INTRODUCTION The study of epistemology has its own problems relating to its validity, for it is difficult to specify the

conditions under which it is appropriate to talk about genuine knowledge. The conditions include the problem of specifying the mode of acquiring any knowledge. This particular problem constitutes the core of the subject matter of epistemology. In the history of philosophy, the modes of acquiring knowledge metamorphoses into the scope of knowledge and this concentration were given by rationalists and empiricists. It is Leibniz who classified the nature and scope of human knowledge into truths of reason and truths of facts. For Hume it is the relation of ideas and the matters of facts that constitute the scope of knowledge and for Kant judgments constitute knowledge. To what extent the theories of the rationalists, the empiricists and Immanuel Kant give way for the a priori -a posteriori distinction in epistemology forms the basic substance our discussion in this work. Although so much is written and discussed about this distinction in the past, there is ample scope for further research in this area as this distinction appears to be ubiquitous in all forms of epistemology. Keeping this in mind an exclusive chapter on Indian epistemology is added. The distinction between a priori and a posteriori forms of knowledge, by and large, is restricted to scientific and empirical forms of knowledge by the Western epistemologists. But there are some types of knowledge which do
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not form under these two categories. For instance, the Indian epistemologists have relied on Sruti as a valid source of knowledge. This is normally treated under abda pramaThis prama is

treated as non-empirical source of knowledge by the Indian epistemologists. Now the question arises whether this prama can be treated as an a priori source of knowledge. Immanuel Kant noticed the inadequacy of the views expressed by both the rationalists and the empiricists. His transcendental philosophy acknowledges the fact that both the rationalists and empiricists are true in what they are asserting but are false in what they are negating. By maintaining this, he changed the existing pattern of mind approaching the object (to know it) into objects approaching the minds (to know what it is). This resulted in the acquisition of objective knowledge, considered to be scientific, which inherits the forms and categories with it. As he accommodates both the contents of the senses and understanding in the process of knowing something; Kant tried to bridge the gulf between rationalism and empiricism. we will take up these issues, particularly discussing Kants distinction of a priori and a posteriori knowledge as well as analytic and synthetic judgments and how a priori synthetic judgments are possible for him.

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Kants distinction of analytic and synthetic judgments in terms of definitions was criticized by Frederick Waismann. He gave a formal definition of the meanings of analytic statement and analyzed it thoroughly. From this analysis he concluded that no definition is precise, for it has no boundary. Such a feeling led him to reject the analytic and synthetic distinction as they are based on linguistic concepts which are vague as well as strictly bounded with rigid rules. We will explore some of the issues he raised in the present work. No one can define analyticity without presupposing the notion of the analytic. If analyticity cannot be specified, then there is no clear cut distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. This is the conclusion arrived by W. V. O. Quine. He has provided some powerful arguments against this traditional distinction. In order to show that analyticity cannot be specified, he deals with meaning, definition, interchangeability and synonymy. He reaches the conclusion that we can never escape the vicious circle as it becomes necessary to appeal to an a priori use of analyticity, if we want to define analyticity. Moreover, it seems that every statement can be revised in the light of experience. If this is the case than it seems that there is no difference between the statement at the core (analytic statement) and the statement at the periphery level (synthetic statement). So no statement is immune to revision. That means one can make adjustment both in the inner
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principle and on the periphery level. So Quine concludes that there are no absolutely analytic and synthetic statements. As Quine rejects this distinction on the basis that it is not expressed in precise words it is senseless to say altogether that this distinction does not exist. Grice and Strawson say that we know in practice that there are cases in which the distinction applies. We also know the cases in which it does not apply. Clarification of these problems will be taken up in this work. The distinction between empirical and non-empirical forms of knowledge in Indian epistemology is discussed with a view to see this distinction in the light of a priori and a posteriori forms of knowledge by taking some of the fundamental sources of knowledge admitted by the prominent Indian philosophical systems. Finally in the conclusion, a summary of what is discussed in each chapter is given along with my own reflections on this distinction. Strictly speaking empirical and non-empirical forms of knowledge presuppose each other. In that sense the so called distinction between a priori and a posteriori is only for the sake of convenience. Knowledge being an integral system, the segregation between a priori (non-empirical) and a posteriori forms is something uncalled for.

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The scheme of the present work The entire work is classified into five chapters that exclude introduction and conclusion. The first chapter deals with the aim and scope of theory of knowledge. The fundamental problems of epistemology, sources and justification of knowledge are discussed in this chapter. The second chapter highlights the historical account of the problem under study. The cleavage between a priori and a posteriori forms of knowledge can be traced back to the writings of Leibniz and followed by Hume, Kant and modern empiricists. A detailed analysis of the problem under consideration is given. The third chapter is exclusively devoted to discuss Kantian epistemology in the light of the distinction made between the analytic and the synthetic, a priori and a posteriori. Also, it discusses Kants critique of rationalist and empiricist structures of knowledge and their reconciliation in Kants epistemology. In the fourth chapter an attempt is made to show the nonempirical approach to the distinction between a priori and a posteriori, especially from the standpoints of Waismann and Quine. A detailed examination of their critique of the above said distinction is given.

The fifth chapter is a novel attempt in which the distinction between a priori (non-empirical) and a posteriori (empirical) forms of knowledge is located in Indian epistemology. The main attempts of this chapter would be attempts made by B. K. Matilal in his Perception. In the conclusion, a critical estimate of the problem under consideration is presented. By and large, it is shown that by invoking the polar argument the conclusion attempts to show that empirical (a posteriori) presupposes non-empirical (a priori) and vice versa. At the end, a detailed bibliography is given.

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