Greek and Medieval Studies in Honor of Leo Sweeney, S. J. Edited by William J. Carroll & John J. Furlong 4. PETER LANG New York + Washington, D.C Baltimore + San Fra Bern + Frankfurt am Main » Berlin * Vienna Bern + FrankfurtLibrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Greek and medieval studies in honor of Leo Sweeney, $1 / edited by ‘William 1 Carroll and Job J Furlong, Indes bibliographical references. Philosophy, Ancient. 2. Philosophy, Medieval. 3. Theology Decirinal~ History Middle Ages, 6001500,” I, Sweeney. Leo 1. Carvoll, William 1 I, Furlong, Jon Bi71.G738 1904 THO —de20 933148s ISBN 0.8204-1641-X cr Die Deutsche Bibliothek-CIP-Einheitsaufnahme Greck and medieval studies in honor of Leo Sweeney, S.J. / William J ‘Carroll and Joba 1. Furlong. ~ New. York: Sun Francisco: Bern; Baltimore: Frankfurt am Main; Berlin; Wien; Paris: Lang, 199 ISBN 0.8204-1641-X NE: Carsoll, William J (Hrsg. |; Sweeney, Leo: Festschrift Cover design by Nona Reuter The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the ‘Council om Library Resources © Peter Lang Publishing. Inc. New York 1994 All rights reserved, Reprint or repreduction, even partially. in all forms such a microfilm, evopraphy. microfiche, mctocard, offset stitly prohibited. Printed in the United States of America, CONTENTS: Editors’ Introduction vii Preface Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R. xix PART ONE: ON PLATO, PLOTINUS, AND NEO-PLATONISM Arthur Madigan Philebus 15B 1-8: A Suggestion 3 Hermann Schibli ‘The Lost Self In Plotinus 7 Kevin Corrigan Ecstasy And Ectasy In Some Early Pagan And Christian Mystical Writings Py Curtis Hancock Energeia In Two Selected Treatises Of Plotinus’ Enneads: 11, 5 (25) And VI, 2 (43): A Reaction To Plato And Aristotle 39 Denis O'Brien Plotinus On Matter 59. William J. Carroll Participation: The Link To The Divine In Fseudo-Dionysius The Areopagite B PART TWO: ON ARISTOTLE AND ST. THOMAS AQUINAS DT. Asselin Happiness: The Final And Self-Sufficient Human Good In The Nichomachean Ethics 85 Maurice Holloway St Thomas” Doctrine On Usury 119Judith Barad A Tension In Aquinas’ Accounts Between The Ontological And Ethical Status Of Animals| 127 Henry B. Veatch ‘A Possible Mis-Step In The Articulation Of The Grifinnboyle Moral Philosophy 145 Joseph Pappin IL Reflections On Augustine, Aquinas And The Incomprehensibility of God 161 PART THREE: ON EARLY CHRISTIAN AND MEDIEVAL AUTHORS ‘Thomas Losoncy Chapter 1 Of St. Anseim’s Prostogion: Its Preliminaries To Proving God's Existence As Paradigmatic For Subsequent Proofs Of God's Existence m Francis Catania Albert The Great On Divine Infinity: A Reply To Francis Kovach 1st Norman Wells Soncinas On Essence And Existence 191 Roland J. Teske, S. J William of Auvergne’s Rejection Of The Agent Intellect an Mark G. Henninger, S. J Henry Of Harclay’s Quaestio On Relations In His Sentences Commentary: An Edition 237 Allan B. Wolter, O. F. M. Alnwick On Scotus And Divine Concurrence 255 PART FOUR: BIBLIOGRAPHY Bibliography Roman Ciapalo 287 EDITORS’ INTRODUCTION ‘This volume commemorates the scholarly career of Father Leo sweeney, $. J. His influential writings in Greek and medieval philosophy hhave attracted the respect and admiration of major scholars in these fields, to which the contributions herein attest. But this volume also is a celebration of a life — a life of service and dedication to all. Each of the contributors of this volume have been touched in some special way by him. His life long record of publications and scholarly presentations testify to his scholarship; his life long friendships with those whose lives his has intersected testify to him as a person. Father Sweeney is a man who exemplifies discipline charterized by spontaneity; a man whose strength is undergirded by his kindness, a man who can be confrontive but always supportive. The contributors of this volume have been inspired by Father Sweeney as students and now continue to benefit from his advice and scholarly \wisdom; some of us have been lifelong colleagues; and, indeed, a few have been his teachers. To the scholar, friend, advisor, critic, and healer that Father Sweeney has been and remains we dedicate this book. Charles Leo Sweeney was born at O'Connor, Nebraska on September 22, 1918. He entered the Jesuit novitiate anc was ordained a priest. Having received an A.B. in Classical Languages, Licentiate in philosophy «and theology, and an M.A. in philosophy from St. Louis University, he took his Ph.D. in philosophy at the University of Toronto in November of 1954, He taught at St. Louis University from 1954 to 1968, at Creighton University from 1968 to 1970, and at Catholic University of America from 1970 to 1972, Since then, he has taught at Loyola University of Chicago and currently is Research Professor at that institution Even before he received his Ph.D., Father Sweeney had begun his writing career as Editor of The Modern Schoolman. He has maintained an affiliation with this journal throughout his academic life, while contributing Substantially to virtually every journal in which one would expect to find the work of a scholar with his wide interests. His early experience as editor certainly sharpened his skill at a genre few scholars pay proper attention to: the book review. A cursory inspection of Professor Ciapalo’s excellent bibliography reveals the quantity of Fr. Sweeney's production; reading Fr. Sweeney's helpful surveys, however, shows much more, — a sense of fairness, a completeness of summary, a sympathetic-yet-critical voice.vil Introduction Fr. Sweeney's particular interest in divine infinity emerged early, his dissertation topic focusing on divine infinity in St. Thomas Aquinas. Writings in the late 1950's expanded the focus to include the treatments of Plotinus, Lombard, Richard Fishacre, and others. Throughout his career, Fr, Sweeney has returned to divine infinity, exploring the theme further in the works of the authors mentioned, discovering new insights on infinity in the Presocratics (which resulted in his Infinity in the Presocratics: A Bibliographical and Philosophical Study in 1972), John Damascene, Bonaventure, Albert the Great. His efforts at tracing divine infinity both historically and conceptually culminated in his much-awaited and comprehensive study Divine Infinity In Greek and Medieval Thought, which appeared in 1992. Fr. Sweeney's early concerns about divine infinity seem to have lead him to pursue allied themes in Plato, Plotinus, and the Neo:Platonists; one finds him meditating on these philosophers throughout almost four decades of scholarship. His work on Plotinus and Neo-Platonism, for instance, has evolved from “Infinity in Plotinus” in 1957, through the lucid "Basic Principles in Plotinus’s Philosophy," in 1961, to his most recent work on self and individuality in Plotinus. Fr. Sweeney's period of most intense work on Plato, the late 1970's, has produced useful studies on the Platonisms of Leon Robin, Henry Jackson, and A.E. Taylor as well as an analysis of the “safe” and "cleverer” answers about causality in Phaedo. Though these scholarly preoccupations span the decades of Fr. Sweeney's productive career, yet another theme, appearing with equal frequency, can be formulated in a question Fr. Sweeney uses as a ttle of a paper given at a symposium in 1981: "Can Aquinas Speak to the Modern Mind?” One may view much of Fr. Sweeney's work as a decades-long attempt to answer that question. The range of metaphysical, and allied temological, issues in Aquinas about which Fr. Sweeney has written cannot but amaze: being, analogy, essence and esse, the nature of God, innateness of first principles, participation, separate substances, the eternity of the world — and, of course, divine infinity. He has also contributed to the debate over what kind of philosophy Thomism is or should be. A hint of his own position may be found in the title of a very recent article, "Must ‘Thomism Be Kantian? A Negative Response.” Substantial contributions to Thomistic and medieval studies manifest themselves continually in Fr. Sweeney’s career. Most scholars would — indeed, most do — consider analyses of esse, participation, divine infinity, etc. in Aquinas, Aquinas’ influences, and Aquinas’ predecessors to be adequate for a life’s work. Yet, studies of Aquinas will not by themselves ‘answer whether Aquinas can speak 0 the modern mind, One often discovers Fr. Sweeney, steeped in his historical and exegetical study of Aquinas, jousting with contemporary philosophies and philosophers, Introduction ix autempting 10 show not only the relevance of Aquinas's thought but its Superiority (0 phenomenology, existentialism, and other "philosophies of Subjectivity”. His popular Metaphysics of Authentic Existentialism (reissued as Authentic Metaphysics in an Age of Unreality in 1988 and again in 199 represents the work of a scholar engagé. Working out an “existentialis Thomism, he applies the result to preoccupations that one usually associates with philosophers writing after Nietzsche. To be sure, one runs across Fr. Sweeney's arguments with contemporary philosophers throughout his career, not justin his textbook on ‘metaphysics. Whether Stuart Hampshire's “analyst” interpretation of Spinoza, Gabriel Marcel’s view of God, or Sartre on existence happens to be the topic, Fr. Sweeney presses his case with typical concision and confidence. Pethaps the image of “scholar-engagé" best characterizes Fr. Sweeney's work, its mixture of clarity, rigor, precision on the one hand, ‘and commitment, zest, and fearlessness on the other. Whether one agrees ‘with him or not, one is forced to concede, upor close inspection of his arguments and analyses, that a rebuttal of any one of his theses will not be quick and easy work. ‘The editors ofthis volume sought to impose few restrictions upon the contributors. Certain conventions needed to be established for the sake of general conformity of appearance, such as the decision to require footnotes instead of endnotes. We have, however, not attempted to standardize headings within articles, styles of punctuation (Neo Platonism, neo- Platonism, neoplatonism, or Neo-Platonism?), or devices for referring to texts or authors, beyond the standards accepted in the field. Regarding content or topical consistency of the contributions, we chose to select excellent authors rather than to commission particular topics. As it happened, in addition to Fr. Owen's remarkably apt essay, which we offer as a Preface, three fairly clear categories emerged from submissions articles on Plato (Plotinus, Neo-Platonism), on Arstotle and Aquinas, and ‘on early Christian and Medieval philosophy. ‘The scheme we adopted as a result may seem unnecessarily arbitrary, even taking into consideration the hature of the volume — Aquinas, after all, is a medieval philosopher and ‘many early Christian philosophers tend to be Neo-Platonists. Accordingly, the editors thought it helpful to plot out some of the general lines of contact they have found. We devote the rest of this Introduction, then, to a brief summary of each Part of the bookx Introduction Preface Fr. Joseph Owen's essay, which we have designated the Preface, stands apart from the other studies in that it seems to be a "meta" reflection — a meditation on the doing of philosophy through its history. He attempts to answer the question "Why is the study of the history of philosophy important to philosophy?" Fr. Owens points out that the traditional curricular division of philosophy courses, among scholastic philosophers and others, between "problem" and "history" courses creates the impression that history is irrelevant to the "doing" of philosophy and that one can mark historically the beginning of “real” philosophy anywhere one’s proclivities suggest. Aristotle and Hegel notwithstanding, the history of philosophy notoriously abhors systematizing; it seems to continue robustly pluralistic. Professor Owens exemplifies this insight by recounting how variegated Greek and medieval philosophy appear to the undogmatic eye. Yet, he suggests a loose order among philosophical pursuits: philosophical starting points tend to take three trajectories: toward cognition, toward real things, and toward language. Each destination abounds in variety, but each variation shares a certain “habituation,” which shapes positions within an area on every philosophical issue. Ordering this commendable plurality i, asserts Fr. Owens, the task of a distinct Fach called philosophy. Contact with different philosophies forces “habituation” out of its own ruminations and into confrontation with other theories. Though Thomists, Cartesians, ‘and Quineans may disagree on starting points (and Derrideans that there are such things), their discussions with each other requires a degree of creativity ‘and subtlety that mere speaking to the initiated rarely attains. Tl conversation’ insures that "a genuine philosopher ... can with full coherence hold the absolute truth of his own conclusions while at the same time granting the philosophical worth of different or opposed views." ‘Such a generous view of philosophical dialogue certainly characterizes Fr. Sweeney's work and resonates throughout this volume in the variety of the contributions, Part One: On Plato, Plotinus, and Neo-Platonism Professor Arthur Madigan’s discussion of Philebus 15b 1-8 represents a fine tribute to Leo Sweeney's careful work on Plato and a fitting beginning to this Part. Madigan recounts the tradition of translation and critical ‘commentary on a famously dense passage on the unity of "monads." After his account, Madigan offers a way of resolving the battle over how many "questions" Plato raises in the complicated paragraph: keep grammatical and philosophical difficulties separate. Grammatical complexity, argues Introduction xi Madigan, tends to obscure the fact that two related but separable issues are being discussed. The tradition of commentary has seen only a unity/plurality distinction, but a further distinction — being/becoming — is being examined in this text as well. The problems in parsing the text, Madigan argues, arise not only because two distinctions are treated, but because these two happen ultimately to be inseparable. One could — hypothetically, as Plato does in the passage — discuss unity/plurality without bringing in change and discuss change without glossing one/many. But any complete and adequate account of either distinction will encounter the other. ‘The rest of this Part focuses on a preoccupation of Fr. Sweeney's scholarship, the metaphysics of Plotinus and later Neo-Platonists, Pseudo- Dionysus prominently. Two articles examine Plotinian "psychology," two explore Plotinian metaphysics, and a third extends the metaphysical discussions into the work of Pseudo-Dionysus. Professor Herman Schibli shows that, despite Plotinus” insistence on the self-awareness of the individual soul, ultimately in his system individuality and selfhood are incidental to the soul's conformity to the Intellect and union with the One. Professor Kevin Corrigan further highlights the transformation of the self in Plotinus as he explores the ‘meaning of ecstacy, first in Plotinus, then in Gregory of Nyssa and Pseudo- Dionysius. estacy, Corrigan shows, connotes natural growth, the normal \way of existing in an impermanent universe. estatic movement draws its subject beyond one state into a higher. ‘The ecstatic self “gives itself up,” as it were, to communion with the One. Enriching the description of this movement with Christian metaphor and doctrine, Gregory of Nyssa and Pseudo-Dionysius exhault the “divine drunkenress" of ecstacy, which, ‘occasioned by grace, pulls the soul toward divine unknowing (agnosia). Professor Curtis Hancock examines the use of Aristotle’s neologism energeia in Plotinus’ henology. Paired distinctions between energeia and . 275-276). Dr Schwyzer's conuments are made by way of criticism of an earlier article of mine, “Plotinus on evil: « study of matter and the soul in Plotinus’ conception of human evil, fist published in ‘he Downside review 87 (1969) 68-110, and subsequently reprinted (with a few expan: sions and some very slight corrections) in Le Néoplatonisme: Colioques internationau ‘tu Centre national de la recherche scientifique Royaumont, 9-13 juin 1969) 113-146 (see esp. pp. 127-128 and p. 136). See also ‘Plotinus and the Gnostic on the generation oF matter’, in Neoplatonism and early Christian thought, Essays in honour of A.H. Armstrong, ed. H. J. Blumental, R. A. Markus (London, 1981) 108-123 (esp. p. 113 0p. 121 fn, 19), — Dr Schwyzers criticisms doa east have the virtue of clarity ‘vin Corrigan also takes issve with my interpretation of ‘he philosophy of the Ennead’ an article entitled ‘Is thete more than one generation of matter in the Enneads?” Pblised in Phronesis 31 (1986) 167-181. But Corrigar’s criticisms are so obscurely64 Plotinus On Matter Error in understanding the text of the Enneads. Dr Schwyzer says that I am wrong to suppose that matter, in the Enneads, is generated, for Plotinus himself (according to Dr Schwyzer) tells us exactly the opposite: ‘standing apart from all existent things, nor did matter come to be.” I quote the Greek as Dr Schwyzer has quoted it: c-xoordioa xévraw av drrav obre €yévero. These words are indeed to be found in Plotinus, ‘on the concluding page of one of the treatises I have already referred to, On the meaning of ‘in potency’ and ‘in act’ (Enn. 11 5 [25] 5.14-15). But the quotation is incomplete. ‘The whole sentence runs as follows, lines 13-15: ore 6€ ti €& cinyris éveoryela 1 exoarcion aavrev ray Syria odre éyévero, ‘The meaning is now quite plainly: ‘Matter neither was, from the beginning, anything in act, standing apart from all existent things, nor did it come to be (sc. anything in act).” ‘The verb which Dr Schwyzer has quoted, &évro, is not an absolute use of the verb, ‘came to be'/“came to exist’, but a predicative use, ‘came to be something’. The meaning is matter neither was nor ever came to be anything in act. ‘That sentence is essential to Plotinus’ whole conception of matter as pure potentiality (and in that sense as ‘non-being’). But Dr Schwyzer’s error is here not so much a doctrinal one, as a purely linguistic or grammatical one. He has failed to understand the grammar of the sentence, in its context, and so has failed to recognize that éyévero is not here an absolute use of the verb, but a predicative use, with the predicate (évep-yeiq ‘n) carried over from the first half of the sentence, Doctrinal error appears in Dr Schwyzer’s claim that, in the chapter have quoted from Various investigations, Plotinus is writing not of matter, but of body. expressed as to be at many crucial points virally unintelligible. I have however done ‘my best to make sense of Corrigan’s objections to my interpretation, and to take account ‘of them, in a separate publication (Plotims on the origin of matter, an exercise inthe Interpretation ofthe ‘Enneads’), which will appear shorly in the collection Elenchos. — ‘Another young Canadian scholar has attempted to deal with same issue; see J.-M. Narbonne, ‘Ploti et le probléme de la génératon de la matire; a propos d'un article récent’, Dionysius 11 (1987) 3-31. But so far is Narbonne from being able to understand Plotinus’ (admittedly difficult) Greek, that be cannot even master the meaning of a ‘sraightforward text in modern English. See my note ‘J.-M. Narbonne on Plotinus and the generation of matter: two corrections’, Dionysius 12 (1988) 25-26, Denis O'Brien 65 Here Dr Schwyzer has failed to understand the doctrinal import of the sentence which closes the chapter (Enn. IIL 9 [13] 3.15-16): ‘Looking again (sc. atthe object which she has made), as though by a second initiative, soul covered the image with form and rejoicing she enters into it.’ It is true that, taken on their own, those words may seem a trifle obscure, but if Dr Schwyzer had only cared to read again the penultimate sentence of the parallel passage which I had quoted, the opening chapter of the treatise On the daimon, he should have at once seen what Plotinus was up to, Pa that penultimate sentence of the opening chapter of On the damon, Plotinus tells us (Enn. Il 4 [15] 1.14-16) that the object which has been generated by soul, and which he had so far described as ‘utterly indefinite” (arm [sc. ddpiaror], line 14; of. dopioriar...rawreds, lines 11-12), ‘when itis completed” (redetovjzevor), ‘becomes body’ (yiveraa axipa), “by receiving a form’ (nopdiv Nay), ‘the form which is appropriate to its capacity’ (nopdrv...riv 1 Suvciue. xpéobop0"). ‘Thus in both treatises (Various investigations, Enn. IIL 9 [13] 3.15-16, and On the daimon, Enn. MIL 4 [15] 1.14-16) the object which the soul has generated becomes body by its reception of form. And what can that object be but matter? Plotinus had indeed already told us as much in the passage I quoted ‘a few moments ago from the treatise On immortality (Enn. IV 7 [2] 2): the soul makes body from matter by the imposition of form. ‘What we did not know then (Enn, IV 7 [2}), but what we do know ow (Enn. IIT 9 [13] 3; Brn. IIL 4 [15] 1), is that the matter which receives form and becomes body, prior to its reception of form, had been generated by soul You remember the sentence quoted earlier from chapter three of the treatise On immortality (Enn. IW 7 [2] 3.24-25y: without soul, ‘matter Would perhaps not exist at all.’ The qualification (‘perhaps’, rééxex) is now no longer needed. Matter would not exist without soul, because it is soul ‘which has generated matter. Textual error, doctrinal error: those two types of error could hardly hhave been present in so blatant, and so vulnerable, a form, had Dr Schwyzer not been the victim of some deep-seated and more powerful misapprehen- sion. And since there is a certain disarming vaiveré in Dr Schwyzer's Uyhtings, he makes it quite easy for us to see just wherein that misapprehen “Could Plotinus really have thought’ (I translate freely from the erman of Dr Schwyzer's article) ‘that matter was created by soul?66 Plotinus On Matter Created, 1 mean, subject to the conception whereby there would be a {imeless procession, more or less in the way that it ean be said of the One, that the One creates Intellect. Matter cannot possibly be created in such a sway, Matter is rather uncreated.” ‘Sle ist vielmehr ungeschatfen.) If someone told me that could not believe in the Real Presence without believing in transubstantiation, T might well be hard put to it to say whether 1 betieved in the Real Presence or not. And so it is with Dr Schwyzer's matter. If matter has to be generated as the result of a prossss sralogous to the generation of Intellect by the One, then 1 to0 might welt Be damped to conclude, as Dr Schwyzer has done, that matter is not created But of course in either case the condition is all important. Belief in transutetantiation is not a necessary condition for believing in the Real Prescno, And the soul's generation of matter is not analogous 10 the generation of Intellect by the One.” Dr Schwyzer thinks that itis, only because he already has in mind a single, unitary concept of creation, a concept which would be appropriate seh perhaps to the generation of Intellect from the One, but which creat be applied to the generation of matter by the soul." Dr Schwyzet Tatore concludes that matter is not — cannot be — created. And of caer on his own premiss he is right, For what is at fault is not the courfesion which Dr Schwyzer has drawn from his premiss, but the premiss self Dr Schuyzer has foisted onto the hypothesis of the generation of matter by soul a wholly inappropriate analogue (the generation of Intellect ty the One), an analogue which has no ground inthe text of the Enneads. bac whieh is so firmly rooted in Dr Schwyzer's mind that it blinds him fo the plain grammatical and doctrinal import of the text which he has $0 carefully edited. Ty the short time that is left to me, let me try to correct Dr Schwy- zer’s premiss. TTheologically minded readers may Hike to Know that my remarks on the Real Prescune sel ransubsaiation are Intended seriously, in o far as 1 id once outline & ereseaal schema appropriate wo bli the Real Presence, oter than tat offered coe St raraubsiantation (Or, for that mater, of consubstntation), See “A "in The Times of Saturday 9th Ostober 1976. Poe rei ey addition of the word ‘peta’. is only out of deference to Dr chopocr tat [allow myself the use of the word ‘ereation” in this eonext | (De Seyret the pasage I have quoted, writes geschafenangeschafen.), Im any mors saree teing analysis T sold, of course, have to distinguish berween ‘reaion’ and Denis O'Brien a ‘The clearest and simplest statement oft i r the One ist be found inthe opening ns of he bt went Ihave niready alluded to, the eleventh in chronologicel order, entitled On the geretion and oder of ings wich come afer he Fst (Em. V 211 ‘The One is ‘not being’ (ov dv, Enn. V2 [11] 1 12). The One is ‘complete’ (réhaor, line 7), because it has n0 need of anhing ines 7-8), and it makes something ese" ho, line 9), n0t because i lacks anything, but because its ‘overfill’ and it evetomt (oe iaepedioes, Snepeposn, lines 89). ‘The ‘something else’ which ‘comes into being” (76.52 yer6uevor, ine 9) turns back towards its source (lines 9 10), and by looking towards its source it becomes Intellect (lines 10-11). ‘Those expressions seem to me starkly, almost crudely simple, But purpote here is aot o comment oa the simplicity, or lack of simpliciy, of Plotinus’ account of the generation of Inelect from the One, but simply to point out to you that on every count the generation of matter by soul and the sereration of nlc frm th One are whol ferent ake frst the point that dhe One is ‘not being" (ok 6, Enn. V 2 (11 1.6), This isnot tue of soul. We are specifically wold by lotus, inte concluding line of his treatise On mare, that ineligible matter is “being! un thatthe principe prior to itis therefore "beyond being, whereas the matter ofthe sensible world is ‘non-being” and the principle prior to it (soul or Inet is “being” (Em. M412] 16.2627, — “cg nt One i8. “compete” (rdor, En. V2 [11] 1.7) and Seva because of any “need” (ines 7.8) Not soute mul, The soul Severs mate, and body, because she has ned of a “eeepc Sroboxs, Hm TH 4 (15 1:18) For, as Pins writes in sl earie eats, ifthe soul stayed forever enclosed win Ge ineoxpreal word, her Powers would have i fill and he sou Rerslf would never ave known in wont aivites which she i able wo dsp in he word of sense {Be descent of sod into bois, Ean. WV 8 [6] 8.27.3; of. Em. WV 3 Finally, and most explicitly, — th moti . — the question of movement. irons nm. 2111.89) ha i of oune aly foo de pare {Rinus waite explicitly elev Uneecopin, line 8). The “overfiowing” of wae ene aera erences See ee68 Plotinus On Matter that the soul's generative activity is accompanied, not by rest, but by movement (lines 18-19) ‘There are thus two distinct moments in the life of soul. Soul, as also Intellect, is “fulfilled” by looking towards her source (wAypovrax, Enn. V 2 [11] 1.20; of. éxdnpciby, line 10). But this higher soul then generates an image’ of herself by ‘advancing towards a different and opposite motion’ to that which carried her to Intellect (lines 20-21), ‘And those same two moments are reflected in the life of the “partial” soul, the ‘image’ of the higher soul.? The ‘partial® soul ‘is illuminated’ (@uriterex) when she turns towards the principle which is prior to her (Enn. II 9 [13] 3.7-8), but she produces her ‘image’ (non-being), not when she turns towards the principle which is prior to her, but when she turns towards herself” (mpd¢ aunjv yap Bovdopéry..., lines 10 sqq.)."° But in attempting to refute Dr Schwyzer's assumption that the ‘generation of matter by soul should be somehow analogous to the generation, of Intellect from the One, I feel that I am pushing at an open door. The error is so blatant. ‘And as before, Schwyzer's overt error lies not so much in his neglect and misunderstanding of the obvious texts as in a false point de départ. In this case, Dr Schwyzer's underlying error is symptomised in the very title of his article: Zu Plotins Deutung der sogenannten platonischen Materie. In order to discover the antecedents to Plotinus’ theory of matter, Dr Schwyzer combs through Plato's Timaeus. And in one way of course he is right to do so. A large part of Plotinus’ conception of matter is derived "1 thus identify the “image” ofthe higher soul described in Enn. V 2 [11] 1.18-21 (see also Enn. It (15] 1.1-3; in both cases, the product of the movement of a higher soul is described as ‘sensation’ and ‘nature’) with the “partial sou!” whose ectivities are eseribed in Enn. IIL 9 [13] 3.7-16. ‘the modalities of the generation of Intellect from the One and of soul from Intellect, as outlined above, may be usefully supplemented from chapters 6 10 7 of the tteatise On the three principal hypostases (Enn. V 1 [10]), — kn the final expression 1 hhave quoted (pd cari» yap Bovdowiry, Enn. IH 9 {13} 3.10), we can most simply supply an infinitive. 6épcoPaa, carried over from écpowérn (line 8). Teis true that the ‘eau is trifle paradoxical (how can the soul wish tobe ‘carried” towards herself), but tasly explained by the intervening idea: the soul is “carried” towards herself when she {s ‘earvied" towards ‘what comes after her" (lines 7-10: éurifera..npd¢ 10 x06 aris Sepouden..cig 88 70 per” adv Isc. gepouéom] eis 76 gah dr (se. $épercu}. rovro Be rowe Grewr ode cwriv (8c. Géperad|’ z06¢ alriy yap Bovdoutrn {. ‘Séocobea|..). Perhaps, however, it is over-scrupulous to want to fill in all the ‘Symactical lacunse in Plotinus’ highly syncopated Greek Denis O'Brien oo from Plato, and a good many pages of Plotinus’ account of the nature of matter in his treatise On the impassibilty of incorporeals (Enn. IIL 6 [26] 6- .9) are taken up with a commentary on the Timaeus. But no less important as a source for Plotus’ theory of matter is Plato's Sophist, and it is Plotinus’ adaptation of Plato's theory of non-being in the Sophist which does mich to explain the modalities of the theory of the generation of matter in the Enneads. Last time T was here, I outlined to you my general understanding of the difference between Plato's and Plotinus’ conception of non-being. Plato distinguishes non-being as otherness from the non-being which would be (impossibly) the contrary of being, while Plotinus distinguishes a third kind of non-being, non-being not simply as otherness, but as absolute other- This afternoon, therefore, I shall limit myse'f to one particular point: Plotinus’ understanding of Plato's description of ‘the form of non-being’, of “really what is not’ (Soph. 258D5-E3). Plato, you may remember, defines ‘not beautiful’, ‘not large", ‘not just’, and so on, as an opposition between a part of otherness and the corresponding positive form: beauty, largeness, justice (Soph. 257B1- 258A3). In the same way (or so the Stranger, on a first reading of the dialogue would have us believe: in fact there are important differences), non-being is an opposition between a part of otherness and the nature of being (Soph. 258A6-C5), And the Eleatic Stranger concludes his refutation of Parmenides by declaring that ‘that part of the nature of otherness which is opposed to the being of each thing is really wha: is not’ (Soph. 25862-3: 7 xpog 78 dy éxdorou dp ainig Isc. Tig Barépov diaesc) cuniribeuevor...ai76 roir6 éonw Grr 78 hi 6y). Pilotinus refers to this passage in the opening lines ofthe final chapter of his treatise On matter (Enn. 11 4 [12] 16.1-3). Here as often, Plotinus is carrying on a long and intricate argument with himself, He has already dealt with the relation of matter to ‘privation’ (orépnaic, cap. 13-14) and to the “infinite” or ‘unlimited’ (ré eéxeipor, cap. 15), and now, at the start of the final chapter of his treatise, chapter 16, he asks himself whether matter is idemtical to ‘otherness’ (dp " ov eat érepéram radrér;)." Not ite, he says GF of, line 1). Matter is rather identical to ‘that part of ‘otherness which is opposed to the beings properly so-called, i.e. the forms’ (XG popiy érepdryros eivrrarropéns Epc 14 Srra Kupiwc, dd 61) Néyou, lines 1-3). The reminiscence, or so it seems to me, is ‘Ch. footnote $ above and corresponding paragraph. OM he intricate question of afin in Poin, scholars wil tr gratefully L. Seeney's magisterial study, ‘Infinity in Paina", Gregorianum 38 (1987) 815.535 and 52. (Other articles followed.)70 Plotinus On Matter unmistakable (Soph. 258E2-3; ef. Enn. Il 4 [12] 16.1-3), and yet there is one curious difference between Plato's own formula and its rehandling by Plotinus. In the manuscripts of Plato (B and T in Burnet's Oxford edition), rnon-being is that part of otherness which is opposed ‘to the being of each thing’ (Soph. 252E2: xpdc 79 dv éxciorov), whereas Plotinus (Enn. IL 4 [12], 16.1-3) has fairly obviously paraphrased, not the text of these manuscripts, but the text of the Sophist recorded by Simplicius. In Simplicius’ commen- tary on the Physics (Phys. 238.26), non-being is that part of otherness which is opposed, not to ‘the being of each thing’ (76 é» éxciorou), but to ‘each being’ (xpd¢ 75 dv éxacroy)."* And that difference is crucial. For the non-being which Plotinus has identified with matter is now opposed, not simply to ‘the being of each thing’, but to ‘each being’, ie. to each one of the forms (‘the beings properly so-called’, Enn, Ii 4 [12] 16.1-3). Matter thus becomes (for Plotinus) a part of otherness which so to speak subsumes the whole. Plotinus’ non-being or matter is opposed to beauty, largeness, justice, so that it becomes non-beautiful, nor-large, non-just....It becomes in fact ‘deprived of rational principle’ (hoyov. of. Enn. Il 9 [13] 3.13) and ‘utterly indefinite’, as described in the opening chapter of On the daimon and in the third chapter of Various interpretations (xcivrg [8c. eiéptarov], Enn. Mtl 4 (15) 1.1314; of. Enn, IL9 [13] 3.12-13). Matter is ‘utterly’ or “absolutely indefinite’, hecause it is opposed not simply to being, but to every positive determination of being: beauty, largeness, justice. ‘And that characterization of matter explains the final, crushing difference between the generation of matter by soul and the generation of Intellect from the One. The One which generates Intellect is ‘complete’, ‘perfected’ (réde.ov, Enn. V 2 [11] 1.7). Not so the soul. The soul which generates matter by ‘turning towards herself” ‘becomes more indefinite’ ‘For manuscripts B (cod. Oxoniensis Bodleianus, mss. E.D. Clarke 39) and T (cod. Venetus Marcianus graecus, append. class. 4, cod. 1), I have simply followed Burnet's dition, Platonis opera tl [2nd ed}, in the Scriptorum classicorum Bibtiotheca ‘Oxoniensis (Oxonii, 1905) ad 258E2. The same reading (éxioroe) is wo be found in manuscripts Y (cod. Vindobonensis 21 (codices philologici et philosophici grace) and 'W (cod. Vindobonensis $4, suppl. phil. gr. 7) according to A. Dies, Platon, CBuvres completes, in the Budé collection, t. VIM, 3 panic (Paris, 1925) 374. ‘This too (Gacoroo) isthe reading given by Simplicius in an earlier passage of his commentary on the Physics (Piys. 135.26) “Hence the error of modern editors. Burnet and Digs (sce the preceding footnote) abandon the reading of the manuscripts (Soph. 252E2: éxito) in favour of the reading fecorded. by Simplicius at Phys. 238.26 (Gara). But once one appreciates the ‘neoplatonic bias of this later formulation (r6 dr &xao70r), the lesson to be drawn is ‘obvious. In Plato's text (Soph. 2522), we should follow the manuscripts and read, not Exaoros, but éxciorou Denis O'Brien a (ciopiatorépa ywonér, Enn. IIL 9 [13] 3.11-12). And hence the ‘image’ of soul, more precisely the image of the soul's increasing lack of definition (rovrov at Enn. UL 9 [13] 3.12 picks up from doptororépe yuroyérn immediately preceding), is ‘utter’ and ‘absolute’ indefiniteness. It would have to be, for every ‘image’ is a falling away from the principle which has ‘brought it into being.'* ‘And this leads to a new difference between the generation of matter from soul and the generation of Intellect from the One, but a difference this time ex parte prolis. What is generated from the One ‘turns back’ to the One and ‘looks upon him’ and in so doing becomes Intellect (Enn. V 2 [11] 1.9-11). Even soul, when she is generated by Intellect, “looks a: the principle which she has sprung from’ (lines 19-20), And the same is rue of the matter of the intelligible world, which ‘is defined” when it ‘turns towards’ the source from which it has sprung (Enn. I 4 [12] 5.33-38). Not so the matter of the sensible world. Because the matter of the sensible world is ‘uter indefiniteness” (coporiaw...aavredsj, Enn. IML 4 [15] L114; of Enm, IIL 9 [13] 3.12-13), it no longer has the power to turn back towards its source. The abject generated by form is “an offspring without life’ (r3.yerduevoy citer, Enn. IIL 4 (15) 1.7), and that is why the covering of matter with form (and so the production of body) requires a ‘second inate" on the part of soul (Serena xpoaBoN, Emm I [13] AAs for the generation of Intellect, as for the generation of soul, and 4s for the generation of intelligible matter, there are two ‘moments’ of Production, But the difference is that for the matter ofthe sensible world, the ‘initiative’ comes each time from soul. ‘There is (by implication) a first initiative, whereby the soul generates matter, and then (explicitly) a second inate, whereby soul covers matter with form s that take things the ther way round) matter “is completed’ and “beco: ” (En, 51516 HS [15] L113). alee take ster Tat Sul activity is peculiar to soul. Intellect, soul and ineligible Wing rn oftheir own acord to the source from which they have sprung {ate alone tequires a second intervention on the part of the principle Stich has made it, a second intervention which will make the offspring (in far as it can be) “perfected” (cf. redewievor, Enn. Ill 4 [15] 1.14) “Plo equ cman Ptmas fequry invokes this es. Among the rete lead quote, sc for ample Enn. V 1 [10] 6.39; 7.38-42. Pat we 6n Plotinus On Matter In one way that is the end of the story, and in another way it is only beginni te cna: stig teal cnn of the soul's ‘second initiative’, and of her entering into the object she has made ‘rejoicing’ (ja0eoc, Err. 9 (13] 3.16), together with the further step whereby the non-being of the Sophist becomes not merely not beautiful, but ugly, not merely not good, but bad, are all crucial ingredients in Proins” answer tothe problem of evil an answer which tes an intricate ind delicate course between Gnostic and Christian theories of evil ae Sot that, a8 [have said, is another story, and must be left for another day. PARTICIPATION: THE LINK TO THE DIVINE IN PSEUDO-DIONYSUS THE AREOPAGITE William J. Carroll Ohio Dominican College ‘As a result of early philosophers’ attempts to explain the relation of the One to the many (in later thought, of the Creator to creation) and in so doing avoid the extremes of pantheism and deisr, the Platonic notion of participation, as the bond between the Intelligibe World and the things Hrete, emerged as the dynamic Tink between God and creation.! However, the transition from the philosophy of the Greeks to the philosophy adopted and developed in the Judaeo-Christian tradition did not transpire easily. In fact, it took the mysterious machinations of Pseudo- Dionysius the Areopagite to lay the groundwork for the conversion from Neoplatonism to the Judaeo-Christian intellectual tradition. This paper examines how Dionysius the Areopagite ut Proclean notion of participation in his own system, and how this notion evolved into a supposedly Christian metaphysics. Unfortunately, the Dionysian corpus does not begin with a chapter on participation which the reader can use asa propaedeutic for what follows. The notion is embedded 'By Platonic notion of participation, we mean that ncton as developed by Plato, Plotinus, Proclus, Pseudo Dionysus, eal. For the history of the notion of participation, sce M, Annice, C.S.C., “Historical Sketch of the Theory of Participation,” New Scholastciom 26 (1952), 49-79; N, Clark, S. J., "The Meaning of Participation in St Thomas,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosopaical Association 24 (1952), 147-87; B, Puntel, “Participation,” Sacramentum Mundi TV (1969), 347-50; C. Fabro, Participation,” The New Catholic Encyclopedia 10, 1042-1046, The history ofthe enigmatic figure known as Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite is Strouded in mystery. Although the exact identity of this figare has not been ascertained, *Poroximately thirty suggested identities have been proffered. For an examination of the Possible identities ascribed to the Pseudo-Dionysius, see W.. Carroll. Participation In flected Texts of Pseudo-Dionysus the Areopagite’s The Divine Names (Washington, PL Catholic University of America Doctoral Dissertation, 1981). pp. 167-69, Rt {sthaway, Hierarchy and the Defntion of Order in the Leters of Pscudo-Dionysius: A ‘Muy inthe Form and Meaning of the Pseudo-Dionysian Writings (The Hague: Nijhoft {26% Caroline Putnam, Beauty inthe Preudo-Denis (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic hniversity of America Press), 1960. Throughout the remainder of this article, Pseudo- Dionysius the Arcopagite will be "ferred 16 as Dionysius74 Participation: The Link To The Divine. in the very concepts it helps explain like a finely woven thread in a luxurious fabric. One appreciates the fabric and not the thread, Yet, without the thread there is no fabric. Likewise, one may appreciate the philosophical and theological systems of a Dionysus and a Thomas Aquinas but without their use of participation, the systems crumble. In fact, it was through Dionysius’ adoption of this notion from the late Neoplatonists that paved the way for later uses by philosophers and theologians including John Scotus Erigena, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas Dionysus on Participation Although the notion of participation is found throughout the Dionysian corpus." aclear example of Dionysus’ use of this notion ean be found in his discussion of Being, Life, and Wisdom and how these names are predicated fof the divine, Throughout The Divine Names, Dionysius insists that the Good (God =) is the source of all perfections.‘ These perfections are basically three: Being, Life, and Wisdom, What is the relationship of the Good (or God) vis & vis Being, Life, and Wisdom? Dionysius’ use of this triad is to be expected since it was much discussed in post-Plotinian Neoplatonism.’ To prepare ourselves for Dionysius’ use of the triad, let us trace the highlights of this discussion. >For a complete list of texts in which participation is used see William J. Carroll, pp 2:3. ‘All references to The Divine Names will be to the Greek text in C. Pera's edition ‘of St. Thomas De Divinis Nominibus Expositio (Turin: Marieti, 1950). We shall refer to this text as follows: the first number indicates the chapter, the second the section, and the third the paragraph in Pera, For example, Il. 3. 37 refers to the second chapter, Section three, paragraph thirty-seven. All tansations are mine unless otherwise noted. For an example of the Good as the source of all perfection, see 1.2.10 and I4.47, ‘the nature of ths triad and its further development inthe philosophies of Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus and the fragmentary commentary on the Parmenides known as the “Anonymous Taurinensis” have received careful atention in P. Hadot’s Prophyre et Victorinus (Paris: 1968). Other works that discus the development of this triad are $B. Gersh, A Study of Spiritual Motion in the Philosophy of Proclus (Leiden: E.1. Brill, 1983, Idem, From Tamblichus to Eriugena: Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Leiden: E.3 Bil, 1978), A.HL Armstrong (ed), The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Univesity Press, 1970), R.T. Walls Neoplatonism (New York: “Setibnce, 1972), Thomas Whittaker, The Neoplatonists: A Study in the History of Hellen (Hildesheim: Georg. Olms Verlegsbuchandlung, 1961); John D. Turner, “Gnosticism and Platonism: The Platoniing Sethian Texts from Nag Hammadi in Their Relation wo Later Platonic Literature," A paper presented atthe International Conference tn Gnosticism and Neoplatonism held at the University of Oklahoma, March 17-21, 1984 tn addition, se Leo Sweeney, §.J., "Esse Primum Creatum in Albert the Great's Liver de Causis ef Processu Universitatis,” The Thomist, 44 (1980), 599-646. William J. Carroll 8 Plotinus’ triad is the result of his att i r attempting to interpret Plato's five categories of the Sophist (Being, Rest, Motion, Sameness, nce Professor Wallis explains fit toon For Poin thse expres ferences the tema if of Inligence; inprc Mton sl Die esc wile ee ply tht cous a te pas of Possson, tears Wh ‘acquired through Reversion. Ts ‘Yet Plotinus cannot be sad to have had a consistent theory on this subject, At one point he suggests the order of Being, Inelgence, and Life, where Life has the lowest level because of its association with Soul.” Later he suggests that Life might be associated with the second hypostsis in its verflow or unformed stage and that Intellect might be associated with the return oF formed stage, when it has received form and limit." This imprecise triadology underwent much development with Porphyry and later with Proclus.® Such an elaboration was nevessary to defend Neoplatonic paganism faced with a formidable Christian apologetic.” To this end the and airtight system of Proclus emerged." Proposition 101 of The El ia ments of Theology clearly exemplifies this development: ae Of al tinge piping in eligi, te wig Taig comes before. and Life before those that pricias in life, and Being Wali. 67. Fora dlscson of Plt dct Magia 21522 ce Pts Enea, 1.6.7; VL. 7.8. 17.22; Vi 616. 36.8, the Enneads are to E. Bréhier's translation: Enneads. 7 v« sociae dion ‘Les Belles Lettres,” 1938). bileiaialbaeras “ier pe ita V9.7. 26 VL 2126, Tame spss (Coss and acon.) tat Pinas might have changed the oro he ad a 1 po the Gnostic treatise Allogenes. . is oe sen th Atm nn arotution Ace Pony (so: Been Pes 185) 190 ede aston wih uni al he ae eran of Pus hth sucue a ay coresponis ex) tote we wih terGeakpsophers mind worst here separate rel ety wich Selo ny itn mi cin mat.” Wnie Ps neo’ incon betwen Deng, Ilgece, and Ue. Kaine for Po k oun see them as separate hypostases. pe (cSt WR. lige, "Neoplnonia,” in Exocloeda of Religion and Eh iNew Yor ‘Charles Scribner's Sons, n.d.), pp. 307- av eae nn, oH. Dee "Zam Ure er euponisen Hyposasele,* fermes 82 (1954), pp. 331-42, — see P. Hadot, Porphyre et