FIRSTDIVISION

[G.R.No.136427.December17,2002]

SONIAF.LONDRES,ARMANDOV.FUENTES,CHICHITAFUENTESQUINTIA, ROBERTOV.FUENTES,LEOPOLDOV.FUENTES,OSCARV.FUENTES and MARILOU FUENTES ESPLANA petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, ELENA ALOVERA SANTOS and CONSOLACION ALIVIO ALOVERA, respondents. DECISION
CARPIO,J.:

Beforeusisapetitionforreviewon certiorari[1]oftheMarch17,1997Decision[2]andthe November 16, 1998 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 35540 entitled Londresvs.Alovera. The assailed decision affirmed the validity of the Absolute Sale dated April 24, 1959 vesting ownership of two parcels of land, Lots 1320 and 1333, to private respondents.Thesamedecisionalsoorderedpublicrespondentstopayjustcompensationto private respondents. The questioned resolution denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners. TheAntecedentFacts The present case stemmed from a battle of ownership over Lots 1320 and 1333 both locatedinBarrioBaybay,RoxasCity,Capiz.PaulinaArcenas(Paulinaforbrevity)originally owned these two parcels of land. After Paulinas death, ownership of the lots passed to her daughter,FilomenaVidaI(Filomenaforbrevity).ThesurvivingchildrenofFilomena,namely, SoniaFuentesLondres(Soniaforbrevity),ArmandoV.Fuentes,ChiChitaFuentesQuintia, Roberto V. Fuentes, Leopoldo V. Fuentes and Marilou Fuentes Esplana (petitioners for brevity)nowclaimownershipoverLots1320and1333. On the other hand, private respondents Consolacion Alivio Alovera (Consolacion for brevity)andElenaAloveraSantos(Elenaforbrevity)anchortheirrightofownershipoverLots 1320and1333ontheAbsoluteSaleexecutedbyFilomenaonApril24,1959(AbsoluteSale forbrevity).FilomenasoldthetwolotsinfavorofConsolacionandherhusband,JulianAlovera (Julianforbrevity).ElenaisthedaughterofConsolacionandJulian(deceased). On March 30, 1989, petitioners filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of contract,

damagesandjustcompensation.PetitionerssoughttonullifytheAbsoluteSaleconveyingLots 1320and1333andtorecoverjustcompensationfrompublicrespondentsDepartmentofPublic Works and Highways (DPWH for brevity) and Department of Transportation and Communication(DOTCforbrevity).ThecasewasraffledtotheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch 18,RoxasCity,CapizanddocketedasCivilCaseNo.V5668. IntheirComplaint,petitionersclaimedthatasthesurvivingchildrenofFilomena,theyare theownersofLots1320and1333.Petitionersclaimedthatthesetwolotswereneversoldto Julian. Petitioners doubt the validity of the Absolute Sale because it was tampered. The cadastrallotnumberofthesecondlotmentionedintheAbsoluteSalewasalteredtoreadLot 1333whenitwasoriginallywrittenasLot2034.PetitionerspointedoutthatLot2034,situatedin BarrioCulasi,RoxasCity,Capiz,wasalsoownedbytheirgrandmother,Paulina. Petitioners alleged that it was only recently that they learned of the claim of private respondents when Consolacion filed a petition for the judicial reconstitution of the original certificates of title of Lots 1320 and 1333 with the Capiz Cadastre.[4] Upon further inquiry, petitionersdiscoveredthatthereexistsanotarizedAbsoluteSaleexecutedonApril24,1959 registeredonlyonSeptember22,1982intheOfficeoftheRegisterofDeedsofRoxasCity.The privaterespondentscopyoftheAbsoluteSalewastamperedsothatthesecondparceloflot sold,Lot2034wouldreadasLot1333.However,theRecordsManagementandArchivesOffice keptanunalteredcopyoftheAbsoluteSale.Thisothercopyshowsthattheobjectsofthesale wereLots1320and2034. IntheirAnswer,privaterespondentsmaintainedthattheyarethelegalownersofLots1333 and1320.JulianpurchasedthelotsfromFilomenaingoodfaithandforavalidconsideration. Private respondents explained that Julian was deaf and dumb and as such, was placed in a disadvantageous position compared to Filomena. Julian had to rely on the representation of other persons in his business transactions. After the sale, Julian and Consolacion took possessionofthelots.Uptonow,thespousessuccessorsininterestareinpossessionofthe lotsintheconceptowners.PrivaterespondentsclaimedthatthealterationintheAbsoluteSale was made by Filomena to make it conform to the description of the lot in the Absolute Sale. Privaterespondentsfiledacounterclaimwithdamages. The crossclaim of petitioners against public respondents was for the recovery of just compensation.PetitionersclaimedthatduringthelifetimeofPaulina,publicrespondentstooka 3,200squaremeterportionofLot1320.ThelandwasusedaspartoftheArnaldoBoulevardin Roxas City without any payment of just compensation. In 1988, public respondents also appropriateda1,786squaremeterportionofLot1333asavehicularparkingareafortheRoxas City Airport. Sonia, one of the petitioners, executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the RepublicofthePhilippinesoverthisportionofLot1333.Accordingtopetitioners,thevendee agreed to pay petitioners P214,320.00. Despite demands, the vendee failed to pay the stipulatedamount. PublicrespondentsintheirAnswerraisedthefollowingdefenses:(1)theyhavenocapacity to sue and be sued since they have no corporate personality separate and distinct from the Government(2)theycannotcomplywiththeirundertakingsinceownershipovertheportionsof landisdisputedbyprivaterespondentsanduntiltheissueofownershipissettled,petitioners havenocauseofactionagainstpublicrespondentsand(3)theyarenotproperpartiessince theywerenotpartiestotheAbsoluteSalesoughttobenullified.

OnMay28,1991,thetrialcourtissueditsdecisionupholdingthevalidityoftheAbsolute Sale.Thedispositiveportionofthedecisionreads: INVIEWOFALLTHEFOREGOING,judgmentisherebyrendered:

1.DeclaringtheAbsoluteSaleexecutedbyFilominaVidalinfavorofspousesJulianAloveraand Consolacion Alivio on April 24, 1959 over subject Lots 1320 and 1333 (Exh. 4) valid and effective 2. Declaring private defendants Consolacion Alivio Alovera and Elena Alovera Santos legal ownersofsubjectLots1320and1333 3.Ordering public defendants Department of Public Works and Highways and Department of Transportation and Communications to pay jointly and severally private defendants ConsolacionAlivioAloveraandElenaAloveraSantosjustcompensationofthe3,200square meter portion taken by the government from subject Lot 1320 used as part of the Arnaldo BoulevardinRoxasCity,andthe1,786squaremeterportionalsotakenbythegovernment fromsubjectLot1333tobeusedasvehicleparkingareaoftheRoxasCityAirportand 4.Orderingthedismissalofthecomplaintforlackofmerit.

Thecrossclaimofprivatedefendantsagainstpublicdefendantsandprivatedefendantscounterclaimfor damagesagainsttheplaintiffsarelikewiseordereddismissed.Costsagainstplaintiffs. SOORDERED.[5] Petitioners and private respondents appealed. On March 17, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgateditsdecisionaffirmingthedecisionofthetrialcourt,thus: PREMISESCONSIDERED,thedecisionappealedfromisherebyAFFIRMED. SOORDERED.[6] On November 16, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied the respective motions for reconsiderationofpetitionersandprivaterespondents.Thedispositiveportionoftheresolution reads: WHEREFORE,forlackofmerit,thetwomotionsforreconsiderationareherebyDENIED. SOORDERED.[7]

TheRulingoftheTrialCourt ThetrialcourtruledthattheAbsoluteSaleisvalidbasedonthefollowingfacts: First,thedescriptionofsubjectLot1333,asappearingintheAbsoluteSaledatedApril24,1959executed byFilomenaVidalinfavorofspousesJulianAloveraandConsolacionAlivio(Exhs.24and24A),reads: 2)Aparcelofland(LotNo.1333oftheCadastralSurveyofCapiz),withtheimprovementsthereon,

situatedintheBarrioofBaybay,MunicipalityofCapiz(nowRoxasCity).BoundedontheN.bythe propertyofNemesioFuentesontheS.bythepropertyofRufoArcenasontheE.bythepropertyof MateoArcenasandontheW.bythepropertyofValerianoArcenascontaininganareaofEighteen ThousandFiveHundredFiftySeven(18,557)squaremeters,moreorless.Thisparceloflandisallrice landandtheboundariesthereonarevisibleconsistingofstonemonumentserectedthereonbytheBureauof Lands.ItisdeclaredunderTaxDec.No.336inthenameofFilomenaVidalandassessedatP930.00. IntheAbsoluteSaleexecutedbythesamepartiesonthesamedate,theabovequoteddescriptionisthe sameexceptthelotnumber,i.e.,insteadofthefigure1333whatiswrittenthereinisthefigure1320 Second,subjectLot1333issituatedinBarangayBaybay,RoxasCity,whereasLot2034whichisthe secondlotsubjectofthequestionedabsolutesaleissituatedinBarangayCulasi,RoxasCityasevidenced byacertifiedtrue/xeroxcopyofasketchplan(Exh.29)therebyindicatingthatsaidLot2034insaid BarangayCulasi(Exh.29A). Third,Lot2034waspreviouslyownedbyJoseAltavas(Exhs,38and38A)andlaterisownedin commonbyLibertadAltavasConlu,etal.(Exhs.37and37A)andthereisnoconvincingevidence showingthatthislotwaseverowned,atonetimeoranother,byPaulinaArcenasorbyFilomenaVidalor byplaintiffs,ortheirpredecessorsininterest Fourth,thetwolotshavebeenthesubjectofthetransactionsmadebytheirformerowner,FilomenaVidal, withsomepersons,includingspousesJulianAloveraanddefendantConsolacionAlivio Fifth,thesubjecttwolotshavebeencontinuouslyworkedonsincetheearly1950suptothepresentby AlejandroBerlandino,andlaterbyhisson,ZosimoBerlandino,whowereinstitutedthereinastenantsby JulianAloveraandtheprivatedefendants Sixth,thesetwolotshaveneverbeeninthepossessionoftheplaintiffs.[8] ThetrialcourtfurthernotedthatwhilepetitionersandprivaterespondentsclaimedthatLots 1320and1333aretitled,bothfailedtoaccountforthecertificatesoftitle.Thetrialcourtthen concludedthatthereismerelyadisputablepresumptionthatLots1320and1333aretitledand coveredbycertificatesoftitle.Thetrialcourtfurtherdeclaredthatownershipoverthetwolots canstillbeacquiredbyordinaryprescriptionasinthiscase. Privaterespondentsandtheirpredecessorsininteresthavebeenincontinuouspossession ofLots1320and1333fornearly30yearsingoodfaithandwithjusttitle.Thetaxdeclarations issuedinthenameofConsolacionandtherealestatetaxespaidbyprivaterespondentsare strongevidenceofownershipoverLots1320and1333.Petitionerslatefilingofthecomplaint, 30 years after the execution of the Absolute Sale or seven years after the registration of the same,wasconsideredbythetrialcourtaslaches. Thetrialcourtgavemorecredencetotheexplanationofprivaterespondentsastowhythe AbsoluteSalewasaltered.Consolacionnoticedthatthelotnumberofthesecondparcelofand soldtothembyFilomenaundertheAbsoluteSaleappearedtobeLot2034andnotLot1333. Togetherwithherhusband,Julian,ConsolacionwenttoFilomena.ItwasFilomenawhoerased Lot 2034 in the deed of sale and changed it to Lot 1333. However, the copies of the document in the custody of the Notary Public were not correspondingly corrected.

Consequently,thecopieskeptbytheRecordsManagementandArchivesOfficestillreferredto thesecondparceloflandsoldasLot2034. Based on its factual findings, the trial court held that private respondents are the legal ownersofLots1320and1333.Privaterespondentsarethereforeentitledtojustcompensation fortheportionsoflandtakenbypublicrespondentsfromthetwolots.However,thetrialcourt ruledthatprivaterespondentscouldnotrecoverattorneysfeessincetherewasnoindication thatthecomplaintwasmaliciouslyfiledandintendedtoprejudiceprivaterespondents.Thetrial courtheldthatpetitionersfiledtheactioningoodfaith,believingthattheyweretherealowners ofthetwolots. TheRulingoftheCourtofAppeals The Court of Appeals sustained the factual findings of the trial court, specifically the six points enumerated by the trial court establishing Lots 1320 and 1333 as the objects of the AbsoluteSale.ApplyingArticle1370oftheCivilCode,[9]theCourtofAppealsagreedwiththe trialcourtthattherecouldbenoroomforinterpretationastotheintentionofthepartiesonthe objectsoftheircontract. The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the trial court that private respondents are not entitled to attorneys fees and damages. The Court of Appeals opined that while there might have been incipient greed when the DPWH and DOTC notified petitioners of the just compensationfromthegovernment,therewas,however,noevidencethatpetitionersfiledthe complaintinbadfaith.Therewasnothingintherecordstoindicatethatpetitionershadactualor constructive knowledge of the sale of the two lots to Julian. The document on file with the Records Management archives Office alluded to a parcel of land denominated as Lot 2034 whichisdifferentfromthepropertyinquestion,Lot1333.Itwasonlyduringthehearingofthe casethatitwasmadeclearthroughthepresentationofevidencethatthelotreferredtointhe AbsoluteSalewasLot1333,notLot2034,inadditiontoLot1320. TheIssues Petitionersthusinterposedthisappeal,raisingthefollowingerrorsallegedlycommittedby theCourtofAppeals: I. THECOURTOFAPPEALSACTEDWITHPATENTGRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETIONINNOT REVERSINGTHEDECISIONOFTHETRIALCOURT,INSOFARASITDECLAREDVALID ANDEFFECTIVEANABSOLUTESALE,PURPORTEDLYEXECUTEDBYFILOMENA VIDAL,PREDECESSORININTERESTOFPETITIONERS,INFAVOROFPRIVATE RESPONDENTCONSOLACIONALIVIOANDHERSPOUSE,JULIANALOVERA,ON24 APRIL1959,OVERSUBJECTLOTS1320AND1333. II. THECOURTOFAPPEALSACTEDWITHPATENTGRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETIONINNOT REVERSINGTHEDECISIONOFTHETRIALCOURT,INSOFARASITDECLAREDPRIVATE

RESPONDENTSLEGALOWNERSOFSUBJECTLOTS1320AND1333. Ill. THECOURTOFAPPEALSACTEDWITHPATENTGRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETIONINNOT REVERSINGTHEDECISIONOFTHETRIALCOURT,INSOFARASITRULEDTHATTHE COMPENSATIONFORPORTIONSOFTHESUBJECTLOTSTAKENBYTHEPUBLIC RESPONDENTSBEPAIDTOTHEPRIVATERESPONDENTSANDNOTTOTHE PETITIONERS. IV. THECOURTOFAPPEALSACTEDWITHPATENTGRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETIONINNOT REVERSINGTHEDECISIONOFTHETRIALCOURT,INSOFARASITDISMISSEDTHE COMPLAINTINCIVILCASENO.V5668,RTCROXASCITY,BRANCH18.[10] TheCourtsRuling At the outset, it must be pointed out that this petition was seasonably filed, contrary to privaterespondentscontentionthatitwasfiledonedaylate.PetitionershaduntilJanuary17, 1999tofilethispetition,whichwasaSunday.Sincethelastdayforfilingthispetitionfellona Sunday,thetimetofilethepetitionwouldnothaverununtilthenextworkingday.[11]Petitioners filedthepetitionthenextworkingday,January18,1999.Plainlythen,thepetitionwasfiledon time. Thepetition,however,mustfailonsubstantivegrounds. Petitioners implore the Court to declare the Absolute Sale void for failing to identify with certainty the two parcels of land sold by Filomena, their mother, to private respondents. However,thereisnovalidgroundforannullingtheAbsoluteSale.TheAbsoluteSaleisclearas tothefirstparceloflotsold,whichisLot1320.Whatraisessomedoubtistheidentityofthe secondparceloflotsold,IsitLot2034asindicatedintheregisteredcopyoftheAbsoluteSale? OrisitLot1333asmadetoappearinthecopyoftheAbsoluteSaleofprivaterespondents? Incivilcases,thepartywiththeburdenofproofmustestablishhiscasebyapreponderance ofevidence.[12]Bypreponderanceofevidenceismeantthattheevidenceasawholeadduced by one side is superior to that of the other.[13] Petitioners have the burden of proving that Lot 2034 was the real object of the Absolute Sale and the alteration of the same instrument was unauthorized,warrantingtheabsolutenullificationofthesale.ThetrialcourtandtheCourtof Appeals found the evidence of private respondents far more convincing in explaining the alterationintheircopyoftheAbsoluteSale.Bothcourtsruledthatthecorrectionwasmadeby thepartiestoreflectthetrueobjectofthesale,whichwasLot1333,notLot2034.Inarrivingat thisconclusion,thetwocourtsconsideredcontemporaneousandsubsequentactsthatindicate thatwhatFilomenaactuallysoldtoprivaterespondentswereLots1320and1333.Thesefactual findingsarebindingupontheCourt.[14] Asarule,theappellatejurisdictionoftheCourtislimitedonlytoquestionoflaw.[15]Thereis aquestionoflawinagivencasewhenthedoubtordifferencearisesastowhatthelawisgiven acertainsetoffacts,andthereisaquestionoffactwhenthedoubtarisesastothetruthorthe

falsityoftheallegedfacts.[16]Noexceptionalcircumstancesarepresentinthiscasethatwould justifyareevaluationofthefactualfindingsofthetrialcourtandtheCourtofAppeals,findings thataredulysupportedbyevidenceofrecord. PetitionersinsistthatthereisseriousdoubtastotheidentityoftheobjectsoftheAbsolute SalebecausethedescriptionsofLots1320and1333intheAbsoluteSaledonotcorrespondto thetechnicaldescriptionsofthetwolotsasfoundbytheBureauofLands.Petitionersdirectthe Courtsattentiontothesediscrepancies: TECHNICALDESCRIPTION[17] Lot1320,CadI33, C01CapizCadastre,Ap06004023 APARCELOFLAND(Lot1320, Cad133,C01,CapizCadastre,Ap06 004023,situatedinthebarrioofBaybay, municipalityofCapiz(NowRoxasCity), provinceofCapiz,islandofPanay. BoundedontheNE.,alongline12by Lot1327alongline23byLot1328along line34byLot1329ontheE.,alongline 45byLot1326onandtheS.,alongline 56byLot1325alonglines678byLot 1321ontheW.,alongline89byLot 1295ontheNW.,alonglines91011by Lot1319alongline1112byLot1318 alongline1213byLot1328ontheNE., alongline131byLot1327,allofCad 133,CapizCadastre. Beginningatpointmarked1onplan beingN.8828W.,651.78metersfrom BBMNo.12,Cad133,CapizCadastre, thence N.8501E.,23.00m.topoint2 N.8340E.,19.03m.topoint4 S.8422W.,61.31m.topoint6 S.8300W.,145.33m.topoint8 N.8742E.,26.49m.topoint10 N.8307E.,31.86m.topoint12 N.8309E.,76.04m.topoint13 S.0704E.,41.88m.topoint1. DESCRIPTIONPERABSOLUTE SALE 1)Aparcelofland(LotNo.1320ofthe CadastralSurveyofCapiz),withthe improvementsthereon,situatedintheBarrio ofBaybay,MunicipalityofCapiz(nowRoxas City). BoundedontheN.bythepropertyofMatea ArcenasontheS.bythepropertyofRoque SeverinoontheE.bythepropertyofMatea ArcenastheW.bythepropertyofDamaso Arches | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Pointofbeginning ContaininganareaofTWENTYFIVE THOUSANDSEVENHUNDRED SEVENTYFIVE(25,775)SQUARE METERS,moreorless. TECHNICALDESCRIPTION[18] Lot1333,CadI33,C01 CapizCadastre,Ap06004022 APARCELOFLAND(Lot1333,Cad133,C 01,CapizCadastre,Ap06004022,situatedin thebarrioofBaybay,municipalityofCapiz(now RoxasCity),provinceofCapiz,islandofPanay. BoundedontheSE.,alongline12byLot1330 ontheW.,&NW.,alonglines2345byLot 1329ontheNW.,alongline56byLot1334 alongline67byLot1335ontheNE.,&SE., alonglines781byLot1332allofCad133, CapizCadastre. Beginningatapointmarked1onplanbeing N.7844.,326.64metersfromBBMNo.12, Cad133,CapizCadastre,thence S.8142W.,59.67meterstopoint2 N.0736W.,46.62meterstopoint3 N.8234E.,84.29meterstopoint4 N.0913W.,4005meterstopoint5 N.8257E.,59.24meterstopoint6

containinganareaofTHIRTY THOUSANDNINEHUNDRED FORTYFOUR(30,944)SQUARE METERS,moreorless.Thisparcelof landisallricelandandtheboundaries thereonarevisibleconsistingofstone monumentserectedthereonbythe BureauofLands.ItisdeclaredunderTax Dec.No.4338inthenameofFilomena VidalandassessedatP1,550.00.

DESCRIPTIONPERABSOLUTESALE 2)Aparcelofland(LotNo.1333ofthe CadastralSurveyofCapiz),withthe Improvementsthereon,situatedintheBarrioof Baybay,MunicipalityofCapiz(nowRoxas City). BoundedontheN.bythepropertyofNemesio FuentesontheS.bythepropertyofRufo ArcenasontheE.bythepropertyofMatea ArcenasandontheW.bythepropertyof ValerianoArcenas | | | | | | |

N.8148E.,18.71meterstopoint7 S.0330E.,95.46meterstopoint8 S.8257W.,94.35meterstopoint1 Pointofbeginning. ContaininganareaofTEN THOUSANDEIGHTHUNDRED SIXTYless.

| | | | containinganareaofEIGHTEEN THOUSANDFIVEHUNDREDFIFTY (10,860)SQUAREMETERS,moreor SEVEN(18,557)SQUAREMETERS,more orless.Thisparceloflandisallricelandand theboundariesthereonarevisibleconsistingof stonemonumentserectedthereonbytheBureau ofLands.ItisdeclaredunderTaxDec.No. 4336inthenameofFilomenaVidaland assessedatP930.00.

Wearenotpersuaded.PetitionersrelyonthetechnicaldescriptionsofLots1320and1333 thatwereissuedbytheBureauofLandsonNovember8,1988.Itmustbepointedoutthatwhen privaterespondentsandFilomenaexecutedthesalein1959,theybasedthedescriptionofthe two lots on the tax declarations of Filomena. Early tax declarations are, more often than not, basedonapproximationorestimationratherthanoncomputation.[19]Thisisunderstandablyso becauseoftheabsencethenoftechnicalknowledgeintheaccuratemeasurementoflands.[20] What really defines a piece of land is not the area mentioned in its description, but the boundariesthereinlaiddown,asenclosingthelandandindicatingitslimits.[21]Inthiscase,the boundariesofthetwolotsaresufficientlydesignatedintheAbsoluteSale,leavingnoroomto doubttheidentityoftheobjectsofthesale. PetitionersanchortheirrightofownershipoverLots1320and1333asthesoleheirsoftheir mother,Filomena,whopreviouslyownedthelots.However,Filomenahadalreadycededher right of ownership over Lots 1320 and 1333 to private respondents when she executed the AbsoluteSale.Asaleofrealpropertyisacontracttransferringdominionandotherrealrightsin thethingsold.[22]Proofoftheconveyanceofownershipisthefactthatfromthetimeofthesale, or after more than 30 years, private respondents have been in possession of Lots 1320 and 1333.Petitionersontheotherhandhaveneverbeeninpossessionofthetwolots. Filomenadiedsometimein1985[23]andpetitionersinstitutedthecomplaintfouryearsafter Filomenasdeath.ItisunthinkableforFilomenatohaveallowedprivaterespondentstoenjoy ownership of Lots 1320 and 1333 if she never really intended to sell the two lots to private respondents or if she had Lot 2034 in mind when she signed the Absolute Sale. In the first place,Lot2034couldnothavebeencontemplatedbythepartiessincethisparceloflandwas never owned by Filomena, or by her mother, Paulina. Secondly, Lot 2034 does not fit the

description of the second parcel of lot mentioned in the Absolute Sale. The Absolute Sale describes the second lot as located in Barangay Baybay, Roxas City. Lot 2034 is situated in BarangayCulasi,RoxasCity. InresolvingthesimilarcaseofAtilanovs.Atilano,[24]wheretherewasalsoamistakeinthe designation of the lot number sold, the Court took into account facts and circumstances to uncover the true intentions of the parties. The Court held that when one sells or buys real property,onesellsorbuysthepropertyasheseesit,initsactualsettingandbyitsphysical metesandbounds,andnotbythemerelotnumberassignedtoitinthecertificateoftitle.As longasthetrueintentionsofthepartiesareevident,themistakewillnotvitiatetheconsentof theparties,oraffectthevalidityandbindingeffectofthecontractbetweenthem.Inthiscase,the evidenceshowsthatthedesignationofthesecondparceloflandsoldasLot2034wasmerely anoversightoratypographicalerror.TheintentionofthepartiestotheAbsoluteSalebecame unmistakablyclearwhenprivaterespondents,asvendees,tookpossessionofLots1320and 1333intheconceptofownerswithouttheobjectionofFilomena,thevendor. Petitioners harp on the fact that the notarized and registered copy of the Absolute Sale should have, been correspondingly corrected. Petitioners believe that the notarized and archivedcopyshouldprevail.Wedisagree.Acontractofsaleisperfectedatthemomentthereis ameetingofthemindsuponthethingwhichistheobjectofthecontractandupontheprice.[25] Beingconsensual,acontractofsalehastheforceoflawbetweenthecontractingpartiesand theyareexpectedtoabideingoodfaithwiththeirrespectivecontractualcommitments.[26]Article 1358oftheCivilCode,whichrequirescertaincontractstobeembodiedinapublicinstrument, isonlyforconvenience,andregistrationoftheinstrumentisneededonlytoadverselyaffectthird parties.[27] Formal requirements are, therefore, for the purpose of binding or informing third parties.[28]Noncompliancewithformalrequirementsdoesnotadverselyaffectthevalidityofthe contractorthecontractualrightsandobligationsoftheparties.[29] Petitioners fault the trial court for declaring that Lots 1333 and 1320 can be acquired by prescriptioneventhoughtheselotsarealreadycoveredbycertificatesoftitle.Therealissuein thiscaseisthetrueintentionsofthepartiestotheAbsoluteSale,notadversepossession.The decisionsofthetrialcourtandtheCourtofAppealsareclearonthispoint.Infact,theCourtof Appealsnolongerdealtwiththeissueofacquisitiveprescriptionsinceitwasalreadyconvinced thatprivaterespondentsrightoverLots1333and1320emanatesfromtheAbsoluteSale. In a desperate bid to compel the Court to disregard the evidence of private respondents, petitioners question the admissibility of the testimony of Consolacion on the ground that it violatestheDeadMansStatute.PetitionerscontendthatConsolacionstestimonyastohowthe alterationoftheAbsoluteSaletookplaceshouldhavebeendisregardedsinceatthetimethat Consolaciontestified,deathhadalreadysealedthelipsofFilomena,precludingpetitionersfrom refutingConsolacionsversion. Thecontentioniswithoutbasis.TheDeadMansStatutethenembodiedinSection20(a)of Rule130ofthe1988RulesofCourtprovides: SEC.20.Disqualificationbyreasonofinterestorrelationship.Thefollowingpersonscannottestifyasto mattersinwhichtheyareinterested,directlyorindirectly,ashereinenumerated: (a)Partiesorassignorsofpartiestoacase,orpersonsinwhosebehalfacaseisprosecuted,againstan

executororadministratororotherrepresentativeofadeceasedperson,oragainstapersonofunsoundmind, uponaclaimordemandagainsttheestateofsuchdeceasedpersonoragainstsuchpersonofunsound mind,cannottestifyastoanymatteroffactoccurringbeforethedeathofsuchdeceasedpersonorbefore suchpersonbecameofunsoundmind xxx Theforegoingprohibitionappliestoacaseagainsttheadministratororrepresentativeofan estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person.[30] The present case was not filedagainsttheadministratoroftheestate,norwasitfileduponclaimsagainsttheestatesince it was the heirs of Filomena who filed the complaint against private respondents. Even assumingthatConsolacionstestimonywaswithinthepurviewoftheDeadMansStatute,the fact that the counsel of petitioners failed to timely object to the admissibility of Consolacions testimonyisawaiveroftheprohibition.[31]Thewaiverwasmademoreevidentwhenthecounsel of petitioners crossexamined Consolacion.[32] Petitioners cannot now invoke the rule they knowinglywaived. FromthetimeoftheexecutionoftheAbsoluteSaleonApril24,1959,privaterespondents becametheownersofLots1320and1333.Theexpropriationofanyportionofthetwolotsfrom thetimeoftheexecutionoftheAbsoluteSalewouldnecessarilyentitleprivaterespondentsto thepaymentofjustcompensation.Wecannot,however,agreewiththetrialcourtandtheCourt of Appeals that public respondents could be ordered to pay private respondents just compensation in the same suit. Public respondents were impleaded in this case when petitionersfiledacrossclaimagainstthemforjustcompensation.Thecrossclaimshouldhave beendismissed,asitdoesnotcomplywithSection7ofRule6ofthe1988RulesofCourt.The ruleprovides: SEC.7.Crossclaim.Acrossclaimisanyclaimbyonepartyagainstacopartyarisingoutofthe transactionoroccurrencethatisthesubjectmattereitheroftheoriginalactionorofacounterclaimtherein. Suchcrossclaimmayincludeaclaimthatthepartyagainstwhomitisassertedisormaybeliabletothe crossclaimantforallorpartofaclaimassertedintheactionagainstthecrossclaimant. Basedontheforegoingrule,thecrossclaimisproperonlywhen: 1.Itarisesoutofthesubjectmatterofthecomplaint. 2.Itisfiledagainstacoparty. 3.Thecrossclaimantstandstobeprejudicedbythefilingoftheactionagainsthim.[33] Thethreerequisitesareabsentinthiscase.Thecrossclaimforjustcompensationisanew matterraisinganewcauseofactionthatmustbelitigatedinaseparateaction,notinthesame action for the nullification of contract. The purpose of a crossclaim is to avoid multiplicity of suits.[34]Multiplicityofsuitsshouldbeavoidedifthefilingofaseparateandindependentaction torecoveraclaimwouldentailprovingexactlythesameclaiminanexistingaction.[35]However, when the causes of action are distinct and separate from each other, as in this case, the independentinterestshouldbepursuedinanotherproceeding.[36]Also,petitionersandpublic

respondents are not coparties as they are not coplaintiffs. Lastly, petitioners, as cross claimants,wouldnotbeprejudicedbythefilingoftheactionsincetheyaretheplaintiffsinthis case. Atanyrate,privaterespondentsarenotleftwithoutanyrecourse.Theycanfiletheirclaim for compensation with the proper government agency. Public respondent DPWH in its CommentpointsoutthatitisnowpublicrespondentDOTCthathasjurisdictionovertheclaim forcompensationsincetheportionsofthepropertiessubjectofthiscaseweretakentoformpart of the parking area of the Roxas Airport.[37] In the same Comment, public respondent DPWH concedesthattheyhaveneverdeniedtheirobligationfromtheverybeginningofthiscase.[38] Publicrespondentswereonlyconstrainedtowithholdpaymentofjustcompensationasthereel ownersofthelotsInquestionwereyettobedeclaredbytheCourt.Sincetheissueofownership hasbeensettled,privaterespondentscannowrightfullyclaimjustcompensationfortheportions ofLots1320and1333takenbythegovernmentaftertheexecutionoftheAbsoluteSale. WHEREFORE,theDecisionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CVNo.35540ishereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the crossclaim against public respondents is DISMISSED.Costsagainstpetitioners. SOORDERED. Davide,Jr.,C.J.,(Chairman),Vitug,YnaresSantiagoandAzcuna,JJ.,concur.

[1]UnderRule45oftheRulesofCourt. [2]PennedbyAssociateJusticeEmeterioC.CuiwithAssociateJusticesLourdesK.TayaoJagurosandRomeoA.

Brawnerconcurring,SeventhDivision.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner with Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and Martin S.

Villarama,Jr.concurring,SpecialFormerSeventhDivision.
[4]DocketedasReconstitutionCaseNo.R1843. [5]Rollo,p.97,PennedbyJudgeRogerB.Patricio. [6]Ibid.,p.80. [7]Ibid.,p.82. [8]Ibid.,pp.9394. [9]ART.1370.Ifthetermsofacontractareclearandleavenodoubtupontheintentionofthecontractingparties,

theliteralmeaningofitsstipulationsshallcontrol. Ifthewordsappeartobecontrarytotheevidentintentionoftheparties,thelattershallprevailovertheformer.
[10]Rollo,p.17. [11]Section1,Rule22ofthe1997RulesofCourt.SeealsoZacatevs .CommissiononElections,353SCRA441

(2001).
[12]Sapuanvs .CourtofAppeals,214SCRA701(1992). [13]Ibid.

[14]SeeSernavs .CourtofAppeals,308SCRA527(1999). [15]Fabelavs .CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.142546,August9,2001. [16]Sernavs .CourtofAppeals,supra. [17]Rollo,p.98. [18]Ibid.,p.99. [19]DirectorofLandsvs .Funtilar,142SCRA557(1986). [20]Ibid. [21]Fabelavs .CourtofAppeals,supra. [22]Titongvs .CourtofAppeals,287SCRA102(1998). [23]TSN,November6,1990,p.17.TestimonyofElfigoLondres,soninlawofFilomenaandhusbandofSonia. [24]28SCRA231(1969). [25]Agasenvs .CourtofAppeals,325SCRA504(2000)citingFulevs .CourtofAppeals,286SCRA698(1998). [26]Ibid. [27]Ibid. [28]Ibid. [29]Ibid. [30]Razonvs .IntermediateAppellateCourt,207SCRA234(1992). [31]SeeCruzvs .CourtofAppeals,192SCRA209(1990). [32]SeeRazonvs .IntermediateAppellateCourt,supra. [33]OSCARM.HERRERA,REMEDIALLAW,REVISEDED.,1994,VOL.I,p.339. [34]Ibid.,p.338. [35]AssetPrivatizationTrustvs .CourtofAppeals,324SCRA(2000). [36]Ibid. [37]Rollo,p.258. [38]Ibid.,p.257.