CAMBRIDGE TEXTS IN THE HISTORY OF
POLITICAL THOUGHT
DENIS DIDEROT
Political WritingsCAMBRIDGE TEXTS IN THE
HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT
Series editors
Raymon Geuss
Reader m Phalosophy, University of Cambridge
QUENTIN SKINNER
Regius Professor af Modern History in the Uxiversity of Cambridge
Cambridge ‘Texts in the History of Political Thought is now firmly
established as the major student textbook series in political theory. It aims
to make available to students all the most important texts in the history of
wesiern political thought, from ancient Greece to the eatly twentieth
cemtury. All the familiar classic texts will be included, but the series seeks
at the same time to enlarge the conventional canon by incorporating
an extensive range of less well-known works, many of them never before
available in a modern English edition, Wherever possible, texts are
published in complete and unabridged form, and translations are specially
commissioned for the series. Each volume contains a critical introduction
together with chronologies, biographical sketches, 2 guide to further read-
ing and any necessary glossaries and textual apparatus. When completed
the seties will aim to offer an outline of the entire evolution of western
political thought.
For a list of titles published in the series, please see end of hookContents
Foreword
Introduction
Chronology
Further reading
Articles from the Encyclopédie
The Supplément au Voyage de Bougainvitie
Observations sur le Nakaz
Extracws from the Histoire des Deux Indes
Index
page vii
aii
3
1
165,
215Foreword
‘Towards the end of his life, after he had completed his editorial labours
for the Encyclopédie, Diderot wrote extensively about politics. Some of
his earlier writings on the subject, though influential, were unoriginal;
muuch of his later work was unpublished in his lifetime. Our selection of
texts has been formed from those which were the mostimportant when
they appeared, or which give the fullest treatment of his political
thought. The first category includes his articles for the Encyclopédie and
his contributions to the Histoire des Deux Indes, works which were widely
circulated and attracted much attention. The second category includes
the Suppliment ax Voyage de Bougainville, the most speculative of his
political writings, and the Observations sur le Nakaz, his most precise,
detailed and also broadest discussion of contemporary issucs.
Any selection of course entails omission, and ours does scant justice
to the range of Diderot’s literary styles and skills, for instance the
conversational tone of his Mémoires pour Catherine IT or the polemical
quality of the Apologie de l'abbé Galiani, a defence of Galiani’s critique
of the physiocrats. If Diderot’s forceful arack against the despotism of
Frederick II in his Pages contreun tyran hasits counterpart in the Historre
des Deux Indes, nothing in our selection can capture the idiosyncratic
flavour of his last work, the Essai sur les régnes de Claude et de Néron
(1782), largely devoted to Seneca, but interspersed with reflections on
the role of the phifosophe in times of oppression and a final volley in the
protracted quarrel with Rousseau. Since our aim has been to convey
Diderot’s political thought, rather than his literary personality, such
exclusions are inevitable. Among these omitted texts, moreover, the
Mémoires and Essai are each too long to be included in a collection ofForeword
this kind, and the Apologic and Pages contre un tyran both form
commentaries on another author and cannot be read properly apart
from the writings to which they refer.
While we have worked together closely and produced the introduc-
tion joindy, it may be noted that the translations of the Observations sur
ke Nakaz and the Histoire de Deux Indes are chiefly by JHM, and those
from the Encyclopédie and of the Suppiément are mainly by RW. We are
grateful to Karen Hall for typing much of the material in this volume,
and to Derek Beales and Raymond Geuss for their comments on an
carlier draft.
viiiIntroduction
The Encyclopédie
The reign of Louis XIV, le roi soleil, may have marked the epitome of
absolutist government in Europe, but that achievement did not
survive him, Although monarchica! power, buttressed by divine right,
had become unlimited in theory, it was in practice often ignored and
occasionally even defied. The separate regions of France preserved
their own traditions and administration, while the legal and tax
privileges of the hereditary nobility and Church ensured that some of
the most prosperous sections of society retained a vested interest in
resisting the dominance of the throne. In the eighteenth century,
moreover, new intellectual forces appeared which undermined the
spiritual and moral authority of the French state. In their barle
against superstition and intolerance, and by their call for a rational
exercise of power, the philosophes of the Enlightenment challenged the
assumptions of absolutism and condemned the brutalities of auto-
cratic rule. Montesquieu, Voltaire and Rousseau each championed
liberal principles of toleration against religious bigotry and the
despotic tendencies of unrestrained government, and they were
rightly perceived by their contemporaries 2s opponents of the same
dark forces of prejudice and injustice which still held sway under the
ancien ségime. Although they envisaged disparate, even incompatible,
programmes of reform, they were united in seeing the prevalent
institutions of politics, religion and society as corrupt. Each espoused
ideals of freedom against the despotisms of their day, and at least to
this extent upheld a common cause of enlightenment.
ixIntroduction
No one in the eighteenth century promoted that cause more
vigorously than Diderot. For more than twenty years, from the mid
17408 unti the late 1760s, he was absorbed by the ordeals of editing
and contributing to the greatest literary monument of the eighteenth
century. [ike the Crystal Palace built a century tater to pay tribute to
an Age of Industry, the Encyclopédie was assembled as an exhibition
and celebration of an Age of Reason and Invention. Originally con-
ceived as a French translation of Chambers’ Cyclopedia, the work
underwent remarkable expansion after Diderot was appointed editor,
jointly with d'Alembert, in 1747. The first volume was published in
1751; the seventeenth, intended to conclude the written text,
appeared in 1765. By 1780, when at last completed by others, it came
to embrace thirty-five volumes exceeding 20 million words and 2,000
plates. This ‘reasoned dictionary of the arts and sciences’ was of
course a collective venture, composed by a ‘society of men of letters’
which inchuded Voltaire, Rousseau, d’Hoibach, Turgot, Raynal,
Toussaint and more than a hundred other authors. A substantial
proportion, perhaps one-fifth of the whole text, came to be drafted by
a single person, the chevalier de Jaucourt. But it was Diderot who
proved the guiding spirit of the enterprise; who fired the enthusiasm
of his contributors and subscribers while at the same time whetting
the ambitions of his publishers; who attracted sufficient sympathy
from the director of publications, Malesherbes, to resist the bans
imposed upon it by the Church, Crown and Paris Parlement; who
scorned the work’s enemies and persisted after they had driven
d'Alembert into retirement; who at the outset personally took charge
of mote articles, covering a wider range of subjects, than any other
figure; who ventured to make the Engelopéidie not only a lofty com-
pendium of knowledge but also worldly display of the arts and crafts
of his day.
By background and disposition he was well suited to his task. Born
in Langres in 1713, he was the devoted son of a master cutler and
retained a life-long interest in the manufacturing techniques of ordi-
nary domestic implements and tools. Formally educated in his native
city and in Paris, be read widely in classical literature and science -
especially Horace and Lucretius, whose ideas would always inform
his mature writings, Surrounded by relatives who devoted their lives
to the Church, he acquired that distaste for clerical intolerance and
the pieties of obscurantism which infuses many of the essays he
xIntroduction
drafted for the Encyclopédie, and which in other, even bolder, works
would incline him towards atheism. Launched upon his career as a
writer through translations of such texts as Shaftesbury’s Inquiry con-
cerning Virtue or Merit, he soon became an expert literary ventriloquist,
refashioning the compositions of others so that they might speak in
his voice. No one in the Enlightenment achieved greater originality by
way of transliteration and commentary, through the reassociation of
the ideas of other authors.
Diderot’s articles ‘Art’ in volume 1 and ‘Encyclopédie’ in volume v
illustrate his attachment to the mechanical arts as instruments of
scientific discovery and the moral improvement of mankind. He
assesses the revolutionary impact of technological innovations and
calls for greater co-operation between specialists of different disci-
plines ~ more interpenetration of the theory and practice of science,
and of liberal with mechanical arts - so that knowledge may be
invested in applications which promote public welfare. The dis-
semination of such useful knowledge formed the central objective of
the Encyclopédie. To make intelligible the successive achievements of
extraordinary individuals which constitute ‘the march of the human
spirit’ is to benefit the general mass of mankind. It shows the value of
criticism and reveais how the authoritative precepts of one age
become dead dogma to another, lifting the yoke of precedent and
pointing the way towards reason. These ideas from the article
‘Encyclopédie’ recapitulate some of the themes of d’Alembert’s ‘Dis-
cours préliminaire’ to the first volume of the Encyclopédie, and indeed
the two pieces together form a kind of manifesto of the Eniighten-
ment as a whole. Each, coincidentally, draws attention to the philo-
sophy of Rousseau, who, just prior to the publication of the first
volume, had produced an account of the moral effects of civilisation
{his Discours sur les sciences et les arts) which seemed to contradict the
very purpose of the Enoydepédie. In 1755, when the fifth volume was
published, Diderot was still Rousseau’s closest friend, but he would
soon have occasion to regret his encomium of a man he ‘never had the
strength to hold back from acclaiming’ (p. 26).
If the article ‘Encyclopédie’ forms a part of his philosophy of
history, Diderot’s more specifically political contributions concentrate
instead on principles such as justice, authority and natural right,
illustrated with examples drawn most often from antiquity. These
articles are largely second-hand — partly by design, since Diderot was
xiFntreductien
convinced that a work of reference cught to be inspired by the best
authorities, and partly from necessity, since official opposition to the
Encyclopédie soon deprived him of the services of some liberal theolo-
gians who had been responsible for material on the history of political
thought. Diderot took over this subject himself, borrowing copiously
from Sully, Fontenelle, Bayle, Girard, Buffier and other sources, and
relying above all on the political thinker whose authority throughout
the first half of the eighteenth century was pre-eminent — that is,
Pufendorf. In the article ‘Cité’ he adopts Pufendorf’s formulation of
the idea of the state as.a corporate body or moral being entrusted with
the collective will and assembled force of its various members, and in
the article ‘Citoyen’ he accepts Pufendorf’s distinction berween the
duties of man and those of the citizen, while nevertheless objecting to
his views on native-born as opposed to naturalised citizenship. In
‘Autorité politique’ he subscribes to Pufendorf’s conception of the
true source of all authority, which must be the consent of the people
themselves, rather than nature or force. In relinquishing their liberty
to their princes, the inhabitants of civil society act in conformity with
tight reason and so establish a common power in the public interest.
‘This is the doctrine of the social compact, which binds subjects to
their prince, but also princes wo their subjects, limiting their authority,
as Diderot conceived it, under conditions stipulated by natural law.
The moral foundations of the state might thus appear not to need a
theological framework. Yet, together with Pufendorf, he contends
that subjects retain no right of resistance against the authority they
have set up, however despotic they might judge it, since they are
bound by religion, reason and nature to abide by their undertakings.
Men should remain free in matters of conscience, he observes in his
article ‘Intolérance’ in volume vill, since conscience can only be
enlightencd, never constrained, and violence merely renders a man a
hypocrite. But he does not follow the Anabaptists or Locke, who held
similar views, in suggesting that conscience and good faith may justify
a civil right of resistance. The article ‘Autorité politique’ gave rise to
no such implications, though it excited fierce hostility from the sup-
porters of the divine right of kings, which even put the continued
publication of the Encyeopédie at tisk. To allay any misunderstanding,
Diderot added, to volume 11 inan erratum (see p. 11), that the consent
of subjects to the rule of their princes does not contradict, but rather
xiFntroduction
confi, the proposition that real authority stems ultimately from
od.
Pufendorf had put forward his account of the popular and contrac-
tual foundations of monarchy in conjunction with a theory of human
nature and a speculative history of the origins of civil society. Much
persuaded by the Hobbesian doctrine of man’s fundamental inse-
curity and selfishness, he nevertheless maintained that Hobbes had
been mistaken to suppose that man was by nature a solitary creature
« whose ambitions incline him towards war, since, on the contrary, the
weakness of savages must have led them to seck survival through
association with their neighbours, their selfish sociability prompting
them to establish and accept the regulations of civil law. In his article
‘Droit naturel’ Diderot pursues much the same critique of the idea of
natural conflict, reproaching Hobbes, whom he portrays as a ‘violent
interlocutor’, for supposing that each person's passions must bring
“terror and confusion to the human race’ (pp. 18-19). The Hobbesian
thesis is either insane or evil, he observes, for ‘man is not just an
animal but an animal which thinks’, capable of exercising his reason
in accordance with justice. In his Suite de l’Apologie de Vabbé de Prades
of 1752, Diderot had already remarked that the pure state of nature
was an dat de troupeas: - a barbarous condition of men living in herds,
each individual being motivated by fear and his natural passions
alone. But only s contemptible Hobbist could suppose that the
unlimited power of princes had been established as a remedy for
man’s original anarchy, since the passage of the human race from an
état de troupeau to an état de société policée — from its natural state to the
state of civil society — had come about just because of men’s recog-
nition of their need to subject themselves collectively to laws whose
beneficial effect was manifest to them all. As Diderot puts this point
in the Observations sur le Nakaz (.xx1), ‘men . . . became aware that
they struggled to better effect together, than separately’.
In the ‘Droit nature? he considers how selfish individuals,
motivated by private interest, can form such agreements. Before the
institution of governments, he claims, justice can only be settled by
the tribunal of mankind as a whole. For although ‘private wills are
suspect... the general will is always good! (pp. 19-20), and cach of us
partakes of that general will by virtue of our shared membership of the
human race, which determines what are the inalienable natural rightsIntroduction
and fundamental dutics of man. It was in this way that Diderot
introduced his idea of the ‘volonté générale’, a term of scant signifi-
cance in political thought before the publication of the Encyclopédie. In
his own article, ‘Economic politique’, in the same volume, Rousseau
employed the term himself for the first time, along lines not dissimilar
to those of the ‘Droit naturel’. Later, in the Contrat social, he was to
give a very different meaning to the concept, insisting that it could
only be realised within, and never outside, the state.
Diderot’s idea of the law of nature was thus conceived as a rational
principle of common humanity which restrained the selfishness of
individuals and made the establishment of civil society both necessary
and possible. Many philosophers of natural law had put forward
similar notions before, but from his references and allusions to
Pufendort’s work — that is, to both the De jure naturae et gentium and
the De officio hominis et civis - it is clear that his account was principally
indebted to this author alone. That debt, however, was by and large
indirect, since Diderot drew most of his Pufendorfian principles not
from their original source but from Jacob Brucker’s Historia critics
philosephiae, published in five volumes between 1742 and 1744 (with a
sixth supplementary tome printed in 1767). This was an erudite work
of a Lutheran pastor, himself much inspired by Pufendorf, which
Diderot consulted time and again in his contributions; many of his
essays amount to little more than plagiarism from Brucker’s Latin.
Indeed, no other text was pillaged so frequently and at such length by
Diderot as the /fisteria critica philosophiac; itis one of the mainsprings
of the whole Encylopédie. But while the article ‘Hobbisme’ is an
almost literal translation of Brucker’s account of Hobbes, it includes a
postscript of Dideror’s own conception, comparing the system of
Hobhes with that of Rousseau, to the detriment of both thinkers.
According to Diderot man is neither naturally good nor naturally
wicked, since goodness and’ evil, together with happiness and misery,
are finely balanced in human nature, If Hobbes had falsely supposed
that men are by nature vicious, Rousseau had been equally wrong to
believe that they always become so in society. For Diderot virtue and
vice were at once natural and social, and by his nature man was
impelled and enabled to form civil associations which brought both
benefits and harm to the human race. A Pufendorfian perspective ofa
society of selfish agents could therefore be invoked as a corrective not
only to Hobbes but to Rousseau as well. With the publication of his
xiv