Ichong vs Hernandez G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957 FACTS: Republic Act No.

1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 1180 denies equal protection of laws and due process? HELD: We hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future.

IBP vs Zamora FACTS: The petitioner argues that the order of the President for the Philippine National Police and the Philippine Marines to carry out joint visibility patrols to prevent and restrain crime, violated the principle of supremacy of civilian authority over the military and the civilian character of the police force. ISSUE: Wheter or not civilian supremacy is violated HELD: The participation of the Philippine Marines constitutes a permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The civilian character of the police force is also not affected by this participation. The members of the PNP are the ones in charge of the operations. They are the ones who will direct and supervise the deployment of the Philippine Marines.

Calalang vs. Williams Case Digest Facts: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition Issues: Whether or not there is a undue delegation of legislative power? HELD: There is no undue deleagation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly

Oposa Vs. Factoran, Jr. FACTS: The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others

who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court."

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi. HELD: Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.

Asso. Of Small Landowners Vs. Sec. Of DAR FACTS: A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the legislatures power. Issue: Whether or Not the aforementioned EOs, PD, and RA were constitutional.

HELD: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and eminent domain.The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain.

REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a foreshore land. ISSUE: Whether or not foreshore land and the reclaimed area is within the commerce of man. HELD: The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term foreshore lands.

Isagani Cruz vs DENR

FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain somehow against the regalian doctrine.

LA BUGAL BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC vs RAMOS FACTS: Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter. ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources RULING: Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. The same section also states that, the exploration and development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

Chavez v. Pea FACTS: Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estradas admin, PEA and A MARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void. ISSUE: w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution RULING: The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell

these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

Meyer v. Nebraska Facts. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the eighth grade. The Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the conviction.

ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

RULING: The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom from bodily restraint. The state argues that the purpose of the statute is to encourage the English language to be the native tongue of all children raised in the state.

Pierce v. Society of Sisters FACTS: Appellees, two non-public schools, were protected by a preliminary restraining order prohibiting appellants from enforcing an Oregon Act that required parents and guardians to send their children to public school. Appellants appealed the order. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control HELD: The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be destruction of the appellees schools. The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the right and duty to choose the appropriate preparation for their children.

WISCONSIN v. YODER

FACTS: Respondents, members of the Old Order Amish religion and the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law (which requires a child's school attendance until age 16) by declining to send their children to public or private school after they had graduated from the eighth grade. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment was violated

HELD: The State's interest in universal education is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on other fundamental rights, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children.

CABANAS VS PILAPIL Facts: Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to be his sole beneficiary. He likewise indicated that if he dies while the child is still a minor, the proceeds shall be administered by his brother Francisco. Florentino died when the child was only ten years old hence, Francisco took charge of Florentinos benefits for the child . Meanwhile, the mother of the child Melchora Cabaas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money in her favor and allow herself to be the childs trustee. ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of parens patriae to the terms of the insurance policy? HELD: The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve according to the best interest of that person.

TANADA VS ANGARA

FACTS: On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines (Fidel V. Ramos) of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. HELD: The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.

LIMBONA VS MANGELIN

FACTS: Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions.

RULING: An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of

power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction.

Basco vs PAGCOR FACTS: Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local is violative of the local autonomy principle. ISSUE: Whether or not PAGCORs charter is violative of the principle of local autonomy. HELD: NO. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.

A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines and limitation as Congress may provide.