INDUS WATER TREATY

ISSUE:
Lack of water-sharing agreement leads India to stem flow of tributaries to
Pakistan on 1 April 1948

OBJECTIVE:
Negotiate an equitable allocation of the flow of the Indus River and its tributaries
between the riparian states.
DATES OF NEGOTIATION:
1951-1960
PARTIES INVOLVED IN NEGOTIATION:
The Indus Waters Treaty is a water-sharing treaty between the Republic of India
and Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The treaty was signed in Karachi on September
19, 1960 by the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the then President of
Pakistan Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan. The World Bank is a signatory as
a third party.

INDIAN PRIME MINISTER JAWAHARLAL NEHRU AND PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN FIELD MARSHAL
MOHAMMAD AYUB KHAN SIGNING THE IWT, KARACHI ON SEPTEMBER 19,1960
PROVISIONS:

INDUS & TRIBUTRIES

The Indus System of Rivers comprises three Western Rivers the Indus, the Jhelum
and Chenab and three Eastern Rivers - the Sutlej, the Beas and the Ravi; and
with minor exceptions, the treaty gives India exclusive use of all of the waters of
the Eastern Rivers and their tributaries before the point where the rivers enter
Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan has exclusive use of the Western Rivers. Pakistan
also received one-time financial compensation for the loss of water from the
Eastern Rivers.

The countries agree to exchange data and co-operate in matters related to the
treaty. For this purpose, treaty creates the Permanent Indus Commission, with a
commissioner appointed by each country.

The treaty is considered controversial as the state of Jammu and Kashmir was
deprived of control of its water while benefitting the Indian state of Punjab.
Kashmiri farmers or businesses cannot use the water of their rivers as a result of
this treaty. The government of Jammu and Kashmir has time and again
demanded compensation for decades. This aspect is downplayed by the
governments of India as well as Pakistan.

ORIGIN OF INDUS RIVER:

The waters of the Indus basin begin in the Himalayan Mountains of disputed
state of Jammu and Kashmir. They flow from the hills through the arid states of
Punjab and Sind, converging in Pakistan and emptying into the Arabian Sea
south of Karachi. Where once there was only a narrow strip of irrigated land
along these rivers, developments over the last century have created a large
network of canals and storage facilities that provide water for more than 26
million acres - the largest irrigated area of any one river system in the world.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND:

The partition of the Indian subcontinent created a conflict over the plentiful
waters of the Indus basin. The newly formed states were at odds over how to
share and manage the water resources of Indus basin. Furthermore, the
geography of partition was such that the Source Rivers of the Indus basin were in
India. Pakistan felt its livelihood threatened by the prospect of Indian control over
the tributaries that fed water into the Pakistani portion of the basin. Where India
certainly had its own ambitions for the profitable development of the basin,
Pakistan felt acutely threatened by a conflict over the main source of water for
its cultivable land.

INTER-DOMINION ACCORD:

During the first years of partition the waters of the Indus were apportioned by
the Inter-Dominion Accord of May 4, 1948. This accord required India to release
sufficient waters to the Pakistani regions of the basin in return for annual
payments from the government of Pakistan. The accord was meant to meet
immediate requirements and was followed by negotiations for a more permanent
solution. Neither side, however, was willing to compromise their respective
positions and negotiations reached a stalemate. Pakistan wanted to take the
matter to the International Court of Justice but India refused, arguing that the
conflict required a bilateral resolution.

INDUS WATER TREATY:

By 1951, the two sides were no longer meeting and the situation seemed
intractable. As one anonymous Indian official said at the time, "India and
Pakistan can go on shouting on Kashmir for all time to come, but an early
settlement on the Indus waters is essential for maintenance of peace in the sub-
continent". Despite the unwillingness to compromise, both nations were anxious
to find a solution, fully aware that the Indus conflict could lead to overt hostilities
if unresolved.

In this same year, David Lilienthal, formerly the chairman of the Tennessee
Valley Authority and of the US Atomic Energy Commission visited the region to
write a series of articles for Colliers magazine. Lilienthal had a keen interest in
the subcontinent and was welcomed by the highest levels of both Indian and
Pakistani governments. In his journals he insisted the World Bank to be the part
of dispute and resolve it in the best interest of both the nations.

Lilienthal's idea was well received by officials at the World Bank, and,
subsequently, by the Indian and Pakistani governments. Eugene R. Black, then
president of the World Bank told Lilienthal that his proposal "makes good sense
all round". Black wrote that the Bank was interested in the economic progress of
the two countries and had been concerned that the Indus dispute could only be a
serious handicap to this development. India's previous objections to third party
arbitration were remedied by the Bank's insistence that it would not adjudicate
the conflict, but, instead, work as a conduit for agreement.

Black also made a distinction between the "functional" and "political" aspects of
the Indus dispute. In his correspondence with Indian and Pakistan leaders, Black
asserted that the Indus dispute could most realistically be solved if the functional
aspects of disagreement were negotiated apart from political considerations. He
envisioned a group that tackled the question of how best to utilize the waters of
the Indus Basin - leaving aside questions of historic rights or allocations.

Black proposed a Working Party made up of Indian, Pakistani and World Bank
engineers. The World Bank delegation would act as a consultative group,
charged with offering suggestions and speeding dialogue. In his opening
statement to the Working Party, Black spoke of why he was optimistic about the
group's success:

Black's hopes for a quick resolution to the Indus dispute were premature. While
the Bank had expected that the two sides would come to an agreement on the
allocation of waters, neither India nor Pakistan seemed willing to compromise
their positions. While Pakistan insisted on its historical right to waters of all the
Indus tributaries, the Indian side argued that the previous distribution of waters
should not set future allocation. Instead, the Indian side set up a new basis of
distribution, with the waters of the Western tributaries going to Pakistan and the
Eastern tributaries to India. The substantive technical discussions that Black had
hoped for were stymied by the political considerations he had expected to avoid.

The World Bank soon became frustrated with this lack of progress. What had
originally been envisioned as a technical dispute that would quickly untangle
itself became an intractable mess. India and Pakistan were unable to agree on
the technical aspects of allocation, let alone the implementation of any agreed
upon distribution of waters. Finally, in 1954, after nearly two years of
negotiation, the World bank offered its own proposal, stepping beyond the
limited role it had apportioned for itself and forcing the two sides to consider
concrete plans for the future of the basin. The proposal offered India the three
eastern tributaries of the basin and Pakistan the three western tributaries.
Canals and storage dams were to be constructed to divert waters from the
western rivers and replace the eastern river supply lost by Pakistan.

While the Indian side was amenable to the World Bank proposal, Pakistan found
it unacceptable. The World Bank allocated the eastern rivers to India and the
western rivers to Pakistan. This new distribution did not account for the historical
usage of the Indus basin and repudiated Pakistan's negotiating position. Where
India had stood for a new system of allocation, Pakistan felt that its share of
waters should be based on pre-partition distribution. The World Bank proposal
was more in line with the Indian plan and this angered the Pakistani delegation.
They threatened to withdraw from the Working Party and negotiations verged on
collapse.

But neither side could afford the dissolution of talks. In December of 1954, the
two sides returned to the negotiating table. The World Bank proposal was
transformed from a basis of settlement to a basis for negotiation and the talks
continued, stop and go, for the next six years.

One of the last stumbling blocks to an agreement concerned financing for the
construction of canals and storage facilities that would transfer water from the
eastern Indian rivers to Pakistan. This transfer was necessary to make up for the
water Pakistan was giving up by ceding its rights to the eastern tributaries. The
World Bank initially planned for India to pay for these works, but India refused.
The Bank responded with a plan for external financing supplied mainly by the
United States and the United Kingdom. This solution cleared the remaining
stumbling blocks to agreement and the Treaty was signed by the Prime Ministers
of both countries in 1960.

The Indus Waters Treaty is the only agreement that has been faithfully
implemented and upheld by both India and Pakistan. Although its negotiation
was often arduous and frustrating for the World Bank and for the Indian and
Pakistani delegations, the final outcome was amenable to all parties. The Indus
waters are the life blood of Pakistan and much of western India; functional
cooperation was necessary for both sides to survive and prosper. The example of
the Indus Waters Treaty suggests that cooperation between India and Pakistan is
possible in cases where the benefits of agreement are plentiful and pressing,
overwhelming the political hedging that prevents other forms of reconciliation.

SALIENT FEATURES OF INDUS WATER TREATY:

After nine years of negotiations, the Indus Waters Treaty was finally signed on
September 19, 1960, with the cooperation of the World Bank.

The salient features of the Indus Waters Treaty are:

• Three Eastern rivers namely Ravi, Sutlej and Beas were given to India.

• Three Western rivers, Indus, Jhelum and Chenab were given to Pakistan.

• Pakistan to meet the requirements of its Eastern river canals from the
Western rivers by
constructing replacement works.

• Safeguards incorporated in the treaty to ensure unrestricted flow of waters

in the Western rivers.

• Both parties were to regularly exchange flow-data of rivers, canals and

streams.

• A permanent Indus Waters Commission was constituted to resolve the

disputes between the parties. The Treaty sets out the procedure for settlement
of the differences and disputes. It also provides for settlement of disputes
through the International Court of Arbitration.
Thus, future prospects persuaded the two countries to agree to a partition of the
Indus Basin waters. Both countries were expected to exploit their respective
water shares with the help of an Indus Basin Development Fund to be
administered by the World Bank.

ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION
WORK
IN PAKISTAN AS PART OF IWT
The Indus Basin Project involved construction of two large dams, five barrages,
one siphon and seven link canals as detailed below in Tables, to transfer 14 MAF
of water from the Western rivers. There are three systems of link canals. Two of
the systems, the Rasul-Qadirabad-Balloki-Suleimanki System (R.Q.B.S.) and the
Trimmu-Sidhnai-Mailsi-Bahawal System (T.S.M.B) connect
the Jhelum River through to the Sutlej and the third system Chashma-Jhelum
System (C.J) connects the Indus with the Jhelum.

ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION WORK IN PAKISTAN AS PART OF IWT –

CANALS

Link Canals Constructed in Pakistan under the IWT

From -To Link Canal Name Description

Rivers

1. Jhelum – Rasul-Qadirabad 30 miles long; provides 19,000

Chenab cusecs Jhelumwater to Chenab
2. Chenab – Qadirabad-Balloki 104 miles long; provides 18,600 cusecs water
Ravi to Ravi

3. Ravi – Su Balloki- 39 miles long; provides 6,500 cusecs water

tlej Suleimanki II toSutlej

4. Indus – Chashma-Jhelum 63 miles long; provides 21,700 cusecs water

Jhelum to Jhelum

5. Indus – R Trimmu-Sidhnai 44 miles long; provides 11,000 cusecs water

avi to Ravi

6. Ravi – Su Sidhnai-Mailsi 60 miles long; provides 10,000 cusecs water

tlej to Sutlej

7. Indus – Taunsa-Panjnad 38 miles long; provides 100,000 cusecs water

Panjnad to Sutlej

ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION WORK IN PAKISTAN AS PART OF IWT -

RESERVOIRS

Reservoirs Constructed in Pakistan under IWT

Mangl On Jhelum at Mangla, Mirpur Distt.; completed in 1968

a

Tarbe On Indus ; completed in 1977; Gross storage 11.62 MAF; Live storage 9.7
la MAF; Generates 3478 MW power

ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION WORK IN PAKISTAN AS PART OF IWT -

BARRAGES & SYPHONS

Barrages Constructed in Pakistan under IWT

Marala On Chenab ; completed in 1968; Max. discharge 1.1 Million cusecs

Qadirab On Chenab ; completed in 1967; Max. discharge 900,000 cusecs

ad
Sidhnai On Ravi ; completed in 1965; Max. discharge 167,000 cusecs

Rasul On Jhelum ; completed in 1967; Max. discharge 876,000 cusecs

Chashm On Indus ; completed in 1971; also has a reservoir of 0.75 MAF; Max.
a discharge 1,176,000 cusecs

Mailsi On Sutlej ; a gated siphon; Max. discharge 429,000 cusecs

OTHER ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTIONS ON THE INDUS RIVER SYSTEM

Other Important Engineering Structures

Jinnah Barrage Constructed 1946; Max. discharge 950,000 cusecs

Taunsa Constructed 1959; Max. discharge 750,000 cusecs

Barrage

Guddu Barrage Constructed 1962; Max. discharge 1,200,000 cusecs

Sukkur Barrage Constructed 1932; Max. discharge 1,500,000 cusecs

Kotri Barrage Constructed 1955; Max. discharge 750,000 cusecs

Ghazi Barotha Constructed 2004; Max. discharge 500,000 cusecs; Power

generation 1450 MW