CONCLUSION We have come to the end of our debate, moving from a discussion of the origin of analytic and synthetic

distinction to the Quinean rejection of it. As stated earlier, knowledge is the subjective reflection of objective reality. Such knowledge is always scientific; however it is informative. Information can be traced to the given sense experience. So all the knowledge is information but not all information is considered as knowledge. The distinction between knowledge and information can be explained in the following way. Knowledge always brings new information, thereby adding something new to our conceptual realm, whereas information will not yield any new knowledge, for we do not subject the sense experience to any further test. But for the conditions of acquisition, both knowledge and information do not posses any other similarities. Let me now highlight the mission of maintaining knowledge as the compound of analytic and synthetic judgments. The conclusions that I have arrived at are that analyticity presupposes judgments of synthetic nature and synthetic judgments presupposes analyticity. This shows that any genuine distinction cannot be made from the stand point of the theory of knowledge though one can talk of the distinction between these two entities in question from the standpoint of their origin and specification.

It is obvious that both analytic and synthetic judgments stand for the reality; i.e., they acquire their meaning if and only if they were employed in the objective reality. If analytic and synthetic judgments are taken as such without reference to the reality they are void in their contents and are empty in their expression. As, Kant maintained, they are exposed as the elements of objects to our minds. Analytic judgments, basically derived from the concepts of those objects are validated when these judgments cover or fix to the concept in question. The fixation of these judgments with the concepts is possible after careful consideration of a number of repeated instances in experimentation. For example, we conclude that the statement All brown coloured cows are cows is an analytic judgment, after observing a number of instances of brown coloured cows with the resemblance of the cows that we had seen already. This shows that we have derived the concept of cow in a priori with the help of repeated experience. From this we can conclude that (a) analytic judgments always cohere with the judgments of reality. (b) Analytic judgments which are supposed to be a priori have their origin in experience (sense experience). To say that analytic judgments are in one way or other derived from experience is to say that the former presupposes the latter. For example, some native tribal people use the following method when they want to refer to the numbers. Let us suppose that a native wants to refer to that there are five trees. He will not use the numbers 5;
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instead he will mark five short lines, such as /////. If we try to explain to him that these lines can be replaced by the number 5, he would find it hard to follow our symbolism. For him, the number 5 stands for an abstract entity. Further there are chances for him to take the number 5 as a picture resulting from some kind of drawing. This shows that the number as such is of no use. If at all one wants to explain that the number 5 stands for the five trees in reality, the native will consider our case. Thus the number 5 as more from without reference to experience is void in nature. As the native observes five trees he could draw five lines. The same principle with its modernity has proved the way for numbers to represent the reality. Thus, numbers are a priori concepts derived out of experience. The same example explains the theory of coherence of analytic statements as well; i.e., the number 5 in our case coheres with the five trees in the reality. Let us now turn our attention to synthetic judgments. We are told that synthetic judgments are derived from experience. As such it has its own inclinations towards empiricism. Synthetic judgments constitute knowledge not in isolation but in association with a priori principles. Right now it seems that we are maintaining Kantian reconciliation of rationalism and empiricism. But the situation is rather different, for Kant fails to recognize experimentation in his process of bridging the gulf between rationalism and empiricism. Accordingly, we can classify
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empiricism

into

philosophical

empiricism and scientific empiricism. Kant never comes into these two ways of thinking for he told his position in a different way. Philosophical empiricism favors only the observed data as the source of knowledge. But for Hume, all classical empiricist fall into this kind of thinking. If the observed data alone has taken as the source of knowledge then it has to consider as the given information and not a genuine knowledge. Scientific empiricism recognizes reason, sense-experience, experimentation, and hypothesis formation as the postulates of any genuine knowledge. Hypothesis is nothing but a priori assumption arising out of experience. A hypothesis can be said to stand for genuine knowledge, for it is verifiable in the future. It also gives some additional knowledge for it is usually projected towards future events, which we are yet to experience. Karl popper and other logical positivists favor scientific empiricism as the mode of achieving any knowledge. A synthetic judgment that arises out of scientific empiricism corresponds to matters of facts. A correspondence is being made between the idea and the object that it stands for. Though scientific judgments are derived from experience, they have their validity with respect to concepts which are nothing but a priori principles. If we do not recognize a priori principles in our experience, then the cow that we are experiencing at each moment and the one that we are going to

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experience in the future will be different from one another for there is no concept of cowness. Though Kant accepts both percepts and concepts as

constituents of knowledge, his theory of knowledge does not possess any guarantee for its application in the future. The reason for this could have been his omission of experimentation in his account of knowledge. As such his transcendental method falls neither into the framework of philosophical empiricism nor scientific empiricism. Closer analysis reveals that correspondence of facts and the coherence of reality are the ingredients of knowing anything at all. They are part and parcel of one and the same process. One without the other will not be able to account for knowing something. It means that when we perceive something, both coherence and

correspondence are being worked out all at once. This view comes very close to the view of naiyayikas. For them, though a distinction can be made between nirvikalpaka (indeterminate perception) and savikalpaka (determinate perception), they are both part and parcel of the same perceptual process. There can be only one perceptual process. Incidentally, in perceiving something, perception of both quality and quantity is possible. This does not mean that one precedes the other, but it means that they are the parallel outcome of the same perception. Perception of quality is possible in terms of sense experience, and the perception of quantity is possible in terms

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of the action of the mind. Perception of quantity without quality is meaningless. This shows that analyticity presupposes experience. We can also claim that the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgment is not possible on the grounds that both induction and deduction presuppose each other. In analytic judgments, the predicate is already given in the subject. We are not gaining new knowledge in analytic judgments. That is to say we cannot deduce something more that what is already given in the subject. By applying reason we conclude that the predicate is the constitute of the subject. This is nothing but deduction. That is the reason why analytic judgments are always necessarily true. Necessary truth is one of the rules in deductive arguments for providing its validity. Thus analytic judgments and deductive logic coincide with other in many ways. In analytic judgments we are extending our knowledge. That is, we are forming a general proposition which can be very well applied in the future. Such statements are possible if and only if one has undergone a number of instances in experience. Similar is the case with inductive arguments. In inductive arguments also we are projecting the future. Thus inductive arguments and synthetic judgments can go together very well.

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Now, it can be shown that deductive arguments always presuppose inductive arguments. Consider a deductive argument of a simple form: All men are mortal Socrates is a man / Socrates is mortal In this deductive argument, the major premise is all men are mortal. This proposition is a universal affirmative and hence it is a general proposition. Now, one can question whether it is derived through reason or experience. If it is derived through experience, we cannot talk of things that we have not experience so far. However we can conclude that all men are mortal, which is of course a general proposition. Thus in our case, the major premise is possible if and only if we already made sense of induction. If we accept this we should also have to accept that the water-tight distinction between a priori (analytic) and a posteriori (synthetic) is invalid. Our rejection of the distinction (between a priori and a posteriori judgments) does not imply that we are supporting the views of Waismann and Quine. Both of them reject the distinction on the basis of their concern with language. But our problem is based on knowledge. We have earlier maintained that knowledge is the subjective reflection of the objective reality. We have also maintained that both a priori and a posteriori forms of knowledge are the two sides
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of the same coin. The integral approach to knowledge is quite visible in Indian epistemology. The pramana theorists gave due importance to both non- empirical (a priori) and empirical (a posteriori) forms of knowledge in their epistemological doctrines. All perceptual

knowledge is not obtained from one source. All the five sensations contribute to the perceptual knowledge. Thus it is a mistake to oppose non-empirical forms of knowledge by dubbing them totally irrational. The non-rational approach to knowledge that involves intuition, revelation and verbal testimony as its chief sources are taken for granted by the people in their day-today life. Therefore, the distinction between non-empirical and empirical forms is complementary to each other but not antithetical to each other.

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