Japan’s Political Response to the

Rise of China – Takahara Akio

A Summary by Tangguh

ASEAN and the Regional Dynamic of Northeast Asia

International Relations Studies, Faculty of Social and Political Studies
University of Indonesia
10/20/2009 1
 •Japan has supported China’s reform and opening policies since
they were first adapted, but the Tiananmen incident changed
China’s image in Japanese eyes

•Japanese-Chinese relations deteriorated in the mid-1990s due

to Taiwan matter and reconfirmation of Japan-US alliance

•In the latter half of the 1990s cooperation among East Asian
nations, including Japan-China relations, strengthened due to
the Asian financial crisis in 1997

•China then took positive steps in multilateral regional

frameworks and shifted to new approach to bilateral relations
with Japan

•Japan had been advocating relations with China in the regional

context, yet many Japanese are annoyed that China, not Japan, is
leading regional efforts in integration
10/20/2009 2
 •China’s shift on regionalism and on its approach toward its
neighbors was accompanied by a new concept of security that,
unlike the old concept based on military alliances and the
solution of conflict by military means, was based on mutual
trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation

•China applies conciliatory policies toward its neighbors and

pursuit of regional integration

•Japan is still undecided on security arrangements in the region,

while increasingly believing that Japan should promote the
formulation of a multilateral security framework in East Asia

•Japan and China’s bilateral and regional policies have become

quite similar. However, major difference exists in the desired
pace of change
10/20/2009 3
 Preface
•China’s rise has been significant not only because of its size, but
also because its rise has coincided with the end of the cold war
and the advent of globalization

•It also coincides Japan being in flux on many fronts in the 1990s
oEnd of LDP domination and beginning of continuous political
change
oBurst of “bubble” economy and flounder of economy
oCollapse of Soviet Union (question to the raison d’être of Japan-US
alliance)

•Japan-China relations declined

oTransfer of factories to China, hollowing out of industry in Japan
oTaiwan’s effort to gain international recognition
o50th anniversary of the end of the World War II
oChinese nuclear testing in 1996
oReconfirmation of the Japan-US alliance in 1996
oRise in nationalism in both countries: Chinese were gaining
self-confidence and Japanese were losing theirs

10/20/2009 4
 Preface
•China changed its policy towards its neighbors and started
deepening ties with them, including Japan

•China taking up the challenge of free trade and promoting East

Asian regionalism poses a challenge to Japan as the leading
economy in East Asia

•China’s rise and its deepening involvement in regional

economic frameworks urge neighbors to consider East Asian
security arrangement
oChina’s self “new security concept” includes fostering mutual trust
and benefit, equality and cooperation between nations, and
peacefully solving conflict through dialogue

10/20/2009 5
 •Japan has supported China’s reform and opening policies since
they were first adapted
oProviding official development assistance (ODA), technical
assistance and policy advice
oSupporting China’s admission to international organizations such as
GATT and WTO
oCancelling economic sanctions adopted in the wake of the
Tiananmen incident

•Four motivations of Japan assisting China’s reform and opening

oSuccessful reform and opening in China were regarded as important
to regional peace, stability and prosperity
oJapan considered that pragmatic forces within China’s socialist
government could be strengthened if the new economic policies
brought tangible benefits to the Chinese people
oJapan understood the potential of China as a central player in the
regional and global economy
10/20/2009 oJapan realized that an effective way to change China’s domestic 6
system and behavior was to co-opt China into the global system
 •The Tiananmen incident changed China’s image in Japanese
eyes

•China protested the reported idea of the Olympic Commission

of Asia to invite Taiwan’s President Lee to the Asian Olympic
Games to be held in Hiroshima in October 1994
o1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué and Article 8 of the Postdam
Declaration oblige Japan to return Taiwan to China
oThat Taiwan was now a democracy, combined with historical and
cultural affinity between Japan and Taiwan, rose sympathy among
Japanese public for Taiwan’s situation
oChina’s third generation announced a conciliatory eight-point
proposal in February 1995; however, Lee rebuffed this initiative and
realized a visit to the US

10/20/2009 7
 •China perceived the reconfirmation of Japan-US security
alliance as closely related to the Taiwan matter
oThe alliance needed new meaning after the cold war: cancelling the
alliance would change the status quo in the region
oBoth Japan’s and US’s interest was in furthering cooperation with
China
oThe 1996 Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security was signed only a
month after China launched missiles off the coast of Taiwan and the
US sent two aircraft carriers there

•Japan was increasingly concerned about China’s future

oChina’s nuclear test and missile test: enhanced the image of a
militaristic China in Japanese minds
oChina’s anti-Japanese, patriotic propaganda commemorating the
50th anniversary of the end of World War II
oChina’s economic growth (in contrast to Japan’s economic fall)
10/20/2009 oChina’s surge of nationalistic sentiment 8
 •In the latter half of the 1990s cooperation among East Asian
nations, including Japan-China relations, strengthened due to
the Asian financial crisis in 1997
•China’s diplomacy includes regional approaches; nevertheless,
China has attached greatest importance to bilateral relationships
oChina prefers bilateral approaches since it has the advantage over
most states in the region
oChina also doesn’t want the leadership in multilateral frameworks
to be assumed by power stronger than itself
•China then took positive steps in multilateral regional
frameworks
oChina understood that globalization was a new trend in world
history and regarded it as a historic opportunity
oChina was alarmed of the Asian financial crisis because of its
problem with nonperforming loans, and perceived the crisis as
contributing to a strengthened East Asian identity as they realized
their fates were interdependent
10/20/2009 oChina managed to hold the crisis at bay, not devaluating the yuan, 9
boosted its confidence, including in regional multilateral frameworks
 •China advanced its thinking about its dilemma of needing a
peaceful international environment to pursue economic
development, while not raising a sense of a “China threat”
among its neighbors
oThat ways include promoting regionalism, contributing to the
regional economy by further opening China’s own economy, and
providing more opportunities for others to benefit from its growth

•China proposed a free trade agreement with ASEAN in 2000

•China shifted to new approach to bilateral relations with Japan:

joining hands with Japan is essential if China wishes for effective
regional cooperation
oJiang’s visit to Tokyo in 1998 saw a Sino-Japanese agreement on
“Strengthening Cooperation toward the Twenty-first Century”
10/20/2009 oChina first concluded bilateral negotiations with Japan for its entry 10
to the WTO
 •China was now seeing relations with Japan in the regional
context, precisely what Japan had been advocating

•Yet many Japanese are annoyed that China, not Japan, is leading
regional efforts in integration

•A major reason for Japan falling behind lies in the structure of

its domestic politics: There is a lobby that protects farmers’
interests by arguing against liberalized trade in agricultural
products

•Another reason is that Japan is still uncertain about its future

relationship with China, stemming from concerns about the
security environment in East Asia
10/20/2009 11
 •China’s shift on regionalism and on its approach toward its
neighbors was accompanied by a new concept of security that,
unlike the old concept based on military alliances and the
solution of conflict by military means, was based on mutual
trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation
oThe Asian financial crisis added other dimensions to the concept
namely comprehensive security and economic security
oThis new concept provided the basis for Shanghai Cooperation
Organization with Central Asian neighbors, the ARF and ASEAN + 3
•One factor pushing this new concept was China’s fear of being
isolated in the region
oJapan and the US had adjusted and reinforced their alliance
oChina’s military build-up met with protests from its neighbors
•Another factor was relations with the US
oChina didn’t want confrontation with the US, knowing the huge gap
oNATO’s new strategic concept of protecting humanitarian values in
out-of-area operations, combined with China’s “human rights
10/20/2009 violations” in Tibet and Xinjiang, destroyed China adjusting the 12
unstable nature of relations with the US
 •China anticipated pressure from the US by conciliatory policies
toward its neighbors and pursuit of regional integration
oThe strong view was that regional cooperation should be extended
to security matters

•Japan is still undecided on security arrangements in the region

oFacing enigmatic North Korea, worrying about stronger China
oReconfirming alliance with the US while taking to become a
“normal” country assuming a more active role in its own defense

•Japan and China agreed that exchanges between security

personnel should be promoted to increase confidence and
transparency

•Japanese increasingly believe that Japan should promote the

formulation of a multilateral security framework in East Asia
10/20/2009 13
 •Since China changed posture on regional cooperation, Japan
and China’s bilateral and regional policies have become quite
similar
oBoth promote regional integration and establishing an East Asian
Community
oBoth agree about adopting a multilateral approach to the nuclear
crisis on the Korean peninsula
oBoth agree about preventing historical issues from negatively
influencing other aspects of bilateral relations

•However, major difference exists in the desired pace of change

oWhen the focus of regional cooperation is free trade, interests in
Japan’s protected sectors constitute block in policy process, while in
China farmers’ interests are hardly represented
oMounting public ill feeling toward China has hampered the Japanese
government in taking bold steps
oJapan lacks of strategic vision about the region’s future order since
many Japanese policymakers seem to believe that their task is to
10/20/2009 come up with policies acceptable to the US 14