Bhandarkar Oriental Series No.

28
THE
METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY
,
OF THE EARLY
With An Appendix
, - -
DASAPADARTHI OF CANDRAMATI
(A Translation with a Reconstructed
Sanskrit Text, Notes and a Critical
Edition of the Chinese Version}
BY
KEIICHI MIYAMOTO
BHANDARKAR ORIENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
PUNE 411004 (India)

CHAPTER l
ON NUMBER ( SANKHYA)
Except for texts there are few texts which argue
from the purely theoretical point of view how we acquire the
cognition of numbers.
1
We shall examine the Prasastapada
and the Vaisefkasutra in detail, and show that their theory
of number is deeply connected with their theory of cognition,
particularly direct cognition.
1. Definition of number
Number belongs to the category of quality.
defines number as follows:
Prasastapada
J
''Number is the cause of pragmatics of 'one' etc. "
2
According to Candramati and Srldhara, pragmatics ' ( vyavahiira )
here indicates both ' cognition ' and 'expression '. Consequently
1 The theory of number seems to have been difficult also
for traditional scholars to understand. Since the thirteentll century there
bas prevailed, for example, following proverb :
" One who retains unshakable understanding as to ( ,des-
truction of] the number two. the production of f qualities which
are] produced by burning and separation which is produced
by separation is indeed known as a
dvitve ca pakajotpattau vibhage ca vibhagaje,
yasya na skhalita buddhis fUll} vai vaUetikOlfl
( Madbava's Sa1va 'arsa11asangraha, A11liikyadarsana, pp. 81-82;
Kesavamisra's p. 32)
As for pakajotpatti, sec III. 3. The MimiiJ!lsakas also enumerate number
as one of qualities, but they do not refer to the complicated of
our attaining the cognition of number. Cf. Manameyodaya, p. 241. .
2 sa1ikhya. The term ' vyavahara' has many
meanings- cognition,' 'expression,' 'volition, ' behaviour, ' secular
life' and so on. I translated it as pragmatics ' with intention to
such many meanings. The term pragmatics ' itself has recently been used
in order to build a new philosophy which should overcome reductionism
and nihilism.
60 PART II : On Cogniiion
number is not 'one' ( eka) etc., but it the cause of the cogni-
tion and expression 'This is one' etc., and it is conceived as the
number one ( ekatm ), the number two ( :lvitra) etc. We should
be conscious of the fact that dvit vattm as a universal, for example,
was sometimes also written as 'dit Pa '. l We need to distingui sh
- betwe,en dvitva as a quality and as a universal.
2. How we get the cogniton of number ... in the Prasasta
... The process of the production and destruction
of the number two ...
The distinguish between the number one and
other numbers in the following
First of all, the number one inheres in one substance. The
eternity and non-eternity of the number one depends on whether
its locus is eternal or not. The number one is conceived as exist-
ing independently of cognizers. Direct cognition of the number
one is produced by contact of the sense organs and the number
: one.
Secondly, the numbers two etc. inhe1e in plural substances,
and are all non-eternal. The numbers two etc. do not exi st in-
dependently of cognizers. First of all, the numbers two etc. are
produced and come to inhere in piural substances through the
3. To dist.nguish beiween two kinds of t!vita, the terms of d'il
1
a-
8amiinya ( = dvtt1atva, twoness) and (the number tvw) are also
used.
4 "And it [is divided into] that 1-vhich has one substance and tbt
which has many substances. Of them, that which has cne sub.stancc
like colour etc. of atoms of water etc., lin one ca8C ] etcmal and [
another case] non eternal. On the other hand, that which has many sub-
stances is the number two to the Elaximum n umber, [ and is non-eternal] .' '
(sa panar ekadmi')'J canekadravya ca. ta!raikadravyayii!J saTiladipara!ll a(:(l-
,.ii,adlnam anekadravyi tu pararddfJa;;-
tii.) 'Water e tc. means water, fi cr and air. Colo ur etc. of their atoms
eternal. But those of atoms of earth art: not 8(). They turn into another
ones by burning, ::.nd are called qua!i lit: s which are produced by burning.
As for the and Naiyayika theory of the production of t:1em.
see III. 3.
On N11mber ( Smikhyii) 61
process of counti ng, and only then direct cognition of the numbers
two etc. is produced. To understand theory of
number, there-for;;, is to understand their theory of direct cognition.
Pras:Jstapiida the process of the productiJn and
destruction of t !Jc number lwo as follows" : (Each of the nine
stages represenis only or:e moment.)
( 1 ) A visual sense organ and two substances come to be in
contact.
( 2) The cognition of oneness ( ekatvasiimiinya=ekatvatva) is
produced.6
( 3) The cognition as efficient cause ( ),
1
which
takes t wo n umber ones as its objects, is itself produced
by oneness, the relation beiween oneness and two number
ones, and t he cognition of oneness.
8
( 4) number two is produced in its loci ( two substances)
by the cognition as effident cause.
:; :,,,

s-7n(i i1asmnanajiitlyayor
sat i I .1 ' >".'1' !1 l'it.'; na ;fano tpal t iiv ekatvasii manya-
ta.f;,;:/1 11.1 !!k a::u.::ayor eka buddhir utpadyat? tada
lat1l .c: 1afraya_vor dtdtvanJ Grabi;yate. punas las1nin
d vith1Sa 'iiall_:.i:/a.';am u'pulyate. tasmad dvitva.riimallyajiianad apekl[abilddlzer
virwfyalt 1. d:,it:nsiitil:7!!;ut"tNmbandh.1tajj.:fa uebhyo dvi fl ,agu(Jabuddlter utpa-
dyamaw;tety ekt;/; !ata idi.ia1m apd. {j buddUrina.fad
J-at t Ci : rh!!J.(!2ilrnGnya.,! na 'tasya akO.rar-anz,
:_/;!e rlr[! l'J'e iti dravyaj iiU. uasyoi plzdo dtitt'asya vinQ.{o
dravyajiialiat Sai!i skf.irasyotpadyamtinatel)'
d: nyaj tYiinad a.o inafo dravyabuddher
a pi sm(zokarii t .
6 The co:snii i,>:1 ;:;.s cftkient ca!.lse ( at this moment,
comes to th-.; 0; i.: C'.ir;g about to he
7. H is not ::1 the but in the Dafapal artlll and the
P rafasfapar/.&lio:;)'a that :;,e tcr<11 aj, 1pears. Apek:;ahuddlzi
has been mi ;undersl ooJ by many scholars. As for the correct
n1caning nf ope.' d. :!.
8 Vyo;miva a nd Srfdh:1ra ment ion t h31, in this case, two sub-
st auc.:s arc the matcr:at cause, two number ones are the non-material
cause and apekvabuddhi is the efficient cause.
62
PART II : On Coguitioti
( 5) The cognition of twoness ( dvit1asiimanya = dvitvat1a) is
then produced. The cognition as efficient cause is about
tk (b:\1.1
I.

di
,lr:,-._. .... l
:_: t:'Ll
'- otll 1 '
1
''1
::1 t i.i. r:'
p2,
I ,..-- ---,
l'""' j "'i. ll.

ill '
I ,...., ----- -.I

I-- - - ---
I d. ::.. )il. u
.... _' l(
,
, .
,.
L
:;-a :t i
u-1. tt I J yil ( .]
dVti:l t: U '_'' JII l ll il
'
5 :-;, ;} ,,, ., ...
:.. l :.f.i l
,.
I
'
n a .C.:. . :-til i

' "
:1::c
On Number ( Sarikhyii ) 63
to be destroyed ( vinasyattii ).
9
The cognition of the
number two is about to be produced ( utpadyamiinatii )1
by twoness, the relation between twoness and the number
two, and the cognition of twoness.
( 6) The cognition as efficient cause is then destroyed. The
number two is about to be destroyed. The cognition of
the number two is produced. The cognition These are
two substances' is about to be produced by the number
two, the relation between the number two and two sub-
stances, and the cognition of the number two.
( 7) The cognition ' These are two substances is then pro-
duced. The number two is destroyed. [The cognition of
twoness is destroyed.] The impression ( sa'!l skiira=smrti)
is about to be produced. The cognition of the number
two is about to be destroyed.
( 8) The impression is then produced. The cognition of the
number two is destroyed. [The cognition ' These are
two substances' is about to be destroyed. ]
11
(9) [The cognition' These are two substances is destroyed.]
This is the process of the production and destruction of the
number two. Next, we shall examine some reasons which require
such a process.
A. Cognition produces the number two
It is a vital point that the number two is produced by cog
nition. According to Srldhara, it is not a mystery, but it is well
9 All the commentators mention that the state of being about to be
destroyed means that [ all the ] causes of destruction are present ( vinaf a-
k a r a ~ a [ -samagrl-] sannidhya ).
10 All the commentators mention that the state of being about to
be produced means that [all] causes of production are present ( utpatti
k a r a ~ a [ -samagrl-] s(mnidhya ).
11 According to Prasastapiida, it takes three kalas for the process
to pass from stage ( 2) to stage ( 7 ). According to Sr f dhara, 1 k a l a ~
( Continued on the next page)
64 PART II : On Cognition
known that an external object can be produced by cognition.
11
This is refuted by the oppenents ( probably the Buddhists) sa
follows:
''Because it is established that a substratum of two quali-
ties (two number ones ) makes emerge the nu mber two, it
is not that [ the number t wo ] is produced dctcnninately
immediat ely the cognition [is produced]. " '
1
Sridhara presents the following syliogism as a reply.
" [Statement] the number two is produced by cognit ion.
[Reason ] Because [the number two is 1 cognized by only
one cognizer.
[Illustrat ion] All that are cognized by only one cognizer
are those which are produced by cognition, !ike plea-
sure etc.
[Application 1 The number two is also cognized by only
one cognizer.
[Conclusion 1 Therefore, [ the number two 1 is also pro-
duced by cognition.
Udanaya, while presenting almost the same syllogism
10
as Sri-
dhara's also presents another syllogism :
( Continued from the last page )
Including stages ( l} and ( 8 ), whok p rocess takes eight k ,val!as,
which also accords with the explanation of the Upaskara on the Vai fe f fka
suira 7. 2. 9 ( 7. 2. 8 according to the Upaskara ).
12 jfi(i nad arthasyotpida iti na!.wkikam hbm smik!nadl:iam tasmad
utpattidarfana t. bahyartlzasyotp:i do na iii . na, v;idharm};amarrnm
ta lanvayatirek e ljii nuvidhayit1a syobltay :lfravis e$ii t .
13 ubhayagw;alamb'l nasya siddhe sati j iianasya
tada n(mantary aniyamotpat.ti
14 prayogas f u- dvifV{!I?Z niyamenaikapratipatt rredyatr(i f.
yan niyamenaikapratipatt [l;edym(Z tad b:td . .filijm!z yatha sukhadikam. niyamc
naikapratipatt rledya'!z ca dviti'Q111. tasm{ui idam a pi buddhijam.
15 dvitvam buddhijam. suk lull'ad it i .
On Number ( Sarikhya ) 65
" [ Statement] The cognit ion as effi r.ieut cause produC{s
the number two.
[ Reason ] J3eC1!.1S<: [ the cogniti on as efficient cause is]
actually by it ( the number tvvo ), while [sub-
stances :ue J impossible to make emerge [the number
two J.
[Illustra tion ] Like conneclivn and separati on in the case
of SOUi1d . "lo
Thus, in order to explain the production of the number two,
it is necessary to tha t cognition produces external objects.
The say, we acqui re !.he cogniton 'These are two' not
by cognizing t h.! n umber t wo \Vhich al ready inheres in external
objects, but by the number 1\vo after it has been produc
ed by cogni tion.
But th is does not mean t hat cognit ion is the material cause
of the number two. According to the Vaisel?ikas, a quality connot
be t!Je material of a quality.
11
As Vyoma&iva etc. point
out, the material ca.use of i be number two is the t wo substances,
the nonmaterial cause is the two number ones, and the efficient
cause is cognitioa. l l
B. DEstruction of the number t wo by the
destruction of cognition
At stage ( G) ( see above), the number two is about to be
destroyed b;: t he destruction of the cognition as efficient cause,
and it is destroyed ::tt ( 7 ). The question then arises as to
whether qualities can be dest royed by the destruction of its effic.i-
16 apek!abuddhis tu dvit asyotpadika. tenan
11
-
v!dhiJ!imliiwrt rat. prati it i.
17 See the Vaiff J. l . 15 which expounds the definition of
quality. It reads : dra.y-:ifmri O'fU(l'IVtlll akaral)am ana
iii V_: {j,{ hla reads: dravya.<f rayl na gu(lr.l'an san.zyoga-
anapeklf .:J iti
18 See note 8 .
. .. 9
66 PART II : On Cognition
eot cause. A piece af cloth .. for example, is destroyed by the
destruction of its threadf, namely, its m2terial cat;ses, but it is not
influenced at all by t.he destruction or the shuttle of the loom etc.,
namely, its efficient cause.
Srldhara does not mention any particular argument about
this. It is an empirical fact for bim that a quality can be destroy-
ed by the destruction of its efficient cause. He illustrates this by
the case of final release. When one is about to attain fi nal release,
the last true cognition is destroyed by the destruction of his body.
The last true cognition is a quality, and his body is an efficient
-cause.
1
ll
Udayana presents a syllogism as follows :
" [Statement] The nnmber two is destroyed by the
destruction of its efficient cause.
( Reason] Because it is destroyed, even if its loci ( two
substances) are not destroyed, and, moreover, even if
there does not appe:1r another quality which is incom-
patible with it, and although it is a quality.
[Illustration] Like the last cognition [immediately before
the final release]. "
20
C. Different /eJ!els of cognition
At stage ( 3 ), the of two number ones comes after
the cognition of oneness. At stage ( 5 ), the cognition of the
number two comes after the cognition of twoness. At stage ( 6 ),
the cognition 'These are two substances' comes after the cogni-
tion of the number two. In this way, the cognitions, which lead
to the cognition ' These are hvo ( or three ) substa nces, ' procctd
from stage to stage by first graspi;1g universals, then qual ities and
finally sul:-stances. This rule is tbe key to the theory of
19 dmo grl (zonam api vinaso yar!zii
vasth:jyiim antyatattvajfiiin(Jsya sar1rminiifiit.
20 dvitl'am nimit avi.'l?if iis
bhaviibhiive ga,asya sato vinasitviit caramajniinavat.
Oil Number ( Smikhya)
67
number. This seems to make the theory of number confusing.U
But it is quite consis!ect in light of the theory of direct cognition.
As is weH known, the Vaisef!ikas divide direct cognition into
two kinds. Thi 5 ci visio:J originates in the Vaisc$ikasutra. One is
the direct cognitien \v J!ch is not verbalizablc ( nirvika"r;ajiiiina },
and which cannot be m;:!morized, while another is the direct cog
nition which is verbaliz:t h!e ( savikalpakafniina ), and which can be
memorized, al t hough tb t erminol ogy devel oped much later. The
latter belongs to the gr oup of cogniti on of what is qualified
( by the qaalifier ( ). For example, the cognition
'This is a cow' is a cognition of the qualified (this) by cowness.
the quali fier .
Prasastapada utili z.: s this division, though used different ter
minology. As for the essence of the theory of di rect cognition, we
shaH examine it in detail in II. 3.
Now, taking the theory of direct cognition into consideration.
we shall investiga<.e some points about the theory of number.
First of all, the cog nition 'These are two substances' is the
cognit;on of what is qualified by some qualifier. For example, in
the case of t he cogniti0!1 of mere man, but the cognition of a man
qualified by a stick, the q ualifier. Sridhara presents the following
syllogism :
" [Statement] The cogni tion 'These are two
comes after the cogni ti on of the qualifier.
[Reason] Because of its being the cognition of the
qual ifi ed.
( Ill ustrati cn ] Like the cognition ' He is a man with a
stick. ' "
22
21 Faddegon, who fa ;led to theory of number, says;
"t h:s ca pri cious and af;cr all nons': nsical constn: ctic n " (B. Fa ddegon,
Wicsbaden : Dr. !lhrtin Sa ndi g oHG, 1969 (Reprint of
1818 ], p. 206 ) .
22 dve dravye it i
da1.uftti j iianavad iti.
68 PART II : On Cognition
In this way, if a cognition is the cognition of the qua!ified, it
ought to come after cognition of the qualifier. The cognition
of the qualifier is the cause of the cognition of the qualified. In
the case of the cognition ' These are two substances,' its cause is
the cognition of the number two. And this ensures that the cog-
nition of the number t\VO precedes the cognition 'These are two
substances. ' This means that the two cognitions take place in
different moments.
Thus, the cognition of the qualifier precedes the cognition of
the qualified. Now, Srldhara quotes an opponent who argues that
these two cognitions could be simultaneous.
''Now, there are some who assert that the qualifier and the
qualificand ( are the objects of the same cognition.
-But, for them, how about [ the cognition of] ' This is a
sandal wcod with good fragrance'?- A visual sense organ
does not take good fragrance as its object, and a sense
organ of smell does not cat ch the subst:mce. Therefore,
two [sense organs] do not perceive the relation [ between
two objects] ... This [cognition] should be produced by a
visual sense organ and a sense organ of smeli simultaneous
ly, and takes both as its objects through the ability of two
causes. "
23
The direct cognition of a sandal wood witb good is
produced by special contact ( which is strictly dd!;Jcd
in later texts as fniina!ak0Wl ii Now, Srldhara refutes the oppo-
nents in the following way (summary ) :
A cognition bas no parts. If the opinion of the opponen!s
is admitted, the cognition would have to have parts, thcr.,
23 ye .ftt

i(v ka vtir!la '! na lt i na ca
dravyam ii 'lt.tte. Ia IW tabhyal(! sam.'Hmdhagraha(Uim . .. . . ..


ghra(l4bhyG!!J 'ambhuya jauyamiinam idm!z kiira1Jad1ayasan1arthyad ubhayt
-..ifayaTti syad ( i iy eke samarthayani i).
On Number ( Sa1ikhya)
69
a visual cognition, and a smelling cognition etc. would be
confusing in one and the s:1me cognition.a
Then, he pres-:nts the foilowing syllogism :
" [ J The cognition of the qua lificed, the point at
issue, takes only tLe qualificand as its object.
[Reason J Because of its being a direct cognition
25
and,
moreover, of its being the cognition of the qualificand.
[Illustration J Like the cognition of ' This is a sandal
wood with good fragrance. '"
25
But, as to the meaning of 'takes only the qualificand as its
object, ' another opinion is presented. It is as follows :
" If we admit that a mere substance itself is the object of
the cognition of the qualificand, then, we should be able to
attain the same cognition even when the qualifier should
not exist. Besides, even if it is [ possible to consider] that,
as the qualifier produces [the cognition of the qualificand ],
the cognition of the qualifi.cand would not be produced
without its existence, this [cognition of the qualificand]
would not differ from the cognition of the substance itself.
24 tad api u:J s'idhlyCJ nirb!riigatv(it . yadi jrl anam sabhiigan_1 syat tada
kafci1 asyal!l fo janya:e kas cic upopadyate vyarasthii,
25 Inferent ia l cogniiiGn is excluded f um this phrase according to
Sri Jhara. ( pratyuk santi lai;igjkaj'i"ii;mvyoracchediirtham.)
26 viie{i yoj::i atzar! r keva!m,ife{i ya!amb:mam. pratya
sati surabfli candant-m iti j rianarat. Sddbara asserts
that we atLaiu the CL'gni t ion of 'This is a sanda l wood wi th good frag-
nn.:e ' in the follov.- ing "Therefore, aft er good fragrance was
perc:cvcd by a smsc organ 0f smell, the cognition of the quali5caml which
takes only th.: qua lific;111 d as its objec t is pro by a visual sense organ
assisted l'Y that [former ] tasmad gamlh< grhlle
pascat visena-
jiianml} janyate.
70 PART II : On Cognition
Because a cognition is not differentiated if its object is not
differentiated.
If the qualificand is regarded as the same as 'a mere substance
itself, ' this opinion wouid be reasonable. But Sridhara insists
that the object of this cognition ought to be the qualified, not ' a
mere substance itself. ' He says :
"Being the qualified is quite different from [a thi ng] itself. "28
. For example, he says, the object of the cognition 'This is a man
with a stick' is neither a mere man nor his mere connection with
a stick, but a man different from others owing to his being charac-
terized by a stick, and, therefore, the qualifier is said the limitative
_( vyavvacchedaka ).
29
Now, taking the above argument into consideration, let's
return to the process of the production and destruction of the
number two.
First of all. Prasastapada uses the following compound in
l.tage ( 3 ) : ekatl'asiimihya-tatsambandha-j'iiiinebhya[t. go
Sridhara, after mentioning the following :
27 nanu yadi dravyasr1r 'Jpamii tram eva ,,if
asaty api tatha syat. atlza janokatvan na
tadabhave tathapi dravyarupapratyayad asya na vise,w!J.
jiiiinasya
28 ca eva.
29 [ ca srarup{direki(ry eva] ya da(;tjlti jii(Jne pratibkii sate
na kfla/:1 latra pratilir, llapi tatha
ca prarliav era
casya da.:rtJopasarjauatmm eva. ata e1a vyaracchedakam iti
dando hi sropasatjm:atiipratipatiim kurvan itarasmiid vravac-
Hereafter Srid!Jara refers to the of and
which is to come to be an important point at issue for the
Navyanaiyayikas, He says : aya;!l upa!akfll (:am
api ;za til nn hi yatha da(ujlli
da!Jcfa?asm}:;!wra pz!;ufe pra!lyate tatha ja{abl!is tapasa iti I lipase ja!opa,ar-
jarwta. da(l<jopasa:j.J'i. lla pradlzall)'al!l carfh!lkriyariim upabhog{iti
- say(matis
30 Vyomam/1 reads : -tajpii;nebhya!J.
On Number ( Smikhyii )
71
" The cognition of the qualifier is the ca11Se of the cognition
of the qualificand ( ,=, the qualified ). Two number ones
are the qu<: li fkPnd, a nd oCJ cness is !l: e qua!i fie ". TLerefore
the cognition is thought ( to be produced] of it (oneness)
in the fi rst.
analyzes the compound into the following three components.
( l ) oneness, ( 2) the relation of oneness with qualities, or
two number ones, ( 3 ) the cognirion.
It is clear tbat 'the cognition' is of oneness. Udayana interprets
this in rhe same way, and clarifies 'the relation' as inherence.
Vyomasiva also interprets it in almost the same way.
Second, Prasastapiida uses the following compound in stage
( 5) : dvitl'asiimiiny;;;-tatsambal1dha-t:ljj niinebhyo[1'
3

Srldhara's interpretation is as follows :
( l ) twoness, ( 2) the relation of twoness with a quality, or
the number two, ( 3) the cognitioa of twoness.
Udayana's and Sr)dhara's interpretations are the same as Sndharas.
Thirdly, Prasastapada uses the following compound in stage
( 6) : dvitvagu1}a-tajfiianasambandhebhya[t P
All the commentators interpret it as follows :
( 1) a quality, or the numbr:: r two, ( 2) the cognition of the
two, ( 3) the reb.tic-n [of the number two with
two subjects J.
Udayana also mentions the following
"Be::ause the qualifier (the number two, a quality) and
its relation [with the cognition of 'these are two sub-
31 1i.f vi [ ca
yor ekatl'as!nnaryat!l ft'liada;t tatraiva j ii ailnT!l cintyate.
32 Kiral}avall omits - t aj-.
33 V vom:na/1 and KiraQavall r<Jad : dvitvagu.:wjfianatatsam bandhe

PART II : On Cognition
stances ' ] are already established, and there is nothing
more necessary. ' ' 34
Thus, the causes of the qualificand (strictly the
qualified) can be formulated under the following three headings.
( i ) the quali fi er
( ii) the relat ion between the qualifi er and the qualificand
(iii) tbe cognition of the qualifier
Now, t he basis of such for mulation, which consists of the
three cames of cognition, can be found in t he The
most important is sutra 8. 9.
"By an inherent white colour and by the cog ni tion of the
whi te colaur the cogni tion of a v>hite [substance is pro-
duced]. These t\vo [kinds of cognitions ] are in rel ation
of causality. "
samaviiyinc. b svaityiic ch1
1
uityabuddhe!1 svete buddhis te
kiiryakiirmpbhute.
35
The Vrtti jnterpret s it as follows:
"By a universal, or wbiteness,;which is inherent in a quality,
or a white colour, and by the cognition of a universal, or
whiteness, the cogniti on of a quality, or whiteness, is pro
4
duced. The relation between a universal and a quality
must be tlken into consideration too. Therefore, tbc cog-
nition of the qualifi er is the cause, and the cognition of the
qualificand is t he effect.

34 [ g ii(Nj,fipu;m e1a hi carr:r:m d'av)'ajif(i llasyotpadak m!l] ti.fe,Hl .! atat-
sambandhayo!J p!inmiddhat rat ap ekpnl ylintarabhatal .
35 Vyakl1ra and Upaskara read : - buddhes ca sve-.
36 !Vti _:-' .' . 'ai tyasG. InG!lrat SraityasQnrG.NyCt
samO.nyaj f. anac ca { ,Ci:Jf: !l ( ajri"a!l:ll!l j"(zyate. 'pj
a t o kO. rapm vife,ryabw'dhi !J kayam. From the
context of the itself, the Vrrtr s interpret ation is the most
rati onal. Cf. IL 3.
On Number ( Sankhyii)
73
This interpretation seems to be su itable because, since the
resulting cogni tion is of a 'svaitya' ought to be a
white colour, or a quC! Iity, not whi teness, or a universal.
The Vyiikhyii in terprets it as follows :
"' By an inherent ' =by the relation between a quality, or
a white colour, and a substance, ' by a white colour =by
a quality, or <t whi te colour, and 'by the cognition of the
white col our ' = by the cognition of a quality, or the white
colour, the cognition of 'a white' = a piece of cloth
which is qualified by a quality, or a white colour, is
produced. This way [is applied J to other cases. 'These
two ' = the cognition of t he qualifier and that of the quali
ficand, or the cognition of the quali fier and that of the
qualified, are ' in relation of causality.' This is ascertained
by direct cognition with the help of positive and negative
concomitanceY Because the cognition of the qualified is
produced when there exist the relation between the quali
fier [and tbe 4ualificand ], the qualified and the cognition
[of the qualifier ], and, besides, the fo rmer is not produced
when the latter does not exist. "as
Udayana interprets it as follows :
" ...... Thus, in the case of the cognition of a white shell etc.,
it is said that the inherence of a white colour, or a quality.
a white colour and the cognition of the qualifier. or a white
""Colour, are the causes. Thus, [it is said that] the relation
between the qua lifter [and the qualificand], the qualifier
37 an:-ayavyatircka. This means here the method to examine causal
concomitc. nce of t wo Amaya : of A is accompanied by
presence of B. Vyat i;-da : absence of A is a<: conpanied hy a bsense of B.
If ti'.O matters a re att cs.ed t o be in they are said to make
causali ty.
38 samavayinet i .1: s vaityad iii fuklagwJ(it
S1aityabilddhcr iii .fuidq:u.wh11d !heh . vete f pate buddhir
iiiyaie. tad cii nya!rapi, re ;if
ca, karyakara !Wbhute arnarul''' u' irekas!litaprat yak$ ea!J vasite, vi f efaiJaS am
bandhmif sat.m vi ) i.J f,1pratyayodayad asatsu canudayat .
... 10
74 PART II : On Cognition
and the cognition of it (the qualifier) are the causes of
the right cognition, or the cognition of the qualified.'
39
As was examined above, VaiSeikasiitra 8. 9 is understood as
expounding the typical theory of direct cognition that
the so-called ' caus1.l triad ' ( kiira1Jatraya- Vyomasiva) causes
the cognition of the qualified.
Prasastapada also quotes 8. 9 in discussing two
problems which pertain to tbc procuction and destruction of the
number two. One of these will be investigated in subsection D.
The present problem is stated by an opponent. It is summarized
as foJlows :
' Even if the number two is destroyed and does not exist
any more. the cognition of two substances is possible to be
produced merely by the existence of the cogrition of the
number two.
Before quoting the sutra concerned, Prasastapada states the
following :
"Because, as the cogmtton of the qualificand (strictly
speaking, the qualified) has similarity [with the qualifier).
it cannot exist without its relation with the qual ifier . "u
39 ca s ret satikha ityadipra!ltau s vaityasammayosya s mitya-
s vailyavis ca ity uktam tatha ca vi e,lm,ra-
sambandhavis vi !apratyak.,apramiin;l prat i it i.
40 " [Objection: 1 [The cogniti on of two substances is possible, ]
like inference, [to be produced 1 merely by cognition,
[Answer : 1 This should me<Jn : In such a cash as 'that which uici not
appear [is the probans 1 of th'lt which appeared' (one phrase from Vai-
fesikasutra 3. 1. 8 ), without probans, the cognition of substances is possible,
like inference, to be produced merely by the cognition of a quality even
if the quality (the number two) might have been destroyed." laitigikamj
jiiii'Jmatrad iii cet? syan matam, yathabh'i]tar?t bhutasyety atm liJigtibltti ve
'pi jiiiir.llmatrad olltllllana/1} tat ira gur.avinaf e 'pi gu(zabuddhimatrad dravya-
pratyaya!J syad iti.
41 na hi sarupyal vifefo!Jasambandham
bhavilum arhati.
On Number ( Sarikhyii)
75
The word 'similarity' is, according to Udayana, the same as
commonness' or as ' having the same substratum.' According
to Sridhara, it indicates that the cognition of the qualificand is
characterized by the qualifier, that the qualifier is the nature of the
quali.licand, and that the qualifier is the ca1se which lets us cognize
that it is attached to the qualificand.
42
Now if the qualifier does
not exist, it is not possible for the above mentioned relation to
exist. Therefore, since the cognition ' These are two substances'
is the cognition of the qualificand, it is needed that the number
two which qualifies the two exist when the cognition These are
two substances ' is produced.
Prasastapada quotes the sutra concerned immediately after the
above argument. Although he does not present any interpretation
of it, it is clear that he quoted it in order to emphasize the theory
of ' causal triad ' of direct cognition.
D. Non-simultaneity of cognitions
The theory of the production and destruction of the number
two is based on the rule that two cognitions are unable to exist
simultaneously in one person. This rule originates from the tradi
tiona! idea that mind, since it is singular in one person and the
smallest, is unable to come in contact with many sense organs
simultaneously.
43
Now, Prasastapada says that the non-simultaneity or incom
patibility of things can be interpreted in two ways. On the one
hand, it means being ' impossible to coexist' ( sahiinavasthiina )
1
and, on the other hand, it means the relation between ' a to Qe
killed and a killer' ( vadyaghiitaka ). Let's take two things A and
42 svopa
sarjanatiipratTtihetur iti yii ;at. na cii vidyama!lasyanuraiijakatva1!1 svopasarja
11
atiipratTtihetutml!1 yuktam ato na ante.
re!Ja arhat i sadr&yad viSetaiJa
samba11dham bharitum arhati.
43 Cf. 3. 2. 3; Nyayasutra 3. 2. 57-60; Prasastapada
bhiina, the Mana!J-nirupar;a.
'76 PART II : On Cognition
B, and assume that A precedes B. In the case of being ' impos-
sible to coexist. ' A is destroyed at the moment when B is pro-
duced. It is li terall y impossible for A and B to coexist But, i!1
the case of bei ng 'a to-be-kil ied and a killer, ' A is destroyed at
the moment after 13 is produced. It is possible for A and B to
coexist for one moment only. Then, what is the relationship
between the two cognit ions ? As can be gue5sed from the list ol
the stages in the process ( see al so figure 1 ), the correct relation-
ship is 'a to-be-killed and a killer. ' The reason is as follows :
If the non-simultaneity of cognitions meant impossibility ot
coexistence, the theory of number vvould collapse. Tha1
is to say, if it is impossible for two cognitions to coexist, at stagt
( 5) the cognition as efficient cause would be destroyed at th(
moment when the cognition of twoness was produced. Then, tb(
number two would be about to be destroyed at the moment wher
cognition as efficient cause was dest royed. At the next momen
when the cognition of the number t\vo is produceu the numbe1
two is destroyed. If so, the number two, which produces the cog
nition 'These are two substances, ' woul d not exist at thi:
moment. This leads to the conclusion that the cognition Thesr
are two substances' is never produced, For the cognition 'Thes.
are two substances ' is the cognition of the qualificand ( tb,
qualified). I t s production neds the followi11 g ' causal triad' : ( i
number two, ( ii) the relation between tbe number two a111l tw.
substances, (iii) the cognition of the number t wo. But, at th
moment when the cogniti on ' These are two substances' is to b
produced, ( i ) and ( ii) do not exist. Therefore, the cognitio
1
These are two substances' is never proLluced. This is absunl
Therefore, the relationship bet\veeu two cognitions is not '
sible to coexist,' but ' a to-be-killed and a killer. '
3. Conclusion
The theory of HUtll her has been thought to be one of th
most difficult of the theories. But after havi ng invest
gated it in detail, we are now able to understand that it is establ
On Number ( Sankhyii)
71
shetl strictly in accordance with the rules. The key-stone
of these rules is the 'causal triacl, ' on which the theory
of direct cognition is based. And it is notable that the idea of
'causal triad' origi,1ates in 8. 9. The theory of
direct cognition in the is extremely perfect beyond
our imagination. This illteresting point \viii be investigated in
datail in II. 3.
CHAPTER 2
: A SPECIAL COGNITION
The term plays an importa nt role in the
througbly realistic (in contrast with nominalistic)
This term docs not appear in the but appears for
the first time in the Dasapadiirth[l and then in the Prasastapiida-
bhiil!ya. Of these two the latter uses it far more frequently. So
we shall investigate the true meaning of the term
by examining the way it is used in the
Prasastapada succeeded in explaining the production and des-
truction of things deeply related to our consciousness. The later
and Naiyayikas were so satisfied with his explanation
that they did not attempt to reinterpret it. Besides the term is
apparently a curious compound whose first member is apekfiii '
and whose second member is 'buddhi. ' This has led many modern
scholars to a great deal of confusion, misunderstanding and non-
understanding. A list of their translations of the term
buddhi' reveals the extent of the confusion.
* relating cognition (Keith, Indian Logic and Atomism.
p. 187 ).
* distinguishing perception ( Apte, The Practical Sanskrit-
English Dictionary : Cowell, tr. of the Sarvadarsana-
sangraha ).
fundamental intellection ( Faddegon, Vaic;e[!ika System).
* distinctive notion (G. Jha, tr. of the Padarthadharmasmi-
graha of Prasastapiida with the Nyayakandal{ of Srldhara).
unitary conception ( G. Jha, tr. of the Tattvasailgraha-
paiijika ).
* die auf die Mannigfaltigkeit der Dinge gerichtete Geistes-
haltigkeit ( P W)
1 See the paragraphs ( 13!] and ( 137] lo the Appendix,
: A Special Cognition
79
* sabetsu suru ishiki [distinguishing consciousness) ( Y.
Kanakura, Indo no S!Jizen Tetsugaku [Natural Philosophy
of India] ).
* sotai no isbiki [consciousness of rel ativity] (H.
Nakamura, Sanko Bunka Kenkyujo Nenpo] Annual of
Cultural Institute of Sanko] Vols. 6- ,, 1973-74 ).
Except Faddegon's tramlation which is too obscure, the others
agree in interpreting in such a way that the subject
of the verbal root apekif (which means 'to expect,' 'to respect
for' etc. ) is buddhi (cognition). This is, however, quite doubtful.
Before refuting this, we shall examine in detail the usage
of the term concerned.
1. The fi re cases in which functions
The term is the key to explaining the produc-
tion and destruction of the number two, the separateness of two
( substances ), priority and posteriority.
[ 1 ] The following sentence is found in Gul}a-slidnarmya-
vaidharmyanirupa!Ja.
''Priority, posteriority, the number two, separateness of
..
two ( substances) etc. are buddhyapekEJii]}. "
2
The commentators offer the following explanations : Priority etc.
'do ' buddhi when they are to be produced. (Vyomasiva )
3
;
They do not come into exis tence without buddhi. ( Do. )
4
; Buddhi
is considered the efficient cause of their production. ( Sridhara )
5
;
This very buddhi is ( Udaya na
That is to say, priority etc. do not exist independently of a
cognizer, but are produced only through the process of counting.
2 paratvaparatvadvitvadviP: thaktvudayo
3 Vyomavati, p. 435 l. 20.
4 Ibid. , p. 435 l. 23.
5 Nyayakandali, p. 116 z. 6.
6 Kiratflivali, p. 108 l. 23.
80 PART II : On Cognition
Take number for example. The number one exists in every
substance utterly independently of a cognizer and is cognized by
the same process as other external things are cognized. But the
number two does not inhere in t\vo substances independently of a
cognizer. lt comes to inhere in two substances through the count-
ing of a cognizer. Only then, it is directly cognized
7

[ 2] which functions in the process of the
production of the number two was already examined in H. I.
[ 3] as concerned with the production of
separateness of two ( substances ) etc. functions in the same way as
that of the number two.
[ 4] Priority and posteriority are each divided into spatial
one and temporal one. Here we shall take spatial priority as an
example. It is produced and destroyed through the following
process.
( 1) A man looks at two things, A and B, which are located
in the same direction. First, the distance between the man
and A and between the man and B are divided into parts by
using some kind of unit of length. Next, the numbers of
connections of each part with its adjoining part which exist in
the distance between the man and A and in that between the
man and B are counted. If there is cognized a
between two numbers (consider the latter is more), the
buddhi B is further than A' is produced with A as a standard.
This buddhi is the
{ 2) Priority is produced by the material cause, namely, B,
the non-material cause, namely, a connection qualified by
moreness, and the efficient cause, namely, the apekiibuddhi.
7 Sridhara pre5ents a. syllogism as follows : " [Statement] The
number two is produced by cognition, [ Reason] Because : the number
two Is] cogcized by only one cognizer. [ Illustration] All that are cognized
by only one cogni zer are those which are produced by cognition, like pl easure
etc. [Application] The number two is as well cognized by only ooe
cognizer. [Conclusion] Therefore, (the number two] is produced by
cogniiion. " As for the original see note 14 on II. 1.
(!)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(51
(6)
(1)
Apek[iiibuddhi ; A Special Cognition
dr. dravya
g. gu.t)3
s. samanya
ja. jMna
ap.
u. utpatti
(Figure 2)
paratva g.jii.v.
v. vinasa
sarp. S31pSkara
( 3 ) The cognition of prioritiness is produced.
81
( 4) The cognition of priority is produced. The apekl'i
buddhi is destroyed by the production of the cognition of
prioritiness.
( 5 ) The cognition of substances ( ' B is prior to A' ) is
produced. Priority is destroyed by the destruction of
The cognition of prioritiness is destroyed by the
product ion of the cognition of priority.
[ ( 6) The impression is produced. The cognition of priority
is destroyed by the production of the cognition of substances.
( 7) The cogni tion of substances is destroyed by the produc-
tion of the impression. ]""
[ 5] also appears in the argument on dimen-
sion. Non-eternal dimension is produced by number, dimension
8 ( Q) and ( 7) in [ ] is complemented by me from the
to Prasastapada's explanation of dvitr;otpatti .
... 11
82 PART II i On Cognition
and collection. The number of atoms and diads which human
beings are unable to cognize is produced by the buddhi of the Lord.
This buddhi is It functions in the same way as in
the case of the number two etc.
2. The usage of the tenn ' '
We have looked at aJI of the cases where the term
buddhi' appears in the At this point we are
able to understand how it functions, but we need to further
examine the use of thr term ' apelqabuddhi' in order to acquaint
ourselves with its exact meaning.
Its usage in th.e Prasastapadabhiil}ya is as follows:
[A] In the cases where the object of the is
indicated, the term is not used. Only the tcrlll
' buddhi ' ( seven times ) is used.
anekavil}aya-vuddhi-
buddhi/1 (once )10
buddhi!z (once )11
buddhil). (once )12
viprakrfl!li buddhilJ. (once )
13
[ B] In the cases where the effect of the apeks,iibuddhi is
indicated, the term 'buddhi is also used exclusively ( seven times )
( once )11
buddhim J tam apekl}ya (six times )
1
5
9 Sankhya-nirftPaua.
10 Loc. cit.
11 Pat'atvaparatva niruPa!la,
12 Loc. cit,
13 Loc. cit,
14
15 Once in we. cit. and five times in the Paratva.Pat'atvani,.rzPar-a.
; A Special Cognition
83
( C) On the other hand, in the cases where only its own
production and destruction are referred to wi thout any relation to
its object or effect, the term 'apekttlibuddhi' is used ( twenty-two
times ).16
In later texts, as far as I know, usage [A] is found. almost
always. As for [ B ], while in the cases where the buddhi
( = appea rs together with those verbal roots as apa-
lk:h ii-rabh-, bhu- ( l'inli na) or with their derivatives the term
'buddhi' is used, in those cases where it is combined with the
verbal root jan- or its derivatives both the terms ' buddhi' and
' are used optionally
17
Furthermore, when
combined with the verbal root ut-pad- or its derivatives, the term
apekttiibuddhi ' seems to be used exc!usively
18
. Usage [ C] is
without excep tion. Besi des, the term' apektjiibuddhi' is sometimes
replaced with the term 'nim ittakarwza '
19

From the above examination we can conclude that the Vaise
in using the term' apek:jiibuddhi' in some cases and' buddhi'
in other cases, meant the following : The antecedent apekttii-' is
not used at all when the object of the cognition is indicated.
Because the meaning of the term ' apektjli- ' and the object the
cognition are not related. The effect produced by [ ]
budd!Ji, for example the number two, is the grammatical subject of
the verbal root 'apekf!- ' while the grammatical object is nothing
but buddhi.
3. Conclusion
We can summarize the above investi gat ion as follows l
16 For exampl e
( Sankhya-ni,..upmHz ).
17 For exa mpl e ( J(iranavali, p. 108 l. 23 )
1
dvitvam buddhi jam ( p. 129 l. 12 ).
I S For e xa mple : t tt dvit vasyotpadika ( Kirauavali,
p. 129 l. 10 ), 11a cuPekialmddhi 1!t v inotpattih ( Vyomavati, p. 464 l. 29 ).
19 The cases of such a r eplacement arc too many to enumerate In
later texts . i s repl ac ed by in the Vyoma-
vati ( p. 464 l. 20 and l. 28 ). It is mentioned in t he Vyomavati ( p. 517
l. 17) that the term ' means '.
84
PART II : On Cognition
[I 1 Priority, posteriority, the number two etc. and separate-
ness of two (substances) etc. do not inhere in substances, in
advance, independently of a cognizer, but come into existence only
through the intellectual activi ty of a cognizer. Aithough priority
etc. could be said to be the products of ideas, they are by no means
like phantoms, but they are external existents which inhere in
substane.::s. Only then, do they become the objects of direct
cognition. This is what is postulat ed in Vaiseika realism.
[II] The antecedent in the compound
buddhi' indicates the causality between buddhi and its effect, in
other words, apektjlibuddhi is the efficient cause of priority etc.
Its verbal root 'apek[!- ' is not related with the object of the
cognition.
Thus, the term etymologically means
expectation [of-something-directed-to-] cognition ' or 'cognition
[which is 1 expected [by something (priority etc. ) which is to be
produced by it ]. ' and actually means' cognition as effici ent cause.'
Except for the obscure translation of Faddegon, all of the transla-
tions by modern scholars which were listed in the beginni ng were
due to a completely upside-down undershnding of the grammatical
object and subject of the verbal root ' '