F i n a l l y , t h i s awareness takes as i t s object the "common (samsrsta) dharmas'.'
This i s the most puzzling aspect of the term. How.can a non-conceptual aware-
ness have an object? Asvabhava (U 4l6c2) explains that, "common (f^jL yj&. )
dharmas" means that the awareness bears upon ( $$jfL ) the manifest character-
i s t i c s "common" ( ) to a l l things, i . e . , tathata. While a very s i m i l a r
passage (VIII:5) contains no mention of tathata, that term occurs i n the
glosses to both 111:12 and VIII:5. As the use of tathata i n t h i s l i t e r a t u r e
has not been properly studied, and as i t seldom appears i n t h i s t e x t , the few
passages which mention i t have been set aside. In other words, t h i s i s aware-
ness of the r e a l i t y common to a l l perception, a r e a l i t y normally misapprehended
and concretized into variousr.isolated concepts.
While the "subsequent" of "subsequent awareness" (prsthalabdha) can merely
mean "coming a f t e r , " here i t r e f e r s to the state subsequent to meditation when
the calm and i n s i g h t f u l mental a t t i t u d e i s c a r r i e d over into perception of the
ordinary world. As 111:12 says, i t
10k
. . . sees everything a r i s i n g from the alayavijnana and
a l l merely mental appearances to be l i k e an i l l u s i o n , a r i s i n g
by i t s very nature free from misaprehensions.
In terms of the trisvabhava view of t h i s t e x t , by subsequent awareness
one sees the v i j n a p t i , which are paratantra, but appreciates the fact that
31
t h e i r nature i s " l i k e an i l l u s i o n . " Therefore, they are not misapprehended,
32
i . e . , are not p a r i k a l p i t a . "Misapprehension" i s a widely-used term
explained i n the Abhidharmakosa.V:9: "Taking the impermanent as permanent, ,,the
s u f f e r i n g - f i l l e d as s a t i s f y i n g , the impure as pure, and that which has no
atman as-having an atman." Here, Asvabhava (U U l 6 c l 9 - 2 0 ) i d e n t i f i e s misap-
prehensions as erroneous i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of paratantra, i . e . , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s
whose acceptance gives r i s e to p a r i k a l p i t a and whose r e j e c t i o n gives r i s e to
parinispanna.
In 111:12, the non-conceptual and subsequent awareness are said t o :
. . . attentuate a l l the imageproducing seeds belonging
to the alayavijnana, and strengthen the seeds of contact
with the Dharmakaya.
The p r a c t i c e of non-conceptualization weakens the inveterate tendencies to
r e i f y experience. Asvabhava (U l+l 6cl l -12) glosses "seeds of contact with the
Dharmakaya"
3 3
a s
"the influence of having heard much Mahayana [teaching!,"
thus i d e n t i f y i n g i t as a development of the influence which o r i g i n a l l y set the
p r a c t i t i o n e r on the p a t h . ^ This may also explain the phrase "by contact" i n
the Tibetan version of the o r i g i n a l question at X:^+.
The end of t h i s process i s described r e s p e c t i v e l y as "omniscience""
(at 111:12), " t r i p l e Buddhakaya" (111:1"+) and " f i l l i n g
3 6
the Dharmakaya"
105
(V:2.10). As the passages are "very s i m i l a r , i t . is-reasonable'to see these as
synonymous terms. The fact that one speaks of "Buddhakaya" while the other
speaks of a l l three kayas suggests that the Dk i s not merely one of the three
hut can stand for a l l three. They are also synonymous with "omniscient aware-
ness"not an:.infinite extension of.the ordinary epistemie process but., ' as
Asvabhava (uHl6cl.5.-l6) glos.ses, "a s t a i n l e s s and unimpeded jnana."
By the F i v e - f o l d P r a c t i c e
. The second answer to the question of how the Dharmakaya i s f i r s t acquired
i s :
X:h.2 "By the f i v e - f o l d p r a c t i c e . "
Vasubandhu does not comment. Asvabhava (U !+37b28-c5) quotes the explanation
from V:h and also says that the f i v e aspects are no b i r t h , no destruction,
primordial calm, e s s e n t i a l peace, and no self-nature. These two explanations
are apparently a l t e r n a t i v e s .
The explanation at Y:h i s embedded i n a discussion of the ten Bodhisattva
bhumis. The relevant portion i s as follows:
How should we understand the p r a c t i c e of these bhumis? The
Bodhisattva who, on bhumi a f t e r bhumi, p r a c t i s e s samatha and
vipasyana does so by a f i v e - f o l d p r a c t i c e . The f i v e aspects
of i t are:
1. common p r a c t i c e
2. c h a r a c t e r i s t i c l e s s p r a c t i c e
3. spontaneous p r a c t i c e
k. intensive p r a c t i c e
106
5. i n s a t i a b l e p r a c t i c e
By t h i s f i v e - f o l d p r a c t i c e the Bodhisattva achieves f i v e
types of r e s u l t :
1. "In each instant a l l the supports of a f f l i c t i o n are destroyed.
2. He i s freed from various notions and obtains the pleasures
of the garden of the dharma.
3. Accurate awareness of the incommensurable m u l t i p l i c i t y of
appearances of the dharma and the t r u l y endless [manifesta-
tions ofD i t s aspects.
h. The signs^which^,accompany purity^, and.'are not just imagined,
are manifested in-him'.- ..
5. In order that,he may f u l f i l l (paripuri) and perfect
( p a r i n i s p a t t i ) the Dharmakaya, he seizes upon the most
perfect cause.
Asvabhava (U U2l +c28-^25a29) shows that these are a l l meditative techniques
and that each element of the second l i s t i s the respective r e s u l t of each
p r a c t i c e i n the f i r s t .
Asvabhava and Vasubandhu (Bh359b21-2"+) s u b s t a n t i a l l y agree that "the most
perfect cause" i s the " i n s a t i a b l e p r a c t i c e , " i . e . , the t o t a l i t y of h i s prac-
t i c e s up to that time, and that " f u l f i l l m e n t " r e f e r s to the Dk on the tenth
bhumi, while " p e r f e c t i o n " r e f e r s to residence i n the Buddhaland.
This passage strengthens the previous evidence that the Dk i s something
gained e a r l i e r but f u l f i l l e d at the highest stage. It also shows that the Dk,
not just the Sbk, can l i v e i n ( ) a Buddhaland.
107
By Amassing the Accumulation of Equipment on A l l Bhumis
The t h i r d way i n which the Dharmakaya i s obtained i s :
X:k:3 By amassing the accumulation of equipment (sambharasamcaya)
on a l l bhumis.
There i s no commentary here, but at 111:15 and 18 (U l+17b26-28 and U iil8bl6-20)
Asvabhava defines i t as the s t a b i l i z e d p r a c t i c e of the s i x paramitas r e s u l t i n g
from having p r a c t i c e d them throughout innumerable past ages. This i s i n accord
37
with the normal use of the term.
By the Vajropamasamadhi
X:4.H By the Vajropamasamadhi which breaks the d i f f i c u l t - t o - b r e a k
avaranas. Immediately a f t e r t h i s samadhi they are separated
from a l l the avaranas.
1
" ' m
"Vajropamasamadhi" designates the f i n a l state of meditation i n which the
38
l a s t d i f f i c u l t i e s are overcome and f u l l enlightenment achieved. These f i n a l
obstacles to enlightenment (avaranas) are "subtle and d i f f i c u l t to break."
Asvabhava (U *+37c7-8) glosses t h i s as "unemotional non-awareness."^ Ting*
4 0
'
defines these as the l a s t and most d i f f i c u l t obstacles severed by the Buddha
but not by the Arhat. Hence the Buddha achieves omniscience.
That i s , the avaranas are commonly divided into klesavaranas (obstacles
c o n s i s t i n g of b l i n d emotional reaction) and jneyavaranas (obstacles c o n s i s t i n g
of unawareness). The former are more e a s i l y overcome than are the l a t t e r . The
"subtle d i f f i c u l t - t o - b r e a k avaranas" are the l a s t and most d i f f i c u l t of the
1 *
jneyavaranas.
108
X:"+."+ This i s the way i n which r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the-support i s -
obtained.
This c l o s i n g l i n e v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i f i e s obtaining the Dharmakaya with
r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the support. That t h i s "support" i s each of the f i v e
skandhas i s i m p l i c i t i n T and e x p l i c i t i i n H's t r a n s l a t i o n .
i i i . The Dharmakaya as Reorientation of the Skandhas
While the preceding passage has described the a l t e r a t i o n i n the basic
perceptual stance of the aspirant who moves from common man to Dharmakaya,
we may l e g i t i m a t e l y request a more d e t a i l e d account of the changes i n t h i s
i n d i v i d u a l . Such an account i s found at X:5. The explanation at X:5 r e s t s
upon two key terms: " r e o r i e n t a t i o n " ( p a r a v r t t i ) ^ and "sovereignty"
( v i b h u t v a ) . ^
To say that some aspect of the aspirant has been reoriented means that
i t has not been abolished but has been put to a new use within the new
personality.
Asvabhava (U U37cl8-22) explains that the Sravaka, etc., attempts to
abolish h i s misery by destroying the skandhas just as a f o o l i s h leper commits
s u i c i d e . The Bodhisattva attempts to reorient each skandha just as a wise
leper w i l l seek a cure which w i l l transform h i s diseased body into a healthy
one.
Actions which have been reoriented are termed "sovereignties." Ordinary
non-reoriented existence i s composed of skandhas which are forced into a
determinate form by the e f f e c t s of past action (karma). The i n d i v i d u a l i s
trapped into existence i n a c e r t a i n type of world by what appear to be powerful
109
external forces.
The Buddha i s not trapped hut i s himself i n c o n t r o l he exercises
"sovereignty." While ordinary man perceives a s i t u a t i o n forced upon him, the
Buddha creates or manifests a s i t u a t i o n i n response to the needs of others.
Hsuan-tsang c e r t a i n l y understood "sovereignty" i n t h i s sense, as" he repeatedly
t r a n s l a t e s Asvabhava's commentary by: "He obtains the sovereign power of
manifesting . . . "
X:_l By how many sovereignties does the Dharmakaya obtain
sovereignty? The answer i s , i n short, by f i v e of them.
X:5.1 By a r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the rupaskandha i t obtains sover=-
eignty over the Buddhafield, the body, the laksanas, the
minor marks, the i n f i n i t y of phonemes, and the i n v i s i b l e
c r a n i a l mark.
A possible misunderstanding of X:5 can be avoided by bearing i n mind that
the skandhas are not f i v e groups of factors comprising an i n d i v i d u a l . They
are the factors comprising a moment of r e l a t i o n a l e x i s t e n c e i n c l u d i n g the
epistemic subject, the epistemic object, the schemata of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and
the f i n a l perceptions. Therefore, when the text speaks of the rupaskandha
becoming Buddhafields etc., i t i s not portraying the conversion of the i n d i -
vidual's p h y s i c a l form into a cosmic Buddha. It i s simply saying that the
ordinary world (included i n the rupaskandha) i s transformed into a Buddhaland.
The statement at X:5.1 says that the Buddhaland replaces the former
p h y s i c a l world. Asvabhava says they may be gold or s i l v e r according to the
desires of sentient beings..
The Buddha also obtains the a b i l i t y to manifest a body which, according to
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Asvabhava, corresponds to the capacities of beings to be taught, i . e . , the
Nirmanakaya.and Sambhogakaya. While t h i s w i l l be dealt with l a t e r , l e t us note
that "Dharmakaya" i s here used as a general term for Buddhahood,' while., the-
rupakaya i s the s p e c i f i c way i n which i t appears.
The laksanas and minor marks are the 32 major and the 80 minor marks of a
^3
great man. The i n f i n i t y of phonemes r e f e r s to the Buddha's a b i l i t y to speak
to any sentient being i n any s i t u a t i o n .
The i n v i s i b l e (to gods and men) c r a n i a l mark i s the usntsa, or - f l e s h y
kk
protuberance on the - crown of the headT' - The author's reason for mentioning i t
here i s obscure.
X:5.2 By a r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the vedanaskaridha i t obtains sover-
eignty over the irreproachable, immeasurable, vast happy
residences.
The vedanaskaridha i s the second l o g i c a l moment i n perception. When sense
object and f a c u l t y are juxtaposed, the immediate r e s u l t i f v e d a n a " s e n s a t i o n "
the f e e l i n g of pleasure, pain or i n d i f f e r e n c e which i s inherent i n any normal
perception, and over which one has no c o n t r o l . These sensations are the basis
of involvement i n samsara.
The text i s saying that, for the Dk, reoriented vedana i s a sovereignty
c a l l e d "residence." Asvabhava explains that "irreproachable" means that there
are no klesas, "immense" that they are replete with gunas, and "vast" that
they surpass a l l the pleasures of the t r i p l e world.
It i s not clear i f t h i s i s one residence or several, or i f sukhavihara i s
synonymous with brahmavihara (of X:10). However, i t i s clear that f e e l i n g -
toned reactions (klesas) based on past encounters with a c e r t a i n class of
I l l
object have "been replaced by " b l i s s " (sukha)a transcendent pleasure grounded
i n the attitude of the Buddha rather than the appearance of the object.
X:5-3 By r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the samjnaskandha i t obtains sover-
eignty over explaining groups"of names, of statements, and
of phonemes.
The samjnaskandha i s the aspect of the perceptual process i n which the
perception, having acquired the feeling-tone of vedana, i s i d e n t i f i e d as a
c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c by the a f f i x a t i o n of a verbal l a b e l . In Buddhist
thought such l a b e l s are discussed under the theory of "names, statements and
phonemes."^ When reoriented the samjnaskandha becomes the a b i l i t y to master
t h i s v e r b a l i z a t i o n . As there are various theories, and Vasubandu and Asvabhava
disagree on the exact import of t h i s passage, i t i s probably unwise to push
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n much further.
X:5.^ By a r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the samskafaskandha i t obtains
sovereignty over creation (nifmana), transformation,con-
vening the great assemblies, and c o l l e c t i n g white dharmas.
The samskaraskandha i s the c o l l e c t i o n of personal predispositions which
have been b u i l t up through past experience i n t h i s and former l i v e s . They are
the forces d r i v i n g the i n d i v i d u a l into c e r t a i n types of action which lead him
to c e r t a i n types of perception. Asvabhava (u *+38a8) says that here the author
i s r e a l l y speaking about cetana, "motivation,"^
6
the a l l - i n c l u s i v e samskara.
In the Dk t h i s has been reoriented to y i e l d the sovereignty of creating
appearances and.of transforming things ' as -desired, of bringing together great
assemblies of those who wish to l e a r n , and of bringing together white dharmas.
112
Again, the basic idea i s a switch from being driven into s i t u a t i o n s
(cetana), to being able to create appropriate ones.
X: 5 . 5 By a r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the vijnanaskandha i t obtains sover-
eignty over the m i r r o r - l i k e j nana, the self-same j nana,
the contemplative
1
jnana, and the action-accomplishing jnana.
In abhidharmic thought the vijSanaskandha i s the f i f t h skandha, the f u l l -
fledged feeling-toned recognition of an object a r i s i n g from the preceding
process. In the Vijnanavada, vijflana r e t a i n s t h i s sense but i s also elevated
to an overarching framework within which the other skandhas f i n d t h e i r place.
While t h i s was not e n t i r e l y absent i n e a r l i e r schools insofar as each skandha
could be described only as an aspect of a process i n c l u d i n g a l l , i t s d e t a i l e d
development became a major concern of the Vijnanavadins, who posited four
s t r a t a of vijnana. F i r s t , the alayavijnana which stores the b i j a s and serves
as the ground for the others. Second, the klistamanas as the locus of
atmadrsti (the idea of the s e l f as a d i s c r e t e e n t i t y ) , which discriminates and
divides. Third, a r i s i n g from the klistamanas, the manovijnana, the c e n t r a l
synthesizing-discriminating consciousness where concepts are formed from sense
data. F i n a l l y , the sense data from each of the f i v e sense f a c u l t i e s are _
c a l l e d a vijnana and the f i v e together are c a l l e d p r a v r t t i v i j n a n a " a c t i v e
vijnana."
As each of these four classes of vijKana i s reoriented, an "accurate
awareness" (jnana)"results..
The sense i n which t h i s jnana i s an "accurate" awareness i s explained by
the trisvabhava theory of chapter I I . The jnana i s not an awareness of the
r e a l thing, nor i s i t some amorphous mystical experience. Both common man and
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Buddha f i n d themselves engaged i n a perceptual s i t u a t i o n (.paratantra). The
common man r e i f i e s h i s perceptions and mistakes them f o r objects ( p a r i k a l p i t a ) .
The Buddha sees through t h i s r e i f i c a t i o n and so understands the perceptions to
be just that (parinispanna). The former type of perception i s vi-jnana,
"awareness of c e r t a i n things," while the l a t t e r i s jnana, "accurate awareness."
The r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the alayavijnana gives the " M i r r o r - l i k e jnana" which
provides an accurate r e f l e c t i o n unhindered by s p a t i a l or temporal b a r r i e r s .
The r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the klistamanas y i e l d s the self-same jnana which i s aware
of the lack of difference between oneself and others and so i s able to manifest
images of the Buddha as required.
The r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the manovijnana y i e l d s the "Contemplation-jnana"
which i s the reasoning aspect of the Buddha.
F i n a l l y , the f i v e sensory vijnanas are reoriented to obtain the "Action-
accomplishing jnana" which comprises the various a c t i v i t i e s of a Buddha. Thus,
the entire Dkperception and a c t i v i t y i s included i n X:_5.
b. The Dharmakaya What Is It?
In the preceding sections we have seen that, ,inthe Mahayanasamgraha, the
Dharmakaya, having both e f f e c t i v e and noetic aspects, i s a synonym for Buddha-
hood. These sections have shown the c o n t i n u i t y of common man and Dk by
l i m i t i n g t h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n to those sets of concepts applicable to both, and
by s t r e s s i n g the p r a c t i c e s , e s p e c i a l l y the meditative ones, which e f f e c t the
t r a n s i t i o n from one to the other.
However, the Dk i s not simply the terminus of the praxis but i s also a
new r e a l i t y . We may legitimately.; ask-, "What i s i t ? " as well as - "What was
i t ? " As t h e r e - i s ho metalanguage i n which a "true" description of the
Ilk
Dharmakaya may he framed (see X:3-5= " i n c o n c e i v a b i l i t y "*),.. Asanga i s l i m i t e d to
.the Abhidharmic concepts which-were the standard t o o l s of Buddhist-reasoning.
He attacks from a v a r i e t y of angles with various questions, each y i e l d i n g a
d i f f e r e n t type of^answer; -
Interpreting these r e d u c t i o n i s t i c answers presents a formidable challenge.
F i r s t , the Abhidharmic language, which i s i t s e l f mysterious to us, must be
t r a n s l a t e d into contemporary concepts. The more serious problem arises from
the fact that Asanga has done only part of the task. Chapter X of the Mahayana-
samgraha i s not a systematic t r e a t i s e on Buddhahood, but i s more l i k e a c o l l e c -
t i o n of materials toward such a work. Even with the commentator's opinions,
t h i s doctrine i s merely nascent. Implications are not worked'-out, minor
inconsistencies remain unresolved, loose ends abound, and nowhere has a simple
theory of the Dk been separated from the confusing mass of d e t a i l s .
Since Asanga's approaches follow no d i s c e r n i b l e pattern, they w i l l simply
be taken as they occur.
i . C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s (laksanas) of the Dharmakaya
The Dharmakaya has f i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s :
X:3.1 Reorientation: because it:'_is reoriented toward the destruc-
t i o n of a l l obstacles belonging to the samklesa aspect
of the paratantra svabhava and Cit i s reoriented] toward
obtaining l i b e r a t i o n from a l l the obstacles to sovereignty
over the dharmas; and .because_it i s reoriented toward the
presence of the pure aspect-of paratantra.
This passage i s very concise because " r e o r i e n t a t i o n " has already been
115
described i n d e t a i l at IX:1-2, where the notion that the world i s renounced,
upon reaching enlightenment i s integrated within the Vijnanavada. The key.
passage (IX:.l) reads:. "Renunciationis the Bodhisattva's- non-abiding
nirvana. Its laksana i s the r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the double support, i . e . ,
r e j e c t i n g the samklesas while not r e j e c t i n g samsara." That i s , "renunciation"
does not imply an escape from the world, but only from those disturbing
emotions' (samklesa) which are c o n t i n u a l l y d r i v i n g man into improper, misery-
inducing perceptions and reactions. This in-the-world-but-not-of-it state,
c a l l e d "non-abiding" ( a p r a t i s t h i t a ) nirvana, i s characterized by "reorien-
t a t i o n . "
Here, at X:3.1, Asanga places t h i s idea within the structure of the Mahaya-
nasamgraha by r e l a t i n g i t to the trisvabhava doctrine. The "double support"
whose r e o r i e n t a t i o n constitutes renunciation i s simply the p ar at ant r a- s vab ha va,
the "given-ness" of a perceptual s i t u a t i o n . The term "double" points to the
ambiguity of t h i s s i t u a t i o n , which may be experienced e i t h e r as a determinate
world or as an occasion for enlightened action. The f i r s t of these p o s s i b i l i -
t i e s i s explained i n chapter I I I . An i n d i v i d u a l becomes more deeply enmeshed
i n samsara when the emotional reactions attached to h i s b e l i e f i n h i s own
ultimate r e a l i t y force him to ascribe a f a l s e ultimate r e a l i t y to the given
(paratantra) perceptual s i t u a t i o n , thus transforming i t into a t o t a l l y
imaginary ( p a r i k a l p i t a ) perception. On the other hand, there i s also the
p o s s i b i l i t y of c o r r e c t l y appreciating (parinispanna) the true nature of the
perceptual s i t u a t i o n and, rather then r e i f y i n g i t , simply acting properly upon
i t . This i s the perceptual process of the enlightened i n d i v i d u a l .
Therefore,-.Asanga i s saying that when the sutras apply the term "renuncia-
t i o n " to a Buddha they do not mean that he has become cut-off from experience.
116
They mean that h i s reaction i n a perceptual s i t u a t i o n i s an accurate apprecia-
t i o n rather than a r e i f i c a t i o n .
Furthermore, at IX:2.5-6, Asanga distinguishes the Hinayana r e o r i e n t a t i o n
from the Mahayana r e o r i e n t a t i o n , and l i s t s the "advantages" (anusamsa) of the
l a t t e r . This provides yet another capsule d e f i n i t i o n of Buddhahood. IX:2.6
reads: " . . . The. Bodhisattvas understand dharmanairatmya, and, considering
samsara to he peaceful, they sever a l l the disturbing emotions but do not
abandon Cthe worldD. . ." The advantages of t h i s are: "Being grounded i n
t h e i r own r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the base, they obtain sovereignty over a l l samsaric
things. By manifesting.appropriate sentient bodies to the d i f f e r e n t classes
of.Miving beings, ..they use t h e i r p r o s e l y t i z i n g s k i l l s to a i d the converted
beings to obtain the highest b i r t h s and to set out on the three s p i r i t u a l
careers (yanas)."
.That i s , a reoriented, accurate appreciation of the true nature of the
perceived world automatically e n t a i l s a compassionate involvement with helping
others i n i t .
This brings us to the second c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the Dk,- i t s true nature.
X:3.2 Having white dharmas as i t s r e a l nature (svabhava), because
the ten masteries (vasita) are obtained through the f u l f i l l -
ment of the s i x paramitas.
To the d i r e c t question, "What r e a l l y i s the nature of the Dk?" Asanga
r e p l i e s that i t i s not a s t u f f (vastu) of any k i n d i t i s a b i l i t y . Nor i s i t
simply an indiscriminate omnipotence, but a s p e c i f i c set of a b i l i t i e s which
have been developed by long p r a c t i c e on the Bodhisattva stages. These a b i l -
i t i e s are indicated by the term "white dharmas," which.are here synonymous
with the "masteries."'
4
^
It i s d i f f i c u l t to imagine a stronger possible affirmation of the
continuity between the i n d i v i d u a l who has set out on the Mahayana path and the
Dk which i s the eventual r e s u l t . The true nature of the l a t t e r i s simply the
developed a b i l i t i e s which have been c u l t i v a t e d by the former.
Each of the ten masteries i s described. Asvabhava's explanations
(U i+36bli+-l8) are i n square brackets.
(1) By f u l f i l l i n g the danaparamita the Bodhisattva obtains
the ayurvasita [ a b i l i t y to abandon l i f e of one's own free
w i l l l , the c i t t a v a s i t a [ a b i l i t y to undergo transmigration
without being s o i l e d ! and the pariskara (sambhara) v a s i t a
[ a b i l i t y to accumulate food, drink, etc., as one wishes!.
(2) By f u l f i l l i n g the silaparamita the Bodhisattva obtains
the karmavasita [ a b i l i t y to do only good a c t s ! and the
upapattivasita [ a b i l i t y to be born i n whichever destiny
one wishes!.
(3) By f u l f i l l i n g the ksantiparamita the Bodhisattva obtains
the adhimuktivasita [ a b i l i t y to change a land to gold, etc.,
simply by forming as a s p i r a t i o n to do so!.
(k) By f u l f i l l i n g the viryaparamita the Bodhisattva obtains
the pranidhanavasita [ a b i l i t y to r e a l i z e one's vowsl.
(5) By f u l f i l l i n g the dhyanaparamita the Bodhisattva obtains
the rddhi v a s i t a [ a b i l i t y to accomplish a l l types of
miraculous deeds! that . goes along with the f i v e abhijna.
(6) By f u l f i l l i n g the prajnaparamita the Bodhisattva obtains
the jnanavailita C r o u g h l y a b i l i t y t r u l y to understand
teaching], and the dharmavasita [ a b i l i t y to preach as one
wishes].
In each case the forces which drive an ordinary man through samsara have
been mastered and can now be used by the Dk f o r the b e n e f i t of others. There-
fore, the true nature of the Dharmakaya i s mastery.
A c l o s e l y r e l a t e d passage appears at X : l . l : "The Svabhavikakaya i s the
Tathagata's Dharmakaya because i t i s the support for sovereignty (vibhutva)
over a l l the dharmas." Asvabhava (U l 436al - 5) suggests two explanations of the
term Dharmakaya. E i t h e r , " i t i s c a l l e d Dharmakaya because the nature of the
dharma (dharmata) i s to be a body," or, " i t i s c a l l e d Dharmakaya because i t i s
the support for a l l dharmas." The phrase, ". . . because i t i s the support for
sovereignty over a l l dharmas," i s glossed as ". . . because i t i s the support
for obtaining sovereignty over a l l dharmas."
That i s , kaya implies both a coherent organic u n i t , and a support or
occasion for something, just as a human body supports human a c t i v i t i e s .
X: 3 . 3 Non-duality (advaya):
(a) Of Being and Non-Being, because Con the one hand] none "of"
the dharmas e x i s t s , Chut on the other hand] t h e i r character-
i s t i c , sunyata, r e a l l y does e x i s t .
(b) Of samskrta and asamskrta because Con-the one. hand! i t i s
not caused by karma or klesas, Chut on the other hand] i t
does possess the sovereignty of being able to appear as
conditioned.
119
(c) Of p l u r a l i t y and unity, because Con the one hand! the
support of a l l the Buddhas i s not d i f f e r e n t i a b l e , [while.on
the other] innumerable streams of existence are enlightened.
This passage presents two d i f f i c u l t i e s : that caused by the three sets of
unfamiliar concepts, and the fundamental one of grasping the sense of advaya.
The three sets are unexplained simply because Asanga presupposes an under-
standing of them. The f i r s t , existence/non-existence of the dharmas, harks
back to the dichotomizing analyses of the early Buddhist schools, e s p e c i a l l y
of the Vaibhasikas. They began with experiences. These were f i r s t divided
into those which were believed to represent existent things ("being"), and
those which were i l l u s o r y ("non-being"), the outcome of the i n t e r p l a y of the
true existence. The existents were further divided i n t o samskrta, which
p a r t i c i p a t e i n the i n t e r a c t i o n which engenders the i l l u s o r y , and the asamskrta
which do not, and which thus become the key to the eventual destruction of the
i l l u s o r y . This reduction of the existent continued u n t i l a c e r t a i n set of
fundamental things (dharmas) were posited. In addition, the process by which
the i l l u s o r y non-existents gain credence was also analyzed. Near the basis of
t h i s process was found the tendency to divide experiences into "mine" and
"others," a tendency v i r t u a l l y synonymous with the " u n i t y / p l u r a l i t y " of our
passage (Ui+37aT-8).
This passage emphasizes the inadequacy of the o l d analysis i n the face of
Mahayana ideas. F i r s t , the d i s t i n c t i o n between the concretely existent and the
i l l u s o r y f a i l s when one takes the Mahayana p o s i t i o n (developed at great length
i n the prajnaparamita l i t e r a t u r e ) that none of the dharmas are concrete r e a l -
i t i e s . This does not simply mean that everything i s s h i f t e d to the non-being
category. These dharmas do have one t r u l y existent a s p e c t t h e fact that they
120
are characterized by sunyata,- whichyon a purely predicative l e v e l , implies a
complete absence of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . " ^ While t h i s has s h i f t e d the sense of
the term " e x i s t i n g " from "being a concrete t h i n g " to "being an absolutely true
f a c t , " the l a t t e r i s merely a wider d e f i n i t i o n of the same type, not a new
l i n e of thought. We must remember that even the Vaibhasikas did not regard
the dharmas as r e a l i n the common Western sense of being s e l f - e x i s t e n t e n t i t i e s .
Secondly, the d i s t i n c t i o n between'samskrta and asamskrta f a i l s . In Abhi-
dharma thought samskrta ("put together") r e f e r s to the factors composing a
moment i n the r e l a t i o n a l existence of an ordinary being. They are brought
together i n t h i s moment by past action (karma) and automatic reactions estab-
l i s h e d by past experience (klesa). The a c t i v i t i e s of t h i s assemblage set up
the conditions for future combination. The asamskrta, on the other hand,
a r i s e from a c e r t a i n few actions such as meditation, but do not engender
future combinations of dharmas. Hence, t h e i r production breaks down samsara,
and leads to nirvana. The Mahayana concept of Dharmakaya does not submit to
such an analysis. It i s not brought about by karma or k l e s a but by the v a r i -
ous practices already outlined. While t h i s might be said of the t r a d i t i o n a l
asamskrta, the Dk cannot simply be asamskrta since i t leads not simply to
nirvana but to future appearances i n samsara.
F i n a l l y , the u n i t y / p l u r a l i t y category also f a i l s . This point i s very
important'.to Asanga since i t becomes v i r t u a l l y synonymous with the question of
how many Buddhas are i n existence. His denial of unity i s e a s i l y understood.
Insofar as many i n d i v i d u a l s obtain Dharmakayas upon reaching enlightenment,
there are many Dharmakayas. His further contention, that the concept of
multiple Dharmakayas i s also unsatisfactory, i s more complex. He says that
the Dk cannot be e n t i r e l y p l u r a l because "the support of a l l Buddhas i s not
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d i f f e r e n t i a b l e (T: 'not m u l t i p l e ' ) . " To t h i s Asanga has appended two stanzas
which have been commented upon by Asvabhava.
The second stanza (X:3.3b) gives a v a r i e t y of reasons f o r which the idea
of e i t h e r one Buddha or many i s unacceptable. I t s place here suggests that
Asanga d i d not d i f f e r e n t i a t e between "Buddha" and "Dharmakaya." Asvabhava's
commentary t o the f i r s t stanza ( l A37a6-13) says that the concept of p l u r a l i t y
does not apply t o the Dharmakaya because t h i s concept i s based on a d i v i s i o n
of the world i n t o " I " and "others," a d i v i s i o n not made by a Dharmakaya. This
curious reasoning b r i n g s us t o the heart of the problem. .By appealing t o the
p u b l i c , observable f a c t that, many i n d i v i d u a l s have reached enlightenment,
Asanga has proven that the Dk cannot be u n i t a r y . That i s , the o r d i n a r y man has
made a common sense and (to the b e l i e v e r ) v e r i f i a b l e observation. Now, t o
support h i s d e n i a l of the e n t i r e t r u t h of the conclusions drawn from that
o b s e r v a t i o n , Asanga appeals t o a p u r e l y i n t e r n a l , p r i v a t e f a c t about the Dk's
perceptions. Suddenly he i s no longer speaking about how the Dk appears t o
the observer, but about how the observer appears t o the Dk'. Our task i n under-
standing t h i s s e c t i o n now becomes one of f i n d i n g a hermeneutical framework
which w i l l r e s o l v e the apparent confusion.
At t h i s p o i n t i t w i l l be h e l p f u l t o d i s t i n g u i s h the general Buddhist use
of the term advaya from the Vedantic a d v a i t a which i s a l s o o f t e n t r a n s l a t e d by
"non-dual." The Buddhist term never stands f o r an u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d r e a l i t y
u n d e r l y i n g appearances, w h i l e the Vedantic one may. As T. R. V. M u r t i says:
Advaya i s knowledge f r e e from the d u a l i t y of the extremes
of ' I s ' and 'Is not,' Being and Becoming, e t c . I t i s knowledge
f r e e d of conceptual d i s t i n c t i o n s . A d v a i t a i s knowledge of
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n l e s s e n t i t y . . . . 'Advaya' i s a p u r e l y
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l approach, the a d v a i t a i s o n t o l o g i c a l . 5 1
122
In the present instance, t h i s should warn against an overly l i t e r a l
understanding of the English t r a n s l a t i o n of advaya laksana as a "non-dual
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the Dharmakaya." Asanga i s not a s c r i b i n g a q u a l i t y to an
existent thing. Such a q u a l i t y would be a svabhava and would belong i n the
previous passage (X:3.2). Asanga i s not making any assertions about the
o n t o l o g i c a l status of e i t h e r Dk or perceiver of i t . Once we "go behind" the
d i v i s i o n into " i " and "other," our question about "Whose perception?" must be
dropped, as i t i s an o n t o l o g i c a l l y based one which simply cannot occur within
t h i s system. I f the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c "non-dual" describes the process of percep-
t i o n rather than either subject or object, the problem becomes, "What does i t
reveal about t h i s process?" I can see no a l t e r n a t i v e to concluding that "non-
dual" defines the viewpoint or stance of the perceiver. That i s , a stance from
which one simultaneously perceives, on a conventional l e v e l , the Bodhisattvas
reaching Buddhahood, and on an ultimate l e v e l , the lack of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n
between Buddhas. This b i f o c a l view i s developed e a r l i e r i n t h i s text ( i l l ,
the trisvabhava) and i s the subject of the entire Madhyantavibhaga. This
d e f i n i t i o n would also apply to the e a r l i e r points (a) and (b) of the above-
quoted passage.
X:3.4 Perpetuity, because i t i s characterized by the p u r i f i c a t i o n
of the true nature, i t i s the outcome of a former vow, and
i t s a c t i v i t y i s never completed.
I t would seem natural to extend the reasoning of the preceding section on
non-duality to the t r a n s i t o r y / e t e r n a l dichotomy which, for schools l i k e the
Vaibhasikas, was v i r t u a l l y synonymous with the samskrta/asamskrta categories.
Asanga's clear statement to the contrary warns us that the subject i s much more
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complex. He i s not merely e s t a b l i s h i n g a method for avoiding any extremes,
but i s making assertions about s p e c i f i c cases.
He takes the same b i f o c a l view as i n the previous section, seeing the
Dharmakaya i n both an ultimate and a r e l a t i v e sense. But he now finds the
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c "perpetuity" applicable to both views. The argument that from
a worldly standpoint the Dk i s perpetual,'because i t s a c t i v i t y i s never,
completed, i s e a s i l y understood. Note that t h i s unceasing a c t i v i t y i s not an
e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , but an observable fact about the Dk. Note also that
again the Dk_ i t s e l f i s capable of a c t i o n with no reference to a Sambhogakaya
or a Nirmanakaya.
The former-vow argument i s much the same. The Bodhisattva on the way to
acquiring t h i s Dharmakaya has vowed to continue acting i n the world so long as
sentient beings require h i s a i d ; and, since many have s t i l l not reached nirvana,
the Dharmakaya continues to act. Again, i t s continuation i s grounded i n the
common world: f i r s t , through a vow taken by the Bodhisattva; second, through
the a c t i v i t i e s of others. The l o g i c of t h i s w i l l be worked out i n d e t a i l by
use of the t r i k a y a at X:37-39.
F i n a l l y , the Dk i s also perpetual i n the ultimate sense because i t i s
characterized by a pure true nature (tathata), which Asvabhava (u437b7-8) says
i s perpetual and immutable.
This r a i s e s a major problem of Vijnanavada scholarship. Asanga makes
statementssuch as "the Dharmakaya i s eternal"
:
which appear to attach the
same predicate to an object from both the ultimate and the conventional view-
points, and by these to explain the way i n which the two i n t e r a c t . For example,
the fact that the Dk i s e t e r n a l l y present i s the basis for i t s constant work
for the welfare of a l l sentient beings. To be able to do t h i s , Asanga p o s i t s
12k
a "true nature" (tathata) which, as the ultimate object, hears the predicate.
This reduces many problems to one"What i s tathata?" I f i t i s a t r u l y e x i s -
tent r e a l s t u f f , then t h i s doctrine d i f f e r s r a d i c a l l y from that i n the rest of
t h i s system (or indeed, of any Buddhist system). I f not, how can one p o s s i b l y
c a l l i t perpetual any more than existent? While t h i s question i s examined i n
the Vijnanavada sastras, i t does not seem to concern the author of t h i s text.
X: 3 . 5 Inconceivable (acintya), because i t s true, pure nature
must be known by i n t r o s p e c t i o n , because there i s no worldly
equivalent, and because i t i s not an object for speculative
reasoners.
Asvabhava explains that the phrase, " . . . because there i s no worldly
equivalent, and because i t i s not the object for speculative reasoners," i s an
abbreviation i n d i c a t i n g the entire process of reaching a f i r m l o g i c a l conclu-
sion, including reasoning, r e f l e c t i o n , meditation, speculation and examples.
That i s , the ultimate nature.of the Dharmakaya i s inconceivable because i t
53
cannot be ascertained by normal reasoning.
However, there must be some sense i n which the true nature of the Dk i s
knowable, otherwise the entire concept of a Dk would be merely a l o g i c a l
a r t i f a c t p a r i k a l p i t a rather than parinispanna. This sense i s defined by,
" i t s true, pure nature must be known by i n t r o s p e c t i o n . " Although our commen-
t a r i e s leave " i n t r o s p e c t i o n " ^ ^ undefined, t h i s term i s common throughout the
Mahayana debates on perception. It r e f e r s to the Vijnanavada b e l i e f that
primary sense-data are a source of absolutely v a l i d knowledge ( i . e . , knowledge
of the "true, pure nature," nirmalatathata) which may be either c o r r e c t l y appre-
c i a t e d or misapprehended. Other Buddhist schools, p a r t i c u l a r l y the Prasangika,
125
rejected t h i s d o c t r i n e . ^ Therefore, Asanga i s maintaining that the r e a l
nature of the Dk can be appreciated only by d i r e c t experience of i t rather
than by reasoning about i t .
i i . X: 7 The Buddhadharmas
Asvabhava (U,U38c25) explains that the question, "How many Buddhadharmas
are involved i n the Dharmakaya?" i s a request for information about the true
nature (svabhava) of the Dk. The ensuing l i s t of s i x Buddhadharmas which
comprise the svabhava i s r e l a t e d to the laksanas v i a X : 3 . 1 , " r e o r i e n t a t i o n
laksana." Each reoriented aspect of the Bodhisattva r e s u l t s i n an a t t r i b u t e
which belongs to the svabhava of the Dk. There also may be some r e l a t i o n s h i p
v i a X : 3 . 2 , "having-white-dharmas-as-svabhava-laksana," but Asvabhava glosses
them i n quite d i f f e r e n t ways..
The f i r s t Buddhadharma i s :
X: 7 . 1 P u r i f i c a t i o n (visuddhi) because by r e o r i e n t i n g the alaya-
v i jnana, the Dharmakaya" "Is obtained.
Asvabhava (u.U38c26-l+39a3) explains that the Dharmakaya i s "pure" as i t i s
free from the tendencies to b l i n d emotional reactions (samklesabij a). Thus,
the Dk i s fundamentally defined as that which i s free from klesas. As these
are factors which drive the i n d i v i d u a l i n t o i n c r e a s i n g l y unhappy s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h i s point may be p o s i t i v e l y expressed by saying that the Dk i s that which can
control or dominate (vasita) i t s s i t u a t i o n , an idea already seen at X : 3 . 2 and
developed below at X: 7 ^.
We have already encountered the idea of r e o r i e n t i n g the alayavijnana at
X : 5 . 5 . However, there the reoriented alayavijnana was the M i r r o r - l i k e
126
awareness. Here, i t i s the Dk i t s e l f . This apparent contradiction i s due to
d i f f e r e n t ways of regarding the alayavijnana. At X:5 i t was the basis of the
perceptual process. Here, i t i s the container f o r impure tendencies.
X:7.2 Result (vipaka) because by r e o r i e n t i n g the rupendriya, the
vipakavijnana i s obtained.
Vipaka may simply mean that one thing i s the outcome or r e s u l t of another.
In the AbhidharmakoIa i t indicates that something ( e s p e c i a l l y an indriya)
pertains to a l i v i n g being and arises from e a r l i e r causes but i s not i t s e l f
good or bad. For example, the j i v i t e n d r i y a , the simple f a c t of being a l i v e ,
i s vipaka because the i n d i v i d u a l i s a l i v e through his past.action, yet has the
option .,of ' moving toward e i t h e r samsara or nirvana.
The present passage retains t h i s general meaning. When the material sense
organs (rupendriya) of the Bodhisattva are reoriented, he obtains a new type
of awareness (jnana). By l a b e l l i n g t h i s awareness "vipaka," Asanga stresses -
the idea that the Buddha's awareness reveals no new and independent r e a l i t y to
which the Bodhisattva i s suddenly opened upon reaching enlightenment, but i s
the outcome of the Bodhisattva's previous state. Therefore, i t i s the very
nature of the Dharmakaya to be grounded i n the sensory l i f e of the Bodhisattva.
X:7.3 Residence (vihara) because by r e o r i e n t i n g the residences,
such as the a c t i v e - l i f e - o f - d e s i r e residence, etc., the
immeasurable jnana-residence i s obtained.
By s t r e s s i n g the transformation, rather than the elimination, of a spe-
c i f i c r e l a t i o n s h i p to the world (vihara), the idea of an u t t e r l y transcendent
Dharmakaya i s rejected. The l i f e dominated by worldly desire i s replaced by
one dominated by immeasurable'jfiana.
Obviously, vihara, l i k e the previous two Buddhadharmas, deals with the
Buddha's awareness. The model here i s one of broadening, from a l i f e of
reacting to a c e r t a i n narrow range of pleasurable s t i m u l i , to an a b i l i t y to
take i n and appreciate the immeasurable richness of r e a l i t y .
J.:J.k Sovereignty", '..^-because, by r e o r i e n t i n g the various l u c r a t i v e
actions, t:he; sovereignty of the jnana, which i s abhijna
unhindered throughout a l l the regions of the world, i s
obtained.
The " l u c r a t i v e actions" are worldly occupations such as a g r i c u l t u r e and
commerce. The "jnana which i s abhijna unhindered throughout a l l the regions of
the world" i s not a member of the t r a d i t i o n a l l i s t of a b h i j n a s . ^ Asvabhava
(U439al0-12) seems to hold that i t r e f e r s to the entire l i s t , to the general
idea of abhijna.
This passage c l e a r l y indicates that the s h i f t from common man to Dharma-
kaya does not displace the cognizing i n d i v i d u a l from h i s c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n . I t
seems to mean that h i s " l u c r a t i v e " a s s i m i l a t i o n of the world i s replaced by
unhindered appreciation of i t .
X:7>5 Discursus (vyavahara)v vecause, by "reorienting the- discursus
of everything seen, heard, f e l t , and known, the sovereignty
c o n s i s t i n g of-.the awareness which s a t i s f i e s the. mind of a l l
centient beings i s obtained.
Asvabhava (uU39al2-15) seems to understand by t h i s that ordinary ways of
speaking about experience become, for the Dharmakaya, a way of speaking which
128
i s i n e v i t a b l y able to s a t i s f y (Lamotte: "charm") a l l sentient beings. I f t h i s
i s Asanga's meaning, there i s no idea of the Dk i n h a b i t i n g some i n e f f a b l e
absolute. Ordinary speech simply changes to pleasing speech.
X:7.6 Expulsion (samudghta), because, hy. r e o r i e n t i n g toward an
expulsion of s u f f e r i n g and f a u l t s , a destruction of the
s u f f e r i n g and f a u l t s of a l l sentient beings i s obtained.
Following Asvabhava (U*l39al5-l8), because the Dharmakaya has expelled i t s
own s u f f e r i n g and f a u l t s , i t can then destroy the s u f f e r i n g and f a u l t s of
others. This i s possible because the r e o r i e n t a t i o n y i e l d s the marvelous
awareness that destroys the sufferings and f a u l t s of others.
i i i . X:9-27 Gunas Associated with the Dharmakaya
F i n a l l y , the Dharmakaya i s described by a'set of q u a l i t i e s (gunas).
Unlike the inherent c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s (laksanas) or fundamental nature (dharma),
the gunas are merely "associated with" (samprayukta; T: dang-ldan-par; H:
) the Dk. This term u s u a l l y i n d i c a t e s : e x i s t e n t i a l conjunction without
r a i s i n g the question of e s s e n t i a l b a s i s . Here, Asvabhava (U^39bl2) regards i t
as an i n d i c a t i o n that these gunas are not exclusive to the Dk but also occur
with the Sravakas, and so on. Perhaps because the e s s e n t i a l basis for them
does not come into question, t h i s passage affords l i t t l e fresh i n s i g h t into
the, author's p r i n c i p l e s .
These gurtas are, i n f a c t , merely an o l d and widely accepted set of concom-
i t a n t s to Buddhahood... . The .fact that 'this , t r a d i t i o n a l "list... i s . there applied to
the Dk i s yet another i n d i c a t i o n that, for Asanga, "Buddhahood" equals
"Dharmakaya."
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This p a r t i c u l a r l i s t and explanatory karikas are drawn d i r e c t l y from the
Mahayanasutralaxtkara, XXI:43-59. As they are well known and as Lamotte has
provided excellent references t o other texts i n which they are discussed and
defined,
6
"^" I have simply reproduced the basic l i s t below, and have paraphrased
rather than t r a n s l a t e d a few of the more obscure ideas.
X:10 The four immeasurables (apramana).
X : l l The eight freedoms-from (vimoksa), the e i g h t f o l d non-disturbing
perception (abhibhvayatana); and the ten all-bases (krt snayat ana).
X:12 The a b i l i t y to prevent emotional reactions i n others (arana).
X:13 The awareness which i s an outcome of the Bodhisattva vow
(pranidhijnana).
X:lk The four aspects of expertise i n the study and proclamation of
62
the dharma (pratisamvid).
X:15 The s i x superior knowledges (abhijna).
X:l6 The thirty-two major and eighty minor marks of a superior man.
Asanga lays very l i t t l e stress on these. When he l a t e r d i s t r i b u t e s the
Dk's a t t r i b u t e s among the three kayas, he does not r e a l l y say whether the
Nirmanakaya or Sambhogakaya exhibits them. They remain simply "associated
with" Buddhahood.
X:17 The f o u r f o l d universal p u r i t y (sarvakaraparisuddhi).
X:l8 The ten powers (bala).
X:19 The four grounds for self-confidence (vais"aradya).
X:20 The t h r e e f o l d absence of anything-to-conceal (araksya), and the
three applications of mindfulness (smrtyupasthana).
X:21 The t o t a l destruction of habitual reactions (vasanasamudghata).
X:22 Opportune a i d to others (asammosata).
X:23 Great compassion (mahakaruna).
X:2h The eighteen a t t r i b u t e s s p e c i f i c to the Buddha (avenika
Buddhadharmah)..
X:25 Universal awareness (sarvakarajnata).
X:26 F u l f i l l m e n t of the s i x perfections (paramitaparipuri).
Asvabhava's commentary on universal awareness (X:25) and the summary
(X:2T) w i l l be examined l a t e r , as they contain information on the t r i k a y a .
c. The Dharmakaya as -Seen by the Bodhisattva
The d e s c r i p t i o n of the Dharmakaya thus far might be termed p h i l o s o p h i c a l .
That i s , the s c r i p t u r a l facts have been arranged i n a r a t i o n a l pattern compre-
hensible to any reasoning man. No e x t r a - r a t i o n a l q u a l i t i e s n o mystical i n s i g h t
or believer's commitmenthave been required. Since, to the Vijnanavada;
common man and Buddha are not two d i f f e r e n t beings, but two d i f f e r e n t epistemic
a t t i t u d e s , there i s no e s s e n t i a l reason that the Buddha cannot" be described
i n common language.
None of t h i s reasoning would be a l i e n or incomprehensible to a Western
131
metaphysicianprovided he was induced to accept the above set of " f a c t s . " Our
r e l i g i o u s author, however, cannot be content with merely describing how the Dk
appears to ordinary man. He not only believes that his reader ( o r i g i n a l l y
"auditor") can make the gradual t r a n s i t i o n to Buddhahood but wishes to encour-
age him to do so. Therefore, to f a c i l i t a t e t h i s t r a n s i t i o n he o f f e r s several
descriptions of Buddhahood, each from a viewpoint nearer the f i n a l goal.
The major such intermediate stage i s that of the Bodhisattva. The Bodhi-
sattva 's view of the Dk i s not cast i n the same l o g i c a l form as that of the
common man, because the Bodhisattva's perceptions are not l i m i t e d by the same
l o g i c a l categories. In-the Mahayanasamgraha h i s view i s characterized as
"profound" (gambhira) and i s described at X:28 by passages obviously taken
from or i n s p i r e d by the prajnaparamita w r i t i n g s . Asvabhava (\jhk3b6-9)
i d e n t i f i e s t h i s passage as the Bodhisattva view by maintaining that "profound,
very profound" means that neither worldly sages nor Sravakas can understand-
63
the basic nature of the Dk. ,
The description of the Dk proceeds i n the normal prajnaparamita s t y l e .
Each c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s mentioned twiceonce to a f f i r m i t , and again to negate
i t , the p a i r of a n t i t h e t i c a l statements being fused into a single l i n e of
verse. The r e s u l t i n g nonsensical image derives i t s convincing power from
poetic e f f e c t s e s p e c i a l l y when the stanza i s chanted. That i s , there i s no
being born at the Buddha's b i r t h , his residence:is no residence, and so on,
through a l i s t of twelve t o p i c s .
While X:28 expresses the "profound" b i f o c a l v i s i o n of the Buddha enjoyed
by the Bodhisattva, i t gives no hint of the intense p o s i t i v e evaluation of the
Buddha expected from a p r a c t i t i o n e r . This view of Buddha held by Bodhisattva-
as-devotee i s contained i n X:29 where i t i s c a l l e d "review of the Dharmakaya."
132
The term "review" (anusmrti) i s derived from s m r t i , an ambiguous term whose
root meaning "memory" gives l i t t l e clue to the complex s e r i e s of terms
generated from i t . B a s i c a l l y , i t r e f e r s t o the process of m a i n t a i n i n g a
s t a b l e epistemic object f o r purposes of meditation.
In t h i s passage the object of a t t e n t i o n i s the Buddha. Asvabhava
(\]kh^c2-3) comments t h a t anusmrti means a s t a b l e r e c o l l e c t i o n of the Buddha.
The Mahayanasamgraha and i t s commentaries t e l l us nothing about the a c t u a l
meditation r i t u a l , but X:29 says t h a t when the Bodhisattva does f i x h i s
a t t e n t i o n upon the Buddha he focuses upon seven p r o p e r t i e s :
X:29.1 The Buddhas have obtained sovereignty over a l l dharmas because
they have obtained unhindered awareness which penetrates
throughout the e n t i r e world.
To t h i s i s added a stanza t o the e f f e c t that Buddha does not enjoy a s i m i l a r
sovereignty over the beings i n the world. Asvabhava (uUU5t>l5) e x p l a i n s t h a t ,
while the Buddha enjoys sovereignty i n the sense t h a t he i s aware of every- "
t h i n g , he cannot abrogate the law of karma and immediately introduce a l l
beings t o n i r v a n a .
X:29.2 The bodies of the Tathagatas are e t e r n a l because the Tathagatas
65
are c o n t i n u a l l y f r e e from s t a i n .
Here, as elsewhere i n t h i s t e x t , the e p i t h e t " e t e r n a l " i m p l i e s not an i n f i n i t e
s u b s t a n t i a l existence but an u n i n t e r r u p t e d c o n t i n u i t y of some f o c a l c h a r a c t e r -
i s t i c ( i . e . , freedom from s t a i n ) .
X:29-3 The Tathagatas are t o t a l l y i r r e p r o a c h a b l e because they are
t o t a l l y exempt from the k l e s a and jneya avaranas.
133
X:29.k The Tathagatas are spontaneous because a l l t h e i r Buddha actions
flow i n an uninterrupted e f f o r t l e s s stream.
X:29-5 The Tathagatas enjoy great pleasure due to the pleasures of
the pure Buddhafield and of the dharma.
X:29.6 The Tathagatas are unsoiled because, although appearing i n the
world, they are not s o i l e d by any worldly dharmas.
X:29.7 The Tathagatas have a grand purpose because, by manifesting
enlightenment and nirvana, they mature a l l sentient beings who
are not yet matured and l i b e r a t e those who are already matured.
d. The DharmakayaA Summary
It i s now obvious that, i n the Mahayanasamgraha, the term Dharmakaya
designates Buddhahood, the terminus of the Mahayana p r a c t i c e s . It i s w e l l
summarized i n the t i t l e of chapter X: "Resulting-Awareness" (phalajfiana). The
Dk i s a " r e s u l t " i n the sense that each of i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i s the f u l f i l l -
ment of some p r a c t i c e previously adopted by the Bodhisattva. It does not
involve a r e b i r t h or any sort of new being. C a l l i n g t h i s r e s u l t an "awareness"
does not define i t s o n t o l o g i c a l state. It indicates that the Dk i s being
described within the same epistemological framework that was applied to the
common man and the a s p i r i n g Bodhisattva. Within t h i s framework, the p h y s i c a l
body of the common man i s an "idea" ( v i j n a p t i ) r e s u l t i n g from a l i m i t e d , biased
awareness (vijnana). This notion of the body as v i j f i a p t i i s s i m i l a r to that
of a "self-image." As the i n d i v i d u a l begina Mahayana p r a c t i c e s and h i s v i s i o n
broadens, the vijnana changes (through the stages of preparatory, fundamental
and subsequent) into a non-discriminating awareness (nirvikalpajnana) or, i n
13k
t h i s text, simply "awareness" (jnana). His s t a t i c self-image gives way to the
r e a l i z a t i o n of himself as the perfect embodiment (kaya) of the Mahayana i d e a l s
(dharmas), i . e . , a Dharmakaya.
The notion of "self-image" must not be pressed too f a r , since i t presup-
poses some " s e l f " (pudgala) or transcendental ego to experience the image.
Such an ego i s denied throughout Buddhist thought. In the Mahayanasamgraha
Asanga has cast the theory e n t i r e l y i n epistemological terms. The mechanism
by which the self-image of the common man maintains i t s e l f i s described. The
way i n which t h i s can be reoriented to become the resulting-awareness which i s
the DJk i s explained. And the r e s u l t i n g awareness i t s e l f i s described i n var-
ious ways. But these descriptions are confined to the process of perception.
There i s no mention of a r e a l perceiver or object. Even a t t r i b u t e s of the Dk
which appears to imply an ontologyare interpreted i n epistemic terms. For
example, the apparent affirmation that the. Dk i s immortal (nitya). i s i n t e r -
preted as a reference to the Incessant nature of the perception. Therefore,
while the concept of "self-image" i s .applicable to the
:
.common man's v i j n a p t i ,
i t i s not applicable to the Dk.
The d e s c r i p t i o n of the Dk as resulting-awareness i s the key to under-
standing most of the previous passages. I t prevents the misunderstanding of
the Dk's a c t i v i t i e s which occurs when one sees the Dk as a god-like figure
exerting sovereignty or mastery over the things of t h i s world. The concept
that the Dk i s awareness, not an accurate perception of external e n t i t i e s but
a breadth of v i s i o n , reminds us that there are no "things" to be mastered by
the Dk. The actions through which mastery or sovereignty i s exercised are
themselves aspects of the awareness. This point can be understood more c l e a r l y
i f we compare the actions of the common man, the Bodhisattva and the Dk.
135
For the common man, past events have planted the seeds of present
perceptions, which present a concrete s i t u a t i o n including i n d i v i d u a l ,
world, and perception of the world. The i n d i v i d u a l i s driven to c e r t a i n
actions by the s i t u a t i o n , and perceives "himself" carrying out the actions.
When the aspirant enters the Mahayana and becomes a Bodhisattva, he
develops the s i x perfections (paramitas) which w i l l eventually form the Dk.
These are customarily divided into two groups: the f i r s t f i v e , which define
the Bodhisattva's action (upaya); and the s i x t h , the i n s i g h t (prajna) which
i s his perception of the s i t u a t i o n . Applied to the present t e x t , these
categories can be misleading, since the Bodhisattva's insight (prajna) can
be e a s i l y confused with the awareness ( n i r v i k a l p a j nana) which i s the basic
nature of the entire process. A l l s i x paramitas, including both i n s i g h t
and action, are simply abstractions from the t o t a l i t y of one pattern (see
IV:7.6) which, when f u l l y developed, i s c a l l e d the Dk. At t h i s point, the
perception i s no longer interpreted as " s e l f " and "other" locked into a
f i x e d r e l a t i o n s h i p . Therefore, the idea of perceiving an environment and
then acting on the perception, while misleading when applied to the Bodhi-
sattva, i s incorrect when applied to the Dk. The Dk's awareness includes
the r e a l i z a t i o n that both i t s view and i t s actions have the same l o g i c a l
status, i . e . , they are aspects of the perception. It i s often easier to
consider them both as "actions" through which the sovereignty or mastery i s
exercised.
Because the Dk i s the r e s u l t of the p r a c t i c e of the paramitas, i t s ac-
tions do not constitute an empty omnipotence or simple "freedom-from." As the
outcome of the Bodhisattva vows and p r a c t i c e s , a l l a c t i v i t y i s d i r e c t e d toward
the welfare of others ( s t r i c t l y defined as aiding others eventually;,to"develop
136
a s i m i l a r outlook). Freed from concern f o r i t s " s e l f , " the Dk can reach out
with compassionate concern. This outreach involves perceiving ( i . e . , creating)
a s i t u a t i o n within which the needs of others are both appreciated and s a t i s f i e d .
The appreciative insight'"(prajna) into t h e i r p l i g h t is-.-not^'pure. openhess.-to
experience, for there i s nothing to be experienced. I t i s the epistemic aspect
of the mature patterned concern for others. The action which solves the
problem i s not a manipulation of the l i v e s of others, f o r there are no l i v e s
to be manipulated. The perceived-encounter, created by compassionate concern,
within which the needs of the other can be appreciated, i s also the very
one within which these needs are s a t i s f i e d . . That-is, through the very
process of appreciating the other's problem, the s o l u t i o n develops"
spontaneously.
This explanation r a i s e s the obvious problem of the l o g i c a l status of the
r e c i p i e n t of the Dk's assistance. He seems to have no standing- apart from
the s i t u a t i o n which has been created by the Dk. There can be no question of
t r a d i t i o n a l solipsism because there i s no r e a l s e l f involved, but some sort of
quasi-solipsism appears to be unavoidable. I believe that t h i s problem i s
inherent i n the doctrine of t h i s text as a byproduct of the presentation of an
epistemology divorced from metaphysics. The l a t e r Vijnanavada thinkers seem
to have r e a l i z e d the problem and developed doctrines that avoid i t .
This brings us to the r e a l methodological problem of the present section,
that of proposing a metaphysical.interpretation of Asanga's theory. We must
f i r s t note that the pure epistemology of the text apparently s a t i s f i e d many
within the samgha. Why?.
While t h i s question must be l e f t to the h i s t o r i a n , I w i l l make a simple
suggestion based on observation of present-day bKa'-brgyud-pa communities
137
that follow a s i m i l a r doctrine. I suspect that epistemology may s a t i s f y the
"believer who l i v e s within a d i s c i p l i n e d community under the d i r e c t i o n and
i n s p i r a t i o n of a s p i r i t u a l master. He may draw d i r e c t l y from h i s i n t e r a c t i o n
with the master the" reassurance.and guidance that we expect from a metaphys-
i c a l statement. He may requirethe theory to do nothing more than to explain .
how h i s practices and meditational experiences are related'to the main points
of Buddhist dogma. Such a requirement .would "be e a s i l y met by the theory of
.the Mahayanasamgraha.
The scholar needs more. The p r a c t i t i o n e r has h i s guru, a l i v i n g symbol
of his goal, c o n t i n u a l l y before him. His task i s to emulate the guru, not to
discuss the p o s s i b i l i t y of his existence. The scholar deals i n ideas, not
persons. He requires an i n t e l l e c t u a l formulation of the Buddha rather than an
incarnation. He l e g i t i m a t e l y asks, "What i s the Dharmakaya?" The answer may
not be e n t i r e l y s a t i s f y i n g , but i t must give him some concrete p o r t r a i t of the
Buddha.
We could, l i k e Guenther, turn to a l a t e r school of Vijnanavada thought
and accept i t s metaphysic. I f such a school had appeared i n immediate post-
Asafiga India, t h i s would be the proper t a c t i c . Emphasis could then be trans-
ferred to the writings of that school, and the Mahayanasamgraha interpreted as
a forerunner of the mature doctrine. However, Guenther's sourcethe rNying-
ma-pa mastersappeared much l a t e r , i n a d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r e , and were influenced
by intervening developments; i t s ideas may not be a legitimate v e h i c l e for
i n t e r p r e t i n g the early Indian t r a d i t i o n . Therefore, I s h a l l attempt to derive
an answer d i r e c t l y from the contents of the Mahayanasamgraha.
At t h i s point idealism reappears. Even though Asanga has f a i l e d to
develop such a doctrine, i s i t not the obvious concomitant to his epistemology?
The answer i s Ho. An i d e a l i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n involves one of two unaccept-
able alternatives-. E i t h e r some element of the epistemic process must be
declared more basic than the others, or some very abstract u n i f y i n g concept,
such as an "absolute," must be introduced. In the former case i t i s v i r t u a l l y
impossible to avoid regarding the chosen element as an existent e n t i t y , thus
introducing an unacceptable substantialism. A crude example of t h i s would be
the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the alayavijnana as a r e a l substratum of personal
existence.
I f the second choice i s accepted and an Absolute that i s s u f f i c i e n t l y
transcendent to avoid o n t o l o g i c a l problems i s posited, the u n i f y i n g p r i n c i p l e
has simply been elevated to a r a r e f i e d status where i t i s of s l i g h t help with
actual problems.
The task of: deriving a. more satisfactoryexplanation i s simultaneously
rendered both more and l e s s d i f f i c u l t by the need to avoid ontology. It i s
more d i f f i c u l t because we cannot simply use the p u d g a l i s t i c notion of an i n d i -
v i d u a l who sees things f i r s t as a common man and l a t e r In an enlightened
manner. Nor can we assign o n t o l o g i c a l status to any other element of the
epistemology theory.
The .=task. becomes less, d i f f i c u l t because we are forced to acknowledge the
view of many philosophers that the metaphysician's task i s not to uncover r e a l
e n t i t i e s , but to devise a scheme within which experience may be interpreted.
In the words of A. N. Whitehead, "Speculative Philosophy i s the endeavour to
frame a coherent, l o g i c a l necessary system of general ideas i n terms of which
66
every element"of our experience can be i n t e r p r e t e d . "
As a demand for a perfect system, t h i s sounds l i k e an o n t o l o g i c a l quest
i n disguise. However, Whitehead means i t only as the i d e a l i n the sense that
139
a perfect s c i e n t i f i c hypothesis i s the i d e a l . Any a c t u a l theory may s t i l l be
acceptable, although f a l l i n g short of t h i s . He adds:
Philosophers can never hope f i n a l l y to formulate these
metaphysical f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s . Weakness of i n s i g h t and d e f i -
ciencies of language stand i n the way inexorably. Words and
phrases must be stretched towards a generality f o r e i g n to
t h e i r ordinary usage; and however such elements of language
be s t a b i l i z e d as t e c h n i c a l i t i e s , they remain metaphors mutely
appealing for an imaginative leap.
Throughout t h i s study I use the term "metaphysics" to mean t h i s search
for an i n t e g r a t i v e perspective. That i s , I s h a l l follow what S. K. Verma i n
The Nature of Metaphysics c a l l s the "root-metaphor" theory of metaphysics.
Our problem i s much more modest than that of the general metaphysician i n
search of a scheme embracing the t o t a l i t y of experience. We need only a root-
metaphor that i s capable of u n i f y i n g the ideas about the Dk. While i t need
not be t o t a l l y s e l f - c o n s i s t e n t , i t must be a v i v i d , concrete metaphor which
w i l l stay-firmly i n our-mind and (almost.Miterally) r e s t r a i n the tendency to
d r i f t of "into meaningless inhuman abstractions.
Materials f o r such a metaphor l i e r e a d i l y at hand. Asanga's t a l k of
ground, seeds, maturation and f r u i t suggests an organic metaphor i n whiclf'the
ordinary p e r s o n a l i t y becomes a self-perpetuating weed-patch (klesas). The
paramitas are desirable plants which, i f planted among the weeds and properly
tended, w i l l eventually crowd them out. The r e s u l t i s a mature crop of
paramitas, which i s c a l l e d the Dharmakaya.
This metaphor has several useful features. F i r s t , i t c l e a r l y i s no more
than a metaphor. No one w i l l take i t l i t e r a l l y . Second, i t i l l u s t r a t e s two
of the most puzzling aspects of the Dk: the fact that i t i s both obtained at
the s t a r t of the aspirant's career and developed throughout and the f a c t that
iko
i t i s neither singular nor p l u r a l . The ordinary use of the term "crop"
exhibits exactly those p e c u l i a r i t i e s . Furthermore, the notion of a "crop" and
"seeds" i s e a s i l y extended to account f o r the ideas of the dharma which, as an
outflow of the dharmadhatu, i n i t i a t e d the spread of Dharmakaya(s). F i n a l l y ,
the metaphor maintains the continuity between common man and Dk.
Its f a i l u r e s are inherent i n the nature of metaphor. The actual
s i t u a t i o n i s always perceived from within by one standing somewhere on the
continuum between common man and Dk. Yet the metaphor portrays a s i t u a t i o n
from without, as a thing, thus r e i f y i n g and d i s t o r t i n g the "ground" of the
s i t u a t i o n . Therefore, d e t a i l e d conclusions about the ground or basic nature
cannot be drawn from such a p o r t r a i t .
Despite the apparent t r i v i a l i t y of t h i s metaphor, i t i s a true
metaphysical view which w i l l serve better than many couched i n more formal
p h i l o s o p h i c a l terms. It i s a model which exhibits many important character-
i s t i c s of the s i t u a t i o n described by Asanga, and can e a s i l y be kept i n mind to
provide a perspective within which any ideas about the Dk can be kept within
the system. No one having t h i s metaphor i n mind could mistake the Dk for a
d e i f i e d f i g u r e , speak of a cosmic Buddha, or see i t as a p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n of
some i n e f f a b l e ultimate r e a l i t y . It provides a u s e f u l way to grasp Asanga's
general sense of Buddhahood and w i l l be h e l p f u l l a t e r as we deal with s p e c i f i c
questions under each of the three kayas into which the Dk may be analyzed.
The most s t a r t l i n g aspect of t h i s p o r t r a i t may be i t s conservatism. Most
scholars have seen the Mahayana Buddhology as a r a d i c a l departure from e a r l i e r
concepts, i n v o l v i n g the s u b s t i t u t i o n of a t h e l s t i c , god-like, transcendent
68
Buddha for the e a r l i e r awakened aspirant. Yet, the previous passages contain
none of t h i s . The Dk i s not a god and h i s a c t i v i t i e s are not god-like. His
a b i l i t i e s are remarkable only for t h e i r s o t e r i o l o g i c a l e f f i c a c y , i . e . , he can
control both himself and the s i t u a t i o n i n order to teach e f f e c t i v e l y . There
is, no suggestion of any cosmic powers such as world creation or d i s s o l u t i o n .
He c e r t a i n l y i s no deus ex machina meddling with the fate of man, even for the
l a t t e r ' s b e n e f i t . He i s even unable to abrogate the karma of another without
that .individual's conscious co-operation (X:38-39)-
3. THE TRIKAYA
While Asanga drew the preceding ideas d i r e c t l y from other a u t h o r i t i e s ,
the arrangement of t h i s f i n a l set into a t r i k a y a doctrine appears to be his
own contribution.
I s h a l l f i r s t v e r i f y that Asanga a c t u a l l y p o s i t s a u n i f i e d t r i k a y a , and,
as the text mentions four kayas, discover which three form the t r i k a y a and
c l a r i f y t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p to the fourth.: The core of the present study, an
examination of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between'the three elements and-.of the develop-
ment of the-key ideas, w i l l follow. As Asanga mentions several' perennial .
.'Buddhological dilemmas i n connection with these kayas, I - s h a l l , i n v e s t i g a t e ' t h e
u t i l i t y of the t r i k a y a i n s o l v i n g them. F i n a l l y , I s h a l l propose a model of
the t r i k a y a doctrine which can guide i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . i n t o r e l a t e d doctrines.
a. A U n i f i e d Trikaya or Three Kayas?
The l a t e r standard term " t r i k a y a " i s not used i n the Mahayanasamgraha;
Asanga speaks of the " t r i p l e Buddhakaya" (sangs-rgyas-kyi sku-gsum; ^~j$f ^ ):
P. 3-10 The t r i p l e Buddhakaya . . . i s the 'phala.jnana of these
X : l
lh2
[three Bodhisattva observances!.
111:2; 111:1"+ and V:2.10
[These three s i m i l a r passages l a b e l the r e s u l t of
p r a c t i s i n g non-conceptual and subsequent awareness as
"omniscience," "the t r i p l e Buddhakaya," and " f i l l i n g the
Dharmakaya," r e s p e c t i v e l y . !
VIII: 13 . . . the terminus of the nirvikalpa.jnana i s the obtainment
of the three pure kayas and of the highest masteries. To
Vasubandhu (Bh 365b8), "pure" indicates that they have
reached the tenth bhumi.
X:28 By the three kayas,
You have obtained t o t a l mahabodhi . . .
X:28.2 A l l Buddhas have three kayas.
II:33.l8
e
. . . the unlimited domain of the t r i p l e Buddhakaya.
In these passages, " t r i p l e Buddhakaya" i s synonymous with the "Dharmakaya"
previously examined. Furthermore, none of these passages suggests that one
kaya may be obtained by i t s e l f or before 'the" others-. This strengthens the
assumption that none of them can stand alone, and that the " t r i p l e Buddhakaya"
i s a unitary concept, equivalent to Dharmakaya or "Buddhahood."
The evidence that i t s three aspects are obtained and developed simultane-
ously (VIII:13; X:25) also warns us not to misconstrue the various assertions
that one kaya "depends upon" another as an i n d i c a t i o n that one i s temporally
p r i o r to the others.
11*3
b. Which Three Kayas?
The i d e n t i t y of the three kayas (are they Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya, and
Nirmanakaya, or are they Svabhavikakaya, Sambhogakaya and Nirmanakaya?) i s
bound up with the meaning of the term Svabhavikakaya. This question w i l l be
answered on the basis of the following passages:
P.3.10 The t r i p l e Buddhakaya: Svabhavikakaya, Sambhoghakaya and
\ Nirmanakaya, i s the r e s u l t i n g awareness of these [Bodhi-
sattva p r a c t i c e s ! . . .
There can be no mistake. The f i r s t i s d e f i n i t e l y Svk, not Dk, i n the
Tibetan as well as the Chinese t r a n s l a t i o n s by Hsuan-tsang, Dharmagupta and
Paramartha. Buddhasanta uses j|l rather than |j 'l"-^ but t h i s should
c e r t a i n l y be also understood as "svabhava."
Vasubandhu (Bh 32.3&?.3-?h ) comments that
The t r i p l e Buddhakaya i s c a l l e d the ' r e s u l t i n g awareness'
'.'resulting' because' i t - i s the result, of previously
;
mentioned
practices and ' r e s u l t i n g awareness' because t h i s r e s u l t i s
aware. [Thus,] i t s basic nature (svabhava) i s to be 'the aware
r e s u l t of these.'
Now, i f there were no Svabhavikakaya ET:- ' i f - t h e r e were
no svabhava'] there would be. no Dharmakaya . . .
Asvabhava (U38lal6) says that the three are the Svk, Sbk and Nk, and adds
(,38lcll|) that the "Svabhavikakaya i s unimpeded and s t a i n l e s s awareness (jnana).
As such, i t i s a term for Dharmakaya."
X : l . l
The Svabhavikakaya i s the Tathagata's Dharmakaya because
i t i s the support for the sovereignty over a l l dharmas.
Asvabhava (uH36al-5) o f f e r s several explanations for the term Svk i n th
above passages:
I t i s c a l l e d 'svabhava' because i t contains nothing a r t i -
f i c i a l and 'kaya' because i t i s the support. Because the dharma-
nature (dharmata) i s a body, i t i s c a l l e d 'Dharmakaya' Cu333al:
"the body composed of the dharmas i s the dharmatakaya"j or because
i t i s the support for the dharmas, i t i s c a l l e d 'Dharmakaya.' The
phrase, ' i t i s the support f o r sovereignty over a l l dharmas' means
i t i s the support for obtaining such sovereignty.
X:3.2 [The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s (laksanas) of the Dharmakaya are being
explained. The second laksana i s : II "Having white dharmas
as svabhavabecause the ten masteries are obtained through
the f u l f i l l m e n t of the s i x paramitas." [The ten masteries
are explained by the commentators. These w i l l be taken up
later.1
X:25 "The three kayas. . ." glossed by Asvabhava as "the
Svabhavikakaya,"-etc.
X:28.2 [Vasubandhu. r e f e r s to the f i r s t of the three as "Svabhavikakayav
X:23.1 A l l Buddhas have obtained sovereignty over a l l dharmas,
because throughout the e n t i r e world they have obtained
unhindered penetrating awareness . . .
X:31 The Buddha's dharmadhatu at a l l times exhibits f i v e sorts
of a c t i v i t y . . . [Asvabhava i d e n t i f i e s the dharmadhatu as
the Dk.:
X:35 Why i s the Sambhoghakaya not the Svabhavikakaya?
11+5
X:36 Why i s the Nirmanakaya not the Svabhavikakaya?
The answers to X:35 stress the fact that the Svk cannot appear i n diverse
ways. The answers to X:36. stress the f a c t that the Svk cannot act i n an
inconsistent manner. Asvabhava (Tjl+U8bl5-l6) seems to suggest that the Svk i s
enlightened i n the T u s i t a heaven but acts i n the world by means of a nirmana.
These passages appear to contain two contradictory ideas:
that Svk is. synonymous with Dk.
that Svk r e f e r s to the f i r s t of three kayas, whereas Dk has been used as a
general term for enlightenment, roughly synonymous with the " t r i p l e Buddha-
kaya."-.'
The only d i r e c t discussion of whether Dk and Svk are synonymous,,- Vasuban
dhu's commentary to P:3.10 (Bh 323a23-bl+), i s rendered no more i n t e l l i g i b l e by
Asvabhava's apparent contradiction. This question must be resolved by
comparing statements about the Svk with those made about the Dk. Before doing
t h i s , two types of passages must be deleted from the descriptions of the Svk.
Those i n which the Svk i s equated with the Dk and those in which the Svk i s
l i s t e d as the f i r s t of the three merely repeat our basic problem. In addition,
those that speak of the "svabhava of the Dharmakaya" w i l l be considered as
references to the Svk.
Two types of descriptions of the Svk. (or the svabhava of the Dk) remain.
They are:
an awareness r e s u l t i n g from the Bodhisattva practices (.P:3.10; X:35-6 (U)).
This compound idea may be divided into those concepts of being a ' r e s u l t '
of Bodhisattva p r a c t i c e s , and of being e s s e n t i a l l y 'awareness.'
146
a support for sovereignty or mastery over the dharmas ( X : l . l ; X:3.2).
Thus, the Svk e n t a i l s three basic concepts: r e s u l t , awareness and
sovereignty. In order to explore the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Svk and the Dk,
we w i l l now reorganize the Dk passages from the previous section under the
above three headings.
Again, c e r t a i n passages which would obscure the argument have been set
aside: the l i s t of eighteen avenika Buddhadharmas at X:24 (which are c l e a r l y
of l i t t l e i n t e r e s t to Asanga and contain nothing new), the profundity of the
Dk (X:28; which deals with the Bodhisattva's view and has been explained as
such), and the question of whether the Dk i s unitary (X:8; which w i l l be
considered l a t e r ) .
When the remaining passages are examined, we f i n d that the Dk, l i k e the
Svk, i s the culmination or r e s u l t of the Bodhisattva p r a c t i c e s . It i s obtained
by "Bodhisattva p r a c t i c e s , " i . e . , by p r a c t i s i n g the paramitas (X:4.3; X:26),
by l i s t e n i n g to the dharma (1: 46- 48) , and by meditation. (.III:12,l4; V:2.10;
X : l ; X:4.2, 4; X:7-2).
Like the Svk, the Dk i s "awareness" (jnana). Dk awareness i s described
i n great d e t a i l . It i s pure and unobstructed by vasanas, klesas and avaranas
which prevent accurate perception (.1:46-48; X:7.1; X : l l ; X:17; X:20; X:21;
X:29.3; X:29.6).
This awareness i s an omniscience directed to questions necessary for the
s a l v a t i o n of others ( X : l l ; X:13; X:l4; X:15; X:19; X:25). As such, i t i s not
merely an accurate, unemotional perception of surrounding objects, but i s
compassionate concern for others* welfare (.X:6.1; X:7-3; X:10; X:23). -
From t h i s concern spring the various a c t i v i t i e s of protection and a i d
which eventually lead others to a s i m i l a r way of perception (,X:6.2-3; X:7-6;
X:l6; X:22; X:29-7; X:3l). As these a c t i v i t i e s are ceaseless or at l e a s t
coterminous with the l i b e r a t i o n of a l l sentient beings, the Dk may be c a l l e d
e t e r n a l (X:3.^; X:29.2,k).
The c e n t r a l idea that awareness n e c e s s a r i l y involves action i s treated as
a t h i r d category: the Svk as the support for sovereignty over the dharmas.
The connection between sovereignty (or mastery) and awareness i s explained at
X:29-l, while sovereignty i s described at X : l . l ; X:3-2; X:7.^ and X:7.5.
The key passage at X:5 outlines the way i n which each skandha of ordinary
man i s reoriented i n order to obtain a s p e c i f i c sovereignty of Buddha. Reori-
entation i s discussed i n several passages, but X:3-l i s e s p e c i a l l y relevant to
the present t o p i c . D e t a i l s on sovereignty may be found at X:ll,12 and X:l8.
From the ease with which the Dk passages have been subsumed under the
three aspects of the Svk, we may conclude that the Svk and the Dk are not two
d i f f e r e n t things or even the same e n t i t y ("Buddhahood") viewed by d i f f e r e n t
types of i n d i v i d u a l s . They are descriptions of the same phenomena viewed at
d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of generality. The Svk i s very general, while the Dk i s
exceedingly d e t a i l e d . When Asanga wishes to r e i f y the phenomenon of Buddhahood
to "a Buddha," he uses Svk or Dk interchangeably. When he wishes to stress
the broader categories, he r e f e r s to the "svabhava of the Dharmakaya," or
"Svabhavikakaya." His p r i n c i p a l use of t h i s term i s as the f i r s t member of
the t r i k a y a , to d i f f e r e n t i a t e the fact of being a Buddha from the way i n which
the Buddha appears to sentient beings.
In b r i e f , the members of the t r i p l e Buddhakaya are Svabhavikakaya, Sambho-
gakaya and Nirmanakaya, and together they form a unity which i s equivalent to
the term "Dharmakaya."
Ik8
c. The Nirmanakaya: Buddha i n the World
The Nirmanakaya i s usually considered to "be the form i n which Buddhahood
i s manifested within the world, i . e . , the h i s t o r i c a l Buddhas such as Dipaiiikara,
Sakyamuni or Maitreya.
P:3-10 [Commenting on the f i r s t mention of the NkT,. Vasubandhu
(Bh323a29) says:!
I f there were no Nirmanakaya, the Bodhisattvas on the
^ ^ TO' - ^
adhimukticaryabhumi .' and the Sravakas etc /whose a s p i r a -
t i o n i s i n f e r i o r , would not be able to escape from samsara.
VI:5.2 [Asanga i s explaining that the supreme morality i s to lead
others to p r a c t i c e the dharma, and that the question of
means used to do t h i s transcends ordinary categories of
morality,3
"Furthermore, the affected (nirmana) b o d i l y and vocal
actions are to be understood as the profound morality of
the Bodhisattva. By them, he exercises authority, i n f l i c t -
ing various torments on sentient beings i n order to secure
them i n [the p r a c t i c e o f l Buddhist d i s c i p l i n e (vinaya)."
VIII:10 The r e t r i b u t i o n (vipaka) of the Bodhisattva's n i r v i k a l -
pajnana occurs i n the two Buddha assemblies according to
preparation and a c q u i s i t i o n .
"Retribution" indicates'the fate of an i n d i v i d u a l i n his next incarnation.
. 71
"Nirvikalpajnana" (non-conceptualizing awareness) i s a general term for
enlightened awareness. Here the question i s , "Where w i l l the Bodhisattva who
Ik9
possesses nirvikalpajnana be reborn?" The commentators (Bh 365alO-l"+;
U"+30cl8-2"4-) agree that, i f his n i r v i k a l p a j nana i s only i n preparation, he w i l l
be born i n the Nirmanakaya assembly, while i f he has a c t u a l l y acquired
n i r v i k a l p a j Sana, he w i l l be reborn i n the Sambhogakaya assembly.
That i s , the assembly surrounding the Buddha's Nk_ i s composed of those who
are "preparing" t h e i r awareness. This preparation i s further characterized
(vTII:l"+) by a s p i r a t i o n (adhimukti) and simple confidence (sraddhamatra).
X:1.3 The Nirmanakaya also depends upon the Dharmakaya because
i t manifests Lthe following Buddha-activities!: r e s i d i n g
i n the T u s i t a heaven, descending, being born, leaving the
household l i f e , frequenting t i r t h i k a s , p r a c t i c i n g auster-
i t i e s , a r r i v i n g at mahabodhi, and entering mahaparinirvana.
Asvabhava (U"+36al7-19) says, "Because of h i s developed i n s i g h t , he leaves
the. T u s i t a heaveniCand^performs a l l the Buddha a c t i v i t i e s ! , f i n a l l y e n t e r i n g
nirvana. Such i s the way i n which anthropomorphic mental images a r i s e i n
another's stream of being."
X:6.3 CThe Dharmakaya! i s the support for the various Nirmanakayas
because i t p r i n c i p a l l y assures the maturation of the Sravakas.
Asvabhava (u"+38cll-15) explains that " p r i n c i p a l l y " indicates that.the
Bodhisattvas on the lowest l e v e l t h e adhimukticaryabhumialso need the Nk:
"Because of t h e i r i n f e r i o r a s p i r a t i o n , the Sravakas and adikarmika Bodhisat--
tvas are not completely matured i f they do not see the Buddha. But the Bodhi-
sattvas who have entered the great bhumis are not matured by the Nirmanakaya
because they penetrate the vast and profound dharma."
150
X:8 [To the question of whether or not the various Sarabhogakayas
are d i f f e r e n t or not d i f f e r e n t , Asanga replies:"! . . . As
t h e i r intentions and actions do not d i f f e r , they are not
d i f f e r e n t . It i s not the case that t h e i r d i f f e r e n t supports
do not d i f f e r a n immeasurable v a r i e t y of supports are
found. The preceding remarks on the Sambhogakaya also apply
to the Nirmanakaya.
X:12 [Asvabhava (u440cl-l6) i s commenting on the a b i l i t y of the
Tathagata to destroy klesas of sentient beings. He says
t h a t , i f the Tathagata sees that sentient beings w i l l produce
klesas i n regard to the Buddha's body, i f they are capable
of enjoying a nirmana of the Buddha, he approaches them and
s k i l l f u l l y d i s c i p l i n e s them. Asvabhava contrasts t h i s
Tathagata with the Sravaka who, upon f i n d i n g that h i s presence
i n a town or grove might excite passion, r e f r a i n s from
entering it.1
X:l6 When a l l sentient beings see you,
They recognize you as a mahapurusa.
By a mere glimpse they achieve f a i t h .
Homage to you, the e f f e c t i v e one.
Asvabhava (uU4lbT-12) says that sentient beings see the thirty-two major
and eighty minor marks which convince them that the Buddha i s the good arranger
(H: "dharma-opener") of the world. Unfortunately, there i s no clear i n d i c a t i o n
of which kaya(.s) manif est (s) these, Hsuan-tsang probably understood both. Sbk.
and Nk, but t h i s i s not supported by.the Tibetan.
151
X:27 . . . [You the BhagavanH are i n the world and i n the Buddha
assemblies. . .
Asvabhava (u4U3a23) says,". . . the Nirmanakaya i s manifested i n ( & )
the world, while the Sambhogakaya resides i n ( ) the great assembly."
X:31.1 [The Dharmakaya] protects sentient beings from s u f f e r i n g
because a mere glimpse of i t protects against such miseries
as blindness, deafness, madness, etc.
Asvabhava (W6cl6-21; u351b8-352a3) deals with the d i f f i c u l t y r a i s e d by
the fact that elsewhere the Dk has been declared to be i n v i s i b l e . How can a
"mere glimpse" of i t protect someone? He r e p l i e s :
[I w i l l now explain the way i n which ordinary beings
may"! 'see the Dharmakaya.' The Dharmakaya i s perfected by
the p r o j e c t i n g power of i t s previous Great Vow. I t then
manifests a functioning ( $\ ) Nirmanakaya which causes the
b l i n d to see, etc. From the p r o j e c t i n g power of previous
equipment i t obtains ( ^ ) the Dharmakaya, spontaneously
) sending f o r t h [actions 1 l i k e a wheel which
f i n a l l y returns to i t s s t a r t i n g point. So although we say
they 'see the Dharmakaya; they r e a l l y see only a nirmana.
X:36 Why i s the Nirmanakaya not the Svabhavikakaya?
This question receives a complex r e p l y i n eight sections. In the f i r s t
f i v e ,the t r a d i t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s p r a c t i c e d by a Buddha between h i s l a s t earthly
r e b i r t h and h i s parinirvana are shown to be i n e x p l i c a b l e i f t h i s worldly form
(Nk) were, quite simply, the Buddha. To avoid such, c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , i t i s neces-
sary to p o s i t an earthly body (Nk) and an e s s e n t i a l body (Svabhavikakaya).
X:36.1
It i s i l l o g i c a l that the Bodhisattva who has long ago
acquired the imperishable samadhis, should be born i n
the T u s i t a heaven or among men.
A being i s reborn according to" h i s past actions .arid 'the act ion "of
p r a c t i s i n g the meditation i n v o l v i n g imperishable samadhis throughout the
Bodhisattva career cannot r e s u l t i n r e b i r t h i n the kamadhatu. But s c r i p t u r e
reveals that the Buddha i s reborn i n the T u s i t a heaven and then i n Jambudvipa,
both of which are i n the kamadhatu. Thus, we must p o s i t a bimodal Buddha.
This reasoning i s extended i n Paramartha's t r a n s l a t i o n of Vasubandhu's Bhasya
(T. v o l . 31, p. 26Tcl6) ,' where the human body that the Buddha takes i n order
to convert sentient beings i s said to e x i s t without cause (^^, 1^1 ) and
therefore to be Nk rather than Vipakakaya or Svabhavikakaya.
That i s , we must also recognize that no r e l a t i o n of karmic c a u s a l i t y
holds between the two modes. This w i l l be an important point for understanding
the sense of "nirmana"
X:36..2 I t i s i l l o g i c a l that the Bodhisattva, who has long since
remembered h i s . former b i r t h s , should The Ignorant 'of ..
' -
1
' 75
w r i t i n g , caTculatioh, numbers,
:
finger reckoning, a r t s ,
sciences, and the enjoyment of objects of desire.
X:36.3 I t i s i l l o g i c a l that the Bodhisattva, who has long since
known the dharma, badly preached or well preached, should
go to the t i r t h i k a s .
X:36.U I t i s i l l o g i c a l that the Bodhisattva, who has long since
known the good dharma of the path of the three v e h i c l e s ,
should p r a c t i c e asceticism.
X:36.5 It i s i l l o g i c a l that the Bodhisattvas should neglect one - -
153
hundred k o t i s of Jambudvipas i n order to achieve complete,
enlightenment and turn the dharmkacakra i n a s i n g l e place.
The problem i s here thrown into the starkest possible r e l i e f by the
cosmological s e t t i n g . To the Mahayana authors, the cosmos consists of endless
r e p l i c a t i o n s of the four-continent.universe. Now, the Bodhisattva has vowed
to save a l l beings, presumably i n c l u d i n g those of other universes. I f the
Buddha were merely a single e n t i t y , he would have to choose one of these i n
which to exercise h i s s a l v i f i c a c t i v i t y , thus v i o l a t i n g his vow. Furthermore,
Asvabhava (uUl+8bl2) says that these d i f f e r e n t places are i d e n t i c a l . Thus,
the choice i t s e l f would necessarily be made on purely f o r t u i t o u s grounds, a
concept a l i e n to Buddhist thought.
X: 36. 6 I f , instead of manifesting complete enlightenment Cin
every JambudvipaU, the Buddha performed Buddha a c t i v i t i e s
everywhere else by Nirmanakayas Ewe could say t h a t l he had
reached enlightenment only i n the T u s i t a heaven.
X:36. 7 Why not admit that i n Jambudvipas, Buddhas are born
simultaneously? There i s no s c r i p t u r e or reason hindering
t h i s conclusion.
Asvabhava (U^"+8bl5) sees t h i s as a reply to those who would attempt to
maintain the i d e n t i t y of Svk and Nk by p o s i t i n g a quasi-unitary Buddha who
becomes enlightened i n t h i s Jambudvipa and sends nirmanas to act i n other
Jambudvipas. Surely these thinkers would be w i l l i n g to go further and admit
that the enlightenment takes place i n the T u s i t a heaven and that a l l a c t i v i t i e s
i n the Jambudvipas are by means of nirmanas. Asvabhava sees no harm i n t h i s ,
and such an admission i s quite enough to support the claim that the Svk must
be distinguished from the Nk.
This argument assumes that various Nks may be present simultaneously.
The author must now explain why t h i s does not contradict the s c r i p t u r a l maxim
that two Buddhas cannot appear-in_the world at the'same time. He says:-
X:36.8 Even i f many nirmanas appear, because "the world" i s a
four-continent world-system, the b i r t h of two Tathagatas
i n the world does not contradict the sutra which [asserts 1
that two Tathagatas do not a r i s e i n the world, just as
two Cakravartins cannot a r i s e i n the same world.
Asvabhava explains that the "world" of the sutra i s one four-continent
world-system, not an entire universe containing one thousand four-continent
world-systems. There i s no s c r i p t u r a l obstacle to simultaneous Buddhas, as
long as each world-system contains only one;
A stanza i s quoted to close this.argument:
Many of the Buddha's subtle Nirmanakayas
Are i n the womb simultaneously,
In order to manifest
The Manifold Enlightenment.
The commentary (Bh 379b8-13; U 41i8c2-5) introduces an important idea.
When the Buddha's Nk descends from'the T u s i t a heaven into i t s mother's womb,
nirmana !3ravakas such as Sariputra are created by the Buddha and descend to
t h e i r mothers' wombs. Without t h e i r i n f e r i o r i t y , the s u p e r i o r i t y of the Buddha
would not be apparent. This s u r p r i s i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n shows that the phrase
155
77
"manifold enlightenment" i s not "the various types of enlightenment," hut a
single synonym for the highest enlightenment, thus j u s t i f y i n g the s u p e r i o r i t y
of the Mahayana enlightenment. While I t may he possible to see t h i s as the
basis of the l a t e r notion that various beings may be Nks, there i s no i n d i c a -
t i o n that Asanga or h i s commentators entertained such a notion.
X:36.8 CThe Buddha"! made his vow and p r a c t i s e d the r e l i g i o u s l i f e
i n order to achieve great enlightenment for the welfare
and happiness of a l l sentient beings. It i s i l l o g i c a l to
hold that he has completely gone to nirvana, because that
would render his vow and p r a c t i c e s t e r i l e and useless.
Asvabhava explains that we are to conclude that the Buddha who has
entered nirvana i s the Nk, d i s t i n c t from the Svk, which i s s t i l l present to
a i d others.
X:37 CIn t h i s discussion (which w i l l be studied l a t e r ) of whether
the Buddha's body i s e t e r n a l , Asanga maintains that the Nk
i s not eternal (nitya) but i s repeatedly manifested.]
X:38 The Nirmanakayas of the Buddha Bhagavans do not remain
Cin the worldl f o r s i x reasons:
( l ) Because t h e i r . a c t i v i t y i s complete when the matured
sentient beings have been l i b e r a t e d .
The Nk i s c l e a r l y a r e l a t i o n a l body whose appearance depends on both the
Buddha and the sentient beings for whom i t i s manifest. When they no longer
need i t , i t w i l l disappear.
156
(2) To prevent [sentient beings3 from not d e s i r i n g nirvana
while seeking the Tathagata's eternal body.
(3) To prevent mistaken ideas about the Buddha and to cause
sentient beings to understand the profound teachings of
the true dharma.
(U) In order to cause [sentient beings!] to long for the
Buddha's profound b i r t h because they [the BhagavansU
fear that, i n those who often see the Buddha, a f e e l i n g
of contempt w i l l a r i s e .
(5) In order to cause [each sentient beingl personally to
exert himself when he knows that the r e a l teacher i s
d i f f i c u l t to f i n d .
( 6) In order that sentient beings be quickly matured by
not r e j e c t i n g the yoke of personal exertion.
These are a l l s p e c i f i c i l l u s t r a t i o n s of one point. The Nirmanakaya e x i s t s
because i t i s the most e f f i c a c i o u s way i n which the Buddha may a i d sentient
beings. The help which can be given i s not an action-on-behalf-of, but i s a
stimulus to personal exertion and a d i r e c t i o n for i t . For t h i s purpose, an
eternally-present Buddha would be useless to the Sravaka who sees the Buddha
as an external, a u t h o r i t a t i v e , god-like f i g u r e . To one with such an a t t i t u d e ,
the d e b i l i t a t i n g presence of the eternal within the t r a n s i t o r y would lead to a
passive dependency, the precise opposite of the desired maturation.
i . The Nirmanakaya: a Summary
The preceding passages portray the Nirmanakaya as the Buddha-form
157
manifested i n the world by the Dharmakaya. As such, i t i s the f a m i l i a r Buddha
(Dipamkara, iSakyamuni, Maitreya, etc) defined by a set pattern of actions.
These passages also suggest solutions to the p r i n c i p a l problems a r i s i n g
from such a p o r t r a y a l . The f i r s t problem, "Who can see the Nk?",. i s notas
simple as i t may appear. While VIII:10 suggests that the Nk appears to those
Sravakas who have made some s p i r i t u a l progress, the remainder of the passages
suggest that the Nk i s v i s i b l e to a l l sentient beings, but i s necessary only
for the s p i r i t u a l progress of the Sravakas and Bodhisattvas on the adhimukti-
caryabhumi. That i s , a l l sentient beings can see the Nk, but only the
!3ravakas and novice Bodhisattvas benefit from t h i s exposure.
A second problem involves the action of the Nk. The question, "What does
the Nk do?" receives two d i f f e r e n t types of answers. F i r s t , (VI:5-2) Asanga
suggests that the Bodhisattva, by means of b o d i l y and vocal actions which are
nirmanas, can do anything (including apparent harm) which might help e s t a b l i s h
sentient beings i n the Mahayana d i s c i p l i n e . While t h i s passage appears to
r e f e r to the Nk, there are no s i m i l a r ones elsewhere i n the Mahayanasamgraha.
Furthermore, the Tibetan t r a n s l a t o r i s c a r e f u l to use the word lus ("physical
body") rather than sku used elsewhere, to t r a n s l a t e the kaya of Nirmanakaya.
Therefore, t h i s idea of taking d i r e c t action upon the aspirant does not seem
to belong to Asanga's basic v i s i o n of the Nk. Second, the Nk performs c e r t a i n
actions i n a p r e s c r i p t i v e mythical pattern- It i s born, leaves the house- .
hold l i f e , achieves enlightenment, turns the dhafmacakra, and so on. The
pattern of these a c t i v i t i e s defines the Nk_ and constitutes i t s h i s t o r i c a l
r e a l i t y , i . e . , i t s v i s i b i l i t y to sentient beings. However, there i s no sugges-
t i o n that the Nk's main taskmaturation of the Sravakasis d i r e c t l y achieved
by these actions. Not even preaching ("turning the dharmacakra") i s c e n t r a l
to t h i s s o t e r i o l o g i c a l action.
This maturation seems to he achieved not by the Nk 'doing' something to
the laravaka, but by the s i t u a t i o n i n which the Nk (present by v i r t u e of the
Buddha a c t i v i t i e s ) i s seen by the Sravakas, by Bodhisattvas on the adhimukti-
caryabhumi, and by sentient beings i n general. In addition to i t s maturing
action, a mere glimpse of the Nk protects the Sravakas from worldly calamitie
This maturation involves f a i t h (sraddha) and a s p i r a t i o n (adhimukti).
VIII:10 holds that the Sravaka must have these i n order to be born i n the
presence of a Nk; X:6.3 says that t h e i r i n f e r i o r adhimukti c a l l s for a glimps
of the Buddha; and X:l6 says that t h i s glimpse r e s u l t s i n adhimukti.
A reasonable i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s would be that the Sravakas and the
Bodhisattvas see the Nk because they have a c e r t a i n confidence and a s p i r a t i o n
and that these are strengthened by the experience. This i s i n general agree-
ment with the d e s c r i p t i o n of the benefits of hearing about the p e r f e c t i o n of
the Tathagatas which i s found i n the Abhidharmakosa viil:3^cL.
The verb "to see" ( ^ , mthong-baj implies ordinary grasping perception
and Is contrasted by Asvabhava at X:6.3 with the Bodhisattva's "penetration"
of the dharma. This leads into the question of the r e l a t i o n between Nirmana-
kaya, Sambhogakaya and Dharmakaya, a discussion which w i l l be taken up a f t e r
the data on the Sbk have been examined.
But what does 'seeing the Nirmanakaya' mean? Does Asariga l i t e r a l l y mean
that the mere sight of the Nk i s e f f i c a c i o u s , or i s t h i s a metaphor for being
able" to meet with, and undertake the r e l i g i o u s l i f e under, an h i s t o r i c a l
Buddha? We should f i r s t note that 'seeing' the Buddha cannot be a metaphor
for hearing or understanding the Buddha-word. Both hearing and understanding
have t h e i r own consistent terminology throughout the Mahayanasamgraha, and
159
that terminology i s not found here. Furthermore, Asvabhava (Ulj-36al9) r e f e r s
to "anthropomorphic mental images." While there i s also some chance that
'seeing' means j o i n i n g the Buddha's entourage, the majority of passages seem
to be based upon the more l i t e r a l notion. Asvabhava's statement that the
glimpse of the Buddha i s a c t u a l l y a glimpse of h i s thirty-two major and eighty
minor c h a r a c t e r i s t i c e (X:l6) ' suggests that the recognition of a Buddhais the
essence-ofthe s o t e r i o l o g i c a l event.
Such an understanding makes good sense of these passages. Ordinary sen-
t i e n t beings can see, but not recognize, the Nk. The Sravaka does recognize
i t . His career i s already well launchedhe knows the basic doctrine, p r a c t i c e
the meditation, and keeps the precepts. He requires assurance. A 'mere
glimpse' of the Buddha w i l l indeed assure him that the goal and foundation of
his p r a c t i c e i s r e a l i z a b l e , and w i l l therefore increase his confidence and
a s p i r a t i o n .
The question of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Nirmanakaya and Svabhavika-
kaya w i l l be taken up l a t e r .
d. The Sambhogakaya-Buddha i n the Buddhafield
In the Mahayanasamgraha, the Sambhogakaya i s the form i n which Buddhahood
resides within a Buddhafield, teaching an enjoyable doctrine to the Bodhisat-
tva.. Relevant passages w i l l be examined under three headings:
1. The Sambhogakaya; i i . The Buddhafield; i i i . The Bodhisattva.
i . The SambhogakayaGeneral
Prastavana LThe commentators (Bh323a25-29; U38lcl7-20) say t h a t , due
3.10
l6o
to the Sambhogakaya, the Great Bodhisattvas who have
entered the great bhumis experience the pleasures of the
dharma and these pleasures assure the p e r f e c t i o n of t h e i r
equipment.1
VIII:10 [This passage on the r e t r i b u t i o n of nirvikalpajnana was
quoted when discussing the Mrmanakaya. Asvabhava adds
that being born i n the Sambhogakaya Buddha assembly i s
the r e t r i b u t i o n for having obtained the fundamental
n i r v i k a l p a j nana (described at VIII:iht).]
The i m p l i c a t i o n seems to be that the fundamental n i r v i k a l p a j nana leads
to r e b i r t h i n t h i s assembly, and that there the "subsequent (.prsthalabdha)
n i r v i k a l p a j nana," "whose possessor can.circulate throughout the world without
being s o i l e d , " i s obtained.
X:6.2 [The Dharmakaya] i s the support for the various Sambho-
gakayas because i t assures the maturation of the
Bodhisattvas.
X:8 [To the question of whether the various Sambhogakayas
are d i f f e r e n t ^ o r not d i f f e r e n t , Asanga r e p l i e s : ] . . .
As t h e i r intentions and actions do not d i f f e r , they are
not d i f f e r e n t . It i s not the case that t h e i r various
supports do not d i f f e r i n n u m e r a b l e supports occur.
Asvabhava (.UU39b2-5) explains that the Buddhaf i e l d s , assemblies, verbal
expressions, sizes of the bodies, major and minor marks, taste'O'f the doctrine,
161
etc., d i f f e r i n various universes.
X:27b . . . [You, the Bhagavan! are present i n the world and
the Buddha assemblies. ... .
Both commentators agree that the Buddha appears i n the world by the
Nirmanakaya and i n the Buddha assemblies by the Sambhogakaya.
X:35 Why i s the Sambhogakaya not the Svabhavikakaya? For s i x
reasons:
(1) Because a rupakaya can be seen.
Again, Vasubandhu i s ambiguous. Asvabhava (;Tjl+l+7c27-28). says, " . . . the
Sambhogakaya has a material (rupa) appearance while the Svabhavikakaya does not."
(2) Because i t appears v a r i o u s l y i n the innumerable
Buddha assemblies.
Asvabhava (u"+"+7c29-^8al) says the Sambhogakaya exhibits diverse forms
whereas the Svabhavikakaya does not.
(.3) Because i t can be seen according to the aspirations
Cof the devotee], i t appears to have an indeterminate
svabhava.
Asvabhava (uHU8al-l+) says that the Sambhogakaya i s manifest i n accord
with the " a s p i r a t i o n s " (adhimukti)_ of the observer and lacks a f i x e d nature.
He quotes "a sutra" to the e f f e c t that some see a ' 'Sambhoga-Buddha, others a'
young man, and s t i l l others a c h i l d .
(h) Because i t appears i n d i f f e r e n t ways, i t can be seen
162
to have a changing svabhava.
Asvabhava explains that the Sbk appears d i f f e r e n t to the same observer
at various times.
(5) Because i t can be seen mixed with various assemblies
of Bodhisattvas, Sravakas, devas, etc.
The term "mixed" i s taken for granted by the commentators. I t probably
means that the Sbk i s seen "as a member of" the various assemblies. This i s
c e r t a i n l y the case at X:1.2 where the Sbk i s said ". . . to be characterized
by the various Buddha assemblies because i t experiences the very pure Buddha-
f i e l d s . . . . "
( 6) Because the two reorientations-of-support, that of
the alayavijnana and that of the p r a v r t t i v i j n a n a ,
do not appear l o g i c a l l y to coincide.
Asvabhava (uUWalC12) explains that the r e o r i e n t a t i o n " o f the alayavi jnana
y i e l d s the Svabhavikakaya while that of the other active vijnanas y i e l d s the
Sambhogakaya.
X:37 As neither the Sambhogakaya nor the Nirmanakaya i s
e t e r n a l , how can the sutra say that the Tathagata's body
1
i s eternal? Because both Nisyandakaya and Nirmanakaya
depend upon the eternal Dharmakaya. As the enjoyment i s
never interrupted and the nirmanas are repeatedly manifest,
i t i s proper to regard the Tathagata's body as eternal. . . .
Asvabhava ( uW8c l 9) equates the Nisyandakaya with the Sambhogakaya.
163
X:1.2 The Sambhogakaya depends on the Dharmakaya and i s
characterized by various Buddha assemblies because i t
experiences the very pure Buddhafields and pleasures
of the Mahayana dharmas.
80
The term " i s characterized by" indicates that t h i s i s the way the
Buddha i s perceived, not that the Buddha assemblies, etc. are inherent
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .
Asvabhava (TjU36a6-12) explains that the "Buddhafield" i s a gathering'of
various groups of Great Bodhisattvas (as i n Sukhavati, e t c . ) . The "pleasures"
are: the pleasures of jewels and precious metals; the pleasures of understanding
the meaning of Mahayana sutras, etc.; and the pleasures of s c h o l a s t i c reasoning
enjoyed by the Buddha and Bodhisattvas. I t might be possible to i n t e r p r e t
Asvabhava (.TjU36all-12) as saying that both the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas
possess Sambhogakayas, but t h i s passsage i s obscure and i s not supported by
the Tibetan.
In these passages, the Bodhisattva who has perfected nirvikalpajnana
finds himself i n the presence of the Tathagata (the Sambhogakaya) i n a Buddha
assembly. The p h y s i c a l appearance (rupa) of the Sbk i s projected by the
a s p i r a t i o n (adhimukti) of the observer, and hence varies from s i t u a t i o n to
s i t u a t i o n . The Bodhisattva takes great pleasure i n the occasion, and h i s
pleasure i s instrumental i n furthering h i s s p i r i t u a l progress.
There i s no suggestion that the Sbk can appear apart from the Buddhafield;
i t i s an i n t r i n s i c part of the d e f i n i t i o n of Sbk. Asanga devotes more space
to describing the Buddhafield than to the Sbk i t s e l f .
161+
Q-i
i i . The Buddhafield
The primary d e s c r i p t i o n of the Buddhafield occurs at X:30. The Bhagavan
of t h i s passage should be understood as the Sbk of others. To the possible
objection that i f Asanga had meant "Sambhogakaya" he would have used that term,
I can only r e p l y that, asX:30 i s based upon a d i r e c t quotation from an e a r l i e r
text (presumably a version of the Samdhinirmocanasutra), i t i s determined by
the l a t t e r ' s terminology.
Just as the Sambhogakaya could be considered the superimposition of an
appearance projected by the Bodhisattva on the fact of Buddhahood, so the
Buddhafield can be considered to be a symbol which maintains the perfect congru-
ence of the image of a s p a t i a l country r u l e d by the Tathagata, and the notion
of the Bodhisattva's s o t e r i o l o g i c a l s i t u a t i o n within which j o y f u l and enriching
communion i s possible.
X:30 How should we understand the pure Buddhafields of the
Buddhas? In the introduction to the Bodhisattvapitaka-
satasahasrikasutra, they are described as follows:
The Bhagavan resides i n an i n f i n i t e grand palace:
(.1) which i s adorned with the blaze of the seven jewels
f i l l i n g the i n f i n i t e universe with a great radiance,
(.2) whose immense rooms are well disposed,
(.3) whose compass i s unbroken,
(.k) whose domain t o t a l l y transcends the three dhatus,
(.5) which a r i s e s from supremely wholesome world-
transcending roots.
165
At X:30 the physical model for the Buddhafield i s a great palace b l a z i n g
with jewels, possessing immense, well-proportioned rooms, an unlimited area
and immeasurable dimensions. Asvabhava (uU^6al2-ll+) explains " i t s domain
transcends the three dhatus" to mean that the Buddhafield i s not something
that can be e i t h e r desired or attained l i k e an ordinary p h y s i c a l palace.
Rather, i t "arises from supreme and world-transcending wholesome roots," which
Vasubandhu (Bh377alO) i d e n t i f i e s as. non-conceptual awareness and subsequent
awareness. This idea- of an epistemic nature i s supported by (.6):
(.6) which may be characterized as very e f f i c a c i o u s and
very pure v i j n a p t i
Asvabhava (U^U6al7-20) explains that no jewels, etc., can be found apart
from the awareness of them. Thus, the Buddhafield i s not a "more r e a l " place
than the common world. Both are "ideas" ( v i j n a p t i ) ; the d i f f e r e n c e originates
from the d i f f e r i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s placed on experience by the common man,
Sravaka and Bodhisattva.
Vasubandhu has confirmed the suggestion (noted previously at VIII:10) that
the'Bodhisattva i n the Buddhafield exercises subsequent awareness (prsthalabdha-
jnana). As t h i s i s the awareness whose possessor can c i r c u l a t e f r e e l y
throughout the world without being s o i l e d , t h i s i s another i n d i c a t i o n that the
Buddhafield i s not some "place" apart from the world. Further, hints that the
Buddhafield i s simply the present environment viewed from a revaluating
perspective occur at X:35-6," where Asvabhava .affirms that the r e o r i e n t a t i o n of-
the alayavijnana y i e l d s the Dharmakaya, while r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the other
active vijnanas y i e l d s the Sambhogakaya; and at X:5> where the r e o r i e n t a t i o n of
the rupakaya i s said to y i e l d sovereignty over the Buddhafield, i . e . , the
166
Buddhafield i s a revaluation of the common world.
(.7) which i s the residence of the Tathagata.
X:30. l U [The BuddhafieldH surpasses a l l other arrays (vyuha)
because i t i s displayed by the Tathagata's b l e s s i n g .
Asvabhava (U^6b5) says that i t surpasses the arrays of the Bodhisattva
because i t i s the seat (asana) of the Tathagata's manifestation.
These passages, which portray a f i g u r e seated i n the middle"of a space
arranged and b e a u t i f i e d by his. presencej leave no doubt-that the Tathagata
has a r e a l i t y apart from the'Bodhisattva, even though the l a t t e r ' s expectation
provides the form under which he,..beholds the Tathagata. ...
Later i n X:30 we f i n d :
' "(.15'-') whose roads are great memory, i n t e l l i g e n c e and
i n s i g h t ,
(.16) whose vehicles are samatha and vipasyana,
(.17) which i s entered through the great doors to
l i b e r a t i o n : sunyata and animitta.
(.18) which rests upon the arrangement c o n s i s t i n g of a
great jewelled r o y a l lotus ornamented by innumer-
able q u a l i t i e s .
Like a p h y s i c a l region, the Buddhafield has gates, roads and v e h i c l e s .
The gates are the great entries to liberationsunyata,.animitta,.and passion-
l e s s n e s s V The roads are the paths (marga) to l i b e r a t i o n h e a r i n g , r e f l e c t i o n
and meditation. The vehicles are calm (samatha) and i n s i g h t (vipasyana).
F i n a l l y , i t rests upon a "great jewelled r o y a l l o t u s " which Asvabhava
(U*+"+6bl5-23) says may be either a p h y s i c a l thing or the lotus seat of the
Tathagata himself.
X:30 (.10) which i s maintained by the j o y f u l taste of the
dharma and great b l i s s ,
(.11) whose actions are e n t i r e l y f o r the benefit of a l l
sentient beings,
(.12) which t o t a l l y excludes klesa-induced torments,
(.13) which expels a l l maras.
Any d i f f i c u l t y i n understanding Asanga's concept of the Buddhafield arises
from our preconceptions. The f i r s t preconception.comes from our f a m i l i a r i t y
with' the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s placed upon such passages by the Pure Land schools of
China and Japan, which regard the Buddhafield as a place reached by pilgrimage,
as an a e r i a l region?in which one may be reborn or as a s i t u a t i o n created by
meditation. These ideas may be comprehended by regarding the Buddhafield as a
symbolic environment i n which both the p h y s i c a l place and the s o t e r i o l o g i c a l
s i t u a t i o n are equally and simultaneously.Indicated by the'term' "Buddha-
f i e l d . "
But such a symbolic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n cannot be applied to Asanga's explana-
t i o n He gives a highly r a t i o n a l i z e d d e s c r i p t i o n of the Buddhafield which so
exhaustively i n t e r p r e t s the myth of the Buddhafield as a b e a u t i f u l dwelling
that i t retains l i t t l e of i t s polyvalence. Instead, the d e s c r i p t i o n becomes
a d i d a c t i c allegory i n which Buddhafields a r i s e from supremely pure, world-
transcending roots; t h e i r roads are great memory, i n t e l l i g e n c e and i n s i g h t ;
they are t r a v e l l e d by the vehicles of samatha and vipasyana, and so on.. Even
the most basic s p a t i a l question: Where i s the Buddhafield?" i s l e f t dangling.
168
Asvabhava (uU36a9) says that they are "Sukhavati, etc. i n the four d i r e c t i o n s . "
However, there i s no other mention i n t h i s text of t h i s notion.
The d i d a c t i c nature of X:30 i s underlined by the f a c t that Asanga has not
applied the same type of hermeneutic as he d i d to the e a r l i e r (11:33) descrip-
t i o n of the Buddhafields and residences. There i s l i t t l e need to i n t e r p r e t
the present d e s c r i p t i o n i t i s i t s e l f an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the myth.
i i i . BodhisattvasResidents of the Buddhafield
The Buddhafield:
X:30 (.8) i s the refuge of the Great Bodhisattvas,
(.9) i s the promenade of i n f i n i t e numbers of nagas,
yaksas, gandharvas, asuras, garudas, kimnaras,
mahoragas, manusyas, and amanusyas.
The image of the Buddha surrounded by a group of attendants i s a f a m i l i a r
scene from the sutras. At X:1.2 the followers are only Bodhisattvas, while at
X:35-5 the Sambhogakaya i s surrounded by assemblies of Sravakas, devas, and so
on. At X: 30.8-9, Asvabhava (u4^6a21-26) reconciles these by saying that the
Buddhafields are r e a l l y inhabited only by the Bodhisattvas who have entered
the great bhumis, and who a s s i s t the Tathagata. The remaining i n h a b i t a n t s
the devas, nagas, and so o n a r e nirmanas, not r e a l aspirants. The question
of whether the Sravaka i s , i n any sense, capable of entering a Buddhafield or
seeing the Sbk i s not answered i n t h i s text,- However, even i f he can see the
Sbk, his Buddha i s the Nk. The Sbk i s the form.related to the Great Bodhi-
sattvas .
The Bodhisattva perceives the Buddha and h i s environment as a Sambhogakaya
i n a Buddhafield. Both are permeated with pleasure (sambhoga: enjoyment;
successful love; sexual union) j u s t as the world of the common man or the
Sravaka i s pervaded with s u f f e r i n g (duhkha). Even the fact that the c e n t r a l
Sbk "dwells" within the f i e l d rather than being "manifested ,'
v
as was the Nk, i s
interpreted as a reference to the aspirant's constant pleasure, rather than as
an i n d i c a t i o n of the presence of a subsistent being. This pleasurerls such an
important element of the theory that a systematic examination of i t s nature
and cause w i l l form an excellent framework within which to examine Asanga's
understanding of the Bodhisattva who. experiences i t .
Let us f i r s t note that t h i s p l e a s u r e - f i l l e d Buddhafield i s one of the
most s u r p r i s i n g innovations to appear within the Buddhist t r a d i t i o n . E a r l i e r
thinkers had pictured a world permeated with the misery a r i s i n g from the
i n d i v i d u a l ' s inveterate tendency to c l i n g to objects generated by r e i f i c a t i o n
of experience. Such immediate and l i m i t e d pleasure as might be gained from
these pseudo-objects would be more than offset.by the pain, and f r u s t r a t i o n
r e s u l t i n g from the i n e v i t a b l e termination of the basic experience. The object
of Buddhist p r a c t i c e was seen as the eradication of the misapprehensions that
caused the r e i f i c a t i o n . When t h i s p r a c t i c e was successful, the aspirant was
beyond s u f f e r i n g and, i n c i d e n t a l l y , beyond pleasure.
Suddenly, the Vijnanavada presents, along with, t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l model,
the notion that the Bodhisattva enjoys pleasure rather than abandoning both
pleasure and pain as he nears enlightenment. How can Asanga hold that the
Bodhisattva simultaneously experiences pleasure and abandons pleasure?
We cnannot avoid the problem by the f a c i l e assumption that "pleasure i n
the Buddhafield" denotes a Bodhisattva-emotion which i s forever beyond the
grasp of ordinary man. Statements of that type are c l e a r l y l a b e l l e d "profound"
170
(gambhira), a l a b e l not attached to these pleasures. Asanga i s attempting to
construct a r a t i o n a l system, and his ideas must be given a l o g i c a l i n t e r -
pretation.
At f i r s t reading, the Mahayanasamgraha might appear to contain a symbolic
83
arrangement such as that frequently found i n l a t e r Indo-Tibetan works, which
would explain the contradiction: the aspirant abandons the three basic klesas
i n reverse order, i . e . , he f i r s t abandons revulsion-misery, then d e s i r e -
pleasure, and f i n a l l y nescience-dullness. The aspirant who was o r i g i n a l l y
dominated by misery moves to a s i t u a t i o n dominated by pleasure. This c e r t a i n l y
would be i n accord with the move of the aspirant to the Buddhafield. It would
reduce the pleasures of the Buddhafield to a s p e c i a l case of the older theory,
i . e . , the Bodhisattva has simply not yet abandoned them. However, i n t h i s
pattern the text would then show him moving to a s i t u a t i o n dominated by d u l l -
ness, and then to f u l l enlightenment. The Mahayanasamgraha does not mention
the dullness, and the f u l l enlightenment i s not simply a further stage. In
addition, the pleasures of the Buddhafield are obviously not the r e s u l t of
l i n g e r i n g k l e s a s t h e y are healthy, p o s i t i v e f a c t o r s . Therefore t h i s expla-
nation f a i l s .
I suggest that the problem can be resolved by viewing the concept of
pleasure within the basic trisvabhava framework of the Mahayanas amgraha. That
i s , both common man and Bodhisattva are constantly engaged i n perceptual
'situations that may be analyzed'through the same c a t e g o r i e s t h e skandhas.
These include the vedanaskandha'- (feeling-tone) of which pleasure i s one
possible aspect. '-The' difference i s that the common man-reifies his exper-
iences and.finds himself within"a f i e l d of f i x e d external objects that
dominate his existence. The Bodhisattva may be said to share the same basic
171
experience, but i n a reoriented manner. He sees through the nature (which i s
that of mere idea, v i j n a p t i ) of. the experience by h i s non-conceptual awareness
(jnana or nirvikalpajnana), and so inhabits a world of creative p o s s i b i l i t i e s .
Rather than being driven by imaginary external objects, he himself creates,
or exercises sovereignty over, the world. Both may experience pleasure but,
while the common man experiences i t as an inherent c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of c e r t a i n
t r a n s i t o r y objects, the Bodhisattva experiences i t as a phenomenon which he
can maintain.
I s h a l l now v e r i f y the above s o l u t i o n by examining relevant passages of
the t e x t . As these are scattered throughout the Mahayanasamgraha, they w i l l be
abstracted and arranged under the following headings: Pleasure, Reorientation,
Sovereignty, Awareness, Pleasure and the Other, Pleasure and the Bodhisattva's
Maturation.
Pleasure
The Bodhisattva's pleasure i s defined as "the enjoyment of the Mahayana
dharma" (X:1.2). This has both an obvious and a subtle sense. The obvious
gloss i s given by Asvabhava (.U*+36a9-12) as the enjoyment of the jewels, etc.,
i n the Buddhafield and the pleasure of discussing and understanding the
Mahayana t e x t s . This must be intended for those with a l i t e r a l concept of the
Buddhafield. The "jewels" are the contents of the Buddhafield, and are seen
as valuable just as the "objects" of the common world are valueless. The
pleasures of discussing and understanding the teachings are almost c e r t a i n l y
an i d e a l i z a t i o n of the f a m i l i a r monastic delight i n the evening discussion
between master and d i s c i p l e s . Neither of these rather l i t e r a l explanations
i s c e n t r a l or i s developed further.
172
The subtle sense i s r e a l i z e d when we r e c a l l that by "the Mahayana" Asanga
means his trisvabhava-based doctrine, and that chapters II-IV teach that
understanding the doctrine and being able to understand one's world i n the
reoriented way i t describes are equivalent. Therefore, enjoyment of the
Mahayana dharma i s equivalent to seeing the world i n a reoriented manner.
Reorientation
X:5.2 By r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the vedanaskandha i t Cthe Sbk]
attains sovereignty over irreproachable, immeasurable,
immensely pleasant residences.
Both Vasubandhu (Bh372a3) and Asvabhava (U^38a2) agree that the residence
i s "immensely" {J^jf ) pleasant because i t "transcends" ( fcji ) the
pleasures of the three worlds.
That i s , the Bodhisattva also experiences any perception as p a i n f u l ,
pleasurable or i n d i f f e r e n t but, because he sees through i t s nature, he
evaluates i t d i f f e r e n t l y . Unlike the ordinary i n d i v i d u a l within "the three
worlds," the Bodhisattva does not ascribe these f e e l i n g s to some external
object and hence h i s pleasure i s not l i m i t e d by the caprice of such an object.
He exercises sovereignty which i s "immense" and "transcendent."
Sovereignty
Sovereignty (yibhutva) and mastery (vasita) both imply a r e v e r s a l of
r e l a t i o n s h i p s within a l i f e , rather than-the abandonment of any maj-or
aspect of a r e l a t i o n s h i p . In the most general sense, the "drivenness"
i s replaced by " c o n t r o l , " even i f the actual actions are i d e n t i c a l . For
example, the Bodhisattva abandons l i f e of h i s own free w i l l rather than being
"taken" by death; he i s able to choose the s t a t i o n of r e b i r t h rather than
being driven to a womb; he i s able to perceive accurately and minister e f f e c -
t i v e l y instead of being gripped by misapprehensions and preached to by others.
The most important such r e v e r s a l i s connected with the Bodhisattva's vow
to work for the welfare of others. The common man, working for h i s own worldly
gain, i s permeated with misery. The Sravaka, working f o r h i s own s p i r i t u a l
b e n e f i t , becomes free from misery. But the Bodhisattva, working for the
s p i r i t u a l welfare of others (X:7.6; X:10; X:12; X:29-5; X:37), i s permeated
with pleasure. While the common man.or Sravaka s t r i v e s t o ingest.desirable
aspects of h i s environment, the Bodhisattva donates these to others. The
former a c t i v i t y engenders s u f f e r i n g ; the l a t t e r , pleasure.
The idea that the worlds of the Bodhisattva and of the common man are
mirror-images suggests the p o s s i b i l i t y that the Bodhisattva's pleasure i s the
a n t i t h e s i s of the common man's s u f f e r i n g . Such an idea would be very conven-
i e n t , f o r , while the pleasures -of the Buddhafield are discussed i n general,
oblique, and symbolic terms, s u f f e r i n g (duhkha)in p a r t i c u l a r , the famous
dictum " a l l that is:'Impermanent i s suff e r i n g " (yad - anityam tad duhkham)has
been treated very d i r e c t l y and exhaustively i n the Abhidharma l i t e r a t u r e .
Therefore, we should expect t h i s l i t e r a t u r e to further our understanding of
the Bodhisattva's pleasure.
This l i n e of thought leads to a f a s c i n a t i n g consideration. Were we to
view the question of the Bodhisattva's pleasure i n a s t r i c t Abhidharmic frame
of reference ( i . e . , not invoking the trisvabhava), i t could be rephrased as
follows: The Bodhisattva must have the same i n d i v i d u a l experiences, either
pleasant or p a i n f u l , as does the common man. The o v e r a l l tone, however, i s
pleasant. How can t h i s be? How can a s p e c i f i c p a i n f u l experience have an
o v e r a l l pleasant tone? The i n t e r e s t i n g thing about t h i s question i s that i t
i s a mirror-image of the actual Abhidharma question regarding misery. How can
l i f e , which has both pleasant and p a i n f u l experiences, be said to be permeated
with suffering?
The answer of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (also a t t r i b u t e d to Asanga) may be
summarized as follows. Various s p e c i f i c instances of misery or s u f f e r i n g
(duhkhaduhkhata) are concomitants to common experiences. However, t h i s ex-
perience i s not s u f f e r i n g as such, but i s only, one l i m i t e d - aspect.of a broader,
phenomenon: " s u f f e r i n g o f i a l l conditioned existence" (samskaraduhkhata).
B. K. M a t i l a l has described t h i s as the "anguish of the human heart caused by
8h
our constant awareness of lack of freedom."
Since both pleasure and s u f f e r i n g are f e e l i n g s that r e s u l t from the
primary processes, they need not be understood.as t i g h t l o g i c a l concepts. The
joy which an i n d i v i d u a l may occasionally f e e l need not i n v a l i d a t e the statement
that his l i f e i s permeated with misery (or anguish), nor i s i t necessary to
deny the s i m i l a r i t y between the momentary joy and the pervasive, anguish.
I f t h i s way of understanding misery i s applied to the Bodhisattva's .
pleasure, the l a t t e r i s seen as a thoroughgoing enjoyment of the Buddhafield,
d i f f e r e n t only i n degree from common pleasure. I can f i n d no passages i n the
Mahayanasamgraha which would r u l e out such an understanding, and many t a c i t l y
support i t . For example, i n the d e s c r i p t i o n of the Buddhafield at X:30.12-13,
Asanga says that i t i s free from a l l the torments caused by klesas and that
a l l the maras are expelled. This does not n e c e s s a r i l y i n d i c a t e an absence of
pain caused by the automatic emotional reactions (klesas). Asvabhava (U^l+8b3)
says that everything associatedtwith fear, i . e . , klesamara,
r
skandhamara,
mrtyumara (death) and devaputramara (the d e v i l ) , i s expelled. Again, while
1 7 5
pain may be present, i t does not engender d r i v i n g fear.
Notice that we have been able to explain the pleasure i n Abhidharmic
terms, without recourse to the trisvabhava.
Thus, both the trisvabhava explanation and our Abhidharma-derived view
show the close connection between ordinary pleasure and the pleasure of the
Buddhafield, and stress the concept of sovereignty as the d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g
f a c t o r .
Awareness (inana or nirvikalpajnana)
An examination of the l o g i c a l status of the pleasurable experience
reveals s t i l l more features. As we have seen, t h i s text does not contain an
ontology. Asanga regards any s i t u a t i o n as an experience formed by a complex
preconscious process ( c a l l e d "dependent upon another," paratantra). The
experience can appear only as the experience of a subject who completes i t by
taking a c e r t a i n a t t i t u d e , thus assigning to i t some p a r t i c u l a r status. I f
the observer i s a commoner or Sravaka, the experience i s r e i f i e d into an
"awareness of" (vi-jnana) some t o t a l l y imaginary ( p a r i k a l p i t a ) object. I f he
i s a Bodhisattva, he sees through the nature of the experience and so has a
"non-conceptual awareness" ( n i r v i k a l p a - j nana) without any o n t o l o g i c a l
referent, i . e . , i t i s "perfected" (parinispanna).
We can i n f e r that the Bodhisattva's pleasurable perceptions are the
non-conceptual awareness, and that descriptions of the l a t t e r w i l l also be
i n d i r e c t descriptions of the former. This inference i s upheld by X : 7 - 3 :
CThe Svk involves the a t t r i b u t e ofH "residence" because
from the r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the l i f e of desire, etc., the
immeasurable "awareness" (jnana) residence i s obtained.
Chapter VIII, which appears to he the c h i e f passage i n Vijnanavada
sastras devoted to the n i r v i k a l p a j nana, i s p a r t i c u l a r l y h e l p f u l . I t l i s t s
three types of n i r v i k a l p a j nana:
the preparatory n i r v i k a l p a j nana (prayogika), the attainment of which
enables the aspirant to enter the Nirmanakaya assembly.
the fundamental n i r v i k a l p a j nana (mula)often simply c a l l e d n i r v i k a l p a j nana
or even jnanathe attainment of which enables the aspirant to enter the
Sambhogakaya assembly or Buddhafield.
the subsequent nirvikalpajfiana (prsthalabdha ) which i s developed by the
Bodhisattva within the Buddhafield, and which enables him to c i r c u l a t e i n
the world without being stained.
The notion of the subsequent nirvikalpajnana has been noted previously
when examining the way i n which the Dk may be obtained. The basic passage i s
worth repeating:
111:12 . . . the subsequent awareness,.which sees-everything a r i s i n g
from the alayavijnana and merely mental appearances to be
l i k e an i l l u s i o n , arises by i t s very nature free from misap-
prehensions. Thus, just as a magician i s free from misappre-
hensions about the r e a l i t y of things he has created, so the
Bodhisattva, although speaking of causes and e f f e c t s , i s
always free from misapprehensions about them.
Furthermore, we have also seen (at X-,30.5 and . 6) that the Buddhafield
arises from supremely wholesome world-transcending roots (.which Vasubandhu
i d e n t i f i e s as fundamental and subsequent nirvikalpajnana), and that i t may be
characterized as very e f f i c a c i o u s and very pure v i j n a p t i
177
These passages leave no doubt that, despite the negative form of the term
nirvikalpajnana, the Bodhisattva's awareness ("subsequent"- nirvikalpajnana) -"
i s not a mental blankness or an i n e f f a b l e state. It i s the perception of an
environment which, although i t may have the same form as that perceived by the
common man, i s understood to be simply a transient experience rather than a
binding and oppressing assemblage of objects.
This conclusion suggests that the pleasure experienced by the Bodhisattva
i s connected with h i s awareness of freedom. I f misery r e s u l t s from a percep-
t i o n of oneself as driven within a world of objects, then pleasure r e s u l t s
from a perception of oneself as being i n a c o n t r o l l i n g p o s i t i o n within a f i e l d
of experiences.. Reversing M a t i l a l ' s d e f i n i t i o n of duhkha gives an equally
good d e s c r i p t i o n of pleasure: the joy of the human heart caused by our
constant awareness of the presence of freedom.
Pleasure and the Other
The previous discussion notwithstanding, there i s s t i l l something odd
about applying such an apparently egocentric f e e l i n g as pleasure to a non-
egocentric phenomenon. This objection disappears before the r e a l i z a t i o n that
the Bodhisattva's p l e a s u r e i i s not s e l f i s h but i s the pleasure taken i n the
l i b e r a t i o n of both s e l f and others..
The key to further information i s the note at Prastavana: 3.10 which
states that the Bodhisattva simultaneously enters the Buddhafields and f i r s t
great bhumi, the j o y f u l (pramudita) bhumi. Therefore, a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h i s
bhumi w i l l also describe the Bodhisattva's pleasure. The Vijnanavadin doctrine
of the bhumis finds i t s c l a s s i c a l statement i n the Dasabhumikasutra. That
t e x t , the Mahayanasutralamkara (XX-XXII, 32) and the Mahayanasamgraha (V:2)
a l l agree that:
178
V:2.1 [The pramud.itabhumi takes i t s name from the fact that
thereD . . . one obtains, for the f i r s t time, the a b i l i t y
to assure both h i s own personal welfare and that of others.
Asvabhava (ul+2^al8-23) adds that the Sravaka, working only for h i s own
welfare, obtains a clear i n s i g h t (abhisamaya) but does not and never w i l l f e e l
joy, whereas the Bodhisattva experiences joy which w i l l continue u n t i l f u l l
enlightenment i s reached.
It i s tempting to suppose that the former i s the basic n i r v i k a l p a j nana
and the l a t t e r i s the subsequent n i r v i k a l p a j nana, but there i s no r e a l support
f o r t h i s assumption. Note that Asanga i s not suggesting that the Sravaka
takes pleasure i n h i s own l i b e r a t i o n while the Bodhisattva takes pleasure i n
the l i b e r a t i o n of others, an idea which would require the Sravaka to f e e l
pleasure and the Bodhisattva e g o c e n t r i c a l l y to "evaluate h i s experiences
d i f f e r e n t l y from those of others. Both of these ideas are r e j e c t e d i n the
text. The Bodhisattva f e e l s pleasure i n h i s perception of both himself and
others as l i b e r a t e d . The Bodhisattva has vowed to e s t a b l i s h a new pattern of
l i f e based upon an a l t r u i s t i c regard for others. While t h i s i s described i n
chapter IV, i t Is e a s i l y overlooked i n the present context. At X:30.8,
Asvabhava (uU"+6a23) says that the Bodhisattva " a s s i s t s " the Tathagata, and at
VII:5 t h i s assistance i s described: " . . . CThe Bodhisattva,! while r e s i d i n g
i n meditative b l i s s , takes b i r t h where he wishes."
Pleasure and the Bodhisattva's Maturation
The Bodhisattva's pleasure has been pictured as an epiphenomenon a r i s i n g
from his engagement with h i s world. This impression i s contradicted by the
commentators who, i n several passages (e.g., P:3.10, Bh323a25-29; U38lcl7-20),
i n s i s t that the pleasure i s i t s e l f instrumental i n the Bodhisattva's maturation,
179
or i n the c o l l e c t i o n or p e r f e c t i o n of h i s equipment (samhhara).
At X: 30.10 Asvabhava (Ul+U6a27) says that i n the pure Buddhafield the joy
and pleasure i n the taste of the Mahayana dharma serves as food, and at X:8
(uU39b5) that i n each universe the "enjoyment of the taste of the dharma" i s
s p e c i a l . The same point i s made i n d i r e c t l y at X:6.3, where Asvabhava (uU38clU-
15) comments, " . . . the Bodhisattvas who have entered the great bhumis do not
need to see the Buddha's Nirmanakaya i n order to be matured,' because they
themselves penetrate the profound and extensive dharma." The equivalence of
the "penetrating ( i . e . , understanding) the dharma" and of-the Bodhisattva's
pleasant awareness has been noted.
The concept of pleasure cannot be f u l l y understood u n t i l the mechanism
whereby i t assures the Bodhisattva's maturation has been accounted f o r . The
fact that the Mahayanasamgraha does not explain i t d i r e c t l y indicates that
Asanga had some straightforward concept i n mind, probably that the pleasure i s
simply the motive for the Bodhisattva p r a c t i c e s . The Mahayanasamgraha maps
the Bodhisattva's progress within the Buddhafield into ten stages (bhumis,
chapter V), which the Bodhisattva ascends as he develops the s i x facets of
a l t r u i s t i c personality (paramitas, chapter IV). It mentions the vow by which
t h i s a l t r u i s t i c a c t i v i t y i s d i r e c t e d and channelled. What i t does not mention
i s the motivation required by any model of goal-oriented a c t i v i t y .
The common man's motivation i s the pleasure and s u f f e r i n g that drive him
through h i s l i v e s . In the Sravaka, the motive force i s the confidence
(sraddha) and a s p i r a t i o n (adhimukti) i n s p i r e d by his encounter with the
Nirmanakaya. It seems reasonable that the Bodhisattva's motive for continual
p r a c t i c e of the paramitas i s the increasing joy which i s present from the
f i r s t bhumi onward.
180
e. The Three Kayas: I n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s
The essence of the t r i k a y a doctrine l i e s i n the way i n which each member
i s r e l a t e d to each of the others. Only a few passages address t h i s question
d i r e c t l y . They are:
P:3.10 The three types of Buddhakaya: Svabhavikakaya, Sambho-
gakaya and Nirmanakaya, are the -awareness-result of-these
[Bodhisattva p r a c t i c e s ] .
Both commentaries explain t h i s by a succinct preview of the t r i k a y a
doctrine. Vasubandhu (,Bh 323a22-b4) says,
The t r i p l e Buddhakaya i s c a l l e d the 'aware r e s u l t '
(phalajnana)'result' because i t i s the r e s u l t of the p r e v i -
ously mentioned p r a c t i c e s , and 'aware r e s u l t ' because t h i s
r e s u l t i s aware. [Thus,] i t s basic nature (svabhava) i s to
be 'the aware r e s u l t of these.'
Now i f there were no Svabhavikakaya [T: " i f there were
no svabhava ], there would be no Dharmakayathis i s s i m i l a r
to the caksurindriya. I f there were no Dharmakaya, there
would be no Sambhogakayathis i s s i m i l a r to the caksurvi-
jnana. In t h i s simile the support and the supported should
be considered as equals.
I f there were no Sambhogakaya, the Bodhisattvas would
not enjoy the pleasure of the dharma a f t e r entering the great
bhumis. Without t h i s pleasure t h e i r equipment f o r enlighten-
ment would not be p e r f e c t e d t h i s i s s i m i l a r to the rupa
[bh: " s i m i l a r to not seeing the rupa"].
I f there were no Nirmanakaya, the Bodhisattvas on the
adhlmukti-practi.cing bhumi, and the Sravakas, etc. of l e s s e r
adhimukti, would f a i l ' from the very f i r s t to .'leave the
stations of r e b i r t h ( g a t i ) . ' Therefore, i t i s established
that there must be three kayas.
VIII:10
[This passage on the r e t r i b u t i o n of the n i r v i k a l p a j nana
has already been included under both Nirmanakaya and
181
Sambhogakaya. Vasubandhu (Bh 365all+) adds that both
kayas are the outflows (nisyanda) of the n i r v i k a l p a j nana.
I f the Dharmakaya (or Svabhavikakaya) i s i d e n t i f i e d with
the nirvikalpajnana, we now have the r e l a t i o n of "outflow"
between i t and the other two kayas. This term i s not as
simple as i t appears, since i t cannot imply temporal
p r i o r i t y and s t i l l be consistent with VIII:13, below. 1
VIII:13 The terminus of the Bodhisattva's n i r v i k a l p a j nana i s the
a c q u i s i t i o n of the three pure Buddhakayas and highest
sovereignty (vasita)
Vasubandhu (Bh 365b7-9) and Asvabhava (U^31al0-ll) agree that the three
are obtained on the f i r s t bhumi, but that they become "pure" only on the tenth.
This surely eliminates any p o s s i b i l i t y that one might be acquired p r i o r to
the others.
The commentators also i d e n t i f y the sovereignty with those sovereignties
whose svalaksana i s discussed l a t e r , presumably at X:3.2.
X:1.2 The Sambhogakaya depends upon (brten-pa; ) the
Dharmakaya . . . because i t experiences the very pure
Buddhafields and the enjoyment of the Mahayana dharma.
Asvabhava (U^36a6) explains that "depends upon" means that "because of
the existence of a, Dharmakaya, a Sambhogakaya i s 'obtained."
X:1.3 The Nirmanakaya depends upon the Dharmakaya because i t
manifests Cthe various Buddha a c t i v i t i e s 3 .
182
X:5
[This passage was quoted e a r l i e r . Each of the skandhas,
when reoriented, becomes an aspect of the Dharmakaya.
Two of them are relevant to the t r i k a y a question::
X:5.1
By a r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the rupaskandha, i t Cthe Dharmakaya1
obtains sovereignty over the Buddhafield, the body, the
laksanas, the minor mark(s), the i n f i n i t y of phonemes
and the i n v i s i b l e c r a n i a l marks,
From t h i s we might conclude that a r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the rupaskandha y i e l d s
the Sambhogakaya and associated Buddhafields, etc. However, both Vasubandhu
(Bh 371c24-29) and Asvabhava (U^37c22-29) say that the "body" i s manifested i n
various great assemblies according to the p a r t i c u l a r capacities of the sentient
beings to be taught. I f the Sambhogakaya i s -visible only to the Bodhisattva,
then t h i s passage may also r e f e r to the Nirmanakaya.
X:5 -^ [Reorientation of the samskaraskandha r e s u l t s i n sover-
eignty over: . . . nirmana, transformation, convening the
great assemblies, and c o l l e c t i n g white dharmas.
This would appear to i n d i c a t e the Nirmanakaya, but again the commentators
do not support such a view. They explain these as the Buddha's a b i l i t i e s to
create, transform, etc., as desired, but do not l i n k these a b i l i t i e s more
d i r e c t l y to the Nk.
X:6
How many things does the Dharmakaya support?
(1) I t i s the support f o r the various Buddha residences. . .
(2) It [the Dk: i s the support for the various Sambhogakayas
because i t assures the maturation of the Bodhisattvas.
183
The Chinese t r a n s l a t i o n (U*+38clO-ll) of the key portion of the Asvabhava
commentary d i f f e r s from the Tibetan (u337b2). The Chinese says that the
Dharmakaya i s the adhipatipratyaya for the transformation into a Sambhogakaya,
but not i n the same way that the sun supports i t s rays. The Tibetan says:
"The Dharmakaya i s the support for the Sambhogakaya. I f i t Cthe Dharmakaya!
e x i s t s , then i t manifests Cthe Sambhogakaya!. This i s l i k e the sun and i t s
rays." It i s probably unwise to conclude anything beyond the simple fact that
the Sbk i B p r i m a r i l y dependent upon the Dk.
(3) I t i s the support for the various Nirmanakayas because
i t p r i n c i p a l l y assures the maturation of the Sravakas.
X:37 . . . both the nisyandakaya Ci.e., the Sambhogakaya! and
the Nirmanakaya depend upon the eternal Dharmakaya . . .
Calthough i n d i f f e r e n t ways!.
In these passages, the key term i s obviously "dependence." The Sbk and
Nk each "depend upon" or "are supported by" the Dk, but do not depend upon
each other.
We should note i n passing that t h i s eliminates any p o s s i b i l i t y that the
Dk (or Svk) i s the .real^transcendent Euddha^wha^msnif est.s a- Sbk which i n turn
manifests a worldly Nk_. The r e l a t i o n s h i p of both Nk and Sbk i s d i r e c t l y to
the Dk.
The most important clue to a proper understanding of the dependence
r e l a t i o n s h i p i s Asvabhava's commentary to P:3.10 i n which he compares the kayas
to the perceptual t r i a d : rupa-caksurindriya-caksurvijnana. Unfortunately, i t
i s not c l e a r which factor i s being likened to which kaya, and the d e t a i l s are
very ambiguous. However, I f t h i s simile simply means that the r e l a t i o n s h i p
181*
between the kayas should be understood i n the same way as that between the
perceptual elements,':the d e t a i l s are superfluous. It i s based upon the
Abhidharmic analysis of a moment of r e l a t i o n a l existence i n t o : an epistemic
object (in the case of v i s i o n , the rupa), an epistemic subject (the f a c u l t y
of v i s i o n or caksurindriya), and the awareness a r i s i n g from t h e i r conjunction
(the caksurvijnana). Most t h e o r e t i c i a n s accepted the subject and object as
dharmas ( i . e . , components found at a f i n a l l e v e l of analysis) and did not
attempt to go further than saying that the j u x t a p o s i t i o n of subject and object
gave r i s e to awareness. The j u x t a p o s i t i o n was explained by other factors i n
the t o t a l s i t u a t i o n , such as habits and memories.
The simile must mean that we should adopt a s i m i l a r a t t i t u d e to the three
kayas. Instead of searching for the mechanism by which three d i f f e r e n t
e n t i t i e s are r e l a t e d , we should regard them as abstractions from a single
given s i t u a t i o n c a l l e d Buddhahood or Dk. The reasons for p o s i t i n g the three,
and the r e l a t i o n s h i p between them, become equivalent questions to be answered
by reference to t h e i r power of explaining s p e c i f i c aspects of the t o t a l group
of phenomena termed "Dk." Thus, the statement that the Nk and Sbk "depend
upon" the Dk points to the l a r g e r s i t u a t i o n within which each of them makes
sense.
This l i n e of reasoning i s exactly the one followed at X : l : ". . . because
i t experiences the very pure Buddhafields . . . because i t manifests . . .
because i t p r i n c i p a l l y assures the maturation of the Bodhisattvas . . . because
i t p r i n c i p a l l y assures the maturation of the Sravakas. . . .." The Asvabhava
commentary to X: 6. 2 may support t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n even more e x p l i c i t l y , but
t e x t u a l problems, including wide divergences between the Chinese and Tibetan
versions, render i t suspect.
185
i . Nirmanakaya and Sambhogakaya Compared
The question of r e l a t i o n s h i p s can be seen more c l e a r l y i f Asanga's ideas
about the Nk and Sbk are summarized and compared. The f i r s t s i m i l a r i t y i s
that both are ways i n which the Buddha appears to a c e r t a i n class of observers,
rather than being aspects or parts of the Buddha. This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s
v a l i d a t e d by the fact that both exhibit the same three basic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
as do the Dk or the Svk, i . e . , each i s the r e s u l t of c e r t a i n p r a c t i c e s , each
can be described as an awareness, and each exhibits sovereignty.
That i s , the Sbk r e s u l t s from the p r a c t i c e s by which the aspirant perfects
h i s non-conceptual awareness. Like the Svk, the Sbk i s an "awareness" rather
than a concrete object. This i s ' i m p l i c i t i n the previous point and e x p l i c i t at
X:356(u). F i n a l l y , l i k e the Svk, the Sbk exercises sovereignty, which
involves the joy or pleasure aroused i n the Bodhisattva (P:3.10; X:1.2; X:30.10;
X:3l), and which ensures h i s maturation (P:3.10; X:6.2). Like the Svk, the Sbk
i s eternal because t h i s maturing a c t i v i t y does not cease ( X:3l).
The s i x differences between the Svk and the Sbk l i s t e d at X:35 amount to
one p o i n t t h e Sbk, unlike the Svk, appears i n a series of s p e c i f i c determinate
forms depending upon s p e c i f i c circumstances.
The passages describing the Nk are very s i m i l a r i n form and may be grouped
under the same three main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . Like the Sbk,. i t r e s u l t s from two
types of p r a c t i c e s : those by the Buddha and those by the aspirant. However,
the l a t t e r are not r e a l l y Bodhisattva practices i n s o f a r as they are accom-
p l i s h e d by Sravakas or low-level Bodhisattvas. The action of the Buddha, not
of the aspirant, i s emphasized.
The Nk_ and Sbk both appear i n s i t u a t i o n s where both the Buddha, who has
vowed to a i d a l l sentient beings, and a sentient being who i s prepared to
186
accept such assistance, are present. The Buddha's vow remains the same i n each
case, but the stage of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s progress e l i c i t s e i t h e r a Nk or a Sbk.
The various passages examined generally agree that the Nk appears only to
the Sravakas and to the adhimukticaryabhumi Bodhisattvas (novice Bodhisattvas
on the f i r s t and lowest Bodhisattva l e v e l ) . X : l 6 , the only passage which might
be read as suggesting that ordinary beings who are not Bodhisattvas may see
the Nk, i s glossed by Asvabhava as a reference to those who, sooner or l a t e r ,
w i l l see the Nk (presumably as Sravakas).
A major problem arises from the differences between the information i n
chapter VIII and chapter X. In V I I I : 1 0 - l U the Bodhisattvas who are "preparing"
t h e i r nirvikalpajnanawho l i s t e n to others explain the non-conceptual ( n i r v i -
kalpa ) character of things but cannot see i t d i r e c t l y themselvesare s a i d to
be reborn i n the Nk assembly. The Bodhisattvas who have perfected t h e i r
n i r v i k a l p a j nanawho have personally grasped the t r u t h of t h i s d o c t r i n e a r e
reborn i n the Sbk assembly. On the other hand, at X:2T Asvabhava (U^ll3a23- 26)
says that the Dk is:" i n v i s i b l e to gods and men, the Nk i s manifested i n (
These two versions must be based e i t h e r upon d i f f e r e n t theories or upon
d i f f e r e n t viewpoints. Since the Mahayanasamgraha i s reasonably free of
contradictions, I believe that the difference i s one of viewpoint. VIII: 1 0 i s
a mythical statement of an omniscient narrator recounting, from some detached
cosmic standpoint, the place of each i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e b i r t h . The viewpoint of
chapter I, on the contrary, i s that of an ordinary man f o r whom the Nk appears
to "enter" the world as a p r o j e c t i o n from somewhere outside. The Sbk assembly,
on the other hand, i s i t s e l f outside t h i s commonplace world and i t s aspirant
i s seen to move toward i t .
) the assembly.
187
The Sbk affords a more complex s i t u a t i o n . The aspirant sees not only the
Sbk, but an e n t i r e transformed environment i n which he i s able to hear or
receive the Buddha-word from which he attains an understanding which involves
pleasure. This pleasure encourages him to continue p r a c t i c i n g the paramitas
and i n t h i s way helps perfect a l i f e dedicated to the welfare of others.
Exactly what the aspirant must do to enter the Buddhaland i s unclear. In
chapter VIII Asanga suggests that he i s reborn there. The idea, known i n
l a t e r p r a c t i c e , that the Buddhaland i s entered during meditation i s not
85
contradicted i n the Mahayanasamgraha. F i n a l l y , the t r a d i t i o n that a f t e r
many years of r i t u a l p r a c t i c e Asanga was taken to the T u s i t a heaven and taught
by Maitreya may also be relevant.
i i . The Trikaya and the C l a s s i c a l Problems
Many developments i n Buddhology appear to have been forced by the need to
resolve c e r t a i n basic contradictions i n the concept of the Buddha. The most
ubiquitous of these can be considered to be the " c l a s s i c a l " problems. They
are:
One Buddha, or many Buddhas?
Is the Buddha mortal, or- immortal?
Does the Buddha remain i n nirvana, or not?
As the i n t e l l e c t u a l horizons of the early Buddhist thinkers expanded and
the implications of t h e i r basic dogmas became better understood, e a r l i e r
attempts to set aside such questions or to provide simple answers were seen as
inadequate. It became clear that these questions c a l l e d for a d e s c r i p t i o n of
a transcendent Buddha i n worldly terms. A s a t i s f a c t o r y answer must be mediated
188
by a frame of reference which w i l l allow the ambiguity inherent i n t h i s concept.
As the t r i k a y a i s the fundamental Buddhology of the Mahayanasamgrahawe should
expect that Asanga and h i s commentators would have applied i t to these ques-
t i o n s . In the following section, I s h a l l examine t h i s a p p l i c a t i o n and, from
i t s effectiveness, attempt to judge the degree to which such questions might
have encouraged the development of t h i s concept.
One Buddha, or Many Buddhas?
A l l Buddhist t r a d i t i o n s share a common myth of successive Buddhas, each
t r a i n i n g a d i s c i p l e who, upon reaching Buddhahood, t r a i n s another. This myth
r a i s e s the u n i t y / p l u r a l i t y problems that a r i s e from one basic dilemma. On the
one hand, "Buddha" i s a c e r t a i n c l u s t e r of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . I t makes no sense
to speak of more than one. It i s a s i n g l e concept applied when an i n d i v i d u a l
has become coterminous with t h i s i d e a l . On the other hand, although the
Buddhist cannot speak of a p l u r a l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l s i n a state known as Buddha-
hood, he can and does speak of the p e r s o n a l i t i e s and practices of various
i n d i v i d u a l s who have reached Buddhahood. I t seems unreasonable to deny any
sense of p l u r a l i t y to the r e s u l t i n g Buddha(s). Note that t h i s i s a p e c u l i a r l y
Buddhist problem. In almost a l l other systems of thought a d i s t i n c t i o n between
the i n d i v i d u a l and h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s must be maintained. No matter what set
of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s the i n d i v i d u a l acquired, the "one, or many".problem could
be solved simply by counting the i n d i v i d u a l s i n the class of those possessing
the set of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . In the Buddhist system, which recognizes no
i n d i v i d u a l apart from h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , an aspirant who has s u c c e s s f u l l y
taken on those of Buddha i s "Buddha"totally.
Most Buddhist thinkers have solved the problem by recognizing a Buddha
189
possessing two aspects. For example, i n Abhidharmakosa, v i i : 3 U the question,
"Are the Buddhas s i m i l a r to each other?" receives the reply, "The Buddhas are
s i m i l a r with regard to equipment for enlightenment, Dharmakaya, and the
service of sentient beings. They are d i s s i m i l a r with regard to the length of
l i f e , caste, height, and so on." The subsequent commentary implies a t h r e e - f o l d
Buddha: a Dharmakaya and i t s v i s i b l e aspect c a l l e d the rupakaya (which are
i d e n t i c a l for a l l Buddhas), and the appearance of the i n d i v i d u a l who eventually
reaches Buddhahood (which d i f f e r s from one Buddha to another). This argument
i s adopted and expanded i n the Mahayanasamgraha:
X:8 Is i t necessary to say that the Dharmakayas of Buddhas
are d i f f e r e n t or not d i f f e r e n t ?
As t h e i r support, i n t e n t i o n , and actions do not d i f f e r ,
we must say that they are not d i f f e r e n t . But, insofar
as innumerable persons reach enlightenment, we must say
that they do d i f f e r .
What has been s a i d about the Dharmakaya may also be
applied to the Sambhogakayas. As t h e i r intentions and
a c t i v i t i e s are not d i f f e r e n t , then we must say that they
are not d i f f e r e n t . But as t h e i r supports are d i f f e r e n t ,
they are not non-different because innumerable supports
appear.
'The preceding remarks on the Sambhogakaya also apply to
the Nirmanakaya.
Asvabhava (Ul*39a25-b6) explains that the "support" (for the Dk) i s
tathata; i t s " i n t e n t i o n " i s the i n t e n t i o n to work for the b e n e f i t of a l l
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sentient beings; and i t s "actions" are the various Buddha-activities.
The supports that d i f f e r for the Nk and Sbk are the Buddhafields, the
assemblies, the s i z e of bodies, and so on.
X:3i3 [The Dharmakaya i s characterized by a non-duality] of
p l u r a l i t y and unity because, Eon the'one hand,! the support
of a l l the Buddhas i s not d i f f e r e n t i a b l e , ' [while, on the
other,! innumerable streams of existence are enlightened.
Two stanzas develop t h i s point. These are bext expressed by a paraphrase
based upon Asvabhava's commentary:
In the case of a Dharmakaya, no element i n the cognitive
process i s i d e n t i f i e d as more fundamental than the others,
i . e . , as an " I " or a " s e l f . " Therefore, no d i v i s i o n i n t o
" i " and "other," or i n t e r i o r and e x t e r i o r occurs. Since no
s e l f and no d i v i s i o n i s recognized, and the Dharmakaya
c e r t a i n l y i s hot seen; as a s e l f , then there i s no reason to
speak of several Dharmakayas.
However, from a worldly viewpoint, many.individuals
appear to have reached Buddhahood. Therefore., we must also
say that there are multiple Dharmakayas.
The second stanza (drawn from Mahayanasutralamkara IX:77) o f f e r s a series
86
of reasons to r e j e c t the "one, or many" choice. The f i r s t reason i s based
on the concept of gotra o r . s p i r i t u a l lineage. As t h i s i s a complex passage,
I w i l l paraphrase:
There are two types of l i n e a g e s i n n a t e and acquired.
When we regard only the f i r s t , we can say that because the
same inborn tendencies lead to enlightenment, the r e s u l t i s
the same. However, the acquired lineage which depends on the .
s p i r i t u a l guide, etc., i s of d i f f e r e n t types and l o g i c a l l y
should give r i s e to d i f f e r e n t Buddhas. It i s inadmissible
to maintain only that there i s one Buddha, because:
i f only one Buddha a r r i v e d at enlightenment, the p r a c t i c e s
191
of h i s fellow Bodhisattvas would he i n vain, an inadmis-
s i b l e conclusion.
there must be more than one Buddha i n order to lead
various types of beings to enlightenment.
i t i s always necessary for a Bodhisattva to p r a c t i c e under
a Buddha, who must himself have previously p r a c t i c e d under
a Buddha. Thus, there must be a m u l t i p l i c i t y of Buddhas.
On.the other hand, we cannot simply say that there i s
a m u l t i p l i c i t y of Buddhas because the "immaculate" ( i n the
sense that i t destroys adventitious stains) support or
dharmadhatu cannot contain d i f f e r e n t Buddhas.
X:33 I f the Dharmakayas of a l l Buddhas are the same, why do
we speak of many Buddhas? This question i s answered i n
a stanza:
CWe say there i s one BuddhaD because there are not two
Buddhas i n the same world. CHowever,_i because innumer-
able [BodhisattvasI f i n i s h c o l l e c t i n g t h e i r equipment at
the same time, because Cthe idea ofl an orderly progression
Cof Buddhas! a r r i v i n g at enlightenment i s inadmissible,
we a f f i r m the p l u r a l i t y of Buddhas.
The preceding passages a l l o f f e r s i m i l a r arguments which do not depend
upon, or even harmonize with, the t r i k a y a doctrine. They group the Nk and Sbk
together as the p l u r a l , and regard the Dk as the singular, aspect of the
Buddha. To the objection that a p l u r a l i t y of Nks contradicts the maxim that
only one Buddha may appear at one time, Asanga r e p l i e s :
X:36.8 Even:".if many nirmanas appear, because "the world" i s a
four-continent world system, the b i r t h of two Tathagatas
i n the world does not contradict the sutra which CassertsD
that two Tathagatas do not a r i s e i n the world, just as
192
two Cakravartins cannot a r i s e i n the same world.
That is-, the a f f i r m a t i o n of the::existence of several Nks i s orthodox i f they
inhabit d i f f e r e n t world-systems.
From t h i s i t appears not only that Asanga did not need the t r i k a y a i n
order to solve the one-or-many problem, but that he was forced to reduce i t to
a two-kaya system to deal with t h i s problem.
Is the Buddha Mortal, or Immortal?
The most obvious approach to t h i s problem, v i a the Buddhist concept of
87
time, i s impractical because no s u i t a b l e study of that t o p i c i s a v a i l a b l e .
Therefore, I w i l l merely point out a few conclusions a r i s i n g d i r e c t l y from our
text.
The Majjhima Nikaya: 63 l i s t s four questions which the Buddha declined to
answer on the grounds that the answer would not be conducive to s a l v a t i o n : Is
the universe eternal? Is the universe i n f i n i t e ? Are the j i v a and the body
i d e n t i c a l ? Does the Tathagata survive death? I suggest that l a t e r thinkers
devoted a great deal of attention to the f i n a l question because i t proved to
be far from peripheral for s o t e r i o l o g i c a l purposes. The discussion i n the
Mahayanasamgraha involves two types of answers: an abstract, p h i l o s o p h i c a l
answer which shows that the mortal/immortal dilemma cannot undermine the
l o g i c a l structure of the Vijnanavada system; and a s p e c i f i c answer which shows
that orthodox statements questioning the Buddha's:'immortality cannot undermine
h i s s o t e r i o l o g i c a l dependability.
The most fundamental discussion i s found at 11:30 where any dharma ( i n -
cluding the Buddha) i s said to be e t e r n a l , t r a n s i t o r y , or neither, depending
on whether one i s speaking of parinispanna, p a r i k a l p i t a , or paratantra. In
193
the case of the Buddha, t h i s means that the experience "Buddha" (paratantra)
w i l l e i t h e r be r e i f i e d as an i n d i v i d u a l who w i l l i n e v i t a b l y p e r i s h ( p a r i k a l -
p i t a ) ; or i t w i l l be understood as pure experience and so become one pole of
a l i b e r a t i n g encounter, i n which case i t need never end (parinispanna). Which
of these views;'.is followed depends upon the past experience and r e l i g i o u s
practices of the aspirant.
Asanga i s p r i m a r i l y concerned with the dependability (the s o t e r i o l o g i c a l
sense of nitya) of the Buddha, rather than with the s t r i c t l y l o g i c a l question
of immortality. This s o t e r i o l o g i c a l sense i s best expressed i n terms of the
Abhidharma from which i t developed. The Abhidharma masters analyzed a l l
experience into a number of constituents (dharmas), which f e l l into one of two
groups: samskrta or asamskrta. The dharmas composing any event i n samsara
were termed s a m s k r t a " p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the causal process"while those which
could be r e l i e d upon not to create new worldly s i t u a t i o n s were c a l l e d asamskrta.
The samskrta dharmas were described as having three or four basic c h a r a c t e r i s -
t i c s , t y p i c a l l y : j a t i (coming into existence), s t h i t i (remaining i n existence
for some time), j a r a (reaching the end of t h e i r term), and anityata (going out
of existence). While these were understood i n various ways, they are a l l forms
of one idea which i n the Abhidharmasamuccaya i s c a l l e d a n i t y a t a , "impermanence."
Therefore, as the major c r i t e r i o n of asamskrta. dharmas was n i t y a t a , "permanence,"
that term came to designate ultimate r e l i a b i l i t y . This idea that something i s
n i t y a i f i t provides a f i r m basis for personal salvation underlies the Mahaya-
nasamgraha.
In passages which equate the Buddha with a unitary Dk the following
statements appear:
X:3.1+ CA laksana of the Buddha's Dharmakaya isH n i t y a because
9h
i t i s characterized hy the p u r i f i c a t i o n of the true
nature; i t i s the outcome of a former vow; and i t s
a c t i v i t y i s never completed.
In the f i r s t statement n i t y a t a r e f e r s to the true pure' nature (tathatavisuddhi)
which Asvabhava i d e n t i f i e s with the Dk. This i s equivalent to the trisvabhava
explanation at 11:30, since the tathatavisuddhi characterizes the parinispanna.
The same point i s repeated at X:29-2 where Asvabhava (lAU5bl5-l6) adds that
" e t e r n a l " r e f e r s to the f a c t that the Dk's pure tathata, i t s r e a l nature, i s
unalterable and immutably pure. The.other two explanations r e f e r to the
Buddha's a c t i v i t y . As t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between nature and a c t i v i t y i s j u s t
the d i s t i n c t i o n between Svk and Nk-Sbk, t h i s explanation of n i t y a can be
brought into harmony with the t r i k a y a .
The argument i s further developed at X:37, which begins from the contra-
d i c t i o n generated by a naive view of the term n i t y a :
X:3T As the Sambhogakaya and Mrmanakaya are not e t e r n a l , how
can the sutra say that the Tathagata's body Is eternal?
Because both the Nisyandakaya and the Nirmanakaya depend
upon the eternal Dharmakaya.
As the enjoyment i s never interrupted and the nirmanas
are repeatedly manifest, i t i s proper to regard the
Tathagata's body as e t e r n a l . This i s s i m i l a r to saying
that, "CHe~] always nourishes."
That i s , while the author must accept the t r a d i t i o n that the Tathagata's body
i s n i t y a , the Sk and Nk, which are c e r t a i n l y bodies of the Tathagata, are not
n i t y a . How i s t h i s contradiction to be explained?
195
Asvabhava ( l Al +8c l 8) advances two c r i t e r i a "for c a l l i n g something n i t y a ;
i f i t s substance ( f ) i s n l t ^ ,
a s l n t h e c a s e o f t h e m a n d

l t
.
support i s n i t y a , as i n the other two kayas. Hence, the fact that the other
two depend upon the Dk i s s u f f i c i e n t to characterize a l l three as n i t y a . This
explanation contains a t a c i t d i s t i n c t i o n between the s o t e r i o l o g i c a l sense of
n i t y a ( i n which a l l three may be c a l l e d n i t y a as they possess or p a r t i c i p a t e
i n the s a l v i e r e l i a b i l i t y ) , and the p h i l o s o p h i c a l sense: i n which the Nk and Sk
are not n i t y a .
By further explaining the s o t e r i o l o g i c a l sense as constant r e p e t i t i o n , he
divorces i t from any f l a v o r of an e t e r n a l l y s u b s i s t i n g thing. As Asvabhava
( l M8 c 2 7 - 28) says,
The Buddha's Nirmanakaya i s to be understood i n t h i s
way: i t i s not freedom from b i r t h and death which earns i t
the epithet n i t y a , but the fact that i t incessantly appears
again and again according to the needs of beings to- be
converted.- This is>the i n t e n t i o n of the term n i t y a .
This i s supported at X: 2 9 . ^:
X:29.h . . . The Tathagatas are spontaneous because t h e i r
actions flow i n an uninterrupted, e f f o r t l e s s stream.
The f i n a l two passages (X: 3 8, 39) of our text explain the necessity f o r
maintaining a clear difference between a Dk which i s n i t y a , and a Nk which i s
not. At X: 39 the notion that an e t e r n a l Dk n e c e s s a r i l y leads to quietism i s
refuted on the grounds that i t would then undercut i t s own cause ( i . e . , s p i r i -
t u a l e f f o r t ) , a unique argument not a v a i l a b l e to the theologians of t h e i s t i c
r e l i g i o n s ! Therefore, there must be two aspects: the eternal Dk, and a mortal
Nk which i s v i s i b l e to the aspirant. Asahga has already (X: 38) shown that the
196
second i s i d e n t i c a l with the Ek which does not "remain" ( t i s t h a t e ; gtan-du
bzhugs; ^*^> ) -*-
n
^
e
"world.
In conclusion, an answer to the question of the Buddha's immortality,
l i k e that of his p l u r a l i t y , requires a two-term rather than a three-term model.
The t r i k a y a i s unnecessary and must "be reduced to a two-kaya by grouping the
Nk and Sbk as one term.
Does the Buddha Remain i n Nirvana, or Not?
This perennial question, l i k e the l a s t one, also concerns the Buddha's
s o t e r i o l o g i c a l e f f i c a c y .
VIII:22 CThe awareness (jnana)] of the Bodhisattva i s distinguished
from that of the Sravaka by i t s "non-staying" ( a p r a t i -
s t h i t a ) , because i t stays i n non-staying nirvana." [This
awareness i s further explained at X:13.1
Asvabhava (U"+3^all-12) explains that the Sravakas, etc., stay only i n
nirvana while the B o d h i s a t t v a s b e c a u s e of t h e i r karuna and prajna-, stay i n
non-staying nirvana.
X:36.8 CThe BuddhaH made h i s vow and p r a c t i c e d the r e l i g i o u s
l i f e i n order to achieve great enlightenment f o r the
welfare and happiness of a l l sentient beings. It i s
i l l o g i c a l to hold that he has completely gone to nirvana,
because that would render h i s vow and p r a c t i c e s t e r i l e
and useless.
The a p f a t i s t h i t a - n i f v a n a i s only h a l f of Asanga's v i s i o n . The complete
1 9 7
statement at X:3h reads:
X:3k How do we know that the Buddha's Dharmakaya i s neither
wholly i n nirvana nor not wholly i n nirvana?. The
question i s answered by the following stanza:
Because Che Isl free from a l l obstacles, and
Because ChisI a c t i v i t y i s not completed.
The Buddha i s Cat the same timeD wholly i n
nirvana Cbutn wholly not i n nirvana.
This i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the Buddha's actions as the continuing worldly
aspect i s the key to the Mahayanasamgraha?s answer. At X:31.1, Asvabhava
(Ukh6cl8) says that these a c t i v i t i e s proceed v i a the Nk. This does not imply
immortality for the Nk. As we have seen, each Nk has a normal human l i f e s p a n ,
although a repeated series of them i s . possible. Even so, the series w i l l end
when a l l beings are saved.
The only.direct mention of the f u l l t r i k a y a - i n - connection, with.-, t h i s
problem i s X:28.2:
X:28. 2 . . . The Buddha's a c t i v i t y i s stable (dhruva; brtan-pa;
) and unstable, because a l l Buddhas have three kayas.
Here also, the t r i k a y a i s more an embarrassment than a necessary concept.
Both commentators reduce the t r i k a y a to a two-kaya model, although not i n the
same way. Asvabhava says that the a c t i v i t y of the Svk i s stable, while that
of the Nk and Sbk i s unstable. Vasubandhu holds that that of the Sbk i s
stable while that of the Nk i s unstable.
198
Conclusion
The importance of these c l a s s i c a l problems tempts us to regard the
a b i l i t y of the t r i k a y a (or any other Buddhological doctrine) to resolve them
as the key to the doctrine's popularity. Nagao has taken t h i s view (Eastern
Buddhist, 6, no. 1, p. 38). On closer examination, the t r i k a y a seems to be
not simply unnecessary, but even a hindrance to t h e i r s o l u t i o n . Asanga has
reduced i t to a two.,kaya system when dealing with them. Therefore, these
problems cannot have been the motive force behind the development of the
t r i k a y a doctrine, and my attempt to develop an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w i l l not be
focussed on them.
f. Why Three Kayas?
There seem.to be three possible classes of reasons why Asanga chose to
develop a t r i k a y a rather than simply modify one of the two-kaya theories.
These are:
(a) He may have been the f i r s t to r e a l i z e that the e a r l i e r schemes were
inadequate for the doctrines which they purported to systematize.
(b) He may have incorporated r a d i c a l l y new ideas, which forced the addition
of a t h i r d term into his system.
(c) He may have been l e d to a t r i a d i c scheme by external forces, e.g., a
general Indian vogue for t r i n i t i e s .
In the l i g h t of the paucity of h i s t o r i c a l information on Indian culture,
the l a s t i s the l e a s t desirable choice, and w i l l be considered only i f neither
of the f i r s t two seems p l a u s i b l e .
199
The second choice seems most l i k e l y . As we have seen, e a r l i e r thinkers
resolved the c l a s s i c a l dilemmas hy d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the v i s i b l e rupakaya from a
basic Svk or Dk. Asanga found himself with two a d d i t i o n a l , mutually i r r e d u -
c i b l e doctrines. The f i r s t was that of the vow of benevolent conduct (bhadra-
carya-pranidhana) by which the aspirant binds himself to continual worldly
manifestation i n any form necessary for the salvation of s u f f e r i n g sentient
beings. As the actor, he i s i n general control of the encounter with them.
Provided only that the practitioner:.is able to recognize the Buddha, the
l a t t e r presents himself.
This seems to be d i r e c t l y contradicted by the second new doctrine, that
of the Buddhafield which the aspirant reaches by h i s own e f f o r t s , and within
which he encounters the Buddha.
Although the'other two p o s s i b i l i t i e s cannot be ignored, I suggest that
the need to maintain both the unity and the mutual i r r e d u c i b i l i t y of these
concepts forced Asanga t o adopt the t r i k a y a . Embryonic forms of the vow and
the Buddhaland were present e a r l i e r , and we might say that Asanga was the
f i r s t to recognize the problem that they r a i s e d . Furthermore,, i t i s d i f f i c u l t
to imagine that he remained unaffected by the t r i a d i c tendencies throughout
the nascent Indian t h e i s t i c t r a d i t i o n s . However, during h i s era both of these
new doctrines had become so e x p l i c i t that he was forced to d i f f e r e n t i a t e
between a Nk. (which, went out.to the p r a c t i t i o n e r } , a Sbk (which the p r a c t i -
t i o n e r approached i n a Buddhaland), and a Svk which maintained the unity of
these two..,
200
NOTES
Giuseppe T u c c i , On Some Aspects of the Doctrines of MaitreyaCnathaH and
Asanga ( C a l c u t t a : U n i v e r s i t y of C a l c u t t a , 1930; r e p r i n t e d by Chinese M a t e r i a l s
Center, Inc., 1975), PP- 18-20.
2
Bimal K r i s h n a M a t i l a l , "A C r i t i q u e of Buddhist I d e a l i s m , " i n L. Cousins
et a l . , eds., Buddhist Studies i n Honour of I . B. Horner (Dordrecht and Boston:
197M, p. 139-
The wording of the Tibetan and the Chinese (l35a20-2l) versions d i f f e r .
I have t r a n s l a t e d f r e e l y i n order t o emphasize the l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e . The
verb "embraces" i s no t i g h t e r i n the Tibetan (bsdus) than i n the Chinese
( J ^l ). I t s exact meaning must be understood from the context. See a l s o
note 26 below.
h
A p a r t i c u l a r l y v i v i d example of t h i s procedurerxs h i s d i s m i s s a l of the
t r i s v a b h a v a d o c t r i n e :
C'est a i n s i que j e ne t r a i t e r a i pas de l a t h e o r i e des
t r o i s natures, i m a g i n a i r e , dependante et accomplie, b i e n
q u ' e l l e appartienne en propre au Vijnanavada; e l l e n ' o f f r e
en e f f e t aucun element de nature veritablement i d e a l i s t e (p. 272).
^ M a t i l a l does r e f e r t o the La V a l l e e Poussin t r a n s l a t i o n of the Ch'eng
Wei Shih Lun, and t r a n s l a t e s a key passage of the Samdhinirmocanasutra from
Lamotte's r e c o n s t r u c t e d S a n s k r i t . The l a t t e r contains a good example of the
p e r i l s of r e l y i n g on such r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . He has missed the problem r a i s e d by
d i s c r e p a n c i e s between the Chinese ( B o d h i r u c i T . 675; Hsuan-tsangT. 676) and
Tibetan (Otani 77^) d e s c r i p t i o n s of the p a r i k a l p i t a and parinispanna.
^ Ashok Kumar C h a t t e r j e e , Readings on Yogacara Buddhism (Varanasi: Centre
of Advanced Study i n Philosophy, Banaras Hindu U n i v e r s i t y , 1971).
7
Herbert V. Guenther, Buddhist Philosophy i n Theory and P r a c t i c e ( B a l t i -
more: Penguin, 1972). pp. 13-1h.
Q
H, V. Guenther, Buddhist Philosophy i n Theory and P r a c t i c e , pp. 98-103-
H. V. Guenther, "Mentalism and Beyond," JAOS, 86, no. 3:297-30*+.
201
This statement i s a paraphrase from Prastavana:^. The o r i g i n a l
Sanskrit must have been ambiguous, as both commentators have glossed the key
terms (U382al8-27; Bh323bl6-27) and the Tibetan and Chinese (l33a21-22)
t r a n s l a t o r s seem to have understood the grammar d i f f e r e n t l y .
The key terms describing the path are:
, " l o g i c a l l y sound": shin-tu 'thod-pa j | : iL (Lamotte reconstructs:
upapanna^._.and t r a n s l a t e s , "pleinement j u s t i f i e s " ) . This could be understood i n
many ways, but the commentators agree that a l o g i c a l consistency i s meant.
"orthodox": mthun-pa; (Lamotte reconstructs: anukula, and
t r a n s l a t e s , "conformes").
"non-contradictory": 'gal-ba med-pa; jjt^. (Lamotte reconstructs:
aviruddha, and t r a n s l a t e s , "sans c o n t r a d i c t i o n " ) . Both commentators stress
the idea of l o g i c a l consistency.
The Tibetan reads: shes-par bya-bas na shes-bya'o, while the Chinese
reads: . ; . Both are stronger than simply "may be."
12
These l a s t two paragraphs are an extremely s i m p l i f i e d statement of the
"three natures" (trisvabhava) doctrine. Both the character and fundamental".
importance of t h i s doctrine are frequently misunderstood by those who suppose
the Vijnanavada to be an idealism. A more accurate understanding i s emerging
as more early texts become known. An excellent modern work embodying such an
appreciation i s Stefan Anacker's Vasubandhu: Three Aspects. Anacker's work
has been p a r t i c u l a r l y encouraging for t h i s study as he, working from the
Karmasiddhiprakarana and Madhyantavibhagabhasya, has a r r i v e d at the same view^
of the Vijnanavada as I have derived from the Mahayanasamgraha.
He summarizes the importance of the trisvabhava as follows:
Rather than pointing towards an i d e a l i s t i c system, the
theory of the store-consciousness i s used for t o t a l l y d i f f e r -
ent purposes by Vasubandhu. It i s the recognition that one's
normal mental and psychical impressions are constructed, i . e . ,
a l t e r e d and seemingly s t a t i - i z e d by our consciousness-com-
plexes , that forms the actual main point of the Trims-ika.
"Cognition-only" involves p r i m a r i l y the doctrine of the three
natures of r e a l i t y and t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s . In f a c t ,
the store-consciousness serves only as a bridge to t h i s more
e s s e n t i a l doctrine, which i n the l a s t analysis reduces i t s e l f
to a Sunyavada which i s thoroughly all-embracing (p. 70).
Janice D. W i l l i s comes to a s i m i l a r conclusion. ,
t
In "A Study of the Chapter
202
on R e a l i t y , Based upon the Tattvartha-Patalam of Asanga's Bodhisattvabhumi"
(p. 87) she states that the trisvabhava i s Asanga's basic ontology i n a l l
texts except the Yogacarabhumi.
13
This i s : . i m p l i c i t throughout chapter I I . The most nearly e x p l i c i t
statement occurs at I I : l 6 .
Ik
. A very h e l p f u l work for understanding t h i s idea i s Harold N. Lee,
Percepts, Concepts and Theoretic Knowledge: A Study i n Epistemology (Memphis:
Memphis State U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1973).
Dr. Lee has constructed an epistemology s i m i l a r to that of Asanga. His
comments on the r e l a t i o n s h i p between such an epistemology and ontology are
d i r e c t l y applicable to our problem:
When I speak of the f l u x of process, I make an ontolog-
i c a l assumption, but i t i s a most general onesimply that
something i s going on and i t i s continuous. The f l u x i s
posited to give a context for experienceparts of the f l u x
i n t e r a c t , a f f e c t each other, and the i n t e r a c t i o n i s the
experience of each part (p. 2h).
The Mahayanasamgraha also requires the o n t o l o g i c a l assumption that "some-
thing i s going on and that i t i s continuous" whether the action i s thought of
i n terms suggesting a container (the alayavijnana), or an object of perception
(jneya, "the knowable"). However, h i s work demonstrates that, for purposes of
constructing an epistemology, the ontology need be taken no further; that there
i s no need for a r e a l something (such as a mind) i n which such a c t i v i t y occurs.
When throughout the pre'sent study I deny that the Mahayanasamgraha contains
o n t o l o g i c a l presuppositions, I am not denying t h i s most general sense of
ontology, merely any more s p e c i f i c and d e t a i l e d a p p l i c a t i o n . That "something
i s going on" i s indisputable, but Asahga has avoided the question of whether
i t i s mental, m a t e r i a l , or something e l s e . I t would require a separate study
(based on a d i f f e r e n t text) even to confront .the question of whether, or-not-he
considered such a question to be legitimate.
^ Dharmadhatu, the realm or sphere of dharma (or "the dharmas"), i s a
ubiquitous term which has been used i n a number of ways by Buddhist w r i t e r s .
The Vijnanavada use of t h i s term i s s t i l l unclear. David Seyfort Ruegg
touches up the question several times i n La Theorie du tathagarbha et du gotra
(Paris: Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient, 1969), but no comprehensive study
203
i s a v a i l a b l e .
The f i r s t occurrence of the term i n the Mahayanasamgraha i s at I:H8,
where the seed of enlightenment obtained by hearing the dharma i s declared to
be an outflow from the transcendent and very pure dharmadhatu, i . e . , the
dharmadhatu i s the provenance of the preaching which i n i t i a t e s the convert's
career. At 11:9 and 11, the dharmadhatu i s the realm of parinispanna, i n
which the Bodhisattva resides by d i r e c t perception, or which he penetrates.
At X:31, the dharmadhatu i s said to undertake f i v e kinds of action. The
dharmadhatu as actor rather than 'realm' creates problems which both Vasubandhu
and Asvabhava solve by glossing i t as "Dharmakaya."
These passages suggest that the dharmadhatu i s the Buddha's perceptual
s i t u a t i o n and that t h i s i s not a s t a t i c way of .'seeing the t r u t h , ' but a state
of continual outreach to others..
In addition to the a r t i c l e s mentioned i n the e a r l i e r survey of scholar-
ship, see E. Lamotte, Le T r a i t e ' d e ' l a grande veftu de sagesse, tome 3 (1970),
and a r t i c l e s on "Buddha" and r e l a t e d compounds i n G. P. Malalasekera, Encyclo-
paedia of Buddhism '(Sri Lanka: Government of S r i Lanka, 1973), v o l . 3.
17
Etienne Lamotte, ed. and trans., Samdhinirmocanasutra (Louvain: Univer-
s i t e de Louvain, 1935), Tibetan text at Introduction, 2, p. 32; t r a n s l a t i o n ,
pp. l67-l68. See also the sources l i s t e d by Lamotte i n his end-note to 11:33
of the Mahay arias' amgraha.
18
To Lamotte's note (.see end-note to chap. I l l ) that III-X form a unity,
we may add that I-II. do also: As each of these segments ends i n a Buddhology,
i t i s possible that the Mahayan as amgr aha was conceived as two texts that were
l a t e r fused. However, i n the absence of early manuscripts i n which they are
separate, or even of any Sanskrit o r i g i n a l which might be analyzed for s t y l i s -
t i c d i f f e r e n c e s , such notions must remain as conjecture.
19 -
A concise explanation of t h i s process i s given by John MaeQuarrie i n
The Scope of Demythologizing (.New York: Harper Torch-books, i960), p. 19:
But although e x i s t e n t i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a story does
not i n i t s e l f deny the f a c t u a l content of the story, i t cer-
t a i n l y does put that content ' i n brackets,' so to speak. The
objective reference becomes bracketed i n the sense that i n t e r e s t
has s h i f t e d away from i t to the e x i s t e n t i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . The
20h
question of f a c t i s no longer being r a i s e d . We are not ask-
ing what happened but about what the story says to us i n our
s i t u a t i o n now. The objective reference has somehow become
i r r e l e v a n t . Whether we a f f i r m i t or whether we deny i t or
whether we suspend judgement about i t , the e x i s t e n t i a l r e l i g -
ious message of the story can s t i l l speak home to us . . .
20 ^
Ruegg, Tathagatagarhha, pp. kll-k^h.
21
For Asvabhava's commentary to 11:33, see U4l0c22-iillb3 and u287a3-
291bU. No i n d i v i d u a l references f o r t h i s passage w i l l be given.
22 <f
thugs-su chud-pa-, . The Tibetan thugs-su chud-pa i s used to
t r a n s l a t e both the Sanskrit root Jjna ("to understand") and y/gam ("to go"),
The passage seems to read better i f we use "to understand" but as a l l Chinese
versions have ("to a r r i v e at a c e r t a i n state or s i t u a t i o n " ) , the t r a n s l a -
t i o n must be "has gone t o . " The same applies to t h i s term i n 5. and 9-
23
A v i k a l p i t a ; T: rnam-par ma brtags-pa; H: ' f of $
1
]
^ the-t shorn med-pa' i ye-shes; ^ ">$j? Lamotte reconstructs:
"nihsamsayaj nana."
The key to t h i s compound i s "doubt" (the-tshom; v i c i k i t s a ) , an Abhidharmic
term which Vasubandhu (Abhidharmakosa v.32c-33) places near the very root of
incorrect perception. He says that from nescience (avidvjO arises confusion
which leads to doubt about the Buddhist t r u t h s . This doubt leads to the f a l s e
views and hence to the deluded l i f e . Asahga, i n the Abhidharmasamuccaya
(pp. 10, hi), agrees.
The term i s l i t e r a l l y "the accurate awareness (jnana) which involves the
u t t e r absence of doubt ( v i c i k i t s a ) . " This implies that "accurate awareness"
i s not something complete apart from "doubt" as a content^or an evaluation.
The doubt i s a formative factor which d i s t o r t s the e n t i r e perceptual process.
I t s absence i s synonymous with the "accuracy" of the awareness. .To stress the
fact that t h i s compound,isone.awareness, not an awareness whose "freedom from
doubt" i s a secondary non-essential c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , I have t r a n s l a t e d " v e r i d i -
cal, awareness."
5
yinaya; T: 'dul-ba; H: \ ^ ^ . This i s the broadest term for the
actions whereby a Bodhisattva leads sentient beings toward enlightenment.
205
Other t r a n s l a t i o n s , such as "to d i s c i p l i n e " and "to teach," are too narrow.
^
6
"Involved with" (bsdus-pa; jfj^j ) i s reconstructed hy Lamotte as
samgrhita and t r a n s l a t e d , " r e s s o r t i r au." As i t simply indicates general
conjunction of two things, such t r a n s l a t i o n s as "contained i n " or "belongs t o "
are much too s p e c i f i c .
27
adikarmika bodhisattva; T: byang-chub-sems-dpa' las-dang-po-pa,
H: ^1 ^ . This i s the f i r s t stage of the t h i r t e e n i n a Bodhi-
sattva's career. According to the summary of t h i s thirteen-stage theory found
i n Herbert V. Guenther's The Jewel Ornament of L i b e r a t i o n by sGam-po-pa
(Berkeley: Shambhala, 19Tl), PP- 232-256, the adikarmika stage i s equivalent
to the sambharamarga (Path of Preparation) and designates the l e v e l of those
i n d i v i d u a l s who have just begun Mahayana p r a c t i c e s . It i s followed by the
adhimukticaryabhumi (equivalent to the prayogamarga,.Path of A p p l i c a t i o n ) , the
ten great Bodhisattva bhumis and a f i n a l buddhabhumi.
28
For a discussion of the use of t h i s simile to i l l u s t r a t e a s i m i l a r
question about the b i r t h of an i n d i v i d u a l i n the tathagata family, see Ruegg,
Tathagatagarbha,pp. lli|-115.
29
The various types of n i r v i k a l p a j nana mentioned i n these passages are
discussed by Alan Sponberg i n h i s "Dynamic L i b e r a t i o n i n Yogacara Buddhism"
(.The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, ,2,-- no.. 1
(1979): iih-65). '.
30
See Walpola Rahula, t r a n s . , Le Compendium de l a super-doctrine
(.philosophie), Abhidharmasamuccaya, d' Asanga (Paris: Ecole Frangaise d'Extreme-
Orient, 1971), p. I l 6 .
31
Note that t h i s i s a s i m i l e , not a statement that the v i j n a p t i are
i l l u s o r y . The trisvabhava theory i s not concerned with such o n t o l o g i c a l ques-
tions., Asanga uses the simile of someone seeing through an i l l u s i o n to describe
the enlightened mode,of perception. The c l a s s i c set of
:
the- similes-used for t h i s
purpose i s . found i n the Samdhinirmocanasutra, chapter VI.,
32
Misapprehension (viparyasa; T: phyin-ci-log-pa; H: jj| )
i s
206
described by Edward Conze i n "The Mahayana Treatment of Vi.paryas.us," Orlens-
Extremus, Lessing Memorial (February 1962): 35-1+7- Unfortunately, Conze's
i m p l i c i t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of Mahayana and prajnaparamita d i s t o r t s the present
Vijnanavada use of the term.
33
A
^
Lamotte's "Dharmadhatu," rather than "Dharmakaya," i s i n c o r r e c t i n
both text and commentary.
^ See Lamotte, Mahayanasamgraha, 1:1+5 and 111:1.
^ Sarvaj naj nana; T: thams-cad mkhyen-pa'i ye-shes; R: ^3
36 itf] "-fe
T: yongs-su rdzogs-pa; H: )JJ yplRt . Lamotte reconstructs: p a r i p i p a r t i .
37 *
See Louis de La Vallee Poussin, trans,, "L'Abhidharmakosa de Vasu-
bandhu," Melanges chinois,- et bouddhiques, 16 (Bruxelles: l ' I n s t i t u t Beige
des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, 197l), y i i : 3 3 , and.Honda Megumu, trans., Annotated
Translation of the Dasabhumika
r
Sutra, ata-pitaka Series, v o l . 7*+ (New Delhi:
International Academy of Indian Culture, n.d.), fn. 12, p. 2l6.
38 ' '
See La V a l l e e Poussin, trans., Abhidharmakosa, ; i i i : 53b-55d; i v :
I05c-d; i v : 112b; v i : l+l+d-1+5; and Rahula, trans., Abhidharmasamuccaya, p. 127.
^ H: ^ '> Lamotte reconstructs: aklistam ajnanam.
^ Ting Fu-pao, Fo-hsiieh t a - t z ' u - t i e n (.Taipei: Tung Yii Wen Hua Ch'u Pan
She, 19^6), p. 599b.
1+1
The Sanskrit p a r a v f t t i means, "turning back, revolving, change." The
Tibetan '.gyur-ba i s extremely broad: "to change, to become, to revolve."
" 1+ 3
can be read ehuan : "to revolve," of chuan : "to change d i r e c t i o n . " I have
abandoned the usual t r a n s l a t i o n s of these as " r e v o l u t i o n " or "reversion."
"Revolution" i s unsuitable because: Ca) throughout the Mahayanasamgraha a 180
change of d i r e c t i o n i s meant, not a 360 one; (b) the Tibetan would c e r t a i n l y
have chosen skor-ba (as i n "turning the dharmacakra") had the t r a n s l a t o r under-
stood "revolution"; and (c) "revolution" i s now a p o l i t i c a l or at l e a s t a
s o c i a l term, and sounds odd i n t h i s more psychological context. . "Reversion"
207
Buddhist thought. "Reorientation" (from " o r i e n t a t i o n " t h e p r a c t i c e of facing
churches i n an e a s t e r l y d i r e c t i o n ) c a r r i e s the correct i m p l i c a t i o n .
1+2 ^ ^
The Mahayanasamgraha contains two important r e l a t e d terms for the
Mahayana i d e a l of c o n t r o l of a l i f e - s i t u a t i o n : v a s i t a and vibhutva. I t i s
d i f f i c u l t to judge how these d i f f e r as the various t r a n s l a t i o n s have obscured
the o r i g i n a l Sanskrit term i n each passage. The main occurrences of these are
as follows:
X: 1.1: T: dbang-sgyur-ba; H: ^ jj^jjj. ; a l l other Chinese t r a n s -
l a t o r s : |"5 ^fc. . LC_ and Mvy t r a n s l a t e t h i s as v a s i t a (the sgyur and J^^-
probably r e f l e c t the - t a ending). Lamotte, however, reconstructs: vibhutva,
and t r a n s l a t e s : " l a souverainete."
X:3.2 contains a l i s t of ten dbang-ba; H: . Lamotte's reconstruc-
t i o n of v a s i t a , " l a m a i t r i s e , " i s c l e a r l y correct as t h i s i s the same as the
ten Bodhisattva-vasita i n Mvy, 771-780.
X:5; X:7.1*: T: dbang-'byor-ba, which Mvy gives as vaibhutikam; a l l Chinese
translators-: ^ . Lamotte again reconstructs: vibhut va, and t r a n s l a t e s :
" l a souverainete." However, he has reconstructed the abbreviated dbang or
which stands for the contents of X:5 i n the verse summary at X:2 as v a s i t a ,
and translated: " l a m a i t r i s e . "
VIII:13; the terminus of the r e l i g i o u s path i s said to involve the dbang-
g i mchog; H: ^ ^x. which Lamotte reconstructs: agravaslta and t r a n s l a t e s :
"les maitrises superieures."
There appears to be l i t t l e l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between these two terms i f
we follow Lamotte's reading. I f we read v a s i t a at X : l , X:3.2 and VIII:13, and
vibhutva at X:2, X:5 and X:7-l+, a difference does become apparent. Vibhut va
i s , i n each case, the outcome of r e o r i e n t a t i o n ( p a r a v r t t i ) . This may r e f l e c t
the use of the term i n the Mahayanasutralahkara, IX: 1+1-1+8. V a s i t a i s used
when r e o r i e n t a t i o n i s not s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned. This may r e f l e c t the fact
that v a s i t a seems to have been the customary term through the Mahayana schools.
See Mvy, 771-780,;
f
o r
;
the n
s
t of Bodhisattva-vaiita.
Throughout the present study I have adopted the l a t t e r readings i n pref-
erence to Lamotte's, and have t r a n s l a t e d vibhutva as "sovereignty," and v a s i t a
as "mastery."
1+3
These thirty-two laksanas and eighty anuvyanj anas are the observable
208
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a great man (mahapurusa), whether a world r u l e r (.Cakra- . .
v a r t i n ) or a world savior (.Buddha). They include both v i s i b l e b o d i l y charac-
t e r i s t i c s such as f o r t y teeth, a. golden hue, and so on, and behavioral charac-
t e r i s t i c s such as b o d i l y bearing and tone of voice. Asvabhava obviously
understands them to be the most exoteric c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Buddha, by which
he may be recognized by even the d u l l e s t of sentient beings.
A l i s t of these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and references are given by Lamotte i n
h i s end-notes to X : l 6 .
To these should be added the expanded l i s t and references by Leon Hurvitz
i n "Chih-I," Melanges chinois et bouddhiques 5, no. 12 (.Bruxelles: l ' I n s t i t u t
Beige des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, 1 960- 62), pp. 353- 361 .
kh
See Ting Fu-pao, Fo-hsiieh t a - t z ' u - t i e n , p. 1 952c . Lamotte's p l u r a l
t r a n s l a t i o n : "les marques" i s c e r t a i n l y i n c o r r e c t .
^ See Abhidharmakosa, i i : UT
^
6
Note that the common m i s t r a n s l a t i o n of cetana as " v o l i t i o n " would
render t h i s passage nonsensical. Cetana indicates that l i t t l e v o l i t i o n i s
p o s s i b l e , that the i n d i v i d u a l i s driven or motivated to a c e r t a i n type of per-
ception or action by e x t r i n s i c previous influences. See Herbert V. Guenther,
Philosophy and Psychology i n the Abhidharma (Lucknow: Buddha Vihara, 1 9 5 7 ) ,
pp. 61-70.
hi
See Alex Wayman, "The M i r r o r - l i k e Knowledge i n Mahayana Buddhist
L i t e r a t u r e , " A s i a t i c a Studien, 25 (. 1971): 353..
h8
The term "white dharmas" designates a v a r i e t y of desirable things. ,
For a discussion of t h i s term i n Abhidharma thought, see Abhidharmakosa, i v : 6 0 .
h9
See above,, note h2,
^ A Madhyamika understanding of sunyata must not be b l i n d l y applied here.
Both, the Madhyamika and the Yogacara accepted the prajnaparamita l i t e r a t u r e
with i t s terms such as sunyata and tathata, but each, worked out the implica-
tions d i f f e r e n t l y . The Yogacara view of sunyata i s found i n chapter VII of
the Samdhinirmocanasutra, and i s embedded i n the trisvabhava doctrine of the
209
Mahay anas amgr aha. G. M. Nagao offer's useful guidelines for d i s t i n g u i s h i n g
between the two i n "From Madhyamika to Yogacara: An Analysis of MMK, XXIV.18
and MV, 1.1-2," The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist
Studies, 2, no. 1 (1979'): 29-
1
*-3.
T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (.London: George
A l l e n and Unwin Ltd., i960), p. 217- Although Murti goes on to discuss the
use of advaya i n the Vijnanavada w r i t i n g s , h i s analysis i s muddled and super-
f i c i a l . A b r i e f mention of t h i s issue also appears i n Ruegg, Tathagata-
garhha , p. 3.
52
For example, see Paul W i l f r e d O'Brien, A Chapter on R e a l i t y from the
Madhyantavibhaga Sastra (Tokyo: Monumenta Nipponica, v o l 5, "TX-X. 1953-5^1,
v a h d Janice Dean W i l l i s , "A Study'of the Chapter", on R e a l i t y , Based upon, the
Tattvartha-Patalam of Asahga's Bodhisattvabhumi" (Ph.D. D i s s e r t a t i o n , Columbia
U n i v e r s i t y , 1976).
53 ^
See also Ruegg, Tathagatagarhha, f n ; 1, p. 298, f o r comments on a
s i m i l a r passage of the Ratnagotravibhaga. .'"
Pratyatmavedha; T: rang-gis rig-pa; H:
rt ? Vasubandhu
(Bh371c2) glosses t h i s as, "the Tathagata's i n t r o s p e c t i o n , " thus i d e n t i f y i n g
i t as an a b i l i t y of the s p i r i t u a l l y advanced. Asvabhava (ljl+37b20) makes the
same point i n a negative manner: ". . . Cthe ordinary man3 can only adhere to
Cthe Dharmakaya"! by f a i t h . "
The doctrine i s explained i n chapter VI of Candrakirti's Madhyamaka-
vatara. B r i e f English-language accounts may be found i n Th. Stcherbatsky,
Buddhist Logic, 2 v o l s . (.New York: Dover P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1962), v o l . 1, p. 163,
and i n Guenther, Buddhist Philosophy i n Theory and P r a c t i c e , pp. 91-93-
^ Abhidharmakosa li.:57a-b.
^ Vihara: T: gnas-pa; H: Iff . The basic meaning of "a dwelling
place" must be understood within the Buddhist cosmology, which assigns a cer-
t a i n state of being or major preoccupation to the residents of each d i v i s i o n
of the universe. Hence, vihara designates not only a monastery, etc., but
210
also the predominant factors i n an i n d i v i d u a l l i f e .
E-Q
Vibhutva. See above, note k2.
^ The abhijnas are the a b i l i t i e s which, i n Buddhist mythology, are gained
by a Buddha during the night of his enlightenment. By the. exercise of these
a b i l i t i e s he discovers the truths which form the content of h i s eventual
preaching. The Vijnanavadin l i s t i s found i n Rahula, trans., Abhidharmasa-
muccaya, pp. 166-167.:
rddhyabhijnathe supernatural powers such as f l y i n g , etc.;
d i v y a s r o t a b h i j n a t h e divine ear;
c et ahparyayabhij n a t h e a b i l i t y to know the thoughts of others;
purvanivasanusmrtyabhi j n a t h e a b i l i t y to remember previous l i v e s ;
cyutyupapadabhijnathe a b i l i t y to see the b i r t h s and deaths of others;
asravaksayabhij n a t h e a b i l i t y to see the e x t i n c t i o n of impurity. .
^ Vyavahara: T: tha-snyad-pa; H: ^t-Xj ' "the outward sign or s i g n a l
by which communication occurs. I t i s u s u a l l y , but not n e c e s s a r i l y , vocal.
This passage points -out the communicative nature of the Buddha. See also
Abhidharmakosa iv:7^- 75 and F r a n k l i n Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar
and Dictionary, 2 v o l s . (Delhi: M o t i l a l Banarsidass, 1972), v o l . 2, p. 5l 6.
^ Lamotte's references are a l l to primary t e x t s . For t r a n s l a t i o n of the
more important passages, see Abhidharmakosa y i i : 2 8 - 5 6 , and Rahula, trans.,
Abhidharmasamuccaya, pp. 163-176. The most.exhaustive discussion of these i s
found i n v o l . 3 of Lamotte's t r a n s l a t i o n of the ' Le T r a i t e
de l a grande vertu de sagesse (Louvain: I n s t i t u t O r i e n t a l i s t e , 1970).
62
For a d e f i n i t i o n of the pratisamvids, see Asvabhava's commentary to
V: 2. 9 (.UU2Ubl8-2U).
63
A c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n that gambhira was commonly, understood t o r e f e r to
the Bodhisattva's view i s found i n Lamotte, trans., Le T r a i t e , v o l . 1. This
reads i n part:
II en va de meme pour l a pensee: l e sot (bala), par
I'action du savoir conceptuel, decouvre dans l e s Dharma
divers caracteres. V o i r que l e v r a i caractere des Dharma
n'est n i vide (sunya) n i non-vide (asunya), ni. existant
211
(sat) n i non-existant (asat), et penetrer profondement dans
cette doctrine sans detours n i a r r e t s , c'est ce qu'on nomme
"etre passe a l'autre r i v e de l a patience r e l a t i v e aux Dharma
profonds" (gambhiradharmaksantiparamgata) (p. 338).
2. En outre, l e s Bodhisattva ont un savoir (jnana)
profond (gambhira) et aiguise (tiksna) . . . (p. 370).
6k
See Rahula, trans., Abhi dharma s amuc caya, p. 88 f f . ; Abhidharmakosa
ii:2l+.7< A good summary i s given i n Guenther, trans., Jewel Ornament, pp.
229-230. A very c l e a r explanation by Tsong-kha-pa i s t r a n s l a t e d by Alex
Wayman i n Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real (.New York: Columbia Univer-
s i t y Press, 1978), pp. 129-130; and a d e t a i l e d explanation by Kumarajiva i s
found i n Lamotte, Le T r a i t e , v o l . 3, pp. 1329-11+30.
6 5
H. t r a n s l a t e s , ". . . because the tathata ( jit -tl ) i s free from s t a i n . "
T _ ^ .j.,. . , ~ I &r
IS
6 6
A l f r e d North Whitehead, Process and R e a l i t y : An Essay i n Cosmology
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960),.pp. k-6.
6"7
Samarendra Kumar Verma, The Nature of Metaphysics (.Varanasi: Bharat-
Bharati, 1976), Chapter k.
^ For example, see Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought i n India (.Ann Arbor:
Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1970), pp. 172-173, 232; and David J . Kalupahana,
Buddhist Philosophy: A H i s t o r i c a l Analysis (Honolulu: U n i v e r s i t y Press of
Hawaii, 1976). X:38- 39.
69
The term Nirmanakaya cannot be t r a n s l a t e d without severely b i a s i n g
l a t e r arguments about i t s meaning. E a r l i e r scholars who did not doubt the
t h e i s t i c nature of the Mahayana Buddha usually t r a n s l a t e d i t as "transformation-
body," i . e . , as a form into which the Buddha transforms himself according to
the needs of the aspirant. However, t h i s study questions the t h e i s t i c premise.
The word nirmana i s so ambiguous that i t brings l i t t l e inherent meaning to the
compound. I f the search for the "basic" meaning of nirmana i s l i m i t e d to the
Mahayanasamgraha, we f i n d only a few uncompounded examples of the term. Asva-
bhava 's commentary to X:30.9 ((,Ul+l+6a25; u350b8) says, i n Lamotte's t r a n s l a t i o n ,
that the devas, nagas, etc., of the Buddhalands are nirmanas," but as neither
the Chinese nor the Tibetan uses the same term here as they do elsewhere for
212
nirmana i n Nirmanakaya, t h i s i s a questionable reconstruction. The only
unequivocal d e f i n i t i o n i s given by Asvabhava at uUUlb20 where he defines
nirmana as a creation of a form not previously i n existence, i . e . , as the
very opposite of a "transformation."
TO ^
The adhimukticaryabhumi i s the stage immediately preceding the f i r s t
of the ten great Bodhisattva bhumis. In the Mahayanasamgraha t h i s i s properly
the stage of the Bodhisattva who has heard, and adheres t o , the teaching that
a l l dharmas are v i j napt imat r a ( I I I : 3 ) , but Asanga often uses i t simply as a
category for those who have the a t t i t u d e of simple confidence and devotion of
the Sravaka, but who hold a Yogacara rather than a Hmayana philosophy. See
also Rahula, trans., Abhidharmasamuccaya, p. 1^5 (for adhimukticarya-
bodhisattva), and pp. 158-159; G. P. Malalasekera, ed., Encyclopaedia of
Buddhism (Ceylon: Government Press, 19&3), fasc. 2, s.v. adhimukti-carya-
bhumi , pp. 202-203; and Guenther, trans., Jewel Ornament, p. 239- Por
adhimukti, see below, note 72.
71 .
N i r v i k a l p a j nana i s a general term for enlightened awareness. I t must
not be misunderstood as a state-of mind which i s n e c e s s a r i l y l a c k i n g i n d i s c u r -
sive thought. It i s described i n d e t a i l i n chapter VIII of the Mahayanasamgraha
where i t i s divided into three types: ( l ) prayogika, the awareness preparatory
to f u l l nirvikalpajnana; (2) n i r v i k a l p a j nana proper; and (3) prsthalabdha /
the awareness subsequent to n i r v i k a l p a j nana.
For a d e t a i l e d discussion see Alan Sponberg, "Dynamic L i b e r a t i o n i n Yoga-
cara Buddhism," Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
2, no. 1 (1979): kk-6h.
Adhimukti; T: mos-pa; H:
This term u s u a l l y r e f e r s to the
act of d i r e c t i n g the attention to a s p e c i f i c object with a c l e a r , or even
fervent, expectation of a c e r t a i n perception. As t h i s object i s often a
representation of the Buddha, adhimukti i s frequently t r a n s l a t e d , "devotion."
But, as the expectation can amount to p r o j e c t i n g a v i v i d v i s u a l i z a t i o n ,
adhimukti should sometimes be "creative imagination." Since both elements are
important i n t h i s t e x t , I have followed Lamotte's " a s p i r a t i o n . " See Abhidhar-
makosa, ii: 2l +. 9; 72. h; Rahula, trans., Abhidharmasamuccaya, p. 180; and
Guenther, trans., Jewel Ornament, p. 37
213
73 ^
The precise meaning of "simple confidence" (sraddhamatra; T: dad-pa
feam; H: ^\% ) .is. unclear. In general, sraddha designates a warm and
t r u s t i n g confidence. Rahula, i n h i s Abhi dharmas amuc caya, pp. 1U8-1U9 and lkQ,
fn. 2, drawing from the Majjhimanikaya, p i c t u r e s an aspirant c a l l e d a sraddha-
n u s a r i n a rather d u l l i n d i v i d u a l of no great s p i r i t u a l a b i l i t i e s who attains
enlightenment due to the confidence with which he follows i n s t r u c t i o n . The
Vijnaptimatratasiddhi, p. 320, mentions three types of sraddha i n a l i s t which
was l a t e r regarded as a standard Vijnanavada doctrine, e.g., see Guenther,
trans., Jewel Ornament, pp. 19-21.
Furthermore, sraddha i s frequently combined with adhimukti, e.g., sraddha-
dimukta (Abhi dharmas amuc c aya, p. 1U9): " l a personne devouee a l a confiance."
But the term sraddhamatra conjoined with adhimukti seems to occur only i n t h i s
text. I have simply taken the term as an i n d i c a t i o n that the members of t h i s
assembly cannot see the truths themselves, but are w i l l i n g to follow the
i n s t r u c t i o n s of the Nk.
^ See UUU9bl l ( ^ 'ft-k ) and u3*+2b3-U.
^ Mudra; T: l a g - r t s i s ; H: ."p , i s the most obscure member of t h i s t r a -
d i t i o n a l l i s t of subjects studied or r e c a l l e d by the Bodhisattva. The common
meanings such as " r i t u a l hand gesture" or "object of a symbolic encounter'
(e.g., karmamudra)" obviously do not apply. M. Monier-Williams i n A Sanskrit-
English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1899)
5
P- 822, c i t i n g the
Divyavadana, suggests that t h i s mudra r e f e r s to a form of reckoning on the
f i n g e r s . This i s supported by J . J . Jones, trans., The Mahavastu, 3 v o l s . ,
Sacred Books of the Buddhists S e r i e s , v o l s . 16-19 (London: The P a l i Text
Society and Luzac, 19^9-56), v o l . 2, p. 376, who summarizes the comments of
several scholars and opts f o r "reckoning with the f i n g e r s . "
Lamotte's " l a gravure" almost c e r t a i n l y was suggested by Paramatha's
t r a n s l a t i o n (paraphrase?) of Vasubandhu's explanation as yl* ^ jl j<5^
^g. (Taisho v o l . 31, p. 367c25) .
^ T: mthun-pa; H: ^ ^yXw implies a very close s i m i l a r i t y , not an
o n t o l o g i c a l i d e n t i t y . Lamotte t r a n s l a t e s : " p a r e i l . "
^ H: \J\ - j j ^ ^ ^ j " ^ ^ '
r n a m
~ ^
u n
mngon-rdzogs byang-chub-pa, but
21k
u (335a6) reads: rnam-pa thams-cad mngon-par rdzogs-par byang-chub-pa.
78
The idea that the Buddha i s not" immediately recognizable to the non-
b e l i e v e r forms an early and persistent feature of the accounts of Sakyamuni's
l i f e . See the story of his encounter with Upaka, t r a n s l a t e d from several
sources by Andre Bareau i n Recherches sur l a biographie du Buddha dans l e s
Sutrapitaka et l e s Vinayapitaka anciens, 3 v o l s . (Paris: Ecole Francaise
d'Extreme-Orient, 1963), v o l . 3, pp. 155-160.
^ T: 'dres-pa; H: ^fci^L i Lamotte reconstructs: samsrsta.
80
Rab-tu-phye-ba; H omits t h i s phrase; Lamotte reconstructs: prabhavita.
8 l
Lamotte's t r a n s l a t i o n of t h i s term i s puzzling. Both T and H have
used "Buddhafield" (Buddhaksetra; T: sangs-rgyas-kyi zhing; H: j_ )
throughout most of the text. Lamotte, however, sometimes reconstructs: Buddha-
bhumi ("les terres du Buddha") and sometimes: Buddhaksetra ("les champs des
Buddha").
Many summaries of the l i t e r a t u r e on the Buddhafield concept are a v a i l a b l e
i n Western languages. The c l a s s i c study i s Teresina Rowell's "The Background
and E a r l y Use of the Buddha-ksetra Concept," Eastern Buddhist (published i n
three installments: 6, no. 3 (193*0 ,' 6, no. "(1935), 7, no. 2 (1937)...
This i s s t i l l one of the best summaries of data towards a h i s t o r y of the
proto-Mahayana developments.
Ms. Rowell i d e n t i f i e s the e a r l i e s t Buddhafield concept with the idea that
Sakyamuni could see anything i n h i s world (his " f i e l d " of knowledge), and that
he could exercise benevolent influence or c o n t r o l over t h i s f i e l d . The main
type of influence i s h i s teaching to the Bodhisattvas. She also discusses the
early writings on how the Bodhisattva obtains and p u r i f i e s t h i s f i e l d by
p u r i f y i n g his mind and acting for others, e s p e c i a l l y by worshipping the Buddha.
However, her arguments about the developed Mahayana t r a d i t i o n wear
extremely t h i n as she attempts to cover too many texts and ideas.
Far-Eastern developments of the Buddhafield concept are introduced by
David W. Chappell i n "Chinese Buddhist Interpretations of the Pure Lands" i n
-Michael Saso and David.W. Chappell, eds.*., Buddhist .'and Taoist Studies I
'.(Honolulu: U n i v e r s i t y of Hawaii Press, 1977), pp. 23-5**
215
82
In h i s end-notes to X:30, Lamotte notes a suggestion hy Demieville
that t h i s text i s a version of the Samdhinirmocanasutra.
See Francesca Fremantle and Chogyam Trungpa, trans, and comment., The
Tibetan Book of the Dead: The Great L i b e r a t i o n through Hearing i n the Bardo
(Berkeley: Shambhala, 1975)-
8k
Bimal K. M a t i l a l , a t a l k delivered to the Department of Religious
Studies, UBC, i n October 1975.
O r
See E. Obermiller, trans., History of Buddhism by Bu-ston (Heidelberg:
1931; Suzuki Reprint S e r i e s ) , pp. 137-1^0.
86
Ruegg has published an explanation of t h i s stanza i n h i s Tathagata-
garbha, p. 83. As i t i s drawn from Vasubandhu's Mahayanasutralamkarabhasya
i t d i f f e r s s i g n i f i c a n t l y from Asvabhava's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , which has been
summarized here.
87
One of the most i n t e r e s t i n g attempts to date i s N i s h i t a n i K e i j i ' s
"Emptiness and Time" i n Eastern Buddhist, 9, no. 1: U2-71; 10, no. 2: 1-30.
While t h i s Heidegger-on-his-head work i s a b r i l l i a n t apologetic for the
author's Zen-oriented r e l i g i o n , i t lacks the h i s t o r i c a l perspective required
of any useful i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of e a r l i e r Indian Buddhism.
CHAPTER III
CONCLUSION
217
In the l a s t section, the Buddhological passages of the Mahayanasamgraha
were analyzed and the function of the t r i k a y a doctrine was c l a r i f i e d . A f u l l
study of t h i s doctrine would require two further steps:
(a) An examination. of other, texts. -
(b) An i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of "the"doctrine. .
These could be accomplished by two possible s t r a t e g i e s : a h i s t o r i c a l
approach i n which (a) would be undertaken before (b); or a h i s t o r i c a l ,
d o c t r i n a l : a n a l y s i s i n which (b) would be undertaken before (a).
The h i s t o r i c a l approach would involve analyzing other Vijnanavada texts
i n the same way as was the Mahayanasamgraha, and assembling a comparative
h i s t o r y of the t r i k a y a from the r e s u l t s of these analyses. The actual i n t e r -
pretation could then be done i n l i g h t of t h i s h i s t o r y . The l i s t of texts
examined would include, at a minimum, the Ratnagotravibhaga (early Indian
Vijnanavada), the Buddhabhumisutra (Indian and Far-Eastern), the Ch'eng Wei
Shih Lun (Far-Eastern t r a d i t i o n s ) , and one of Guenther's Tibetan sources.
This i s a popular approach. I t i s the methodology i m p l i c i t i n many of the
studies which have been noted, e s p e c i a l l y those by La Vallee Poussin and the
Hobogirin a r t i c l e . I t s c l a s s i c a l formulation i s given by Eliade i n "Methodo-
l o g i c a l Remarks on the Study of Religious Symbolism,"
1
"where he accepts i t - a s
the e s s e n t i a l methodology for the h i s t o r i a n of r e l i g i o n s . In that a r t i c l e ,
to the usual h i s t o r i a n ' s demand that the phenomenon be examined within i t s
h i s t o r i c a l s e t t i n g , he adds the s t i p u l a t i o n that any possible variants of the
phenomenon must also be examined. His example, a study of the Cosmic Tree,
shows the proposed method:
Suffice: i t to say that i t i s impossible to understand
the meaning of the Cosmic Tree by considering only one or
some of i t s variants. I t i s only by the analysis of a
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considerable number of examples that the structure of a
symbol can be completely deciphered. Moreover, one can
understand the meaning of a c e r t a i n type of Cosmic Tree only
a f t e r having studied the most important types and v a r i e t i e s .
Only a f t e r an e l u c i d a t i o n of the s p e c i f i c meanings of the
Cosmic Tree i n Mesopotamia or i n ancient India can one under-
stand the symbolism of Yggdrasil or the Cosmic Trees of
Central A s i a and of S i b e r i a . In the science of r e l i g i o n s ,
as elsewhere, comparisons are made i n order to f i n d both
p a r a l l e l s and d i s t i n c t i o n s .
But there i s s t i l l more. Only a f t e r taking account of
a l l the variants do the differences of t h e i r meanings f a l l
into r e l i e f . I t i s because the symbol of the Indonesian
Cosmic Tree does not coincide with that of the A l t a i c Cosmic
Tree that the f i r s t reveals a l l i t s importance for the science
of r e l i g i o n . Thus the question i s posed: Is t h e r e , . i n e i t h e r
instance, some innovation, obscuration of meaning, or a l o s s
of the o r i g i n a l meaning? Since we know what the Cosmic Tree
means i n Mesopotamia, i n India, or i n S i b e r i a , the question
a r i s e s : Because of what r e l i g i o - h i s t o r i c a l circumstances, or
by what i n t e r i o r reason, does the same 'symbol i n Indonesia
reveal a d i f f e r e n t meaning? (p. 9*0.
This type of study i s based upon the r e s u l t s of previous studies by
s p e c i a l i s t s . As Eliade says, the.task of the h i s t o r i a n of r e l i g i o n s i s ,
To inform himself of the progress made by the specialists:'
i n each of these areas. One i s a h i s t o r i a n of r e l i g i o n s not
by v i r t u e of mastering a c e r t a i n number of p h i l o l o g i e s , but
because one i s able to integrate r e l i g i o u s data into a general
perspective. The h i s t o r i a n of r e l i g i o n s does not act as a
p h i l o l o g i s t , but as a hermeneutist (p. 9l ) .
While t h i s i s an a t t r a c t i v e procedure, i t i s possible only when the
s p e c i a l i s t s have a c t u a l l y made progress and when t h e i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n s have been
s u f f i c i e n t l y s i m i l a r that the r e s u l t s may be compared. This i s a reasonable
expectation when studying a simple symbol l i k e the Cosmic Tree, but the data
on the t r i k a y a ( i . e . , the doctrine from each text) are already the r e s u l t of
complex and s e l e c t i v e studies. It i s d i f f i c u l t to compare the conclusions-of
any two of the scholars previously mentioned.
2 1 9
Therefore, the generalist who studies the t r i k a y a must also be the
s p e c i a l i s t who himself s e l e c t s , t r a n s l a t e s , and arranges each,'in order to
obtain comparable data for a meaningful h i s t o r y . The e f f o r t necessary for
such a project renders the h i s t o r i c a l approach impracticable at t h i s time.
The alternate strategy i s to derive an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the doctrine
from the data i n the Mahayanasamgraha, and then to determine i f t h i s
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n applies to the doctrine i n the other t e x t s .
Although t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n must be made without the guidance of a
f u l l h i s t o r y , such guidance i s l e s s important f o r the study of a sophis-
t i c a t e d doctrine than i t would be for the study of l e s s s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y
t h e o l o g i c a l ("primitive") material. A great deal of meaning, can be deduced
from the l o g i c a l structure of the doctrine, i . e . , from the way i n which the
mass of data has been woven into a coherent doctrine. Furthermore, the
development of each kaya i s not t o t a l l y unknown. While previous studies do
not provide the d e t a i l e d data that would be required to appreciate the
innovative nature of the t r i k a y a , they do show the concepts that fed into
each kaya.
Note that a legitimate:, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may be derived from one text only
i f t h i s text i s known to contain the basic or c e n t r a l version of the doctrine.
The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n derived from an i d i o s y n c r a t i c text would not prepare the
investigator to appreciate other formulations. Fortunately, the choice of
a suitable text i s the type of question on which the scholar may t r u s t the
indigenous theologian's judgement. The learned Buddhist b e l i e v e r , acting as
t e x t u a l c r i t i c , discusses much the same problems as does the scholar. The
Buddhist t r a d i t i o n s have long fostered examinations of the r e l a t i v e
220
importance and i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s of the sastras. Buddhist thinkers, other
modern scholars and myself have found the Mahayanasamgraha to he the c e n t r a l
text of the early Indian Vijnanavada t r a d i t i o n .
Therefore, I s h a l l now develop an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the t r i k a y a doctrine
d i r e c t l y from the preceding analysis of the Mahayanasamgraha with occasional
reference to the e a r l i e r scholarship and to other Vijnanavadin t e x t s .
A. CRITERIA FOR A MODEL
A successful i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the t r i k a y a doctrine w i l l describe or
imply i t s major features i n assertions acceptable to a modern Western non-
2
b e l i e v e r . The description w i l l consist of some type of analogy or model.
This analogy need not have been recognized within e i t h e r the Buddhist or
Western t r a d i t i o n s , but must summarize the message that an informed Westerner
would receive from the text.
The model must s a t i s f y two c r i t e r i a : coherence and c l a r i t y . By "coher-
ence" I mean that, i n the words of A. N. Whitehead, "Fundamental ideas, i n
terms of which the scheme i s developed, presuppose each other so that i n i s o -
l a t i o n they are meaningless." This means that, as the text contains a u n i f i e d
t r i k a y a doctrine rather than three doctrines of separate kayas, i t must receive
one explanation rather than three l o o s e l y - r e l a t e d explanations or models.
By " c l a r i t y " I mean p r i m a r i l y that no element of the model can require
the reader to be a b e l i e v e r i n order to assent to i t . An explanation that
involves any type of non-shared b e l i e f (not only i n Buddhist dogma) i s
unsatisfactory. This demand again i l l u s t r a t e s the inadequacy of any model
that portrays an e s s e n t i a l Svk appearing i n the Buddhafield and descending
221
into the world, an idea which i s acceptable only to those who b e l i e v e in'the
p o s s i b i l i t y of such a god-like being. I have belabored t h i s point throughout
the present study because such i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are the most tempting error and
because the model to be proposed has been shaped by the dynamics of the search
for an a l t e r n a t i v e .
The c l a r i t y c r i t e r i o n involves a second demand: to avoid any element that
requires further explanation o r ~ i s not on the same?logical l e v e l as the r e s t .
That i s , any model that contains a v e i l e d t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f i s unacceptable as
t h i s element would then require another model to"unveil i t s meaning. The"-
i n t e r p r e t i v e model must be a simple analogy that represents the doctrine i n
sensible and generally acceptable terms. As Ian G. Barbour says i n Myths,
Models and Paradigms, "The metaphysician takes a 'co-ordinating analogy' from
some r e l a t i o n s h i p s he judges to be s p e c i a l l y important and from i t derives a
model which can order a d i v e r s i t y of kinds of experience . . ." (p. 6k).
The demand for c l a r i t y eliminates any p o r t r a y a l of a sacred Buddha (which
would require further i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ) v i s - a - v i s a secular or profane aspirant.
I t also eliminates Eliade's p l a u s i b l e model of a t h r e e - t i e r e d universe i n "..:'
which the s a c r i l i t y of the higher regions i s communicated to the lower v i a the
d i s c o n t i n u i t y of the world axis. In t h i s case, c l a r i t y i s equivalent to the
avoidance of normative o n t o l o g i c a l elements i n an explanation of non-ontolog^-
i c a l Buddhist dogma. As Baird^ has shown, such elements are inherent i n
Eliade's model.
B. ELEMENTS OF THE MODEL
The model must portray two classes of f a c t s :
(a) The fundamental nature of the t o t a l s i t u a t i o n or process. This must be
222
decided "before the i n d i v i d u a l elements can he represented,
(h) Individual elements mentioned i n the doctrine, i . e . , each kaya, each type
of aspirant, the f i e l d s i n which they i n t e r a c t , and the r e l a t i o n s h i p s
between them.
We have seen that Asanga has constructed h i s Vijnanavada around the
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , rather than the nature, of experience. His u n i f y i n g concept
i s "awareness"indicated" by terms based upon Vjna, e.g., prajna, jnana,
v i jnana, n i r v i k a l p a j nana, y i f r i a p t i , etc. Therefore, the best analogy for some
sub-doctrine (such as the trikaya) would appear to be an epistemic model. As
the t r i k a y a can be seen as an epistemic encounter between aspirant and Buddha
within a c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n , and these can be i d e n t i f i e d with those of the
s u b j e c t - o b j e c t - f i e l d t r i a d , I suggest that such an encounter form the basic
model for the t r i k a y a . This model w i l l exhibit coherence ( i t i s meaningless
to speak of an objectless subject) and c l a r i t y (none of the three terms r e f e r s
to anything mysterious or hidden behind the s i t u a t i o n portrayed).
This i s not a claim that Asanga's doctrine does (or does not) r e a l l y
r e f e r to such an encounter between Buddha and aspirant. As Asanga does not
admit that either of them e x i s t s , such a claim would be nonsensical. This i s
an analogy. I w i l l argue below that the most useful answer to the question of
. the r e a l nature of the t r i k a y a i s that i t i s a pure structure. While the
epistemic encounter i s only one possible i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s structure, i t
i s the most s u i t a b l e one for studying the contentions embodied i n the ...
Mahayanasamgraha. ,
The'individual-, elements require . l i t t l e " immediate discussion. The main
or:es are the Svk, Nk, Sbk, the S r a v a k a and Bodhisattva, plus the common world
of misery and the j o y - f i l l e d Buddhafield. These f a l l into r e l a t e d sets: the
223
Sravaka and Nk inhabit the common world, while the Bodhisattva and Sbk inhabit
the Buddhafield. Each includes the aspirant (as Sravaka or Bodhisattva) who
perceives the Buddha (as Nk or Sbk) within a f i e l d (common world or Buddha-
f i e l d ) . The Svk, which appears to be a s p e c i a l case, can be ignored for the
moment.
The sets are r e l a t e d i n a c l e a r l y defined manner. They are located
along a l i n e a r continuum of "awareness" (jnana) described i n chapter VIII. It
stretches from the preparatory non-conceptual awareness of the i n d i v i d u a l who
i s not yet a Sravaka, through the fundamental and subsequent non-conceptual
awarenesses. The common world containing the Sravaka-Nk i s located i n the
fundamental non-conceptual awareness region of the continuum, while the
Buddhafield containing the Bodhisattva-Sbk i s located at the subsequent non-
conceptual awareness region.
COMMON WORLD BUDDHAFIELD
SRAVAKA
N K
BODHISATTVA
SBK
PREPARATORY
NON-CONCEPTUAL
AWARENESS
FUNDAMENTAL
NON-CONCE PTUAL
AWARENESS
SUBSEQUENT
NON- CONCEPTUAL
AWARENESS
Figure 1
22k
Note that the distance between s i t u a t i o n s along the continuum of
awareness i s s o t e r i o l o g i c a l distance measured i n degrees of non-conceptual
awareness, not necessarily temporal distance. As Asanga views temporal
d i s t i n c t i o n s as conventional ( v i j n a p t i , 11:2), the model need i l l u s t r a t e
temporal considerations only when they correspond to s o t e r i o l o g i c a l
development.
C. STRUCTURALISM?
Another b r i e f consideration of methodology i s necessary before we can
proceed to develop the model. It i s impossible to ignore the s i m i l a r i t i e s
between" Figure 1 and those models developed by contemporary S t r u c t u r a l i s t s -
This r e a l i z a t i o n i s encouraging because, as structuralism i s a popular
trend, we may expect to f i n d useful suggestions i n i t s immense l i t e r a t u r e .
However, the l a b e l i s applied to a bewildering d i v e r s i t y of method-
ologies i n l i n g u i s t i c s , mathematics, anthropology, psychology and sociology.
P r a c t i c a l a i d can be expected only from someone who deals either with
s i m i l a r questions (improbable) or with structures s u f f i c i e n t l y abstract
that they may be used for such a r a d i c a l hermeneutic. The i n t e r e s t s of the
l i n g u i s t s and l i t e r a r y c r i t i c s are much too narrow, and others (e.g.,
Piaget) are more h i s t o r i a n s of the movement than p r a c t i t i o n e r s . Fortunately,
the work of one scholar i s applicable and accessible.
In t h i s study, "Structuralism" w i l l designate the methodology of
Claude Levi-Strauss. Not only has he studied structures underlying a
broad range of practices and b e l i e f s , but h i s models are very s i m i l a r to
ours.
225
This s i m i l a r i t y can he seen by comparing Figure 1 with h i s . c r i t e r i a for
a s t r u c t u r a l model.- In:Structural Anthropology he says: -
The question then becomes that of ascertaining what
kind of model deserves the name "structure." This i s not
an anthropological question, but one which belongs to the
methodology of science i n general. Keeping t h i s i n mind,
we can say that a structure consists of a model meeting
with several requirements.
F i r s t , the structure exhibits the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of
a system. I t i s made up of several elements, none of which
can undergo a change without e f f e c t i n g changes i n a l l the
other elements.
Second, f o r any given model there should be a p o s s i -
b i l i t y of ordering a series of transformations r e s u l t i n g i n
a group of models of the same type.
Third, the above properties make i t possible to predict
how the model w i l l react i f one or more of i t s elements are
submitted to c e r t a i n modifications.
f F i n a l l y , the model should be constituted so as to make
immediately i n t e l l i g i b l e a l l the observed f a c t s (.pp. 279-280).
A l l of these are s a t i s f i e d by the model of Figure 1.
I must stress t h a t t h i s study follows h i s methodology i n a very loose
manner. I am not obliged to defend any or a l l of h i s opinions on r e l a t e d or
unrelated matters. The S t r u c t u r a l i s t approach i s indicated by the nature of
our data, and i t i s only common sense to accept guidance from others who have
faced s i m i l a r problems.
A r e a l objection must be f o r e s t a l l e d . Structuralism i s often s a i d
( e s p e c i a l l y by l i n g u i s t s ) 'to deal only with i m p l i c i t ( i n the jargon, "uncon-
scious") patterns i n myth, s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , etc. The s t r u c t u r a l i s t ' s task
of exposing patterns normally obscured by conscious doctrine i s seen as a
v a r i e t y of Kantian a n a l y s i s .
6
I f t h i s were s t r i c t l y true, an attempt to e l u c i -
date Asanga's e x p l i c i t dogmas could not be Structuralism. However, such an
226
understanding grossly o v e r s i m p l i f i e s the method. In S t r u c t u r a l Anthropology
Levi-Strauss says:
A s t r u c t u r a l model may he conscious or unconscious without
t h i s difference a f f e c t i n g i t s nature. It can only he said
that when the structure of a c e r t a i n type of phenomena does
not l i e at a great depth, i t i s more l i k e l y that some kind
of model, standing as a screen to hide i t , w i l l exist i n the
c o l l e c t i v e consciousness. For conscious models, which are
usually known as "norms," are by d e f i n i t i o n very poor ones,
since they are not intended to explain the phenomena hut to
perpetuate them. Therefore, s t r u c t u r a l analysis i s confronted
with a strange paradox, well known to the l i n g u i s t , that i s :
the more ohvious s t r u c t u r a l organization i s , the more d i f f i c u l t
i t becomes to reach i t because of the inaccurate conscious
models l y i n g across the path which leads to i t .
From the point of view of the degree of consciousness,
the anthropologist i s confronted with two kinds of s i t u a t i o n s .
He may have to construct a model from phenomena the systematic
character of which has evoked no awareness on the part of
the culture; t h i s i s the kind of simpler s i t u a t i o n r e f e r r e d
to by Boas as providing the easiest ground for anthropological
research. Or else the anthropologist w i l l be dealing on the
one hand with raw phenomena and on the other with the models
already constructed by the culture to i n t e r p r e t the former.
Though i t i s l i k e l y that, f o r the reasons stated above, these
models w i l l prove u n s a t i s f a c t o r y , i t i s by no means- necessary
that t h i s should always be the case. As a matter of f a c t ,
many " p r i m i t i v e " cultures have b u i l t models of t h e i r marriage
regulations which are much more to the point than models
b u i l t by p r o f e s s i o n a l anthropologists. Thus one cannot d i s -
pense with studying a culture's "home-made" models f o r two
reasons. F i r s t , these models might prove to be accurate or,
at l e a s t , to provide some i n s i g h t into the structure of the
phenomena; a f t e r a l l , each culture has i t s own t h e o r e t i c i a n s
whose contributions deserve the same attention as that which
the anthropologist gives to colleagues. And, second, even
i f the models are biased or erroneous, the very bias and type
of error are a part of the facts under study and probably
rank among the most s i g n i f i c a n t ones. But even when taking
into consideration these c u l t u r a l l y produced models, the
anthropologist does not forget as he has sometimes been
accused of doing that the c u l t u r a l norms, are not of
themselves structures. Rather, they f u r n i s h an important
contribution to an understanding'.of the structures, e i t h e r
as f a c t u a l documents or as t h e o r e t i c a l contributions s i m i l a r
to those of the anthropologist himself (pp. 281-282).
227
By these standards the present study i s c e r t a i n l y S t r u c t u r a l i s t research.
Asanga presents the raw phenomena (the agreed-upon facts about Buddhahood)
together with a home-made model (the t r i k a y a ) . I suggest that the t r i k a y a be
regarded as an i m p l i c i t structure underlying the doctrines about Buddhahood.
In the preceding section, following Asanga's categories wherever p o s s i b l e ,
his d e r i v a t i o n of the t r i k a y a was examined. In t h i s section i t w i l l be
c a r r i e d one stage deeper to a r r i v e at a structure s u f f i c i e n t l y abstract to
be credible to those outside the c i r c l e of b e l i e v e r s .
In the course of t h i s d e r i v a t i o n , Levi-Strauss's models w i l l provide
suggestions on how p a r t i c u l a r problems may be solved. At no time w i l l a
s o l u t i o n be adopted simply because he has chosen a s i m i l a r one.
D. DEVELOPING THE MODEL
Levi-Strauss's s t r u c t u r a l models exhibit two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s that suggest
approaches to developing our own model. The most notable features are the
sets of structures that can be transformed into one another according to
c e r t a i n r u l e s . That i s , the same s t r u c t u r a l elements are present i n each
structure of the set although they may take d i f f e r e n t names, forms, etc.
These are d e f i n i t e l y not the same "things" appearing i n d i f f e r e n t ways. The
S t r u c t u r a l i s t focusses on the patterns of r e l a t i o n s h i p s between them and so
gains the a b i l i t y to speak of one thing turning into another without becoming
entangled i n considerations of essence. It i s t h i s a b i l i t y that recommends
the S t r u c t u r a l i s t method for the study of Buddhist material. We can speak of
the Nk and Sbk as transformations of one another without being forced to explain
how t h i s can occur. I s h a l l r e f e r to each s i t u a t i o n , such as the Sravaka-Nk
i n the common world or the Bodhisattva-Sbk i n the Buddhafield, as a "structure,"
228
to the movement whereby one changes into the other as a "transformation," and
to the complete set of structures as a "model."
The second c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a S t r u c t u r a l i s t model i s i t s tendency to
7
contain pairs of binary opposites mediated by an intervening term. . These
i n d i v i d u a l structures are organized into f u l l models which display a s i m i l a r
symmetry.
With t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i n mind, the asymmetry of Figure 1, caused
by the p e c u l i a r protuberance of preparatory non-conceptual awareness, suggests
that the model may be incomplete. The most obvious p o s s i b i l i t y i s that the
Svk (which was set aside) i s the missing complement to the preparatory non-
conceptual awareness, and may be placed to the r i g h t of the Sbk to balance the
preparatory awareness at the l e f t . As one of the basic descriptions of the
Svk has been "awareness" (jHana), t h i s must be i t s l a b e l on the baseline.
However, Asahga gives no reason to regard i t as the terminus of the continuum
of non-conceptual awareness. Both the Svk and i t s awareness seem to be
disconnected from the Buddhafield. This d i s c o n t i n u i t y w i l l be indicated by a
heavy broken l i n e .
Although t h i s i s the only l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n f o r the Svk, i t s jnana i s
c l e a r l y not the missing complement to the preparatory non-conceptual awareness.
The l a t t e r i s part of the continuum, the former i s not. Furthermore, a true
8
complement for the Svk i s a v a i l a b l e as the Prthagjana or worldling dominated
by nescience (avidya) or conceptual awareness (vijnana). Although he i s not
mentioned i n the t e x t , the theory of the Prthagjana, and the i n t e n t i o n of the
Mahayana to o f f e r salvation to a l l , i s c l e a r . He w i l l be located to the f a r
l e f t of the diagram, pa s t the Sravaka-Nk. .His segment of the baseline can be
designated "conceptual.awareness," " vi jnana." This p o s i t i o n does not imply
229
that he i s the lower terminus of the awareness continuum. While h i s vijnana
may appear to he the l o g i c a l s t a r t i n g point f o r the developing non-conceptual
awareness, the t e x t does not state that there i s a c o n t i n u i t y between the two.
This question w i l l be taken up l a t e r .
The addition of these two s i t u a t i o n s has not removed the asymmetry
a r i s i n g from the preparatory non-conceptual awareness. I t i s now c l e a r that
t h i s awareness must pertain to the i n d i v i d u a l standing between the states of
Prthagjana and S r a v a k a , i . e . , one who has heard but not developed the Buddhist
message. As Asanga gives no simple l a b e l f o r such an i n d i v i d u a l , I w i l l c a l l
him the "Neophyte."
These additions give the model i n Figure 2.
PRTHAGJANA
vijnana
avidya
NEOPHYTE SRAVAKA
N K
BODHISATTVA
SBK
PREPARATORY FUNDAMENTAL SUBSEQUENT
NON-CONCEPTUAL NON-CONCEPTUAL NON-CONCEPTUAL
AWARENESS AWARENESS AWARENESS
SVK
jnana
Figure 2
More d e t a i l can be added. Asanga i d e n t i f i e s the Buddha, aspirant,
environment and i n t e r a c t i o n within each s i t u a t i o n . They can be portrayed i n
a f i e l d centered upon whichever figure i s f e l t , by the aspirant, to be the
most important. The other one can be pictured at a c e r t a i n distance from the
center, representing the distance remaining between the aspirant and Buddha-
hood .
F i r s t , the Prthagjana occupies the c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n and no Buddha i s
present. The Neophyte's s i t u a t i o n i s not described. The Sravaka occupies the
center of his world, where he i s approached by the Nk. The Sbk, occupying the
center of the Buddhafield, i s approached more c l o s e l y by the aspirant as
Bodhisattva. Asanga i s ambiguous about whether the lone Svk i s aspirant or
Buddha. However, the pattern across the model suggests that the Svk i s a
fusion of both. The Buddha i s absent from the Prthagjana's world, i s closer
to the Sravaka, and s t i l l closer to the Bodhisattva i n the Buddhafield. It i s
reasonable to assume that the two merge i n the f i n a l s i t u a t i o n .
Note that, i n t h i s diagram, the t r a n s i t i o n from the world of the Sravaka-
Nk to the Buddhafield i s the abrupt turn-about that Asahga c a l l s " r e o r i e n t a -
t i o n . " I suggest that we regard the model as symmetrical about t h i s point.
I f i t i s , then the Buddhaland must be equivalent to the s i t u a t i o n s of Sravaka-
Nk and Neophyte, and w i l l contain a l l phases of the aspirant's i n t e r a c t i o n
with the Sbk.
These additions give the model shown i n Figure 3-
231
N K
PRTHAGJANA
vijoana
avidya
NEOPHYTE
SRAVAKA
z
o
5
z
u
O
u
SBK
SVK
BODHISATTVA
PREPARATORY FUNDAMENTAL I SUBSEQUENT
NON-CONCEPTUAL NONCONCEPTUALj NON-CONCEPTUAL
| AWARENESS AWARENESS AWARENESS
jnana
Figure 3
At t h i s point each s i t u a t i o n of the emerging p o r t r a i t may be examined i n
more d e t a i l .
1. THE PRTHAGJANA
The Prthagjana (pure w o r l d l i n g ) , untouched by the Buddhist message, i s
discussed i n the Abhidharma l i t e r a t u r e . His perceptions are dominated by
nescience; they are conceptual (vijfiana), molded by the general schemata of
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ( i n c l u d i n g those of space and time, see II:2-11) as w e l l as
more i d i o s y n c r a t i c prejudices. Therefore, he experiences h i s " s e l f " as an
object surrounded by other o b j e c t s b o t h s e l f and other generated by h i s
r e i f y i n g p e r c e p t i o n s a closed and f r u s t r a t i n g world i n which experience
cannot lead to i n s i g h t or improvement.
232
As the Prthagjana i s an added l o g i c a l category, i t need not he an"
i n h a b i t e d , or even-habitable, category. Asanga may not-have-believed that'any
being could remain untouched by the Buddhist message. This question w i l l be a
key to l a t e r developments of the-model. .
2. THE NEOPHYTE
The d i s c o n t i n u i t y between Prthagjana and the rest of the diagram marks
the precise point at which the Buddhist message i s addressed to the Prthagjana.
Buddhahood, or non-conceptual awareness, develops from, the impression l e f t by
t h i s seminal message (srutavasanabija). The message consists of the ideas
contained i n the t e x t , including the moral r u l e s , the prescribed meditation,
and the appearance of the Nk with i t s thirty-two and eighty marks. Attending
to i t involves l i v i n g according to the code, performing the meditation i n
order to develop the non-conceptual awareness, and awaiting a Buddha who has
a s p e c i f i c appearance.
The gradual t r a n s i t i o n to the world i n which the Nk has appeared appears
i n the model as movement along the continuum.
3. THE NIRMANAKAYA-SRAVAKA ENCOUNTER
As the preparatory non-conceptual awareness develops, the Neophyte's
s i t u a t i o n becomes that of the S r a v a k a or novice Bodhisattva. While the
aspirant s t i l l occupies the c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n , a Nk, bearing the. marksof a
Buddha, has entered the f i e l d . He proceeds through the t r a d i t i o n a l Buddha
a c t i v i t i e s . His v i s i b l e presence seems to be necessary for the S r a v a k a ' s
maturation, but Asanga places no stress on personal i n t e r a c t i o n , except for
233
the fact that the Nk d i s c i p l i n e s or teaches the S r a v a k a through pain.
The question of the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the Nk to the other kayas can now he
r a i s e d . S u f f i c i e n t emphasis has been placed on the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of a " r e a l "
Buddha behind the Nk to make the advantages of a S t r u c t u r a l i s t model obvious.
In such a model each s i t u a t i o n may be transformed into another without gaining
or l o s i n g elements, i . e . , "For a given model there should be a p o s s i b i l i t y of
ordering a series of transformations^resulting in.a" group of models of the same
type."
I f t h i s i s applicable, the Nk would be a transformation of some element
present, i n d i f f e r e n t forms, i n both the preceding (Neophyte) and following
(Bodhisattva-Sbk) s i t u a t i o n s . ' " T h i s seems'to be the case as the Nk and Sbk may
be regarded as transformations of one another, as may the Neophyte, the
S r a v a k a and the Bodhisattva. But surely there i s no form of the Buddha
present i n the Neophyte's situation? I suggest that the Buddha i s f u l l y
present i n the form of the message or doctrine (dharma) i n t e r n a l i z e d by the
aspirant. When he moves to the Sr avaka-Nk s i t u a t i o n , there i s no need to
posit an external Buddha i n addition to the developing message. The marks and
acts of the Nk are supplied from the memorized descriptions. The presence of
the Buddha, i . e . , the fact that he i s recognized, comes from the aspirant's
preparatory non-conceptual awareness developed through meditation.
This s o l u t i o n , which requires no new or mysterious terms, explains the
puzzling fact that the Nk f a c i l i t a t e s the S r a v a k a ' s maturation into a Bodhisat-
t v a by the pain of the parlnirvana. I f the Sravaka. i s a Neophyte who has gained
both knowledge of Buddhahood and an openness of perception, he w i l l perceive
the Buddha image as he would any other: he w i l l see i t appearing, remaining
and disappearing. The disappearance w i l l cause pain a s would that of any other
23h
valued object. But the Sravaka w i l l benefit from t h i s p a i n f u l experience by
^
A
g
adopting the Mahayana p r a c t i c e s , which w i l l allow him to share the Buddha's
company i n a Buddhafield.
Another way of applying t h i s s o l u t i o n i s to regard the Buddha, as - a
singular " a c t i v e " type of object. Attachment to the Buddha pains the aspirant,
as does attachment to any t r a n s i t o r y object. However, the Buddha i s not a
passive object. Since a l l aspects of i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p s , i n c l u d i n g the p a i n f u l
ones, have been reoriented into masteries, the Buddha can play an active r o l e
i n the aspirant's perception. The pain a r i s i n g from i t s disappearance i s not
grounded s o l e l y i n the Sravaka's mentation, but i s a stimulus whose locus i s
the i n t e r p l a y between Buddha and S r a v a k a .
k. REORIENTATION
The Sravaka develops h i s basic non-conceptual awareness i n the presence
of the Nk before entering the Sbk's Buddhafield. The entry to the Buddhafield
i s the r e o r i e n t a t i o n by which domination of the aspirant by perceptions i s
replaced by a mastery of them. That i s , the q u i e t i s t i c fundamental non-con-
ceptual awareness which can c i r c u l a t e f r e e l y throughout the world.
5. THE SAMBHOGAKAYA-BODHISATTVA ENCOUNTER
This i s a mirror-image of the Nk-Sravaka encounter. The Buddha has moved
to the c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n and has changed from a p l a i n ( i n the iconographic
sense of l a c k i n g jewels, gold, robes, etc.) mahapurusa form, to one which
varies..,according to the a s p i r a t i o n of-the observer but which, tends toward that
of a bejewelled Sambhoga-Buddha.
235
The aspirant who was formerly a S r a v a k a (surely to he pictured as a pious
monk) has now heen transformed i n t o a Bodhisattva and has exchanged places
with the Buddha. Instead of s i t t i n g at the center awaiting the Nk, he
approaches the Sbk who.is seated at the center. The distance between the two
has decreased.
The nature of the f i e l d - h a s also a l t e r e d . The .pain^-filled world of
common objects has changed into a Buddhafield of pleasure-yielding jewels.
Most important, the teaching i s now v i a pleasure rather than pain. Using
the Buddhist pratityasamutpada scheme, we might say. that the Nk teaches by
means of o l d age-death while the Sbk, represented by a c h i l d , young man or
Sambhoga Buddha, teaches by means of b i r t h and l i f e . Under these conditions,
the joy "matures" the Bodhisattva by a i d i n g the development of non-conceptual
awareness.
6. THE SVABHAVIKAKAYA
The Svk appears as the a n t i t h e s i s of the Prthagjana. The former i s pure
Buddhahood; the l a t t e r i s untouched by Buddhahood.. The former i s pure aware-
ness (jnana); the l a t t e r i s conceptual awareness (vijnana). They l i e at
opposite ends of the model but neither i s a d i r e c t continuation of the c e n t r a l
s i t u a t i o n s .
The d i s c o n t i n u i t y between Svk and the Buddhafield i s a key to further
development of the model. A revealing approach i s the consideration of the Svk
i n each-of its t h r e e aspects(result, awareness, and support f o r sovereignty).
As " r e s u l t " i t i s the culmination of a l i f e based upon an acceptance of
the dharma and attendant p r a c t i c e s . The i n i t i a l taste of the dharma leads to
an encounter with the Nk, to a closer encounter with the Sbk, and to eventual
i d e n t i t y with the Svk. Thus, i t appears to he the l o g i c a l terminus of a
" r e s u l t " continuum.
As "support f o r sovereignty" and "awareness," the Svk cannot be seen as
a transformation of the c e n t r a l s i t u a t i o n s . In the f i r s t case, the discon-
t i n u i t y i s obvious. A support for actions must be more than the eventual
r e s u l t of those actions. It must stand beneath or behind that which i t
supports. In the second case, the text outlines a process by which the
preparatory non-conceptual awareness develops into the Sravaka's fundamental"
non-conceptual awareness and f i n a l l y i n t o the Bodhisattva's subsequent non-
conceptual awareness. Asafiga mentions no "super-subsequent" non-conceptual
awareness that could pertain to the Svk or be experienced separately. He
merely matches "awareness" (jnana) and Svk.
7. THE FULL MODEL
The model of Figure 3, with Prthagjana at-.one'end and Svk at the other,'
i s ambiguous. In some ways, i t seems to be a map of personal progress toward
enlightenment. In others, a truncated version of such a map ( i . e . , Neophyte-
Sravaka-Bodhisattva) appears to be caught between the two end terms, which
are disconnected from the facts of personal development.
I suggest that t h i s ambiguity a r i s e s from the superposition of two basic
ideas on the same axis. The f i r s t i s the idea of a continuum of developing
Buddhahood running from Neophyte, through Sravaka to Bodhisattva. The second
i s that of the general d e s c r i p t i o n of the t r i k a y a doctrine as an encounter
between Prthagjana and Buddhaan encounter which takes the form of the three
c e n t r a l s i t u a t i o n s . These are c l o s e l y r e l a t e d but separable.
As both ideas share the c e n t r a l s i t u a t i o n s , they may be better displayed
237
"by turning the Prthagjana-Svk axis at r i g h t angles to the continuum. This
y i e l d s a two-dimensional diagram i n which the former terminal points w i l l he
on the v e r t i c a l axis and the three c e n t r a l s i t u a t i o n s w i l l he on the h o r i z o n t a l
axis. As development i s customarily associated with r i s i n g , the Svk w i l l he
at the top of the diagram and the Prthagjana at the bottom. The c e n t r a l
s i t u a t i o n s may be l e f t i n the same order as i n Figure 3. This gives the model
of Figure k. It w i l l be used throughout the remainder of t h i s study.
The model now has two dimensions which, while they are on the same
l o g i c a l plane and share the same c e n t r a l s i t u a t i o n s , appear to portray quite
d i f f e r e n t approaches to the data. These differences can be understood by
considering the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the upper and lower terms to the c e n t r a l
s i t u a t i o n s .
The f i r s t question i s that of the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the Prthagjana to the
rest of the model. In p a r t i c u l a r , how absolute i s the discontinuity? Can the
Prthagjana ever become a Sravaka or a Bodhisattva? Most Buddhists or scholars
would probably reply i n the a f f i r m a t i v e . However, the Mahayanasamgraha
contains no statement to that e f f e c t . The very term "Prthagjana" i s not found;
the text describes only the development of the Neophyte who has already heard
the dharma.
Support f o r the notion that the Prthagjana i s an empty category also
comes from a previous l i n e of reasoning. We have noted that the diagram of
Figure 3 contains four s i t u a t i o n s : those of the Neophyte, the Sravaka, the
Bodhisattva and the Svk. Each of these contains an element that may be
regarded as a transformation of the aspirant, and an element that may be
regarded as a transformation of the Buddha. The f a c t that the Svk s i t u a t i o n
contains only one element was explained by assuming that the Svk i s the fusion
jnana
4
DHARMA
N E O P H Y T E
N K
S R A V A K A
z
o
H
<
z
u
o
w
CA
SBK
B O D H I S A T T V A
P R E P A R A T O R Y F U N D A M E N T A L
N O N - C O N C E P T U A L N O N - C O N C E P T U A L
A W A R E N E S S A W A R E N E S S
S U B S E Q U E N T
N O N - C O N C E P T U A L
A W A R E N E S S
vijnana
PRTHAGJANA
Figure k
239
of aspirant and Buddha. The f i r s t s i t u a t i o n contains only the aspirant, the
second and t h i r d both contain aspirant and Buddha, and the fourth contains the
Svk, which may he either aspirant or Buddha.
However, the Prthagjana i s apart from the Neophyte. While the Neophyte
encounters the Buddha i n the form of the Buddhist dharma, the Prthagjana lacks
even that contact. Therefore, h i s s i t u a t i o n cannot he a transformation of the
others, and thus cannot he one of the set composing a S t r u c t u r a l i s t model.
Furthermore, i f the Buddha develops from the dharma, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to
understand how the u t t e r l y closed i n d i v i d u a l , who has not heard the message,
could hear or develop i t . Asanga gives no hint of another term that could
become the message.
The f i n a l piece of evidence that the Prthagjana cannot be another
habitable category i s the discussion i n the Vijnanavada l i t e r a t u r e , where he
i s known as an agotraka (one belonging to no "family" of p r a c t i t i o n e r s ) , or
an;.icchantika (one who i s ' " c u t off." from the p o s s i b i l i t y of enlightenment)'.
Although these are not discussed i n the Mahayanasamgraha, the r e l a t e d l i t e r a -
t u r e
1
^ shows that the Vijnanavadins abandoned the p o s s i b i l i t y of such a class
of i n d i v i d u a l s .
Therefore, the v e r t i c a l and h o r i z o n t a l dimensions 'represent alternate
ways of regarding the Buddhology and must be explained d i f f e r e n t l y . I propose
that the v e r t i c a l axis of the model be regarded as a d i a l e c t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p
between two polar opposites, rather than as a continuum of r e l a t e d s i t u a t i o n s .
The d i a l e c t i c a l tension between them gives r i s e to the mediating s i t u a t i o n s
portrayed on the h o r i z o n t a l axis. That i s , "Man" and "Buddha" are the abstract
terms whose i n t e r a c t i o n gives r i s e to the e x i s t e n t i a l encounters portrayed on
the horizontal-axis.
The most valuable c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h i s model i s i t s openness to a
v a r i e t y of a p p l i c a t i o n s . While i t shows the possible patterns of i n t e r a c t i o n ,
i t does not specify the "true" nature of any element (aspirant, Buddha, or
environment) and does not l i m i t the fundamental nature of the process.
Although epistemic terms were adopted as a h e u r i s t i c analogy, they do not
imply that the t r i k a y a i s r e a l l y a d e s c r i p t i o n of perception.
The importance of the openness i s apparent when we consider, for example,
that only the most naive reading of Asanga's account of the aspirant's
encounter with Nk_ and Sbk would i n d i c a t e that these are n e c e s s a r i l y " h i s t o r i c a l
meetings with the Buddha, either i n personal h i s t o r y (as Nk), or a f t e r the
termination of same (as Sbk i n the Buddhafield). Not only do Buddha-figures
appear i n meditation and v i s i o n s , but Prthagjana and Svk can also be regarded
as the l o g i c a l poles i n the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of an i n d i v i d u a l l i f e , mind, moment
of perception, or even lineage. While i t i s senseless to a t t r i b u t e extra-
t e x t u a l ideas to Asanga, i t i s necessary to r e a l i z e that he has sketched an
o u t l i n e that can accept a v a r i e t y of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s and i s capable of
organizing new ideas. I suggest that t h i s theory has proven so enduring
because i t elucidates one of the major unconscious .structures - inherent i n
the Buddhist view of r e a l i t y .
8. THE MODEL APPLIED
I w i l l now reopen discussion of several of the most important questions
encountered i n the Mahayanasamgraha. With guidance from Figure h, we can
improve and expand the former t e n t a t i v e answers.
2^1
a. Reorientation and S o t e r i o l o g i c a l Progress
The text describes the p o s s i b i l i t i e s open to the i n d i v i d u a l . Although
those are mapped more c l e a r l y than are other t o p i c s , and we have examined the
relevant passages, an a p p l i c a t i o n of the model of Figure h to the data reveals
an important concept.
In Figure 3, the i n d i v i d u a l ' s progress was represented as a motion along
a continuum on the h o r i z o n t a l axis. It began with the Neophyte, who i s both
enmeshed i n the world and has some knowledge of the Buddhist dharma. He'.must'
choose whether to disregard the message or begin to develop i t . Although
Asanga has not stressed the element of choice, he c e r t a i n l y does not believe
that the Buddha can force anyone to become enlightened.
When the Neophyte chooses to advance, he develops preparatory non-
conceptual awareness and becomes a Sravaka. He encounters a Nk, begins to
develop subsequent non-conceptual awareness, and moves into the Buddhafield,
but does not continue to some f i n a l realm centered on the Svk.
The point of r e o r i e n t a t i o n i s ambiguous i n t h i s model. While i t appears
to be an abrupt a l t e r a t i o n , chapter IX describes a gradual process i n v o l v i n g
Neophyte, S r a v a k a , and Bodhisattva ( l X : l - 2 ) . This i s another ambiguity a r i s i n g
from the attempt to represent two ideas on the h o r i z o n t a l axis. In developing
the one-dimensional diagram of Figure 3, r e o r i e n t a t i o n was placed as a f i x e d
point between the common world of Sravaka-Nk and the Buddhafield of the
Bodhisattva-Sbk. The shortcomings of t h i s diagram can be exposed by attempting
to trace the aspirant's development. This must be represented by a point
moving from l e f t to r i g h t . However, as t h i s point passes through the p o s i t i o n
of r e o r i e n t a t i o n , we should expect i t to reverse d i r e c t i o n , never reaching the
Buddhafield. The e n t i r e theory demands that i t does reach the extreme r i g h t
2h2
of the diagram "before moving back toward a new aspirant. Figure 3 cannot
portray t h i s .
In the two-dimensional model of Figure h, the problem has been solved by
moving s o t e r i o l o g i c a l progress to the v e r t i c a l axis. The aspirant ascends
from Prthagjana to Svk, but does so by means of the processes i l l u s t r a t e d on
the h o r i z o n t a l axis. He then reaches back to help others through t h i s same
process. The i n t e r p l a y of the aspirant's l e f t - r i g h t motion and the Buddha's
r i g h t - l e f t motion constitutes the dynamics of the model.
The ambiguity i n r e o r i e n t a t i o n was caused by the fact that t h i s concept
belongs to the v e r t i c a l rather than the h o r i z o n t a l axis. It appears i n the
l a t t e r only because i t also marks the point of i n t e r s e c t i o n of the two axes.
Thus, when the v e r t i c a l axis was eliminated, i t s only remaining point was the
single point of i n t e r s e c t i o n with the h o r i z o n t a l axis. I f only the v e r t i c a l
axis i s examined, r e o r i e n t a t i o n i s indicated by a point midway between Svk and
Prthagjana. As the only represented p o s i t i o n of the e n t i r e h o r i z o n t a l axis,
i t w i l l stand f o r the e n t i r e process portrayed on that a x i s . That i s ,
r e o r i e n t a t i o n occurs throughout the s i t u a t i o n s of Neophyte, Sravaka and
Bodhisattva.
I believe that " t h i s i s one of the most u s e f u l i n s i g h t s a r i s i n g from the
new model. It j u s t i f i e s regarding the h o r i z o n t a l axis as a s i n g l e , coherent
p o r t r a i t of the encounter between man and Buddha. This p o r t r a i t i s s u f f i -
c i e n t l y general that i t can r e c o n c i l e diverse ideas about the achievement of
enlightenment. I t i s e s p e c i a l l y promising as a framework within which to
r e c o n c i l e statements found i n the "sudden versus gradual" polemic regarding
the a c q u i s i t i o n of enlightenment.
21+3
b. Svabhavikakaya, Dharmakaya, and Support for the Rupakayas
The d i s t i n c t i o n between Svk and Dk was explored i n the preceding study
of the Manayanasaihgraha. The more important question of the r e l a t i o n s h i p of
e i t h e r of them to the Nk and Sbk was not answered. In the present section, I
w i l l review the concepts of Dk and Svk i n terms of the new model, and w i l l
show that t h i s model can account for Asahga's concept of the supportive
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Svk and c e n t r a l kayas.
We have found that Asahga uses Svk and Dk to describe Buddhahood at
d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of generality. Svk i s very general, while Dk i s d e t a i l e d .
He uses Svk and Dk interchangeably when r e i f y i n g h i s subject'to "a Buddha."
The choice of Svk usually stresses the f i r s t aspect of the trikaya,. the fact
of Buddhahood, rather than either of the s p e c i f i c appearances. In order to
discover further implications of t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s , the p e c u l i a r r e l a t i o n s h i p
of the Svk to the c e n t r a l s i t u a t i o n s must be re-examined.
I have argued that Svk as " r e s u l t " i s a l o g i c a l transformation of the
c e n t r a l s i t u a t i o n s , but, as "awareness" and "support for sovereignty," i s
simply the l o g i c a l pole of a d i a l e c t i c . That i s , depending upon whether we
are discussing i n d i v i d u a l progress or o v e r a l l pattern, the Svk may appear as a
r e s u l t as well as a goal. The l a t t e r idea has been discussed. As " r e s u l t , "
the Svk must be added to the set of habitable s i t u a t i o n s : the Neophyte's
dharma; the- Nk,. the Sbk.,-' and now, the Svk. "The area occupied'.by these'four
i s indicated by the bold l i n e in-Figure 5.. . ' ,,- ' '
I suggest that t h i s area corresponds to the Dharmakaya. That i s , i t i s
portrayed as an i n c l u s i v e category that contains the. Svk. as one element. The
value of t h i s p o r t r a y a l w i l l be shown below.
It i s tempting to create a p e r f e c t l y symmetrical model by assuming that
Figure 5
the Dk i s balanced by a complementary area (including Prthagjana, Neophyte,
Sravaka and Bodhisattva) representing "Sentient Being," the l o g i c a l opposite
of the Dk. However, the tenor of Asanga's reasoning throughout the text
suggests that he believes i n eventual salvation for a l l , and that those who
have reached Buddhahood do not reverse t h e i r progress. Both ideas quickly
became e x p l i c i t dogma within the Vijnanavada t r a d i t i o n . This b e l i e f might
t r a n s l a t e into some asymmetry i n the model. We must avoid eliminating such a
p o s s i b i l i t y by imposing an a r b i t r a r y symmetry not supported by doctrine.
This point could be s e t t l e d only by further research into the r e l a t i o n
between icchantika and sattva i n the Indian Vijnanavada l i t e r a t u r e .
The c e n t r a l unanswered question of t h i s study i s : How does the Svk or Dk
support the Nk and Sbk? The above depiction of the d i s t i n c t i o n between Svk
and Dk shows the Dk supporting the c e n t r a l two kayas as the general category
that contains them. This simple i n t e r p r e t a t i o n appears to explain a l l
relevant passages of the text.
The question of how the Svk supports the Nk and Sbk may be approached
from several d i r e c t i o n s . F i r s t , , - i t . has been s i m p l i f i e d by the argument that
the Svk cannot be a f u l l transformation of the Nk and Sbk as, of the three
concepts that define i t , only " r e s u l t " shows i t to be continuous with the Nk
and Sbk. When i t i s regarded as "awareness" or "support for sovereignty," i t
i s not a continuation of them. Therefore, only the former must be explained.
We have noted several times that the d i f f i c u l t y arises from the f a c t that
the Svk seems to reside at the f a r r i g h t of the diagram when regarded as
" r e s u l t " but occupies the top i n a l l other cases. An acceptable explanation
should encompass both.
I suggest that the key to such an explanation i s the r e a l i z a t i o n that the
2k6
Svk, as r e s u l t , i s equivalent to the aggregate of a l l kayas on the h o r i z o n t a l
axis: the dharma, Nk, and Shk. The Svk takes a l l of these forms hut has no
existence apart from them.
This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n agrees with that suggested previously for the concept
" r e o r i e n t a t i o n . " I f r e o r i e n t a t i o n i s the pointof i n t e r s e c t i o n of the axes,
then the aspirant w i l l encounter and acquire a l l of the kayas as he ascends
the v e r t i c a l a x i s . The a c q u i s i t i o n of the Nk and Shk w i l l then he equivalent
to the attainment of the Svk.
This section of the study has concentrated on the elements i n the r e l a -
t i o n s h i p between Prthagjana and Svk, while ignoring the feeling-tone of that
r e l a t i o n s h i p . The model can also display the feeling-tone and, i n doing so,
display another aspect of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between Svkj Nk, and Sbk.
We have seen that the Nk i n f l i c t s pain upon, and the Svk affords pleasure
t o , the aspirant. We have also noted the symmetry by which the Prthagjana
stands i n a s i m i l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p to the Sravaka and Bodhisattva as the Svk
stands to the Nk. and Sbk. I f an explanation can be found for the r e l a t i o n s h i p
of the Prthagjana to the former two, i t Is reasonable to examine the p o s s i -
b i l i t y that i t s converse w i l l help us understand the way i n which the Svk can
support both the p a i n f u l and the pleasant actions of Nk_ and Sbk. Such an
explanation does exist,.'.and i t s inversion does appear to be u s e f u l .
The relevant doctrine i s that of the "three poisons"'
1 1
the idea that the
Prthagjana i s dominated by a t r i a d of emotional reaction-patterns: an egocen-
t r i c nescience (avidya) or confusion (moha), a subsequent self-aggrandisement
through attachment (raga) to things believed to be desirable objects for
consumption, and an other-depreciation through avoidance (dvesa) of things
seen as inherently p a i n f u l or harmful.
This doctrine shows the same pattern as that displayed hy the lower
portion of Figure k. The Prthagjana i s the model of the i n d i v i d u a l dominated
by avidya. The Neophyte, dominated by avidya, r e i f i e s the Buddha, of whom he
has heard, into an external godlike "other" that may be the occasion for either
p a i n f u l abandonment (by the Nk) or pleasant presence (.of the Sbk). Thus, the
doctrine of the three poisons provides the pattern of support between the
Prthagjana and the Sravaka and Bodhisattva.
An inversion', of t h i s doctrine can be applied to the upper portion of the
model. Just as the Prthagjana i s dominated by nescience,, the Svk i s , or i s
dominated by, i t s opposite, "awareness" (jnana). Just as the aspirant (as
Sravaka) i s pained by the l o s s of the Nk, so the Svkas N k e x h i b i t s funda-
mental non-conceptual awareness, the t o t a l absence of p a i n f u l involvement
( V I I I : l U ) . Just as the aspirant (as Bodhisattva) experiences pleasure i n the
presence of a Sbk i n the Buddhafield, the Svkas S b k e x h i b i t s a subsequent
non-conceptual awareness that can c i r c u l a t e in'.the world without being s o i l e d .
That i s , the Bodhisattva goes to a closed s i t u a t i o n surrounding the Buddha,
while the Sbk expands t h i s s i t u a t i o n to encompass the world.
E. FINAL COMMENTS
In t h i s concluding chapter, I have exposed the structure underlying the
t r i k a y a doctrine of the Mahayanasamgraha, and demonstrated that an abstract
model of i t can elucidate and harmonize the main features of the Buddhology.
The study is. complete.
The next stage i n a continuing study w i l l be an examination of the
a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the model to r e l a t e d t e x t s . Appendix B l i s t s those to be
examined f i r s t .
2k8
Figure 6
2h9
The immediate t e s t of t h i s model would he an attempt to describe the
alternate Buddhology within t h i s same text (.11:33), the twenty-one gunas of
the Buddha (see above, pp. 87-90). As Asanga has quoted 11:33 from the
Samdhinirmocanasutra and kept i t separate, i t should be understood by means of
the commentaries to that text (see below, Appendix B) rather than through
those to the Mahayanasamgraha. Such a t e s t i s too complex to undertake within
the present study.
In addition to displaying the fundamental Vijnanavada ideas about Buddha-
hood, t h i s model can also serve as a framework within which the r e l a t i o n of
any Buddhological idea to any other Vijnanavada dogma may be explored. While
a systematic treatment of the many possible combinations i s impracticable, the
a p p l i c a t i o n of the model to any problem w i l l u s u a l l y be obvious. I s h a l l
examine one, very s u p e r f i c i a l l y , to i l l u s t r a t e the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of t h i s
method.
We have seen that Asanga r e f e r s to the reoriented alayavijnana as both
M i r r o r - l i k e Awareness (X:55 see above, pp. 112-113), and as Dharmakaya
(X: 7. 1; see above, pp. 125-126). This was explained by the supposition that,
when Asanga needed-.a-value-free term t o designate the basis of perception, he
used the former; when he needed a value-laden term for the container of
tendencies to biased perception, he used the l a t t e r . This i s not a t o t a l l y
s a t i s f a c t o r y explanation, as the connection between the two concerns i s merely
i m p l i c i t . When we r e f l e c t that they cannot be two ways of speaking of the
same thing (the alayavijnana i s not a "thing"), t h i s explanation seems even
l e s s s a t i s f a c t o r y .
The S t r u c t u r a l i s t model provides a framework that can encompass both
ideas. The two explanations contain three terms: alayavijnana, Dharmakaya,
and " M i r r o r - l i k e Awareness." Our model does not contain an e x p l i c i t term f o r
the alayavijnana, hut does contain terms for the other two. Figure 5 shows
the Dk d i r e c t l y , and exhibits various types of "Awareness." The Dk i s
c l e a r e s t : i t i s the category containing a l l of the Buddhakayas. Therefore,
the statement that the Dk i s a r e o r i e n t a t i o n of the alayavijnana suggests that
the l a t t e r i s that portion of the diagram complementary to the Dk. That i s ,
i t i s the area containing the Prthagjana, Neophyte, Sravaka and Bodhisattva.
This area matches
-
:.the d e s c r i p t i o n of the alayavijfiana as the container for (or
"composed of") impure tendencies. I t has been portrayed and l a b e l l e d i n
Figure 6. Note that i t i s the area that was e a r l i e r (see above, p. 2^5)
t e n t a t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d as representing "Sentient Being."
The r e l a t i o n of the f i n a l term, " M i r r o r - l i k e Awareness" (adarsajnana),
to the "Awareness" can be seen i n the model. The short d e s c r i p t i o n i n the
text (X: 5- 5 U) appears to include ideas that belong to both Fundamental and
Subsequent Non-conceptual Awarenessit i s accurate, unhampered by time or
space, non-conceptual and enjoys
-
'.the images perceived by the Buddha. That i s ,
i t includes the awareness of both Nk and Sbk. I f so, i t i s coextensive with
the Dk, the category that contains both. With t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , the
problem has been solved. The alayavijnana and M i r r o r - l i k e Awareness are
complementary, general categories. The former i s the awareness that forms
perceptions according to prejudices; the l a t t e r accurately r e f l e c t s the
perceptions. However, the enlightened awareness i s not simply the a b i l i t y to
see things "as they are," but i s the a b i l i t y t o mold a s i t u a t i o n for the
benefit of a l l . Therefore, i t can also be c a l l e d Dk. The two descriptions
that caused the problem i n the section can now be seen as s p e c i a l instances of
the continuous/discontinuous problem that has been discussed at length above.
251
F i n a l l y , I wish to note that the S t r u c t u r a l i s t model i s a useful t o o l for
comparing the r e s u l t s of Western Investigations into Buddhist ideas. Many of
these are of l i m i t e d value, simply hecause i t i s d i f f i c u l t to compare them to
other studies. The wide v a r i e t y of d i s c i p l i n e s and approaches i n use makes
the d e r i v a t i o n of a coherent p o r t r a i t of any aspect of Buddhism nearly impos-
s i b l e . The S t r u c t u r a l i s t model provides a framework within which r e s u l t s from
these diverse studies may be compared.
For example, while John Strong's recent a r t i c l e s on early devotional
practices ("Gandhakuti: The Perfumed Chamber of the Buddha"; "The Transforming
G i f t s : An Analysis of Devotional Acts of O f f e r i n g i n Buddhist Avadana L i t e r a -
ture") obviously deal with s i m i l a r materials, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see them as
d i f f e r e n t approaches to the same t r a d i t i o n . When we also include an a r t i c l e
such as Roy C. Amore's "Giving and Harming: Buddhist Symbols of Good and E v i l , "
which regards s i m i l a r ideas as Buddhist Ethics to be approached through
Ricoeur's phenomenology, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to believe that a common subject i s
under study. A broader picture that shows the p o s i t i o n of each of these i s
necessary. T r a d i t i o n a l Buddhist concepts, addressed to the b e l i e v e r , o f f e r
l i t t l e help, as they were developed to r e c o n c i l e differences of opinion within
one t r a d i t i o n , not to r e c o n c i l e hermeneutical categories from outside any
Buddhist t r a d i t i o n .
The model of Figure k can contain a l l these studies as d e t a i l s of the
symbolic lessening of the distance between aspirant and Buddha i n the s i t u a t i o n
of Sravaka-Nk and Bodhisattva-Sbk. As such, they can e a s i l y be r e l a t e d to
each other, and to any other studies of practices (involving Buddhalands,
stupas, mandalas, worship, etc.) whereby early Buddhists attempted to approach,
t h e i r goal.
252
NOTES
See Mircea E l i a d e , "Methodological Remarks on the Study of Religious
Symbolism," i n M. Eliade and J . M. Kitagawa (eds.), History of Religions:
Essays i n Methodology (Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1959).
2
See above, pp. 139-1^0. For a d e t a i l e d discussion, see Ian G. Barbour,
Myths, Models . and Paradigms: A Comparative Study i n Science and R e l i g i o n (.New
York: Harper and Row, 197*0-
3
See A l f r e d North Whitehead, Process and R e a l i t y : An Essay i n Cosmology,
corrected e d i t i o n , D. R. G r i f f i n and D. W. Sherburne (eds.) (New York: The
Free Press, 1978), p. 3.
k
This model appears i n most of Eliade's works. The clearest statement
i s i n The Sacred and the Profane (New York: Harper and Row, 196l ) .
^ See Robert D. Baird's "Normative Elements i n Eliade's Phenomenology of
Symbolism," Union Seminary Quarterly Review, 2k, no. k (.1970).
6
Paul Ricoeur has developed t h i s characterization. His d e s c r i p t i o n of
Levi-Strauss's work and of the l a t t e r ' s response i s discussed i n P h i l i p
P e t t i t , The Concept of Structuralism: A C r i t i c a l Analysis (Dublin: G i l l and
Macmillan, 1975).
7
Models based on p a i r s of binary opposites are found throughout the
mature works of Levi-Strauss. They are so basic to h i s approach that there i s
probably no s i n g l e passage that may be taken as his standard explanation of
the.topic. A good c o l l e c t i o n of short essays on binary models i n a r t , mythol-
ogy, s o c i a l structure and v i l l a g e geography, i s found i n Claude Levi-Strauss,
S t r u c t u r a l Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, 1963). For a thorough devel-
opment of one basic model i n Amerindian c u l t u r e , see h i s The Raw and the
Cooked, and Honey and Ashes.
8
While the various early systems defined the prthagjana i n s l i g h t l y
d i f f e r e n t ways, the term always r e f e r s to the deluded i n d i v i d u a l who has not
started (or who has barely started) on the Buddhist path. Vasubandhu, i n
253
Abhidharmakosa, i i : 9 b-d, quotes the Samyuttanikaya: "Celui a qui manquent
completement, a quelque degre que ce s o i t , tous ces cinq iridriyas, l a f o i ,
etc., je l e declare homme du dehors, appartenant a l a classe des Prthagjanas."
And again, at i i : 20c-d: "Le Prthagjana est appele ignorant (bala) parce q u ' i l
n'a pas vu l e s v e r i t e s . "
9
Although the early h i s t o r y of Buddhist practices i s obscure, i t i s
clear that practices and symbols derived from the parinirvana and cremation
( e s p e c i a l l y the stupa symbol) have been c e n t r a l to the devotional path since
very early times.
^ See Ruegg, Tathagatagarbha, p a r t i c u l a r l y Deuxieme Partie,.-Chap. II.:;
"La theorie de l ' E v e i l u n i v e r s e l et de 1'ekayana dans l e s commentaires de
1'Abhisamayalamkara," pp. 1 89- 235-
1 1
While t h i s general theory is. basic to Buddhist .thought.,^the..elements
are c a l l e d by d i f f e r e n t names (e.g., k l e s a , anusaya, and r e l a t e d compounds),
and are l i s t e d as parts of d i f f e r e n t sets i n almost every major t e x t . A
thorough account i s found i n Hobogirin (s.v. "Bonno," pp. 121-13*+).
Asanga does not explain t h i s idea i n the Mahayanasamgraha, but simply
mentions the "snare (or 'explosion')" of the passions ;_. However, i t i s i m p l i c i t
i n the-doctrine of the alayavijriana (I:. 29-3*+) and
:
the acceptance of the
twelve-linked chain of causation.
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Lee, Harold N. Percepts, Concepts and Theoretic Knowledge: A Study i n Epis-
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Levi-Strauss, Claude. S t r u c t u r a l Anthropology. Translated from the French by
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MacQuarrie, John. The Scope of Demythologizing. New York: Harper Torchbooks,
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Mahavyutpatti and Index to Mahavyutpatti. C o l l e g i a t e Series, no. 3 , 3 r d
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Malalasekera, G. P. Encyclopaedia of Buddhism. S r i Lanka: Government of S r i
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1
*.
259
Matsunaga, A l i c i a . The Buddhist Philosophy of A s s i m i l a t i o n . Tokyo-Vermont:
C. E. T u t t l e Co., 1969.
May, Jacques. "La Philosophie bouddhique i d e a l i s t e . " A s i a t i s c h e Studien
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Monier-Williams, S i r M. A Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
v e r s i t y Press, l 899.
Murti, T. R. V. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. London: George A l l e n and
Unwin Ltd., i 960.
Mus, Paul. "Le Bouddha pare: son o r i g i n e indienne; akyamuni dans l e
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Nagao, Gadjin M. "From Madhyamika to Yogacara, an Analysis of MMK, XXIV.18
and MV, 1.1-2." Journal of the. International Association of Buddhist
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. "On the Theory of Buddha-Body." Translated by Hirano Umeyo.
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Parrinder, Geoffrey. Avatar and Incarnation: The Wilde Lectures i n Natural
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Faber, 1970.
P e t t i t , P h i l i p . The Concept of Structuralism: A C r i t i c a l Analysis. Dublin:
G i l l and Macmillan, 1975-
Rahula, Walpola, trans. Le Compendium de l a Super-Doctrine (philosophie)
(Abhidharmasamuccaya) d'Asanga. P a r i s : Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient,
1971.
Raju, P. T. I d e a l i s t Thought i n India. Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press,
1953.
Ramanan, K. Venkata. Nagarjuna's Philosophy: As Presented i n the Maha-
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260
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Suzuki, D. T. Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism. London: Luzac, 1907.
. Studies i n the Lankavatara Sutra. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
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Ting Fu-pao. Fo-hsueh t a - t z ' u - t i e n (Great Dictionary of Buddhism). T a i p e i :
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Tucci, Giuseppi. On Some Aspects of the Doctrines of MaitreyaLnatha"] and
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. "Ratnakarasanti on Asraya-paravrtti." A s i a t i c a , F e s t s c h r i f t
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W i l l i s , Janice D. "A Study of the Chapter on R e a l i t y , Based upon the
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Columbia U n i v e r s i t y , 1 976.
APPENDIX B
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SELECTED PRIMARY SOURCES
263
This bibliography contains the most important texts and t r a n s l a t i o n s for
a study of the t r i k a y a concept i n the Indian Vijnanavada. It includes those
mentioned i n the present study and those that would be most u s e f u l f o r an
expanded study.
These are e i t h e r Indie language texts that have been preserved i n Tibetan
and/or Chinese t r a n s l a t i o n s , or are Tibetan or Chinese commentaries.
As indigenous scholars i n both cultures soon elaborated and modified the
doctrine, a l l texts that go beyond an accurate r e f l e c t i o n of Indian ideas have
been excluded. Very conservative c r i t e r i a have been employed i n order to
obtain a r e l i a b l e basis for future work.
With the exception of the three fundamental sutras, the bibliography
excludes texts that do not contain a coherent t r i k a y a , and does not contain
minor texts or texts containing only passing references to the t r i k a y a .
The number accompanying the t i t l e of a Tibetan work i s i t s number i n the
Tibetan T r i p i t a k a Research I n s t i t u t e ' s r e p r i n t of the Peking t r i p i t a k a (also
known as the Otani number). Those accompanying the t i t l e s of.Chinese texts
r e f e r to the Taisho e d i t i o n of the'Chinese canon.
The chief studies on, and t r a n s l a t i o n s of, these texts i n European
languages have been noted. Modern Japanese work, apart from editions of t e x t s ,
has not been included.
I. INDIAN TEXTS AND COMMENTARIES
A. SUTRAS
The Vijnanavada was formulated as an explanation of the new ideas appearing
within the Buddhist t r a d i t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y i n a few Mahayana sutras. Although
a study of the t r i k a y a w i l l be based upon the sastras, i t must not lose sight
of the contents of the three extant and accessible sutras. Although they do
not contain a f u l l t r i k a y a , they are the ultimate authority from which i t was
derived.
261+
1. SaAdhinirmocanasutra
The c e n t r a l and most basic sutra of the Vijnanavada t r a d i t i o n . The
t r i k a y a may be the only d o c t r i n a l idea not developed i n i t . Any study of the
t r a d i t i o n must begin with t h i s t e x t . Sanskrit text l o s t .
a. Translations:
i . Tibetan
P. 77*+. 'phags-pa dgongs-pa nges-par 'grel-pa theg-pa chen-po'i mdo.
Translator not recorded.
i i . Chinese
- T . 678 ( v o l . 1 6, pp.
7
lWTl8a)'#*t % fflJ** ^ *
by Gunabhadra (*+35hl+3 A.D.). This i s a p a r t i a l t r a n s l a t i o n
corresponding to chapter IX of the Tibetan. See also T. 679 for
anonymous t r a n s l a t i o n of chapter X.
T . 675 ;3JL3F ?}f by Bodhiruci (ca. 5 l A . D . ) .
A l l ten chapters complete.
T . 677 f$.
Z
l
%.'^ ty Paramartha ( 557- 569 A.D.).
P a r t i a l ; corresponds to f i r s t four chapters of Tibetan.
T . 676 yjjL^ &fL
b
y Hsiian-tsang (ca. 61+7 A.D.).
In f i v e chapters; corresponds to f u l l ten chapters of Tibetan.
b. Commentaries
i . Sanskrit
Note: While a l l Vijnanavada sastras are "commentaries" on t h i s sutra,
t h i s l i s t includes only d i r e c t commentaries on the text.
Asanga's Aryasamdhinirmocanabhasya.
Tibetan P. 5U8I : 'phags-pa dgongs-pa nges-par
1
g r e l - p a ' i
rnam-par bshad-pa.
( a u t h o r unknown) Aryasamdhinirmocanasutrasyavyakhyanam.
Tibetan P. 581+5: 'phags-pa dgongs-pa nges-par 'grel-pa'i mdo'i
rnam-par bshad-pa.
265
Jnanagarbha's Aryasamdhinirmocanasutra aryamaitreyakevalaparivarta
bhasyam.
Tibetan P. :5535: 'phags-pa dgongs-pa nges-par 'grel-pa'i mdo
l a s 'phags-pa byams-pa'i le'u. nyi t s h e ' i bshad-pa.
i i . Chinese
Lamotte (Samdhinirmocana, p. 11) mentions an Aryagambhirasamdhinirmo-
c ana silt rat i k a by Yuan-ts-'e (]"^J ). This does not seem to be i n the
Taisho, but a t r a n s l a t i o n by Chos-sgrub i s extant i n Tibetan:
P. 5517: 'phags-pa dgongs-pa zab-mo nges-par 'grel-pa'i mdo'i
rgya-cher 'grel-pa. This would have been written ca. 683, when Yuen-
tse resided at Ch'ang-an.
c. Western Language Translations
i . Etienne Lamotte. Samdhinirmocanasutra. Louvain: Bureaux de Recueil.
Bibliotheque de l ' U n i v e r s i t e , 1935-
This, the sole French t r a n s l a t i o n , i s i n three parts:
p r e f a c e
a n edited Tibetan text based upon Fonds t i b e t a i n of the B i b l i o .
Nat., No. 10.
a French t r a n s l a t i o n based upon the Tibetan, Hsiiantsang's Chinese,
and Asanga's AVyasamdhinirmocanabhasya.
To t h i s may be added an a r t i c l e published i n the same year:
Etienne Lamotte, "Les T r o i s Caracteres et l e s t r o i s absences de nature
propre dans l e Samdhinirmocanasutra, chapitre VI." B u l l e t i n de l a
Classe des Lettres et des Sciences morales et p o l i t i q u e s . Bruxelles:
Academie Royale de Belgique, 1935, pp. 289-303.
i i . A n English t r a n s l a t i o n from the Tibetan by Brian C u t i l l o and Geshe
Jampel Thardo w i l l be published i n an English T r a n s l a t i o n Series of
Asanga's works (announced i n Buddhist Text Information, The Centre for
Advanced Studies i n World Religions. #2, March 1975).
d. Western Language Studies
This sutra has a t t r a c t e d l i t t l e attention, as most p h i l o s o p h i c a l
studies have focussed on the voluminous sastra l i t e r a t u r e . Aside from
266
b r i e f passages i n the standard surveys (e.g., Winternitz), I have been
unable to f i n d substantial material.
See also Bibliographie Bouddhique x x v i i i - x x x i (1961), pp. 167-168.
2. Lankavatarasutra
Of the three sutras, the Lankavatara contains the doctrine nearest to the
t r i k a y a . Suzuki's study of the t r i k a y a passages was introduced i n chapter I
of the present study. The Sanskrit text has been published:
Nanjio Bunyiu (ed.). The Lankavatara Sutra. Kyoto: Otani U n i v e r s i t y
Press, 1923 (reprinted 1956 as v o l . 1 of B i b l i o t h e c a Otaniensis).
a. Translations
i . Tibetan
P . 775- 'phags-pa lang-kar gshegs-pa theg-pa'i mdo. The t r a n s l a t o r
i s t r a d i t i o n a l l y regarded as Chos-grub ( / who t r a n s l a t e d from
Chinese to Tibetan during the 9th century.
i i . Chinese
T . 670 4^0 ?J j|_ *|f ^ i n k fasc. by Gunabhadra
(ca kk3 A.D.). The. shortest and most popular version. Probably the
one used by Bodhidharma. I t was t r a n s l a t e d into Tibetan by Chos-grub
as: P. 776. 'phags-pa lang-kar gshegs-pa rin-po-che'i mdo l a s sangs-
rgyas thams-cad-kyi gsung-gi snying-po zhes-bya-ba'i l e ' u .
T . 671 X jilQ by Bodhirucci (ca.. 513 A.D.).
T . 672 ^ C ^ . 7^ 1$ J1]Q "by Siksananda and others (ca. 700 A.D.).
b. Commentaries
No Sanskrit commentaries survive,
i . Chinese
T . 1790 A. $ 5
,y
% by.-Fa-tsang.. (ca. 700 A.D.)'..- This-
i s a short, expository t r e a t i s e r e a l l y a commentary on the Siksananda
t r a n s l a t i o n .
The Dainihon zoku zokyo (Great Japanese Supplement to the Canon).
Kyoto: 1905-1912, fasc. 25-29 contain a t o t a l of f i f t e e n commentaries
267
on the Lankavatara. These include two from the Tang, four from the
Sung, and seven from the Ming dynasties.
c. Western Language Translations and Studies
i . D. T. Suzuki. Studies i n the Lankavatara Sutra. London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1930.
i i : ' D. T. Suzuki. The Lankavatara Sutra: Translated for the F i r s t Time
from the O r i g i n a l Sanskrit. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1932.
i i i . D. T. Suzuki. An Index to the Lankavatara Sutra. To
v
kyo': Suzuki
Research Foundation, I 965.
These are workmanlike sources of information, although the
"studies" are more l i k e "sermons" on the sutra. Suzuki explains i t i n
l i g h t of h i s own b e l i e f i n Mahayana Buddhism.
3. Srimaladevis imhanandasutra
Although t h i s early sutra does not contain a t r i k a y a doctrine, i t does
e s t a b l i s h the r e l a t e d notion of the tathagatagarhha. Since a modern t r a n s -
l a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e which includes an extensive study of the sutra, i t s -
h i s t o r y and t r a n s l a t i o n s , t h i s text should be a reference for any study i n
Vijnanavada theory.
a. Translation
i . Alex Wayman and Hideko Wayman. The Lion's Roar of Queen Srimala:
A Buddhist Scripture on the Tathagatagarhha Theory. New York:
Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Press, 197*+.
B. SASTRAS
The sastras, and scholarship on them, have been discussed e a r l i e r i n t h i s
study. Those l i s t e d below are simply the most promising sources f o r a study.
k. Mahayanasutralamkara
This verse summary of the Vijnanavada must be understood through the
commentaries. The Buddhological passages have been incorporated i n t o the
Mahayanasamgraha.
Sanskrit text edited and t r a n s l a t e d hy Sylvain L e v i . Mahayana-Sutra-
lamkara, 2 v o l s . Bibliotheque de l ' E c o l e des Hautes Etudes: Sciences Histo-
riques et Philologiques. P a r i s : L i b r a i r e Honore Champion, 1907-1911.
a. Translations
i . Tibetan
P . 5521, theg-pa chen-po'i mdo-sde'i rgyan-gyi t s h i g l e ' u r byas-pa.
Translated by Sakyasimha and dPal-brtegs.
i i . Chinese
T . 1601+ %J^_ by Prabhakaramitra (ca. 630-633 A.D.)
b. Commentaries
i . Sanskrit
Sutralamkara-bhasya by Vasubhandu. Tibetan t r a n s l a t i o n P. 5527-
Apparently no Chinese t r a n s l a t i o n .
Mahayana-sutralamkara-tika by Asvabhava. Tibetan t r a n s l a t i o n :
P. 5530: theg-pa chen-po'i mdo-sde'i rgyan-gyi rgya-cher bshad-pa.
Apparently no Chinese t r a n s l a t i o n .
Sutralamkara-vrtti-bhasya by Sthiramati.
Tibetan t r a n s l a t i o n P. 5531; mdo-sde rgyan-gyi 'grel bshad.
Apparently no Chinese t r a n s l a t i o n .
c. Western Language Translations
See above, Sylvain L e v i .
Giuseppe Tucci (ed. and t r a n s . ) . Mahayanasutralamkara. Serie
Orientale Roma, IX, 1956.
d. Western Language Studies
Gadjin M< Nagao. An Index to the Mahayanasutralamkara. Part 1:
Sanskrit-Tibetan-Chinese. Tokyo: Nippon Gakujutsu Shinko-kai, 1958.
Part 2: Tibetan-Sanskrit and Chinese-Sanskrit. Tokyo, 1961.
269
5. Mahayanasamgraha of Asahga. Sanskrit text l o s t .
a. Translations
i . Tibetan -
T
' . -
P . 55^9; theg-pa chen-po bsdus-pa.
i i . Chinese
T . 1592: j^<%.\% ^ Buddhasanta (ca. 531 A.D.).
T . 1593: by Paramartha (ca. 56UA.D.).
T . 159U: ^ j^fe.
b
Y Hsuan-tsang (ca. 6U8 A.D.).
Published by Sasaki Gessho. Kan'yaku Shihon-taisho Shodaijoron.
Tokyo: Nakayama Shobo, 1 959.
b. Commentaries
i . Mahayanasamgrahabhasya by Vasubandhu.
Tibetan t r a n s l a t i o n , P. 5551^ theg-pa chen-po b s d u s - p a ' i ' g r e l - p a
t r a n s l a t e d by Dipamkarasrijnana and Tshul-khrims.
Chinese t r a n s l a t i o n s : T. 1595 by Paramartha Cc a. 56U A.D.); T. 1596 by
Dharmagupta ( 6 05 - 6 l 6 A.D.); T. 1597 by Hsiian-tsang (ca. 6U8- 6^9 A.D.);
a l l are t i t l e d j ^ - f e %% ^% .
i i . Mahayanasamgrahopanibandhana by Asvabhava. Sanskrit text l o s t .
Tibetan t r a n s l a t i o n : P. 5552; theg-pa chen-po bsdus bshad sbyor.
Chinese t r a n s l a t i o n : T. 1598: by Hsuan-tsang.
c. Western Language Translation-.
Et ienne Lamotte. La Somme du grand vehicule d'Asanga. Publications de
1 ' I n s t i t u t O r i e n t a l i s t e de Louvain, no. 8, 1973 ( f i r s t published 1 9^9) .
Vol. 1 contains an edited Tibetan text and a photo-reprint of the Taisho
e d i t i o n of Hsiian-tsang's t r a n s l a t i o n . Vol. 2 contains the French trans-
l a t i o n and commentary.
6. Abhisamayalamkara
This text appears to be prajnaparamita but i s considered to be a Vijnana-
vada sastra. I t contains a Buddhological section that promises to be a good
source for data that could r e l a t e the Prajnaparamita understanding of the Dk
to the one developed i n t h i s study.
270
F u l l d e t a i l s of the a v a i l a b l e texts (Sanskrit and Tibetan) may be found
i n E. Conze. The Prajnaparamita L i t e r a t u r e . The Hague: Mouton and Co., i 9 6 0 .
a. Western Language Translations
i . Abhisamalankara-Prajnaparamita-Upadesa-sastra: The Work of
Bodhisattva Maitreya. Edited and t r a n s l a t e d by Th. Stcherbatsky
and E. Obermiller, 1929. Osnabruck: B i b l i o Verlag, 1970.
i i . Edward Conze. Abhisamayalahkara. Rome: Serie Orientale Roma,
VI, 195U.
7. Ratnagotravibhaga (Uttaratantra.).
Sanskrit text: Ratnagotravibhaga-Mahayanottaratantra a t t r i b u t e d to
Maitreya or to Saramati. Edited with Vyakha, a t t r i b u t e d to Asanga, by E. H.
Johnston. Patna: Bihar Research Society, 1950. Z. Nakamura's e d i t i o n
(Tokyg, 196l) includes both Sanskrit text and Chinese t r a n s l a t i o n .
This w i l l be one of the most important texts for an expanded study as,
l i k e the Srimaladevisutra, i t r e l a t e s the t r i k a y a to the concepts of tathaga-
tagarhha and dharmadhatu. While these are not important i n the Mahayana-
samgraha, they became major features of the Indian Vijnanavada.
a. Translations
i . Tibetan
P . 5525: theg-pa chen-po rgyud-bla-ma'i bstan-bcos.
Translator: Blo-ldan shes-rab (ca. 11th century),
i i . Chinese
Modern publications: see above, Z. Nakamura.
b. Commentarie s
i . Sanskrit
Ratnagotravibhaga vyakya, by Asanga; see above, E. H. Johnston,
i i . Tibetan
P.5526: theg-pa chen-po rgyud-bla-ma
1
i bstan-bcos rnam-par bshad-pa.
Translator: Blo-ldan shes-rab.
by Ratnamati (ca. 511 A.D.).
271
c. Western Language Translations
E . Obermiller, trans. "The Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle to
Salvation." Acta O r i e n t a l i a , 9 (1931).
J . Takasaki. The Ratnagotravibhaga. Rome: Serie Orientale Roma,
1966.
d. Western Language Studies
D. S. Ruegg. La Theorie du tathagatagarhha et du gotra. P a r i s :
Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient, 1969-
J . Takasaki. "A Study of Ratnagotravibhaga (Uttaratantra)." Ph.D.
t h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of Poona, unpublished.
C. MISCELLANEOUS TRIKAYA TEXTS OF INDIAN ORIGIN
8. A number of short descriptions of the doctrine, whose o r i g i n a l t i t l e s were
probably Kayatrayastotra or Trikayastava, e x i s t i n Chinese or Tibetan
t r a n s l a t i o n s . L i t t l e i s known of these t e x t s , but they should be i n c o r -
porated into any further study.
a. Chinese Texts
T . 1677: X - ^ ^ 1 ^ This appears to be the text that Baron
von Stael-Holstein published as Bermerkungen zum Trikayastava (Izd.
Imp. Ak. Nauk B u l l e t i n : Academie Imperiale des Sciences de Petersburg,
Ser. VI, TV pp. 837-8H5, 1911).
- T . 1678: 4 ^ ^ \f
b. Tibetan Texts
P . 9^9: 'phags-pa sku gsum shes-bya-ba theg-pa chan-po'i mdo
(reconstructed as A^rya-kayatraya-nama-mahayana-sutra). One f o l i o .
This text has been reprinted i n note 2 to chapter 1 of the present study.
- - Western Language Translation:
W. W. R o c k h i l l . The L i f e of the Buddha. London: Kegan Paul,
Tremh, ' Triibner & Co. Ltd., 1907, pp. 200-202.
272
P . 2015: sku gsum-la bstod-pa shes-bya-ba (reconstructed by the Japanese
editors as Kayatraya-stotra-nama). Written by Nagarjuna and translated"
into Tibetan by Krsnapandita and Tshul-khrims rgyal-ba.
Only one f o l i o i n length.
Part of t h i s text i s t r a n s l a t e d by La V a l l e e Poussin i n h i s
"Three Bodies of a Buddha," 1906 (pp. U55-^56).
P . 2016: sku gsum-la bstod-pa shes-bya-ba'i rnam-par 'grel-pa
(reconstructed by the editors as Kayatraya-stotra-nama-nivarana).
This i s a commentary to No. 2015. It was written by Nagarjuna
and revised by Sraddhakaravarman and Rin-chen bzang-po. Eight f o l i o s .
P . 5290: sku gsum-la 'jug-pa'i sgo shes-bya-ba'i bstan-bcos (recon-
structed by the editors as Kayatrayavatara-mukham-nama-sastra).
Written by Nagamitra and t r a n s l a t e d by Prajnavarma and Ye-shes sde.
F i f t e e n f o l i o s .
P . 5291: sku gsum-gyi 'grel-pa (reconstructed as Kayatraya-vrtti).
Written by Jnanacandra and t r a n s l a t e d by Prajnavarman and Ye-shes sde.
Seventy-two f o l i o s .
Texts 5290 and 5291 appear to contain a very thorough d e s c r i p t i o n of the
developed t r i k a y a doctrine. However, these texts have not been edited or
studied. Very l i t t l e i s known about t h e i r authors. The e d i t i n g and preliminary
t r a n s l a t i o n of these t e x t s , to render them useful sources of data, would be a
major undertaking. In the immediate future, a few general ideas could be
obtained from them, and, i n the long run, they may be the most important t e x t s ;
but they are u n l i k e l y to be a v a i l a b l e as r e l i a b l e sources for some time.
c. Sanskrit texts
Ratnakarasanti's commentary on the Khasamatantra. G. Tucci has pub-
l i s h e d a very b r i e f palm-leaf manuscript from Nepal, along with i t s
Tibetan t r a n s l a t i o n from the sDe-dge and sNar-thang editions of the
bstan-'gyur. G. Tucci. "Ratnakarasanti on A s r a y a - p a r a v r t t i . "
A s i a t i c a , F e s t s c h r i f t F r e i d r i c h Weiler, 195*+: 765-767.
This l i t t l e text contains an extremely c l e a r treatment of the r e l a t i o n -
ship of the concept of r e o r i e n t a t i o n to the t r i k a y a i n l a t e Indian Buddhist
thought.
273
I I . CHINESE TEXTS AND COMMENTARIES
9 Suvarnaprabhasottamasutra
This i s a popular and widely-studied sutra. Early versions, including
the surviving Sanskrit t e x t , d i d not mention the t r i k a y a . A separate chapter,
which became one of the fundamental statements of the doctrine i n the Far East,
appears i n I-Tsing's t r a n s l a t i o n ( l a t e 7th century), and i n the Tibetan trans-
l a t i o n from his Chinese by Chos-grub (9th century). This chapter was commented
upon by many l a t e r Chinese w r i t e r s .
The Dainihon zoku zokyo (Great Japanese Supplement to the Canon), v o l s .
30-32, contains several commentaries. Hui-chao's l i n e - b y - l i n e commentary
appears to contain the most information on the t r i k a y a doctrine.
Unlike most other t e x t s , t h i s one has been very c a r e f u l l y edited and
t r a n s l a t e d . J . Nobel has published several versions. The one that would be
the basis for any study of the t r i k a y a chapter i s his Suvarnaprabhasottama-
sutra. Leiden: E. J . B r i l l , 1958- This contains a photo-reprint of I-Tsing's
Chinese t r a n s l a t i o n (T. 665: -<fsL )
a n
edited and
t r a n s l i t e r a t e d version of Chos-grub's t r a n s l a t i o n s , and a German t r a n s l a t i o n .
10. Buddhabhumi s ut r a
While the place of t h i s sutra within the development of Indian Buddhism
i s s t i l l unclear, i t a r t i c u l a t e s a Buddhology that i s very close to that of
Asahga. I t should be included i n any expanded study. The sutra, together
with a commentary (vyakhyana) by Silabhadra,' was t r a n s l a t e d into Chinese by
Hsuan-tsang (T. 680: ^ and T. 1530: \% Iflf IjL ), and into
Tibetan by
Edited Tibetan texts of both, and Japanese t r a n s l a t i o n s and commentary,
are found i n : Nishio, Kyoo. The Buddhabhumi-sutra and the Buddhabhumi-
vyakhyana of Silabhadra, 2 v o l s . Nagoya: Hajinkaku Publishing Co., n.d.
11. Ch'eng Wei-Shih Lun
$it_ This i s a summary of the Vijnanavada. It was composed
by the p i l g r i m Hsuan-tsang and his d i s c i p l e K'uei-chi a f t e r the former's return
27k
to China i n the mid-seventh century A.D. It i s arranged as a commentary on
Vasubandhu's Trimsika, and draws most of i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s from Sthiramati
and Dharmapala. It became the fundamental text for the Sino-Japanese heirs
to the Vijnanavada t r a d i t i o n .
While t h i s text i s probably closer i n structure to the Mahayanasamgraha
than any other, and also ends with a Buddhology, i t i s properly the beginning
of the Far Eastern t r a d i t i o n s rather than a culmination of the Indian. The
very fact that Hsiian-tsang, the t r a n s l a t o r of the Mahayanasamgraha, preferred
to arrange his general exposition of the t r a d i t i o n around the ambiguous verses
of the Trimsika,. rather than around the formeri.text, indicates that he was
developing a Chinese i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that required a fresh formulation.
a. Translations
There are no Tibetan t r a n s l a t i o n s and, of course, no Sanskrit text.
b. Commentaries
i . P r i n c i p a l T'ang commentaries:
T . 1830: }ijL, by K'uei-chi ^ ^ . The major work.
T . 1831 :*J^ ^ also by K'uei-chi. A condensed manual.
T . 685: ijjfo ifa by Tao-i j j ^ tf_>
T . 686: j | ;g by -ft 0. .
i i . In addition, there are several l e s s orthodox (to the dharmalaksana
t r a d i t i o n ) i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s from followers of K'uei-chi's r i v a l , the
Korean-born Yuan-ts'e | j ] : J l J ( 6 1 3 - 6 9 6 ) :
- T . 689: by .
T . 690: fifr (incomplete) by >||g. .
c. P r i n c i p a l sub-commentaries to K'uei-chi's
T . 1831: ' f ^ ' l f j f - by K'uei-chi.
T . 1832
T . 1833
O'^'y^i
b
Y |L >tZ (
d
- T l
1
* ) , second p a t r i a r c h of the sect.
3 f by ^ ]] .
d. Western Language Translations
Louis de l a Vallee Poussin, trans, and ed.; Vijnaptimatratasiddhi:
l a s i d d h i de Hsiian-tsang. Buddhica, tome I. P a r i s : Paul Geuthner,
1928. Index published i n Buddhica, tome VIII, 1948.
275
Wei Tat, trans. Ch'eng Wei-shin Lun. Hong Kong: The Ch'eng Wei-shih
Lun P u b l i c a t i o n Committee, 1973.